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102d Congress JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
*"^^— PRACTICES FOR 1991
9 2 005
REPORT
SUBMITTED TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S. SENATE
BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED
VtHliMtNF DQCy.
COLLECTION
9^
MAR 1 ^ 1<^^^
FEBRUARY 1992 . ^„™
Printed for the use of the Committee on For^^Tfl^frsHirfd Forei^
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Senate respectively
UMASS/AMHERST «
31EDtb01b7b'^lE3
102d Coneress
2d Session ' JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1991
REPORT
SUBMITTED TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S. SENATE
BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED
FEBRUARY 1992
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Foreign
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Senate respectively
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
50-726 WASHINGTON : 1992
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents. Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-037393-X
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, Chairman
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
MEL LEVINE, California
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
TED WEISS, New York
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
JAIME B. FUSTER, Puerto Rico
WAYNE OWENS, Utah
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
AUSTIN J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania
PETER H. KOSTMAYER. Pennsylvania
THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA, Pennsylvania
FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
BILL ORTON, Utah
(Vacancy)
John J. Brady,
WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
BENJAMIN A. OILMAN, New York
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JIM LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
JOHN MILLER, Washington
BEN BLAZ, Guam
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
PORTER J. GOSS, Florida
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
Jr., Chief of Staff
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island, Chairman
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
ALAN CRANSTON, California
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
PAUL SIMON, Illinois
TERRY SANFORD, North Carolina
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, New York
CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
HARRIS WOFFORD, Pennsylvania
Geryld B. Christianson, Staff Director
James P. Lucier, Minority Staff Director
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas
LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
HANK BROWN, Colorado
JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont
(II)
FOREWORD
The country reports on human rights practices contained herein
were prepared by the Department of State in accordance with sec-
tions 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended. They also fulfill the legislative requirements of section
31 of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act and section 505(c) of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended.
The reports cover the human rights practices of all nations that
are members of the United Nations and a few that are not. They
are printed to assist Members of Congress in the consideration of
legislation, particularly foreign assistance legislation.
Dante B. Fascell,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Claiborne Pell,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
(in)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
Department op State,
Washington, DC, January 30, 1992.
Hon. Thomas S. Foley,
Speaker, House of Representatives.
Hon. Claiborne Pell,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Dear Sirs: In accordance with sections 116(d)(1) and 502(b) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and section 505(c)
of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, I am transmitting the
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991.
Sincerely,
Janet G. Mullins,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
Enclosure.
(V)
INTRODUCTION
1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
This report is svibmitted to the Congress by the Department of
State in compliance with Sections 116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.* The legislation
requires human rights reports on all countries that receive aid
from the United States and all countries that are members of
the United Nations. In the belief that the information would
be useful to the Congress and other readers, we have also
included reports on the few countries which do not fall into
either of these categories and which thus are not covered by
the Congressional requirement.
Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act with the foregoing
sections of law so as to to be able to consult these reports
when considering assistance programs for specific foreign
countries. One of the very important consequences — perhaps
unintended — of these legislative provisions is that they have
made human rights concerns an integral part of the State
Department's daily reporting and daily decisionmaking. A human
rights officer in an Embassy overseas who wants to write a good
annual human rights report on the country in which he or she
works must carefully monitor and observe human rights
developments throughout the year on a daily basis. As a
consequence he or she will report on such developments whenever
something of human rights significance happens in the country
of assignment. In the past 13 years, the State Department has
become decidedly better informed on and sensitized to human
rights violations as they occur around the globe.
* Section 116(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act provides as
follows :
X
"The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives ard the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate, by January 31 of each year, a full and complete
report regarding. . .
"(1) the status of internationally recognized human
rights, within the meaning of subsection (a)...
(A) in countries that received assistance under this part,
and
(B) in all other foreign countries which are members of
the United Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a
human rights report under this Act."
Section 502(B) (b) of the Foreign Assistance Act provides as
follows :
"The Secretary of State shall transmit to Congress, as part of
the presentation materials for security assistance programs
proposed for each fiscal year, a full and complete report,
prepared with the assistance of the Assistant Secretary of
State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, with respect
to practices regarding the observance of and respect for
internationally recognized human rights in each country
proposed as a recipient of security assistance."
(VII)
VIII
For most of the Twentieth Century the principal ideological
challenge to the cause of democracy and respect for human
rights has come from the doctrines laid down and the movement
created at the beginning of the century by Vladimir Lenin. The
horrors of World War II, devastating as they were to those
directly affected, were, as to their impact, limited in time
and place. It was Lenin and Communism which cast the longest
shadow by far, influencing developments across the entire globe
decade after decade.
Hand in hand with Communism's messianic promise came the
dreaded secret police apparatus, whose task it was to repress
all dissenting views and thus deprive all those under its rule
of basic human rights. In these volumes we have during the
last 4 years chronicled the significant changes effected in the
state and party created by Lenin, the loosening of totalitarian
rule under the leadership of Mikhail S. Gorbachev. We need now
to take note of the poignant events of 1991, which brought
Lenin's social experiment to an end in the very country which
gave it birth.
In this account of human rights developments we should take
special note of the event on August 22, 1991, when the statue
of Felix Dzherzhinsky was toppled from its pedestal in front of
the KGB headquarters in Moscow. "Iron Felix," Lenin's secret
police chief and the founder of a network of agents of brutal
repression which spanned the globe, and which as late as August
20 had tried to impose its will on the Soviet Union, had
finally been removed from his place of honor. It was a
symbolic act, but it duly marked the end of an era.
Yet, far from its place of birth, Leninism, though in decline,
still is the faith in whose name people are being repressed.
And there are other less traditional challenges to human rights
as well as potential new challenges.
Now that the Albanian people have put their country on the road
to democracy, the set of beliefs which originated on the
European continent and which Stalin dubbed Marxism-Leninism has
by and large disappeared from Europe. As a foreign import it
survives, however, in China, where it controls the lives of
one-fifth of humankind, and in four other countries: North
Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, and Laos. The faith which once inspired
the movement is long gone. Communism is today more a system
for the exercise of power by aging ruling elites, which are
increasingly out of touch with the thinking of their subjects
but still try to use the power which they possess to suppress
all independent thought.
Repressive government is, however, not limited to the countries
which still espouse Leninist principles. Dictatorships
offering unicjue ideologies of their own, or no ideology at all,
continue to exist. Burma, whose imprisoned popular leader,
Aung San Suu Kyi, received the Nobel Peace Prize, attracted
particular attention in 1991. So did, of course, the one-man
dictatorship of Iraq. These are merely two examples of a
category of countries in which, either in the name of a
religious or a secular ideology or without any ideological
commitment, all opposition to the State and all independent
institutions are repressed through a pervasive secret police or
domestic spy apparatus which instills fear in the citizenry.
Between the totally repressive dictatorships, on the one hand,
and the democracies, on the other, there is the vast array of
authoritarian regimes, regimes which do not seek to control all
forms of social interaction in their countries but which will
carefully guard their position and prerogatives against any
group that seeks to replace them. The number of regimes in
IX
this category is in decline, particularly in Africa, where
multiparty democracy and free elections have in a growing
number of countries replaced one-man rule and rigged elections.
Sub-Saharan Africa continued in 1991 as the region in which
democracy and respect for human rights are making new strides
forward. Zambia, where a long-established one-party regime was
overwhelmingly. defeated in a free and fair election, is a
particularly noteworthy case in point.
Although democracy provides the foundation on which a system of
government respectful of human rights can be built, the mere
fact that the executive and legislative leaders of a country
are chosen in free and fair elections does not necessarily
guarantee that the fundamental freedoms and human rights of all
citizens will be fully protected. This is particularly true in
the absence of an independent judiciary capable of safeguarding
the rights of citizens against actions by the executive or
legislative branches which are in conflict with internationally
recognized human rights standards.
The ascendancy of democracy throughout the world is
unquestionably good news for human rights. We must note,
however, that even democratically elected governments can be
guilty of serious human rights violations. New democracies, in
particular, may not as yet have the institutional safeguards in
place which protect against the arbitrary use of executive
power, particularly by security forces. The most common such
human rights violations are the use of undue pressure or even
torture to obtain confessions from persons suspected of having
committed serious crimes, particularly those accused of
terrorism. The more serious the terrorist threat, the greater
the number of incidents of police abuse. (Police abuse and
torture are, of course, also commonplace under authoritarian
and totalitarian rule.)
In the absence of an independent judiciary and solidly rooted
democratic popular instincts in the new democracies, the recent
advances are by no means secure. The danger of relapses into
authoritarian rule are greatest where the expectations for
early economic improvements have been disappointed. The
challenge to the world's established democracies is to help
those new to the fold to sustain themselves.
The sharp decline in the influence of the worldwide Communist
movement has not only spelled the end of Leninist dictatorships
in many countries but has also caused violent conflicts and
human rights abuses based on political ideology to decline
worldwide. At the same time, regrettably, we have witnessed an
upsurge on all continents of serious armed clashes and human
rights abuse stemming from ethnic and religious differences.
The creation of mechanisms to help resolve disputes based on
ethnicity and religion and efforts to combat intolerance are
undoubtedly in the forefront of the challenges now facing the
international community.
To sum up, the year 1991 was one of great progress for the
cause of democracy and human rights worldwide. But the
problems faced by the world in consolidating such progress and
dealing with old and new threats to fundamental freedoms must
not be underestimated.
Richard Schifter
Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
CONTENTS
Page
Foreword HI
Letter of Transmittal V
Introduction VII
Africa:
Angola , 1
Benin 10
Botswana 17
Burkina Faso 25
Burundi 32
Cameroon 42
Cape Verde 55
Central African Republic 61
Chad '^1
Comoros 80
Congo 86
Cote d'lvoire 93
Djibouti 102
Equatorial Guinea 110
Ethiopia 118
Gabon •• 133
Gambia, The 141
Ghana 149
Guinea 159
Guinea-Bissau 168
Kenya 174
Lesotho 190
Liberia 199
Madagascar 210
Malawi 220
Mali 230
Mauritania 239
Mauritius 250
Mozambique 257
Namibia 268
Niger 278
Nigeria 286
Rwanda 302
Sao Tome and Principe 312
Senegal 317
Seychelles 327
Sierra Leone 336
Somalia 344
South Africa 352
Sudan 376
Swaziland 392
Tanzania 402
Togo 414
Uganda 425
Zaire 437
Zambia 449
Zimbabwe 460
Central and South America:
Antigua and Barbuda 473
Argentina 478
(XI)
xn
Page
Central and South America — Continued
Bahamas, The 487
Barbados 495
Belize 500
Bolivia 506
Brazil 513
Chile 524
Colombia 534
Costa Rica 546
Cuba 553
Dominica 567
Dominican Republic 572
Ecuador 582
El Salvador 592
Grenada 607
Guatemala 613
Guyana 625
Haiti 633
Honduras 643
Jamaica 656
Mexico 664
Nicaragua 678
Panama 690
Paraguay 699
Peru 708
St. Kitts and Nevis 723
St. Lucia 727
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 732
Suriname 737
Trinidad and Tobago 746
Uruguay 755
Venezuela 762
East Asia and the Pacific:
Australia 772
Brunei 780
Burma 786
Cambodia 798
China 809
China (Taiwan only) 834
Fiji 848
Indonesia 859
Japan 876
Kiribati 883
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 887
Korea, Republic of 895
Laos 907
Malaysia 915
Marshall Islands 929
Micronesia, Federated States of 933
Mongolia 937
Nauru 943
New Zealand 947
Papua New Guinea 952
Philippines 961
Singapore 977
Solomon Islands 991
Thailand 996
Tonga 1013
Tuvalu 1017
Vanuatu 1021
Vietnam 1026
Western Samoa 1037
Europe and North America:
Albania 1042
Austria 1052
Belgium 1058
Bulgaria 1064
Canada 1073
XIII
Page
Europe and North America — Continued
Cyprus 1078
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 1085
Denmark 1094
Estonia 1099
Finland 1104
France 1109
Germany : 1115
Greece 1122
Hungary 1132
Iceland ; 1139
Ireland 1143
Italy 1149
Latvia 1157
Liechtenstein 1163
Lithuania 1167
Luxembourg 1174
Malta 1178
Netherlands, The 1183
Norway 1189
Poland 1195
Portugal (includes Macau) 1207
Romania 1218
Spain 1229
Sweden 1236
Switzerland 1242
Turkey 1247
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1267
United Kingdom (includes Hong Kong) 1292
Yugoslavia 1309
Near East, North Africa, and South Asia:
Afghanistan 1326
Algeria 1334
Bahrain 1344
Bangladesh 1353
Bhutan 1367
Egypt 1374
India ■. 1388
Iran 1407
Iraq 1419
Israel and the occupied territories 1430
Jordan 1456
Kuwait 1466
Lebanon 1485
Libya 1495
Maldives 1502
Morocco 1509
The Western Sahara 1523
Nepal 1526
Oman 1539
Pakistan 1548
Qatar 1569
Saudi Arabia 1576
Sri Lanka 1589
Syria 1604
Tunisia 1615
United Arab Emirates 1627
Yemen, Republic of 1635
Appendixes:
A. Notes on preparation of the reports 1646
B. Reporting on worker rights 1650
C. Selected international human rights agreements 1652
D. Explanation of statistical tables 1657
E. U.S. bilateral assistance, fiscal years 1990 and 1991 1658
ANGOLA*
During the first part of 1991, the Government of the People's
Republic of Ai^gola (GPRA) remained under the control of the
sole legal political party, the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola-Workers Party (MPLA-PT) . President Jose
Eduardo dos Santos continued to act as both Head of State and
chief of the MPLA-PT. All major policy decisions were taken by
a small group within the party, which also controlled all means
of mass communication.
The 16-year armed conflict between the GPRA and the armed
opposition, the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA) , also continued in early 1991. UNITA remained
in control of the southeastern quarter of Angola and portions
of the north, and increased its activity in central Angola.
Heavy fighting erupted around the eastern provincial capital of
Luena in early April and continued until the cease-fire on May
15, resulting in heavy civilian casualties and the flight of
large numbers of additional refugees to Zambia. According to
the United Nations, the last of the Cuban troops who remained
in Angola in support of FAPLA departed on May 27, more than a
month before the deadline specified in the New York Accords of
December 22, 1988.
In 1991, two related major events significantly altered the
political and military situation in Angola. While the
administration of the GPRA remained under the control of the
MPLA, constitutional reforms were enacted in May in the wake of
the peace negotiations with UNITA, paving the way for future
multiparty, democratic government. The revised 1991
Constitution contains provisions for the formation of
independent political parties and guarantees of freedom of the
press, the right of free assembly, and the right of workers to
strike. Subsequent laws provided the legal framework for these
new provisions.
On May 31, the GPRA and UNITA signed the Angola Peace Accords,
which provide for a comprehensive U.N. -monitored cease-fire,
the release of prisoners (POW's), the formation of a new
nonpartisan national armed force, and the holding of
internationally monitored multiparty elections between
September 1 and November 30, 1992. Under the terms of the
Accords, until elections the GPRA will retain control of the
central administration which is being extended to areas
currently under the control of UNITA. Implementation of the
Peace Accords is under the authority of the Joint Political
Military Commission (JPMC) and its subcommissions .
Angola is potentially one of the richest countries in
sub-Saharan Africa, with extensive petroleum reserves, rich
agricultural land, and valuable mineral resources. The civil
war, combined with the GPRA's command-style economy, has
devastated the country's infrastructure, led to a return to
barter in many areas, and forced the GPRA to divert much of its
revenues, mainly from oil exports, to the military and to
state-owned enterprises. Expressing a willingness to reform
the economy, the GPRA in 1991 instituted a series of reforms
*The United States does not recognize or maintain diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of Angola; while it
maintains a liaison office in Luanda accredited to the Joint
Political Military Commission overseeing implementation of the
May 31, 1991, Peace Accords, access to information on the human
rights situation in Angola continues to be limited.
(1)
ANGOLA
for that purpose, including three devaluations of the currency,
decontrol of prices on most commodities, and an end to the
special and complementary supply system. However, serious
action has yet to be taken on other economic issues, including
reduction of the size of the public sector and the the shift of
public expenditure from military to civilian needs.
The civil war has also taken a devastating toll on the civilian
population. Estimates of victims since the war began in 1976
range from 250,000 to 500,000 killed, more than 20,000 children
orphaned, 30,000 to 50,000 amputees caused by land mines, and
430,000 refugees. Throughout the war, widespread human rights
abuses were reported by both sides, ranging from extensive
violence against civilians and mistreatment of prisoners to
arbitrary detentions, absence of fair trials, kidnaping and
forced military service, forced relocation, and restrictions on
freedom of speech, press, and association. At the beginning of
1991, a 3-month suspension by the GPRA of a U. N. -sponsored
famine' rel ief program further endangered the estimated 1.9
million civilians affected by conflict and drought.
At the end of 1991, human rights continued to be
circumscribed. UNITA alleged that civilian security forces
continued to intimidate its supporters and that the GPRA was
using its control of the administration to influence the
elections unduly. The GPRA, in turn, accused UNITA of
targeting MPLA activists for assassination. Emerging parties
charged that they were being prevented from establishing
themselves by discriminatory registration procedures and
intimidation by security forces as well as by UNITA in the
interior .
Nevertheless, the Peace Accords produced significant
improvements in the human rights situation. By year's end,
there had been no serious violations of the cease-fire.
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), all POW s but two had been released by the GPRA, and
interviews with and releases of POW s held by UNITA were
continuing. UNITA and the GPRA were cooperating in
mine-clearing operations throughout the country. Under the
auspices of the JPMC, UNITA and the GPRA had agreed on a
calendar for elections and on programs for integration of the
police and extension of the GPRA central administration.
Training for the new national army had begun, and an electoral
law had been drafted. While the MPLA retained control of
government structures and the media, 26 new political parties
had announced their intention to become established, and
anti-GPRA propaganda and rallies had occurred without
interference .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Both GPRA and UNITA forces have in the past carried out
extrajudicial killings, including summary executions of
prisoners. Two incidents, one in which UNITA s secretary
general for Malange province was ambushed and killed in
September and another in which a UNITA sentry killed a FAPLA
reserve officer in November, were under review by the JPMC at
year ' s end .
ANGOLA
According to GPRA sources, a former UNITA officer hanged
himself in Luanda's Catete Road Prison in February; however,
other sources suggested that torture was the cause of death.
Press accounts in 1991 repeated earlier allegations that UNITA
has detained or executed internal opponents of Dr. Jonas
Savimbi, UNITA' s president (see Section l.d.).
b. Disappearance
While both GPRA and UNITA forces engaged in kidnapings or
clandestine detentions in the past, there is no conclusive
evidence that either engaged in these practices following the
cease-fire in May 1991. In 1991 Luis dos Passos, currently
Secretary General of the Democratic Renewal Party (PRD), and
another PRD official returned to Luanda. They had been in
hiding outside Luanda since the failed 1977 coup against the
GPRA in which they were alleged to have participated.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were persistent allegations that the GPRA's State
Security Service apparatus continued to use torture against
suspected opponents. Beatings of prisoners and detainees by
police and prison officials is reportedly common. However, the
use of torture and other mistreatment of prisoners has
reportedly declined since the Peace Accords. Released FAPLA
prisoners have also alleged that beatings, torture, and
execution were conducted by UNITA.
The GPRA Ministry of State Security (MINSK) was formally
abolished by Presidential decree in December 1990, and many of
its functions assumed by the Ministry of Interior.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
In 1991 the laws on arrest and detention appeared to be in
transition. In early 1991, laws remained in force under which
persons suspected of committing serious acts against "state
security" could be held for an initial period of 3 months,
renewable for a further period of 3 months. Such detainees did
not need to be presented to a judge within 48 hours of their
arrest, as stipulated in the Code of Criminal Procedures for
persons suspected of other crimes. They apparently had no
right to challenge the grounds of their detention. After 6
months, the State Security Service had to inform the detainee
and the public prosecutor of the charges or release the
suspect. Once the case was presented to the public prosecutor,
there did not appear to be a specific time limit within which a
suspect must be brought to trial.
On October 9, the National Assembly approved laws on detention,
investigation, search, and arrests. However, at the end of the
year there was no reliable information available on the effect
of these actions and legal provisions, especially on the
practices of detention without charge and other arrest
procedures .
The number of political detainees and criminal and military
prisoners held by both sides at the end of 1990 was estimated
in the thousands. On February 5, the GPRA released 3,983
reportedly UNITA prisoners serving sentences at Bentiaba
rehabilitation center.
ANGOLA
Under the terms of the Peace Accords, all civilian and military
prisoners detained as a consequence of the conflict between the
GPRA and UNITA were to be released under supervision by the
ICRC. In late July, the first prisoners on each side were
released. As of December 24, the ICRC had verified that more
than 900 POW s had been released. Two POW s are known to be
still held for crimes allegedly committed in prison, including
murder. As of the same date, the ICRC had registered
approxin.ately 2,850 FAPLA and GPRA civilian personnel detained
by UNITA. Of this number, almost all have been released;
approximately 120 are still awaiting ICRC interview.
As in previous years, reports citing UNITA s detention of
internal opponents of UNITA president Savimbi appeared in the
press in 1991. The emergent Angolan Democratic Forum (FDA)
party publicly alleged that UNITA "violated and constantly
violates human rights," citing detention of UNITA members Tito
Chingungi and Wilson dos Santos, among others. While Chingungi
was seen alive in the Jamba area in early 1991, his status and
that of others allegedly detained by UNITA could not be
independently verified at year's end.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Although the GPRA Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary, the judiciary has in the past followed MPLA-PT party
guidelines. The law provides for a public trial and the right
of the accused to legal counsel; the revised Constitution
provides for the right of habeas corpus. There is, however,
insufficient information to determine if, or to what extent,
these rights are observed in practice in regular criminal and
civil cases.
The deterioration of the security situation prior to the
cease-fire exacerbated the general decline in judicial
safeguards and due process. Judicial lines of authority are
unclear, especially since the GPRA's regional military councils
have in the past been given broad responsibility for the trial
of offenses against "state security," including "economic
crimes." It is not known which trials are open to the public
and under what rules of procedure the various military and
civilian courts operate, nor to what extent the jurisdiction of
the military councils may in fact have been reducea, as
planned, following the cease-fire. A Supreme People's Court,
described by GPRA President dos Santos as a first practical
step to an independent judiciary, was established in April
1990; little information is available on its specific
functions, but it reportedly handles civil cases only.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Although the Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
home and privacy of correspondence, the GPRA has in the past
conducted arbitrary searches of homes, inspected private
correspondence, and monitored private communications. No
recent information is available on these practices. UNITA has
done the same in areas it controlled; UNITA has also forcibly
occupied buildings in some provincial capitals. In a serious
incident in December, UNITA supporters forcibly occupied a
hotel and several other buildings in Lobito; 4 people were
killed and more than 20 wounded when GPRA police moved in to
dislodge them. This incident was successfully resolved by
UNITA and the GPRA within the JPMC.
ANGOLA
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
During the initial months of 1991, fighting continued in many
parts of Angola. Intense fighting around the provincial
capital of Luena during the final few weeks of the civil
conflict caused civilian casualties in the hundreds. On May
15, a de facto cease-fire went into effect, followed by a de
jure cease-fire on May 31. There have been no serious
violations to date by the military of either side.
In 1990 it was estimated that between 1 and 1.5 million
civilians had been internally displaced by the war, many
hundreds of thousands located in drought-affected areas.
Credible reports indicate that the GPRA forcibly displaced
thousands of civilians, in part to deny UNITA a social base,
and that UNITA captured thousands of civilians and forced them
to work on UNITA farms. Following an attack on Ambriz in Zaire
province in early 1991, UNITA reportedly abducted over 100
local children to deter a FAPLA counterattack. Both sides
practiced forced conscription of civilians into their
respective armies throughout the war. Conscription has been
discontinued by both sides.
In September 1990, the GPRA and UNITA agreed to a U.N. relief
program to provide assistance to affected civilians on both
sides of the conflict. Amidst mutual recriminations, in
December 1990 the GPRA cut off the relief program and permitted
it to resume only in March 1991. The program has been extended
until the end of 1992.
The GPRA and UNITA placed thousands of land mines in footpaths
to agricultural fields during the civil war as part of a
strategy to deny food to civilians in contested areas. Good
cooperation between both sides on land mine removal has been
reported since the cease-fire; however, rural roads and fields
remain hazardous.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Under the previous constitution, the right of free expression
was protected by law, but censorship, intimidation, and GPRA
control of the media severely limited this right. The revised
Constitution also provides for freedom of expression. In
practice, banners, posters, and public rhetoric highly critical
of the GPRA have proliferated, with no evidence of government
interference in the capital; however, UNITA and some of the
emerging parties have complained of government interference in
other provinces, citing as an example GPRA refusal to register
students who openly support UNITA. Some emergent parties also
allege harassment of their activists in areas controlled by
UNITA.
The revised Constitution also guarantees freedom of the press,
and law 22/91 provides the legal framework by which periodicals
and publishing companies, as well as foreign journalists and
publications, are to be registered with the Ministry of
Information. The establishment of news agencies is still
reserved to the State. However, there are to date no
independent publications.
The government-owned news media remain heavily influenced by
the GPRA, and almost always paint UNITA in a negative light.
ANGOLA
Nevertheless, UNITA officials are often quoted
straightforwardly in the government media, and increasing air
time and print space are devoted to UNITA. The media also
report regularly on third party activity. Hostile rhetoric and
propaganda still abound on VORGAN (UNITA-controlled radio,
heard in Luanda) and the FAPLA Armed Forces Radio Program
"Angola Combatente," despite promises by both sides to refrain
from such practices.
The access of political parties to the electronic media for
campaign purposes remains a contentious issue; the JPMC
specified in its agreement on the electoral calendar that
modifications to air time laws may be made to ensure
"transparency and impartiality of the information media."
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The revised Constitution guarantees the right of peaceful
assembly and association. Law 16/91 provides for the right to
assemble in public and in private, a 3-day notification to
authorities, and penalties for those who interfere in lawful
demonstrations. The law bars military, paramilitary, or
militia from participating in demonstrations. However, the law
also makes participants liable for 'offenses against the honor
and consideration due to persons and to the organs of
sovereignty." It is not known how this particular provision is
being interpreted and applied.
In practice, the law appears to have been generally respected,
and most requests for rallies are routinely granted in the
capital. Denials appear to be based on questions of public
safety or timeliness of the requests. Police broke up a rally
in front of the Luanda port because demonstrators gave only 1
day's notice. Several pro-UNITA demonstrations and others in
support of emerging parties have been held in Luanda. However,
UNITA has accused the GPRA of interfering with its planned
rallies in areas outside the capital, such as Cunene and
Lobito. Some emerging parties charged that they have not been
permitted to organize and to hold rallies in UNITA-controlled
areas .
c. Freedom of Religion
Although the Constitution provides for the inviolability of
freedom of conscience and belief and for separation of church
and state, the authorities have in the past been critical of
religious activities. Approximately 85 percent of the Angolan
population is either Roman Catholic or Protestant, while most
of the remainder practice a variety of animist beliefs. The
GPRA has eased its antireligious stance but has yet to restore
all church properties previously confiscated. Church services
are held regularly and widely attended. Foreign and Angolan
religious workers are allowed to carry out normal activities.
UNITA respects freedom of religion in the areas it controls and
provides limited administrative support to both Catholic and
Protestant churches.
The GPRA has in the past banned smaller religious sects that it
deemed subversive, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the
Tocoist Church, founded in Angola in 1949. The Tocoists have a
syncretic blend of Christian beliefs and indigenous religious
practices. However, recent information indicates that the ban
on the two sects has been lifted.
ANGOLA
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Until May 1991, travel throughout Angola was tightly restricted
by war and by regulations . Under the terms of the Peace
Accords, free circulation of movement and goods is guaranteed.
However, the GPRA and some international agencies have charged
that UNITA has prevented them from entering UNITA-controlled
areas, or that UNITA requires "visas" for travel into those
areas and otherwise obstructs the movement of people.
Angola currently hosts approximately 10,300 Zairian refugees,
2,000 of which have registered for repatriation to Zaire.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), most of the more than 1,000 South African refugees
have returned home on their own; the remainder may choose to
stay in Angola. There are approximately 430,000 Angolan
refugees resident in neighboring countries, m.ost of whom have
been in refugee status for many years. In April 1991,
following fierce fighting in the Luena area just prior to the
cease-fire, over 5,000 additional refugees fled to Zambia. In
May, at the urging of the GPRA, about 600 GPRA soldiers were
repatriated without UNHCR screening.
Due to generally poor living conditions and danger posed by
land mines in their home areas, most of the 430,000 Angolan
refugees resident in neighboring countries have not yet begun
returning home in large numbers. At year's end, however,
several thousand Angolans and Zairians had fled Zaire into
northern Angola in the wake of Zairian unrest. The UNHCR is
planning to assist in the repatriaton of approximately 300,000
refugees which UNHCR estimates will elect to return home in the
spring of 1992 following the rainy season.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
In 1991 citizens still did not have this right, and until May
all political activity was still limited to participation in
the MPLA-PT or in one of its controlled and sanctioned
organizations. Groundwork to enable Angolans to change their
government peacefully was laid in 1991 by the revised
Constitution, subsequent political laws on political parties,
and the Peace Accords. At year's end, multiparty elections by
secret ballot for President and a representative National
Assembly were tentatively scheduled to take place in September
1992. The new laws provide for independent poltical parties
but prohibit regional or tribal parties. At year's end, 26
parties had announced their intention to become established,
though some complained they will have difficulty meeting the
legislated requirements for registration. By December the
Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) was awaiting certification of
registration by the People's Supreme Court, the Angolan
Democratic Party (PDA) had been denied registration, and the
Allied Party of Angolan Youth, Workers, and Peasants Party
(PAJOCA) had submitted its application for registraton.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Neither the GPRA nor UNITA permitted independent local human
rights groups to operate in its respective territory. In the
past, neither the GPRA nor UNITA would allow international
nongovernmental human rights researchers into the country.
ANGOLA
although the GPRA permitted Africa Watch (AW) personnel to
travel in requested GPRA areas in late 1990 without an escort.
AW also requested permission to visit UNITA-control led areas;
UNITA agreed in principle, but travel permits were not arranged
during the requested timeframe. The GPRA did not cooperate
with Amnesty International's request for information regarding
numbers and identities of released prisoners and in the case of
one death in custody.
In 1991 the GPRA Defense and Security Council approved a
protocol to allow the ICRC to visit state security prisoners,
and visits took place.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution declares that all citizens are "equal before
the law and enjoy the same rights and are subject to the same
duties, without distinction as to color, race, ethnic origin,
sex, place of birth, religion, level of education or social or
economic status." Because of the unstable situation which
prevailed in most of Angola during much of the year, there is
little information available on the existence or extent of
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, language or
social status. The number of .assault cases brought by women
before Angolan courts is reportedly increasing; however, there
is little information available on the extent of violence
against women in Angola.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Until 1991 the sole legally recognized trade union organization
in GPRA-administered Angola was the National Union of Angolan
Workers (UNTA) , which was formed in the late 1950 's as an
appendage of the MPLA and became the ruling party's official
labor wing after Angolan independence in 1975. The monopoly
position of the UNTA was ensured by the statutory basis of the
single-union structure. Strikes were illegal and participation
in strikes punishable by compulsory labor.
The revised Constitution contains a provision recognizing the
right of Angolans to form trade unions and to participate in
trade union activities. New laws on unions and collective
bargaining have been prepared but have not yet been published.
By years 's end, there had been no formation of independent
labor unions as such. However, free labor activity increased
as individual factories and offices formed their own workers'
committees.
The revised Constitution also recognizes the right to strike.
Law No 23/91 of June 15, 1991 provides the detailed legal
framework for the right to strike, including a prohibition on
lockouts, a prohibition on worker occupation of employment
premises, and protection of nonstriking workers. Strikes by
certain workers, including military, police, prison workers and
firefighters are prohibited, and strike limitations are imposed
on workers in specific sectors affecting infrastructure and
national defense.
In fact, numerous strikes occurred before and after the
promulgation of the new laws. While there were reports of
scattered incidents of violence between strikers and police or
ANGOLA
strikers and nonstr iking workers, there was no GPRA
interference with strikers in the capital, even in some cases
in which strikers did not rigorously follow the law.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
In 1991 the revised Constitution gave Angolan workers the right
to bargain collectively. As noted above, new laws on unions
and collective bargaining have been prepared (but not yet
published) which, inter alia, prohibit discrimination against
union members. The GPRA, through its Ministry of Labor and
Social Security, controls the process of setting wages and
benefits. Several significant salary increases were granted in
1991 as a result of negotiations following work stoppages.
There is no export processing zone.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Previous GPRA legislation authorized compulsory labor for
breaches of labor discipline and participation in strikes. On
the basis of this legislation, the International Labor
Organization (ILO) in 1984 and 1990 cited the GPRA for
violations of ILO Convention 105, which the GPRA ratified in
1976. The new labor legislation prohibits forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
In 1976 the GPRA ratified ILO Convention 6 governing night work
of young persons and Convention 7 regarding the minimum age for
employment at sea. The minimum age for employment of children
is 16.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
In 1991 the GPRA established a new minimum monthly wage. This
minimum wage by itself is not sufficient to support a family,
and many depend on informal sector trade to ensure a minimal
standard of living. According to a decree issued in 1982, the
normal workweek is limited to 44 hours. The workweek is
limited to 34 hours and 6 days a week for persons aged 14 to
16, and to 38 hours and 7 days a week for persons aged 16 to
18. This decree applies to all state institutions, to state,
semipublic, private, and cooperative undertakings, and to mass
and social organizations. No information is available on the
existence or adequacy of national occupational health and
safety standards nor on actual practice with respect to any
labor standards.
10
BENIN
In 1991 the Republic of Benin peacefully achieved the agenda
established at the 1990 National Reform Conference to transform
the country from a single-party, military-dominated regime to a
multiparty democracy. Thirteen presidential candidates
competed in the first round of presidential elections in
March. In the presidential run-off. Prime Minister Nicephore
Soglo, who had headed the transitional government, defeated
decisively President Mathieu Kerekou, Benin's ruler during its
17 years of Marxist-Leninist rule. Official observers from
several countries found the elections free and fair. Of the 24
political parties founded after the 1990 National Reform
Conference, 16 ran candidates in the February legislative
elections. No single party won a majority of the 64 seats, and
21 parties, either alone or in alliance, are represented in the
new National Assembly. Since its convening in July, the
National Assembly has asserted its constitutional role as a
check on the executive branch.
Benin's armed forces of approximately 8,000 personnel are under
the direction of a civilian Minister of Defense, while the
1,500-man police force is under the Minister of the Interior.
The once-dominant Beninese military continued to maintain a low
profile in 1991, but their commitment to democratic changes is
a general source of concern. The new Constitution provides for
members of the Beninese military, as well as civilian
officials, to disobey the orders of superiors if obedience
would result in a serious violation of human rights. The new
Government's goal is to keep the armed forces professional and
depoliticized, and Calpinet members are now all civilians.
Benin's underdeveloped economy is largely based on subsistence
agriculture, cotton production, regional trade, and small-scale
offshore oil production. In accordance with World Bank and
International Monetary Fund agreements, Benin has undertaken an
austerity program for the purpose, inter alia, of privatizing
many state-owned enterprises, reducing fiscal expenditures, and
deregulating trade. Benin achieved an unexpected 3-percent
growth rate in 1991. Nevertheless, it must still deal with a
bloated and inefficient bureaucracy, high debt-servicing
charges, and widespread unemployment, if development
expectations are to be met.
The human rights situation in Benin continued to improve
throughout 1991. The transitional government and the newly
elected Government respected the fundamental human rights
provided for in the Constitution of December 1990. The new
Constitution includes important safeguards prohibiting
arbitrary detention and making torture a criminal offense; no
political detainees or prisoners were held during the year.
Several well-known officials from the previous regime were
arrested on charges of corruption. The head of the
now-disbanded Presidential Guard was also arrested on charges
brought against him by a Guinean who was held without trial
from 1982 to 1989. At year's end, none of those arrested had
been tried.
11
BENIN
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or other extrajudicial
killings. However, there were isolated instances of violence
and at least one death in the northern region in connection
with the elections during a confrontation between supporters of
different candidates. In late 1991, the trial of those
arrested and charged with this violence was in process .
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The 1990 Constitution forbids torture and cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment. With public attention focused on past
incidents and on bringing to justice those who committed acts
of torture under the old regime, there were no reports of
torture in 1991. Citing the need for legally admissible
evidence, the Government has moved slowly in investigating
persons, primarily members of the military, widely believed to
have committed acts of torture. Moreover, for reasons that
appear to arise from individual considerations rather than from
fear of military reprisal, those tortured by the previous
regime, mainly from the Communist Party of Dahomey, have not
instituted legal cases. This makes it difficult to bring to
justice those accused of torture.
Prison conditions in Benin remained harsh and characterized by
extensive overcrowding and lack of sanitation and medical
facilities. The prison diet is grossly inadequate, and
malnutrition and disease are common among prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
With the release of remaining political prisoners in 1990,
arbitrary arrest and detention ceased to be practiced by the
central Government. Procedural safeguards against arbitrary
arrest include a constitutional provision forbidding detention
of more than 48 hours without a hearing before a magistrate,
whose order is required for continued detention. There were no
reports that this provision was violated, nor were there
reports of incommunicado detention.
The 1990 Constitution contains a provision prohibiting the
Government from exiling any Beninese citizen, and exiles have
returned to Benin in large numbers since the change in
government and a presidential amnesty decree of 1990.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Benin's legal system is based on French civil law and on local
customary law. A civilian court system operates on the
national and provincial levels. Military disciplinary councils
deal with minor offenses by military members but have no
jurisdiction over civilians. The judges in the civil courts
are career magistrates, appointed by the President. Judges are
administratively under the Ministry of Justice. However, under
12
BENIN
the Constitution, officials are answerable only to the law in
the carrying out of their duties and may not be removed.
Serious crimes are first presented to a magistrate who conducts
an investigation and decides whether there is sufficient
evidence to warrant a trial. Defendants have the right to be
present at their trial and to be represented by an attorney, at
public expense, if necessary.
Under the new Constitution, the highest courts are the
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, the court of last
resort in all administrative and judicial matters. The role of
the Constitutional Court, which has yet to be actually formed,
is to pass on the constitutionality of Beninese laws, and thus
to act as the main judicial counterweight to the legislative
and executive branches of government. Until the Constitutional
Court is seated, its functions are assumed by the High Council
of the Republic, a transitional body created under the National
Reform Conference. The Constitutional Court has a mandate to
determine the constitutionality of laws which may violate
fundamental human rights. The Constitution also provides for a
High Court of Justice — which remained unformed in 1991 — to
preside over cases of crimes committed against the nation by
the President or members of the Government. A number of
judicial codes, including the penal code, were under
consideration before the Law Committee of the National Assembly
at year's end. Interim legislation abrogated certain
unacceptable provisions, including those permitting "People's
judges . "
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of private
property and of the home. Police are required to obtain a
judicial warrant before entering a private home. No violations
of this requirement were reported in 1991. There were also no
reports of governmental interference with private
correspondence in 1991.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of expression and of the
press and other media. These rights were respected in 1991.
Beninese freely discussed politics in public and private forums.
The Government continued to own and operate the most
influential media, the local radio and television stations and
one daily newspaper, but in contrast to the past, official
journalists extended their coverage of sensitive matters and
criticized the Government. When government officials
criticized the official media's coverage of politics in a
neighboring country, the journalists' union protested
vigorously, a fact in turn duly reported in the official
press. Some 20 independent private newspapers, representing a
variety of viewpoints, circulated in Benin in 1991. The press
and television aired widely diverging views on the
constitutional referendum and reported on all political
parties, including the Communist Party of Dahomey, which had
been banned under the previous regime.
There was no censorship of foreign books or artistic works.
Foreign periodicals were widely available on newsstands, and
13
BENIN
much of the population listens to foreign broadcasts on
shortwave radio.
In general, academic freedom is enjoyed in schools and in the
sole university. University professors are permitted to
lecture freely in their subject areas, conduct research, draw
independent conclusions, and form unions.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution recognizes the rights of peaceful assembly and
association. These rights were respected in 1991. Multiple
political parties exist, as do numerous religious and cultural
organizations. Only political parties wishing to participate
in elections need register with the Government. In April
police dispersed and briefly detained some protesters who were
demonstrating against the decision of the then President
Mathieu Kerekou to run for reelection. The demonstrators had
declined to seek a permit before undertaking to parade in
central Cotonou. Once the detainees were brought before a
magistrate, charges were dropped.
c. Freedom of Religion
Christianity, Islam, and traditional religions coexist in
Benin, and adherence to a particular faith does not confer any
special status or benefit. Religious ceremonies and shrines of
all faiths are protected by law. There are no restrictions on
religious ceremonies, teachings, foreign clergy, or conversion
to any religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Domestic movement is unrestricted. The Government earlier
dismantled police and gendarmerie roadblocks within the country
to facilitate free movement, although a number of checkpoints
remained. Police checkpoints had reappeared by the end of the
year, however. Passports and exit permits needed for travel
outside of West African countries are not difficult to obtain.
Emigration is common. Beninese live and work in neighboring
countries without jeopardizing their citizenship.
Benin welcomes refugees and helps to integrate them into
Beninese society if they choose not to return to their country
of origin. Refugees who marry Beninese are entitled to
citizenship. Benin's longstanding refugee population from Chad
declined from 600 in 1990 to a few dozen in 1991, reflecting
continued voluntary repatriation. At the end of 1991, a
political crisis in Togo temporarily brought Togolese refugees
to Benin, an estimated 15,000 at its peak. The United Nations
Development Program has handled refugee matters in Benin since
the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
closed in 1990. >
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government.
During 17 years of authoritarian, single-party rule, the
Beninese were unable to change their government. The 1990
National Reform Conference and the subsequent transitional
government laid the groundwork for the creation of a multiparty
democracy in which citizens in 1991 peacefully changed their
government in accordance with the new Constitution of December
1990. Legislative and presidential elections were held in
February and March respectively. In the presidential
14
BENIN
elections, 13 candidates participated; none achieved an
absolute majority. President Kerekou, who had brought
authoritarian rule to Benin, and then Prime Minister Soglo, who
had been appointed by the National Reform Conference, contested
a run-off election. Nicephore Soglo won by a two-to-one margin
in elections by secret ballot that foreign observers from the
United States, Canada, Cote D'lvoire, France, Germany, and
Nigeria found to be free and fair. However reluctantly,
outgoing President Mathieu Kerekou handed over the reins of
government to President Soglo. The Constitution provides for a
5-year term for the President, who is limited to two terms of
office, and for a 4-year term of office for National Assembly
members, who may serve an unlimited number of terms.
In the Assembly, 21 parties are represented, with President
Soglo 's alliance holding the most seats — only 12 out of the
total of 64.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Several Beninese nongovernmental organizations monitor human
rights, including the Human Rights Commission, the Study and
Research Group on Democracy and Economic and Social
Development, the Association of Christians Against Torture, and
the League for the Defense of Human Rights in Benin. In
contrast to the attitude of the former authoritarian
government, which considered outside investigations into human
rights unwarranted interference in Benin's internal affairs,
both the transition government and the newly elected Government
have welcomed international and nongovernmental scrutiny of
human rights in Benin.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status.
Such discrimination is prohibited in the Constitution and by
law, and there is no evidence of officially sanctioned
discrimination.
Benin has a long tradition of regional rivalry. This led to
violence during the elections when northerners, who supported
ex-President Kerekou 's candidacy, and southerners clashed.
These clashes were most severe in several northern cities and
led to at least one death. Approximately 6,000 southerners
fled the north temporarily as a result. Subsequent to
President Soglo 's election, southerners have reasserted their
traditional claim to power and relatively few northerners have
been appointed to senior governmental positions. Nor were any
northerners elected to leadership positions in the National
Assembly. The southern third of the country, which was favored
in the colonial period, has about two-thirds of Benin's
population and is itself divided among various ethnic and
religious groups.
The Constitution specifically states that women are by law the
equals of men in the political, economic, and social spheres.
The Government officially encourages opportunities for women,
and 2 of 20 cabinet ministers are women. Beninese women also
play a major role in the commercial sector. In rural areas,
however, they have traditionally occupied a subordinate role
and are responsible for much of the subsistence farm labor. In
particular, women have not enjoyed the same educational
15
BENIN
opportunities as men. In some parts of the country, families
are reluctant to have their daughters educated at all.
While no studies are available, violence against women,
including wife beating, occurs, although it is prohibited by
law. Police and courts are reluctant to intervene in cases of
domestic violence, considering such affairs to be family
matters. Female circumcision exists, mostly in the northern
part of the country. It is both deeply rooted in the
traditions of certain Beninese cultures, and it is a source of
income for those who perform the procedure. Efforts of a small
Beninese nongovernmental committee to reduce the practice
through educational measures have thus far met with only
limited success. A conference sponsored by the U.N.
International Children's Emergency Fund and the Inter-African
Committee on Women's Health was held in mid-October to set up a
national committee to address the situation.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The December 1990 Constitution gives workers the freedom to
organize, to meet, and to strike. In 1974 all preexisting
unions were absorbed into a single trade union center which for
17 years was the designated mass organization of a single-party
Marxist regime. This heretofore sole center, the National
Workers' Union of Benin (UNSTB) declared its independence from
the former ruling party in 1990 and claims 26 nationwide
affiliated unions in Benin. The Confederation of Autonomous
Unions, a separate group formed in February 1991, represents an
additional 23 unions, mostly in the public sector.
Approximately 75 percent of wage earners in the modern sector
belong to organized labor unions.
There were a number of strikes in 1991 conducted by labor
unions in the public sector (teachers, airport workers, civil
servants in the Ministries of Planning, Finance, Commerce,
Industry, Education, and Culture, and the Public Treasury) .
For the most part, strikers were seeking back wages, in many
cases overdue for a number of years. The Government announced
in 1991 that it would no longer pay striking public employees
for time away from the job due to strikes.
Confederations and individual unions have the right to
affiliate with international labor movements. In 1990 the
UNSTB disaffiliated from the Communist-dominated World
Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Beninese Labor Code provides for collective bargaining.
The Code, which dates from 1967, is basically copied from the
French colonial labor code, but the Marxist regime ignored many
of its articles. Individual labor unions are authorized to
negotiate with employers on labor matters and represent
workers' grievances to both employers and to the Government,
with the Government often voluntarily acting as arbitrator.
The Labor Code prohibits employers from taking union membership
or activity into account when making decisions on hiring, work
distribution, professional or vocational training, or
dismissals. There are no export processing zones.
16
BENIN
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by the Labor Code and
is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Code prohibits the employment or apprenticeship of
children under the age of 18 in any enterprise. However,
enforcement by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor is
limited, and child labor does occur, especially in rural areas,
where children below the age of 14 often work on family farms.
Some child labor occurs in urban areas, primarily in the
informal sector. For example, street vendors of newspapers,
smuggled petroleum products, and foodstuffs are frequently
under the age of 16.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Benin's labor force of about 2 million is primarily engaged in
agriculture (80 percent), with less than 2 percent of the
population involved in the modern (wage) sector. Many also
engage in trade activities in the informal sector. For the
wage sector, the Labor Code establishes a workweek varying
between 40 hours (nonagricultural employees) and 56 hours
(security guards), depending on the type of work. The
Government administratively sets minimum wage scales for a
number of occupations. Most of those actually employed in the
wage sector earn a good deal more than the lowest minimum wage,
which was last set in 1984 and is sufficient only to provide
rudimentary food and housing for a family. It must be
supplemented by subsistence farming or small trade in the
informal sector if a family is to enjoy a decent living. The
Government supports policies designed to improve the conditions
of workers in both the agricultural and industrial sectors.
The Labor Code also establishes health and safety standards,
but enforcement by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs is limited.
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Botswana is a multiparty democracy. The Constitution vests
executive power in the President, currently Quett Masire, who
was reelected in 1989 for a second 5-year term. The President
selects his Cabinet from members of the National Assembly.
While there are several active political parties in Botswana,
in practice the country's politics are dominated by the
governing Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) . All citizens,
regardless of race, are free to participate fully in the
economic and political life of the country.
Botswana's military, the Botswana Defense Force (BDF), numbers
about 6,500 soldiers. The Botswana National Police (BNP)
numbers about 3,000. Both the BDF and BNP are subordinate to
civilian authority. Episodes of soldiers firing on civilians
appear to have been effectively halted by new "rules of
engagement" promulgated last year. The trial of military
personnel accused of shooting civilians in 1988 and 1990
resulted in the conviction of one soldier, the acquittal of
another, and a $400,000 judgment against the BDF.
Botswana's economy is market oriented with strong encouragement
for private enterprise. Spurred by diamond revenues, the
country's economy has expanded rapidly, with real gross
domestic product (GDP) growth averaging nearly 9 percent
annually since 1980. Since independence in 1966, per capita
GDP has increased from $69 to a current figure of about
$2,400. However, more than 50 percent of the population lives
outside the formal sector, gaining its livelihood from
subsistence farming and animal husbandry. Income distribution
is heavily skewed, with the top 20 percent of the population
probably earning two-thirds of the total income, with the
bottom 50 percent earning less than one sixth.
Botswana's laws and legal system provide for a broad range of
individual rights and freedoms, which are widely observed in
practice. However, women face significant legal and practical
discrimination, and public consciousness of the problem of
violence against women is growing. There have been some past
reports of police beatings of detainees, but none in 1991.
Labor conditions are generally good given the level of economic
development, although trade unions continue to face certain
legal restrictions.
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and other extrajudicial killing
There were no reports of such killings.
b. Disappearance
There have been no reports of politically motivated
disappearances since Botswana's independence 25 years ago.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
In the past, there have been credible reports of police
beatings of suspects and detainees, which were condemned by
government officials. Police officers found to have abused
suspects are subject to both internal disciplinary procedures
and criminal prosecution.
18
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No cases have been reported of women being raped or subjected
to other abuses while in custody. Arrested women are
immediately placed in the charge of matrons, reducing the
potential for mistreatment by male police officers.
Caning is allowed for certain offenses for men below age 40.
Strict conditions regulate the size of the cane, require
medical examinations of the prisoner before and after
punishment, and prescribe strokes only across the buttocks. A
recent High Court opinion disallows corporal punishment for
children below 14 which, however, under the rubric of
"traditional punishment," can still be meted out by parents and
village headmen.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Citizens are protected from arbitrary arrest under the
Constitution. An arresting officer must clearly inform the
person being arrested of the charges and of the right to remain
silent. An accused person may contact anyone of his choosing.
In most cases, a suspect must be charged before a magistrate
within 48 hours of arrest. Bail is allowed, and detainees have
the right to hire attorneys of their choice. Poor
communications in rural villages, however, make it difficult
for detainees to obtain legal assistance. There is no public
defender service for those unable to afford a lawyer.
Once a suspect has appeared before a magistrate, he or she may
be detained only if the magistrate issues a writ of detention,
valid for 14 days and renewable every 14 days thereafter.
There have been complaints, including in 1991, that police and
rangers from the Department of Wildlife have held people
accused of poaching longer than the prescribed 48 hours.
Offending police officers have been administratively punished
or sued successfully in civil actions.
These restrictions on detention do not apply to illegal
immigrants (mostly Zimbabweans or Zambians); there are perhaps
200 to 300 such persons per year. These illegal immigrants are
usually found in periodic sweeps by the police and deported
after being held for up to 2 weeks. Botswana's Constitution
allows the President to declare a person a "prohibited
immigrant" and order deportation, but this provision has seldom
been used. No explanation is required nor is any normally
given, and the order is not subject to judicial review. A
prohibited immigrant can reenter Botswana only with
presidential authorization. There was one such case in 1991,
but the deportee was not named publicly.
Persons charged under the National Security Act (NSA) must be
arraigned before a magistrate within 96 hours, and suspects may
be held indefinitely. However, this Act has rarely been
invoked. Security cases are often tried under ordinary
criminal procedures after an initial hearing.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Botswana's judiciary is independent of the executive and
legislative branches of government in both law and practice.
Botswana has two court systems, the regular courts and the
customary (traditional) courts. In the regular courts, a
defendant's right to due process is provided for by law and
largely honored in practice, although many defendants are not
apprised of their rights in pretrial or trial proceedings.
19
BOTSWANA
Most trials are held in public, and court records are public.
However, trials under the National Security Act may be held in
secret. As a rule, courts appoint public defenders only for
those charged With capital crimes (murder and treason);
lawyers in these cases serve on a no fee basis. Thus, those
charged with noncapital crimes are often tried without legal
representation if they cannot afford an attorney. However,
defendants may confront witnesses and present evidence.
Customary courts usually handle land, marital, and property
disputes as well as minor crimes. There are clearly defined
appeal procedures with separate courts of appeal in both
systems, as well as the possibility of appeals to the High
Court. Customary courts are open only to members of the tribe
served by the particular court. The tribal chief presides over
the court, and there are no attorneys for either side.
There were no political prisoners reported in Botswana in 1991.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Hom.e, or
Correspondence.
These rights are safeguarded by law, and privacy in family
matters is respected. Court-issued search warrants are
required, but police officers of the rank of sergeant and above
can enter, search, and seize property provided they believe "on
reasonable grounds" that criminal activity is involved, that
evidence would be lost or compromised by waiting for a warrant,
and that the evidence is later brought before a magistrate. In
practice, this means that seizures of property are frequently
made without resort to search warrants. Evidence gained
without a warrant is admissible in court. Judges can
disqualify such evidence if it can be shown that it would not
likely have been compromised by taking the time to obtain a
proper warrant. There is no evidence of arbitrary or illegal
surveillance of persons or their communications.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press are provided for in the
Constitution and respected in practice. Opposition viewpoints
and criticism of the Government are freely expressed. However,
both the government media and the independent press follow
unwritten rules against criticizing senior officials directly
or discussing the personal lives or financial affairs of
important figures.
Although the Botswana Press Agency (BOPA) is part of the
Deparrment of Information and Broadcasting, it functions with a
great deal of autonomy, and its editorials do not always
reflect the Government's view. The Government's daily
newspaper, m.ade available free of charge, consists largely of
reports of speeches of ministers and other high officials and
international wire service stories.
While opposition parties' activities receive adequate press
coverage, the government media tend to give more space to
ruling party viewpoints, and the independent press tends to
present mere balanced coverage. In the past, the Government
has clashed with the independent press over the proper
reporting of national security issues. Books and publications
are not censored. Academic freedom is fully respected.
20
BOTSWANA
although a proposed new law would restrict the right of
university students to conduct protests on campus.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Botswana has a long history of peaceful assembly which is
integral to traditional village life and is exemplified in the
village meeting, the kgotla. During kgotla meetings, men
freely question leaders and voice opinions on local politics.
Women do not typically speak out at kgotla. Permits are
required for public meetings and demonstrations and are usually
granted as long as the police believe public order will be
maintained .
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is guaranteed. There is no state religion,
although the majority of the population identify with some
denomination of Christianity. Hindu, Muslim, and Baha'i groups
practice their faiths freely. There are no restrictions on
places of worship, the training of members of clergy, religious
publishing, religious education, conversion or participation in
charitable activity. There are no restrictions against
missionaries or foreign clergy. There is no discrimination
based on religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Botswana has no restrictions on movement within the country,
foreign travel, emigration, or the right to return. Passports
are easily obtained.
Refugees documented by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) are readily accepted into Botswana but are
normally required to live in the refugee settlement at Dukwe,
in northeastern Botswana, although the Government may authorize
them to live elsewhere. Due to past allegations from
neighboring countries that refugees were using Botswana as a
launching area for subversive operations beyond Botswana's
borders, refugees found out of their authorized living areas
can be declared by the Government to have abandoned their
refugee status and be deported to neighboring countries.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Batswana have the right to peacefully change their government
through democratic means, although in practice one party, the
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), has dominated Parliament since
independence 25 years ago. Members of Parliament are elected
by universal suffrage and secret ballot; the President is
elected by the Parliament. Thirty-four of the 38 members of
the National Assembly are elected every 5 years; the remaining
4 are appointed by the President. In the 1989 elections, the
BDP won 31 of the 34 elective seats. There are currently eight
active political parties, but only two, the BDP and Botswana
National Front (BNF) are represented in Parliament.
Women and minorities legally have the same political rights as
everyone else. Even though the traditional patriarchal society
has discouraged women from taking part in politics, women vote
in greater numbers than men, and the number of positions held
by women in various institutions is increasing. Women hold
21
BOTSWANA
about 40 percent of the seats in local and district councils,
and there are two women in Parliament, one of whom is the
Minister of External Affairs. There are a number of female
senior lecturers at the university, but as yet few females of
professorial rank.
Section 4 Government Attitude Toward International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Local human rights groups operate freely. Organized in 1989,
the Botswana Association for Human Rights expects its official
registration as a nonprofit organization to be completed by the
end of the year. The goals of the association are to focus
national attention on laws needing reform, to make
recommendations to the National Law Reform Committee, to
heighten public awareness about human rights, and to pressure
the Government to ratify more of the existing international
human rights instruments. Independent organizations dealing
with the rights of women and rural dwellers also exist.
The Government also permits international organizations
involved in human rights advocacy to operate in Botswana,
including the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
UNHCR, the International Labor Organization (ILO), and others.
To date, there have been no international investigations of
human rights violations in Botswana. The Government has stated
that it would cooperate if there were such an investigation.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Tswana majority, comprising about 65 percent of the
population, has a tradition of peacefully coexisting with the
largest minority, the Kalanga, which constitutes 25 percent of
the population. Although ethnic rivalries are not entirely
absent, no ethnic group suffers from serious discrimination.
The most prominent complaint comes from the Government's
refusal to allow instruction in minority languages in schools.
Groups living in remote areas, including the Kgalagadi and the
San (the Bushmen), have suffered discrimination in the past in
access to government services and legal redress, partly because
of their distance from settled areas and their nomadic
lifestyle. They are still poorly represented in politics, but
some are being resettled and are gaining better access to
government services.
The Constitution and Penal Code forbid discrimination based on
color, race, nationality or creed but do not mention
discrimination based on sex. However, a number of laws and
customs have the effect of restricting political, social, and
economic opportunities for women. For example, women married
under the "in common property" concept become legal minors.
This means that a married woman may not purchase or sell
property or make other legally binding agreements without her
husband's consent. While a woman may enter a binding
transaction as a public trader, she may become a trader only 7
with her husband's consent. Under customary law a husband may
have additional wives after consulting with his first wife and
the families, although this practice is dying out.
Marriage license applications are increasingly accompanied by
explanations of marriage "out of common property" under which a
woman retains the property she brings to a marriage as well as
22
BOTSWANA
full adult legal standing after marriage. Although frowned
upon by more traditional families, these marriages are
increasingly common.
A woman is required to obtain her husband's permission for the
use of contraceptives or for operations to prevent conception.
Under 1991 legislation, abortion is allowed in cases of rape,
incest, when the physical or mental health of a mother is
threatened, or when a child will suffer grave physical or
mental abnormalities. Two physicians must agree that the
health of the mother or child is threatened. If the health of
a married couple's child is at risk, or the mother is an unwed
minor, abortion is a family decision. Otherwise, the law does
not require the consent of the husband or father.
The Attorney General maintains that women have no legal
recourse in sex discrimination cases. However, the recent case
of a female attorney who challenged the Citizenship Act on
discrimination grounds was decided in favor of the plaintiff.
She held that the law discriminated against her by preventing
her from transmitting Botswana citizenship to her children
since her husband, the children's father, was not a Botswana
citizen. The State has appealed the case, arguing that the
authors of the Constitution did not intend to outlaw
discrimination based on sex. A long list of laws would have to
be changed if the decision stands.
Inheritance laws and customs call for each child to receive a
share of an estate regardless of sex. The oldest male child
receives a larger share but is responsible for his widowed
mother and minor siblings.
Domestic violence against women is on the increase as Botswana
society becomes more urban and people live away from constant
contact with the extended family. Men have traditionally had
the right physically to "chastise" their wives, although this
is changing. Since marital problems are considered a problem
to be dealt with between husband and wife, the police are
reluctant to intervene. Problems are still frequently settled
by the extended family, with fully 75 percent of the cases of
domestic violence brought to police attention withdrawn because
of family pressure. As a conseqence of these factors, no
accurate statistics exist on the extent of domestic violence.
The incidence of rape has grown, with increased depersonalized
urbanization as a major factor, although increased reporting
should not be discounted. The maximum penalty is life
imprisonment with mandatory corporal punishment; the average
sentence is 4 years with corporal punishment. A form of female
circumcision exists in Botswana, but it is rarely performed and
only by a few traditional doctors.
Concerted government action to improve the status of women has
been slow in coming. In .1981 the Ministry of Home Affairs
established a women's affairs unit which published a woman's
guide to the law and information on the citizenship law. It
has also done research on such subjects as maternity leave and
teenage pregnancy. The majority party (the BDP) established a
women's wing to focus on women's issues in 1987.
There is no evidence of particular jobs being reserved for
men. Wom.en are highly visible in the professions, commerce,
and as laborers, and women's organizations are growing in
number. The most active group is Emang Basadi, which seeks to
23
BOTSWANA
educate women about their rights, argues for the enforcement of
fathers' obligations to support their children, and argues for
day care in institutions that employ large numbers of women,
like the National University and banks. In addition, numerous
local women's groups are organized for self-help.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers (except for pensionable government workers) are free to
establish or join labor unions. Government workers may form
associations which function as quasi-unions . Unions are well
developed in mining, railways, banking, and among government
manual workers. There is one major confederation of trade
unions, the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU). Trade
unions in Botswana are independent of government control or
party affiliation and actively seek to represent their members'
interests. Unions may employ administrative staff, but
Botswana law requires elected union officials to work full time
in the industry the union represents. This severely limits
union leaders' effectiveness and has been criticized by the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
In addition, the law severely restricts the right to strike.
Legal strikes are theoretically possible after an exhaustive
arbitration process, but there has never been a legal strike.
There were three notable wildcat strikes in 1991 in the mining
sector. Management maintained that all three were illegal, and
all were settled peacefully (but with few gains for the
strikers). In November unskilled and semiskilled government
workers struck for 1 week over long-standing wage demands. All
workers returned to their jobs without winning salary
increases, and the Government is pursuing legal actions against
the strike organizers for not following procedures stipulated
by the Labor Code.
Unions may freely join international organizations, and labor
representatives regularly attend international conferences.
Discussions continued in 1991 between government, employers,
and trade unions over reform of labor laws. Unions say that
elected officials should be able to serve members' needs full
time. Unions are also asking for severance pay greater than
the usual 2 months' pay. Finally, unions want restrictions on
the Labor Commissioner's right to attend BFTU meetings.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Although employers are required under the Trade Union Act to
bargain with any trade union that organizes at least 25 percent
of the work force in a given industry, the union's ability to
demand collective bargaining depends on its overall strength.
Collective bargaining is common in the mining sector, where
trade unions are relatively strong, but is virtually
nonexistent in most others.
Public sector salaries are set by the Government and formerly
served as a benchmark for private sector wages. However,
Parliament voided that policy in 1990, and pay raises and
inflation indexing must now be negotiated separately in the
private sector. In early 1991 government employees received
raises ranging from 13 percent at the lowest levels to 90
percent at executive levels.
24
BOTSWANA
Although the law prohibits employers from dismissing workers
for union activities, there is disagreement over how well they
are enforced. Other reasons are often given for dismissals so
it is difficult for dismissed employees to prove that union
activities were the real reason. Dismissals may be appealed to
labor officers or civil courts, but labor officers rarely do
much more than order 2 months' severance pay. Labor law
practice in Botswana's only export processing zone, in
Selebi-Phikwe, is the same as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is not practiced in Botswana and is
specifically forbidden by the Constitution.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Botswana law prohibits the employment of children 12 years of
age and under by anyone except members of the child's immediate
family. No one under the age of 15 may be employed in any
industry, and only persons over 16 may be employed in night
work. No person 16 or younger is permitted to work in
hazardous jobs, including mining. Botswana law also protects
young people from recruiters for jobs outside the country.
Scattered violations of age standards occur in small-scale and
family enterprises and in the informal sector. The Department
of Labor is insufficiently staffed to enforce full compliance.
Although education is not compulsory, it is almost universally
available, and most children attend school at least through the
seventh grade. The Government is rapidly making 9 years of
free public education universally available.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum monthly wages are established by law for all but
agricultural and domestic workers. The level varies by
industry, and the lowest minimum is barely adequate for one
person to maintain a decent standard of living in an urban
environment. In most cases, workers must supplement this with
a second job or subsistence farming. Most families have more
than one wage earner .
The law mandates a maximum 48-hour workweek with provisions for
overtime pay (time and a half) for more than 48 hours. Most
major employers use the standard workweek, but some smaller
firms refuse to pay overtime, and action is seldom taken
against them. The Government establishes basic job health and
safety standards. Most industries adhere to the standards,
although compliance by construction firms is sometimes lax.
Nevertheless, industrial accident rates are not high on the
whole. While workers who complain about hazardous conditions
have legal protection from dismissal, application of this
enforcement has been uneven. Enforcement of safety standards,
which is divided between the Departments of Labor and Mines and
the Ministry of Health, has been hampered by inadequate
staffing.
2$
BURKINA FASO
In 1991 Burkina Faso remained under the rule of President
Blaise Compaore, who toppled Thomas Sankara on October 15,
1987, in the country's fourth military coup since 1980. In
June 1990, President Compaore began a carefully controlled
process of government restructuring and reform, legalizing
opposition parties and independent media but dictating
arrangements for the transition to multiparty elections. A new
Constitution, approved by referendum in June 1991, contains
provisions which, if fully implemented, would provide citizens
a wide range of civil and political rights. Opposition groups
originally participated in a broad-based transitional
government but withdrew when the President refused to accept a
national conference or to negotiate changes in arrangements for
the presidential elections on December 1. The opposition
refused to participate in the elections, and only an estimated
25 percent of the registered electorate turned out to vote,
thus denying Compaore the mandate he sought . In the aftermath
of that vote, opposition activist Clement Ouedraogo was killed
in a grenade attack, and another opposition member, Moctar
Tall, was seriously injured in a separate attack. Many
Burkinabe believed the Government was responsible for the
attacks .
Burkina Faso's security apparatus consists of the armed forces,
the paramilitary gendarmerie, and the police, all controlled by
the Ministry of Defense. Although the situation improved from
previous years, elements of the security services, used for
police duties, were responsible for human rights abuses in
1991, including mistreatment of detainees.
Burkina Faso is overwhelmingly dependent on subsistence
agriculture which, in turn, is highly vulnerable to variable
rainfall. Frequent drought, weak communications and
transportation infrastructure, and a low literacy rate are all
longstanding problems. Per capita income is approximately $300
a year. In March the Government reached agreement with the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on a 3-year
structural adjustment program. This program aims to open the
economy to free market forces, promote privatization, and
attract foreign investment.
The Government instituted some limited human rights
improvements in 1991, most notably in releasing two groups of
political detainees: those implicated in a December 1989 coup
attempt and students arrested during protests at the University
of Ouagadougou in May 1990. On July 25, President Compaore
declared a general amnesty pardoning those found guilty of
political offenses since the country's independence and
restoring their civil rights. The appearance of privately
owned newspapers stimulated critical discussion of reform.
However, these developments were clouded by the Government's
intimidation of political opponents and local human rights
activists and by the assassination of Clement Ouedraogo.
RESPECT FOR HU>1AN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
In addition to the assassination of Clement Ouedraogo and the
attempt on the life of Moctar Tall, there were two apparent,
but unconfirmed, extrajudicial killings. Professor Guillaume
26
BURKINA FASO
Sessouma, detained in December 1989 for allegedly participating
in a coup plot, and medical student Dabo Boukary, detained
following student demonstrations in May 1990, were reportedly
killed while in detention by members of the paramilitary
gendarmerie. Government officials continue to insist that the
two escaped to Ghana. According to informed sources, however,
both men were tortured and killed shortly after their arrest.
The Burkinabe Movement for the Rights of Man and Peoples
(MBDHP) continues to pressure the Government to account for
both disappearances.
b. Disappearance
Initial reports indicated that a number of protestors were
missing after an attack by supporters of President Compaore's
Organization for Popular Democracy (ODP/MT) on a peaceful
opposition rally and march on September 30. However, these
allegations have never been confirmed and appear to have
resulted from the confusion of the moment. An estimated 100
persons were injured in the incident.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
While legally prohibited, torture and mistreatment of detainees
have been documented for a number of years, and no known
disciplinary action has been taken against those responsible.
The most recent manifestation of the problem occurred in
Bobo-Dioulasso, where those taken into custody following an
election day riot on December 1 were tortured before being
turned over to the police. After Burkina's two local human
rights groups (see Section 4) protested these actions, those
detained were released, and no further allegations of
mistreatment were made.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Since the June adoption of the Constitution, which provides for
the right to expeditious arraignment and access to legal
counsel, there have been no known cases of prolonged arbitrary
arrest or detention. The law permits detention for
investigative purposes without charge for a maximum of 72
hours, renewable for a single 72-hour period. In practice,
this limitation is rarely observed, particularly in sensitive
cases. The military code takes precedence over the civil code
in national security cases.
Prior to the controlled reform process, the Compaore regime
held in custody a large number of its opponents who were
allegedly implicated in two 1989 coup plots. In 1991 the
Government released these persons, without ever bringing them
to trial. Some opposition supporters were detained by
authorities after opposition marches on September 30 and
October 29, and after the December 1 Bobo Dioulasso riot, but
they were released following demarches by local human rights
organizations .
Though some intellectuals, military officers, and former
government officials remain in self-imposed exile abroad, a
number have repatriated themselves since the beginning of the
country's reform process. On September 4, a prominent exile.
Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo, returned to Burkina Faso after 8
years in Senegal and France. Earlier in the year. Captain
Boukary Kabore returned to Burkina Faso from Ghana, following 4
years of exile. Kabore, who headed the Koudougou military
27
BURKINA FASO
encampment, was the only military leader to oppose then Captain
Compaore's overthrow of Captain Thomas Sankara in 1987.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution guarantees the right to public trial, access
to counsel, and appeal. These rights are respected in the
normal court system but do not exist in the People's
Revolutionary Courts (TPR's), the politicized tribunals
established following the 1983 revolution to judge former
government officials on corruption and other charges. The
TPR's were inactive after the Constitution's promulgation,
although not officially abolished by the end of 1991.
In 1991 the Government restored the civil rights of those
convicted of political offenses. The July general amnesty,
however, pardoned only those convicted of political crimes, not
those convicted of other offenses by the country's politicized
TPR's. At year's end, a separate process was established
whereby these convictions could be appealed.
Military courts exercise jurisdiction in security and political
cases and are convened on an ad hoc basis. They are subject to
flexible procedures and executive influence. As a result,
there have been growing public pressures to revise the military
legal code.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Government authorities generally do not interfere in the daily
lives of ordinary citizens, but monitoring of private
correspondence or telephones does occur in suspected national
security cases. Under the law, homes may be searched only
under the authority of a warrant issued by the Minister of
Justice. In national security cases, however, a special law
permits surveillance, searches, and monitoring of telephones
and correspondence without a warrant. Vestiges of President
Compaore's old Popular Front government and its infrastructure,
including local revolutionary committees, continued to play an
active role on the local scene in 1991. Though formally
separated from the State, these organizations exercised an
intimidating role in Burkinabe towns and villages.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although freedoms of speech and press increased in 1991, the
Government still employed certain tactics of intimidation to
limit individual expression and criticism of government
policies, e.g., the use of force on September 30.
The information code of 1990 established the right of private
publication for the first time since 1987. The code requires
that this right be exercised with "strict respect" for cultural
and moral values and the political orientation of Burkina
Faso. Thus, it gives the Government wide latitude of
interpretation. However, the four independent newspapers and
Radio Horizon, a private radio station in Ouagadougou, operated
free of government intervention in 1991. L ' Observateur Paalga,
one of the new independent newspapers, soon became the
country's largest selling newspaper. The same pattern held
with, Radio Horizon, which, within a few weeks, dominated the
market. The official government newspaper, Sidwaya, and radio
28
BURKINA FASO
Station, Radio Burkina, display a lingering pro-ODP/MT bias,
and the official press organs remain selective in their
reporting. Yet, the presence of the independent competition,
especially from L 'Observateur , has led the official media to
give more coverage of events sponsored by independent
organizations and opposition parties critical of government
policies .
In general, foreign newspapers and magazines entered the
country freely in 1991. Certain issues of international
periodicals containing articles critical of the Government were
intercepted upon reaching the country. In 1991 foreign
journalists traveled freely, filed stories without censorship,
and enjoyed access to government officials. There is no
interference with international radio broadcasts.
Although academic freedoms have been limited in the past, it
remained unclear in 1991 whether the Constitution would protect
academic freedoms more effectively than did previous
legislation. The Government permitted those students released
from detention to reenter the university.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Since early 1990, political parties have been permitted to
organize and hold meetings. Parties still must seek government
permission for their rallies, although such permission was
generally granted automatically in 1991. More than 50
political parties existed in Burkina at the end of 1991.
An increasing cycle of violence characterized Burkinabe
politics prior to the boycotted presidential election, in an
apparent attempt by hardliners to intimidate the opposition.
Armed supporters of President Compaore and his ODP/MT attacked
a peaceful opposition march on September 30, and widespread
vandalism followed the police breakup of an opposition march on
October 29. Unidentified assailants attacked the homes of
prominent opposition leaders repeatedly in October and
November, using Molotov cocktails and machine guns. In
separate ambushes shortly after the election, one opposition
leader, Clement Ouedraogo, was killed and another, Moctar Tall,
was seriously wounded.
Credible reports indicate the Government discharged some civil
servants who took part in opposition activities and warned
businessmen against supporting the opposition at the risk of
losing government contracts and facing other harassment.
Nonpolitical associations for business, religious, cultural,
and other purposes exist and experience no difficulty in
obtaining permission to meet or associate with international
associations in their fields.
c. Freedom of Religion
Burkina Faso is a secular state, and Islam and Christianity
exist side by side, with about 40 percent of the population
Muslim and about 15 percent Christian. The remainder of the
population practices traditional African religions. Muslim and
Christian holidays are recognized as national holidays. Social
mobility and access to modern sector jobs are neither linked
to, nor restricted by, religious affiliations.
29
BURKINA FASO
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Travelers within Burkina Faso are routinely stopped for
identity checks at police and military checkpoints. There is
little restriction on foreign travel for business and tourism.
Exit permits are no longer required. Refugees are accepted
freely in Burkina Faso, and attempts are made to provide for
their care in cooperation with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. At the end of 1991, there were
approximately 186 refugees and displaced persons in Burkina
Faso, mainly from Chad and Liberia.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
In 1991 citizens still did not have the right to change their
government, but pressures for change continued. The program of
reform, carefully controlled by President Compaore since its
inception, suffered a setback following persistent intimidation
of the opposition (see Section 2.b.) and the failure of the
Government and the opposition to agree on modalities for the
presidential election on December 1. Opposition parties sought
a national conference with authority to govern as a
precondition for their participation. When the President
demurred, the opposition parties boycotted the legislative and
presidential elections. Running unopposed. President Compaore
received 86 percent of the ballots, but 75 percent of the
electorate abstained from voting.
Following the presidential election and the subsequent
assassination of prominent opposition leader Clement Ouedraogo,
President Compaore moved to compromise with the opposition. He
delayed the legislative elections in order to allow the
opoposition to abandon its boycott and accepted the principle
of a "national forum of reconciliation." At the end of 1991,
no date for the forum had been set. The opposition made
government assurance of its security a precondition for
continued participation in negotiations on Burkina's future.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government's response to demarches by local human rights
groups has been mixed. The Government has continued to
tolerate the activities of the Burkinabe Movement for the
Rights of Man and Peoples (MBDHP), and, after protests by the
MBDHP and the other local human rights group, it released
opposition supporters detained following election-day riots in
Bobo Dioulasso. However, it has studiously ignored MBDHP
demands to account for the deaths of Boukary Dabo and Guillaume
Sessouma. The MBDHP is an independent group, composed mostly
of professionals, led by the President of the Administrative
Chamber of the High Court. The MBDHP has organized forums on
constitutional and human rights issues at which discussion has
been impressively free and open; it also publishes a quarterly
journal. The government press, however, still ignores certain
MBDHP activities, an issue the Movement raised with the.
Minister of Information in late September. By that time, the
MBDHP had established local chapters in 25 of Burkina's 30
provinces. As yet, MBDHP members do not appear to have been
targeted for reprisal, although the car of Movement president
Alidou Ouedraogo was burned on September 30, 1991, during an
BURKINA FASO
attack by ODP/MT supporters on the headquarters of the National
Convention of Progressive Patriots, an opposition party.
In April a second human rights organization, the Association
for the Promotion of a State of Law and Liberty (APED/L), was
founded by a group of lawyers and professionals. Claiming to
defend the "everyday" rights of man, APED/L has subtly
criticized the MBDHP ' s antigovernment stance. The
Association's close relations with the Government and official
media suggest that it was established to counteract the MBDHP 's
human rights activities. The Government is rarely responsive
to investigations by international nongovernmental
organizations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic origin
is illegal under the 1991 Constitution. In practice, such
discrimination does not occur on a wide scale. Minority ethnic
groups are as likely to be represented in the inner circles of
the Government as are the majority Mossi, and government
decisions do not favor one group over another.
In the largely rural society of Burkina Faso, women continue to
occupy a subordinate position and face discrimination in such
areas as education, jobs, property, and family rights. In the
modern sector, however, women are well represented, making up
one-fourth of the government work force, usually in lower
paying positions. Women constitute approximately one-third of
the total student population in the primary, secondary, and
higher educational systems. Schools in rural areas have
disproportionately fewer girls than schools in urban areas.
Violence against women, especially wife beating, occurs fairly
frequently in rural areas, less often in cities. The
Government is attempting to educate people on the subject
through the media. Such cases are sometimes mediated by a
"popular conciliation tribunal," composed of community
repr esentat ives .
The Government has made a particularly strong commitment to
eradicate female genital mutilation through widespread
educational efforts. Female circumcision still occurs in many
rural areas, although it is becoming less common in urban
centers. Another form of mutilation is scarring the faces of
both boys and girls of certain ethnic groups. This custom,
too, is gradually disappearing.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers, including civil servants, have traditionally enjoyed a
legal right to association, which is recognized in the newly
ratified Constitution. There are a large number of trade
unions and five trade union federations. Although unions are
independent of the Government, the military Government has at
times limited their freedom of action to ensure compliance with
government labor policy. Once the most powerful political
force in the country, organized labor — approximately 60,000
nonagr icultural workers--lost much of its influence under the
Sankara and Compaore military regimes. The five trade union
federations participated in the drafting of the national
Constitution adopted in June.
31
BURKINA FASO
The new Constitution also guarantees organized labor the right
to strike in accordance with the laws in force. Labor unrest
has increased a^ the country has embarked on an austerity
economic adjustment program. Labor unions are free to
affiliate internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions have the right to bargain for wages and other benefits
both directly with employers and with industry associations.
These negotiations are governed by minimums on wages and other
benefits contained in the interprofessional collective
convention and the commercial-sector collective convention. If
no agreement is reached, employees may exercise their right to
strike. Either labor or management may also refer the impasse
in negotiations to the Government for consideration at the
level of the country's labor tribunals. Appeals may be pursued
through the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court, whose
decision is binding on both parties. Collective bargaining is
extensive in the modern sector, although this encompasses only
a small percentage of the population. The Labor Code prohibits
antiunion discrimination, and complaints about such
discrimination are handled by Labor Ministry inspectors and are
appealable to a tribunal in the Ministry. This is a
functioning system which union officials feel works
adequately. There are no export processing zones in Burkina
Faso .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Code sets the minimum age for employment at 14, the
average age for completion of basic secondary school. However,
the Ministry of Employment, Labor, and Social Security, which
oversees labor standards, lacks the means to enforce this
provision adequately, even in the small wage sector. Most
children actually begin work at an earlier age on small, family
subsistence farms and in the traditional apprenticeship system.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Code mandates a minimum monthly wage and a maximum
workweek of 48 hours and establishes safety and health
provisions. The current minimum wage rate, which does not
apply to the large subsistence agriculture sector, was last set
by the Government in 1983 and is not adequate for an urban
worker to support a family. Wage earners usually supplement
their income through reliance on the extended family and
subsistence agriculture. A system of government inspections
under the Ministry of Labor and labor courts ensures that
health and safety standards are applied in the small industrial
and commercial sectors, but they are not applicable in the
subsistence agriculture sector, which involves over 85 percent
of the population.
32
BURUNDI
The Republic of Burundi is a one-party state led by President
Pierre Buyoya, an army major who came to power in a bloodless
coup in September 1987. President Buyoya is also head of the
National Party for Unity and Progress (UPRONA) and exercises
considerable executive, legislative, and regulatory powers.
The 23-member, predominantly civilian Cabinet manages the
day-to-day business of government. In spite of an increasingly
open political atmosphere, UPRONA is still the only legal
political entity in Burundi.
Throughout its history, Burundi has been plagued by ethnic
conflict, characterized by the traditional dominance of the
minority (14 percent) Tutsi ethnic group over the majority (85
percent) Hutu ethnic group. Although progress towards reform
suffered a setback following ethnic violence in 1988, in which
5,000 to 10,000 people were killed, there has since been slow
but definite movement in the direction of democratization.
In a nationwide referendum on February 5, the National Unity
Charter was approved by nearly 90 percent of the voters. This
document is intended to provide a guarantee of equal rights for
all Burundis regardless of ethnic origin and thus to bring
about national reconciliation. A 35-member constitutional
commission, largely composed of civilians, was officially
formed on March 21 to formulate a new constitution to replace
the one suspended by President Buyoya when he came to power in
1987. The commission recommended in September the creation of
a multiparty political system, with fundamental rights
including free speech and press, the separation of powers, and
the protection of minorities. Government officials and
commission members carried out an energetic campaign to inform
the population, both at home and abroad, of the commission's
recommendation and to solicit their views. President Buyoya
has called for a referendum on the constitution early in 1992
to be followed by general elections in early 1993. However,
major opposition groups rejected both the commission's report
and the President's program for transition as the unilateral
products of a government that came to power by force.
Internal state security is still the responsibility of the
security police. A much larger regular police force, or
gendarmerie, is responsible for maintaining law and order. The
state security police have the same powers of arrest as the
regular police and are subject to the same process of judicial
review. Both are part of Burundi's 18 , 000-member military
force. An ethnically balanced National Security Council was
created in 1990 to oversee the activities of the various
security forces, which continue to be almost entirely composed
of members of the Tutsi ethnic group. During times of unrest,
the army is permitted to take persons into custody on behalf of
the gendarmerie. Elements of the military committed
significant human rights abuses in 1991 in responding to
alleged threats and attacks from members of the Party for the
Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) .
Landlocked Burundi is extremely poor and densely populated.
Over four-fifths of the working population is engaged in
subsistence agriculture, working small, privately owned plots.
The small monetary economy is based largely on the export of
coffee, with few other cash crops. The country has embarked on
a structural adjustment program supported by the donor
community which includes the privatization of a range of
industries. The increasingly grave social and economic problem
33
BURUNDI
of the acquired immumodef iciency syndrome (AIDS) complicates a
preexisting health-care crisis.
In 1991 civil liberties continued to be significantly
restricted, including the rights of assembly and association
and of political expression. Brutality, and sometimes torture,
of detainees remained a problem, as did the Government's
failure to investigate effectively and punish those
responsible. In the aftermath of attacks on military and
police installations in November, security forces overreacted,
resulting in the death of between 500 and 1,000 people. A
commission of inquiry was established to investigate these
incidents, and some military person were arrested. The
Government also abolished a special security court. Citizens
still did not have the right to change their government, but
there was progress towards a democratic political system.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
In late November and December, 500 to 1,000 people were killed
as the result of security forces' response to attacks on
military and police installations. Reliable reports indicate
that many of these deaths were the result of the use of
excessive force. The Government established a commission of
inquiry, headed by the Attorney General, to investigate the
causes of the violence as well as excesses on the part of the
authorities. At year's end, several Tutsi military officers
had been detained for prosecution where culpability had been
determined. There were persistent reports that Burundi
military forces killed an unspecified number of Hutu peasants
in the north of the country. The Government denied the reports,
Questions concerning the 1990 death of Remy Gahutu, a prominent
exiled Burundi political dissident who died while in the
custody of Tanzanian authorities, remained unresolved in 1991.
Clinical information indicated the death may have been the
result of poisoning, and members of Gahutu 's organization have
alleged that Burundi authorities were ultimately responsible.
b. Disappearance
There were numerous reports of people disappearing during the
November disturbances, and the Government promised to provide
lists of those arrested. At year's end, it was still not
possible to account for all missing persons. Some may be
presumed to be among the approximately 40,000 Burundians who
fled to Zaire or Rwanda as a result of recent or threatened
violence and who remained outside of the country.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is forbidden by law, but cruel treatment of suspects or
detainees continues to occur in the form of beatings during
arrest or interrogation. There is no evidence of vigorous
prosecution for such torture or brutality, and the council
established 2 years ago to investigate official misconduct and
brutality apparently has seldom met and reportedly has taken
action only once. Members of the legal and human rights
34
BURUNDI
communities report that judges rarely press the police about
the nature of their conduct in questionable cases.
Prison conditions remain severe in Burundi, due to lack of
adequate hygiene, clothing, medical care, food, and water.
Food must be grown by the prisoners and when possible
supplemented by their families. The Government has begun a
program of gradually improving conditions; to date, efforts
have been focused on increasing the supply of food and
clothing. Visits by family members are difficult, particularly
when prisoners are moved to locations distant from their homes
due to overcrowding.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Police officers are empowered to detain suspects without an
arrest warrant but must submit a written report to the public
prosecutor ■ s office within 24 hours. The public prosecutor may
either order the detainee's release or issue an arrest warrant
valid for 5 days. The public prosecutor must then state the
charges before a magistrate in the presence of the detainee.
The magistrate may confirm the detention, initially for 15 days
and subsequently for 30-day periods as necessary to prepare the
case for trial. The law allows unlimited pretrial detention.
Bail is set only in cases of embezzlement or similar crimes
involving financial wrongdoing.
In general, the prescribed procedures for arrest and
imprisonment are followed in criminal cases, although
proceedings may be affected by the lack of a well-trained
judiciary. In political security cases, however, procedural
requirements are sometimes ignored. In all cases, time limits
for issuance of arrest warrants and appearance before a
magistrate are often exceeded, usually due to a shortage of
magistrates and prosecutors.
The constitutional commission remarked that arbitrary arrests
and prolonged preventive detentions still exist. Three
American law professors, who did extensive judicial consulting
in July and August, confirmed that persons are detained before
trial without prosecutorial or judicial review. The Ministry
of Justice has expressed concern about this problem and is
reportedly considering remedies to correct the situation.
In 1991 the Government cracked down on members of opposition
groups (see Section 3), both legal and illegal, when they were
suspected of supporting antigovernment activities. One member
of the opposition party, the Front for Democracy in Burundi
(FRODEBU) spent 3 months in prison — from May to July — for
possession of antigovernment literature. In August the
Government began detaining supporters of the illegal opposition
group PALIPEHUTU for agitation and possession of antigovernment
literature. The detainees included the vice president of the
group. The Government acknowledged that, prior to the outbreak
of violence in November, it had arrested 60 persons for
activities against the Government. These persons have not yet
been charged, and the cases have not yet gone to trial. There
are divergent estimates of the number of additional arrests
made during the violence in November, but the number could
presumably be in the hundreds. Once again, charges have not
been filed, and the cases have not been brought to trial.
However, the Government has stated that all those arrested will
be tried under existing criminal laws.
35
BURUNDI
During the course of 1991, some members of the Jehovah's
Witnesses were arrested by local authorities for refusing to
comply (on religipus grounds) with local government
directives. No charges were filed, and all were released
within 48 hours.
The Government does not exile its nationals as a means of
political control. However, since 1987 ex-president Bagaza and
his wife have been denied permission to return to Burundi,
although the Buyoya Government has stated that it is willing to
negotiate the conditions of their return. In 1991 Mrs. Bagaza
attempted to return secretly, using a false name and passport,
but was not allowed to land in Burundi. The Government
reiterated its willingness to negotiate her return. Three
Bagaza daughters, all minors, remain in Burundi with relatives;
they are free to leave, however.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is not independent; it is expected to adhere to
the guidance and recommendations of UPRONA, the Government, and
the President. In practice, there is a high degree of autonomy
in the court's daily administration of justice. The President
has the power to pardon or reduce sentences. In cases of major
political interest, the Government occasionally intervenes in
the judicial process.
Military and civil/criminal cases are dealt with in separate
court systems. Military tribunals have jurisdiction only over
military personnel and persons suspected of committing crimes
against the military. A separate state security court which
had jurisdiction over both civilian and military personnel in
cases involving state security was abolished in 1991, and its
cases will now be handled by the appropriate criminal or
military court.
The judicial system consists of the Supreme Court, the courts
of appeals, the administrative courts, the Labor Court, and the
Court of Accounts. The latter Court investigates and
prosecutes cases of official corruption; to date most of its
cases have involved actions that occurred under the previous
regime. Pretrial proceedings, which are not public, are
conducted by the Government and may involve lengthy
investigations. Most cases do not involve an effective
independent defense due to a shortage of lawyers and resources
on the part of the accused.
The courts are hampered by a shortage of legal personnel and a
heavy case load. Currently, systemic problems with
dissemination of information, new presidential decrees, and
Supreme Court decisions mean that the law is not equally
applied in all cases. Upcountry magistrates, in particular,
often have access to only a single volume of 1970 laws.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The inviolability of the home and of private correspondence
were provided for in the suspended constitution and are still
respected in practice. A judicial warrant is required for a
law enforcement official to enter and search a private
residence. The state security office monitors political
dissidence through the state security police and by employing
informers who report on discontent and dissent as well as on
36
BURUNDI
criminal activity. Membership in the UPRONA party is not
required by law.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
There are significant restrictions on speech and press
freedoms. The Buyoya regime has permitted public debate on
formerly taboo subjects, such as ethnic relations and official
corruption; however, debate is largely confined to UPRONA party
meetings, the forum for dialog officially encouraged by the
Government. Criticism outside party forums is restricted.
Possession of opposition political tracts is a punishable
offense, e.g., seven members of the FRODEBU opposition party
were arrested and imprisoned in 1991 for possession of such
tracts (see Section l.d.).
The Government regulates domestic print and broadcast media. A
French-language daily and a Kirundi-language weekly newspaper
are published by the Ministry of Information, which also
operates the domestic radio and television stations. The
official media supports the fundamental policies of the party
and the Government. While some criticism of the Government is
permitted, journalists are state employees and subject to
disciplinary action if their criticism goes beyond what is
considered tolerable. The Government has interfered on
occasion with the distribution of foreign news publications and
censored sexually explicit foreign film material or
publ ications .
In 1988 a liberalized ordinance authorized private print media
in Burundi, provided they have prior authorization from the
Ministry of Information. Private broadcast media are not yet
authorized. Two news publications emerged, one a Catholic
biweekly in Kirundi and the other a monthly magazine published
in French by an association of Burundian intellectuals.
Although these publications debate multiparty versus single
party political systems and have been critical of UPRONA, they
appear to refrain from taking genuinely controversial positions
on critical issues.
Academic freedom is limited; primary and secondary
schoolteachers are expected to support government policies.
Professors at the University of Burundi come from a wide
assortment of national backgrounds. They are generally
permitted to lecture freely in their subject areas, conduct
research, and draw independent conclusions, but they do not
concern themselves with domestic politics.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These rights are restricted. No political meetings or
associations other than those tied to UPRONA are currently
permitted, although some are tolerated within limits. A number
of Burundian intellectuals are openly supportive of the FRODEBU
opposition party, without, apparently, suffering for it.
Informal gatherings and some criticism is permitted; however
the PALIPEHUTU party, considered by the Government to promote
ethnic division, is illegal, and its activities are not
tolerated. In August, eight PAI IPEHUTU supporters were
arrested and imprisoned for agitation, as a result of holding
an illegal meeting.
37
BURUNDI
c. Freedom of Religion
For the most part, the Buyoya Government has reversed the
repression of religious expression under the previous regime of
Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza. Buyoya has freed religious
prisoners, reopened closed churches, returned confiscated
church properties, including houses and schools, authorized
workday religious services, reinstituted the activities of the
catechists, and authorized church schools (including seminaries
and literary and catechism classes), publications, and
broadcasts. Those missionaries who were expelled have been
allowed to return, and there are no restrictions on new
missionaries for authorized churches. Since more than 60
percent of the population is Catholic, the Catholic Church
plays an important role in the development of the country and
in the lives of both rural and urban Burundians.
Religious organizations, subject to the same rules and
restrictions that apply to secular organizations, must obtain
approval from the Government to operate in Burundi, and a
Burundi citizen must be designated as legal representative of
each organization. The approval process, which includes an
investigation of the association's activities in its home
country, can be lengthy. The Government has legally recognized
the Seventh-Day Adventist Church and has restored its
confiscated properties.
However, the pattern of arrests and harassment of Jehovah's
Witnesses continued in 1991, despite the June 1990 visit of an
international delegation of Witnesses. The Government still
has not granted the group legal status, allegedly because of
Witnesses' refusal to acknowledge secular authority.
Religious groups may not engage in political activity critical
of the Government. There are no barriers to the maintenance of
links with coreligionists in other countries. Participation in
religious life does not exclude membership in the UPRONA party
or eligibility for social benefits.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government has not instituted nationwide restrictions on
internal travel since the after.math of the August 1988 ethnic
violence. Since that time, local travel has occasionally been
restricted in areas experiencing unrest. The Government's
policy is to discourage urban migration through rural
development programs and a public education campaign. A
voluntary resettlement program exists to promote migration from
densely populated areas to parts of the country where more land
is available.
Foreign travel and emigration are relatively free. In 1990 the
Government abolished the requirement that Burundi citizens who
travel abroad must surrender their passports to the immigration
office on their return to Burundi. Citizens are not required
to have passports for journeys to neighboring areas of Rwanda
and Zaire. Foreigners residing in Burundi must have exit visas
to leave the country.
All but approximately 800 of the more than 50,000 Burundi
citizens who fled to southern Rwanda following the August 1988
ethnic violence have returned voluntarily to their homes. The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is
continuing to work with those who wish to return home. In a
BURUNDI
special repatriation effort, the Burundian Government and the
UNHCR are working to make possible the voluntary repatriation
of Burundians who fled to other countries following the 1972
outbreak of ethnic violence. More than 150,000 Burundians left
the country at that time. Approximately 17,000 returned during
1991, but an additional estimated 40,000 fled to Zaire or
Rwanda as a result of the November violence.
The current official estimate of Burundi's refugee population
is 269,000, most of whom are Rwandan Tutsis who have resided in
Burundi since the 1960's. These refugees, for the most part,
have been integrated into Burundi society and no longer require
assistance from the UNHCR. No refugees were forcefully
repatriated in 1991; however, some refugees reportedly joined
the Rwandan Patriotic Front in the armed conflict in Rwanda.
Several refugees, with assistance from the UNHCR, were
resettled from Burundi to other countries. In 1991, 18
Rwandans and 1 Zairian were resettled in Canada, and 32
Somalians who had arrived in Burundi in 1989 were resettled in
the United States. Some 20 Somalians remain in Burundi under
UNHCR auspices.
The Government occasionally repatriates Rwandans and Zairians
who lack residence permits, or who have been arrested on
suspicion of criminal activities. At present, Burundi
citizenship may only be acquired through birth from Burundi
parents or by marriage, but the Government is considering the
question of naturalization.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the legal right to change their
government. In August the constitutional commission,
presenting its report, called for wide public participation in
the creation of the new constitution. It also called for
public debate its recommendation that Burundi adopt a
multiparty system. Since the release of the report, government
officials and members of the commission have conducted public
meetings in localities throughout the country and met with
interest groups to solicit comments. Opposition groups have
criticized this process and called for a national conference to
assure more open and free debate.
Political participation currently takes place only within the
one-party structure of UPRONA, and voters can express
dissatisfaction only by voting against incumbents for party
positions. The party is open to all Burundi citizens
supporting its principles and, with its youth, women's, and
labor affiliates, claims a membership of over three-quarters of
the adult population. However, many registered party members
are inactive.
While the report of the constitutional commission calls for the
development of a multiparty system in Burundi, its
recommendations also make it clear that, now and in the future,
parties will be allowed to operate only as long as they do not
violate prohibitions against activities or literature calling
for ethnic identification. The Government took the position
that any action or literature which challenged the concept of
national unity or called for ethnically based political
movements represented an illegitimate challenge to the
Government. At the end of 1991, UPRONA remained the only legal
political party in Burundi. However, during the year the
Government tolerated some activities on the part of parties
39
BURUNDI
which apparently were not considered a serious threat to the
Government or the principle of national unity. These parties
include FRODEBU, -the Movement for Peace and Democracy, the
Party of the People, and the Royalist Party.
In contrast to its relatively tolerant attitude toward these
parties, the Government took aggressive action against the
PALIPEHUTU Party during 1991. The Government accused the party
of openly fostering ethnically based divisive politics as well
as supporting violence against the Government. Numerous party
members were arrested.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In 1991 two local human rights groups were officially
recognized by the Government. While these organizations are
apparently free to conduct investigations and publish findings,
their activities and effectiveness have thus far been limited
by a lack of experience and resources and by the Government's
lack of procedures for handling requests for information and
permission to carry out monitoring activities.
The Government allows international and nongovernmental
organizations to investigate human rights conditions in
Burundi. After initially rejecting calls for an international
investigation into the August 1988 ethnic violence, it allowed
an extensive survey of conditions in the affected areas by U.N.
representatives. An Amnesty International delegation visited
Burundi in June 1989, primarily to investigate the status of
the detainees arrested in the aftermath of the violence.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Historically, the minority Tutsi (14 percent) have dominated
the majority Hutu people. Serious civil strife resulting in
thousands of deaths has erupted between the two groups several
times in the modern era, most recently in April 1972 and August
1988. In both instances, a large majority of the victims were
Hutus. Following the 1988 ethnic violence, the Government,
with the support of the international community, moved rapidly
to try to restore ethnic confidence, including the appointment
of a national unity commission to recommend fundamental ethnic
reforms .
However, de facto discrimination by Tutsis against Hutus
remains in many areas of society, although it is not condoned
by law. There are very few Hutus in the army, and they are
seriously underrepresented in the civil service and university
positions. The Tutsis have traditionally had better access to
educational opportunities. As a result of recent reform
efforts, Hutus have made inroads into the civil service. The
number of Hutus now exceeds the number of Tutsis entering
secondary school, which represents progress compared with past
years but still remains greatly disproportional . The pace of
integration in the military remains slow. Tutsis dominate the
modern economic sector, while in rural areas economic
opportunities are roughly equivalent for both groups.
Women hold a secondary position in Burundi society, based on
traditional patterns. The suspended constitution provided for
legal , equal ity, and this continues to be respected in
practice. The current legal code prohibits polygamy and a
40
BURUNDI
dowry requirement, allows women some control over family
matters, and provides for land inheritance by women. However,
legal restrictions persist, including the provision that a
married woman may not start a business without her husband s
permission. Fewer women than men obtain formal education;
according to U.N. data, females get one-third of the schooling
of males. Once a woman obtains a degree, she can generally
find suitable employment. The Government has not discriminated
against women in hiring, and the civil service pay scale makes
no distinction between men and women. However, women are not
significantly represented in business, the professions, or at
higher levels of government, though the situation has improved
in recent years.
Violence against women, especially wife beating, is known to
take place, but the extent of the violence has not been
documented. While police do not normally intervene in domestic
disputes, severe cases are dealt with by the legal system. The
Government officially discourages violence against women and
addresses the problem largely through the Burundi Women's
Union, which provides counseling and, when deemed necessary,
referral to legal authorities.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Up to the end of 1991, workers did not have the right to freely
form and join labor unions. The UPRONA party controlled the
National Trade Union Confederation (UTB) and supported it
through direct and in-kind subsidies. Its leadership was
appointed by the President. No other unions were allowed by
law. On December 30, as part of its move to a multiparty
system, the Government dissolved the UTB, defining its 18
subgroups as politically and financially independent unions,
organized by trade. The Confederation of Free Unions of
Burundi (CSB), with an elected chair, was created as an
administrative umbrella organization. While not all issues
concerning the new unions' structure and rights have been
resolved, they and the CSB face the immediate challenge of
supporting their activities based solely on worker
contributions. Labor policy has been and will continue to be
formulated by the National Labor Council, on which employers,
organized labor, and the Ministry of Labor are represented.
The Council debates labor issues and makes policy
recommendations to the Government.
Strikes are permitted only if authorized by the Ministry of
Labor after negotiations have failed, and advocacy of an
unauthorized strike or lockout is a criminal offense. There
have been no authorized strikes in recent years. Public sector
employees have not been allowed to strike. The UTB was
affiliated with the Organization of African Trade Union Unity.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers did not have the right to organize outside the UTB
until the end of the year. Prior to December 30, collective
bargaining was supervised by the Government. There were no
limits on the issues which could be bargained between the UTB
and the employers, but the two sides were bound by the
guidelines on wage and working conditions guidelines
established by the National Labor Council and approved by the
Government. To resolve labor disputes outside of collective
bargaining situations, a three-step process was available:
41
BURUNDI
direct employer-employee negotiations under the auspices of the
UTB; an administrative hearing before a government labor
inspector; and a legal proceeding before the Labor Court (or an
administrative court, in the case of public employees), in
which the UTB represented the employee (whether a union member
or not). The UTB was often successful in forcing employers to
change their practices through this process. The UTB estimated
that it had between 80,000 and 100,000 members, or
approximately 50 percent of the country's wage-earning
employees. Antiunion discrimination is prohibited by law and
is not a problem in practice because of the protections
provided to employees under the Labor Code.
There are no export processing zones in Burundi.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is forbidden by law and is not
practiced. The International Labor Organization's (ILO)
Committee of Experts (COE) has regularly noted that various
legislative provisions that call for imprisonment and an
obligation to work as punishment for expressions of political
views contrary to those of the party are not in compliance with
ILO Convention 105. The COE has also noted that provisions
concerning agricultural ordinances are in violation of ILO
Convention 29. The UTB stated that, while many prisoners do
agricultural or artisanal work to help feed themselves, there
is no compulsory convict labor in Burundi.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
In the modern, urban sector of the economy, children under the
age of 16 may not be employed in any capacity. Enforcement of
this minimum age by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor is
lim.ited. As a practical matter in this poor, largely rural
country, many children are obliged by custom and circumstance
to help their families in subsistence agriculture. Many urban
children engage in small-scale street trading and other
activities to supplement the family income.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Over 90 percent of the population of Burundi is engaged in
subsistence agriculture. Minimum labor standards are
established by the National Labor Council and promulgated by
the Government in the Labor Code, but these standards have
relevance primarily for workers in the small wage sector of the
economy. The established minimum wage rate is inadequate to
provide a decent living for urban families, who frequently
supplement their income through family gardening or petty
commerce .
The maximum workweek is fixed by law at 45 hours. In the
modern economic sector, minimum health and safety standards are
incorporated in the Labor Code and are monitored by the
Ministry of Labor. The number of safety inspectors is
insufficient to enforce these standards effectively.
42
CAMEROON
Political power in Cameroon is concentrated in the Presidency
and a single party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement
(CPDM) . President Paul Biya is Head of State and president of
the CPDM. He makes all major decisions and appoints all senior
government and party officials. Members of the 180-deputy
National Assembly may initiate bills and amend measures
proposed by the Government. However, in practice, provisions
the Government finds inimical are never brought to a vote by
the full house. Cameroon's political system is influenced by
its ethnic and linguistic diversity, which comprises 230
languages and major dialects and 3 separate European colonial
traditions (German, French, and British). Balance among the
various groups is required to maintain political cohesion,
which acts as a check on government power .
Internal security responsibilities are shared by the national
police, the national intelligence service (CENER), the
gendarmerie, the Ministry of Territorial Administration
(MINAT) , military intelligence (SEMIL), the army, and, to a
lesser extent, the presidential security service. MINAT is in
charge of prisons, and its local-level officials (prefects)
play a key role in ensuring order. The gendarmerie and the
police have the dominant role in enforcing internal security
laws. In the 7 of the country's 10 provinces which experienced
significant unrest during the year, all security forces were
under the nominal command of an "operational commander" from
late May until early December. In 1991 there were numerous
credible reports of human rights abuses committed by security
forces .
Cameroon's per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of about
$1,000 in 1989 placed it among the lower middle-income
developing countries, a slight decline from 1988. Preliminary
data indicated that GDP declined again in 1991. Cameroon's
food self-sufficiency helps mitigate the effects of declining
terms of trade and other external difficulties.
The human rights climate in Cameroon deteriorated sharply in
1991. In several cases, there was evidence of government
tolerance for human rights abuses and throughout much of the
year of government inaction in the face of widespread,
continuing abuses. Continuing human rights abuses included
extrajudicial killings, torture and other mistreatment of
prisoners, harsh prison conditions, repeated arbitrary arrest
and detention, restrictions on freedoms of speech and assembly,
and limitations on women's and worker rights. Starting in the
spring, there were a number of serious incidents and abuses,
some of which caused many civilian deaths. Beginning in April
with student protests and continuing with general strikes
called by the opposition, public demonstrations often met
brutal repression by security forces. In addition, the
Government banned six associations, closed newspapers it found
troublesome, and harassed the political opposition, using
arbitrary arrest and detention and administrative
restrictions. This repression abated somewhat at year's end.
Responding to pressure for reform. President Biya in October
announced that multiparty elections to the National Assembly
would be held in 1992, in accordance with procedures developed
in coordination with the opposition political parties.
However, sharp disagreements between the Government and the
opposition, and within the opposition itself, left it unclear
at year's end whether a date could be agreed on. During the
year, the Government legally recognized over 40 political
43
CAMEROON
parties, permitted the return of a number of political exiles,
and released over 100 persons imprisoned for political reasons
or who had never been tried.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were over 100 instances of extrajudicial killing in
Cameroon during 1991. These instances varied widely, from
police beating a baker to death in Mbouda to mob lynching of a
gendarme in Douala and to ethnic clashes in Meiganga. Often
the deaths occurred during the heat of a confrontation between
security forces and crowds protesting against government
policies. Victims included security officers as well as
civilians .
Among the many examples was the incident at Yaounde University
on May 6. Students and many others claim that at least 3 and
as many as 20 students were killed after the gendarmerie
intervened to break up a meeting of a student organization. A
government-named special commission found no evidence that
security forces had killed anyone, but many persons claim that
fear of retribution kept potential witnesses from providing
testimony that would have constrained the commission to find
otherwise .
In mid-April confrontations between security forces and
political demonstrators led to between two and nine deaths in
Ngaoundere, capital of Adamaoua Province. A son of the local
traditional ruler and at least one security officer were among
those killed. Following a night of disorder on April 19,
including vandalism and some physical violence, a young woman
who was 5 months pregnant was brutally tortured and sexually
abused by security forces, leading to her death (see Section
I.e.).
Credible reports indicated that the authorities in the Adamaoua
Province town of Meiganga exploited longstanding ethnic
tensions in an effort to break the opposition-led general
strike, known as "Operation Ghost Towns." In mid-July these
tensions boiled over into an interethnic skirmish which left at
least 40 dead. As far as is known, there was no investigation
into the circumstances leading to this tragedy or of the many
instances of killings by security forces during 1991.
In early September, a retired archbishop was strangled at his
home in Ngaoundere shortly after he met with President Biya.
It is widely believed that political motives prompted the
murder; however, the police investigation was neither energetic
nor thorough and has not produced any suspects.
b. Disappearance
Various sources reported that between 53 and 68 students
disappeared following the May 6 incident at Yaounde
University. All but one of these persons were accounted for
soon thereafter by a special commission. The unreliability of
student registration rolls complicated efforts to follow up on
allegations of disappearance.
44
CAMEROON
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although the Penal Code proscribes torture, renders
inadmissible in court evidence obtained thereby, and prohibits
public servants from using force against any person, there were
many credible reports of security forces inflicting severe
beatings, systematic torture, and other inhumane treatment
during 1991. Sanctions against those responsible are almost
unknown. Investigations are rare because abused persons
frequently fear reprisals against themselves and their families
in the event they lodge a complaint. Prison conditions are
abominable, though overcrowding in the major Douala and Yaounde
prisons eased somewhat in 1991.
Among the examples of brutality by security forces and of harsh
prison conditions was the case of the pregnant woman mentioned
in Section l.a. Prior to her death, she told a Western
diplomat that she had suffered repeated mistreatment, including
regular, severe beatings, denial of food and exercise, and, on
the first night in prison, being forced to strip naked and
share a 12 square-meter cell with 20 naked male prisoners.
Shortly after making these reports, she was returned to
Ngaoundere Prison, where she was reportedly interrogated about
her discussions with the Western diplomat and subjected to
further mistreatment, including being repeatedly raped. When
she fell into a coma, she was returned to the hospital, where
she died, chained to her bed.
Other examples included severe police beatings in January of a
group of persons demonstrating peacefully for the release of
political prisoners in Garoua, capital of the North Province.
They had disobeyed an order to disperse and sat on the ground.
The responsible civil administrator was later transferred to an
equivalent position in another area. Following unrest in
Yaounde on April 2, state television showed security officers
beating the bottoms of the feet of two prisoners seated on the
ground. An article in the government-owned newspaper reporting
the trial of a man suspected of stealing a sewing machine
stated in part: the suspect "denied that charge... but he later
succumbed to the allegations under torture." On another
occasion, the government newspaper reported that an angry mob
burned the houses of six gendarmes after the security officers
beat five suspects about the feet and legs so badly that the
men could no longer walk.
In another instance, in the town of Mora, gendarmes beat dozens
of suspects following arson attacks on their homes provoked by
the May 16 shooting death of a local youth. In several cases,
heads of households were stripped naked in front of their wives
and children by gendarmes and police, a practice calculated to
inflict special humiliation in this heavily Muslim area. Naked
prisoners at the gendarmerie brigade in Mora were crowded in
large numbers into a small holding cell devoid of sanitary
facilities. At least 30 persons were later transferred to the
gendarmerie legion headquarters in Maroua, where gendarmes
subjected the detainees to beatings and other torture and
degrading treatment twice each day for 15 days. Prisoners were
kicked, had the bottoms of their feet beaten, were swung from
the wrists and ankles, were ordered to pray and then beaten
about the head for so doing, and were compelled to engage in
acts of sodomy. Many showed scarring on wrists, hands, and
lower legs consistent with the type of mistreatment they said
they suffered. Some had medical certificates describing their
injuries .
45
CAMEROON
Security forces grossly mistreated opposition figures
throughout the year; there was no evidence of government action
or intention to put an end to it. On July 5, military, police,
and gendarmes sealed a group of opposition leaders inside the
private home of Cameroon Democratic Union President Adamou
Ndam-Njoya. As others arrived to join the meeting, they were
forced to undergo humiliating treatment. For example,
according to an eyewitness report, one leader of a minor party
was forced to walk the length of the street on his knees,
resulting in ruined trousers and bloody knees.
In another incident, members of several opposition political
parties were meeting on the premises of a Douala computer
assembly company on August 4 when police and gendarmes entered
the compound firing guns and tear gas canisters. Also present
and armed were a local administrative officer and an official
of the ruling CPDM. Those captured were split into two groups,
one of which was taken to the gendarmerie legion headquarters
where eyewitnesses report they saw about 100 naked men and
women being forced to walk on knees and elbows across gravel
for over an hour. After 2 nights spent in the mud and rain,
the prisoners were split into groups of about 20 and placed in
underground cells about 20 meters square with.no beds and only
a sink for plumbing. After 7 days, they wer-e moved to
windowless cells in another location, where they were forced to
sleep in a mixture of excrement and water in small cells
lacking plumbing of any kind. During this time, one female
detainee was denied access to her child to breastfeed it.
On August 21, following a confrontation between security forces
and the opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF) in Bafoussam,
10 soldiers badly battered a number of civilians, prompting the
Catholic Bishop to protest to the West Province Governor. In
response to inquiries concerning this incident, Douala
authorities claimed those detained were linked to an arson
attack; however, no one was ever charged.
On September 23 and 24, authorities in Douala took into custody
24 opponents of the Government (see also Section 2.b.). Though
they were released within 2 days, most suffered serious
mistreatment while in detention. Samuel Eboua, President of
the National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP) and lawyer
Charles Tchoungang were among those hospitalized as a result of
having been severely beaten with iron rods and rubber
truncheons. Progressive Movement (MP) Party President
Jean-Jacques Ekindi, who was placed under house arrest and
denied access to visitors for an additional day after his
release, received even harsher treatment.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arbitrary, prolonged detention remains a serious problem.
Under Cameroonian law, a person arrested for a nonpolitical
offense may be held in custody up to 24 hours before being
charged. The period may be renewed three times. However,
after a magistrate has issued a warrant to bring the case to
trial, the detainee may be held in "pretrial detention"
indefinitely pending court action. Furthermore, a 1990 law
permits detention without charge for renewable periods of 15
days "in order to combat banditry." During 1991 public
officials sometimes abused this authority in order to suppress
political expression. The number of arbitrary detentions that
took place during 1991 is impossible to estimate accurately but
may have exceeded 10,000.
46
CAMEROON
A presidential decree reducing sentences for many crimes, an
amnesty law voted by the National Assembly in April, and the
conclusion of an effort by the Ministry of Justice to clear the
prisons of persons being held for reasons no longer known, cut
the national prison population significantly and resulted in
the closure of three notorious political prisons. The amnesty
law brought about the release of the last of the prisoners held
in connection with the failed 1984 coup attempt. In the Center
Province alone, the Justice Ministry's initiative reduced the
number of persons in pretrial detention (i.e., awaiting trial
or whose cases were on appeal) from 2,568 to 671.
Persons taken into detention are frequently denied access
either to legal counsel or family members. The law permits
release on bail only in the Anglophone provinces, whose legal
system retains features of British common law. Even there,
bail is granted infrequently. CENER and SEMIL do not implement
fully the penal code requirement that detainees be brought
before a magistrate for investigation of possible offenses and
have held detainees incommunicado. Persons placed in
administrative detention or taken into custody by security
forces do not disappear. They are eventually released, though
the families are not always informed promptly of their
whereabouts. The law does not provide for judicial
determination of the legality of detention, and judicial
authorities are precluded from acting on a case until the
administrative authority who ordered the detention turns the
case over to the prosecutor.
On August 29, the Lamido of Rey Bouba, a powerful traditional
ruler who had traveled to Garoua to welcome President Biya to
the North Province capital, took 50 local residents hostage
after Garoua youths stoned his motorcade. In spite of pleas
from local authorities, the Lamido refused to release the
hostages until after his return to Rey Bouba. During the time
the Lamido was holding the hostages. President Biya decorated
him for service to the nation.
Cameroon does not generally engage in the practice of forced
exile, and many prominent exiles returned to Cameroon in 1991.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Cameroonian court system is subordinate to the Ministry of
Justice. Thus, it is part of the executive, not a separate or
independent branch of government. Magistrates in Cameroon are
career civil servants responsible to the Minister of Justice,
and they are subject, particularly in political cases, to
government direction. Numerous magistrates have commented that
rendering a decision that displeases the Government may result
in transfer to a less desirable position. However,
magistrates' decisions in nonpolitical cases are not usually
subject to government interference. There have been reported
cases of the Government refusing to pay damages when a court
has found against it. Public trial by a presiding magistrate
is provided for in law, and this practice is followed except in
the case of persons held under administrative detention. In
late 1991, Minister of Justice Douala Moutome several times
enjoined his Ministry's officials to be fair and impartial in
the conduct of their duties.
Traditional courts continue to play an important role in
Cameroon, particularly in rural areas. Their authority varies
by region and by ethnic group, but they are often the arbiters
of property and domestic disputes and may serve a probate
47
CAMEROON
function as well. Most traditional courts permit appeal of .
decisions to traditional authorities of higher rank.
Civilians accused of subversion or weapons offenses are liable
to trial before the State Security Court, which was established
by a law enacted in late 1990. This Court has seven members,
five of whom must be trained magistrates; these were not
appointed until November 14, so the Court has not as yet heard
any cases. This Court's ruling may not be appealed except with
respect to a point of law. There were no known political
prisoners being held at the end of 1991.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
While both invasions of the home and tampering with
correspondence are violations of Cameroonian law, there have
been frequent reports of police harassing citizens and entering
homes without warrants during periodic searches. This practice
was particularly widespread in neighborhoods near Yaounde
University in April and May and in Douala in August and
September. Police officials also sometimes enter homes and
demand to see receipts for household property as a customs law
enforcement measure. Surveillance of suspected dissidents and
the monitoring of their mail and telephone conversations are
common practices.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although the Constitution of 1972 provides for freedom of
expression and of the press, Cameroonian law and practice have
long restricted these freedoms. While there are no overt
restrictions on private speech, some civil servants in 1991
reported having been subjected to involuntary transfers,
suspension from their duties, and other administrative
sanctions as a result of their membership in or support of
opposition political parties. Such actions appear to have been
at the initiative of overzealous supporters of the Government
or ruling CPDM and do not appear to be derived from government
policy.
In late 1990, a new law established more liberal regulations
for the creation of newspapers and magazines and opened the
door to eventual private broadcasting. That same law, however,
formally enshrined prepublication censorship and granted the
Minister of Territorial Administration authority to suspend the
right to publish. While censorship and suspensions may be
appealed, the competent court is not obliged to rule until 1
month has elapsed--with obvious ramifications for
time-sensitive media.
The Government publishes two official newspapers — the English
and French editions of the Cameroon Tribune--and controls radio
and television (the most important media). Most official
journalists are civil servants who may be transferred to less
desirable positions if they do not practice self-censorship. A
number of television journalists were taken off the air in 1991
following incidents in which they implied disagreement with
government actions. The government-controlled broadcast media
also provided disproportionately high levels of coverage to
even minor CPDM functions while blacking out the most important
oppostdon events.
48
CAMEROON
The press was subjected to repeated attacks during 1991. In
January two journalists, including prominent essayist Celestin
Monga, were arrested and charged with having insulted the
President, the l.'ational Assembly, and the judiciary in an "open
letter" to President Biya. The arrests and trial provoked an
international outcry and led to the first massive
antigovernment demonstrations in Douala since independence.
The journalists were convicted and given token sentences, but
censorship was subsequently relaxed for several months.
Censorship returned with a vengeance in June and July as
seizures of newspapers multiplied rapidly. Even cartoons were
censored. when one newspaper attempted to publish the second
in a series of articles concerning the report on Cameroon in
the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1990, the entire page was censored. Although the
law requires that publishers be notified of seizure orders,
that prescription was seldom followed in practice, and security
forces frequently entered kiosks and bookstores and confiscated
copies of putatively offensive publications without formal
authority.
On July 22, Minister of Information and Culture Augustin
Kontchou Kouomegni set up a special newspaper reading unit at
the national printing company charged with detecting and
censoring anything the Government deemed unworthy of
publication. Legally, this Ministry has no authority to censor
anything, but neither President Biya nor Prime Minister Hayatou
ordered Kontchou to dismantle the unit. Many publishers began
to print their newspapers in Nigeria, and the Government
continued its policy of seizures. Foreign publications
imported into Cameroon are also occasionally seized. In
October the Ministry of Information and Culture proposed a code
of ethics for journalists and a draft law governing the
exercise of the journalistic profession. The proposals angered
journalists, who viewed them as another heavy-handed government
attempt to censor them.
After one newspaper published a document establishing that
gendarmerie authorities in Douala had taken protection money
from local merchants. Minister of Territorial Administration
Gilbert Andze Tsoungui banned three independent newspapers.
The newspapers responded by changing their names and continuing
to publish. The Minister promptly banned the new
publications. In mid-November, the bans on six of the (by that
time) seven banned papers were lifted as part of an agreement
between the Government and the opposition. On September 4,
security forces in Douala attacked a group of journalists and
other citizens protesting the banning of independent newspapers
and invaded the offices of La Detente, where some of the
protesters had taken refuge. Employing rubber truncheons and
firing live ammunition and tear gas, the security forces
brutally took some 40 persons into custody for several hours.
Several of those detained reportedly suffered serious injuries,
including broken limbs and at least one gunshot wound.
There are no restrictions on academic freedom, though it is
generally believed that CENER informants pervade the campus of
the University of Yaounde. Some university professors believe
that their political viewpoints and activism have had a
negative impact on professional opportunities and advancement.
49
CAMEROON
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly" and association are provided for in law but
are restricted in practice. Laws enacted in late 1990
liberalized Cameroonians ' ability to form private associations
and political parties but did not address the formation of
labor unions (see Section 6.a.). The Penal Code prohibits
public meetings, demonstrations, or processions without prior
government approval. The 1990 law on freedom of association
provided that Cameroonians may freely form associations simply
by notifying the responsible administrative authority according
to a set procedure. The authority is required formally to
acknowledge that notification by issuing a receipt to the
associations' organizers. Barring notification to the
contrary, the group is considered to be a legal entity on the
60th day after issuance of the administrative receipt. In
practice, some administrators refused to issue the receipt
called for by law, providing instead a piece of paper promising
to deliver the receipt at a later date. As a result, a number
of groups were put into a sort of legal limbo, neither
authorized nor refused authorization. In mid-July Minister
Tsoungui banned six groups on the grounds that they had engaged
in activities not foreseen in their charters and had advocated
civil disobedience. The organizations banned were: the
self-described human rights groups, Cap-Liberte, Cameroon
Organization for Human Rights (OCDH), and Human Rights Watch;
the women's rights group. Collective of Women for the New Deal
(CFR); the Cameroon Professional Drivers Association; and the
Sportsmen's Association of Cameroon. Although the law permits
organizations to appeal a banning order, the groups were unable
to commence action for nearly 6 weeks because the Government
refused to provide the official notification of banning
required by the law until about August 22. Meanwhile, law
enforcement and administrative authorities took action to
prevent the groups in question from holding meetings.
Authorities continue occasionally to compel citizens to attend
rallies in support of the Government or the ruling party. In
March, for example, the subprefect for Maroua wrote a decree
ordering traditional rulers in his jurisdiction to participate
in a CPDM meeting, warning that "no absence would be tolerated.'
The 1990 law on political parties established criteria for the
formation of political parties. Although some political party
leaders expressed suspicion that the Government was
unreasonably delaying authorization of their parties, there is
no evidence that government officials failed to respect the
letter of the law in that respect. By the end of 1991, more
than 40 political parties were in existence.
The Government's record on permitting parties to carry out
their activities is not nearly so positive. While the law
calls for 7 days' advance notification to the responsible
administrative authority of any public meeting or march, the
ruling CPDM was on several occasions permitted to schedule
demonstrations on less than 7 days' notice. Opposition
parties, on the other hand, frequently experienced the
frustration of having their marches canceled at the last minute
by civil administrators citing vague threats to public
security. As tensions rose in the period after May 16 — when
the opposition called for concerted action against the central
Government — some prefects banned all demonstrations of a
political nature in their areas of responsibility. However, in
a number of cases, the ruling CPDM was nonetheless permitted to
continue to hold meetings and other functions. For several
50
CAMEROON
months during 1991, the opposition Social Democratic Front
(SDF) sponsored thrice-weekly marches in Bamenda, refusing to
seek the required permit.
c. Freedom of Religion
Cameroon is a secular state. There is no established
religion. Roughly 25 percent of Cameroonians are Muslims, 40
percent are Christians, and the rest follow traditional
beliefs. Some blend elements of Christianity with traditional
practices. Officials of the Government and the CPDM include
members of all three groups. Freedom of religion is provided
for in the Constitution, but a religious group must be approved
and registered with the Ministry of Territorial Administration
in order to exist and function legally. In 1991 a small group
called Universal was banned without explanation in the
Southwest Province. Government officials state that no
Jehovah's Witnesses are imprisoned as a result of their beliefs
and that the Witnesses, banned from 1970 until 1990, are now
free to practice their religion. While there have been
isolated incidents of religious intolerance, the Government
discourages such acts, and most Cameroonians are proud of their
tradition of religious harmony.
The Government does not discourage the practice of traditional
religions. Acts of witchcraft, divination, or magic "liable to
disrupt public order or tranquility, or to harm persons or
property" are outlawed, with potential penalties of up to 10
years' imprisonment. Missionaries played a major role in the
development of Cameroon and continue to be active. Foreign
clergy suffer no ill-treatment. There are no particular
restrictions on places of worship, the training of clergy,
religious education, or participation in charitable
activities. Conversions are common. Independent Christian and
Muslim publications exist in Cameroon, and there is no evidence
they are more heavily censored than is the secular press.
There are no restrictions on religious travel, such as the hajj.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement within the country is not restricted by
law. Police frequently stop travelers to check identification
documents, vehicle registrations, and tax receipts as a
security and immigration control measure. After the onset of
widespread civil unrest in mid-May, the checks became pervasive
and occasionally oppressive. Ordinary citizens were at times
hindered in going about their business by as many as 10
roadblocks within a 100-kilometer stretch of highway.
Personnel manning these roadblocks frequently solicit bribes to
speed passage. Authorities sometimes employed these roadblocks
to limit the activities of political parties. At one time, the
road between Douala and Yaounde was closed for 2 days as part
of a government effort to prevent opposition sympathizers from
traveling to the capital.
The Government has sometimes used its passport control function
against those it considers real or potential threats. Writer
and economist Celestin Monga ' s passport was seized at Douala
International Airport on orders of the national police chief in
late August without legal justification. Monga said he was
told his passport was "a privilege granted to you by the
national chief of police, and he may withdraw it at any time."
During the same period, five opposition leaders had their
planned visit to France in late August disrupted by the
51
CAMEROON
Government's decision to delay their departure through
temporary passport seizures and other administrative means.
After the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)
collapsed in late June, many Cameroonian residents of Pakistani
and Indian nationality having no connection to BCCI or its
Cameroonian affiliate were temporarily prevented from traveling
outside the country by confiscation of their passports.
Over the years, Cameroon has served as a safe haven for
thousands of displaced persons and refugees. An estimated
35,000 refugees are currently in Cameroon. The majority are
Chadians who arrived in the early 1980 's and who live,
unregistered, in border areas. In December 1990, an additional
influx of 3,500 refugees entered Cameroon after the fall of the
Habre government in Chad. Most returned to Chad in early
1991. The latest group of Chadian refugees came to Cameroon in
October 1991. Numbering about 1,000, they are being assisted
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the
Poll Faro refugee camp. Although Cameroon occasionally returns
illegal Chadian immigrants, there were no reports of forced
repatriation of recognized refugees in 1991.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Major legal changes effected late in 1990, if fully and fairly
implemented, would permit a return to the functioning
multiparty system abandoned in 1966. Throughout 1991, however,
Cameroon continued to be a de facto one-party state with
political power and administrative authority concentrated in
the Presidency. The President appoints all cabinet members,
governors, and prefects. The Prime Minister, whose position
was restored by constitutional amendment in 1991, has
considerable responsibility in the economic sphere but no power
to remove ministers or to deal directly with the National
Assembly. However, the elected National Assembly continued a
recent trend toward playing a more active role in determining
the country's direction.
During the year, many opposition political parties were
authorized. Widespread dissatisfaction with the Government and
the CPDM boosted opposition parties' popularity. A coalition
was formed among the opposition parties which demanded that the
Government hold a national conference. The Government refused,
arguing that such a meeting would be nondemocratic and
extraconstitut ional . In response, the opposition organized a
series of general strikes and acts of civil disobedience, known
as "Operation Ghost Towns," which lasted from mid-May until
early December. In December President Biya promulgated a new
electoral code, which, together with constitutional amendments
enacted earlier, delineates a parliamentary system under which
the Prime Minister would be chosen from the party or parties
comprising the National Assembly's majority. In October
President Biya announced that multiparty elections would be
held on February 16, 1992. At year's end, most opposition
parties were lobbying strongly for a date in late May amid
numerous credible reports of irregularities in the voter
registration process.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In November President Biya named members to the National
Committee on Human Rights And Liberties which he had created a
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52
CAMEROON
year earlier. At year's end, government officials indicated
that these members would be installed in January 1992. The
decree which established the committee stipulated that it would
act as Cameroon's official link to nongovernmental
organizations concerned about human rights issues.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Access to the Government's social programs is open to all
Cameroonian citizens on a nondiscriminatory basis. President
Biya has repeatedly stressed publicly the dangers of tribalism,
but there remains deep-seated suspicion among ethnic groups, to
which government officials are far from immune. Cameroon is
officially bilingual, but the Anglophone minority (20 percent)
often charges that it is denied economic opportunity and real
political power. The Francophone Bamileke, the country's
largest single ethnic group (also about 20 percent of the
population), level similar charges against the rest of the body
politic. Following unrest at Yaounde University in April and
May, security forces frequently targeted Anglophone and
Bamileke students for harassment solely because of their
linguistic/ethnic affiliation. Most observers agree that
interethnic animosity became more open and more venomous during
1991. Independent newspapers associated with the opposition
frequently attacked the Beti, while those close to the
Government fulminated against the Bamileke, Anglophones, and,
to a lesser extent. Northerners.
Women are granted equal rights under the Constitution, and some
are politically active in the party and the sole legal labor
federation. However, significant cultural pressure is brought
to bear on women to remain subservient to men. Polygamy is
permitted by law and tradition, but polyandry is not. The
extent to which a woman may inherit from her husband is
normally governed by customary law in the absence of a will,
and traditions vary from group to group. In cases of divorce,
the husband's wishes determine custody of children over the age
of six. A married woman may not legally obtain contraceptives
without her husband's consent; neither may she be sterilized
without his authorization. While a man can be convicted of
adultery only if the sexual act takes place in his home, a
female can be convicted irrespective of venue.
In many traditional societies, custom grants greater authority
and benefits to male than to female heirs. The percentage of
female secondary school students increased by 45 percent
between 1970 and 1986. Girls made up 45.7 percent of primary
school pupils in 1986, but that percentage drops to 38.3
percent at the secondary level and to only 14 percent at
university level.
Women's rights advocates report that violence against women has
surged in the past 2 years, and the law does not impose
effective penalties against violators. Wife beating is not, of
itself, a legal ground for divorce. Most women regard having
been the victim of a sexual assault as so profoundly shameful
that they cannot bring themselves to confront the assailant.
The commission investigating the behavior of security forces
during unrest at Yaounde University wrote, "We found that the
chances that there were rapes are very high, but no young woman
presented herself to be heard." Frequently, a victim's family
or village takes matters into its own hands and imposes direct,
summary punishment upon the suspected perpetrator through means
ranging from destruction of property to lynching.
53
CAMEROON
While there are no reliable statistics on the frequency with
which violence against women takes place, newspaper articles
indicate the frequency is high. Female circumcision is not
common in Cameroon-. It is practiced by a limited number of
traditional Muslim families and is almost unheard of in other
groups .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The 1990 law on associations specifically excluded trade
unions, and there is still no law pertaining to the
organization of trade unions. There are reports of at least
three nascent trade unions that find themselves unable to
function fully because of the ambiguity of their status. Civil
servants are not permitted to join trade unions.
The Organization of United Cameroonian Workers (OSTC) , the
umbrella group for the country's officially sanctioned trade
unions, announced during 1991. that, because Cameroon was moving
toward a multiparty system, it had severed its formal links
with the ruling CPDM and would henceforth be neutral within the
context of party politics.
Strikes are authorized only on a few, severely restricted
grounds; likewise, political activity by trade unions, except
for action designed to protect economic and other interests, is
prohibited. Strikes do occur, however, though they are usually
directed at single enterprises and seldom last more than a few
days. Most strikes during 1991 were by employees of
government-owned enterprises seeking payment of overdue wages
and salaries. Most strikes were settled through negotiation,
but the Government showed mixed tolerance for strikers trying
to attract the attention of higher authorities to their
concerns .
The OSTC is a member of the continentwide official trade union
body, the Organization of African Trade Union Unity, but all
contact with foreign trade union organizations requires
government authorization.
The International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee of
Experts (COE) noted once again in 1991 that various legislative
provisions, which regulate the right of public servants to
organize, restrict their right to strike, and ban foreign
workers from trade union office, are inconsistent with ILO
Convention 87 on freedom of association.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Although the Labor Code recognizes the right of trade unions or
trade union federations to engage in collective bargaining with
employers or groups of employers, true collective bargaining
between employers and workers is rare. Under the law, all
employers of more than 10 workers must permit the election of a
worker representative from among the employees. This worker
representative has a statutory right to discuss labor
conditions with the employer on behalf of the employees and
enjoys special protection from arbitrary dismissal. Candidates
for these positions must be approved by the OSTC. While the
Labor Code does not provide specific penalties for those who
violate its provisions, it does state that any act in
contravention of its provisions shall be null and void. Also,
54
CAMEROON
employees may, and often successfully do, pursue formal labor
complaints, which often include demands for payment of damages.
There are no export processing zones in Cameroon, but one is in
the formative stages, and others are under consideration.
Legislation enacted to govern operations within such zones
states that "the current terms and conditions of employment
must be consistent with internationally accepted workers'
rights . "
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by the Labor Code. However,
concerns expressed in 1990 by the ILO's Conference Committee on
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations concerning
the use of prison labor (inmates from Cameroon's "production
prisons" are sometimes rented out to private employers as day
labor) remained valid in 1991. There have been reports of
communal labor being employed in some traditional societies.
In December the government-owned newspaper reported that
"slavery is still practiced" in Rey Bouba (see also Section
l.d.).
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Code sets the minimum working age at 14 — a rule that
appears to be respected and enforced in the modern wage
sector . Inspectors from the Ministry of Labor are empowered to
enforce provisions of Cameroon's Labor Code, as are labor
courts. In rural areas, where 80 percent of Cameroon's
citizens engage in farming, children participate at an early
age in agricultural work alongside adults. In addition, young
relatives, especially girls from rural areas, are often
employed in the household as domestics. Street vendors in
urban areas are occasionally under age 14.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum monthly wages are set by the Government for all public
and private sector jobs and cover a wide range. These rates
are determined by a complex formula which takes into account
geographic location, education, experience, and profession and
type of industry. The Ministry of Labor is responsible for
making the necessary calculations. Most workers in the modern
sector are paid well in excess of the minimum wage. The lowest
wages are insufficient to support a family but usually are
supplemented by a second job or another family member's
earnings. Workers with middle-range wages also are likely to
need second incomes to support a family, especially in Yaounde
and Douala.
Under the Labor Code, the minimum annual paid vacation is 18
days, and the legal workweek ranges from 40 hours for
nonagricultural employees to 56 hours per week for security
guards. In order to make room for younger workers, civil
servants are encouraged to retire upon reaching the minimum
retirement age of 55. The Ministry of Labor sets health and
safety standards, which are enforced by labor inspectors.
Enforcement of standards varies. Labor inspectors will
generally investigate complaints and frequently find for the
complainant. However, many employees are loath to file
complaints, and spot inspections are rare.
55
CAPE VERDE
In 1991 Cape Verde became the first African country to change
governments peacefully following a popular election won by an
opposition party. - Dr. Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro, an
independent, won over 70 percent of the popular vote in the
February elections and was inaugurated as President in March
1991. The Movement for Democracy (MPD) , headed by Dr. Carlos
Wahnon de Carvalho Veiga, also won over 70 percent of the
popular vote in the January legislative elections. The new
Government, with Carlos Veiga as Prime Minister and concurrent
Defense Minister, was invested in April. Both the President
and the Prime Minister came to office with strong human rights
credentials .
The new Government began in 1991 to reorganize and democratize
the security forces, including disbanding the secret police.
It accelerated preparations to create a coast guard as a
nucleus of a reorganized military force, dedicated to the
protection of Cape Verde's exclusive economic zone and to drug
interdiction. Control of the police and local administration
are being decentralized and will be in the hands of locally
elected mayors and municipal councils. The police force is
being demilitarized and patterned after police forces in
Western democracies.
Cape Verde has few exploitable natural resources, aside from an
attractive climate, a hardworking population (350,000), and a
strategically placed geographic position. Cape Verdeans have a
long history of economically driven emigration, primarily to
Western Europe and the United States. In 1991 Cape Verde,
which is unable to produce enough food to feed its population
in years of optimum rainfall, experienced its worst drought
since 1985, requiring substantial international food aid. The
Government set in motion plans to privatize many of Cape
Verde's state-owned firms and to base future development on the
private sector.
In 1991 the human rights climate in Cape Verde improved
significantly with the change from an authoritarian, Marxist
centralized government. The first decision taken by the Veiga
Government prohibits private or official investigations of
citizens to determine their political affiliation. The
Government's 5-year plan, adopted at the first multiparty
National Assembly session in June, enshrined a commitment to
pluralistic democracy and a basic liberal economic framework.
The new Government disbanded the popular militas and the
popular courts, which had been instruments of party and
government control, and established a human rights commission
to serve as a watchdog against human rights abuses.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reported instances of political or other
extrajudicial killings in 1991.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported instances of disappearances.
56
CAPE VERDE
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Police brutality has not been a problem in 1990 and 1991. In
1991 one of the first acts of the new Government was to disband
the secret police, which had been accused in the past of
abusing prisoners. There was no evidence of torture or other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment during the
year .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Cape Verdean law requires that an accused person, unless caught
in the act of committing a crime, be brought before a judge to
be charged within 48 hours of arrest. Additionally, a person
may not be arrested without court order unless caught in the
act of committing a felony. In exceptional cases, with the
concurrence of a court official, the formal charge process may
be delayed up to 5 days after the arrest. These provisions are
observed in practice.
However, for crimes against state security, persons may be
detained for up to 5 months without trial upon a judge's
ruling. Prior to 1991, this loophole was occasionally abused,
especially in cases of arbitrary arrest by members of the
"popular militia," a paramilitary organization associated with
the former ruling party but disbanded by the new Government.
There were no known security detentions in 1991. There is a
functioning system of bail, and everyone is entitled to
representation by an attorney in civil or criminal cases.
There were no known instances of forced exile for political or
other reasons .
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system includes a Supreme Court, whose members are
appointed by the Government, and regional courts. The
autonomous Institute for Judicial Support, to which most
private lawyers belong, provides counsel for indigent
defendants. Trials are conducted by one judge, without a jury,
and appear to be handled expeditiously. Trials are public, and
evidence suggests that the courts protect individual rights in
criminal cases. Verdicts may be appealed. Regional courts
adjudicate minor disputes on a local level in rural areas. The
judges, appointees of the Ministry of Justice, are usually
prominent local citizens without legal training.
Regional court decisions may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
In 1991 it was widely perceived that there had been increased
judicial independence under the new Government. There were no
known political prisoners at the end of 1991.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution recognizes the citizen's rights to the
inviolability of domicile, correspondence, and other means of
communication, and these rights are respected in practice. The
law requires warrants issued by a judge before searches of
homes may be conducted.
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CAPE VERDE
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution proclaims freedom of speech and intellectual
creativity, including the rights of authorship. However, it
also stipulates that none of these rights and freedoms may be
exercised "contrary to national unity." While freedom of the
press is not a specific constitutional guarantee, a law adopted
in December 1985 assures citizens the right to express their
thoughts in the press in a responsible manner. Although the
term "responsible manner" is not defined in law, no journalist
or newspaper has been punished for actions considered to be
irresponsible. There is no evidence to indicate that
self-censorship is a significant factor in Cape Verde.
Throughout 1991, the most widely read newspaper, the radio, and
the television, all government owned, gave balanced coverage to
government and opposition viewpoints. The first multiparty
National Assembly session was broadcast live in its entirety.
After the new Government was invested, the official newspaper
Vozdipovo dedicated the first page to letters to the editor,
generally half supportive and half critical of the Government.
The Prime Minister announced at midyear that the Government
would no longer subsidize advertisements by state-owned firms
in the major opposition newspaper. The Government said it had
no obligation to subsidize a partisan journal through its
advertising. The move was seen as giving unfair advantage to
the ruling party. Local radio broadcasts carry items from a
variety of international press sources, generally balancing
coverage and identifying sources on controversial international
issues .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The 1980 Constitution provided for the freedom to assemble,
associate, and demonstrate; however, in practice these freedoms
were limited to the party meetings and groups in power until
1990. In 1990 the National Assembly adopted a law permitting
political associations to form and assemble publicly, and
subsequently it legalized political opposition parties. By
early 1991, two political parties contested the democratic
elections, the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde
(PAICV, the Government) and the MPD . Later in 1991, the
Independent and Democratic Cape Verde Union (UCID) was also
legalized as a political party by the Supreme Court.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution requires separation of church and state.
Freedom of worship is respected by the Government; members of
all faiths practice their religion without harassment. Some 80
to 90 percent of the population, including much of the
government leadership, is nominally Catholic.
There are no restrictions on religious practices, teaching, or
contacts with coreligionists outside Cape Verde. Foreign
missionaries operate freely in Cape Verde; more than half of
the Catholic clergy are foreigners. Cape Verdean immigration
law requires that missionaries applying for residence belong to
a denomination with a recognized membership in Cape Verde. In
this context, two American Mormon missionaries were asked to
leave Cape Verde in 1989 after their visitor's visas expired;
however, American Mormon missionaries were readmitted to Cape
58
CAPE VERDE
Verde in 1990, and in 1991 the American Nazarenne Evangelists
opened three new churches. There is also a small community of
Muslims who are free to practice in Praia.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no extraordinary legal or administrative restrictions
on travel or residence in Cape Verde. Indeed, the Government
maintains an office to serve intending emigrants. A law
requiring citizens wishing to leave, either temporarily or
permanently, to obtain an exit permit was abolished in late
1991. Permission has not been denied for political reasons.
Historically, emigration has been an important and recognized
means to escape from harsh economic conditions. The Government
maintains close contact with emigre communities and encourages
Cape Verdeans living abroad, including dual nationals, to
maintain ties with their homeland. Nationality laws were
passed in 1990 to permit Cape Verdeans who had accepted a
second nationality to reapply for Cape Verdean citizenship.
Repatriation is a constitutional right that is not discouraged
by the Government. On the other hand, the law allows for
revocation of citizenship on several grounds, including
activities contrary to the interest of the country. However,
there were no known cases of the Government having instituted
proceedings to deprive persons of citizenship or residence in
Cape Verde for political reasons. This includes the period of
the hotly contested legislative and presidential elections in
early 1991, when Cape Verdeans resident abroad challenged the
incumbent Government .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
After 15 years of one-party, postcolonial rule by the PAICV,
Democracy came to Cape Verde in January 1991. For the first
time Cape Verdean citizens had a clear choice between
candidates, and they flocked to the polls to elect new
legislative leadership. The opposition party, the MPD, won
with over 70 percent of the popular vote. Cape Verdeans
repeated this performance 1 month later, by electing President
Antonio Mascarenhas, over the long-time PAICV incumbent
Aristides Pereira. During the campaign, the victors promised
democracy, scrupulous observance of human rights, and economic
liberalization. Throughout 1991 Cape Verde's new leadership
has made efforts to carry out its campaign promises. Members
of the former government indicated acceptance of their role as
the opposition, and the PAICV began reorganizing itself with
the aim of contesting future elections.
The local elections held in mid-December were the final phase
in freely electing political institutions at all levels of
government. The predominant campaign themes centered on social
justice and a fair distribution of scarce resources. The
elections were orderly, and there was no evidence of electoral
fraud.
Under the former PAICV-dominated government, the Presidency
gained greatly enhanced powers. Specifically, the President is
authorized to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister subject
only to parliamentary confirmation, to dissolve the National
Assembly, within certain restrictions, and to veto
legislation. An absolute majority is required for the
legislature to override a veto. During the 1991 legislative
59
CAPE VERDE
campaign, the MPD vowed to rewrite the Constitution with one of
the announced aims to diminish presidential powers.
Subsequently, to allow time for public consultations, the new
Governm.ent postponed introducing a new Constitution to the
National Assembly until 1992.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged violations
of Human Rights
While there are no official restrictions, no private human
rights groups have formed to date. In late 1991, the
Government established a human rights commission with the
objective of raising popular consciousness of the need for
respect for human rights at the individual and institutional
levels. Cape Verde has traditionally cooperated fully with
representatives of private human rights organizations who visit
Cape Verde periodically to investigate alleged violations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Racial discrimination is not a problem in Cape Verde where the
vast majority of the population shares Portuguese and African
ancestry. Sex discrimination is banned by the Constitution,
and the family code, enacted in October 1981, prescribes the
full equality of men and women in law, including equal pay for
equal work. However, traditional male-oriented Portuguese and
African values predominate, and women are, in fact, excluded
from certain types of employment and are often paid less than
men. Educational statistics show 53 percent male/47 percent
female enrollments through secondary school, 30/70 percent in
the technical school, and 55/45 percent in the teachers'
training school .
In 1991 the Government made efforts to involve more women in
political, economic, and social activities. In addition to
naming two women as secretaries of state, women also were
appointed head of the hospital in Cape Verde's second largest
city, head of the largest state-owned enterprise, head of the
national health program, and head of the health program for
Praia, the largest municipality. A conscious effort is made to
employ women in labor-intensive economic development projects
financed by foreign grants. The Organization of Cape Verdean
Women was founded in 1980, with government encovaragement , to
sensitize the citizenry to issues affecting women. It
continues to operate, even though it no longer is subsidized by
the new Government .
Domestic violence against women, including wife beating,
remains common, particularly in the rural areas. Crimes such
as rape and spouse abuse are rarely brought to the attention of
the police or tried in the courts. Neither the Government nor
the womens ' organizations has addressed directly the issue of
violence against women. The Ministry of Health and Social
Affairs has undertaken, with U.S. financial assistance, to
publicize the civil and human rights of women and children.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers are legally free to form and join unions of their
choosing, and no longer must belong to the National Union of
Cape Verde Workers--Trade Union Confederation (UNTC-CS) . In
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CAPE VERDE
1991 the new Government broke all ties, including subsidies, to
the UNTC-CS which had been controlled by the previous
government and party in power. The UNTC-CS has attempted to
adapt to the new situation and in 1991, for the first time,
took positions independent of those of the Government. In
addition to suffering serious financial problems, UNTC-CS
membership declined as Cape Verde began to privatize the
economy with a subsequent loss of patronage jobs in the heavily
staffed public sector of the economy.
Legislation passed in September 1990 guarantees workers the
legal right to strike. There were periodic strikes throughout
1991, most frequently in the state-owned organizations. Unions
are now free to affiliate internationally, and the UNTC-CS
joined the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in
1991 .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Legislation provides the right to organize and function without
hindrance. Workers and management reach agreement through
collective bargaining in the small private sector. However,
despite the new Government's plans to denationalize, it
remains the largest employer and continues to play a dominant
role in setting wages and other benefits for most of the
economy. Cape Verde does not have an export processing zone.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is forbidden by law and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 14, and children under 16 are
prohibited from working at night, for more than 7 hours per
day, or in establishments where toxic products are used. There
is no enforcement mechanism for minimum age laws, but
observance is not a problem in the small informal sector of an
economy in which unemployment and underemployment approached 70
percent of the work force.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wage rates are established by the Government for both
the public and private sectors. These minimum wages are not
sufficient to provide a worker and his family a decent standard
of living, and most workers must rely on a combination of
second jobs, extended family help, or subsistence agriculture.
All enterprises must submit a yearly report to the Director
General of Labor with information on salaries and wages of all
employees. This provides the Government with a vehicle for
controlling employment practices.
The normal workweek for adults is 44 hours over 5 1/2 days,
with at least 1 free day per week. While large employers
generally respect these regulations and minimum wage standards,
many employed in domestic service or by small employers in
rural areas do not enjoy legally mandated work conditions.
There does not appear to be an overall safety and health code,
although some regulations exist in this area. The Director
General of Labor, under the Ministry of Justice, Public
Administration and Labor, is responsible for enforcing labor
regulations. However, Cape Verde has few industries that
employ heavy or dangerous equipment, and work-related accidents
are uncommon. Consequently, there is no systematic government
enforcement of labor laws.
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The Central African Republic (C.A.R.) has been ruled since 1981
by General Andre Dieudonne Kolingba, who came to power in a
bloodless coup and', with backing from the military, has since
exercised virtually full political control. In 1986 General
Kolingba was elected unopposed to a 6-year term as President,
and a Constitution was adopted establishing a National
Assembly. The following year the Central African Democratic
Assembly Party (RDC) was formed as the sole legal party. Faced
with growing public discontent. General Kolingba announced in
April 1991 that other parties legally registered by the
Ministry of the Interior could compete with the RDC for
legislative elections in March 1992 and for presidential
elections in November 1992. At year's end there were 15
registered parties, and the Government continued to move slowly
toward political liberalization.
The Ministry of Defense controls military and national
gendarmerie forces totaling 4,000 troops. These forces share
internal security responsibilities with the civilian police
force under the Ministry of Public Security, which is
responsible for normal police functions. President Kolingba
controls a 1,400-man presidential security force led by 150
French advisers.
The C.A.R. is a landlocked and sparsely populated country, most
of whose inhabitants practice subsistence agriculture. The
principal agricultural exports are coffee, cotton, timber, and
tobacco. Since 1982 the Government has tried to implement
economic structural reforms in cooperation with international
donors. However, with continuing unfavorable world economic
trends and corruption and mismanagement in government, progress
has remained elusive. Also, workers became increasingly
discontented in 1991, and labor unrest throughout the year
paralyzed the economy and public administration.
Human rights remained circumscribed in 1991. Major abuses were
the use of arbitrary arrest and detention against political
opponents and workers; repeated interference in the judicial
process; and continued abridgements of freedoms of speech,
press, assembly, and worker rights. More than 30 union members
were arrested in July for essentially peaceful political
activity. After holding dissident General Francois Bozize in
detention for 2 years without charge or trial, the Government
brought him and four of his associates — all of whom were
forcibly repatriated from Benin in 1989 — to trial in
September. The High Court of Justice acquitted Bozize and two
others, but the Ministry of Justice refused to release them;
the President subsequently pardoned them on December 1, along
with all other political detainees. The Government's tactics
against the growing opposition, including slow progress toward
convening a national conference, undercut the progress made in
political party formation and the Government's promise of free
elections .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated killings, but
there were a few reports of extrajudicial killing. In January
a government official announced that Pierre Wanga and three
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others had been beaten while in police custody in 1990 and that
Wanga had died as a result. Although the Government announced
that there would be a complete investigation and that suspects
had been arrested, there was no subsequent announcement
concerning judicial action.
In August government soldiers killed an unknown number of
youths under questionable circumstances at a coffee storage
warehouse outside of Bangui. Officials of the Central African
League of Human Rights claimed the youths were students
protesting government policy towards the opposition on property
owned by a presidential ally; the Government charged that the
youths were part of a bandit gang. During a demonstration on
May 6 in Bangui against governmental education policy, a
secondary school student was fatally injured by a tear gas
canister fired by security forces.
b. Disappearance
There were no confirmed reports of politically motivated
disappearance .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Penal Code prohibits torture and defines sanctions for
those found guilty of physical abuse. Nonetheless, reports of
police beatings of criminal suspects continue as in the case of
Pierre Wanga.
The physical conditions of Central African prisons are hard.
One pro-opposition group reported that some of its members were
jailed for up to 6 months from September 1990 to March 1991 in
cramped cells without toilet facilities and only such food and
other necessities as families could provide.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
In 1991 the Government used detention to suppress political
activity, holding labor activists and opposition supporters for
protracted periods on charges of being a threat to state
security.
Persons detained in nonpolitical cases must be brought before a
magistrate within 96 hours. In practice, inefficient judicial
procedures often caused this deadline to be exceeded. Further,
according to credible reports, three persons have been held in
Ngaragba prison without charge or trial since March 1990,
reportedly because they failed to pay a bribe to a local
official. No system of bail exists, but sometimes persons are
released on their own recognizance.
Political detainees may be held without charge for up to 2
months. The Government consistently ignored this limit or held
persons without trial for long periods while preparing the
State's case against them. The Government does not reveal the
number of political detainees it holds. The number of those
arrested and detained tended to rise during strikes and
opposition activities. In January more than 50 prisoners were
known to be in detention. In April the Government announced
the release of 48 political prisoners, including Ruth Rolland
and Phillipe Bolibo, both incarcerated for political opposition
to the regime since 1989. Following a general amnesty on
September 1, the total number of detainees dwindled to 11. At
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year's end, there were no known political detainees or
prisoners being held.
Other political dfetainees released during the year included 21
members of the Coordinating Committee for the Convocation of a
National Conference (CCCCN) . They were released in March after
6-months ' incarceration on the grounds of insufficient evidence
to warrant trial. The CCCCN group, which had called for a
national conference independent of the ruling RDC congress, had
been arrested in September and October 1990 for attending an
opposition meeting.
Among those detained in 1991 were Roger Poguy Magineaud, a
businessman, detained and questioned for 7 days in May about
his alleged political activities. During the first week of
July, at least 25 people, including three prominent labor
leaders, were arrested during strikes in Bangui (see Section
6.a.). Most were detained following confrontations between
police and workers at the labor union headquarters in Bangui
and released on July 11, but the three union leaders were
charged with inciting violence and given suspended sentences of
1 to 3 years on July 31.
Concerned relatives and opposition leaders claimed that several
youths were arrested following the demonstrations on May 4-6
and flown to Birao in the furthest northeast corner of the
country. Criminals and "undesirables" have been exiled there
in the past. The authorities acknowledged that government
policy directs the police to arrest youths not possessing valid
identification and work papers, but they did not provide
specific information on this case.
Exile is not permitted in law and is not practiced by the
Government, but a number of political opponents have left the
country to avoid government sanctions. Among well-known
self-exiles are Rodolph Iddi-Lala, currently in Togo, and Ange
Patasse, currently in Paris.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary consists of regular and military courts, with the
Supreme Court at the apex. In common criminal cases, the
accused have a right to legal counsel at all stages, trials are
public, and defendants have a right to be present. These
safeguards generally apply in practice. Insufficient
resources, however, including inadequate training of officials,
sometimes hampers administration of the law, and persistent
traditional beliefs regarding witchcraft and sorcery sometimes
overcome strict adherence to formal rules of evidence.
In political cases, the Government frequently interferes, and
the procedural safeguards specified above do not apply.
Created in 1988 to try "political" prisoners, the High Court of
Justice heard its first cases in September 1991, those of
General Francois Bozize and four codef endants . Political
prisoners are generally defined in the Central African
Constitution as persons who threaten state security. In a
public trial, the Court unconditionally acquitted Bozize and
two others of political charges but remanded the two
codef endants to criminal court for further action. Although
the High Court of Justice is constitutionally defined as the
court of last appeal for political cases, the Minister of
Justice refused to accept the verdict and immediately
instituted new legal steps against Bozize and the two others.
A three-judge panel subsequently decided that the three must
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stand trial again before the Supreme Court on charges stenuning
from an alleged 1982 coup attempt. On December 1, the
President pardoned Bozize and his codef endants . Some local
human rights activists criticized the State's arbitrary
handling of the Bozize case, including the sudden Presidential
pardon and complained about official media coverage of the
affair .
The Ministry of Justice took several other steps to check
growing judicial independence, creating the post of Inspector
General charged with oversight of justice, removing the
President of the Supreme Court, and replacing the president of
a tribunal which had ruled to annul a government decision to
suspend six union federations.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government rarely abused legal prohibitions on invasion of
the home without a warrant in civil and criminal cases, but in
political and security cases, police are legally permitted to
search private property without written authorization and do so
in practice. The Government maintains a close watch on
citizens who are suspected of opposing it. To combat local
crime, including robbery and assault, the RDC political party
created citizens' action groups called vigilance committees in
1988, consisting of 20 volunteers per neighborhood. These
committees have sometimes intruded on police responsibilities
but in general were less active in 1991.
Civil servants were not required to join the ruling RDC, but
there were strong social pressures to join, particularly in the
case of those holding high-level positions.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The right of private citizens to speak publicly about political
developments or to criticize the Government is circumscribed,
although most people feel free to comment privately on
political affairs. The National Assembly provides a
constitutional forum for public discussion of government
policies, but since the Assembly is traditionally obedient to
the executive, few citizens follow Assembly debates or approach
their representatives with concerns.
Newspapers, radio, and television are all government owned and
controlled. Unswerving in their support for President Kolingba
and the RDC, the media do not provide objective coverage of
important national political developments, including the Bozize
trial (see Section I.e.). Despite a September pledge, the
Government did not give opposition parties equal access to the
national media. Domestic news favored upbeat stories and
noncontroversial events, although the newspapers' awareness
campaign about the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)
through articles and advertisements addressed a major domestic
health problem. Opposition parties and groups published and
distributed manifestos, policy statements, and analyses of
events, most often in typewritten and photocopied form.
Reporting on international news was selective and avoided
events that might have embarrassed friendly foreign
governments, but radio broadcasts, over the course of the year.
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
did cover reform of other single-party systems in Africa and
Eastern Europe.
Academic freedom. is limited: striking teachers in 1990 and
1991 were important actors in maintaining pressures for
political reform.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right of assembly is constitutionally guaranteed but is
restricted in practice. Several labor and student
demonstrations were broken up by police, and the Ministry of
the Interior banned a political rally in September.
The Government addressed demands from a cross-section of
Central African society for a national conference to discuss
current political problems and the future political structure
of the C.A.R. by promising in September to schedule for
February 1992 a "national debate." No date had been set by
year's end. The RDC declared in October 1990 its intention to
pursue democratization within a single-party system. However,
in April 1991 President Kolingba suddenly announced to the RDC
leadership that he would permit mult ipartyism . In June the
National Assembly drafted a law governing the formation,
activities, and dissolution of political parties, and on July 4
the law governing multiparty politics and setting standards for
party registration took effect. This statute required
submission of a dossier for each application containing
information about the party leadership; police records of the
party leaders; the statutes, program, and by-laws of the party;
and the location of the party headquarters. If the Minister of
Territorial Administration does not reject the application
within 45 days, the party automatically becomes a legal
entity. At the end of 1991, there were 15 registered parties,
including the RDC.
c. Freedom of Religion
A variety of religious communities are active in the country,
including traditional African faiths. Christian denominations,
and Muslims. Most religious organizations and missionary
groups are free to proselytize and worship. However, religious
groups must register with the Government, and any group whose
behavior is considered political in nature remains subject to
sanctions .
The Government's 1986 ban on the activities of the Jehovah's
Witnesses community remained in effect on the grounds that this
group's refusal to serve in the army or salute the flag
constituted defiance of government authority. The 1989 ban on
the activities of the Union of Evangelical Pentecostal Churches
for "irresponsible conduct" remained in effect at the end of
1991 .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
While people were generally free to move within the country,
police and other government officials at checkpoints along
major roads sometimes harassed travelers unwilling or unable to
pay bribes. The Government took steps in September to reduce
this practice. The Government recognizes the right of
voluntary travel and repatriation, and financial and
educational constraints, rather than government controls, act
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to restrict most foreign travel and emigration. There were no
known cases of revocation of citizenship.
By the end of 1991, more than 10,000 Sudanese had fled civil
strife in Sudan to seek safe haven in the remote southeastern
corner of the C.A.R. In collaboration with U.N. agencies and
private relief groups, the C.A.R. National Commission for
Refugees is providing assistance to this group. The C.A.R.
also continued to host 1,600 Chadian refugees, and at year's
end the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was still
interviewing those who may choose to repatriate voluntarily.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Despite constitutional guarantees, citizens were not able to
change their government by democratic means in 1991, and until
April only those candidates selected by the ruling RDC were
legally permitted to contest National Assembly elections, next
due in March 1992. The power and prerogatives of the
President, who ran uncontested in the 1986 presidential
elections, and the RDC were not subject to change from below.
President Kolingba allowed his Cabinet some latitude in
day-to-day government administration, but frequent cabinet
changes minimized the effect of broadening this small base of
executive decisionmaking. The President carefully controls
political change, and it remained to be seen at year's end if
the advent of mult ipartyism will bring true democratic reform.
The Constitution grants the National Assembly the authority to
debate and vote on bills proposed by the executive and to
initiate legislation of its own. Assembly sessions sometimes
involved criticism of the Government, and Deputies, who have
immunity, did occasionally modify the language of proposed
legislation. However, the Assembly rejected no legislation
proposed by the executive in 1991. Its initial rejection of
the Government's 1991 budget drew stern rebukes from the
executive branch and was promptly overturned. It is rare that
deputies cast negative votes or abstain.
There are no legal impediments to the participation of citizens
in the political process. In practice, women have generally
not been appointed to high level ministerial positions in the
Government. Of 88 ministers in Kolingba Governments over 10
years, only 2 have been women.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In September the National Assembly agreed to the creation of a
National Human Rights Commission empowered to operate under the
direct authority of the President. This appointive Commission
draws members from a wide array of professions, and its goals
and effectiveness remained unclear at year's end. In June
human rights lawyer Nicholas Tiangaye also created the Central
African Human Rights League (LCDH), a nongovernmental
organization with the declared goals of publicizing human
rights violations in Central Africa, implementing the
international human rights accords to which C.A.R. is a party,
lobbying the Government for improved human rights practices,
and pleading individual cases of human rights abuses before the
courts. The LCDH had some effect in calling attention to
official abuses (see Section l.a.).
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In the past, the Government has permitted representatives of
Amnesty International to visit Bangui on request, and the
regional representative of the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) visited Bangui in July.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution mandates that all persons are ecjual before the
law without regard to wealth, race, or religion. In practice,
however, some minorities receive unequal treatment. The
forest-dwelling Bayaka, commonly known as Pygmies, are subject
to discrimination and exploitation which the Government has
done little to correct. Pygmies are often hired by villagers
to work for wages much lower than those received by other
groups. Muslims, particularly Mbororo (Peuhl) herders, are
sometimes resented by other Central Africans for their
affluence and thus are singled out for harassment, such as
police shakedowns. There are few Muslims in senior government
posts .
There are about 80 ethnic groups in the C.A.R., and President
Kolingba has stressed the desirability of an ethnic balance in
his Cabinet. In practice, however, preference for high
government and military positions has been given to members of
his Yakoma ethnic group, which forms less than 5 percent of the
population. During a special May session of the RDC, the
Government came under public criticism for its ethnic
imbalance. President Kolingba responded by replacing some
Yakoma in his Cabinet but not really addressing the imbalance.
Although the Constitution affirms the equality of all citizens,
women are not in fact treated as equal to men economically,
socially, or politically. Although progress has been made in
narrowing gender differences, gaps exist not only between men
and women, but between urban and rural women as well. Between
60 and 70 percent of urban women go to primary school while
only 10 to 20 percent of their rural counterparts do so. At
the primary level, females and males have ec[ual access to
education, but a majority of females drops out at ages 14 and
15 due to social pressure to marry and bear children. At the
university oi; Bangui, the sole university in the C.A.R., only
20 percent of the students are female.
Traditional patterns persist to a considerable degree. In most
rural areas, where subsistence farming is the chief livelihood,
women continue traditional child-raising and heavy farming
tasks while men frequently seek paid physical day labor or
await hard-to-find salaried work. Some women work in commerce
as market vendors.
There is no precise data on the percentage of women in the wage
labor force, but in cities many educated women find work
outside the traditional patterns. Some hold clerical
positions, and a small but growing number are establishing
private businesses or moving into the upper ranks of the
Government. In 1990 women were accepted for training in the
gendarmerie for the first time; the first of these graduated in
1991.
Polygamy is legal, although fewer women accept the practice
than in the past. A prospective husband must indicate at the
time of the marriage contract whether he intends to take
further wives.
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Violence against women, including wife beating, occurs, but it
is difficult to gauge the extent of the problem, which is
seldom officially reported. Some women believe that spousal
abuse of women has diminished from past levels. The Ministry
of Justice hears few cases of spouse abuse, although the issue
does come up during divorce trials or in civil suits for
damages. Cases of domestic violence occasionally appear in the
press. Some women reportedly tolerate abuse in order to retain
a measure of financial security for themselves and their
children. Neither the Government nor the women's division of
the RDC publicly addressed this issue in 1991.
The Penal Code forbids blows or injuries to children under the
age of 15. Current interpretation of the Code includes
prohibition of female genital mutilation. Nonetheless, the
force of tradition tolerates this practice in rural areas and,
to a lesser degree, in Bangui, although many urban dwellers
consider it an outdated custom. However, it was praised in a
press article on the national mothers' day as a national
tradition.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
During 1991 the Government continued to harass or inhibit labor
activity by banning some organizations and by arresting labor
leaders .
A 1988 law, which entered into force on May 1, 1989, grants all
workers the right of association. Since then teachers, civil
servants, postal workers, and employees in the few large
factories and businesses in Bangui have organized.
Approximately 60 locals exist in Bangui alone. The Ministry of
the Interior has also recognized 10 sectoral unions in Bangui
and 24 provincial unions, all of which belong to the main labor
federation, the Labor Union of Central African Workers (USTC) .
Recognition requirements are pro forma. For most of 1991,
there was only one main labor federation, the USTC, plus six
public sector federations.
The 1988 law provides for the right to strike but only after
rigorous requirements are met, that is, after a government
mediator and an arbitration council both fail to achieve
agreement between labor and management . There were a number of
strikes in 1991 which did not follow these requirements,
including a general strike protesting salary arrears,
mistreatment of unionists, and lack of political reform. The
general strike, which began in May, led to a July 3
confrontation between strikers and security forces at union
headq^aarters . The military occupied the headquarters and
arrested more than 30 unionists. The following day, security
agents arrested three union leaders leaving the July 4
reception at the U.S. Ambassador's residence.
Starting in June, the Government made efforts to dissolve the
six public sector labor federations for striking illegally for
political reasons. When the courts refused to dissolve the
federations. President Kolingba removed the magistrates
involved. On July 6, Prime Minister Edouard Franck announced
the suspension of the six public sector union federations until
October 31 and ordered the private sector to return to work.
Although these actions ended the general strike and the public
sector unions were forced to hold meetings clandestinely, most
teachers and public health workers remained on strike through
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
the end of the year. The Government lifted the public sector
union suspension on November 1.
Most detained unionists were eventually released, but several
received prison terms. USTC Secretary General Theophile
Sonny-Cole was sentenced to a year in prison without actually
being arrested or appearing in court. While he remained at
liberty at the end of the year, the Government appeared to
retain the option of imposing the sentence at any time. The
other unionists who were sentenced received either suspended
terms or were freed under the amnesty which President Kolingba
declared on September 1 to mark his 10th year in power.
Toward the end of the year, the Government announced that it
supported the principle of "multiunionism" as a logical
corollary to multipartyism. By year's end, three smaller
federations had been formed, but none initially demonstrated
any provincial or sectoral union support. Credible evidence
suggested that one, the Confederation of Central African Trade
Unions (CSTC) , was mostly government funded; another, the
National Confederation of Central African Workers (CNTC) is the
resurrected version of a previously government-controlled
federation, headed by a retired union rival of Sonny-Cole's.
The 1988 law allows unions to affiliate with international
labor organizations. Both the USTC and the CNTC maintain
international labor contacts.
In April 1989, the U.S. Government announced the suspension of
tariff preferences accorded the C.A.R. because of the
Government's failure to respect worker rights. The C.A.R.
formally requested reinstatement in September 1989, and its
request was granted in February 1991, before the most recent
round of arrests and the suspension of labor federations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The C.A.R. has little industry or large-scale agriculture. The
1988 union law, which applies throughout the country, accords
trade unions full legal status, including the right to own
property and to sue in court. However, it does not
specifically state that trade unions may engage in collective
bargaining. Mechanisms for collective bargaining contained in
the 1961 Labor Code have in the past been used occasionally in
the private sector during the periods in which union activity
was not banned. Collective bargaining, though failing to bring
a lasting settlement, took place in 1991 in both the private
and public sectors. Employers are expressly forbidden from
discriminating against workers on the basis of union membership
or union activity, and infractions can result in the assessment
of legal damage. Several of the USTC unions claim, however,
that the Government has itself discriminated against their
members, notably through the arbitrary reassignment of teachers
and civil servants to provincial posts. There are no export
processing zones in the C.A.R.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is specifically prohibited by the 1961 Labor Code,
and no reports were made of forced labor in 1991.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Employment of children under 14 years of age is forbidden by
law, but this provision is only loosely enforced by the
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Ministry of Labor and Civil Service. In practice, the role of
children in the labor force is generally limited to helping the
family in traditional subsistence farming or retailing.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wages are established by the Government, euid a social
security system exists for private industry. The lowest
minimum wage assures a family the basic necessities but is
barely adequate to maintain a decent standard of living. In
July the Government announced that it would raise the minimvun
monthly industrial wage by 40 percent, and the minimum
agricultural wage by less than 25 percent a day. These
increases had not yet taken effect by year's end. Much labor
is performed outside the wage and social security system,
especially by self-employed farmers in the large subsistence
agricultural sector. The law sets maximum working hours for
government employees and most people in the private sector at
40 hours per week. Domestic employees may work up to 55 hours
per week. There are also general laws on health and safety
standards in the workplace, but they are neither precisely
defined nor actively enforced by the Ministry of Labor and
Civil Service.
71
CHAD
Chad is a republic with a transitional government headed by
President Idriss Deby. President Deby and the Patriotic
Salvation Movement (MPS) took power from Hissein Habre on
December 1, 1990. He immediately declared human rights and
democratization to be the primary objectives of the new
Government. On March 1, the National Charter was announced,
setting up a 30-month transition period of government, with
most power concentrated in the hands of President Deby. The
Charter abolished the 1989 constitution. On October 4, the
Government introduced the Charter on Political Parties. By the
end of the year no parties, apart from the MPS, had been
authorized, but several parties had formally applied for
official authorization, and others were in the process of being
established.
The Deby Government operates a large security and military
apparatus that includes an army of about 50,000 personnel
(Republican Guard, army, gendarmerie, and air force), the
National Police, and the Center for Research and Coordination
of Information (CRCR). The size of the security forces posed a
serious drain on Chadian resources in 1991, and the Government
had difficulty in financially supporting them and in
maintaining discipline. With French assistance, Chad began to
reorganize, retrain, and reduce the size of the forces.
Meanwhile, in 1991 there were numerous reports of human rights
abuses committed by the military and security forces. Credible
reports pointed to the Military Intelligence Branch (B-2) as
the major offender. An alleged coup attempt on October 13 led
to interethnic killing, led by Zaghawa elements of the Chadian
military loyal to President Deby. Interior Minister Maldoum, a
Hadjerai, was removed from office for supposed complicity with
the plot.
Chad is one of the poorest countries in the world, with an
estimated per capita income of $205 per annum. The literacy
rate is estimated at 25 percent, and 80 percent of the
population is engaged in subsistence agriculture, fishing, and
livestock raising. Cotton is Chad's most important export.
The Government relies heavily on external financial support,
especially from France, to meet recurring budgetary costs and
virtually 100 percent of government investment. Habre
exacerbated the financial crisis by fleeing the country with
much of its liquid assets. In 1991 emergency food aid was
necessary due to drought.
In 1991, with strong public backing from President Deby, the
human rights situation in Chad improved somewhat, including the
right of workers to organize. There were still restrictions on
freedom of the press and speech, although the situation had
improved over 1990. The Government also permitted the
establishment of several organizations devoted solely to human
rights. However, like previous governments, the Deby
Government, with its political and military base primarily in a
regional ethnic grouping, faced serious problems in
establishing a national political consensus. It nevertheless
made modest progress in 1991 in identifying the aspirations and
priorities of the people, in permitting the formation of
political parties late in the year, and in setting a timetable
for national consultations in the form of a national conference
for May 1992. On December 24, President Deby issued a decree
forming an 80-person, ethnically and politically diverse,
preparatory commission to organize the National Conference,
which would be sovereign. At the same time, a number of
serious human rights abuses occurred in 1991, notably
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CHAD
extrajudicial killings (mainly due to factions settling old
scores and interethnic killing following the alleged coup
attempt on October 13), the use of arbitrary arrest and
detention, the denial of fair public trials, and the use of
force to prevent assembly and association of people outside the
MPS.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Credible reports indicated that the Habre regime executed more
than 300 political prisoners shortly before it collapsed.
During the first months of the Deby regime, there were many
credible reports of further extrajudicial killings, most of
which involved the settling of scores between the new and old
factions. Most of these killings had ceased by March, although
reports of killings continued throughout 1991, usually
attributed to armed bands currently or formerly associated with
the Chadian army. Armed groups of loyalists to former
President Habre survived by pillaging in the eastern part of
the country. Some members of the Zaghawa, who accompanied the
Deby forces, turned to banditry as did other groups of
soldiers. The Government condemned these actions but was often
several months behind in meeting its military payroll, and its
ability to control offending units, particularly in provincial
areas, remained limited. The Government established
courts-martial in March to try military offenders, but these
met with limited success. One early trial was disrupted by
armed men who attempted to rescue the defendants . Subsequent
sessions were heavily guarded by troops with heavy weapons.
However, these events had an intimidating impact on the conduct
of later trials.
In the first days of the Deby administration, there were
assassination attempts on the lives of several ministers. An
army officer, Gabaroum Demtita, was arrested, and reliable
reports indicate he was executed in late December 1990 by
members of the security services.
On October 13, government forces reacted with excessive force
to suppress an alleged coup attempt by Minister of the Interior
Maldoum and Hadjerai army officers. The Government failed to
control its troops in subsequent days. Hadjerai military and
civilians were particularly targeted by uncontrolled Zaghawa
armed elements. Reliable reports indicate that approximately
200 persons were killed in N'Djamena by Zaghawa soldiers and
civilians during the week of October 13.
b. Disappearance
There were no known allegations in 1991 of politically
motivated disappearances. There were allegations of political
prisoners being held incommunicado, though fewer than under the
Habre regime.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
In 1991 there were persistent uncorroborated reports that the
B-2 Military Intelligence and the MPS Security Branch engaged
in torture which included: whippings, beatings, and forced
73
CHAD
ingestion of water and then dropping the detainee to the
floor. These units also reportedly denied medical treatment to
torture victims. The number of allegations increased in the
latter part of 1991, indicating that these practices were not
simply a function of the chaos of the first months of the Deby
regime. Four men were publicly executed by firing squad in
October after being convicted under the special court-martial
authority, one reportedly for attempted theft. The executions
were carried out in a manner that prolonged the suffering of
the men. While the Government officially condemns the use of
torture and the mistreatment of prisoners, it has not commented
on these reports nor, as far as is known, conducted any
investigation of such incidents.
Prison conditions under the Deby regime continued to be harsh.
They are characterized by overcrowding, poor sanitation, lack
of medical facilities, inadequate food, mixing of male and
female prisoners, and detention of children. Deaths from
malnutrition in common cells were frequent, with the bodies not
being removed rapidly after death. Prisoners are dependent on
their families for food, medicines, and other necessities.
Nonpolitical prisoners are allowed daily access by visitors.
Some reports indicated that political and security prisoners
were detained incommunicado. Military prisoners are detained
in separate facilities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Deby Government abolished the 1989 constitution which
provided for certain safeguards for the citizen against
arbitrary arrest and gave detainees specific rights, such as
the right to counsel and to be presented with charges. The
Chadian penal code, which is still considered in effect,
specifies these rights, but its provisions, like those of the
1989 constitution, are not enforced. In practice, most
individual military or security organizations were able to
arrest or detain citizens without legal warrant, without
presenting charges, or without referring a detainee to an early
trial.
In June a group of 44 military officers and noncommissioned
officers (NCO's), all of southern Chadian origin, were arrested
for circulating a signed petition that complained of unjust
treatment. They were detained at the gendarmerie and the
former presidential compound. The officers were held for
several days and the NCO's for up to 11 days before being
released without charge. Other allegations surfaced in the
press that military and civilians were detained without
charge. In contrast, there were numerous allegations that
military and civilians of the Zaghawa ethnic group who were
guilty of crimes were not incarcerated (see Section I.e.).
Due to the secrecy of the Government, the number of political
detainees held in 1991, if any, was not known. High-level
Chadian officials contend there were no political detainees or
prisoners held in 1991.
The Deby Government actively engaged in a program for the
return of Chadian exiles. There were no reports of returning
exiles being detained or mistreated. The Government had some
difficulty absorbing several thousand Chadian citizens who were
involuntarily returned from Libya with little or no preparation
or notice during the year. Significant numbers of Chadians
have chosen not to return to Chad and remain in Europe, Niger,
Libya, and other African countries.
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CHAD
e. Denial of Fair Trial
Chad's judicial system is at best rudimentary, in part due to
decades of civil war creating serious staffing and training
deficiencies. Three forms of courts existed in Chad in 1991:
the regular judiciary, a traditional system presided over by
village chiefs and sheiks, and the newly established special
military court to try soldiers and civilians accused of
criminal activity (see Section l.a.). There are legal
safeguards built into the court-martial system, including the
right to be represented by an attorney and the right of appeal
to a higher tribunal within the same system. In September a
seven-person Special Court of Justice was established to look
into the issue of funds which disappeared at the time of
Habre's fall.
The highest court in Chad is the Appellate Court in N'Djamena.
It reviews the decisions of lower courts and judges all cases
calling for more than a 2-year penalty. Due to the shortage of
judges in the provinces, legal matters were often presided over
by either traditional or other governinent authorities,
frequently military commanders. The traditional or customary
system of justice, common in the rural areas and used for civil
matters, is not codified, but its judgments are generally
respected by the population. Decisions rendered by a
traditional court may be appealed to the regular civilian
courts .
There were no efforts at systemic overhaul of the judiciary in
1991, although the MPS Conference in March cited judicial
reform as a national goal, and President Deby indicated that
judicial reform would be addressed in the national conference
in 1992. Meanwhile, the judiciary remained subordinate to
executive authority. The Government did make an effort to
staff rural courts which had not functioned under the previous
government .
In 1991 there were credible reports that the civilian court
system and the new court-martial system were unable to bring
members of the Zaghawa ethnic group to trial. In August
Zaghawa soldiers attacked the first court-martial session in an
attempt to free Zaghawa prisoners. On October 13, Zaghawa
soldiers attacked the prison in order to free Zaghawa
prisoners. There are reports that citizens preferring charges
against Zaghawa were threatened by other Zaghawa in the
military. Government actions to prevent these abuses have not
been fully effective.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under the penal code, homes may be searched only during
daylight hours and only under the authority of a warrant. In
practice, security personnel of various agencies searched homes
and arrested occupants without a warrant from judicial
authorities. In early 1991, several deaths occurred as a
result of searches of homes by the army. There were numerous
reports that thievery by soldiers occurred frequently during
house and street searches.
Membership in the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) is not
required for employment or appointment to high position.
However, MPS membership reportedly has been solicited through
coercive means in the rural areas.
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CHAD
It was widely assumed that surveillance of persons, monitoring
of telephones, and checking of domestic and international
correspondence occurred in 1991.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
President Deby lifted many restrictions on freedom of speech
and press. Individual views were expressed openly, and there
was no evidence of government interference with or restriction
on small private meetings (see Section 2.b.). The private
press developed rapidly after the change in government . Five
private newspapers were published in 1991, sold openly, and
often carried stories highly critical of the Government.
Chadian television, radio, and the Chadian Press Agency
continued to be government controlled in 1991. In state-owned
media journalists were allowed greater latitude in publishing
and broadcasting than during the Habre regime. However, as the
year progressed, the official media became increasingly
restrained in the choice of topics and quoted sources,
apparently under government pressure, and considerably less
outspoken than the private press.
Low-ranking soldiers attacked journalists on several occasions,
and MPS officials intimidated newspaper staff. Additionally,
there were disturbing incidents aimed at intimidating the
press. In mid-March soldiers burst into Radio Chad studios and
roughed up journalists. Reporters went on strike until the
Government promised such incidents would not happen again. On
July 7, the Government warned the press about unspecified
"excesses". Soldiers beat three Tele-Chad journalists on July
28. In early November, offices of the independent weekly
Contact were vandalized and the texts of articles were stolen.
In late December, the publisher of N'Djamena Hebdo was detained
briefly by armed men and the newspaper offices were searched.
Members of the private press have expressed the view that they
are under frequent personal or electronic surveillance.
Foreign publications were available in Chad, and there were no
reports that foreign publications were censored or withdrawn
from circulation during 1991.
The academic system is state supported but was free of
government control of curriculum or course content. Class
discussions of academic topics were unrestricted and
uninhibited, but political commentary in and out of class
tended to be restrained, unless discussions took place among
close, trusted friends. Fear of government informants is
pervasive at institutes of higher education.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms were tightly circumscribed in 1991. The
Government prohibited assemblies or meetings with political
objectives and, until October, declared any political activity
and political party organizations outside the MPS illegal. A
planned antigovernment demonstration on March 26 failed to
materialize after the Government declared it illegal. The
Government used force to disperse striking students at the
University of Chad in February, resulting in the death of at
least one person and several wounded. The students were
calling for the removal of two administrators, reinstatement of
suspended students, payment of stipends, and better conditions.
76
CHAD
In 1991 the Government required organizations to have official
authorization to function prior to beginning operations. While
it authorized three private human rights organizations and two
union federations to organize, it had not given permission by
year's end to many cultural and social organizations with no
stated political objective.
c. Freedom of Religion
Chad is officially and in practice a secular state in which
Islam, Christianity, and other religions are practiced without
official constraint. Both Islamic and Christian holidays are
given official status. More than 50 percent of Chad's
population is Muslim, and Chad is a member of the Islamic
Conference. Christian and other missionaries may enter the
country to proselytize and perform public assistance work.
Christian missionaries are most active in the south. In 1991
there were no reports of harassment for religious views, and
religious publications are disseminated without government
restriction.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Chadians enjoy freedom to move around the country, except
within military zones. Clearance by internal security services
is required for international travel, but this requirement did
not appear to impede movement. Chadians are free to emigrate
and have the right to return.
From 1979 to 1982, as many as 185,000 Chadians fled drought and
civil war to seek refuge in neighboring countries. Most of
those who left during this time have since returned to Chad and
have been resettled with the help of government organizations.
Several thousand returned in 1991. About 24,000 still remain
outside Chad, mainly in Sudan.
In addition to this older population of refugees, Chad
experienced a new outflow of about 10,000 persons following the
December 1990 overthrow of the Habre government by Idriss
Deby. Most of these recent refugees returned to Chad in early
1991. About 3,000 remain in Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon.
There were no reports in 1991 of mistreatment of returnees.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
In 1991 Chadians lacked the right to change their government by
democratic means. President Deby governs through a Council of
Ministers and the Prime Minister. The Provisional Council of
the Republic, a consultative body comprised of regional
representatives and political notables appointed by the
President, serves some of the functions of a legislature but
without authority to initiate or approve laws.
Upon coming to power, Deby's provisional Government, through
the National Charter, abolished the 1989 constitution and the
national assembly but promised to install a multiparty system.
A Charter of Political Parties was adopted on October 4, and a
national conference is scheduled for May 1992, one of its
objectives being to draft a new constitution. Municipal,
legislative, and presidential elections were promised for 1993.
77
CHAD
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In a marked departure from Habre's regime, the Deby Government
allowed investigation into human rights abuses, particularly
those committed by Habre. In the first months of 1991
prominent press coverage, both foreign and domestic,
documented abuses. Three Chadian human rights organizations
were founded and authorized to operate in 1991. The Chadian
League of Human Rights (LTDH) was established first, and it
actively promoted human rights issues. The Convention for the
Defense of Human and Citizens Rights (CODHOC) and the Chadian
Association for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights
(ATCPH) were founded toward the end of the year to promote
human rights. All three operated without government
interference.
The Government permitted Amnesty International and a French
judge to conduct investigations in 1991.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There are approximately 200 ethnic groups in Chad. They are
roughly divided among Saharan and Arab Muslims in the northern,
central, and eastern regions, and Bantu people, who practice
Christianity or animist religions, in the south. Sustained
civil war since 1965, revolving around ethnic disputes, has
badly fractured any sense of national identity. Ethnic
divisions continued to be a major problem in Chad despite
Deby's efforts to forge national reconciliation and unity.
While regional and ethnic representation in government was
diverse, real power remained in the hands of a few minority
ethnic groups from northern and eastern Chad, principally the
Zaghawa, Bideyat, and Gorane.
Officially the Deby Government opposes discrimination, and
Chadian women have full political eq\iality and protection under
the law. However, culture and tradition among many of Chad's
various ethnic groups perpetuate the de facto subordinate
status of women. Much of the agricultural work on subsistence
farms is done by women. Neither traditional law nor the penal
code specifically protects women's rights. The literacy rate
for women is significantly lower than for men, and a 1991
United Nations Development Program study stated that on average
females receive one-third of the education of males. A few
women are found in higher positions in the Government as well
as in commerce, the professions, and the military. The
Ministry of Public Health and Social Affairs actively promoted
women's rights, sponsoring a national women's week and seminars
on women's issues. A private women's advocacy group was
authorized and was active in promoting women's rights.
Household violence directed against women, including wife
beating, is believed to be common, and women have only limited
legal recourse against abusive spouses. Female genital
mutilation (circumcision) is widespread in Chad. This practice
is deeply rooted in tradition, both in the north and the south,
and strongly advocated by many Chadians, including women,
despite its severe consequences for women's physical and mental
health. The Deby Government took no action to prohibit the
practice.
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CHAD
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Given the level of economic development, Chad's labor movement
is still in its infancy. Over 80 percent of all Chadian
workers are involved in subsistence agriculture, animal
husbandry, or fishing. Involvement in labor organizations
centers mostly on the public sector and the small, private
commercial sector.
The National Charter of March 1991 specifically recognized the
right of labor to organize, and workers are free to join or
form unions of their own choosing. However, government
authorization is required before unions can commence
operations. There was no indication in 1991 that the
Governinent interfered wih the right of workers to organize,
although it refused authorization to the National Federation of
Chadian Trade Unions (UNST) to function under the name of UNST
because of its association with the Habre regime. It granted
approval once the name was altered to the Federation of Chadian
Unions (UST) . A second federation of unions, the Federation of
Chadian Workers (CLTT), was formed in 1991. Both new
federations are independent of the Government. Both
federations held congresses in 1991 and freely affiliate with
international and regional labor organizations.
The Deby Government considers the current Labor Code still in
effect. It permits the right to strike but mandates that
certain steps are to be taken to resolve disagreements prior to
striking. The 1989 constitution implicitly repealed the 1975
ordinance which suspended the right to strike. However,
strikes did not take place under the Habre government. A new
labor code is nearing completion, according to government and
union officials.
In 1991 five strikes were staged without evidence of government
interference or restrictions. Hospital workers, airport
employees, government-employed journalists, and textile workers
in southern Chad went on strike during the year over wage and
benefit issues and for improved working conditions. In
December primary and secondary teachers, with sympathy support
from higher education institutions, led a strike for better pay
and benefits. In each of these instances, the Government
negotiated mutually satisfactory resolutions to the strikes.
In April, however, when the former UNST called for a general
strike to protest the Government's refusal to allow it to
function under the name UNST, the Government deemed the strike
illegal because it was called by an unauthorized organization,
and the strike failed to take place.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The National Charter specifically recognizes the right of trade
unions to organize and bargain collectively, and in 1991 there
was no abridgement of this right as there had been under the
previous government. However, the International Labor
Organization's (ILO) Committee of Experts in 1991 again asked
the Government to amend a section of the Labor Code which
empowers the State to intervene in the collective bargaining
process. In practice, few collective agreements exist given
the small size of the private sector. Chadian law does not
specifically prohibit antiunion discrimination, but this was
not an issue in 1991. There are no export processing zones in
Chad.
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CHAD
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
While there is no specific prohibition on forced or compulsory
labor in Chadian law, such labor did not occur in 1991.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment of children is 14 in the wage
sector, but there is only limited enforcement of this law by
the Ministry of Civil Service and Labor. In practice,
employment of children was almost nonexistent, except on family
farms .
Approximately 600 minors, between the ages of 12 and 17, were
reported to be in the army. One objective of the Deby
Government was to reorganize the army and release minors from
the ranks. This process was under way at year's end with the
Government coordinating closely with the United Nations
International Children's Fund to provide reintegration of the
children into civilian society.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
A minimum wage scale established in 1978 remained valid under
the Deby Government. This nationwide minimum wage scale
applied to all categories of work, but higher grade levels
existed for specialized functions. Minimum wages were
insufficient to support subsistence, much less an acceptable
standard of living. Most workers relied on second jobs,
subsistence agriculture, or assistance from the extended family.
Most nonagricultural work is limited by law to 48 hours per
week with overtime paid for supplementary hours. Agricultural
workers were statutorily limited to 2,400 work hours per year.
All workers are entitled to 24 consecutive hours of rest per
week. In practice, issues involving working conditions were
still in their infancy. Some occupational health and safety
standards exist for the work environment, but enforcement by
the Ministry of Civil Service and Labor is rare.
80
COMOROS
Located in the Mozambique Channel between East Africa and
Madagascar, the Federal and Islamic Republic of the Comoros
comprises three islands and claims a fourth, Mayotte, which is
governed by France. Until his assassination in November 1989,
President Abdallah, backed by the presidential guard, presided
over a de facto one-party state. Following his assassination,
some 25 European mercenaries who had served as officers in the
presidential guard briefly became the ruling authority until
French troops arrived to stabilize the situation.
Early in 1990, opposition politicians returned from exile, and a
wide spectrum of political leaders and eight political parties
contested presidential elections in two stages. The acting
President, Said Mohamed Djohar, emerged the winner in the second
round. His defeated opponent, Mohamed Taki, refused to accept
the results and departed the country for several months. Though
allegations of fraud and tampering with ballot boxes were made
by opposing political parties, most outside observers, including
representatives from the Organization of African Unity,
concluded that these instances did not decisively alter the
results. Following his inauguration on March 20, 1991, the new
President vowed to promote full democracy and became leader of a
coalition of five parties, naming some former opposition figures
to ministerial positions.
French military advisors assisted the new Government in
restructuring and reducing the regular military and police
forces. In 1991 the security forces came under effective
civilian control.
Agriculture dominates the economy, but the Comoros is running
out of arable land, and soil erosion on the steep volcanic
slopes is exacerbating the problem. Revenues from the main
crops — vanilla, essence of ylang-ylang, and cloves — continued to
fall. Comoros is part of the French Franc Monetary Zone and
depends heavily on France for budgetary support and technical
and security assistance.
The human rights situation has improved significantly since
1989, but progress slowed in 1991 with the postponement of both
legislative elections and revision of the Constitution to
establish firmly a multiparty system. This slower pace of
change was due in part to cabinet changes, the distraction of
natural disasters (volcanic activity), and an attempted coup
d'etat in August involving Supreme Court figures. Efforts to
institutionalize democratic practices and the protection of
human rights continue to be hampered by the lack of internal
security arrangements and poor economic conditions.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no confirmed reports of such killing in 1991.
However, the case of Said Mlindre, a member of presidential
candidate Taki's political party who died in 1990 while in
government custody, continued to be raised by the political
opposition. The Government maintains he died of natural causes,
while his family alleges torture and poisoning. A doctor who
attended Mlindre on the night of his death testified he was
unable to determine whether the death was natural or inflicted.
81
COMOROS
He said he lacked the means to perform an autopsy, and the
feunily insisted on immediate burial. No new information was
developed in 1991.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no substantiated reports of torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in 1991. However,
various opposition newspapers and human rights groups maintained
that Said Mlindre and others detained in August 1990, including
a journalist, had been tortured.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
In 1991 there were no known cases of arbitrary arrest or
detention, although the circumstances surrounding the detention
of Said Mlindre and other Taki supporters had not been fully
clarified. After Djohar's election in March 1990, there were
clashes in early April between security forces and opposition
supporters . Eighteen of those involved were arrested and held
without charge. Fourteen were released in September and the
remaining four in October without coming to trial. The law
provides for a detained person to be charged within 48 hours,
but this procedure was not followed in the case of Mlindre and
the others arrested in 1990.
Nximerous opposition political figures, who had been abroad in
exile during the Abdallah period, returned to the Comoros in
early 1990 to participate in the presidential elections.
Mohammed Taki, who remained in self-imposed exile for most of
1991, returned to the Comoros at the end of the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The 1978 Constitution provides for the equality of all citizens
before the law and the right of all accused to defense counsel.
The Comorian legal system applies Islamic law and an inherited
French legal code. Most disputes are settled by village elders
or by a civilian court of first instance. In regular civil and
criminal cases, the judiciary is largely independent, and trials
are public. However, in national security cases observed since
1990, suspects were never brought to trial. Most were
subsequently freed, but only after a period of detention of up
to 1 year . The Supreme Court has the power to review the
decisions of lower courts, including the Court of Appeals.
National security cases — involving attempts to destabilize the
country or overthrow the Government by violent means — are
handled in the regular court system.
In 1991 the only important national security case involved
members and supporters of the Supreme Court who attempted a
"legal coup d'etat" by declaring the President unfit for
office. They invoked articles of the Constitution which would
install the President of the Supreme Court as head of state.
The attempt failed, and six persons, including Supreme Court
President Ahmed Talidi, were placed under house arrest and
awaited trial at year's end. The President has stated that he
is willing to drop their case; however, the former head of the
Supreme Court still insists he should be head of state.
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COMOROS
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of home and
property. There were no known cases of arbitrary interference
with privacy or correspondence in 1991.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedoms of expression, thought,
and conscience. In contrast to the experience under the
Abdallah regime, these freedoms were generally respected during
1991. Comorians discussd and criticized the Government and its
leading personalities openly. A wide spectrum of political
views were aired in roundtable discussions leading up to the
1992 presidential elections. Radio broadcasts from Mayotte and
two French television stations are received on parts of the
islands without interference. Satellite antennas are popular,
and amateur radio licenses are easily obtained.
The print media continue to enjoy a significant degree of
openness, and several small independent newspapers are now
published. The semiofficial newspaper, which became a weekly,
publishes articles critical of some government policies. Lack
of funds and illiteracy are the biggest obstacles to wider
publication and distribution of the newspapers. Foreign
journals and newspapers are available, as are books from
abroad. The Paris-based Indian Ocean Newsletter and Lettre de
Comores, which are often highly critical of the Government,
arrive through the international mail without interference.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association. Under the late president Abdallah, Comorians were
circumspect about organizing public political gatherings, and
political groupings kept a fairly low profile. All of this
changed in 1990 and 1991 as new political parties were formed,
old ones were resurrected, and numerous rallies and assemblies
took place with a minimum of governmental interference. No
political parties have been banned. At the end of the year,
there were approximately 18 political parties.
c. Freedom of Religion
An overwhelming majority of the population is Sunni Muslim. The
Constitution holds Islam to be the "wellspring of the principles
and rules which guide the State and its institutions." The
State upholds the right of non-Muslims to practice their faith,
and there are churches for the small Catholic and Protestant
populations. Christian missions work in local hospitals and
schools, but by local custom they are not allowed to proselytize.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on travel within the country or
abroad, and exit visas are freely granted.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens now have the right to change their government through
peaceful means. No less than 14 political groups were
83
COMOROS
represented in the roundtable discussions held prior to the 1990
elections; 8 of these fielded candidates for the elections. The
candidates issued platforms of varying ideological positions,
which were published in the semiofficial newspaper. In the
second round runoff. Said Mohamed Djohar defeated Mohamed Taki
by gaining 55 perc-ent of the votes.
At the end of 1991, the Government consisted of a coalition of
five parties. The 1978 Constitution was being rewritten to give
legal status to a multiparty system and to provide for other
fundamental rights. After the presidential election in early
1990, it was envisioned that a new constitution could be quickly
written and ratified and that legislative elections could take
place in the fall of that year. However, the dates were
constantly postponed because of political, procedural, and
economic problems. Some parties insisted that the elections
should take place before the referendum on the constitution.
Further, the August 1991 coup attempt set back the political
reform timetable because of the prominence of the people and the
institution involved and the lack of established procedures to
guide the process (see Section i.e.). Legislative elections
must take place before March of 1992 as the legislators' terms
expire in that month.
Traditional social, religious, and economic institutions also
importantly influence the country's political life. Interisland
rivalries have been a persistent and growing factor. Village
notables and Muslim religious leaders tend to dominate local
politics.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
An organization called the Comorian Association for the Rights
of Man was established in May 1990. It has been active in
pursuing human rights causes, including the Said Mlindre case,
with no interference from the Government. This Association has
exerted pressure on the Government to free those prisoners
detained for probable political reasons but who have not been
charged with national security violations — with the exception of
those Supreme Court members currently under house arrest. The
Association tends to focus publicly on women's rights and on
raising the minimum wage.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution formally provides for the equality of citizens
regardless of race, sex, or religion. Nevertheless, within
Comorian society, men have the dominant role. In theory, women
have the right to vote and participate in the political process
as candidates, but tradition has been a powerful force in
discouraging women from direct participation in politics.
Change in the status of women is most evident in the major
towns, where women are finding increasing employment
opportunities in the small paid labor force and generally
receiving wages comparable to those of men in similar work,
However, school enrollments for females are well below those for
males. In August the first Comorian woman was appointed to a
high government position: Sittou Raghadat Mohamed was named
Secretary of State for Population and the Condition of Women. A
Comorian Women's Federation, formed in late 1989, aims to
assemble and propose a family bill of rights. Women are not
required to wear a veil. Property rights do not disfavor women;
for example, the house the father of the bride traditionally
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84
COMOROS
provided to the couple at the time of their marriage remains her
property, even in the case of divorce.
Violence against women, including wife beating, occurs.
However, medical authorities, the Women's Federation, and the
police believe that violence against women is rare, partly
because of the nonviolent nature of Comorian society. The
Government has not addressed this issue specifically, and there
are no studies or statistics available to help determine the
extent of the problem. In principle, a woman can seek
protection through the courts in the case of violence, but in
reality the issue would most likely be addressed within the
extended family or at the village level. Female circumcision is
not known to be practiced in the Comoros.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution allows workers to form unions and to strike,
but these rights only became a reality in 1990 and 1991 with the
association of some workers into unions. Farming on small land
holdings, subsistence fishing, and petty commerce make up the
daily activity of most of the population. Hence, the wage labor
force is small (less than 2,000 excluding government
employees). For the first time in 1990, however, groups of
teachers, civil servants, and dock workers — which in previous
years formed temporary associations to press their
demands — formed into unions for purposes of collective action.
In 1991 there were work stoppages and slowdowns by all three
groups. The Government did not interfere with these actions,
but the basic issues of low or late wages remained unsolved
because of the country's financial and economic problems.
Unions are free to join in confederations and to associate with
international bodies, although given the nascent state of union
development these rights have not yet been exercised.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Laws do not prohibit antiunion discrimination or protect
collective bargaining, which is still in its infancy in the
Comoros. Labor legislation, to the extent that it exists, is
found mainly in the Labor Code, which is not rigidly enforced.
The Labor Code does not address collective bargaining. The
private sector sets wages by informal employee/employer
negotiations. Public workers' wages are set by government
policy through the Ministries of Finance and Labor. Economic
rather than political impediments stand in the way of a more
active role by labor organizations. Unofficial unemployment
figures exceed 70 percent. There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is forbidden by the Constitution and
not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Code defines 15 years as the minimum age for the
employment of children. The Ministry of Labor is lax about
enforcing this provision. Child labor is not an issue due to
the lack of employment opportunities for adolescents and young
adults. Children generally help with the work of their families
in the large subsistence farming and fishing sector.
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e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is a legislated minimum wage, but it is barely adequate to
cover basic human needs. However, most workers also have access
to some subsistence agriculture or fishing and receive support
from the extended family. The hours of work in any one job
rarely exceed 35 hours per week. The Government periodically
reminds employers to respect the Labor Code, which guarantees a
day off per week, plus a month of paid vacation per year, but
does not set a maximum workweek. Overall, there are very few
standards set by the Ministry of Labor. As there is virtually
no manufacturing, little attention has been given to health and
safety standards in this sector.
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The Congo's political system changed dramatically in 1991 as
the country ended decades of one-party, Marxist rule and
installed a transitional government mandated to prepare the way
for democratic, multiparty elections in 1992. Assuming
sovereign powers, the National Conference, composed of some
1,200 delegates from a broad cross-section of institutions,
organizations, and social groups, met from February 25 to June
10 to chart a new political course for the country. The
National Conference permitted the President of the Republic,
Denis Sassou Nguesso, to remain in office but with only
ceremonial duties; elected Prime Minister Andre Milongo to
serve as interim Head of Government; adopted the Fundamental
Act, including a comprehensive bill of rights, to serve as an
interim constitution; and elected a 153-member Superior Council
of the Republic to serve as an interim legislative body.
Shortly before the Conference, the 12-year-old regime of Sassou
Nguesso had legalized political parties and had instituted a
number of other democratic reforms, including freedom of
speech, press, and assembly. A new constitution will be put up
for referendum sometime in early 1992. At year's end, some 100
political parties had begun their campaigns for local,
legislative, and presidential elections scheduled for the first
6 months of 1992.
Formerly, the Congolese military was closely tied to the
Congolese Workers Party (PCT) under the one-party regime. It
was responsible along with the State Security Organization
(DGSE) for internal security and suppressing dissident
activity. High-ranking military officers held party positions,
and party-designated "political officers" served at all levels
of the military. In January these positions were abolished,
and active membership in any political party became
incompatible with holding a military commission. Throughout
the National Conference the military played a neutral,
apolitical role. It ensured the security of the conference
hall and the delegates, but did not, as an organization,
participate in the proceedings. The transition Government
reorganized the country's security services and abolished the
military-commanded DGSE, leaving the civilian police with
responsibility for law enforcement and public order.
The economy is highly dependent on petroleum earnings.
Declining oil prices since 1985 have forced the Government to
seek debt relief and cooperate with international institutions
in implementing a long-term, austerity readjustment program,
including a gradual shift toward a free market economy.
Congo's economic difficulties were a major impetus for
political and economic reform in 1991.
The human rights situation improved significantly in 1991. The
National Conference decisions, if effectively implemented, hold
the potential for entrenching real democratic reform and the
enjoyment of a broad array of civil and political liberties.
However, early in 1992 units of the military seized control of
parts of Brazzaville and demanded the replacement of Prime
Minister Milongo, thus threatening the democratic transition.
After several days of tension, the military returned to its
barracks, the Prime Minister announced a cabinet reshuffle, and
the provisional legislature set dates for elections. Human
rights problems in 1991 included police beatings of detainees
(a problem which has apparently not diminished during the
transition period), harsh prison conditions, and documented
reports of the existence of slavery in remote parts of the
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country. In response to a large influx of people fleeing
serious unrest in Zaire, the Government deported 10,000
Zairians, including many who had been resident in the Congo for
years .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of such killings authorized or condoned
by the transition Government, or by the Congo's military or
security forces.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The new Congolese bill of rights forbids the use of torture,
and there were no reports of its use by the current
Government. Justice in the Congo remains somewhat arbitrary:
shopkeepers still beat marketplace thieves with impunity, and
the local police reportedly still regularly beat detainees,
especially those who allegedly resist arrest.
As the Government has officially acknowledged, prison
conditions are bad. The prisons are old and were never
designed for long-term detentions, since under French rule
convicted felons were sent out of the country. Between 30 to
100 prisoners are currently kept in one large cell. They sleep
on the floor and subsist on a single meal per day. There are
no exercise or educational facilities, and medical care is
rare. Women prisoners are kept separate from the men.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The new bill of rights forbids arbitrary arrest, detention, or
exile. There is no evidence that the interim Government has
engaged in any of these practices.
The current Code of Penal Procedure requires that a detainee be
brought before a judge within 3 days and that a detainee must
be charged or released within 3 months . However , these
protections are frequently ignored in practice. The time
between arrest and trial can extend to years, with bail often
denied arbitrarily. Official indifference and insufficient
personnel to handle case loads are major factors in
perpetuating these abuses.
The Government does not use forced exile as a means of
political control. All voluntary exiles from the former regime
have been invited to return. Some members of the previous
government have gone into self-imposed exile rather than face
prosecution for past crimes.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court system continues to be modeled on the French system
and consists, under the new Government, of three levels: local
courts, courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court. All "special"
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courts have been abolished, as have secret trials. The accused
has a right to a lawyer of his own choice, with the State
paying the fees in cases of poverty.
Judges are required to have a degree in judicial studies and,
after due service on the bench, may be appointed by Parliament
to a term on the Supreme Court. It is too early to estimate
the degree of independence judges will be able to exercise.
Congo's traditional courts still handle many local disputes,
especially property cases. They operate in urban as well as
rural areas. Many domestic disputes are also adjudicated
within the context of the extended family.
The present and future Governments are faced with the problem
of coming to terms with the human rights abuses and economic
crimes of the past. Several former high officials have already
been sentenced to long jail terms for embezzlement.
Prosecutions for human rights violations will probably not take
place until an elected government is in power. Former
officials suspected of crimes or civil rights abuses are not
prevented from traveling abroad.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Current law requires a warrant for all searches and forbids the
police to conduct searches during the hours of darkness. The
Government has publicly announced that the police have limited
powers and encourages people to insist on their rights. The
secret police, which was formerly responsible for the
surveillance of citizens antagonistic to the Government, has
been disbanded. The new Government outlawed wiretapping and
the maintenance of security files on citizens who have not been
accused of violating the law.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The new bill of rights provides for complete freedom of
expression. People on the street talk freely and are often
quite critical of past and present political figures, something
that was impossible a year ago.
There is no longer an official government newspaper. It has
been replaced by numerous private newspapers operating without
hindrance. The broadcast media, radio and television, are
still state owned, although the journalists belong to an
independent union and are allowed to disagree on the air with
government positions. To help eliminate the Marxist bias in
the media, the Government transferred some state reporters
hired by the old government, who under Congolese law are almost
impossible to discharge, to the provinces where they would have
less influence on national politics. There are, in principle,
no barriers besides economic ones to the establishment of
private radio and television services.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The new bill of rights guarantees the freedom to assemble and
associate without government interference. Those wishing to
hold public assemblies must inform the Minister of the
Interior, who reserves the right to forbid assemblies inimical
to public peace or welfare. In practice, permission was almost
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never denied since the new Government came to power. The right
of political parties to form was widely exercised. The single
political party of the former government has been replaced by
nearly 80 independent parties, which compete freely for members
and office.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion; the people are free to join any
church or practice any religion. Denominations not already
established in the Congo (there were only seven allowed by the
former government) must complete a rather cumbersome
registration process. Local missionaries report no hindrance
either before or after registration. According to the Ministry
of the Interior, registration is for the sole purpose of
granting legal status. The current Government is in the
process of returning church property confiscated by the former
regime. Church leaders of the seven denominations recognized
by the former regime were active in the National Conference and
continue to play a role in the interim Government.
The Jehovah's Witnesses, prohibited in previous years, are
again active and held a large public rally in 1991. As far as
is known, the Government has not restricted the activities of
this group.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The new bill of rights grants freedom of movement both inside
and outside the country, and there are, in practice, no
restrictions on travel. In contrast to the past, there were no
reports of arbitrary, politically motivated denials of
passports by the transition Government. The office formerly
responsible for controlling movement within the Congo has been
abolished.
The Congolese have traditionally been hospitable to refugees,
allowing them to enter, obtain work, and have access to
government services on the same basis as Congolese citizens.
The Government was especially helpful during the September and
October evacuations from Zaire, setting up refugee processing
centers for African and European evacuees and providing food,
shelter, and assistance with onward travel arrangements. The
large influx of Zairians, however, strained this traditional
policy, and, declaring the Zairians to be economic migrants,
the Government forcibly deported about 10,000 Zairians,
including many who had lived in the Congo for years.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens acting through the National Conference forced a
peaceful change in government in 1991. The Conference
abolished the old one-party system, set multiparty elections
for 1992, and established a broadly based transitional
Government headed by Prime Minister Milongo. If followed to
completion, this process will result in a functioning democracy
by the end of 1992, governed by a Prime Minister and a
bicameral legislative body. Under the future constitution, the
President of the Republic will almost certainly have more
responsibility than the ceremonial duties now entrusted to
President Sassou Nguesso. The proposed constitution has been
published and awaits the upcoming referendum.
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Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are several domestic human rights organizations, which
include the National Committee on Hiaman Rights, headed by Dr.
Norbert Lamini (see Section 5), the Congolese Human Rights
League, and a committee of the Congolese Association of Women
Lawyers. All have criticized aspects of past government human
rights practices.
Section 5 Discrimination Based of Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The new bill of rights forbids all discrimination on any basis
and requires equal pay for equal work. A small group of about
7,000 Pygmies, who live in the northern forests, are isolated
from the mainstream of Congolese life, but there is no official
discrimination against them. However, missionaries report that
nurses at some government medical centers frequently refuse to
provide services to Pygmies. Congolese human rights activist
Dr. Norbert Lamini reported finding "incontrovertible evidence"
of the practice of traditional, ancestral slavery in parts of
the Congo, especially the keeping of Pygmy slaves by Bantu
farmers in the rural north of the country, around the district
capital of Ouesso. Dr. Lamini also reported evidence of
Bantu/Bantu slavery in the port city of Pointe Noire.
There is no officially sanctioned discrimination against women
in the Congo, except in the area of adultery, which is legal
for men, but not for women. Despite the lack of legal
discrimination, there remains a large disparity between the
salaries of men and women and in educational opportunities.
According to a 1991 United Nations study, females receive only
33 percent of the schooling males receive. Moreover, although
several women have attained high official status, women in
general often find themselves relegated to a secondary role in
both urban and rural areas.
Polygamy is legal and widely practiced, but a woman may, at a
state-sponsored wedding, bind her future husband, with his
agreement, to a monogamous marriage. An estimated 80 percent
of urban women have the opportunity to choose monogamy. In the
villages the figure is less than 20 percent. There are no
statistics available concerning the percentage of polygamous or
monogamous marriages. The husband, father, or other male head
of family has considerable legal or actual control over the
activities of female family members. Indeed, on the death of
the husband, the wife is often lumped together with the
husband's other moveable property and parceled out to the
relatives. The husband's power is often moderated by the
influence of the extended family.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that violence against women,
especially wife beating, is not uncommon, but there are no
statistics available. Family violence against women is
generally handled in the context of the extended family rather
than in the formal judicial system. Female circumcision is not
practiced among the Congolese. The new Government has not
addressed the issue of violence against women.
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Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Labor Code affirms the right of workers to associate
freely, and there, are no restrictions on the formation of trade
unions. The right to join a union is also protected under
Article 15 of the new Bill of Rights. The former single
confederation, the Congolese Trade Union Confederation (CSC),
has lost its official status but is still the only umbrella
orgcinization in the country. The checkoff system which gave
the CSC much of its power was abolished in June by Decree
91-672 of the interim Government. After the CSC lost its
monopoly status, numerous small unions based on employment
interests were established. Unions may now freely form and
join federations or confederations and affiliate with and
participate in international trade union bodies. The new
Congolese trade uniions have not yet contracted any formal
international affiliations, but a number of them cooperate with
foreign, usually French, counterparts.
Unions are free to strike, but in theory a strike may not take
place until after both parties, employer and union, have gone
through a process of nonbinding arbitration under the auspices
of the regional inspector of the Department of Labor . The
Government reserves the right to halt all strikes that are
"inimical to the public order," a phrase which it currently
interprets to mean "violent." There were several strikes in
1991, especially in the oil sector. There were also brief
transportation strikes and general strikes. Most of these
occurred in Pointe Noire and took place without government
interference.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The free union system is recent, and not all the methods of
bargaining and mediation have yet been worked out. In the
past, wages were determined by agreement between the union,
Unicongo (the employers' group), and the Ministry of Labor.
The salary schedules were then published in one of the many
"conventions" that exist for each industry.
The unions are currently engaged in a common effort to
accomplish three major goals: (1) gain higher wages; (2)
tenure more categories of workers (making them extremely
expensive to fire, even in cases of economic contraction); and
(3) prevent the privatization of the old state monopolies.
Goals one and two are part of every current bargaining
session. These sessions are frequently tinged with violence;
and several death threats against employers were reported in
1991. The third goal is presently in abeyance as the State has
not yet abolished any of its monopolies. However, this may
become an issue after the June 1992 elections, when a popularly
elected government is expected to begin promised restucturing
of state-owned enterprises.
Differences between workers and employers are adjudicated in
special labor courts jointly administered by the Departments of
Justice and Labor, with oversight by the Supreme Court. These
labor courts have jurisdiction over all labor issues, not just
those involving unions.
There are no special export processing zones in the Congo.
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c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor, except as part of the penal process, is forbidden
under the new bill of rights and is not currently practiced.
Traditional forms of slavery, however, persist in parts of the
country (see Section 5).
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 16. This is enforced only in
the formal wage sector by the Ministry of Labor. Children
often work at younger ages on family farms in the large
sxibsistence agricultural sector.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government sets a minimum wage, theoretically at a level
that allows for "human dignity." In those trades subject to
"conventions," (see Section 6.b.) the agreed upon minimxim wages
are all considerably higher than the legal minimum. However,
even these wages are often guite low in comparison to the cost
of living and many workers hold second jobs, practice
subsistence agriculture, or receive help from the extended
family. The Labor Code specifies not only reasonable pay, but
also paid holidays, sick leave, overtime after 40 hours a week,
and regular days of leisure. Health and safety standards are
supposed to be enforced by twice yearly visits by officers from
the Ministry of Labor. An informal survey suggests that the
inspections are made but on a less than regular basis.
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COTE D ' IVOIRE
Power in Cote d'lvoire is concentrated in President Felix
Houphouet-Boigny, who has been the country's leader since
independence, and in the political party he foiinded, the
Democratic Party of Cote d'lvoire (PDCI). After many years as
a de facto one-party state. Cote d'lvoire adopted a multiparty
political system in 1990 and held multiparty elections at the
presidential, legislative, and municipal levels. In the same
year, the President appointed a Prime Minister who serves at
his pleasure. Despite genuine reforms which have resulted in a
flourishing of political parties and opposition groups,
Houphouet-Boigny and the PDCI, winners of the 1990 elections,
continue to dominate all levels of government.
Cote d'lvoire's security apparatus includes the Security Police
(Surete) and the Gendarmerie, a branch of the armed forces with
responsibility for general law enforcement. The Gendarmerie is
the primary police organization outside the cities and is under
the Ministry of Defense.
During the 1980 's. Cote d'lvoire was squeezed by a heavy debt
burden and falling prices for its exports, principally cocoa,
coffee, and tropical woods. Per capita annual income slipped
in recent years from well over $1,000 to about $700. After
reaching agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and World Bank on a stabilization program in 1989, the
Government brought its budget under tighter control, instituted
changes in the tax code, and launched an ambitious program of
privatization and administrative reform.
Human rights in general improved in 1991 as the Government came
to accept the existence of various opposition groupings and a
vigorous and vigilant press. Nonetheless, there were serious
human rights violations, including physical abuse resulting in
the death of one soldier and a raid on university dormitories
in which three young women were repeatedly raped, and many
students severely beaten. Security forces sometimes use
beatings to extract confessions or as punishment. Further, the
Government clamped down on the press for defamation of public
officials and insulting the President.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known political killings by government forces;
one student was killed by other students (see Sec. l.d.). In
the only known extrajudicial killing, according to credible
reports Corporal Benjamin Ble Liade died on July 19 as a result
of severe physical abuse while being interrogated by the army
in connection with an alleged mutiny.
b. Disappearance
There were no substantiated reports of officially sanctioned
abduction or disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Criminal suspects are sometimes beaten by the police in order
to extract a confession or as, punishment . Non-Ivorian Africans
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COTE D'lVOIRE
residing in Cote d'lvoire are routinely treated more roughly by
police on arrest than are Ivorians. There were no instances in
1991 of officials being punished for mistreatment of detainees
or prisoners.
On May 17-18, military commandos staged a midnight raid on
University of Abidjan dormitories in Yopougon to arrest
dissident student leaders. Three women were repeatedly raped
by soldiers, and several students were severely beaten. The
soldiers forced students to engage in humiliating acts such as
licking up the blood of fellow students. Under public
pressure. President Houphouet-Boigny established a Commission
of Inquiry which reported to him on November 15. The report
was only made public on January 29, 1992. The President did
not accept the Commission's recommendation that those persons
identified as responsible be punished.
Sanitary conditions in many prisons are abysmal. Common
problems include open sewers, lack of bathing facilities,
unclean food, and infestation by rats and mice. Such
conditions at the Yopougon Prison resulted in an outbreak of
cholera in early September which killed some 50 prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under the Code of Penal Procedure, a public prosecutor may
order the detention of a suspect for up to 48 hours without
bringing charges. The Code dictates that longer detention must
be ordered by a magistrate, who may authorize periods of up to
4 months, but who must also provide the Minister of Justice, on
a monthly basis, a written justification for continued
detention. There have been some reports that local police have
held persons for more than 48 hours without bringing charges.
Defendants are not guaranteed the right to a judicial
determination of the legality of their detention. The
Government has been known in the past to have critics convicted
on trumped-up criminal charges so as to avoid being accused of
holding political detainees. Over 100 students were detained
briefly after the May events, even though most were innocent of
any wrongdoing.
Following the June 17 murder of Zebie Thierry, a reputed
government -hi red thug, by a University of Abidjan student mob,
some 20 students were arrested and jailed. Two of them were
charged with murder, instigation, and destruction of property.
The others were held without charge until President
Houphouet-Boigny ordered their release 2 months later.
In the past, some prominent critics of the Government have
chosen to live and work abroad. With the restoration of a
multiparty political system in 1990, however, many of those
with serious political aims returned. Political exiles from a
number of countries have found Cote d'lvoire a hospitable safe
haven as long as they do not engage in political activities
directed against their home governments.
e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial
The modern judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court and
includes a Court of Appeals and lower courts. Although the
judiciary is generally considered independent of the executive
in ordinary criminal cases, in practice as well as under the
Constitution's separation of powers provisions, the judiciary
follows the lead of the executive in cases concerning perceived
national security issues. There have also been credible
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COTE D ' IVOIRE
reports that the courts have given lenient treatment to persons
with personal connections to the Government.
Ivorian law establishes the right to a public trial, although
key evidence is sometimes given in camera. Defendants have the
right to be present at their trials, and their innocence is
presumed. Those Convicted have the right of appeal, though in
practice verdicts are rarely overturned. Defendants accused of
felonies or capital crimes have the right to legal counsel, and
the judicial system provides for court-appointed attorneys for
indigent defendants. In practice, many defendants cannot
afford private counsel, and court-appointed attorneys are not
readily available.
In rural areas, justice is often administered at the village
level through traditional institutions which handle domestic
disputes, minor land questions, and family law. Dispute
resolution is by extended debate, with no known instances of
resort to physical punishment. These traditional courts are
increasingly superseded by the formal judicial system.
Civilians are not tried by military courts. Although there are
no appellate courts within the military justice system, persons
convicted by a military tribunal may petition the Supreme Court
to set aside the tribunal's verdict and order a retrial.
It is a crime, punishable by 3 months to 2 years in prison, to
offend the President. In 1991 a journalist, who wrote that
President Houphouet-Boigny had "lost his reason" and was a
"tyrant," and his publisher were convicted and served 3 months
and 2 months, respectively, in prison. They also paid
substantial fines. A businessman. Innocent Anaky, who was
widely believed to have been charged with financial impropriety
because of his political activities, was convicted and given an
unusually harsh 20-year sentence. He served nearly 3 years in
prison until his release in a general amnesty on September 29.
The total number of political prisoners is unknown but is
believed to be small. The Government claims that there are
none.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In Cote d'lvoire's multiparty political system, citizens are
free to join any political party or none at all. However,
public officials and employees of state-owned corporations are
subjected to pressure to become members of the PDCI . Party
membership lists are sometimes passed to employees by their
supervisors, and those who fail to sign up are believed to
suffer in terms of promotion.
The Code of Penal Procedure specifies that a police official or
investigative magistrate may conduct searches of homes without
a judicial warrant if there is reason to believe that there is
evidence on the premises concerning a crime. The official must
have the prosecutor's agreement to retain any objects seized in
the search and is required to have witnesses to the search,
which may not take place between the hours of 9 p.m. and 4 a.m.
The police sometimes use a general search warrant without a
name or address . Such was the case in mid-July when the houses
of three prominent opposition leaders were searched in
connection with the Zebie killing a month earlier. None of
those searched had been at the scene of the crime, and no
incriminating evidence was found in their homes. In addition,
the police have entered homes of foreign Africans (or rounded
them up on the streets), taken them to the local police
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COTE D ' IVOIRE
Station, and extorted small amounts of money for alleged minor
offenses. In October officials of the Bureau of Mines in
Odienne, without notice, burned down a mining camp in which
about 500 people were living. According to the officials, the
miners had been working without a permit. There is an ongoing
government investigation of the incident, but no results have
yet been released nor has anyone been charged.
There are credible reports that the police used informers at
the University of Abidjan to provide data on dissident
political activity. Private telephone conversations are
believed to be monitored to some degree, although the extent of
such monitoring is unknown. There is no evidence that private
correspondence is monitored.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Free expression is provided for in the Constitution, but until
recently this right was significantly limited in practice. In
1991 public criticism of government policies and even of the
President was common. Critics of the Government express
themselves in informal situations without fear of reprisal.
The Government operates the radio and television networks and
uses these media to promote its policies. Most of the news
programming is devoted to coverage of the activities of the
President, the Government, and the PDCI . The opposition
parties repeatedly appealed to the Minister of Communication to
grant them greater access to the state-run broadcast media.
The National Assembly President negotiated an agreement with
the opposition to increase coverage of opposition policies and
viewpoints. As a result, coverage has increased.
The variety of newspapers expanded significantly in 1991 to a
total of more than 20. There are now four daily newspapers.
Those with the widest circulation, Fraternite-Matin and the
evening paper Ivoire Soir, are government run. In 1991 both
newspapers ran stories critical of government policies and
increased their coverage of the political opposition. A third
daily. La Voie, is an organ of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI),
Cote d' Ivoire 's strongest opposition party. Finally, La
Chronique du Soir is independent. Most of the weekly
newspapers are either affiliated with opposition political
parties or, if unaffiliated, nevertheless critical of the
Government. Foreign publications circulate freely, but the
Government occasionally expels foreign journalists who write
unfavorable articles. An Agence France Presse journalist, who
inaccurately reported that students were killed in the Yopougon
raid of May 17-18, was expelled from the country.
Although criticism of government policies is tolerated, insults
or attacks on the honor of the country's highest officials are
not. Two Ivorian journalists served jail sentences in 1991 for
offending the President. In addition, six journalists from
four newspapers were convicted on November 6 for alleging
without proof that the Prime Minister was corrupt. Each was
given a suspended sentence of 2 months in jail and a fine of
about $3,500. The National Assembly President strongly
criticized the press in an October speech, accusing them of
"violence of the pen." A press law was enacted in December
which created a new commission to enforce laws against
publishing defamatory material or material "undermining the
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COTE D ' IVOIRE
credit of the nation." The law imposes stiff penalties,
including the seizure of offending newspapers.
Many prominent Ivorian scholars are active in opposition
politics and have not suffered professionally. The Government
insists, however, that teachers separate their political
activity from their work in the classroom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly is guaranteed by the Constitution but in
practice is restricted when the Government perceives a
significant and immediate danger to public order. Although
opposition parties believe that the Constitution permits
private associations of any sort, the Government disagrees, and
all organizations must register before commencing activities.
Registration is sometimes denied, and this device has prevented
the formation of some political parties, although 40 were
registered by the end of the year. Further, Ivorian law
prohibits the formation of political parties along ethnic or
religious lines.
Permits are required for public meetings and are sometimes
denied to the opposition but never to the PDCI . Gatherings
occasionally are prohibited to prevent the expression of
controversial views in public forums. Following the Yopougon
raid of May 17-18, the Ivorian League of Human Rights (LIDHO)
applied for permission to organize a protest march. The
Minister of Interior and Security proposed an itinerary which
was unacceptable to LIDHO. On June 5, LIDHO demonstrated
without a permit. Police used truncheons and tear gas to
disperse the peaceful crowd, and eight people were injured.
On June 17, several thousand students rioted at the University
of Abidjan, and part of the mob killed a reputed government
agent (see Section l.d.). Three days later, the Prime Minister
ordered the prosecution of the executive board of the
Federation of Students and Pupils of Cote d'lvoire (FESCI) for
incitement to murder, and he dissolved FESCI under the law
which prohibits associations from provoking public disorder.
c. Freedom of Religion
There are no known impediments to religious expression. There
is no dominant religion, and no faith is officially favored by
the Government. The open practice of religion is permitted,
and there are no restrictions on religious ceremonies or
teaching.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government exercises minimal control over domestic travel.
However, there are numerous internal roadblocks at which
persons are frequently harassed, and small amounts of money are
extorted for contrived or minor infractions.
Ivorians normally can travel abroad and emigrate freely. In
1991, however, teachers were required to present to the Ivorian
passport control before boarding an airplane the written
authorization of the Ministry of Education; if they were on
strike, authorization was denied. Ivorians have the right of
voluntary repatriation. There are no known cases of revocation
of citizenship.
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COTE D' IVOIRE
Cote d'lvoire's refugee and asylum practices are liberal. The
country has resettled or granted safe haven to many refugees
from different countries. In 1990 more than 230,000 refugees
from the Liberian civil war entered the country, and most
stayed through 1991. While in Cote d'lvoire, refugees receive
1-year renewable resident visas for their first 5 years in the
country, after which they may apply for permanent residence.
The Liberians are a special case; the Government expects that
they will go back to Liberia as soon as that country returns to
normal. The Government is actively involved in managing
Liberian refugee relief, even though most resources come from
foreign and international donors. The continued arrival of
Liberians in 1991 has led the Government to fear that relief is
acting as a magnet. It has established a committee to review
the case of each new arrival to determine whether the person
should be accorded refugee status. The Government is reluctant
to implement self-sufficiency activities that might encourage
refugees to remain in Cote d' Ivore.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
President Houphouet-Boigny and the PDCI were returned to power
in 1990 in the first multiparty presidential, legislative, and
municipal elections since independence. Proceedings were
marred by some serious irregularities. Only at the end of 1991
did the National Assembly, which has the authority to decide on
the validity of the elections of its members, convene a
committee to decide whether irregularities in 11 districts
would invalidate the results.
Before the presidential elections, the National Assembly
effectively restricted the number of candidates by imposing the
stringent requirement that each candidate must pay a large
deposit (approximately $80,000), refundable only if the
candidate received more than 10 percent of the vote in the
first round of balloting. Opposition parties, which became
legal only in May 1990, charged that there had been inadequate
time to prepare for elections held during October-December of
the same year. Further, they faced onerous restrictions on
holding meetings and demonstrations and unecpaal access to the
state-controlled media. There were numerous assertions by
opposition parties of ballot box stuffing, procedural
irregularities, and fictitious, or late-designated, polling
places. In the legislative election, the names of well over
100 duly registered candidates did not appear on the ballot.
President Houphouet-Boigny is both Head of State and president
of the PDCI. In late 1990, he appointed a Prime Minister in
whose hands are concentrated most day-to-day governmental
affairs and much economic power. The Prime Minister serves at
the pleasure of the President. The PDCI holds 165 of the 175
seats in the National Assembly, which is subordinate to the
Executive branch. The Assembly confirms and ratifies
legislative initiatives received from the President. Under the
President's leadership, the party is governed by an 86-member
Central Committee and a 418-member Political Bureau. The PDCI
is a conservative party which has accepted the new multiparty
political system. The chief opposition party, the FPI, calls
for a more honest and democratic government and an end to
cronyism.
Elections for President, the National Assembly, and municipal
councils are held every 5 years, with the next elections
scheduled for 1995. Although under the Constitution only
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COTE D ' IVOIRE
citizens are entitled to vote, the electoral law extends voting
rights to non-Ivorian Africans living in Cote d'lvoire, who
constitute approximately one-third of the country's
population. There is a secret ballot.
Section 4 Governmental Attitudes Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
An internal, independent human rights organization, the Ivorian
League of Human Rights (LIDHO), was formed in 1987 and was
recognized by the Government in July 1990. The League has
actively investigated alleged violations of human rights and
issued press releases and reports, some of which were critical
of the Government. In June 1991, the Ivorian Association for
the Promotion of Human Rights (AIPDH) was established for the
purpose of improving Ivorians' awareness of their basic
rights. The group's first major project consisted of
translating human rights documents into local languages.
Neither LIDHO nor AIPDH has been impeded by the Government (see
Section 2.b. ) .
The Government has been cooperative in the past towards
international inquiries into its human rights practices.
Although the Government has not responded publicly to appeals
from Amnesty International and the International Labor
Organization (ILO), it has subsecjuently taken positive action
to correct abuses.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no overt, official discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, language, or social status. Although French is the
official language and the language of instruction in the
schools, radio and television programs are broadcast in major
local languages. Social and economic mobility are not limited
by policy or custom on the basis of ethnicity or religion, but
there are pronounced inec[ualities based on sex, with males
clearly playing the preponderant role overall.
While some Ivorian traditional societies accord women
considerable political and economic power, in rural areas
tribal customs dictate that menial tasks are performed mostly
by women, although farm work by men is also common. Government
policy is to encourage full participation by women in social
and economic life, but there is considerable informal
resistance among employers to hiring women, who may be
considered "undependable" by virtue of potential pregnancy.
Clitoral excision, which is illegal in Cote d'lvoire, is
nevertheless practiced particularly among the rural population
in the north and west. The operation, which usually takes
place at puberty as one part of a rite of passage, is generally
performed outside modern medical facilities and can be
extremely painful and dangerous to health. The Government does
not make strong efforts to prevent the practice, and social
pressures are sufficiently strong that it persists,
particularly in small villages where the tribal chief is the
primary decisionmaker. Excision is becoming less common as the
population becomes better educated.
Violence against women, especially wife beating, is neither
widely practiced nor tacitly condoned. However,
representatives of women's organizations state that wife
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COTE D ' IVOIRE
beating does occur, often leading to divorce. Doctors state
that they rarely see the victims of domestic violence. A
severe social stigma is attached to domestic violence of any
kind; neighbors will often intervene in a domestic quarrel to
protect a person who is the object of physical abuse. The
courts and police view domestic violence as a family problem
unless serious bodily harm is inflicted, in which case criminal
proceedings do take place. The Government has no clear-cut
policy regarding wife beating beyond the obvious strictures
against violence in the civil code.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to form unions under the Labor Code of
1964, but union membership is not mandatory. For almost 30
years the government-sponsored labor confederation, the General
Union of Workers of Cote d'lvoire (UGTCI), dominated union
activity, except for the independent university teachers',
secondary school teachers', and doctors' unions. In 1991
several formerly UGTCI-af filiated unions including those
representing transport, media, customs, and bank workers broke
away and became independent. An independent labor federation,
Dignite, was officially authorized in 1990 but has attracted
few members. The leader of the UGTCI occupies a senior
position in the PDCI hierarchy. The UGTCI is a relatively
passive coordination mechanism rather than an active force for
worker rights, although it has had some success in improving
working conditions and safety standards. The UGTCI represents
approximately one-third to one-half of the organizable work
force. Independent unions tend to be more activist than those
within the UGTCI structure. ,Some of the independent unions
have links to opposition political parties.
In March gendarmes broke up an extraordinary congress of the
secondary school teachers' union, using billy clubs and whips.
The Union congress voted in a new Secretary General, whom the
Government refused to recognize. The previous Secretary
General was perceived by the union membership as being too
close to the ruling PDCI. In November the progovernment
faction of the union elected a different Secretary General with
the result that there are two claimants on the position. The
leader of an independent trade union was repeatedly called in
for questioning by security authorities during 1991.
The right to strike is protected in the Constitution and by
statute. The ILO's Committee of Experts in 1991, however,
reiterated earlier observations that the Labor Code gives the
President excessive power to submit an industrial dispute to
compulsory arbitration in order to bring an end to a strike.
The Constitution requires a protracted series of negotiations
and a 6-day notification period before a strike may be held,
effectively making legal strikes difficult to organize.
Strikes are seldom authorized by the UGTCI; however,
independent unions freely strike. In 1991 university teachers,
secondary school teachers, media workers, and doctors held
strikes. Although the Government declared the strikes illegal,
it met many of the strikers' demands.
The UGTCI, which is a member of the Organization of African
Trade. Union Unity, formally prohibits its individual trade
unions from forming or maintaining affiliations with other
international professional organizations in their fields.
Independent unions may freely affiliate with international
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COTE D' IVOIRE
bodies. Dignite is a member of the World Confederation of
Labor .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Labor Code grants all Ivorians the right to join unions and
to bargain collectively. Collective bargaining agreements are
in effect in many major business enterprises and sectors of the
civil service. In most cases in which wages are not
established in negotiations between unions and employers,
salaries are set by job category in the Ministry of Employment
and Civil Service. A law prohibiting antiunion discrimination
is enforced by labor inspectors. There are no export
processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There have been no reports of forced labor, which is prohibited
by law.
d. Minimum Wage for Employment of Children
In most instances, the legal working minimum age is 16, and the
Ministry of Employment and Civil Service enforces this
provision effectively in the civil service and in large
multinational companies. However, children often work on
family farms, and in Abidjan some children routinely act as
street traders and vendors of consumer goods in the informal
sector. There are also reports of children working in what
could be described as sweatshop conditions in small workshops.
Many children leave the formal school system at an early age;
lower grade education is mandatory but far from universally
enforced, particularly in rural areas.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Cote d'lvoire has an administratively determined monthly wage
rate which was last adjusted in January 1986. A slightly
higher rate applies to construction workers. The minimum wage
is enforced only with respect to salaried workers employed by
the Government or registered with Social Security. Minimxim
wages vary according to occupation, with the lowest
insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and his family. The majority of Ivorians work in
agriculture or the informal sector where the minimum wage does
not apply.
Through the Ministry of Employment and Civil Service, the
Government enforces a comprehensive Labor Code governing the
terms and conditions of service for wage earners and salaried
workers and providing for occupational safety and health
standards . Those employed in the modern sector are reasonably
protected against unjust compensation, excessive hours, and
capricious discharge from employment. The standard legal
workweek is 40 hours. The law requires overtime payment on a
graduated scale for hours in excess of the standard.
In the large informal sector of the economy, involving both
urban and rural workers, the Government's occupational health
and safety regulations are enforced erratically at best.
Government labor inspectors are empowered to order employers to
improve substandard conditions and, if the employer fails to
comply, fines can be levied by a labor court.
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DJIBOUTI
Djibouti is a one-party state ruled since independence in 1977
by President Hassan Gouled Aptidon and his People's Assembly
for Progress (RPP), which has been the only lawful political
party since 1981. Public life in Djibouti is dominated by two
ethnic groups, the politically predominant Issa (the Somali-
origin tribe of the President) and the Afar (who are also
numerous in Ethiopia). The Afar are the largest single tribe,
but they are outnumbered by the combined Somali ethnic elements
in Djibouti, among whom the Issa are the largest and most
influential component. The Presidency is considered reserved
for an Issa, and the Prime Ministry for an Afar. The various
ethnic groups are represented proportionally in the Cabinet and
political bodies, yet the result is a dominant role for the
Issa in civil service, party, and armed forces.
Djibouti's security services include three police agencies:
the National Security Force (FNS) and the National Police, both
under the Ministry of the Interior, and the Gendarmerie
(military police), under the Ministry of Defense. The security
services and the Gendarmerie in particular have earned a
reputation for using torture and other abusive treatment of
detainees which continued undiminished in 1991. France assures
Djibouti's external security and maintains a force of some
3,800 military personnel (ground, air, and naval) in Djibouti.
Djibouti's arid soil is unproductive, and there is no industry;
commerce and services for the 10,000 expatriate (mostly French)
residents and operation of the seaport and airport account for
most of the gross domestic product. Although the State is the
largest employer, persons are free to pursue private business
interests and to hold personal and real property.
The human rights climate in Djibouti deteriorated significantly
during 1991. In addition to continuing use of torture and
restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and
association, an RPP congress rejected political pluralism, and
the Government detained a number of persons demonstrating
peacefully in favor of multiparty democracy. In January,
following an armed rebel attack in the north, security forces
engaged in mass arrests of Afar, many of whom were tortured
during interrogations. At the end of the year, ethnic unrest
in the north deteriorated into a civil war between an Afar
rebel coalition called the Front for the Restoration of Unity
and Democracy (FRUD) and government forces. In December
secarity forces opened fire on Afar civilians in the city of
Djibouti who refused to cooperate with government searches of
their homes, killing 40 and wounding an additional 50.
Mistreatment of illegal immigrants and refugees by gendarmes
resulted in the death of at least 10 by suffocation.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no incidents of targeted political or extrajudicial
killing during 1991. However, on December 18, security forces
opened fire on Afars who refused to cooperate with government
searches of their homes in the city of Djibouti, resulting in
40 dead and 50 wounded.
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DJIBOUTI
Throughout 1991 the security forces frequently and harshly
mistreated refugees fleeing conflict in Somalia and Ethiopia.
In one egregious incident in September, following an indiscrim-
inate roundup of Ethiopians, Somalis, and Djiboutians, the
gendarmes placed 58 detainees in two tiny, almost airless
prison rooms. The inhumane conditions resulted in at least
10 persons — the official count — dying through suffocation. The
Government's investigation of the incident resulted in minor
disciplinary actions, including the dismissal of two officers
and the razing of the prison where the 10 died.
b. Disappeareuice
A group of 16 persons, who were arrested after the January
attack and subsequently released, complained to the judicial
authorities that as many as 400 people, mostly Afars,
disappeared in January, without any official explanation.
Most were subsecjuently released.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The law requires officials to "respect the moral and physical
dignity of the prisoner." Nevertheless, there were frequent
reports of torture in 1991, including the documentation of many
cases. In particular, the security forces use harsh
interrogation methods, including the use of severe beatings in
handling detainees, especially political/security suspects and
undocumented aliens. The practice continues both because of
official indifference and inadec[uate training of the security
forces concerning citizens' rights.
Following an attack in January by Afar rebels on the military
barracks in Tadjourah, security forces repeatedly raided the
Afar community, arresting hundreds and torturing many. Most
were subsecjuently released. However, a letter from 16 detainees
implicated 22 officers of the FNS and Gendarmerie, accusing
them of being agents of torture. They said the methods of
torture included spinning the victim until he becomes
unconscious, forced ingestion of water, sodomization with glass
bottles, electric shocks administered to the genitals of men
and to the breasts of women, suspension by feet and by hands,
and "shark fishing" in which a bound victim is towed behind a
powerboat in the open sea. The Government did not undertake an
investigation of the Tadjourah incident, and no one was
punished for the many extralegal abuses.
Prison conditions are harsh, especially in remote desert
regions, where political detainees and prisoners were
frequently sent in 1991.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
By law, a person may be detained no more than 48 hours without
an examining magistrate's formal charge. In practice, this
deadline is ignored in cases of political interest. An accused
has the right to counsel, which in theory is provided by the
State if the accused is destitute. An accused person awaiting
trial may, by a judge's order, be released on bail or personal
recognizance, or be jailed pending the verdict.
Close to 70 persons, mainly Afars, were detained follov/ing the
January attack. Among those arrested in January on grounds of
state security were Ali Aref Bourhan, his nephew Aref Moheimed
Aref, and Mohamed Daoud Chehem, formerly director of finance.
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DJIBOUTI
In the National Assembly, the Prime Minister's chief of staff
accused the entire Aref family of attempting to overthrow the
State, participating in assassinations, and associating with
wrongdoers .
Omar Daoud, leader of a small armed Afar opposition group,
remained in prison awaiting trial at year's end. He was
arrested in June 1990.
Another notable case of arbitrary detention occurred in April
when Moh.amed Moussa "Tour-Tour" was arrested after
demonstrating peacefully in favor of multiparty democracy.
Whereas the Aref prisoners are of the minority Afar tribe,
Tour-Tour is an Issa and a former director of planning for the
President. The Ministry of Justice acknowledged the illegality
of his imprisonment, but the Ministry of Interior did not
relent until September 8, when Tour-Tour was released without
explanation for his 5 months of detention.
The Government does not use political exile as a means of
punishment. There are, however, several opposition figures in
self-exile in France.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Djibouti's legal system is a mixture of Djiboutian legislation
and executive decrees, French codified law adopted at
independence, Shari'a (Islamic law), and traditions of the
native nomadic peoples. Crimes in urban areas are dealt with
according to French-inspired law and judicial practice in the
regular courts. Civil actions may be brought in the regular
courts, or in traditional court according to tribal customs.
Shari'a courts handle only family matters (marriage, divorce,
inheritance, etc.). Decisions of all three court systems may
be appealed to the Supreme Court. Proceedings in all courts
except the State Security Court are open to the public. The
judiciary is especially susceptible to government influence in
cases of political interest. Many of the magistrates and
judges are political appointees with little or no legal
training.
The special State Security Court may hear in closed session
cases of espionage, treason, and acts threatening the public
order or the "interest of the Republic." Extensive delays are
typical in such cases due to their political sensitivity. This
Court convened on December 22 to hear the case of Ali Aref and
other Afars accused of coup plotting, but it postponed the
trial at the defense's request — until July 1992. In the
meantime the defendants remain jailed.
Opposition figures challenge the legitimacy of the State
Security Court and the legality of the executive order which
established it, claiming the Court exists primarily to
"adjudicate" the cases of political prisoners held according to
the wishes of the President and his security apparatus. The
Government has responded positively to domestic and
international suggestions for judicial reform. The State
Security Court is now subject to the appeal process before the
Supreme Court, and while the December session was not open to
the public, journalists and family members, as well as
diplomats, were allowed to attend.
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DJIBOUTI
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family* Home, or
Correspondence
Security forces in the city of Djibouti recommenced periodic
roundups during which the FNS and the Gendarmerie
indiscriminately incarcerate loiterers, many of whom are
undocumented refugees. The Gendarmerie typically refuses to
respond to family inquiries regarding people who disappear
during these roundups. There were no known instances of
arbitrary interference with correspondence.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms are seriously restricted. Those who express
public views that are critical of or perceived as threatening
to the Government face prosecution for common crimes or
detention without charge for short periods. During 1991,
unprecedentedly frank discussions took place within the party
over political reform (see Section 3). Despite the ban on free
political expression, critics of the regime have published
clandestine tracts and manifestos th^t circulate widely in
Djibouti .
Djibouti's radio and television stations and one newspaper (a
French- language weekly) are all government owned and operated.
The Government's avowed policy is to coordinate the
dissemination of information "in the interest of national
development." The news media do report on social and national
development problems in Djibouti, such as the acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) problem and female
circumcision, but the Government itself and its policies are
not criticized. The media avoid domestic politics and ethnic
strife in neighboring Somalia and Ethiopia, although the
collapse of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia and the Siad Barre
regime in Somalia received significant coverage.
Foreign journalists (e.g., British Broadcasting Corporation
Somali Service) or members of international organizations,
including from the staff of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) , in Djibouti were expelled
during 1991 for discussing ethnic tensions. Copies of one
issue of a Paris daily newspaper were temporarily held off
newsstands in July because of an article criticizing Djibouti's
treatment of Ethiopian escapees in May and June. Issues of the
monthly Tribune of the Opposition, and those of the Paris
weekly, the Indian Ocean Newsletter, are also banned. People
found in possession of these periodicals may be arrested.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government effectively bans political protest by selective
enforcement of piiblic assembly permit laws. Permits for
political meetings are not issued outside party auspices.
Prodemocracy demonstrations in April followed a March RPP
decision not to accept political pluralism. The leader of the
first demonstration, Mohamed Moussa Tour-Tour, was arrested and
detained in the remote military outpost of Moulehoule where he
was confined for several months until released following a
hunger strike. Four other prodemocracy demonstrators were
arrested on April 23 for their political activities (namely,
demanding Tour-Tour's release); they were released 2 weeks
later .
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DJIBOUTI
c. Freedom of Religion
Djibouti respects freedom of religion for all faiths.
Virtually the entire population is Sunni Muslim, but the
Government imposes no sanctions on those who choose to ignore
Islamic teachings on such matters as diet, alcohol consumption,
and religious fasting.
The expatriate community supports Roman Catholic, French
Protestant, Greek Orthodox, and Ethiopian Orthodox churches.
Less than 1 percent of the native population belongs to these
Christian congregations. Foreign clergy and missionaries may
perform charitable works, but proselytizing is a highly
sensitive issue and, while not illegal, is discouraged.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Djiboiitians travel freely within Djibouti and may live and work
where they choose. Djiboutians leave for, and return from,
foreign countries without restriction or interference, except
for travel to Israel or South Africa. The passports of members
of the Aref family were withheld in January prior to their
detainment .
Djibouti cooperates with the UNHCR to assist the approximately
1,500 registered Ethiopian refugees in the country, many of
whom returned to Ethiopia in August. Following the collapse of
the Mengistu regime in neighboring Ethiopia, Djibouti faced a
massive influx of fleeing Ethiopian army personnel and their
families. With the assistance of the French military, most of
these soldiers were stopped or were forced back across the
border. Many refugees were returned to Ethiopia without UNHCR
supervision to certify that their repatriation was voluntary.
Those that refused to return were not accorded refugee status
but received better treatment than Somali refugees.
As a matter of policy the Government does not recognize as
refugees the approximately 94,000 Somali nationals who have
fled the Somali civil war. The Government has an informal
agreement with UNHCR that these refugees will not be forcibly
repatriated if they do not "cause trouble," but UNHCR in fact
has limited ability to extend protection to these persons, and
the Government's policy has resulted in inadequate water
supplies and medical care as well as malnutrition for the
Somalis .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
All legal political activity is conducted within Djibouti's
single party, the People's Assembly for Progress (RPP) . As in
most Djiboutian institutions, the Issa have a dominant role in
the RPP, which has had a monopoly of power since the rival
Djiboutian People's Movement (MPD) was outlawed in 1981. The
party chooses the candidates for the Presidency and the
65-member National Assembly, a legislative body with limited
power. Presidential elections are held every 7 years, and
elections for the National Assembly every 5 years. Citizens
are encouraged to vote, but affirmative and negative ballots
must be cast in different boxes, making it obvious who votes
against the party.
In early 1991, the RPP held a congress which was marked by some
of the most open political debate in years. Several
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DJIBOUTI
participants called for the end of the single party system and
a move to multipartyism. The RPP rejected this proposal but
has now accepted the principle of political pluralism for the
elections to take place in May 1992. The impetus for change
has been the armed insurgency led by the FRUD coalition. The
Government has made -its democratization pledge contingent on
the cessation of hostilities.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government has not responded to repeated attempts by two
independent groups of Djiboutians to formally register a
"Djiboutian League for Hviman Rights." A third group has
complied with all the laws concerning Djiboutian associations
but has thus far failed to secure official sanction. The
International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty
International have had limited access to visit some, but not
all, of Djibouti's political prisoners. The Government has
also permitted inspection of prison facilities by foreign
diplomats. However, three UNHCR workers were expelled from
Djibouti, one of whom had been incarcerated for 7 hours.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Issa control the party, the civil service, and the military
as a result of the President's policy of assigning positions of
authority to members of his tribal grouping and in particular
his subclan, the Mammasan. Although other government positions
are apportioned according to relative tribal numbers, the
arrangement is suspect as no census figures have ever been
released. Perc[uisites and corruption have created a class of
wealthy bureaucrats who live far beyond the means of the
ordinary Djiboutian.
Women in Djibouti legally possess full civil rights but
traditionally play a secondary role in public life. Women are
active in small trade, as well as in the clerical and
secretarial fields. There are only a few women in the
professions (civil service, judiciary, teaching, and medicine)
and security services.
According to medical personnel, violence against women —
including rape and wife beating — occur. While data are
limited, such violence is still considered a relatively
infrequent occurrence. Neither the Government nor the
party-affiliated Djiboutian National Women's Union (UNFD) has
addressed the issue. Most domestic and community violence is
considered a family or clan matter, dealt with accordingly, and
therefore rarely brought to the attention of authorities. The
UNFD began a government-supported educational campaign against
female circumcision in 1988, but the campaign appears to have
had marginal impact, particularly in the northern districts,
where nomadic traditions of genital mutilation of young girls
(e.g., clitoral excision and the most dangerous form,
inf ibulation) are widely practiced. Recent judicial reforms
have stipulated that anyone found responsible for circumcision
of young girls that results in genital mutilation could face
5 years in prison and a $6,000 fine. By implication, circum-
cisions that are well performed are legal.
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DJIBOUTI
Section 6 Workers Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers are free to join or not join unions as they choose, but
less than 20 percent of persons in the wage economy are union
members. Labor unions thus play a minimal role in Djibouti.
Many unions represent employees of only a single private or
state-owned enterprise. The Government exerts control over
individual unions through the single, state-
organized labor central, the General Union of Djiboutian
Workers (UGTD) . Although there is no legal bar to other labor
centrals, none exist, and the UGTD has no affiliations beyond
its membership in the continentwide official trade union body,
the Organization of African Trade Union Unity. Unions are free
to maintain relations and exchange programs with unions and
labor organizations in other countries.
Workers are free to strike, but there were no strikes in 1991.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Although the law recognizes labor's right to organize and
bargain collectively, in practice, collective bargaining
virtually does not exist. Relations between employers and
workers are informal and paternalistic. Wages are in practice
established unilaterally by employers on the basis of Ministry
of Labor guidelines. When disputes about wages or health and
safety issues arise, the Ministry of Labor encourages direct,
ad hoc resolution by labor representatives and employers.
Either workers or employers may initiate a formal
administrative hearing mediated by the labor inspection service
of the Ministry of Labor.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
By law there is neither forced nor compulsory labor in
Djibouti, and there are no reports that it is practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum age of 14 years is generally respected;
however, the paucity of inspectors from the Ministry of Labor
makes it unlikely that investigations are ever carried out,
according to union sources. Children may and do work in
family-owned businesses such as restaurants and small shops,
including at night. Children are not employed under hazardous
conditions .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wage rates are specified by government regulations
according to occupational categories and are enforced by the
Ministry of Labor. Last increased in 1980, minimum wages cover
a broad range of jobs. Many workers also receive housing or
housing allowances and transportation and food allowances, in
addition to mandatory seniority bonuses. In reality, wages are
lower than the official minimum. Families supplement their
incomes with second jobs or assistance from relatives.
By law the maximum workweek is 40 hours, often spread over
6 days. Overtime pay regulations are in effect. Workers are
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DJIBOUTI
guaranteed daily and weekly rest periods and paid annual
vacations. The Ministry of Labor is responsible for
occupational health and safety standards, wages, and work
hours. Enforcement of these standards, however, is
ineffective. Workers face hazardous working conditions,
particularly in the port where they are exposed to toxic
chemicals and are not properly clothed to handle these
materials. Workers in the electric company face equal hazards
and often work in temperatures exceeding 60 degrees Celsius.
Workers do not protest, as they fear being replaced by others
willing to accept the risks.
no
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Equatorial Guinea is ruled by President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo
who, "in 1979, as Vice Ministep of Defense, overthrew Francisco
Macias, the ruthless dictator, of the country from its
independence in 1968. In 1982 a constitution was promulgated,
and Obioing officially declared the Government to be civilian.
In 1986 he established Equatorial Guinea's sole legal political
party, the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (DPEG) . In
1989 Obiang staged the first presidential election since 1968;
as the only candidate, he was elected to a 7-year term. In a
November 1991 referendum, Obiang submitted to the electorate a
new Constitution which was not made readily available to the
public but was approved by 98.38 percent of those voting,
according to the Government. While providing for a multiparty
system, the new Constitution, which became law in December, was
on balance probably a step backwards for individual liberties
because it entrenched presidential powers and specifically
granted Obiang lifetime immunity from any legal proceeding.
As the country's most senior military officer. Brigadier
General Obiang dominates both the military and civilian
branches of the State, personally holding six cabinet
portfolios, including Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Mines and
Petroleum. Obiang' s Esangui clan and fellow Fang from the
Mongomo area hold an estimated 50 of the 70 most senior
official positions in the country.
Civilian and military security branches are responsible for
public order, augmented by a presidential guard of 400 to 600
men provided by Morocco. These forces historically have
committed the majority of human rights abuses, reportedly often
at the behest of senior government officials, who commonly have
been present at torture and interrogation sessions.
Equatorial Guineans live mainly by subsistence agriculture,
hunting, and fishing. Per capita annual income is
approximately $457. The small wage economy, based on cocoa,
lumber, and coffee, has not recovered from the devastation
caused by the death or exodus of thousands of trained and
educated citizens during the Macias era, although a very small
middle class has emerged in recent years. The country remains
heavily dependent on foreign aid.
Almost the entire spectrxom of human rights continued to be
tightly restricted. Despite President Obiang' s monopoly on
power, there were growing public pressures to institute a
multiparty political system. Most of those actively involved
in opposition activity have been from the professional classes
of all ethnic groups, majority Fang from outside of the Mongomo
area as well as Bubi, Ndowe, Combe, Annobonese, and other
minorities. The Government responded both by arresting,
detaining, and torturing its opponents, and, at a special DPEG
congress in August, by promising to institute carefully
controlled political reform from the top. By the end of the
year, through the new Constitution, Obiang seemed ready to
permit limited political opposition as long as it did not
present a real challenge to his power. As 1991 ended, however,
security forces had not relaxed their harassment of dissidents,
arresting at least 24 in Bata at the end of November and
another 3 late in December, and no opposition party had been
recognized.
Ill
EQOATORIAL GUINEA
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIOTTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No political killings were reported in 1991. One person
accused of witchcraft was tortured and beaten to death by
police (see Section i.e.).
b. Disappearance
There were no known disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
Police and other security forces continued routinely to
administer torture and other cruel forms of mistreatment to
prisoners. Authorities employed a wide variety of techniques,
including severe beatings with sticks and vrtiips, electric
shocks, hanging victims by their feet or arms, and applying hot
pepper sauce to sensitive areas of the anatomy. Physical as
well as psychological torture was used routinely as an aid in
interrogation and to intimidate and punish prisoners.
In July Manuel Nguema, Caspar o Asama, and Diosdado Nsue Abaga
were tortured for causing death by witchcraft. Nguema,
Equatorial Guinea's Consul at Calabar, had been home on leave
when his niece called out his name in her dying delirium. All
three men were accused, detained, and tortured. Nsue, \rtio was
detained and tortured a second time, died as a result. Three
women who interceded on Nsue s behalf were stripped by police
and brutally mistreated. Subsequently, four policemen were
convicted and sentenced to 8 to 10 years in prison for their
involvement in Nsue's death. A traditional healer also
convicted in the case was given a light sentence and released
after a few days, presumably because she was the wife and
sister of senior government officials. The police officer who
directed the beating was not punished.
In August the six men still imprisoned for participation in an
alleged 1988 coup plot were beaten with whips at Bata prison
and sxibsequently denied medical attention.
Prison conditions continued to be extremely harsh. Basic
amenities were rarely provided, and prisoners' essential needs
were largely supplied by their families or friends. The
Government is reported to provide only a single loaf of bread
per prisoner per day.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Despite constitutional provisions, there was little enforcement
of the rights of persons in detention to be charged or released
within a reasonable period of time, to have access to a lawyer,
or to be released on bail. Arbitrary arrests by security
forces or police are cornnonplace, often on spurious charges, in
order to extort money or to gain personal revenge. Many
detainees are held incommunicado, although the right to habeas
corpus and application for pretrial release are provided for in
the Constitution. The number of detainees — political as well
as criminal — held at the end of 1991 was not known.
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
The Goverrunent uses arbitrary arrest, interrogation, torture,
and banishment to remote villages to intimidate dissidents and
keep a viable opposition from forming. In May Alfonso Nsue
Mokuy, chief of special programming at Equatorial Guinea Radio
and Television; £usebio Abaga Ondo Maye, former ambassador to
the Soviet Union; and three other prominent officials accused
of supporting political pluralism were detained, interrogated
at security headquarters in Malabo, and banished to their home
villages. The banishment was rescinded after a short time. In
a similar case, Ricardo Nvu Mba was banished in February to his
home village where he remained at year's end.
In August, less than 2 weeks before a scheduled visit to
Equatorial Guinea by Spanish President Felipe Gonzalez, three
persons, including a journalist, were detained for several days
and fined after being interviewed by a visiting Spanish
journalist .
Sever?il persons living in Luba on Bioko Island, including the
Luba DPEG chief, the municipal secretary, and the director of
the public school, were accused of causing a death through
witchcraft, detained for more than a month, and tortured. They
were eventually released without charge.
Jesus Ela Abeme, former ambassador to France, was detained on
suspicion of distributing antigovernment literature, tortured,
held at security headquarters in Malabo for several weeks, and
then released without being formally charged.
The Government continues to maintain that it encourages exiles
to return to Equatorial Guinea, assuring them that they will
not be persecuted. At the same time, however, the Government
makes it clear that political activity outside the sole legal
party will not be tolerated. In November, 24 politically
related exiles from Libreville were arrested on their return
and held without charge for several weeks. Although they
reportedly had returned to participate in the multiparty system
announced in the new Constitution, most were eventually sent to
their home villages and warned to remain there and not to
become further involved in politics. There were credible
reports during December of continued harassment of people who
wished to participate in political groupings under the new
Constitution. Harassment took the form of surveillance, brief
detentions, summary dismissals from government employment, and
evictions from government-owned housing.
In July the Secretary General of the Reformed Church of
Equatorial Guinea, Jaime Sipoto, led a delegation to Geneva to
attend a conference of Equatorial Guinean exiles and human
rights and religious organizations. Upon returning to
Equatorial Guinea, Sipoto presented to President Obiang a
proposal for a committee of conference participants to visit
Equatorial Guinea to arrange for the return and reintegration
of the exiles. The proposal also included a plan for
democratic reform in Equatorial Guinea.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There is a formal court structure, with the Supreme Court at
the apex, and also military and customary (traditional) court
systems. Traditional laws and customs are honored in the
formal court system when not in conflict with national law.
The tribunal provided for in the Constitution to decide
constitutional issues has never been established; in the
meantime, the Council of State — appointed by the President and
113
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
responsible to him — is empowered to rule on constitutional
questions. Under the Constitution, military tribunals hear all
capital cases.
There is no separation between the executive and the judiciary,
and Supreme Court justices serve at the pleasure of the
President. The executive branch acts with little respect or
understanding for judicial independence. The nation's mixture
of traditional law, military law, and Spanish rules and
procedures combines to produce an inconsistent system of
justice. Judges and court officials are poorly trained. There
is little concept of due process, and appellate proceedings are
virtually nonexistent. Defendants unable to afford legal
counsel stand little chance of acquittal. The fact that the
few lawyers (approximately 20) in the country depend on their
connections to the Government for a livelihood raises questions
about the impartiality of the defense their clients might
receive.
The Government appears to use charges of "kong" (traditional
witchcraft which is believed can cause injury or death) to jail
those suspected of engaging in proscribed political activity as
well as to gain personal revenge. Since the statutes of
Equatorial Guinea do not refer to witchcraft, such cases are
reportedly handled outside the normal court system by the
Director General of National Security, Armengol Ondo Nguema
(President Obiang's brother), and Ricardo Mangue, Chief of the
Appellate Court. In February 1990, the mayor of Ebebiyin and
five others were ordered imprisoned for periods of 4 to 23
years. Although no public trial was held, the men are believed
to have been accused of causing the death by "kong" of a
brother of the mayor, who was killed in a road accident. The
real reason for their arrest and incarceration is reliably
reported to be that they were attempting to form an opposition
political party. Apparently all six were released from prison
late in 1991.
The number of political and security prisoners held at the end
of 1991 was not known. Two of the six men held in connection
with the 1988 coup plot were freed from prison as part of a
limited prisoner release ordered by President Obiang. The six
had been convicted in unfair trials. Venancio Miko, imprisoned
since 1983 on charges of plotting a coup, was released at about
the same time.
In 1990 Spain and the United Nations Human Rights Commission
(UNHRC) jointly financed a visit to Equatorial Guinea by two
senior Spanish judges to review the court system and civil
registry and to make recommendations for improving them. The
judges presented a report to the UNHRC in Geneva and to the
Governments of Spain and Equatorial Guinea. The report
recommended measures to improve Equatorial Guinea's judicial
system and respect for human rights. Spain also agreed to
train judges who would then serve on the Supreme Court. There
has been no followup to the report on the part of the
Government of Equatorial Guinea, although the establishment of
an official human rights commission may have been one outcome
of their visit (see Section 4) .
f . Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government sometimes places under surveillance persons it
deems suspicious. While many believe telephone conversations
are routinely monitored, there seems to be no deliberate
114
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
interference with correspondence. Although required by the
Constitution, search warrants are not normally used.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Public criticism of the Government is not tolerated. Several
employees of the government radio and television service were
detained for talking to a foreign journalist. In another case,
a journalist was threatened with death by a senior government
press official for filing a report which the official claimed
misrepresented President Obiang's views. The Government owns a
small occasional newspaper and the only television and radio
stations. Domestic news is government produced and contains no
criticism of the Government. International news items are
generally supplied by the Spanish agency EFE and other sources.
Distribution of foreign publications critical of the Government
is forbidden. Several persons were arrested or restricted to
their home villages for possession of the Spanish weekly
newsmagazine Cambio 16 containing articles critical of the
Government of Equatorial Guinea.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Despite constitutional provisions guaranteeing these freedoms,
the Government continues to ban opposition political
organizations and assemblies. Private nonpolitical groups,
such as professional organizations, churches, and sports
groups, require government approval to hold meetings.
c. Freedom of Religion
With one exception, freedom of religion is generally
respected. Jehovah's witnesses, originally banned from the
country in 1985 and harassed in 1986 and 1987, are still
prohibited from practicing their religion. Christianity,
mainly Roman Catholicism, is the predominant religion, often
interspersed with traditional religions. The Islamic and
Baha ' i faiths are also practiced openly. In general, active
proselytizing by Protestant denominations is discouraged, but
conversions are permitted. Government permission must be
obtained to open new places of worship. Foreign clergy and
missionaries continue to have an active role in educational
development. All denominations are allowed to participate in
charitable as well as religious activities.
A religious law promulgated in June forbade ministers of
religion to criticize the Government or state organizations in
their sermons. The new law seemed to be aimed at the Roman
Catholic Church, since some of its clergy, including the late
Archbishop of Malabo Raphael Nze Abuy, who died in July, had
publicly criticized the Government and called for greater
openness in the country and respect for human rights.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens and residents of Equatorial Guinea generally may
travel freely within the country, but permits are needed to
visit Mount Basile, just south of Malabo, where a
communications center is situated, and Moka in the southern
part of Bioko Island. Police, who are poorly paid and trained,
often extort small payments for passage through traffic
checkpoints on major roads. At times police become abusive and
115
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
refused without valid reason to permit travelers to pass
checkpoints. There are restrictions on travel abroad,
including lengthy delays in obtaining passports. Both citizens
and residents of Equatorial Guinea must obtain exit permits,
issued by the security police, to leave the country. Many
Equato-Guineans leave the country without formal documentation
for both economic and political reasons and reside abroad,
mostly in Gabon, Cameroon, Spain, and France.
The Government publicly encourages Equato-Guineans abroad to
return, but in 1991 few did so. Severe Moto, exiled leader of
the Progressive Party, was denied the right to return to his
native country when the Ecjuatorial Guinean Embassy in Madrid
refused to renew his passport. Moto was also belittled by name
in the government-run press.
There are a number of workers from other African countries in
Equatorial Guinea. These workers sometimes must resort to
bribery to obtain legal registration but generally are free to
work and travel within the country.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The people of Equatorial Guinea do not have the right to change
their government by democratic means. President Obiang's
party, DPEG, is the only political party allowed to function as
of the end of 1991. Since its founding in 1986, only party
members have been permitted to be candidates in local as well
as national elections. The legislature is subordinate to the
executive with no independent authority; all governors are
appointed and removed by the President; all locally elected
officials serve at the pleasure of the President as well.
Nevertheless, there was growing public pressure throughout the
year, especially from the small professional class, to adopt a
multiparty political system. Obiang called a national
referendum on November 17 which approved a new Constitution —
reportedly by 98.38 percent of those voting. The Constitution
permits a multiparty system and separates the office of the
Chief of State, who would remain the President, from that of
the Head of Government, which would be a revamped office of
Prime Minister. The Constitution entrenched presidential power
and granted Obiang lifelong legal immunity for his actions
before, during, and after his term of office. The text of the
Constitution was not made public until after the referendum.
At the end of the year, security forces continued to harass
political dissidents as well as families of exiles involved in
politics abroad.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In September 1990, citing an Amnesty International (AI) report
on torture in Equatorial Guinea, President Obiang announced
formation of a human rights commission. He did not name the
members of the commission until February 1991, and the
commission did not hold its first meeting until September.
Seven of 14 members are also members of the House of People's
Representatives (two of these are also ministers). At year's
end it appeared the commission would have largely a ceremonial
role. At the invitation of President Obiang, the United
Nations Human Rights Commission specialist, Volio Jimenez,
madean extensive trip in November during which he was given
access to prisons. His report is expected to be made public in
1992;
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Although the law calls for equal treatment for all citizens,
ethnic groups are not granted the same rights and privileges.
The Fang comprise 75 percent of the population, the Bubi 15
percent, and other groups the remainder. A small number of
Fang clans, especially those of the President and relatives by
marriage, dominate all aspects of government, the military, and
social life. Discrimination against the Bubi and Fernandino of
Bioko Island, as well as the Ndowe and associated coastal
groups from the continent, is consistent, whether in the
granting of political office or the approval of academic
scholarships. There are, however, members of minority groups
in positions of prominence but with little real authority,
e.g., a Bubi has held the office of Prime Minister since 1982,
and the President of the House of People's Representatives is a
member of the Benga ethnic group from the island of Corisco.
Women are confined by custom to traditional roles, especially
in agriculture. Polygamy, which is widespread, contributes to
the secondary status given to women in society. According to
the Government, boys and girls, once they gain admission, are
equally likely to complete secondary school. However,
according to recent U.N. data, females in Equatorial Guinea
receive only one-fifth as much schooling as males. The
Constitution and laws guarantee equal rights for women, and
there is no legal discrimination in employment, though women
are largely excluded from some fields, such as the military, by
tradition. The Ministry for the Promotion of Women focuses on
agriculture, handicrafts, and professional training. It is
interested in developing women's agricultural cooperatives and
enrolling more women in the school of professional training in
Malabo.
According to medical professionals, violence against women,
particularly wife beating, is common. Child abuse is
uncommon. The Government has not addressed violence as an
issue and looks to the Ministry for the Promotion of Women to
advance the interests of women in Equatorial Guinean society.
According to the medical community, female circumcision is not
practiced in Equatorial Guinea.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers do not have the right of free association. In the
small wage economy, no labor organizations exist, although
there are a few cooperatives with limited power. Strikes are
prohibited by law.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no legislation regarding these rights or addressing
antiunion discrimination and no evidence of collective
bargaining by any group. Wages are set by the Government and
the employers, with little or no input by workers. The
employer must meet the minimum wage set by the Government, and
most companies pay above the government-established minimum.
There are no export processing or free trade zones.
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor and slavery are prohibited by law, and slavery
does not exist in Equatorial Guinea. However, persons detained
without formal charges at Blackbich prison and security
headquarters in J^alabo and the police station in Luba during
1991 were forced to do day labor on the farms, at residential
construction sites, and in businesses of senior government
officials.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum age for employment is 16, but there is no
enforcement of this law. Children younger than 16 commonly
assist families with agricultural production and sales.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is only a small industrial sector in the country. Most
salaried employment is provided by the Government, construction
companies, businesses providing retail goods and services, and
the plantation agricultural sector. In April 1990, the
Government increased the statutory minimum wage rates for
workers in nonagricultural sectors. The minimum wage law is
not widely enforced, and government employees are exempted from
its provisions. The minimum wage by itself does not provide a
worker and family with a decent living, and most of those with
regular salaried income have to supplement their earnings with
income from other sources or by farming. The law limits the
regular workweek to 48 hours and guarantees employees 1 rest
day per week, plus regularly scheduled national holidays. The
Labor Code offers comprehensive protection for workers from
occupational hazards, but it is not effectively enforced.
Safety and health committees which are explicitly sanctioned by
the Code do not function, and employees who protest unhealthful
or dangerous working conditions risk losing their jobs.
118
ETHIOPIA
A coalition of ethnic-based insurgencies toppled the repressive
regime of President Mengistu Haile-Mariam in late May, bringing
profound political changes to Ethiopia. The former president
flew into exile in Zimbabwe after losing a series of decisive
battles to an umbrella group known as the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) . In addition, the
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) seized the Red Sea
coastline, ending a long struggle for control of the former
Italian colony of Eritrea. In July a broad-based national
conference adopted a charter establishing a multiparty
Transitional Government (TG) to organize democratic and
multiparty national elections before 1994. EPRDF Secretary
General Meles Zenawi was elected President of the TG. The
National Conference also acknowledged a separate provisional
government for Eritrea under EPLF Secretary General Issaias
Afwerki and endorsed an internationally supervised referendum
on Eritrea's political future to be held in 2 years.
The new leadership qpiickly dismantled the extensive military
and security apparatus of the Mengistu government, including
the police and surveillance operations by neighborhood
committees known as kebeles. The joint military/police force
of the TG consists of some 120,000 to 140,000 EPRDF regulars.
While retaining the kebele structure for administrative
purposes, the TG instituted a parallel system of thousands of
"Peace and Stability Committees" with sweeping powers of
investigation, arrest, and detention. Complicating the picture
were thousands of armed followers of other political groups
represented in the TG. At year's end, the TG had not been able
to eliminate armed ethnic clashes, particularly in the
countryside. In Eritrea, approximately 90,000 EPLF regulars
made up the provisional government's military/security force.
The civil war extended into the principal food producing and
coffee growing areas of Ethiopia, which was already one of the
world's least developed countries with an annual per capita
income of $120. When Mengistu' s government finally collapsed,
over a million civilians had been displaced by war; food and
fuel shortages were chronic; the national treasury was empty;
foreign exchange was reduced to less than 1 day of imports; and
inflation reached an annual rate of 21 percent. At year's end,
both the TG and EPLF provisional government had under
consideration draft plans calling for partial privatization and
market oriented reforms, leading in the direction of a mixed
economy .
Civil war remained the primary factor affecting human rights
during the first 5 months. All parties to the conflict
committed major violations, including summary executions,
although the majority of these came from the Mengistu forces
(see Section l.g.). The change of government brought a
significant improvement in human rights, particularly with
respect to freedom of speech, assembly, association, religion,
and travel. The new leaders in both Addis Ababa and Asmara
stated their commitment to the establishment of multiparty
democracy and rule of law with full respect for human rights.
They began important investigations into extrajudicial killings
and disappearances by the Mengistu regime. Nevertheless, there
were new and serious human rights abuses, notably in the hasty,
ill-prepared expulsions of non-Eritreans from Eritrea; in the
detentions without charge of thousands of former Mengistu
government officials; in the political disenf ranchisement of
former members of the now banned Workers' Party of Ethiopia
(WPE); in the use of force in response to growing criminal
119
ETHIOPIA
activity and political challenges; and, above all, in the
continuing ethnic instability and politically motivated
violence, which by the end of 1991 had taken several thousand
lives .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The Mengistu government carried out thousands of political and
extrajudicial killings during its 17 years in power. The
victims of these killings were suspected opponents of the
regime or sympathizers with any number of opposition groups;
ethnic Eritreans, Oromos, and Tigrayans were frequently
targeted. Captured insurgents were often executed.
Throughout the civil war, EPRDF forces generally abided by
conduct codes which forbid the killing of unarmed prisoners.
However, they frequently executed summarily accused looters,
whether civilian or military, including EPRDF members. EPRDF
radio appeals in March to the general public in Gonder and
Gojam to apprehend escaping Mengistu government officials
probably sparked some unnecessary killings, but those
surrendering to the EPRDF were given protection. Faced with
demonstrations during the first 2 days following their takeover
of Addis Ababa, the EPRDF acknowledged shooting at least nine
demonstrators dead, some of them armed. A number of accused
looters were also executed without trial. There were no
instances, however, of extrajudicial killing of former Mengistu
government officials.
After the TG came to power in July, there were dozens of
instances of violent clashes in the countryside between local
military elements of political parties within the TG. In a
number of instances, rival groups repeatedly engaged in
politically or ethnically motivated killings. The ready
availability of automatic weapons contributed to the problem.
In one such case, hundreds of members of one ethnic group were
slain by a rival group armed with automatic weapons on the
shores of Lake Abaya in early June. EPRDF and Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF) troops clashed in the Arsi region in November and
in the Welega and Harerge regions in December. Also in
December, local EPRDF forces fired on a motorcade carrying the
leader of the Sidamo Liberation Movement (SLM) in Awasa (Sidamo
region), resulting in at least one death. In this and other
cases, the national leadership of the political groups
intervened to mediate and investigate. When wrongdoing was
uncovered, the EPRDF appeared more likely to discipline its
members than other political groups.
In Eritrea the Mengistu government summarily executed dozens of
civilians during the first 5 months of the year. EPLF
assassination teams also targeted civilians whom it accused of
collaborating with the Mengistu government. At least four
civilians, including a member of the Mengistu government's
national parliament, were assassinated early in the year.
Since the EPLF provisional government took power in Eritrea in
late May, there have been no allegations of politically
motivated or extrajudicial killings.
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b. Disappearance
In previous years, thousands of suspected opponents of the
Mengistu government disappeared, and a number of Mengistu
government officials also disappeared in areas falling under
insurgent control.
Since the TG came to power in Addis Ababa, there have been
charges and countercharges among its various political parties
of politically motivated violence in the countryside, including
some disappearances of party workers.
In Eritrea, the former director of the Asmara police hospital
disappeared after being taken into EPLF custody in May.
International human rights organizations tried to trace reports
that a half-dozen other persons, most arrested in Addis Ababa
and repatriated to Eritrea, also disappeared while in EPLF
custody.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
During the Mengistu era, both political and criminal prisoners
were routinely subjected to physical abuse and torture,
including beatings and whippings, electrical shocks, and
suffocation, during interrogations. Female detainees were
frequently raped. Under the TG, Ethiopian television has aired
testimony from former victims of such torture.
There have been no allegations of torture in Ethiopian jails,
prisons, or detention centers since Mengistu' s ouster. Three
weeks after capturing Addis Ababa, the interim EPRDF
administration announced that all detained Mengistu government
officials would be treated humanely. The National Charter of
the TG abjures torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Despite protections contained in the 1987 constitution,
citizens suspected of opposing the Mengistu government were
subject to arrest and detention without charge or judicial
review. In addition, thousands were detained without charge
over the years under states of emergency declared by the
Mengistu government in Eritrea and Tigray, which permitted
indefinite detention.
At the beginning of 1991, Mengistu 's government was believed to
have an estimated 500 persons under political detention, most
of them without charge. In the days immediately preceding the
EPRDF capture of Addis Ababa, Mengistu government jailers set
free most prisoners held in the city, criminal as well as
political. The TG denied inheriting any political prisoners
detained by the Mengistu government. The Mengistu government
did not use exile as a means of political control, but more
than 1 million citizens fled the country during the Mengistu
years to escape war and persecution.
The TG National Charter approved in July prohibits arbitrary
arrest, detention, and exile. Since their seizure of power in
late May, however, the new authorities have detained thousands
of civilians without charge, the largest number being senior
Mengistu government or WPE officials arrested solely because of
the position they held. Also detained were former Mengistu
government officials accused of corruption or believed involved
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in violations of humanitarian law. While thousands were
subsequently released, additional suspects continued to be
arrested on the recommendation of local Peace and Stability
Committees throughout the country. In addition, the TG set up
"Complaints Review and Grievance Clearing Committees" to
investigate allegations of corruption or abuse of power.
At year's end, the TG authorities acknowledged having 1,522
Mengistu government civilians under detention who had still not
been charged — a consequence, TG officials said, of abolishing
the Mengistu police force (formally charged with
investigations) and suspending Mengistu public prosecutors and
judges. In addition, other civilians, perhaps hundreds, have
been detained without charge by the EPRDF or other political
organizations around the country. In November the TG detained
four nationals from neighboring Djibouti without charge,
reportedly at the behest of the Djiboutian authorities. In the
absence of a police force, investigations became the
responsibility of EPRDF administrators, local Peace and
Stability Committees, Complaints Review Committees, and
personnel from the newly reconstituted Ministries of Internal
Affairs and Defense. The new judicial system was not yet in
place at the end of 1991.
With support from international donors, the TG demobilized the
majority of the 350,000 to 450,000 soldiers from the defeated
Mengistu army. According to the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), of the 250,000 former soldiers originally
held in TG detention facilities, all but 13,275 had been
released by the end of 1991. Of those still in detention,
9,500 were disabled war veterans accommodated for humanitarian
reasons, and 1,100 were former officers detained for possible
war crimes trials.
In Eritrea the Mengistu government had detained hundreds of
civilians suspected of sympathizing with the EPLF during the
first 5 months of the year. In the port of Aseb, several
hundred ethnic Eritreans and Tigrayans were also detained,
including drivers operating U.N. vehicles delivering relief
food. Of the 85,000 Mengistu military captured by the EPLF in
May (see Section l.g.), all but 900 had been repatriated to
Ethiopia by the end of the year. While no formal charges had
been brought against the 900, all were suspected of war
crimes. Under an agreement with the TG, these 900 were to be
repatriated to Ethiopia for possible trial. In addition, the
EPLF acknowledged having detained 300 Mengistu government and
WPE officials still under detention without charge in December,
as well as 600 other civilians accused of criminal offenses.
While difficult to evaluate, some human rights monitoring
groups believe the number of civilians detained in Eritrea at
year's end was several times the figure given by the EPLF.
The EPLF provisional government published new civil and
criminal codes on September 15 which contain a full range of
judicial safeguards, including habeas corpus and a 48-hour
limit on detention without charge (with the possibility of no
more than two 14-day extensions with judicial authorization) .
The EPLF provisional government does not use exile as a means
of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
For the first 5 months of 1991, the judicial system was based
on the 1987 Mengistu government's constitution which
established a Supreme Court and regional courts elected by the
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respective parliaments. Separate military courts handled not
only trials involving the Mengistu government military but were
also set up in contested areas. Despite constitutional
provisions for judicial independence and public trials, cases
deemed political in nature were often subject to manipulation
and meddling by senior Mengistu officials.
The EPRDF capture of power brought sweeping changes in the
judicial system: the Mengistu government's Ministries of
Defense and Internal Affairs were disbanded and reorganized
only after a delay of 7 weeks; the entire police force was
dismissed (customs police and traffic police were later
reinstated); and government judges and public prosecutors were
suspended. EPRDF soldiers initially assumed all police
functions, but within weeks Peace and Stability Committees had
been established at most local and regional levels. On June
18, the EPRDF announced that all trials of Mengistu government
detainees would be fair and public, follow due process, be open
to international observers, with defendants having the right to
counsel. The TG National Charter approved in July also
promised fair and public trials before independent and
impartial tribunals, presumption of innocence, and no ex post
facto criminal laws.
As of late 1991, no trials of former Mengistu government
officials had begun. TG Ministers of Justice and Internal
Affairs were first appointed in August. By year's end, the
TG ' s overworked Council of Representatives still had not
established the independent judiciary called for in the July
Charter. The Council passed legislation at the end of December
establishing new police forces at the national and regional
level. A draft proposal to establish an office of the special
prosecutor for the cases of former Mengistu officials was
circulating. Investigations proceeded throughout the year,
however, carried out variously by local Peace and Stability
Committees which sometimes gathered testimony in public
meetings. Complaints Review and Grievance Clearing Committees
in the workplace, EPRDF administrators, and personnel from the
newly reconstituted Ministries of Internal Affairs and
Defense. The Council banned former WPE members from any
political activity, and hundreds of former WPE members lost
their jobs in some ministries, including noncareer diplomats
abroad. Others in the civil service, many of whom had joined
the WPE reluctantly or in order to further their careers, found
themselves increasingly harassed by their TG superiors.
In Eritrea the EPLF provisional government established a
separate judiciary in September. At the apex of the EPLF
provisional government's judicial system is a 12-member High
Court made up of legal professionals appointed by the EPLF
provisional government's Justice Secretary, who was responsible
for court administration. Appointments to lower courts were
made by the President of the High Court. Some judges from the
Mengistu government were retained. To ensure judicial
independence, judges were given immunity from arrest and were
subject to removal only by an independent committee.
Investigations into alleged wrongdoing were the reponsibility
of the EPLF provisional government's Secretary for Security,
whereas prosecutions fell to a newly established Attorney
General's office. The Eritrean court system became functional
only in November, and there had been no trials of former
Mengistu government officials by year's end.
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f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Mengistu government's police and security ignored
constitutional requirements to obtain warrants for the search
of offices or private homes, monitoring mail, or conducting
visual and electronic surveillance, and operated extensive nets
of informers, especially through urban kebeles.
During the first several weeks after their capture of Addis
Ababa and other cities, EPRDF forces conducted house-to-house
searches (sometimes involving forced entry) for firearms and
former Mengistu officials in hiding. The TG National Charter
approved in July prohibits arbitrary interference in privacy,
family, home, or correspondence. Nevertheless, complaints
remained common about intrusions into private premises by the
frequently rotated EPRDF troops who provided public security in
urban areas in the absence of a police force. Local Peace and
Stability Committees often appeared to act arbitrarily in
authorizing searches and arrests by the EPRDF. Unlicensed
possession of firearms continued to bedevil TG authorities, and
private and commercial vehicles were subject to random
searches. Former WPE members were required to report to their
local Committee every Sunday; failure to do so could result in
arrest .
The July National Charter explicitly condemned the Mengistu
government's previous coercive policies of resettlement and
villagization and promised priority attention to the
rehabilitation of persons uprooted under these programs.
In Eritrea the EPLF also engaged in searches of homes and
offices for firearms and Mengistu government officials in
hiding. By October the EPLF provisional government authorities
said legal protections against warrantless searches were in
place.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Hiimanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Untold thousands of civilians died in the civil war which ended
in May 1991. All parties to the conflict at times engaged in
military operations with scant regard for civilian lives.
There is no reliable estimate of the number of civilian
casualties during the final months of the war.
The Mengistu government stepped up its enlistment efforts to
include all veterans, retired police and security officers, and
reservists, some in their 50 ' s and 60 's. Despite guidance that
new recruits be 18 years or older, some recruits as young as 14
were caught up in indiscriminate sweeps outside schools or in
marketplaces. Lethal force was sometimes used in stopping
those trying to avoid recruitment. While relying primarily on
volunteers, the EPLF, EPRDF, and OLF on occasion enlisted
minors, some as young as those conscripted by Mengistu' s
government .
The retreating Mengistu government military units generally
exercised good discipline with regard to treatment of civilians
in the final months of the war. In some instances, however,
such as in Nekemte (Welega region) in late March, in Ambo
(Shewa region) in mid-April, and in western Eritrea in late
May, there were credible allegations of robbery, rape,
beatings, and killings of civilians by undisciplined Mengistu
troops. EPRDF and EPLF soldiers showed a high degree of
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discipline and 9ivi^ behavior toward civilians throughout the
final stages of the war.
Upwards of 1,000 civilians died on May 28 while attempting to
loot a munitions plant booby-trapped by the Mengistu government
in the Addis Ababa suburb of Gulele. Another 140 civilians
died and 150 were wounded when former Mengistu government
military personnel sabotaged a munitions dump in the Nefas Silk
suburb on June 4. The explosion and resulting fire also left
7,000 homeless.
Treatment of captured Mengistu government military personnel
was reportedly good, thereby enabling the insurgents to recruit
large numbers into their ranks. Nevertheless, the former rebel
groups and the Mengistu government alike refused to accord
those captured prisoner of war status and barred the ICRC
access throughout the course of the war. Shortly after
capturing Asmara, the EPLF expelled an ICRC medical team there
that had been assisting with war wounded. The ICRC office in
Addis Ababa remained open after the EPRDF took power and worked
closely with the TG in setting up transit camps for demobilized
Mengistu government soldiers. In December the TG authorized
the ICRC to visit all former Mengistu government and WPE
civilians remaining in detention.
The international relief structure largely held together
throughout the year, although military operations occasionally
interfered with the flow of relief. While not as a result of
deliberate effort by the Mengistu government or its opponents,
the war seriously disrupted the flow of relief to Somali and
Sudanese refugee camps in the southeast and southwest,
resulting in serious food ration deficits in some camps.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press did not exist under the Mengistu
government. The government strictly controlled the content of
the state-owned and -operated information media, and individual
expression of unauthorized political opinions or views could
and did result in imprisonment.
The TG's National Charter, approved in July, provides for
freedom of opinion and expression and the right to impart these
through any media, although, pending action on a new press law,
all broadcast and most print media remained under state control
through the end of 1991. Nevertheless, individuals and
political groups, including those critical of the TG, had
access to the state-controlled media. A TG proclamation
guaranteeing free and equal access by all political
organizations to state-controlled broadcast and print media
took effect in November and appeared to be respected in
practice. Three political parties (the EPRDF, the OLF, and the
Oromo People's Democratic Organization, or OPDO) began
publishing their own newspapers in the fall. Ethiopia's first
independent tabloid newspaper began appearing irregularly by
year's end. Owing to lack of foreign exchange, newsprint
remained in short supply, and foreign magazines and newspapers
were not readily available.
In Eritrea the EPLF provisional government abolished the
Mengistu government's censorship boards. It imposed no
restrictions on independent newspapers, and four small
newspapers printed by Eritrean religious organizations
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circulated freely. In September the EPLF government introduced
a new government newspaper, which due to shortage of newsprint
was published only twice a week. The availability of foreign
magazines and newspapers was also restricted due to lack of
foreign exchange. The state-controlled newspaper and radio
broadcasts allowed access to opposition views.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly and association expanded greatly during
1991. Despite constitutional guarantees, the Mengistu
government did not allow citizens to organize or demonstrate
against official policies, and it influenced or controlled most
organizations in the country.
The day after entering Addis Ababa, the EPRDF banned
demonstrations after several turned violent. In the weeks that
followed, however, the EPRDF interim administration permitted
dozens of peaceful demonstrations. The July National Charter
endorsed freedom of association, peaceable assembly, and the
right to engage in unrestricted political activity and to
organize political parties. On August 15, the TG issued a
proclamation recognizing the right to demonstrate, and popular
demonstrations became routine around the country, including
those protesting TG policies.
While there was a proliferation of political organizations (59
by the end of the year) after the TG was formed, not all
political parties were free to organize. Mengistu 's WPE and
its various appendages were dissolved after the EPRDF seized
power in late May. The ban was later endorsed by the TG's
Council of Representatives in August.
While not formally banned, certain expatriate groups which
reject the principles of the National Charter were also not
free to organize in the country, among them: the Coalition of
Ethiopian Democratic Forces, the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Party, and the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement
(MEISON) . On August 15, the TG issued a proclamation requiring
organizers to inform authorities of public political meetings
48 hours in advance. While implementation of the proclamation
did not prove restrictive to organizations which gave notice,
in some cases local EPRDF administrators in the countryside
cited the proclamation as justification for breaking up
unauthorized political meetings and sometimes arresting
participants. In November three executives of the United
Democratic Nationals (UDN) party were arrested after
participants in an authorized UDN demonstration attacked TG
security personnel. The UDN leaders were charged with
responsibility for the incident under the terms of their
demonstration permit, and a trial in one of the civilian courts
still functioning was scheduled for January 1992. As of the
end of 1991, the need for procedures for registering political
parties and other organizations was under discussion in the TG
Council of Representatives.
In Eritrea, by contrast, the EPLF was synonymous with the
provisional government, and there were no restrictions on the
freedom of assembly; no permits for meetings were recjuired.
EPLF provisional government leaders declared all individuals
and groups were entitled to express their views freely in the
period leading up to the referendum. As of late 1991, no rules
for the registration of political or other organizations had
been drafted.
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c. Freedom of Religion
Following the 1974 revolution, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church
lost its status as state church and saw its extensive land
holdings — perhaps as much as 30 percent of all cultivated land
at the time — confiscated by the State. Under the Mengistu
government, all religions were declared equal, but WPE members
were prohibited from religious worship services, and references
to any deity were not allowed to appear in the media. Certain
religions, particularly foreign Protestant evangelical
organizations, were persecuted for alleged political
activities, their leaders arrested, their followers sometimes
killed, and many churches closed. The Jehovah's Witnesses were
totally banned.
Since coming to power in July, TG officials have advocated
complete freedom of religion. The July National Charter
guaranteed freedom of religion, including private and public
worship and the right of conversion. Across southern Ethiopia,
the TG returned hundreds of Protestant churches closed by the
Mengistu government in the late 1970 's. It lifted the ban on
the Jehovah's Witnesses; 4,000 adherents held their first Bible
study in public in September. The construction of some
mosques, halted 15 years ago, resumed. Links with foreign
religious bodies were freely allowed.
The TG authorities appeared to intervene, however, in Ethiopian
Orthodox Church affairs in late August, forcing the Ethiopian
Orthodox Patriarch from office, allegedly for cooperation with
the Mengistu government. The Ethiopian Orthodox Holy Synod
named a committee to oversee church affairs until a new
Patriarch could be elected.
In interconf essional violence in the second half of the year,
churches and moscjues were burned and hundreds may have died.
TG authorities attempted to mediate the disputes.
Most of Ethiopia's small Jewish population, known as Beta
Israel or "Falasha" (a word meaning immigrant or outsider),
left their traditional homelands in Gonder and Tigray during
1990 and emigrated to Israel in 1991. By year's end,
approximately 4,500 Jews were believed to remain in Ethiopia,
and emigration processing was already under way for these few.
There were no reports of violence or discrimination against
Jews or "Feres Mora" (Jewish converts to Christianity) by
either Mengistu or TG officials during the year.
In Eritrea the EPLF provisional government also proclaimed
freedom of religion. The EPLF provisional government announced
its intention to return church property confiscated by the
former government and pledged not to interfere in internal
religious matters. Religious schools closed by the Mengistu
government were encouraged to reopen.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
During the first 5 months of the year, freedom of movement
around the country was increasingly restricted by the civil war
and deteriorating security conditions. Foreign travel,
emigration, and repatriation were severely restricted by
Mengistu government policies. In late May, the interim
government of Lt. General Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan oversaw the
emergency humanitarian airlift of 14,000 Jews from Addis Ababa
to Israel.
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The National Charter adopted in July recognizes freedom of
movement, including the right to foreign travel and
emigration. Citizens no longer require permission for local
travel; however, there were credible reports that some local TG
officials discouraged migration between regions in order to
dampen ethnic tensions. Authorities maintained that Jews have
the Seime right of emigration as other citizens without special
government-to-government agreements that characterized the
Mengistu regime. Emigration of individual Jews resumed in
September. The TG also declared that all citizens remaining in
exile were welcome to return.
Despite its own domestic turmoil, Ethiopia was host during the
year to hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing civil war and
instability in Somalia and Sudan. The TG has been cooperative
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and other international agencies and generally adheres to
international norms for refugees. However the TG did not
maintain a continuous presence in Somali and Sudanese
refugee/returnee camps, as had the Mengistu government.
Refugee protection remained problematic throughout the year.
In southeastern Ethiopia, approximately 400,000 to 500,000
Somali refugees were joined by 350,000 Ethiopian returnees
driven out by fighting in Somalia. An estimated 100,000 Somali
refugees spontaneously returned to northwest Somalia by the end
of 1991. There were credible reports of military recruitment
among war-displaced refugees/returnees by the OLF and various
ethnic Somali-based political groups. Such recruitment
continued in the second half of the year, despite TG
injunctions. In southwestern Ethiopia, the Sudanese People's
Liberation Army (SPLA) forcibly recruited refugees, from
refugee camps which the SPLA was allowed to control by the
Mengistu government, into its armed forces. Following
Mengistu' s fall in late May, the SPLA evacuated, in some cases
forcibly, tens of thousands of Sudanese refugees from these
long established camps; less than 10,000 had returned to
Ethiopia by year's end.
In Eritrea tens of thousands of non-Eritrean civilians fled
during the final stages of the war. Despite intense
international criticism, the EPLF provisional government
hastily repatriated to Ethiopia 85,000 former members of the
Mengistu military and about 50,000 dependents in June and
July. Although denying it was making forced expulsions, the
provisional government also arranged the repatriation to
Ethiopia of tens of thousands of other non-Eritreans . In
December the EPLF provisional government expelled 495 orphans
whom it deemed non-Eritrean. Nonetheless, tens of thousands of
non-Eritreans have opted to remain in Eritrea. Following the
announcement of a general amnesty on June 22, thousands of
Eritrean refugees returned voluntarily from Sudan. By year's
end, the EPLF provisional government had not promulgated an
emigration/ immigration law.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Ethiopians have not enjoyed the right to change their
government peacefully at any time in the last century. In
1991, however, the collapse of Mengistu' s authoritarian rule
brought to power new political forces with the express
intention of creating a multiparty system which, if
implemented, would enable citizens to change their government
through democratic elections. For the first 5 months of the
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year, political power in the Mengistu government was formally
institutionalized in the WPE, the only legal party.
Despite its overwhelming military advantage, the EPRDF invited
27 political and ethnic organizations to attend a July 1-5
National Conference held in Addis Ababa. Conference
13rticipants agreed on a National Charter that spelled out
universal guarantees of human rights, recognized the right of
self-determination for all Ethiopian peoples, and set out a
timetable for establishing a multiparty democracy by January
1994 at the latest. The National Conference also set up a
multiparty Transitional Government (TG) to administer the
country until a new constitution is drafted and national
elections held. The coalition of ethnic-based insurgencies
that toppled the Mengistu government in midyear has attempted
to forge a new political consensus based on recognition of the
country's ethnic and linguistic diversity.
The TG consists of a quasi-legislative Council of
Representatives (87 members representing 32 political and
ethnic groups), a Council of Ministers (17 members representing
7 groups), and an independent judiciary (not yet established by
year's end). The Cabinet announced in August also included the
first female minister in Ethiopian history. The EPRDF
(actually a coalition of four parties) does not enjoy
majorities in either the Council of Representatives or the
Council of Ministers, but it captured most of the key positions
in the Transitional Government (President, Prime Minister,
Foreign Affairs, Defense, Internal Affairs). EPRDF officials
are also predominant in the "provisional administrative
committees" in cities and towns outside the capital. Local and
regional elections planned for October were delayed until 1992
as the Council of Representatives debated how to redraw the
administrative boundaries to reflect ethnic divisions and
election procedures.
In Eritrea, on the other hand, the EPLF administers a one-party
provisional government tasked with governing until an
internationally supervised referendum on Eritrea's political
future can be held. With the general population evenly divided
between Christians and Muslims, the EPLF emphasized religious
balance in leadership positions: five of the nine members of
the EPLF Politburo are Muslim, and Muslims hold half of the
portfolios in the EPLF provisional government cabinet.
Delegates to the Addis Ababa National Conference in July, which
the EPLF attended as an observer, supported interim
administration for Eritrea and recognized the Eritrean people's
right to self-determination through an internationally
supervised referendum, which the EPLF agreed to defer for up to
2 years. In September the EPLF provisional government invited
U.N. assistance in supervising the referendum, and in December
the TG officially requested U.N. assistance in the Eritrean
referendum. Once the referendum is held, EPLF leaders said
they plan to convene a constituent assembly to draft a new
constitution based on a multiparty political system and
democratic elections.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In October a group of private citizens organized Ethiopia's
first independent human rights monitoring body: the Ethiopian
Human Rights Council (EHRCO), headed by a prominent academic
and frequent critic of the TG. Also in October, two other
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private groups formed to further political dialog and promote
respect for democratic rights: the Ethiopian Congress for
Democracy (ECD) and Forum-84 . All three groups have been
allowed to operate freely and have access to state-controlled
media to broadcast information about their activities. As of
December , there had been no attempts to form any local human
rights monitoring group in Eritrea.
The Mengistu government had a long record of resistance to
international efforts to investigate human rights abuses. The
new TG has been generally willing to discuss human rights
concerns with diplomatic missions and international and
nongovernmental organizations. Amnesty International
representatives had their first free and unrestricted visit to
Ethiopia in July and visited again in December to investigate
alleged violations of human rights. An Africa Watch delegation
visited Ethiopia in October. Both groups were received by
high-level TG officials and given prominent coverage in the
state-controlled media.
In Eritrea the EPLF provisional government expelled the ICRC
shortly after seizing power in May, but in December agreed to a
reestablished ICRC presence to cooperate with local authorities
in the field of orthopedics. EPLF officials agreed in
principle that international and nongovernmental organizations
be allowed access to investigate human rights conditions. In
December the EPLF provisional government received an Amnesty
International delegation.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
More than 72 disparate ethnic groups, most having their own
tribal languages, make up Ethiopia's population of over 50
million. The inability of the Mengistu government to deal in a
noncoercive manner with the political and socioeconomic
aspirations of these various groups contributed decisively to
its downfall. The National Charter affirms the right of all
Ethiopian peoples to preserve separate languages and
identities, with recourse to self-determination, including
independence.
The TG abolished the Mengistu government's Revolutionary
Ethiopian Women's Association (REWA) , an appendage of the
banned WPE, and detained the former chairwoman without charge.
No successor organization has been formed.
Despite protections afforded them in the 1987 constitution,
women are accorded low social status in many traditional
cultures in the country. U.N. studies document marriage at
very young ages, hard and time-consuming labor, unequal
employment opportunities, and below average wages in urban
areas. However, women in the major Ethiopian ethnic groups
(Amhara, Oromo, Tigrayan) enjoy certain economic and legal
rights equal to men; they may inherit, sell, or buy property,
and engage freely in commerce. Despite a large number of
female soldiers in the EPRDF forces, women are not well
represented in leadership positions in the EPRDF or any of the
other newly formed parties.
The TG has established a national committee on traditional
practices considered harmful to women. Among them: female
circumcision (affecting fourth-fifths of all Ethiopian women);
tatooing (a possible means of AIDS virus transmission);
insertion of lip and ear plates among some southwestern tribes;
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ETHIOPIA
nutritional taboos; and child marriage. Domestic violence
remains common. While women have recourse to police protection
and official prosecution in cases of domestic violence,
societal norms and fear of loss of the social security that
marriage provides inhibit many women from seeking legal
redress. The TG established a new desk for women's rights in
the Ministry of Justice.
In Eritrea the EPLF provisional government worked to
accommodate nine indigenous ethnic groups and Christian-Muslim
divisions in the Eritrean population of 3 to 4 million. Women
in Eritrea are accorded inferior social status in many
traditional cultures. Nevertheless, participation by women in
the armed struggle — one-third of EPLF fighters were female — is
working to change attitudes. Six women sit on the 71-member
EPLF Central Committee. The EPLF provisional government
codified a broad range of rights for Eritrean women in
mid-September, including guarantees of equal educational
opportunity; land ownership, equal pay for ec[ual work, and
other economic and legal rights; and legal sanctions against
domestic violence. The campaign against dangerous traditional
practices, including female circumcision, nutritional taboos,
and traditional birth methods was taken up by the National
Union of Eritrean Women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Under the Mengistu government, the nonagricultural labor force
was mandatorily organized into a single trade union federation,
the Ethiopian Trade Union (ETU) , under the control of the
ruling WPE. Agricultural workers were organized in the
Ethiopian Peasant's Association (EPA), also under WPE control.
Despite guarantees in the 1987 constitution, workers and
farmers were not permitted to organize outside the ETU and EPA,
and the WPE approved candidate slates for all union officials.
The right to strike was recognized in principle, but forbidden
in practice.
Upon taking power, the Transitional Government (TG) dissolved
the ETU and EPA at the national level. The TG National Charter
recognizes the right to form and join trade unions. Beginning
in July, the TG organized elections for new union officials at
the factory-level, barring former members of the WPE and
security personnel from voting and holding office. Similar
elections were held in those peasant associations that survived
the transition.
By the end of 1991, no new new national bodies for workers and
peasants had yet been established, but planning was under way
by the TG for convening a national labor congress to discuss
the issue. The TG's Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs was
responsible for drafting a new labor code; in the interim, the
existing 1975 Labor Code remained in effect. Under this Code,
the right of affiliation to international organizations was
reserved to the ETU. Despite its dissolution, the ETU
technically remained an affiliate of the Communist-dominated
World Federation of Trade Unions at the end of the year.
Workers were free to form and join unions of their own choosing
without TG authorization, and this right was exercised
extensively. The 1975 Labor Code prohibited discrimination
against union members by management, but union members claimed
that occasional harassment continued. By October approximately
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ETHIOPIA
1,500 unions existed at the plant and factory level. These
unions were free of state interference, but the new political
parties especially the EPRDF have been involved in the
formation of some unions. In the absence of official
guidelines, TG officials have been tolerant of strikes and
protests in the workplace. Management frequently accused the
TG of being over indulgent with labor demands. In one such
case, EPRDF troops responded to charges by a local labor union
by arresting at gunpoint two midlevel managers at one of the
capital's leading hotels; they remained under arrest on charges
of corruption at year's end.
Upon taking power in Eritrea, the EPLF provisional government
similarly dissolved the ETU and EPA. On September 15, the EPLF
provisional government published a new Labor Code which accords
workers the right to join unions of their choice and the right
to strike. Eritrean courts were given the power to order
workers to delay strikes for 50 days pending negotiations.
Should negotiations fail, unions are required to give the EPLF
provisional government Labor Department a further 7-day notice
before any strike. There were no strikes in Eritrea in 1991.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
In principle the Mengistu government accepted international
conventions on collective bargaining and signed hundreds of
individual collective bargaining agreements over the last
decade. In practice, collective bargaining did not exist;
wages were set by the government in the public sector and by
employers with government oversight in the private sector.
The 1975 Labor Code includes the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Under the 1975 Code, wages are to be set in
negotiations between unions and management. If no agreement
can be reached, a disputes committee is formed, composed of two
representatives each from the union and management and a
committee chairman (usually a member of management). If an
agreement still cannot be found, the dispute goes to the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs for settlement. Within a
month of taking power, the TG's Prime Minister announced that
all collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the Mengistu
government, frozen since 1990, were valid. Given the condition
of the economy, there were no wage increases in state-owned
enterprises as of late 1991.
In Eritrea the EPLF provisional government's new Labor Code
published in mid-September explicitly recognized collective
bargaining and outlined an 11-step process for reaching
agreements .
There are no export processing zones in the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Slavery was officially abolished in Ethiopia in 1942, but legal
codes did not address the issue of forced or compulsory labor.
Under Mengistu 's government, citizens were sometimes called on
to perform certain civic obligations, including "volunteer"
assistance in community work projects. In factories, workers
were also expected to volunteer extra hours at no pay so that
production quotas could be met.
The TG's National Charter adopted in July proscribes slavery
and involuntary servitude. Local TG officials outside of Addis
Ababa continued to call on residents to volunteer for
132
ETHIOPIA
uncompensated community work projects, such as road building
and emergency road repair. Industries were operating at less
than half capacity at year's end; in those state-owned
factories still functioning, workers were still sometimes
compelled by factory managers to "volunteer" labor in order to
meet quotas, which could result in cash bonuses.
In Eritrea forced and compulsory labor was barred under the
EPLF provisional government's new Labor Code pxiblished in
mid-September. However, there were unconfirmed reports in late
1991 that some former Mengistu government detainees still held
in Eritrea without charge had been put to hard labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Under the 1975 Labor Code, contract employment of children
under the age of 14 is prohibited. Both the Mengistu
government and the new TG appeared to respect this restriction
in factories, shops, euid among domestic worker's. The Ministry
of Labor and Social Affairs was active in enforcing these
provisions in state-owned enterprises. Nevertheless, underaged
children were frequently seen peddling and begging on city
streets or working in the fields in rural areas throughout the
year .
In Eritrea the EPLF's new Labor Code published in mid-September
raised the minimum age for employment to 18. The provisional
government has also made education compulsory through age 18.
It remains to be seen how effectively it will be enforced.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The statutory minimum wage, unchanged since 1974, remained low
and woefully insufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for an urban worker and family. On the other hand, only
unskilled day laborers usually receive such a low wage. In
addition, fringe benefits not required by law (transportation,
meals, clothing, medical care, shelter) raise the effective
minimum wage. Low-paid workers often supplement their income
by holding multiple jobs, with help from the extended family,
and through subsistence farming. The Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs was responsible for enforcing compliance under
both the Mengistu government and the Transitional Government.
The 1975 Labor Code, observed by both the Mengistu government
and the TG, establishes an 8-hour workday and a 48-hour
workweek. The maximum legal workweek appeared to be respected
in practice with the exception of previously noted
uncompensated "volunteer" labor to meet factory quotas. The
1975 Code also empowers the Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs "to determine protective devices" and to advise on the
health and safety of workers. Compensation for occupational
injuries and disabilities is mandatory. The Ministry's
effectiveness in enforcing health and safety standards
continues to be hampered by lack of resources.
In Eritrea the EPLF provisional government's new Labor Code
published in mid-September retains many provisions of the 1975
Code, including: a very low minimum wage, an 8-hour workday
and 48-hour workweek, and stipulations that the health and
safety of workers be safeguarded, but the degree of enforcement
is unknown.
133
GABON
Although President Omar Bongo has ruled Gabon since 1967,
having been reelected three times in uncontested elections.
Internal pressures beginning in late 1989 forced him to
acquiesce in extensive political reforms. In 1991 a new
Constitution was promulgated which includes provisions for such
basic freedoms as movement, association, and religion and
explicitly abolishes the old system of single party rule. The
new multiparty legislature, which resulted from elections held
during the last months of 1990, grappled with the many legal
ramifications of the new order, including complex legislative
initiatives on public sector employment and newly created
constitutional bodies. In the past, the National Assembly had
no real power, and it is still dominated by the former sole
party, the Democratic Party of Gabon (PDG), which holds a
narrow majority. However, the newly elected Assembly includes
deputies from nine political parties and has been able to
confront and criticize the Government on some issues, e.g., in
forcing extensive changes in spending priorities. The new
Constitution limits President Bongo to one more 5-year term.
The armed forces comprise approximately 4,000 array, navy, and
air force personnel. Responsibility for internal security is
shared by the gendarmerie, a paramilitary force of 2,700, and
the national police, consisting of 2,000 troops; the police
work with the gendarmerie to maintain law and order in
Libreville, Port Gentil, and other provincial capitals. The
security forces use beatings as part of the interrogation
process.
Gabon's relatively high per capita income ($4,165 in 1991) is
based largely on oil revenues, but it belies the underdeveloped
nature of the country and its economy. Although endowed with
petroleum, manganese, uranium, and vast timber resources, Gabon
has experienced limited agricultural and industrial development
and imports most of its food and manufactured goods . Rain
forests cover 85 percent of the country, and approximately
two-thirds of the populace live in rural areas. Due to the
precipitous fall in revenue from oil exports in the late
1980 's, the Government has imposed austerity measures to meet
World Bank and International Monetary Fund program criteria.
Gabon took important steps toward a more open political system
in 1991. With the move toward a multiparty political system,
restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, and assembly were
considerably relaxed. Although the opposition has limited
access to government media, especially radio and television,
there is a lively opposition press, consisting of a half-dozen
weekly newspapers which are often highly critical of the
Government. The government-controlled newspaper, L' Union,
generally avoids direct criticism of the Government and the
President. Despite significant progress, some human rights
problems remain with regard to the mistreatment of prisoners
and detainees, including the heindling of illegal aliens.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known political killings or summary executions in
1991.
134
GABON
b. Disappearance
There were no knovm cases of cibductions or disappearances
ascribed to government security forces or any other group.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Gabonese law and security enforcement officials use beatings
and torture as part of the interrogation process of detainees
to gain confessions. Prisoners are reportedly forced to march
on their knees over stones; in addition, lawyers who have
visited prisons report hearing cries of those who are being
beaten. Prison conditions are harsh, and the main facility.
Central Prison, has insufficient food, inadequate medical
facilities, and poor sanitation. As a result, sickness is
common, and prisoners have died because they had no one to
bring them needed medicine. Violence among prisoners — in
particular, homosexual rape — is also a problem.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Although the law, based on French jurisprudence, provides
procedural protections against arbitrary detention, it allows
for pretrial detention for a prolonged period. Security forces
disregard the procedures concerning arbitrary detention,
particularly in security cases, by detaining persons
indefinitely without charge. There is no way of accurately
determining the number of arbitrary detentions during the year,
but it is thought to be as many as several dozen. However, no
political detainees were being held at the end of 1991.
Exile is not used as a means of political control nor as a
sentence for convicted criminals. A number of opposition
figures such as Pere Mba Abessole, leader of the Bucheron
Party, have returned in recent years. The only remaining
well-known "exile" is Pierre Mamboundou, who was convicted in
absentia for involvement in one of the coup plots uncovered in
late 1989 by Gabonese security forces. He resides in Senegal.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system, modeled on that of the French, has several
levels. The trial court (Tribunal de Premier Instance) hears
questions of fact and law in civil, commercial, ordinary
criminal, and administrative cases. The appellate level is
divided into two courts, with a separate appeals court for
criminal cases. The highest level, the Supreme Court, has
three chambers, and the former fourth chamber, the
Constitutional Cheimber, was recast as an independent body by
the 1991 Constitution. Outside the normal court system, there
is a military tribunal to handle all offenses under military
law; a State Security Court, which is a civilian tribunal; and
a special criminal court which deals with fraud and
embezzlement of public funds by officials.
The right to a fair public trial is provided for in the
Constitution and generally has been respected in criminal
cases, but procedural safeguards are lacking in State Security
Court trials. In this Court, trials are open to the public,
and defendants are represented by counsel, but appeal
procedures to the Supreme Court are restricted to raising
points of law. The State Security Court is a nonpermanent
body, called into existence as the Government determines to
hear political and security cases. It was last convoked in
135
GABON
1990 to hear the coup plot cases of 1989/1990. Subsequently,
in response to clemency appeals. President Bongo twice reduced
the sentences of those convicted in those trials, but none had
been released by year's end.
Although the judiciary is susceptible to intervention by the
executive, particularly in political or security cases, there
was no indication that such intervention occurred in 1991.
Reports persist that there were still some political prisoners
held at the end of 1991, but these have not been confirmed.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Search warrants may be obtained after the fact but, as
occasionally happens in cases of suspected illegal aliens,
sometimes they are not obtained at all. There were credible
reports that in many cases the homes of those detained were
ransacked by security forces who confiscated personal effects.
The Government periodically monitors communications. While the
former ruling party does not compel party membership, there
have been reports of government officials being fired or
transferred for membership in opposition parties.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
With the move toward a multiparty system, most restrictions on
freedom of speech and press have been eliminated. While direct
public criticism of the President previously had not been
permitted, during the legislative election campaign and in
subsequent political debates, Gabonese opposition leaders
criticized the President directly and indirectly, with no
retribution. However, opposition leaders also complained that
the state-controlled media did not provide adecjuate access to
opposition parties.
A half-dozen weekly newspapers, including the government -owned
L' Union and a range of nongovernment papers, continue to
circulate in the capital. The President has encouraged
journalists to point out failures of individual government
officials or ministries and to highlight inefficiency and
corruption. In 1991 such criticism continued and grew bolder,
with leading opposition papers publishing extensive allegations
of financial malfeasance by the President and his inner
circle. As a result of a decision by Multipress, the publisher
of L' Union and owner of the country's only high-speed rotary
press, to demand advance payment, several papers have been
obliged to print in Cameroon. More financially solvent
opposition papers are printed at Multipress without any
restrictions. All newspapers circulate freely within Gabon.
The established media carry wire service material (mostly
Agence France Presse) which gives the public some coverage of
world events. There were no instances in 1991 when foreign
publications were banned.
Academic freedom is relatively unrestricted. A professors'
strike over \iniversity mismanagement, lack of funds for
research, and the deteriorating physical plant at the
university campus in Libreville brought the 1990/91 academic
year to a premature halt and contributed to the fall of the
second Oye-Mba Government; security forces took no action
against the strikers.
136
GABON
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government grants the rights of freedom of assembly and
association to recognized organizations, including 74
recognized opposition political associations. Permits and
notification of police are required for all outdoor meetings.
The Government generally permits such meetings if they are
organized by recognized political groups or their ancillary
units, such as the women's, youth, and labor movements;
cultural and entertainment impresarios; or recognized church
groups. By law, unauthorized demonstrations are not permitted,
but tnere were numerous unauthorized demonstrations in 1991 for
which organizers and participants went unpunished, including a
major May Day rally staged by the Rassemblement National des
Bucherons (generally referred to as the Bucherons party) in
defiance of an explicit government ban.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion, and the Constitution provides for
religious freedom. Because their activities were considered by
the Government to foster disunity, Jehovah's Witnesses and
several small syncretistic sects were banned by presidential
decree in 1970. The decree was renewed in 1985. As recently
as 1987, the courts sentenced 24 Jehovah's Witnesses to short
or suspended terms for belonging to a banned organization. The
primary faiths are Catholic and Protestant. Muslims (including
President Bongo) constitute less than 5 percent of the
population. There are significant niombers of adherents to
traditional religions. Foreign missionaries engage actively in
evangelical and social service activities.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Movement of both Gabonese citizens and expatriates within the
country is not formally restricted; travelers occasionally
encounter gendarmerie control points where identity cards and
other documents are examined. Gabonese citizens may return
freely from abroad. The previous requirement for Gabonese
citizens to obtain exit permits from the police was rescinded
in June, but government employees must still obtain permission
to travel abroad.
There are approximately 200,000 non-Gabonese residents in
Gabon, many of whom are from Equatorial Guinea or Cameroon.
Immigration laws and presidential decrees promulgated in 1986
imposed requirements for heavy financial guarantees on
non-French and non-American expatriates working in Gabon and
levied exit visa fees for each departure from the country. The
gendarmerie periodically detain undocumented aliens who are
then placed in a holding camp under harsh conditions. Most of
the detainees are released after paying fines or bribes. An
increasing number of illegal immigrants are being deported to
demonstrate the Government's commitment to preserving
employment preferences for Gabonese.
The Government encourages, but does not force, "regroupment"
(voluntary consolidation of small rural communities into larger
villages along a road) by improving the delivery of public
services such as water, electricity, and schooling in the
larger villages.
137
GABON
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The 1991 Constitution, promulgated in March following extensive
National Assembly debate, provides formal guarantees of this
right, including the right to organize and campaign in the
political arena. There are now a wide reinge of parties and a
functioning multiparty National Assembly.
Nonetheless, the former single party, the Democratic Party of
Gabon (PDG) , remains the principal political party in Gabon,
and it still dominates the Government. Its leading role is due
to its established strength in organization and infrastructure,
to its close ties with the President, formerly the Secretary
General of the PDG, and to the splintering and inexperience of
the opposition. There have been continuing opposition charges
of ballot rigging by the Government or PDG, but the 1990
irregularities appeared in part to have been tied to the
disorganized election process. In the end, the PDG managed to
retain a narrow majority in the final makeup of the National
Assembly, with 59 of the 120 seats going to PDG members and 3
to PDG sympathizers. The remaining 58 seats are distributed
among eight opposition parties.
President Bongo has been reelected three times to 7-year terms
in uncontested elections, most recently in 1986. The new
Constitution provides for a limit of two 5-year presidential
terms. The National Conference of 1990 determined that for the
purpose of the new Constitution, the President's current term
would be considered his first; thus, he is eligible to stand in
1993 for a final term and is widely expected to do so. In
sharp contrast to the past, however, several candidates have
indicated they plan to run against President Bongo.
Under Gabon's nascent parliamentary system, the President's
Prime Minister is head of government and must be confirmed by
the National Assembly. Since the National Conference, there
have been three governments, each under the Prime Ministership
of Casimir Oye-Mba, but with different ministerial rosters.
The changes occurred when Mr. Oye-Mba submitted his
Government's resignation in response to public pressure; in the
first instance, the completion of the legislative elections
required that the new Government reflect the power balance
resulting from the controversial first round of elections. In
the second, a boycott of the legislature by much of the
opposition and festering problems in the educational sector
forced the Government to seek a fresh start.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Htunan Rights
A number of local human rights groups, including an affiliate
of Amnesty International, operate freely in the country. While
their actions have been limited by inexperience and poor
organization, they have influenced government policy, most
notably in the case of a Moroccan dissident writer expelled by
France to Gabon. Local rights groups published communiques in
the government-controlled press and held a series of meetings
with President Bongo to urge him to ensure the Moroccan's
personal security and allow him full liberty of movement.
Since June the Minister of Scientific Research has been charged
with human rights and relations with the legislature. The
Government has not impeded investigation by international human
138
GABON
rights groups or blocked the activities of human rights
observers.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The 1991 Constitution forbids discrimination based on national
origin, race, gender, or opinion. Gabon's relative prosperity
has enabled the Government to extend health and social security
benefits to all its people, regardless of tribal affiliation or
region. There were no significant ethnic, racial, religious,
or social groups that suffered discrimination in 1991.
In practice, women do face discrimination. However, government
and party policies are supportive of expanding opportunities
for women, and urban women in particular are moving
increasingly into the professions, taking advantage of improved
educational opportunities, including access to technical
training institutions. At the primary school level, there is
universal access for both girls and boys. However, at the
secondary level, only 22 percent of females, as opposed to 31
percent of males, are enrolled in school.
In rural Gabon, women still fill largely traditional roles
built around family and village, e.g., hauling water, tending
fields. The gradual introduction of piped-in water and of
electricity has had the effect of gradually improving living
standards for rural women. Legal rights of rural women are
largely governed by tribal tradition, while in the urban
sector, women's rights are patterned on French law. While all
women's rights are protected by the law, traditional practice,
which prevails in rural areas, assigns most of the hard work —
tending fields, preparing meals, child care — to women while
depriving them of formal authority in the village context.
According to medical practitioners, violence against women,
including wife beating, occurs, but the extent of the problem
is not known. Incidents of violence against women are reported
in the media from time to time and invariably are the outgrowth
of domestic disputes or are related to violence against
prostitutes. Cases of violence against women rarely come
before the courts. In the absence of statistics on the number
of incidents versus the number of court cases, this observation
is based on the relative weight given cases of violence against
women in news accounts. Such reports uniformly treat these
incidents as contemptible vestiges of a brutal past. Several
women's rights groups and professional associations have been
formed to address these concerns .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Under the new Constitution, the former monopoly of the
government-sponsored Labor Confederation of Gabon (COSYGA) has
been abolished. A new labor code, which would repeal the trade
union solidarity tax and other legislative restrictions on
trade union pluralism, is in the drafting stage but had not
been presented to the National Assembly by year's end.
In 1991 the trend continued toward freely formed, primarily
company-based (as opposed to industrywide) unions, which have
staged wildcat strikes aimed at forcing management to address
concerns of pay, benefits, and working conditions.
139
GABON
A strike at the government-run printing press crippled the
print media for 2 weeks, during which none of Gabon's
newspapers appeared on the stands. By the same token, strikes
by public health workers and primary and secondary school
teachers forced the Government to make significant concessions
on construction of .new facilities. In the private sector,
wildcat strikes by workers in state-run and other companies
have resulted in pay raises, benefit improvements, and, in some
cases, replacement of unpopular managers.
Under Gabonese law, strikes are illegal if they occur before
compulsory arbitration remedies prescribed under the 1978 Labor
Code have been exhausted, but the Government informed the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Conference in June that
a draft law on the right to strike has been examined by the
Government and could be incorporated in the revised labor
code. None of the strikers in the cited cases was the object
of arrest or other disciplinary action. COSYGA, whose future
role in Gabonese labor /management relations is unclear at
present, has represented Gabonese workers at the ILO and has
maintained limited contacts with a variety of national trade
centers.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Formally, unions in each sector negotiate with management over
specific pay scales, working conditions, and benefits
applicable to their industry. Agreements reached between labor
and management in each sector also apply to nonunion and
expatriate labor. According to the Labor Code, workers may
individually or collectively take complaints of code violations
to arbitration and may appeal to labor and national courts.
Among the changes in the labor law urged by the ILO is a
provision protecting workers against antiunion discrimination.
There are no export processing zones in Gabon.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law and is not practiced,
although technical violations of the conventions on forced
labor have been criticized by the ILO.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
No one below the age of 16 may work without the authorization
of the Ministries of Labor, Public Health, and Education, which
rigorously enforce this provision. Such permission is granted
rarely, and few employees in the modern wage sector are below
the age of 18. Children at younger ages are involved in
traditional family farm labor in rural areas.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The 1978 Labor Code and the 1982 General Convention of Labor
govern working conditions and benefits for all sectors. Labor
legislation provides broad protection to workers.
Representatives of labor, management, and government meet
annually to agree on minimum wage rates, which are determined
within guidelines provided by the Government. The Gabonese
minimum wage is determined annually pursuant to Articles 94 and
95 of the Labor Code of 1978. These articles designate an
interagency group to study the status of the economy and
recommend a minimum wage for the coming year to the President.
The President then issues a decree, pursuant to Article 88 of
the Code, setting the minimum wage. The current minimum wc^e
140
GABON
for unskilled labor is sufficient to provide a decent living
for workers and their families. Work over 40 hours per week
must be compensated with overtime, and the workweek must
include a minimum rest period of 48 consecutive hours.
The Labor Code provides for occupational health and safety
standards to be established by decree of the Minister of
Health. Adherence to these standards, which are generally
adapted from the French model, varies greatly and usually
reflects company policy rather than governmental enforcement
efforts. Article 134 of the Labor Code assigns enforcement of
its health and safety provisions to the Office of the Inspector
of Labor (Inspecteur du Travail) of the Ministry of Labor.
141
THE GAMBIA
The Gambia is a parliamentary democracy with an elected
president and legislature. Except for a coup attempt in 1981,
The Gambia has had a history of political stability under the
leadership of its only President since independence in 1965,
Sir Dawda Jawara. His ruling People's Progressive Party (PPP)
has dominated the unicameral Parliament, but several opposition
parties participate in the political process, including two
parties formed in 1986.
The Gambia has a small army with an attached naval unit
organized and trained by British officers. Its gendarmerie
forces, formerly headed by Senegalese officers, are now under
the control of, and responsive to, Gambian civilian leadership.
The Gambia's estimated population of 784,000 consists largely
of subsistence farmers growing rice and groundnuts (peanuts),
the country's primary export crop. In 1991 The Gambia
continued its stringent economic reform program in cooperation
with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
The Gambia has made particular efforts to promote observance of
human rights, which are constitutionally protected and
generally observed in practice. In 1991 the death of a person
in police custody led to a swift investigation, arrests, and
trials of police officials.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reported political killings. However, on August
2, a longtime Senegalese resident in The Gambia, Momodou
Jarjue, was detained on suspicion of theft by three Criminal
Investigation Division (CID) officers of the Gambian police.
According to witnesses, the CID officers beat Jarjue
continuously through the night and denied him food, water, and
medical attention. Jarjue died the next morning.
The police immediately began an investigation, personally
directed by the Minister of the Interior and the new Inspector
General of Police, and the three CID officers were detained by
the Gambian gendarmerie. In addition officials of the African
Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies conducted an
independent investigation of the incident and filed their
report with the Attorney General's office. Late in August the
police completed their investigation, and subsequently the
Attorney General annoionced that the three CID officers would be
arraigned before the Supreme Court and charged with murder and
assault. The trial began on October 1 and was continuing at
year's end, with the press providing full coverage of the
proceedings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman,
and degrading punishment. Except for the Jarjue case (Section
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l.a.), there were no known instances of torture or mistreatment
of detainees in 1991.
Prison conditions are severe, and in the past there have been
occasional reports of mistreatment of prisoners. After the
death of several inmates in 1988 due to inadequate diet, a
presidential commission on prison conditions investigated the
occurrence and its recommendations led to prison reforms.
There have been no further reports of such incidents since the
reforms. The Government allows prison visits by local Red
Cross representatives and by close family members.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Based on British legal practice, we 11 -developed constitutional
and legal procedures govern the arrest, detention, and trial of
persons accused of crimes. Under these procedures, a detained
person must be brought to trial within 1 week of arrest. This
waiting period, however, may be extended twice, making 21 days
the maximum period of detention before trial. In fact, due to
overcrowded court schedules, the detention period can be much
longer .
There were no political detainees being held at the end of
1991. There are some self-exiled opposition elements who would
be arrested for suspected involvement in the 1981 coup attempt
if they returned to The Gambia, e.g., the alleged leader of the
plot, Kukoi Samba Sanyang.
In February President Jawara amnestied the last 35 people
imprisoned for criminal convictions relating to the 1981 coup
attempt. Two of the recipients had been convicted of high
treason and condemned to death.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There are three kinds of law in The Gambia: general, Shari'a
(Islamic), and customary law. Shari'a law, governing Muslims,
is observed in marriage and divorce proceedings. Customary law
covers marriage and divorce for non-Muslims, inheritance, land
tenure and utilization, local tribal government, and all other
traditional civil and social relations. General law, based on
English statutes and modified to suit the Gambian context,
governs criminal cases and trials and most organized business
practices. If there were a conflict between general law and
Shari'a, general law would prevail.
The Constitution provides criminal defendants with the
traditional rights of the English legal system, such as
presumption of innocence, the right of the accused to be
informed promptly of the charges, and the right to a public
trial. If released on bail, an accused person may face charges
indefinitely, since there is no maximum time limit for
completing the investigation and bringing the case to trial.
Appeals normally proceed from the Supreme (trial) Court to the
Court of Appeals, the country's highest tribunal.
Judges are appointed by the Government, but the judiciary
operates independently and is free of government interference.
Because of the shortage of legal professionals in The Gambia,
the legal system is staffed in part by judges and prosecuting
and defense attorneys from other English-speaking countries
having the same basic legal system as The Gambia.
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THE GAMBIA
In 1988 a journalist, Sana Manneh, accused four cabinet
ministers of corruption, for which he was subsequently tried in
Magistrate's Court on charges of libeling three of them. In
that trial he was acquitted on two counts and convicted of the
third. The Government appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court, which overturned the acquittals. Manneh then appealed
to the Court of Appeal (The Gambia's highest court), which,
based on a technicality, reversed the Supreme Court's ruling on
December 5. The prosecution failed to give oral notice of its
intent to appeal after the announcement of the Magistrate
Court's judgment, as prescribed by Gambian law.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides guarantees, which are respected in
practice, against arbitrary search of person and property. It
does permit a search to which a suspect submits voluntarily or
if it is reasonably required in the interest of national
defense or public welfare. Under the Gambian criminal code,
search warrants based on probable cause are issued by
magistrates upon application by the police. The code also
specifies that police may conduct a search of a private
residence while a crime is in progress. There are a few
checkpoints in the country where the police and military
periodically stop and search drivers and vehicles.
The rights of family are of great importance in The Gambia's
conservative Muslim society. Marriage, the raising of
children, and religious instruction are regulated by a
combination of personal preference and ethnic and religious
tradition. The Government does not normally intrude in family
matters. There is no effort to censor or control personal
correspondence or communications.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press.
While opposition parties have been relatively inactive since
the 1987 elections, members freely express their opinions about
the Government and ruling party.
The Government does not attempt to censor published materials,
whether they originate within or outside the country. In
practical terms. The Gambia, with its small, mainly rural,
largely illiterate, multilingual population, does not support
an active press, though this is slowly changing. The
Government and the PPP have newspapers which are published on a
biweekly or monthly basis.
There are several independent, intermittently published,
mimeographed newssheets and, more recently, one monthly
newsmagazine. Both the opposition and the independent press
are openly critical of the Government. There is, however, some
degree of self-censorship in the government-owned media, which
exercises restraint in reporting criticism of the Government.
During the Manneh libel trial. Radio Gambia and the official
press ceased coverage after the first week of the trial.
There is no television in The Gambia, although Senegalese
broadcasts can be received. The Government dominates the media
through Radio Gambia. Two commercial radio stations, one of
which opened in 1991, primarily broadcast music. Foreign
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THE GAMBIA
magazines and newspapers are available in The capital. There
is no university in The Gambia.
During 1991, Parliament passed the National Press Council Act,
which establishes a council to oversee the activities of
journalists. The Act originated in response to journalists'
requests for legislation governing press affairs. The council
will be required to prepare a code of conduct and will have the
power to judge journalists with respect to breaches of this
code, reprimand them if the council rules against them, and
impose fines. While the President assented to the bill on
June 27, it has not been published; therefore it is not yet law.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
In general, there is no interference with the freedom of
assembly and association which is provided for in the
Constitution. The Government almost always grants permits for
peaceful assembly but requires that these meetings be open to
the public. Permits for assembly are issued by the police and
are not denied for political reasons. The permits regulate
times, places, use of loudspeakers, and the authority to block
traffic for a parade. The only banned organization in the
Gambia is the Movement for Justice in Africa, which was
suspected of involvement in the 1981 coup attempt. The law has
been amended so that any future bans would be by judicial
decision rather than a presidential decree. The State must now
apply to a court for a banning order, citing specific grounds
for the request. There were no requests to ban any
organization in 1991.
c. Freedom of Religion
The constitutional provisions of freedom of conscience,
thought, and religion are observed in practice. The State is
secular, although Muslims constitute over 90 percent of the
population. The schools provide instruction in the Koran for
Muslim students. Christians, both Catholic and Protestant,
freely practice their religion. There is a small Baha'i
community in Banjul. Missionaries are permitted to carry on
openly and freely their various mission-related activities.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides for freedom of movement, subject to
conditions protecting public safety, health, and morals. There
is no restriction on freedom of emigration or freedom of
return. Because of historic and ethnic ties with the
inhabitants of Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Sierra Leone, and
Mauritania, people tend to move freely across borders, which
are poorly marked and difficult to police.
The population of Liberian refugees registered in The Gambia
increased by almost 150 percent from 1990 to 1991. At the end
of 1991, approximately 180 Liber ians living in The Gambia were
registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) . An even larger number are unregistered. The
UNHCR does not have an assistance program in The Gambia. It
has transported interested Liberians unable to receive help
through family or friends to countries where UNHCR relief
programs are ongoing. Since the settlement of the Casamance
insurgency in southern Senegal, many of the Casamancais
refugees who had settled in The Gambia to escape the turmoil
have begun to return home. While there were a reported 326
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THE GAMBIA
Senegalese refugees in The Gambia, the number could well have
been higher during the conflict given the fluid movements
across The Gambia-Senegal border. Senegalese refugees in The
Gambia were not receiving international assistance.
Late in 1990, a human rights group reported that the Gambian
authorities had forcibly repatriated 10 Casamancais (Senegalese
nationals) from The Gambia to Senegal. The group claimed that
their return to Senegal placed them in danger of torture and
death at the hands of Senegalese security forces. The
Government responded that the Senegalese in question had not
requested asylum in The Gambia and had entered the country
illegally, so they were deported by Gambian immigration
officials. The Government stressed that it was well aware of
its obligations under the Geneva Convention on the Status of
Refugees .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government through
peaceful means. The President and the Members of Parliament
are popularly elected, as are the district councils and the
chiefs, who exercise traditional authority in the villages and
compounds. Presidential and parliamentary elections are held
every 5 years. Citizens must be at least 18 years of age to
vote. Balloting is secret, and measures are employed to assure
that illiterate voters understand the choices and voting
procedure.
A functioning multiparty system exists, even though the
People's Progressive Party under the leadership of President
Jawara has been in power since independence. The principal
opposition party, the National Convention Party (NCP) , contests
both national and district elections. In the March 1987
presidential and parliamentary elections, campaigning was
vigorous, active, and open to all parties. The ruling PPP won
by an overwhelming majority and now holds 31 of 36 elective
seats in the Parliament. The NCP was the only opposition party
to win seats.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government is responsive to charges of human rights
violations and has established the African Centre for Democracy
and Human Rights Studies to promote greater respect for human
rights in Africa through research into and documentation of
human rights problems and through workshops and conferences.
It permits visits of international human rights organizations
to observe the condition of detainees and the trial process.
Early in 1991, the United Nations Human Rights Commission
(UNHRC) made a routine investigatory stop in The Gambia. The
Gambia is an active member of the UNHRC and of the Organization
of African Unity's (OAU) Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights. It took the initiative in persuading the OAU to locate
the OAU Commission, which opened in June 1989, in Banjul. In
May the African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies
hosted a human rights training conference for upper level
magistrates from Francophone African countries.
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THE GAMBIA
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that all persons in The Gambia are
entitled to "fundamental rights and freedoms" regardless of
"race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed, or
sex." There is no officially sanctioned discrimination based
on race, sex, religion, language, or social status. The
Gambian population is overwhelmingly Muslim and rural, with 85
percent living in villages, and there is considerable emphasis
on the collective aspects of rights and privileges. There is
no evidence of discrimination in employment, education, or in
other areas of Gambian life on religious grounds.
Traditional views, especially about the role of women in
society, are changing, but very slowly. Marriages are still
most often arranged, and Muslim tradition allows for polygamy.
Women are disadvantaged educationally, with females comprising
about one-third of the students in primary school, and
one-quarter of the high school students.
Domestic violence occurs, and female circumcision is practiced,
reinforced by traditional beliefs. Until recently, the
Government has been passive in attempting to counter these
practices. However, the Women's Bureau in the Office of the
President conducts an ongoing campaign in both the rural and
urban areas to make women aware of their legal rights in
respect of divorce and custody of children, property matters,
and in cases of assault. The Bureau holds workshops on female
circumcision to inform women of its negative effects and to
discuss the religious and traditional ties to the practice. It
also publishes a quarterly magazine on women's issues, which it
distributes throughout the country. The Women's Bureau
conducted a study in 1990 of women's rights, including specific
(juestions on domestic violence, but data from this study had
not been released by the end of 1991.
To reinforce the efforts of the Women's Bureau, the World Bank,
in conjunction with several other donors, initiated the Women
In Development project in October 1990. This project will run
for 6 years with the objective of improving the health and
income generation capacities of Gambian women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
In October 1990, the Government passed the Labor Act of 1990,
the first labor act since independence, which applies to all
workers except civil servants. The Act specifies that workers
are free to form associations, including trade unions, and
provides for their registration with the Government. Police
officers and the military are specifically prohibited from
forming unions and from going on strike. Members of the civil
service can neither form unions nor strike.
The Labor Act of 1990 authorizes strikes, but it specifies that
a union must give the Commissioner of Labor 14 days' written
notice before beginning an industrial action (28 days for
essential services). Furthermore, upon application by an
employer to the Supreme Court, that body may prohibit an
industrial action which is ruled to be in pursuit of a
political objective, or an action which is in breach of a
collectively agreed procedure for the settlement of industrial
disputes that has not been exhausted. Because of these
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THE GAMBIA ,
provisions, government conciliation efforts, and the poor
bargaining strength of the unions, few strikes actually occur.
The last strike was that of the Bakers' Association in August
1990, which demanded (successfully) an increase in the
controlled price of bread.
Less than 20 percent of the work "force is engaged in the modern
wage sector of the economy, where unions are normally active.
The Gambian Workers' Confederation (GWC) and the Gambian
Workers Union (GWU) are the two main independent and competing
umbrella organizations, and both are recognized by, and have a
good working relationship with, the Government. Unions
exercise the right to affiliate internationally and there are
no restrictions on workers' ability to participate in
international forums.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Labor Act of 1990 provides workers the right to organize
and bargain collectively. Although trade unions are small and
fragmented, collective bargaining does take place. The Labor
Department registers the collective bargaining agreements
reached between the unions and management. The Act also sets
minimum standards for contracts in the areas of hiring,
training, terms of employment, wages, and termination of
employment. The Act states that "any term of a contract of
employment prohibiting an employee from becoming or remaining a
member of any trade union or other organization representing
workers. . .shall be null and void." Otherwise, the Government
does not interfere in the bargaining process. There are no
export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Criminal Code prohibits compulsory labor, and it is not
practiced in The Gambia.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The official minimvim age for employment is 18. There is no
compulsory education legislation and, because of the paucity of
secondary school opportunities, most children complete their
formal education by age 14 and informally enter the work
force. The Labor Commissioner is charged with receiving
employee labor cards, which include a person's age, but
enforcement inspections rarely take place for lack of funding
and inspectors. Control of child labor does not apply to
customary chores on family farms or street trading.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
By law minimum wages and hours of work are determined by joint
industrial councils (commerce, artisans, transport, the port
industry, agriculture, and fisheries), which have
representation from employees, employers, and government.
These minimvim wages do not provide for a decent standard of
living. Moreover, only 20 percent of the labor force is
covered by minimum wage legislation, the remainder being
privately employed, chiefly in agriculture. Most Gambians do
not live on one worker's earnings and rely on the extended
family system, usually including some subsistence farming.
The maximvmi legal workweek is 48 hours within a period not to
exceed 6 consecutive days. Allowance is made for half-hour
lunch breaks. For the private sector, there are four 8-hour
50-726 - 92 - 6
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THE GAMBIA
days with half days on Fridays and Saturdays, making a 40-hour
workweek. Government employees are entitled to 1 month's paid
leave after 1 year of service; private sector employees receive
between 14 and 30 days of paid annual leave, depending on their
length of service.
The Labor Act provides a list of occupational categories and
specifies safety equipment that an employer must supply to
employees working in these categories. Under the Factory Act,
the Minister of Labor is given authority to regulate factory
health and safety, accident prevention, and dangerous trades
and to appoint inspectors to ensure compliance. However, this
system is less than fully satisfactory because of a shortage of
inspectors .
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GHANA
Ghana is governed by the Provisional National Defense Council
(PNDC) under the chairmanship of Flight Lieutenant Jerry John
Rawlings who seized power from an elected government on
December 31, 1981, and suspended the Constitution. Under the
establishment proclamation of January 11, 1982, the PNDC
exercises "all powers of government." In addition to Chairman
Rawlings, the PNDC consists of eight members, of whom two are
serving military officers and six are civilians. The executive
consists of ministries headed by secretaries, who together
constitute a committee of secretaries, chaired by a PNDC
member, that drafts laws for referral to the PNDC for final
consideration and approval. All senior national, regional, and
district officials are appointed by the PNDC.
In 1991, facing mounting public pressures for reform. Chairman
Rawlings announced various, carefully controlled steps in the
process of returning the country to constitutional rule,
including the lifting of the ban on politics following a
referendum on a new constitution. These steps included the
formation of a constitutional drafting committee, which
prepared a draft document by the end of July, and a
Consultative Assembly composed of 260 members to debate and
redraft a new constitution, a task it was unable to finish by
December 31. At year's end, the PNDC announced that the
constitutional referendum would still be held in April 1992 and
that presidential and parliamentary elections, to which
international observers would be invited, would take place
before the end of 1992.
The several security organizations report to various
departments of government, but all come under the control of
the PNDC. Most security cases of a political nature are
handled by the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI). All
security agencies report to the PNDC member for foreign affairs
and national security. There have been occasional instances of
police brutality.
Although Ghana is attempting to rebuild its industrial base
after years of economic mismanagement, more than 60 percent of
the population still draws its livelihood from agriculture.
Cocoa and cocoa products provide more than half of export
revenues. Gold, timber, and diamonds are also produced and
exported. Annual economic growth has averaged 5 to 6 percent
since the inception of an economic recovery program in 1983.
Human rights remained circumscribed in Ghana, but the situation
improved in 1991, with Ghanaians speaking out on political
issues as never before under the PNDC. The fragility of this
progress was demonstrated by the arrests late in 1991 of
several opposition leaders for expressing their opinions.
Independent newspapers became outspokenly critical of the PNDC,
and government opponents voiced their opinions in seminars,
press conferences, speeches, and press releases. Various
social and "public interest" organizations fronting for the
still banned political parties sprang up during the year. They
expressed dissatisfaction with the PNDC's control over the
reform process. In September they formed, with the Movement
for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) , the Coordinating Committee of
Democratic Forces (CCDF) to issue statements on behalf of all
opposition groups. However, there continued to be restrictions
on such basic rights as freedom of speech, press, assembly, and
religion; the right of citizens to change their government; and
legal due process. Summary arrest and detention were
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GHANA
continuing problems, with many instances of incarceration
without formal charges .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated or other
extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
Similarly, no politically motivated disappearances were
reported.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were occasional credible reports of mistreatment of
prisoners, such as keeping them in isolation for long periods
and in dark, small cells without clothes or proper beds.
Prisons in Ghana are antiquated and seriously overcrowded, and
conditions are harsh. From time to time, the PNDC has commuted
the sentences of ill or aged prisoners. The most recent
example was in January 1992 when the PNDC granted amnesty to
roughly 1,000 prisoners.
There are occasional reports of excessive police force,
especially during arrests. In May a demonstrator calling for
the resignation of the PNDC was allegedly beaten by police. In
December an opposition leader was arrested for allegedly coming
to his feet tardily during the playing of the national anthem
and entrance of the paramount chief. He was "drilled" twice a
day in how to show respect for the flag and reportedly had his
head shaved with a broken bottle, although upon his release he
denied being tortured.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Criminal Code provides minimal legal protection against
arbitrary arrest and detention. Although accused persons have
the right to be charged formally within 48 hours of detention,
the court can set excessive bail or refuse to release persons
on bail and instead remand them without charge for an
indefinite period, subject to weekly review by judicial
authorities. The only crimes for which, by statute, there is
no bail are murder and subversion. PNDC Law 4 (preventive
custody law of 1982) provides for indefinite detention without
trial if the PNDC determines it is in the interest of national
security. A 1984 law prevents any judicial inquiry into the
grounds for detention under PNDC Law 4. Ghanaian security
forces occasionally take persons into custody, with or without
warrants, and hold them incommunicado for extended periods of
time, with no legal recourse available to the detainee. The
threat of such treatment serves as a deterrent to political or
other opposition activities.
Businessmen suspected of illegal activities have been arrested
and incarcerated while the Government undertook
investigations. Lebanese and other resident foreign
businessmen have been jailed and held for extended periods
without formal charges and without trial. In some cases.
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GHANA
incarcerated businessmen have been released without any trial
after paying a sum, informally deemed to be a suitable
reparation, to the National Investigation Committee. In 1990 a
naturalized American citizen of Ghanaian origin was held
without charge and eventually released in August 1991 after
repeated high-level U.S. representations.
The exact number of long-term political prisoners and detainees
at the end of 1991 was unknown; the best estimates indicate 50
to 90. The Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ), a movement
organized to provide a forum for the banned political parties
to present their views on the return to constitutional rule and
human rights issues, and several international human rights
groups published lists during 1991. The MFJ claims that there
are others in detention whose names it does not know. The PNDC
often detains for several months Ghanaians who have been
repatriated to Ghana after having been denied political asylum
in Western countries. In addition, persons are regularly
detained for a few days to a few weeks for a variety of reasons
and then released.
It is difficult to determine how many of the 50 to 90 long-term
detainees are political detainees. The Government claims that
28 are held on criminal charges and 36 in connection with coup
attempts. All of them have been, and are being, denied the
right to a speedy, fair, and public trial. The Government
gives no indication that it is prepared to bring them to trial.
The Government does not practice forced exile. In July it
offered limited amnesty to voluntary exiles, excluding those
convicted of any criminal offense, wanted by the police for a
criminal offense, or under sentence of death by any court or
tribunal in Ghana. In recent years, the PNDC has also quietly
encouraged Ghanaians, including dissidents, with valuable
skills who are living abroad to return; in some cases, the
Government has offered amnesty. Some former government and
PNDC officials have returned and resumed careers outside
politics, apparently without difficulties.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Three court systems exist in Ghana. In the "prerevolutionary"
court system, traditional legal safeguards are based on British
legal practices. Trials are public, and defendants have a
right to be present, to be represented by an attorney, and to
present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. This system
includes high courts, appeals courts, and the Supreme Court
headed by a Chief Justice. There are limitations, however, in
the independence of these courts. In the past, the PNDC has
summarily dismissed judges, thereby warning them that they
serve at the PNDC's sufferance. In 1989 the Government
reconstituted the judicial council but confined it to an
advisory role for judicial appointments and disciplinary
matters. The judiciary is still not independent.
A separate public tribunal system at the national and regional
levels was set up by the PNDC in 1982 to bypass the regular
court system and speed up the judicial process by restricting
the procedural rights of defendants. The public tribunals
depend largely on judges with little or no legal experience,
and they shortcut legal safeguards and due process to provide
"rough and ready" decisions, particularly in criminal cases.
This system includes the Office of Revenue Commissioners, the
National Investigations Committee (which, established by PNDC
Law 2, has the power to investigate virtually any allegation
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GHANA
referred to it by the PNDC) , the Special Military Tribunal, and
the Public Tribunals Board.
The PNDC normally avoids bringing political and security cases
to trial, preferring to keep suspected opponents in indefinite
detention. However, if cases come to trial, they are heard by
public tribunals. PNDC Law 24 empowers public tribunals to
impose the death penalty for any crime specified a capital
offense by the PNDC or if the tribunal determines that it is
merited in a particular case, even if the crime is not
punishable by the death penalty under regular statutes. There
are no known instances of this law being used. No appeals were
permitted until 1985, when the National Appeals Tribunal was
created. The Ghana Bar Association has elected not to practice
before the public tribunals and currently has a court case
pending which hinges on its opposition to the tribunals.
The Chieftaincy Act of 1971 gives the village and other
traditional chiefs powers in local matters, including authority
to enforce customary tribal laws on such matters as divorce,
child-custody, and property disputes.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Citizens engaged in activity deemed objectionable by the
Government are subject to interference with regatd to private
conduct, including monitoring of telephones and mail. There is
no recourse if a government agency wiretaps or interferes with
private correspondence. In past years, forced entry into homes
has been reported in connection with security investigations.
In 1990 the PNDC began redefining the role of the local
Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR's), which
previously functioned as neighborhood watch committees and
reported individual political behavior to the Government.
Various PNDC officials have called on the CDR's and the Civil
Defense Organizations (CDO's) to exercise restraint during the
transition to constitutional rule. However, there continue to
be credible reports of CDR interference in private and tribal
matters .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and the press remain restricted by certain
laws. However, the PNDC has allowed a considerable relaxation
in the enforcement of these laws. Several newspapers have
sprung up and these, plus some established independent papers,
have been outspoken in their criticism of the PNDC. Also,
organizations such as the Ghana Bar Association, the MFJ, the
Trade Union Congress (TUC), the National Union of Ghanaian
Students (NUGS), and others have been equally outspoken in
their criticism of the Government. However, arrests late in
the year of a newspaper editor and two opposition figures
showed that there are still limits on freedom of expression.
The Government owns the radio and television stations and the
two principal daily newspapers. Reporting in the official
media accentuates the positive aspects of government policies
but also covers selected instances of corruption and
mismanagement in government agencies and state-owned
enterprises. In general, the government-owned media do not
carry criticism of government policies or of Chairman Rawlings
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GHANA
and PNDC members. They also do not cover the opposition. In
recent months, the official media have opened up somewhat, and
a wider range of opinion is now available. Journalists are
occasionally subject to discipline or dismissal by the
Government for publishing articles deemed unacceptable. As a
result, self-censorship is a pattern in the official media, and
writers, editors, and commentators rarely cross the boundary of
acceptable reporting and commentary.
Foreign periodicals such as West Africa, Time, and Newsweek are
sold in Accra and other major cities; even issues containing
articles critical of Ghana's Government circulate freely. Most
Western journalists are routinely accorded visas and press
credentials as opposed to the practices of a few years ago.
Although in principle the university campuses are subject to
many of the same prohibitions on political expression as apply
to the society in general, the PNDC has not suppressed academic
freedom. The NUGS, one of the more vocal critics of the PNDC,
is tolerated and allowed to organize and hold meetings. There
have been several student demonstrations critical of the PNDC,
but the Government has not taken any action against the student
groups .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly and association is restricted. People
generally are free to join together formally or informally to
promote benevolent or nonpolitical causes, but permits are
required for public meetings or demonstrations, and these are
seldom granted for political purposes, particularly if the
applicant's views are at odds with those of the Government.
The MFJ and the CCDF have repeatedly been denied permits to
hold rallies.
Political parties and political meetings are prohibited. The
Government barred persons with close ties to the old parties
from running as candidates for election to the district
assemblies in 1988-89. Chairman Rawlings has said that the ban
on political parties cannot be lifted until the Consultative
Assembly has determined what organization will oversee the
electoral process, the procedures for registration of parties,
and the regulations regarding their activities. The
Consultative Assembly was unable to complete its work by the
end of the year, as scheduled, and is now expected to finish by
February or March 1992. In a speech opening the Consultative
Assembly in August, Chairman Rawlings indicated that
legislation lifting the ban on political parties and activities
will be adopted within 2 weeks after the constitutional
referendum. In anticipation of open politics, a number of
clubs and societies have sprung up that have close ties to the
two former major parties and that freely discuss political
issues and often criticize the PNDC.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state-favored religion. Ghanaians are
predominantly Christian, and Christians of all sects as well as
Muslims are well represented at all levels of government.
There are no apparent advantages or disadvantages attached to
membership in any particular sect or religion.
PNDC efforts to urge the major religious communities to support
its economic and social policies have created tensions.
Chairman Rawlings publicly criticized the Roman Catholic Church
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for prohibiting its priests from participating in the district
assemblies. The PNDC has also been sensitive to criticism of
Ghana's human rights record by leaders of various denominations.
PNDC Law 221 of Jvine 1989 rec[uired all religious organizations
to register with the religious affairs committee of the
National Commission on Culture. The Commission was granted
authority to deny registration and the right to worship
publicly to any religious group whose actions, it concluded,
would lead to social disruption or offend the morals of the
people. The Government received some 11,000 applications from
various churches wishing to register. However, the Roman
Catholic Church and the 14 mainline Protestant churches which
belong to the Christian Council have refused to register on
grounds that the law infringed on freedom of religion. The
Government has made no effort to enforce that law, and those
religious bodies that refused to register continue to worship
freely. In 1991 the PNDC suspended this religious registration
law while it conducted discussions with the Catholic
Secretariat and the Protestant Christian Council.
Also in June 1989, the Government "froze" the assets of four
churches, two indigenous Christian churches plus the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
(Mormons), and expelled their foreign personnel. The
indigenous churches had often been accused of promoting
practices offensive to the general community; the Jehovah's
Witness community was accused of not showing proper respect for
the symbols of Ghana's Government, and the Mormons were accused
of practicing racism. On November 30, 1990, the Government
rescinded the prohibition on the Mormons. The Government met
with the Jehovah's Witnesses in July 1991 and in November
unfroze the church's assets and allowed it to resume public
worship.
Other foreign missionary groups have generally operated
throughout the country with a minimum of formal restrictions.
Some churches have had difficulty obtaining visas and residence
permits for some of their expatriate missionaries.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Ghanaians and foreigners are free to move throughout Ghana
without special permission. Police checkpoints exist
countrywide for the prevention of smuggling. Roadblocks and
car searches are a normal part of nighttime travel in Accra.
As members of the Economic Community of West African States,
Ghanaians may travel without visas for up to 90 days in member
states. Ghanaians are generally free to exercise this right,
and nationals of other member states are free to travel to
Ghana. Ghanaians are also free to emigrate or to be
repatriated from other countries.
In what appeared to be deliberate harassment, the deputy
national secretary of the MFJ, upon his return from a trip
abroad, was interrogated for several hours, searched, and had
some of his possessions confiscated. He was told to report to
the Bureau of National Investigation, the ecpaivalent of the U.
S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, the next day. When he did
so, his possessions were returned, and he received an apology.
Since the last half of 1990, Ghana has been faced with a
growing refugee population. Liberians fleeing civil war began
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GHANA
to arrive in August 1990. By November 1990, Ghana was hosting
some 8,000 Liber ian refugees. Most of the new refugee
population, as well as many transiting third-country nationals
who also fled Liberia, were housed in a United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and government-assisted camp
20 kilometers outside of Accra. An undetermined number of
refugees have spontaneously returned to Liberia since then. By
August 1991, the estimated camp population was 3,000 to 4,000.
In addition, over 15,000 Ghanaians who resided in Liberia
returned to their home villages in Ghana, often imposing great
strain on government social services. Prior to the influx of
Liber ians, Ghana was hosting approximately 150 refugees
registered with the UNHCR.
In December 1991, some 1,500 to 2,000 Togolese fled
disturbances in Lome and entered Ghana. However, by the end of
the year most had voluntarily returned to Togo.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have this right. Chairman Rawlings and the
PNDC exercise total executive, legislative, and administrative
power. However, in January Chairman Rawlings announced that
the PNDC had entered its last phase, and the country would have
a new constitution by the end of the year. In August, at the
inauguration of the Consultative Assembly, he announced that if
the Assembly finished its work in debating and preparing a new
constitution by December 31, the constitutional referendum
would be held in February or March.
The Consultative Assembly, composed of 260 members — 117 elected
by the district assemblies, 121 elected by organizations, and
22 appointed by the PNDC — was not able to complete its work by
year's end, in part due to administrative problems and the need
for Assembly members to consult with constituents. As a
result, the referendum was rescheduled for April to be followed
2 weeks later by the lifting of the ban on political parties.
According to the PNDC timetable, presidential and parliamentary
elections would still be held by the end of 1992, with
international observers invited to attend.
A key step in 1991 was the passage of a law establishing an
independent electoral commission to replace the PNDC-controlled
National Commission on Democracy. The law established the
requisite de jure independence for the commission; however, it
remains to be seen whether the PNDC will appoint commissioners
of the necessary stature, integrity, and neutrality to provide
de facto independence.
There has been heavy criticism of the PNDC control over the
transition process, including its method of selecting members
for the Consultative Assembly, e.g., allegedly for favoring
groups with PNDC sympathies. However, the Assembly seems to be
operating as an independent body, and the PNDC has made no
effort to influence its deliberations, even when the Assembly
challenges established PNDC policy.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
An organization called the Ghana Committee on Human and
People's Rights was formed in October. Several other
organizations — most notably the Ghana Bar Association and the
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MFJ — have attempted to address human rights issues from time to
time. The Government's reactions to these efforts have ranged
from indifference to active discouragement. In 1991 the PNDC
invited Amnesty International (AI) to visit Ghana to discuss
alleged inaccuracies in an AI report. The Government permits
prison visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Although ethnic differences are intentionally played dovm by
the Government, opponents of the PNDC occasionally complain
that the PNDC and the political leadership are dominated by the
Ewe ethnic group from eastern Ghana. Chairman Rawlings and a
number of his close advisors are Ewe, but many PNDC members and
secretaries are from other ethnic groups.
The Government has made concerted efforts to raise the status
of women, but Ghanaian women remain subject to some forms of
societal discrimination. In 1985 the PNDC promulgated four
laws which overturned many of the customary, traditional, and
colonial laws which discriminated against women. These
concerned family accountability, intestate succession,
customary divorce registrations, and the administration of
estates. Women in urban centers and those who have entered the
modern sector encounter little overt bias, but resistance to
women in nontraditional roles persists. Women in the rural
agricultural sector remain subject to traditional male
dominance and heavy field labor. Statistics show a 50/50
percent male/female ratio in enrollments in grade 1, dropping
to 66/34 percent by grade 6, 80/20 percent at secondary level,
and a 90/10 percent at university level.
Violence against women, including wife beating, occurs, but, as
there are no statistics or studies available, the extent of the
problem is unknown. Police do not normally intervene in
domestic disputes, and such cases seldom come before the
courts. The Government has not addressed the issue of violence
against women, but it strongly discourages the practice of
female circumcision, although it has not made it illegal.
Female mutilation (e.g., clitor idectomy) is practiced only in
the far northeastern and northwestern parts of the country.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
This right is restricted as the trade unions' ordinance confers
broad powers on the Government to refuse to register a trade
union. However, the PNDC has not interfered with the right of
workers to associate in labor unions. Civil servants are
prohibited by law from joining or organizing a trade union.
Trade unions in Ghana and their activities are still governed
by the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) of 1965. The Trade Union
Congress (TUC) , established in 1958, represents organized labor
in Ghana. It has been the sole central organization since its
creation, when it was closely linked to Nkrumah's Convention
People's Party. The TUC has been reorganized on a number of
occasions, including by a pro-PNDC faction following the
military coup of 1981. In 1984 the progovernment slate was
defeated in a free election by experienced union leaders who,
aided by a revised union constitution and bylaws, have sought
to define an autonomous role for the TUC within the PNDC regime.
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GHANA
The right to strike is recognized in law. Under the IRA, the
Government has established a system of settling disputes, first
through conciliation, then arbitration. There has been no
progress in implementing the Government's declared intention to
replace this system with labor tribunals to arbitrate
industrial disputes certified as deadlocked.
The Committee of Experts (COE) of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and other ILO bodies continue to criticize
Ghanaian legislation that limits the right of workers to form
unions of their own choosing.
The TUC is affiliated with the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity (OATUU) , which has its headquarters in Accra.
Consistent with OATUU guidelines, the TUC maintains no other
international affiliations, although it has friendly relations
with a variety of international trade union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The IRA provides a framework for collective bargaining and some
protection against antiunion discrimination as well. Ghana's
trade unions engage in collective bargaining for wages and
benefits with both private and state-owned enterprises, though
in the latter category the threat of detention (a common
practice in the early 1980 's) hangs over union leaders to force
agreement on issues. No union leaders were detained in recent
years for union, or other, activities. There are no
functioning export processing zones in Ghana.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Ghanaian law prohibits forced labor, and it is not known to be
practiced. The COE continues to urge the Government to revise
various legal provisions that permit imprisonment with an
obligation to perform labor for offenses that are not
countenanced under ILO Convention 105, ratified by Ghana in
1958.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Labor legislation in Ghana sets a minimum employment age of 15
and prohibits night work and certain types of hazardous labor
for those under 18. In practice, child labor is prevalent, and
young children of school age can often be found during the day
performing menial tasks in the market or collecting fares on
local buses. Observance of minimum age laws is eroded by local
custom and economic circumstances that encourage children to
work to help their families. Violators of regulations
prohibiting heavy labor and night work for children are
occasionally punished. Inspectors from the Ministry of
Mobilization and Social Welfare are responsible for enforcement
of child labor regulations.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum standards for wages and working conditions are
established through a tripartite committee composed of
representatives of government, labor, and employees. It
establishes a minimum wage rate, and other salaries are
adjusted accordingly. In August the tripartite commission
established a minimum wage combining wages with customary
benefits, such as a transportation allowance, but the existing
minimum wage is insufficient for a single wage earner to
support a family. In most cases households are supportefi by
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GHANA
multiple wage earners, some family farming, and other family
based commercial activities.
The basic workweek in Ghana is 40 hours. Occupational safety
and health regulations are in effect, and sanctions are
occasionally applied through the Labor Department of the
Ministry of Social Welfare. However, Ministry officials are
few in number and poorly trained. They will take action if
matters are called to their attention, but lack the resources
to seek out violations.
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Under President Lansana Conte, Guinea has been governed by the
Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN) and a joint
military and civilian cabinet since 1984. While in 1991
authority remained with the President and his Cabinet, who
continued to govern by decree, in February President Conte
replaced the CMRS with the Transitional Committee for National
Recovery (CTRN) . The CTRN has been assigned lawmaking (i.e.,
legislative) tasks, but the new Constitution only specifies
that the CTRN replaces the CMRN until the Constitution becomes
effective. In 1991 the CTRN concentrated largely on drafting
the "organic" laws necessary to implement the Constitution,
which, passed by referendum in December 1990, provides for a
maximum interim 5-year period of mixed military and civilian
administration leading to at least a two party system of
government. The Cabinet includes representation from all
ethnic groups, but it appeared divided on the need and pace of
political reform. Ethnic violence surfaced again in 1991,
especially after local elections in June, resulting in hundreds
of deaths .
The pace of reform was very much controlled by President Conte
and his team. National Assembly elections are to take place by
the end of 1992, and the new Assembly will then set a date for
presidential elections. Political parties were not permitted,
and in May all meetings and demonstrations were banned,
effectively neutralizing the nascent opposition. By late in
the year, 30 parties and political organizations had formed,
but the Government mandated that they restrict their activities
to meetings in private homes until promulgation of the
political party law.
Military and paramilitary forces number around 17,000 persons.
Responsibility for internal security is shared by the
gendarmerie, the national police, and a well-armed Presidential
Guard. Both the military and the police committed human rights
abuses in 1991. Lawyers were still not allowed in police
stations to help prevent such abuses.
Over 80 percent of Guinea's 7 million people live by
svibsistence agriculture, and per capita gross domestic product
is around $430. Guinea's major exports are bauxite, gold, and
diamonds. In 1991 the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) continued to oversee Guinea's major
economic restructuring program, which involves, inter alia, a
sharp reduction in the size of the public service. This
austerity program was viewed by critics as a major cause of
political turbulence in 1991.
Human rights in Guinea remained tightly circumscribed in 1991,
although public discussion of political reform and the new
Constitution stimulated expectations for change. Major
problems included the inability of the Government to curb
ethnic violence and serious abuses by poorly disciplined
security forces, the use of arbitrary arrest and detention to
harass alleged opponents, and restrictions on speech, the
press, assembly, and association.
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RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Extrajudicial Killings
There were no reports of political killings. However, there
were a number of extrajudicial killings in 1991, mainly
associated with ethnic violence. In June, following local
elections outside Conakry, there were ethnic riots in several
prefectures, notably in N'Zerekore. There, several hundred
people died in clashes between Malinkes and Guerzes touched off
by intertribal taunting after the announcement of election
results .
In January gendarmes in Dalaba beat a suspected thief to death
and then tried to disguise it as a suicide. A march was
organized on the gendarmerie which resulted in the wounding of
two people and the burning of the gendarmerie post.
Subsequently, the resident minister denounced the human rights
abuses on Guinean radio as being inconsistent with the new
Constitution. The gendarmes were not brought to trial. In
April, in Kissidougou, a man was shot and killed by police
after an argument .
The authorities' treatment of Alpha Conde, an opposition
leader, led to one death. He returned to Guinea from abroad in
May, and the authorities immediately accused him of secretly
bringing weapons into the country. The charges were believed
to have been trumped up (see Section l.d.). Police used
excessive force to break up a planned rally organized by
Conde's Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) , injuring several
persons. A few weeks later, police killed a demonstrator
protesting a police summons for Conde to report to police
headc[uarters .
In the first half of 1991, there were reports from the
Guinea-Liber ian border of soldiers detaining and killing
supporters of the Liberian rebel leader, Charles Taylor.
Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
forces had reportedly killed a number of Guineans living in
Liberia. Given fears of a Taylor insurgency in Guinea, Guinean
security forces were more likely to detain refugees suspected
of being Taylor supporters, including those bearing scorpion
tattoos (the symbol of Charles Taylor's forces). Guinean
security forces also took measures to protect refugees with
scorpion tattoos from other Liber ians when it was determined
that they had been forcibly tattooed.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The 1965 Penal Code and the Constitution prohibit torture and
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. However, the Guinean
police are often guilty of brutality against suspects, as the
Dalaba incident indicated. Prison conditions, including those
in the women's prison, are primitive and unhealthy. Deaths due
to malnutrition and disease are frequent. An article in the
February 10, 1991, issue of Horoya, the official newspaper,
highlighted this point.
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GUINEA
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Ineffective administrative controls and limited legal resources
make arbitrary arrest a persistent threat to Guineans. There
were cases of arbitrary arrest and detention in 1991. The most
important involved actions taken following the May return of
the opposition leader Alpha Conde. In a June 20 police raid on
Conde's home, the police apparently exceeded the terms of their
warrant, seizing not only Conde's papers (as instructed) but
stealing large c[uantities of personal items and cash as well.
While Conde was not at home at the time of the raid, police
arrested 60 of his followers (including his brother), 12 of
whom were subsequently brought to trial on charges of
possession of illegal weapons and harboring delinquents. At
one point, Conde's lawyer was briefly held by the police.
Conde himself took refuge in the residence of the Senegalese
Ambassador and later was allowed to leave the country at the
rec[uest of the Senegalese Government.
Many members of the public viewed the case as a frame-up by
elements within the Government (the "arms" shown on television
to a skeptical public turned out to be knives and chemical mace
freely available in the local markets). The case also received
international attention and criticism. Ultimately, Conde's
brother received a nominal fine for possession of illegal
munitions, and charges against the other defendants were
dismissed. The judge ordered the police to return Conde's
property. No disciplinary action was taken against the police.
In December 1990, lawyer and civil rights activist Christian
Sow was summoned and escorted first to the police station, and
then, at gun point, to the Police Academy, 50 kilometers out of
the city. During the night, he received a head injury under
circumstances never clarified, although the police claimed it
was self-inflicted. When his colleagues first inquired about
him at the police station, the police said that they had not
seen him. However, the next morning, the police chief released
him without explanation. One credible report indicated the
incident was the product of a dispute within the CMRN, the
military leadership directly preceding the CTRN, over the
powers of the police. Again, no action was taken to discipline
the responsible police officials.
Roger Millimono, an official in the Ministry of Tourism,
Information, and Culture, was summarily held for 2 months in
prison without specific charge or trial, with the Government
explaining only that it was an "affair of state." Guinean
lawyers complained about improper procedures until Millimono
was released. Mr. Millimono subsequently resumed his duties at
the Ministry.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Guinean law provides guarantees of due process. The Guinean
Penal Code provides for the presumption of innocence of accused
persons, the independence of judges, the equality of citizens
before the law, the right of the accused to counsel, and the
right to appeal a judicial decision.
At present, the judiciary is susceptible to influence by the
executive, although the new Constitution affirms the
judiciary's independence. In trials drawing international
attention, such as the cases involving Conde's supporters, the
legal procedures are more likely to be observed.
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GUINEA
The judiciary includes the courts of first instance (or justice
of the peace at the local level) and two courts of appeal (one
in Kankan, one in Conakry) . The Court of /Annulment is the
Guinean last court of appeal. Guinean law provides for a court
of state security under certain circumstances, but one has not
met since the trial of those allegedly involved in the coup
attempt of 1985. A military tribunal prepares and adjudicates
charges against accused military personnel. However, since
1988 all judgments regarding violations under the Penal Code
have been rendered by civilian courts. There is a traditional
system of justice at the village or urban neighborhood level
where litigants present their civil cases before a village
chief, neighborhood chief, or council of wise men for
judgment. Trials are public. Those accused of major crimes
have the right to an attorney at public expense if they cannot
afford counsel .
The dividing line between the formal and informal justice
system is vague, and a case may be referred from the formal to
the traditional system to ensure compliance by all parties with
the judicial ruling. Conversely, if a case cannot be resolved
to the satisfaction of all parties in the traditional system,
it may be referred to the formal system for adjudication.
In late 1990 and early 1991, officials in the Ministry of
Finance and the Economy were prosecuted for corruption. In a
trial at the Court of Assizes in Conakry, they were found
guilty and given light sentences.
Suspected criminals caught in urban areas are sometimes beaten
to death by victims and their neighbors with the tacit approval
of police authorities. While public officials have openly
condemned such summary justice, no one has ever been tried or
punished for it .
The administration of justice is plagued by numerous problems:
the shortage of magistrates (who are generally poorly trained)
and lawyers (35 in all), an outdated and overrestrictive legal
code, and corruption. There are also allegations of nepotism
in the administration of justice, with relatives of influential
members of the Government being virtually immune to the law.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government stresses traditional family values and the
inviolability of the home. However, the possibility of
interference in citizens' lives continues primarily through
police harassment. It is widely believed that security
officials monitor mail and telephone calls. Judicial search
warrants are required by law, but these procedures are
frequently ignored or, as in the Conde affair (see Section
l.d.), not strictly followed.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
While the Government publicly states that it supports free
speech and a free press, and the new Constitution provides for
an unspecified degree of freedom of expression, these freedoms
are restricted in practice. A new press law, while proclaiming
freedom of press and communications, prohibits communications
which offend the Guinean President, incite to violence,
discrimination or hatred, or disturb the public peace.
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GUINEA
Seditious cries or chants uttered in public are also
prohibited. The law permits the preventive arrest of
publishers, authors, printers, and vendors in all of the above
cases .
The Government owns and operates most of the news media.
Reporters, who are government employees, practice
self-censorship in order to protect their jobs. The Ministry
of Information, Culture, and Tourism continues to act as
overseer of the media, but censorship appears to have
diminished in 1991. A somewhat bolder spirit of criticism in
the Government-owned media surfaced, providing franker and more
open coverage of events. For example, there was open
discussion in the media of the bloody ethnic rioting in
N'Zerekore in June.
Beginning in June, several independent journals sprang up, some
of which were very outspoken in their criticism of the
Government. However, these tended to be published irregularly
and were generally short-lived, due to technical and financial
difficulties rather than government restriction.
Several political tracts, both signed and unsigned, that
included specific criticisms of the President and other
officials were distributed widely in Conakry and other
regions. In February, two Guineans issuing leaflets hostile to
Conte's regime were arrested; the text of the leaflets had a
racist edge. However, foreign publications, some of which
include criticism of the Government, circulated freely in
Guinea. There was no attempt to interfere with foreign radio
broadcasts.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Public gatherings may take place only with the approval of the
Government. The Penal Code bans any meeting that has an ethnic
or racial character or any gathering "whose nature threatens
national unity." Political parties are still not officially
sauictioned, although more than 30 embryonic groups had begun to
organize by year's end. The President stated at midyear that
party organization (but not party-stimulated public unrest) was
permissible and counseled politicians to be patient until the
laws permitting open political activity entered into force.
Open party competition was scheduled to begin on April 3, 1992,
after the Government promulgates its law on parties.
When Alpha Conde attempted to hold a rally on May 19, security
forces intervened with tear gas, injuring three people. The
Government justified the action on the grounds that Conde did
not have a permit (see Section l.a.). In October and November,
three demonstrations by students and former civil servants
protesting unemployment took place without incident.
The Government encourages the formation of nonpolitical
professional organizations, whose numbers continue to increase.
c. Freedom of Religion
Large religious groups enjoy religious freedom and tolerance.
An estimated 85 percent of the population is Muslim. There is
no official state religion, and the preamble of the new
Constitution declares Guinea to be a secular state. The
Government observes major Christian and Muslim holidays.
Foreign missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, operate
freely in Guinea. The state-owned radio and television
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GUINEA
Stations provide regular air time for both Christian and Muslim
broadcasts. In the only known case of violence possibly
related to religion, churches and mosques were damaged during
the June rioting in N'Zerekore (see Section l.a.).
The Government and the quasi-governmental National Islamic
League (LIN) have spoken out against the proliferation of
"pseudo-sects (within Guinean Islam) generating confusion and
deviation" but have not restricted these groups. The new
Constitution guarantees religious communities the freedom to
administer themselves without state interference.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation.
Guineans are free to travel within the country and to change
their place of residence and work, although in practice they
face harassment by police and military roadblocks, particularly
at night. It is common for citizens to pay bribes to avoid
police harassment. Foreign travel is permitted, although the
Government retains the ability to limit it for political
reasons .
About 450,000 Liber ians and Sierra Leoneans have sought refuge
in Guinea, mostly in the forest region. The Government
continues to work closely with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and many other international
and nongovernmental organizations to provide food and shelter
for the refugees. Some were accused of involvement in the
N'Zerekore violence leading to fears of expulsion. No action
was taken against them, and the UNHCR participated in an
investigation that showed the refugees were no more involved
than their nvunbers and degree of integration into society would
have predicted. With the aid of the donors, the majority of
refugees have been well treated by the Government. However,
there were unconfirmed reports in early 1991 of soldiers
killing refugees suspected of being Charles Taylor supporters.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Guinean citizens were not able to change their government
through democratic procedures in 1991. The President and his
Cabinet wielded full powers of government. The Constitution
(basic law) provides for a transition to democracy not to
exceed 5 years. On October 2, President Conte announced that
the CTRN would have finalized versions of all of the "organic
laws" by December 23; that full party activity would be
authorized when the law on political parties came into effect
on April 3, 1992; that legislative elections would be held by
the end of 1992; and that the legislature would fix the date of
presidential elections at its first session.
The role of the military in the Government continues to be a
key issue in political reform. Retiring or sending officers
back to the barracks remains a delicate process. A number of
senior officers were retired in 1991 without incident. The
future political role of the President and certain military
members of the Council of Ministers remains uncertain. The
Alpha Conde affair, as well as that of Christian Sow (Section
l.d.), demonstrated the existence of elements within the
Cabinet, particularly within the security forces, hostile to
democratic principles.
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GUINEA
The Constitution provides for basic human rights and for
democratic structures, including an elected president with
broad powers, an elected national assembly, an economic and
social council, and a supreme court. The Constitution and
relevant organic laws also provide for a multiparty system, as
long as parties are not ethnic or regional. The political
parties law allows the Interior Minister to suspend or disband
political parties, subject to judicial review, when they are
involved in such crimes as inciting violence.
Local elections were held in 1991. Councils were freely
elected — with multiple candidates and secret ballots — in the
five communes of Conakry on March 10, and Conakry district
elections were held on June 3. Communal elections outside
Conakry were held on June 9. There were no legal restrictions
on women or minorities in voting. However, in several
prefectures, the elections involved ethnic rioting, most
notably in N'Zerekore where hundreds died (see Section l.a.).
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are two local nongovernmental organizations in Guinea
that are primarily interested in human rights issues: the
Guinean Organization for Human Rights (OGDH) and the Children
of the Victims of Camp Boiro. The OGDH is composed largely of
members of the professions and is interested in legal and civil
rights as well as such social and economic rights as education
and employment. In one instance in 1991, it called for a
general strike in response to the arrest of Alpha Conde's
attorney. As with OGDH's other activities, the Government did
not interfere. The Children of the Victims of Camp Boiro
(Sekou Toure's main detention center for political prisoners)
became an officially recognized civic organization in 1991. In
addition to seeking restitution of losses for the families of
those who died at Camp Boiro, this organization began planning
a center to collect and disseminate information about human
rights violations committed in Guinea, with a view to
preventing future violations. Partly as a result of this
organization's efforts, the Government announced plans to
create a museum at Camp Boiro. There was no evidence of
government restrictions on human rights activities by OGDH or
by other nongovernmental organizations. There were no calls
for international investigations of human rights violations in
Guinea in 1991.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
While racial or ethnic discrimination is prohibited by the
Constitution and the Penal Code, ethnic identification is
strong in Guinea and mutual suspicion affects relations across
ethnic lines, in and out of government. Official government
policy is to include representatives of all major ethnic groups
in the Government, but the Soussou ethnic group of President
Conte tends to predominate at the most important levels. A
disproportionate number of police are Malinke, former President
Toure's ethnic group.
Women face discrimination in Guinea, although the Constitution
provides for the equality of sexes. In particular, in rural
Guinea opportunities for women are limited by custom and the
demands of subsistence farming. The Government has affirmed
the principle of equal pay for equal work, but in practice
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GUINEA
women receive less pay than men in most jobs. In education,
according to a U.N. Development Program report for 1991,
females receive only 20 percent of the schooling of males.
Violence against women, mainly wife beating, is a criminal
offense and constitutes grounds for divorce under civil law.
However, police rarely intervene in domestic disputes, and
prosecution of husbands for wife beating is infrequent. Health
workers in Guinea say that wife beating occurs, but differ as
to the extent of the problem. The issue received some exposure
in locally produced television dramas but is not mentioned in
the press or given governmental attention. Female genital
mutilation (circumcision) is widespread and practiced among all
religious groups in Guinea: Muslims, Christians, and animists,
although the current generation of young parents is less
supportive of this custom. Grandmothers frequently insist on
the circumcision of a granddaughter even when the parents are
opposed. The most dangerous form of circumcision,
inf ibulation, is not practiced.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Guinea's Labor Code, drafted with the assistance of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) and promulgated in
January 1988, states that all workers (except military and
police) have the right to create and participate in
organizations that defend and develop their individual and
collective rights as workers. At least one independent union,
the General Workers Union of Guinea (UGTG), has emerged since
the new Labor Code ended the previously existing trade union
monopoly system. . The Labor Code requires elected worker
representatives for any enterprise employing 25 salaried
workers. In practice, most workers still belong to the
National Confederation of Guinean Workers (CNTG) which is
funded by the State. The union leadership began work in 1991
to develop a check-off system of dues collection, designed to
increase the Confederation's autonomy vis-a-vis the
Government. The CNTG played a prominent role in negotiations
with the Government in May which eventually led to a decision
to double government worker salaries. After reelecting its
leadership in early July, the CNTG rewrote its internal
constitution in light of the new national Constitution.
With the exception of those engaged in "essential services,"
the Labor Code grants salaried workers, including public sector
civilian workers, the right to strike 10 days after their
representative union makes known their intention to strike.
Mid-1991 saw a series of strikes and threatened strikes of
which the most important was a general strike, including
government workers, in early May. The strike was marred by
pro- and antigovernment violence. A strike at the Friguia
alumina plant was motivated at least in part by a desire to
embarrass the national mineworkers union and may presage a
period of local unions redefining their relationships with the
national unions. Notably, the police presence during the
strike was kept out of sight and violence was averted.
Unions may freely associate with international labor groups,
but the only notable affiliations are those the CNTG maintains
in African regional trade union organizations.
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GUINEA
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Under the Labor Code, representative workers' unions or union
groups may organize the workplace and negotiate with employers
or employer organizations. Collective bargaining for wages and
salaries is protected by law. Work rules and work hours
established by the employer are to be developed in consultation
with union delegates. Union delegates are to represent
individual and collective claims and grievances before the
employer. Individual workers threatened with dismissal or
other sanctions have the right to a hearing before the employer
with a union representative present. Antiunion discrimination
is prohibited by law. In July the CNTG added to all labor
contracts language prohibiting such discrimination. There are
no export processing zones in Guinea.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Labor Code specifically forbids forced or compulsory
labor. There is no evidence of its practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment in the new Code is 16 years of
age. However, apprentices may start at 14. Workers and
apprentices below 18 are not permitted to work at night, nor
for more than 12 consecutive hours, nor on Sundays. The Labor
Code states that the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs must
maintain a list of occupations in which women and youth under
18 may not be employed. Enforcement, however, by inspectors
from this Ministry is limited to large firms in the modern
sector of the economy; children of all ages work on family
farms and in small trades.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government has not yet enacted minimum wage legislation,
but the Labor Code provides for the eventual establishment by
decree of a guaranteed minimum hourly wage. There are also
provisions for overtime and night wages which are fixed
percentages of the regular wage.
According to the Labor Code, regular work is not to exceed
10-hour days or 48-hour weeks, with a 40-hour workweek being
the norm. The minimum weekly day of rest must be 24
consecutive hours, usually on Sunday. Every salaried worker
has the right to an annual paid holiday accumulated at the rate
of at least 2.5 workdays per month of service.
Several articles of the Code provide for safe working
conditions and the continued good health of workers, and labor
inspectors are empowered to suspend work immediately in
dangerous situations. These were as yet goals rather than
practice and were not enforced in 1991. The Ministry of Labor
and Social Affairs is supposed to enforce labor standards.
Labor inspectors acknowledge that they cannot even cover
Conakry, much less the entire country, with their small staffs
and meager budgets .
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GUINEA-BISSAU
The Republic of Guinea-Bissau is a one-party state with former
or present military leaders in key positions. General Joao
Bernardo Vieira serves as President of the Council of State and
Head of State, Commander-in-Chief, and General Secretary of
Guinea-Bissau's previously sole legal political party, the
African party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape
Verde (PAIGC). In elections held in June 1989, Vieira, the
only candidate, was elected for a second 5-year term as
President. Effective power and day-to-day decisions rest in
the hands of the President and the Council of State. However,
there have been growing pressures for political reform, many of
them emanating from within the PAIGC. In 1991 President Vieira
and the PAIGC again reaffirmed that the political structure of
the country was to be changed to a presidentially based,
multiparty system by early 1993.
The armed forces (FARP) are responsible for state security,
both external and internal. FARP leaders are usually members
of the PAIGC and often hold key positions in the Political
Bureau or Central Committee. The police were responsible for
human rights abuses in 1991. Persons accused of political
crimes are tried by military tribunals.
Guinea-Bissau's population of 1 million is engaged largely in
subsistence agriculture. There are some exports of fish and
seafood and small amounts of peanuts. The Government's
post independence efforts to exercise central control over the
economy failed to stimulate agricultural production and
resulted in chronic shortages of most basic commodities,
inefficient state-owned enterprises, high unemployment, and a
weak national currency. In 1991 the economy remained extremely
fragile, despite a series of austerity reforms launched in the
late 1980 's to promote long-term economic growth.
Human rights remained circumscribed in 1991, as the Government
and party carefully controlled the reform process. It passed
potentially important legislation governing new parties, the
press, and labor, but it cracked down, through detentions,
physical mistreatment, and other forms of serious harassment,
on political opponents and nascent groups that attempted to
move quickly toward a multiparty system. By the end of the
year, three new opposition political parties had attained legal
status, ending a long midyear period of government inertia on
the legalization of the opposition. A group of 121 of the
PAIGC 's younger, more reformist members called publicly upon
the President to recommit himself to the transition and to
multipartyism.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or extrajudicial killings,
nor any reports of deaths of persons in official custody.
b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of disappearance.
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GUINEA-BISSAU
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Pxinishment
The Constitution prohibits cruel and inhuman punishment, and a
recent revision also makes evidence obtained through torture or
other coercion invalid. However, security authorities employ
abusive interrogation methods, especially severe beatings. In
September the police beat four members of a nascent political
party while they were in police custody (see Section 2.b.).
There have been no known cases of police officers or security
officials being disciplined for such actions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arrests in Guinea-Bissau are frequently arbitrary, as arrest
procedures are undefined, and the use of arrest warrants is the
exception rather than the rule. The legal system, inherited
from the Portuguese but modified by the Constitution, includes
important procedural rights, such as the right to counsel, but
generally fails to provide adequate safeguards against
arbitrary or illegal arrest and detention. Bail procedures are
also observed erratically.
The Government frequently holds persons without charge or
trial, sometimes for extended periods of time, including in
incommunicado detention. The security services continue to
have the power administratively to detain suspects without
reference to judicial authority, often through the device of
house arrest. The Government used its detention powers in 1991
to arrest and hold for several hours six members of a
prospective new political party for alleged illegal
demonstrations .
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Traditional law still prevails in most rural areas, and many
urban dwellers continue to bring judicial disputes to
recognized traditional counselors. With some exceptions, the
official judicial system is based on the Portuguese model.
Intervals between arrest and trial are often lengthy. Defense
lawyers traditionally have been court appointed. Private legal
practice became permissible only in 1990.
The military dominates the handling of political and security
cases. Trials involving state security usually are not open to
outside observers and are conducted by military tribunals.
Armed forces members are tried by military courts for all
offenses. The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal for
both civilian and military cases, except those involving
national security matters. In this instance the Council of
State reviews all decisions.
The Government maintains that there are no political detainees
or prisoners held since the release in 1990 of 22 prisoners
convicted of involvement in a 1985 coup plot. There are
credible reports, however, that five persons classifiable as
political prisoners are restricted to living in the Bijagos
Islands and are permitted visits only by family members.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Constitutional guarantees of the inviolability of domicile,
person, and correspondence are not always respected in cases of
serious crimes or state security. International and domestic
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GUINEA-BISSAU
mail may be subject to surveillance and censorship. While
membership in the PAIGC was never forced, persons with
political aspirations traditionally have realized the
importance of belonging to what was long Guinea-Bissau's sole
legal political party, and most government appointments in the
past have gone to party members.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of intellectual,
artistic, and scientific expression, with the significant
exception of cases in which these rights are exercised in a
manner "contrary to the promotion of social progress." In
practice, these freedoms are restricted. The Government
controls all information media and tends to view the press as a
vehicle for the expression of government views. Journalists
traditionally are government employees and practice
self-censorship to maintain their positions. Criticism of
certain officials or government offices appears from time to
time in the local news, but typically only when aimed at
persons who are already known to have lost the President's
support .
In the 1991 revisions to the Constitution, an article was added
that for the first time specifically provided for freedom of
the press and established a National Council of Social
Communications to oversee fair access to the electronic and
print media. While a new press law enacted late in the year
requires government media to reflect the full range of public
opinion without favor to any group, it is too early to know how
effective the law will prove in practice. By year's end, newly
legalized parties were granted 10 minutes of television airtime
per month and were being covered by radio news.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association and government approval is not required for
peaceful, nonpolitical assemblies and demonstrations,
heretofore, all existing organizations have been linked to the
Government or the party. This situation changed significantly
during 1991, however, with the formation of numerous political
and nonpolitical organizations having no ties to the PAIGC.
Over a dozen groups attempted to gain legal status as political
parties, and at least five conducted effective nationwide
campaigns to gather the necessary petition signatures.
Newly emerging opposition political parties faced a number of
obstacles in complying with the prescribed legalization
procedures, including a complex and difficult system for
obtaining valid signatures on the required petition.
Additionally, police and security forces harassed and
intimidated potential petition signers, using inter alia,
detentions and physical mistreatment. During the year,
therefore, the Government's position remained ambiguous: the
groups had to canvas to gather signatures and then apply for
legalization by registering the list of their members with the
Supreme Court; until they attained that legal status, however,
they were not "parties" as such and could not properly organize
and publicly campaign to attract members. Nevertheless, three
parties managed to gain legal status, all in the last 3 weeks
of the year. Once legal, parties experienced no difficulties
with the authorities over demonstrations.
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GUINEA-BISSAU
c. Freedom of Religion
Religious freedom is provided for in the Constitution and has
been respected in practice. Christians, Muslims, and animists
worship freely, and proselytizing is permitted. However,
religious groups must be licensed by the Government. In 1991
there were no reports of groups being refused licenses.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens are allowed to move freely throughout Guinea-Bissau.
Foreign travel is not restricted, nor is citizenship revoked
for political reasons. Over the past three decades a
considerable number of persons have emigrated for economic
reasons .
During late 1990 and early 1991, up to 6,000 Senegalese
refugees fled into northern Guinea-Bissau to escape the
separatist disturbances in the Casamance region of southern
Senegal. The Government worked with various international
donors, including the United States, to provide for the basic
health and nutritional needs of the refugees. No pressure was
placed on refugees to return to Senegal and at year's end the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees reported almost 5,000 still
in Guinea-Bissau, most of them indicating that they intended to
remain indefinitely.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens did not have this right in 1991. The PAIGC and
military elite, headed by President Joao Bernardo Vieira,
continued to control all political activity, including the pace
of reform. However, constitutional revisions in 1991 deleted
all reference to the PAIGC 's dominant role and allowed for new
parties, so long as they do not have an ethnic, regional, or
religious orientation. Although public expectations of
political liberalization outpaced actual reforms during much of
1991, progress toward democratization was made.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
A nonpartisan human rights group without government or
political ties was formed in 1991. This group, the Guinean
Human Rights League, has made low-key criticisms of the
Government, calling for penal reform and abolition of the death
penalty.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
While officially prohibited, discrimination against women
persists within certain ethnic groups, especially the Fulas and
Mandinkas of the north and east where female circumcision is
still a widespread practice, despite official prohibition.
Women enjoy higher status in the societies of the Balanta,
Papel, and Bijagos groups, who live mainly in the southern
coastal region. Women are responsible for much of the work on
subsistence farms, and they have limited access to education,
especially in rural areas. According to a recent U.N. study,
females in Guinea-Bissau receive only one-third the schooling
of males. While there are some high-ranking women in the
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GUINEA-BISSAU
Government and a ministry for the advancement of women exists,
authority remains overwhelmingly in the hands of men.
Physical violence, including wife beating, is an accepted means
of settling domestic disputes among all ethnic groups. While
police will intervene in domestic disputes if requested, the
Government has not undertaken specific measures to raise the
public consciousness of women or to reduce violence against
them. It has undertaken educational campaigns against the
practice of female circumcision, but the practice persists
among certain ethnic groups.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
In 1991 the Constitution was revised specifically to grant the
freedom to form independent trade unions, and the Government
had prepared, though still not enacted at year's end, enabling
legislation to enumerate the rights and obligations of new
unions. While the Constitution provides for freedom of
association, in practice only one trade union confederation,
the National Union of Workers of Guinea-Bissau (UNTG), exists
in Guinea-Bissau. With strong ties to the PAIGC, the UNTG more
closely resembles a mass party organization than an independent
union, and it has been neither aggressive nor effective in
promoting worker rights.
The new Constitution of 1991 includes an article which
recognizes the right to strike and prohibits lock-outs. In the
past, strikes have occurred only on rare occasions, and the
public's perception has been that strikes, like antigovernment
meetings, would not be tolerated. In 1991, however, a nearly
nationwide teachers' strike lasted for a number of weeks and
resulted in negotiations between the Government and teachers'
representatives. Also, capital city taxi drivers organized
several short-term work stoppages to protest poor road
maintenance and high fuel prices. In neither of these two
cases did the Government take any repressive actions against
the strikers.
The UNTG is affiliated with the Communist-dominated World
Federation of Trade Unions. The new labor law provides that
unions will have the right to freely affiliate with
international labor organizations of their choice, but until
independent unions are formed the practical effect of this
provision is unknown.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Guinea-Bissau's small manufacturing sector employs fewer than
5,000 persons, and almost half of the estimated 28,000 salaried
workers are government employees. The scarcity of salaried
jobs has forced employees to focus on obtaining and keeping
employment rather than on organizing and bargaining. Public
employees are permitted to join the UNTG, but its activities
have not emphasized organizing employees (whether private or
public) for the purpose of collective bargaining, and the
Government dominates the bargaining process. The Constitution,
even as revised in 1991, does not provide for or protect the
right to bargain collectively. There are no export processing
zones in Guinea-Bissau.
The International Labor Organization's Committee of Experts has
noted for several years that the Government's provision for the
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GUINEA-BISSAU
protection of workers against antiunion discrimination does not
appear to be accompanied by penal sanctions against employers
and that the General Labor Act of 1986 is not applicable
toworkers in the public service.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is not permitted by law and is not
known to exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The General Labor Act of 1986 established a minimum age of 14
for general factory labor and of 18 for heavy or dangerous
labor, including all labor in mines. These minimum age
requirements are generally followed in the small wage sector,
but there is minimal enforcement by the Ministry of
Administrative Reform, Civil Service, and Labor. Children in
rural communities do domestic and field work for no pay. The
Government does not attempt to discourage this practice and, in
fact, delays the opening of schools until the rice harvesting
season has ended.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Even in the small wage sector, labor laws are unevenly enforced
due primarily to the extreme economic underdevelopment of the
country. However, there are governinent regulations governing
such matters as job-related disabilities and vacation rights.
The maximum number of hours permitted in a normal workweek is
45 hours. Although not consistently enforced, a minimum wage
is mandated by the Ministry of Civil Service for government
employees. The wage is inadequate to maintain even a minimum
standard of living, and workers must supplement their income
through reliance on the extended family and subsistence
agriculture. Existing legal, health, and safety standards for
workers are not enforced by the Ministry of Administrative
Reform, Civil Service, and Labor in a uniform or comprehensive
manner .
174
KENYA
After strenuously rejecting calls for political reform
throughout 1991 and harassing and intimidating groups and
individuals advocating multiparty democracy, Kenyan President
Daniel T. Arap Moi, in a surprise move in December, recommended
that Kenya again adopt a multiparty system. Although Kenya has
had an elected civilian government since independence in 1963,
the Kenya African National Union (KANU) has been de facto the
sole political party almost since independence; since 1982 it
has held that status de jure. Passage of the enabling
legislation on December 10 opened the way for multiparty
elections, which must be held by mid-1993 at the latest, for
the elected National Assembly (unicameral Parliament) of 188
members, plus 12 members appointed by the President and 2 ex
officio members. Parties were expected to begin registration
immediately in anticipation of the possibility of early
elections. As of mid-December, legislation was also under
consideration that would increase the number of possible
elected seats in the National Assembly from its present limit
of 188 to a maximum of 210. In its one-party configuration,
the National Assembly has virtually no independent power in
national political affairs, but its sessions provide a forum
for members to raise local or regional issues.
Kenya has a large and growing internal security apparatus that
includes the police Criminal Investigation Department (CID),
the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU), and the
Directorate of Security and Intelligence (DSI or Special
Branch) . The CID and Special Branch investigate criminal
activity and also monitor persons the State considers
subversive. The internal security apparatus has been used to
intimidate and harass politicians, opponents of the Government,
and dissidents, sometimes resorting to torture and other
mistreatment (see Section I.e.).
Kenya's economy, despite the dominance of public and
state-owned enterprises, includes a we 11 -developed private
sector for trade and light manufacturing as well as an
agricultural sector that provides food for local consumption
and substantial exports of coffee, tea, and other commodities.
Tourism is the top foreign exchange earner but grew at a slower
pace in 1991 due to the Gulf War. Although economic growth
continued in 1991, a persistently high population growth rate
contributed to serious and growing unemployment.
While there were signs of improvement in human rights in late
1991, human rights were circumscribed for most of the year, and
significant restrictions remained at year's end. For the first
10 months of 1991 KANU resisted reform. President Moi
repeatedly asserted that Kenya was not ready for multiparty
democracy, and movement towards political change was blocked in
various ways. The Government refused applications for licenses
to hold opposition political meetings, and church groups and
the Law Society canceled prayer meetings on political topics
following government intimidation. The Government denied
registration to a newly formed political party, and KANU
expelled, under the guise of "deregistration" from the party,
several members who joined an informal group advocating change
(the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy — FORD). In 1991
the Attorney General lifted restrictions on the Nairobi Law
Monthly, originally banned for its coverage of the multiparty
debate, and the Government released from custody the three
prominent detainees held under the controversial Preservation
of Public Security Act (PPSA), Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia,
and Raila Odinga. A number of sedition trials were also
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KENYA
concluded in 1991; many questions were raised about the
fairness of these trials, and there were credible charges of
police brutality and torture.
Former Member of Parliament (M.P.) George Anyona and three
codefendants were convicted on circumstantial evidence which
depended heavily on inferences from ambiguous documents found
in the possession of the accused. Former M.P. Koigi Wa
Wamwere, arrested in October 1990 on charges of treason,
continued to be held in prison at year's end, awaiting trial.
In what appeared to be a politically motivated decision,
officers of the Kenyan Law Society were convicted of contempt
of court resulting from an order forbidding them from making
statements critical of the Government.
At year's end, the Government had failed to investigate several
cases of physical attacks on well-known government opponents
and their families. Serious questions remained about the
Government's handling of the investigation into the 1990 murder
of Foreign Minister Robert Ouko. The fall of the Somali and
Ethiopian Governments in the first 6 months of 1991 triggered
an influx of refugees. The Government was reluctant to grant
full refugee status to asylum seekers. Many refugees suffered
police harassment and sporadic refoulements, culminating in a
refoulement by the Kenyan Navy which resulted in the loss of 37
Somali lives.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings
Following the murder of Foreign Minister Robert Ouko in 1990,
which many believe was politically motivated, the Government
called in a team from Britain's New Scotland Yard to assist in
the investigation. A judicial inquiry began in October 1990
and heard testimony for over a year. President Moi, however,
abruptly terminated the inc[uiry on November 26 and asked the
police to resume investigating the case. On December 9, a
former district commissioner was charged with murder in the
case. Two other suspects, former Energy and Industry Minister
Nicholas Biwott and former Permanent Secretary for Internal
Security and Provincial Administration Hezekiah Oyugi, were
arrested November 26 but released without charge 2 weeks later
due to lack of evidence. The judicial inquiry had heard
substantial testimony regarding corruption on the part of
Biwott and Oyugi, with the implication that corruption had
played a part in motivating Dr. Ouko ' s murder. On the last day
of the inquiry, its commissioners published a statement saying
that their telephones had been bugged by the police and that
they had heard rumors of a plot to assassinate one of their
number to end the inquiry. There has been no investigation of
these charges .
On June 30, during a riot over student allowances, one Moi
University student, Shadrack Opiyo, was shot dead by the
police. No investigation followed the incident.
Reports by survivors indicate that on May 25 the Kenyan Navy
towed two boats of Somali asylum seekers out to sea in order to
repatriate them against their will. Cut adrift in rough water,
the unseaworthy boats capsized, and 37 refugees drowned. The •
Navy showed extreme negligence over the possible loss of life.
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KENYA
The Ministry of Home Affairs, responsible for refugee matters,
issued a statement exonerating the Navy, saying that naval
vessels had not towed the refugees to sea but had come to
assist an overloaded refugee boat. While towing the refugees
to safety, the line broke, and the boat capsized. Although the
United States Government and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) requested an official
investigation, at year's end no such inquiry had begun.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhximan, and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is proscribed under the Constitution, but there
continued to be persistent credible reports of severe police
brutality and abuse of prisoners in 1991. For example, when
Reverend Lawford Ndege Imunde was released in March and his
sentence commuted to time served, he alleged that during his
imprisonment he had been beaten, denied appropriate medical
treatment, and held in a prison for the criminally insane.
In the sedition trial of George Anyona and his associates,
defendant Edward Akong'o Oyugi claimed that for 10 days during
his interrogation, he was beaten, kept naked in a flooded cell,
and not given enough food. There has been no investigation of
these allegations, which are the subject of pending litigation.
During the same trial, George Anyona described his
interrogation at Nyayo House in Nairobi, claiming that several
floors of the building contained torture chambers and asking
the magistrate to investigate the charge. The state prosecutor
said that those areas of Nyayo House came under the Restricted
Areas Act, and no further investigation occurred. E. Barrack
Mbajah, brother of murdered Foreign Minister, Robert Ouko,
claimed in an affidavit prepared in the United States that: "I
was arrested, confined for 5 days and nights, and severely
beaten by Kenya (sic) security after I refused to cooperate
with them in covering up the assassination." A defendant in
the Koigi Wa Wamwere treason trial. Rumba Kinuthia, says he was
tortured and kept chained in a water-logged cell. Detailed
accounts of beatings and painful, extended torture reported in
past years have never been investigated. The Government seems
to make no attempt to identify or prosecute those responsible.
Prison conditions in Kenya are harsh due to overcrowding and
insufficient funding for prison operations. Corruption and
sexual abuse occur. Food and medical facilities are in short
supply. Malnutrition particularly affects nursing and pregnant
mothers, whose small children stay in prison with them. In
March the Government made available information about the
conditions under which the three Preservation of Public Safety
Act detainees were held (see Section l.d.), specifically the
frequency of family visits and access to legal and medical
advice. It showed that medical and family access to these
detainees was very limited. In the case of Raila Odinga, all
requests for visits by legal counsel had been refused.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution provides that most persons arrested or
detained (other than those detained under the PPSA) shall be
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brought before a court "as soon as is reasonably practicable."
If such person is not brought within 24 hours after his arrest
or from the commencement of his detention, the burden of
explanation is on the authorities.
The Constitution was amended in 1988 to allow the police to
hold people suspected of capital offenses for 14 days before
being brought before a court. Capital offenses include such
crimes as murder and treason. In practice, suspects of all
types are often held incommunicado for 2 to 3 weeks before
being brought to court. Family members often bring law suits
to compel authorities to produce "missing" prisoners.
Bail is frec[uently granted in nonpolitical cases. In late
1991, the courts more frequently granted bail in "political"
cases than had been the case earlier in the year. When Gitobu
Imanyara was arrested on sedition charges, which were
subsequently dropped by the Attorney General, he was denied
bail, even though he suffered from severe health problems.
When he was hospitalized in recognition of the threat to his
health, he was chained to his hospital bed. Luke Obok, an
associate of Luo politician Oginga Odinga, was charged with
possessing seditious documents and was repeatedly denied bail.
Kenya's PPSA allows the State to detain a person indefinitely
without charges or trial upon a determination "that it is
necessary for the preservation of public security."
"Preservation of public security" includes "prevention and
suppression of rebellion, mutiny, violence, intimidation, .
disorder and crime, unlawful attempts and conspiracies to
overthrow the government or the constitution," and several
other grounds. A formal detention order must be signed and
published in the Kenya Gazette. There is no judicial review of
the legality of detention. A board appointed by the President,
meeting in camera, reviews detention cases every 6 months, but
its recommendations are not binding.
The Government has used the PPSA repeatedly in recent years to
silence opposition. The issue of the three detainees held
under the Act was a major human rights issue of the first half
of 1991. Charles Rubia was released on April 12, Kenneth
Matiba on June 8, and Raila Odinga on June 21, all on health
grounds. As PPSA detainees, they were never formally charged.
Rubia and Matiba subsecjuently sought medical treatment abroad;
Raila Odinga was denied a passport to travel for treatment.
Lawyers, churchmen, and politicians have called for the
abolition of the PPSA, but the law remains in force.
Former MP Koigi Wa Wamwere, arrested in 1990 on charges of
treason, remained in prison throughout 1991 awaiting trial.
According to Kenyan authorities, Wamwere was arrested in
possession of a secret cache of arms, which he intended to use
to overthrow the Kenyan Government. He claims to have been
kidnaped from Uganda and brought by the Kenyans to Nairobi,
where he says the arms were planted on him. On December 16,
Koigi 's lawyers protested to the High Court that all 7
defendants in the case suffered from harsh prison conditions,
including solitary confinement 23 hours a day, a substandard
diet, lack of family visits, and cells without blankets or
mattresses .
On September 24, the police arrested Ahmed Salim Bamahriz, a
founding member of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy,
in Nairobi after President Moi publicly called for harsh
measures against troublemakers. The police said his arrest was
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unrelated to his political views and pertained instead to an
unspecified criminal matter related to his business dealings.
Bamahriz was taken to Mombasa, questioned, and released.
In many other cases, Kenyans were visited and questioned by the
police or held in police custody for periods ranging from a few
hours to several days without being charged or officially
detained under any specific authority. The purpose seemed to
be the intimidation of critics of the Government. Several
priests and ministers, such as the head of the Kenya National
Evangelism Fellowship Church, have been questioned in this
fashion.
From May 8 to 10, the police interrogated the 82-year-old
father of the Reverend Timothy Njoya. Njoya, a minister of the
Presbyterian Church of East Africa and well known government
critic, later issued a statement saying the interrogation was
meant to pressure his father to disown him.
On August 7, the police picked up three farmers from Nakuru
district, holding and questioning them for a week for allegedly
belonging to an antigovernment political party and recruiting
other members. They denied all these charges, and one claimed
that he was tortured by the police.
Traditionally, the Government has used neither exile nor the
threat of exile as a means of intimidation or punishment. At
the end of October, Raila Odinga fled Kenya after government
harassment for his political beliefs and received asylum in
Norway. In 1991 the Government appealed to politically
motivated emigres abroad to return to join in Kenyan nation
building. Early in 1991, some of the exiles asked for
government guarantees that they would not be rearrested on
arrival. Later that year, some of them indicated they wished
to return as a result of the restoration of multiparty
democracy to Kenya. According to press accounts, in a December
18 speech President Moi said that exiles who left Kenya without
passports should not expect to receive them now.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Kenya's legal system, as defined in the Judicature Act of 1967,
is based on the Constitution, laws passed by Parliament, and
common law or court precedent. Customary law is used as a
guide in civil matters affecting people of the same ethnic
group so long as it does not conflict with statutory law.
Kenya does not have the jury system. The court system consists
of the Court of Appeals, the High Court, and two levels of
magistrates' courts where most criminal and civil cases
originate. In 1989 Justice Dugdale decided the courts have no
power to enforce the Kenyan Bill of Rights. Applications for
habeas corpus have never been successful in the High Court.
Civilians are tried in civilian courts, and verdicts may be
appealed to the Kenyan High Court and ultimately to the Court
of Appeals. Kenyans do not have a right to legal counsel at
state expense except in certain capital cases. Most persons
tried for capital offenses are provided counsel free of charge
if they cannot afford it. Military personnel are tried by
military courts, and verdicts may be appealed. Attorneys for
military personnel are appointed on a case by case basis by the
Chief Justice.
The President has extensive powers over the judiciary. He
appoints the Chief Justice and the Attorney General and
appoints High Court judges with the advice of the Judicial
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Service Commission. His power was significantly increased
through constitutional amendments adopted in 1986 and 1988,
which gave him discretionary authority to dismiss judges, the
Attorney General, and certain other officials. In late 1990,
this power of dismissal was restricted when Parliament adopted
a constitutional amendment specifying that the President may
only dismiss those officials upon the recommendation of a
special, presidentially appointed tribunal. Some hailed this
as a restoration of the security of judicial tenure, but many
lawyers criticized it as inadequate to restore judicial
independence. The amendments have not yet been tested because
there has been no government effort to date to remove from
office an officer affected.
A number of trials stemming from Kenya's sedition laws were
concluded in 1991. The Reverend Lawford Ndege Imunde,
convicted of seditious publication on the strength of a private
diary entry, had his sentence commuted to time served, although
the conviction was not overturned.
Press reporting of the sedition trial of George Anyona and his
three codefendants underlined the problematic character of the
verdict, which was based on circumstantial evidence. Anyona
and his three codefendants met in a bar on July 11, 1990, just
after Nairobi was shaken by rioting on July 7. The men were
arrested, charged with plotting the overthrow of the
Government, and held without bail for a year.
When the trial was concluded in July 1991, all four men were
convicted and given 7-year sentences. The prosecution
maintained that the defendants met in a private room to discuss
the overthrow of the Government, but no witnesses came forward
to substantiate this claim. The Government's case depended on
documents, found in the possession of the accused, which were
held to be seditious. One was a piece of paper with the words
"Charles" and "Ken;" the prosecution said the words referred to
Charles Matiba and Kenneth Rubia, two of the detainees released
in 1991. The other most incriminating piece of evidence was
the so-called shadow cabinet list, a list of government
positions paired with the names of government critics. The
prosecution held that the list demonstrated plans to overthrow
the Government and replace ministerial positions from the ranks
of the ant i government activists; the defense said the document
was a crude forgery planted on Anyona by the police. Under
Kenyan law, any publication calculated to excite "hatred or
disaffection" toward the Government is deemed seditious. Some
of the publications found in the possession of the accused and
alleged to be seditious have never been banned in Kenya.
Anyona and his codefendants appealed their convictions. The
case is to be heard in February 1992.
Defendants have occasionally been denied the right to employ
legal counsel of their choice. Kenya theoretically permits all
commonwealth lawyers to practice and also employs British
judges, including the Chief Justice. Yet in 1991 two
defendants, Mirugi Kariuki and Paul Muite, were denied the
right to employ British barristers in their defense.
In some cases, legislation precludes a fair trial. A relic of
the colonial period, the Chief's Authority Act gives low-level
administration officials, called chiefs, wide-ranging powers,
including the power to arrest and hold persons and to restrict
a person's movement without trial. The Kenya Law Reform
Commission has recommended that the law be abolished.
50-726 - 92
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f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Generally, judicially issued search warrants are required and
obtained, but searches without warrants are allowed under the
Constitution in certain instances "to promote the public
benefit," including in security cases. Security officials also
conduct searches without warrants to apprehend suspected
criminals or to seize property suspected to be stolen. Homes
of suspected dissidents have been searched without warrants,
and evidence so obtained has been admissible to support
convictions.
Security forces reportedly employ a variety of surveillance
techniques, including electronic surveillance and a network of
informers. Political activists have been subject to police
surveillance as have some of their visitors. Paul Muite,
Gitobu Imanyara, and ex-detainee Raila Odinga all experienced
physical attacks which appear to have had a political
motivation. In the most serious of these incidents, Raila
Odinga, while driving family members in his car, was hit by a
stone and subsequently required hospitalization. Former Vice
President Oginga Odinga alleges that an unsuccessful break-in
of his house in May was an attempt to plant arms in his house
prior to his arrest. At the time of Gitobu Imanyara 's arrest
in March, on the grounds of seditious publication (Section
2.a.), both his home and the offices of the Nairobi Law Monthly
were searched without a warrant.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press and
outlaws discrimination against any Kenyan on grounds of
political opinion. However, there are numerous restrictions
and inhibitions on the exercise of free speech, although they
are not consistently effective. The legality of the Nairobi
Law Monthly has been upheld; and some public figures,
churchmen, and former Members of Parliament, have spoken
vigorously against the Government. A number of prosecutions
for sedition were withdrawn in 1991, but enough were carried
through to create a climate in which free debate is discouraged
and sometimes penalized. Kenyans have been charged with such
offenses as wearing a badge with a V symbol, which was
interpreted as "creating a disturbance" by seeming to advocate
multiparty politics. In another case, a woman was charged with
creating a disturbance for saying that there is "no justice"
under the present Government. Some small businesses in Kenya
have been fined by the police for the offense of operating
without displaying a picture of the President, even though no
law requires such display.
Free speech and association in Kenya is also inhibited by an
atmosphere of repression created when KANU and government
officials make public statements threatening violence or
repression against dissidents. At a public rally. Minister of
Energy Biwott threatened that if Paul Muite were jailed he
"might not come out alive." President Moi himself publicly
called on KANU members to "act as agitators," and on another
occasion to deal firmly with troublemakers. In September, as
tensions role in anticipation of the planned October 5
demonstration. Energy Minister Biwott and 19 Rift Valley M.P.s
threatened in a rally to "crush" the Forum for the Restoration
of Democracy (FORD) and told the populace to "arm themselves"
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against FORD. At a similar rally. Minister of State Barudi
Nabwera urged KANU youthwingers to "do the needful," a clear
threat, if they encountered FORD organizers.
One television station and all radio stations are owned and
controlled by the Government. A second television station is
owned by KANU and adheres to self-imposed guidelines. The
KANU-owned outlet carries Cable News Network programs,
generally without restriction, although at times stories about
Kenya have been deleted. Privately owned newspapers and
journals are published in Kenya, and there is no systematic
censorship of the press. However, in early 1991 some
publications were seized, and until late 1991 the press
practiced self-censorship and confined its commentary within
usually understood but legally undefined limits. Further,
press members were subject to intimidation by persons
associated with the Government. Despite these limitations,
Kenyan press reporting on local issues remains spirited, and,
after the constitutional changes in late 1991, there was a
significant increase in press commentary critical of the
Government and, most notably, the President.
Newspapers, magazines, and books from abroad are readily
available. In late 1991, Kenya ceased to exclude individual
editions of foreign papers which contained articles critical of
Kenya. More than 100 foreign journalists representing Western
news organizations operate from Nairobi.
Free speech won a notable victory in Kenya when the Attorney
General dropped all sedition charges against Gitobu Imanyara
and subsequently lifted the ban on the Nairobi Law Monthly.
Imanyara was first charged with sedition in 1990 because of the
Nairobi Law Monthly's coverage of the multiparty debate.
Imanyara was taken into custody for the second time on sedition
charges in March, when the Nairobi Law Monthly published an
editorial claiming that the Government distributed jobs in
state-owned companies on the basis of ethnicity. Imanyara 's
printer was heavily fined for pviblishing the magazine without
posting a legally required bond. On May 28, following strong
domestic and international criticism, the Government released
Imanyara and dropped all sedition charges against him. On July
4, the ban on the Nairobi Law Monthly was officially lifted,
thus upholding an October 1990 judgment suspending the ban.
Several other magazines, however, are still proscribed.
Several plays, including a Kiswahili translation of "Animal
Farm" and a Dario Fo play about a rent strike, have been
censored.
Possession, distribution, or publication of banned writing is
subject to a punishment of up to 7 years' imprisonment.
Several persons were charged and convicted of this offense in
1991. In December, after the announcement of the change to
multipartyism, the press continued to report cases of citizens
charged with the possession of seditious literature. None of
these cases has yet come to court since the constitutional
change was recommended.
Another case dramatizing the limits of free speech in Kenya was
the injunction issued by the High Court against Paul Muite,
chairman of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) and other members of
the Law Society council. Muite, in his acceptance speech as
chairman, had urged the registration of the National Democratic
Party (see Section 2.b.).
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Progovernment members of the LSK sought the injunction against
Muite to prevent him from speaking on political topics in his
capacity as LSK chairman. In May Muite, along with other LSK
council members, published a statement criticizing the record
of legal judgments by British expatriate judges, including
Justice Dugdale. Alleging that Muite had violated the
injunction forbidding him to pronounce on political topics,
four lawyers brought an action for contempt of court against
Muite. To do so, they were required to ask the duty judge for
leave for the action to go forward; the judge who granted leave
was Dugdale. The Attorney General has stated that the
Government has no involvement in this case and that it is
private suit brought by one group of lawyers against another.
On October 23, the Court of Appeal found Muite and his
colleagues guilty of contempt of court for disobeying an
injunction prohibiting them from making political statements.
They were ordered to pay a fine of approximately $350.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly, while provided for in the Constitution, is
seriously limited by the Public Order and Police Act, which
gives authorities power to control public gatherings, defined
as meetings of three or more persons. It is illegal to convene
an unlicensed meeting. The ban does not extend to persons
meeting on church property for religious purposes. On April
28, the Reverend Timothy Njoya of the Presbyterian Church of
East Africa, known for his advocacy of multiparty politics,
held an open air prayer meeting without a license. Before the
meeting began, police in riot gear confronted the gathering of
300 people. Security personnel beat up several journalists and
took their cameras, and government figures criticized Njoya for
leading his parishioners to confrontation. On July 28, the
Church of the Province of Kenya (CPK) and the Law Society of
Kenya proposed to call believers to a session of prayers for
peace and justice. According to a schedule published
beforehand, the prayers were to cover many of the issues on the
dissident agenda. The Government refused a request for a
license to hold a procession before the prayers, and the
meeting was called off after the authorities exerted
considerable pressure on the churchmen.
The FORD attempted to hold an unlicensed political meeting on
November 16. A number of FORD members and presumed
sympathizers were picked up before the day of the meeting;
others were arrested on their way to the meeting. In spite of
some stone throwing clashes with the police, the crowd was
essentially peaceful. At least 87 people were arrested for
participating in the banned gathering or urging others to do
so. Charges against most of the FORD members and prominent
sympathizers were swiftly dropped, but the outcome of the
charges against many ordinary citizens arrested in connection
with the rally is still unclear. After the announcement of the
change to multiparty democracy, Nairobi saw a number of
spontaneous small street demonstrations which dispersed on
their own accord without police intervention, but on December 9
the police broke up a peaceful pro-FORD demonstration and
arrested 17 people. However, on January 18, 1992, the
Government authorized a FORD rally in downtown Nairobi. Over
100,000 persons attended the event, which unfolded peacefully.
Freedom of association is governed by the Societies Act, which
states that every association must be registered or exempted
from registration by the Registrar of Societies. In February
Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Kenya's first Vice President, attempted
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to register a new political party, the National Democratic
Party (NDP) . The request was refused under section 2(A) of the
Constitution, which makes Kenya a one-party state. The NDP
argued without success that it was not a political party in the
proscribed sense, since it did not plan to field electoral
candidates, but- would confine itself to propagating its views
on political topics, especially regarding the elimination of
section 2(A) of the Constitution. Later in the year, Oginga
Odinga joined with others to propose a new grouping, the Forum
for the Restoration of Democracy. FORD members urged Kenyans
to form themselves into 9-member groups, since only
associations of 10 or more members legally require registration.
President Moi denounced the FORD as "the NDP in disguise" and
termed it "illegal" and nonexistent. One FORD organizer, Ahmed
Salim Bamahriz, is an elected member of the Mombasa municipal
council. When Bahmariz announced his association with the
FORD, attempts were made to suspend him from KANU and to strip
him of his councillorship. In September Bamahriz and other
FORD members were "deregistered" from KANU by the KANU special
delegates' conference. There is, however, no provision at all
for deregistration in the KANU constitution. KANU, having
agreed under pressure in 1990 to stop expelling members as a
disciplinary measure, seems to be looking for other names under
which to achieve the same effect: suppressing dissent in its
ranks. It is not yet clear whether expulsions will become more
or less common now that Kenyans are legally free to form and
join parties other than KANU.
c. Freedom of Religion
Kenya has no state religion. Freedom of worship is
acknowledged in the Constitution and generally allowed, but
churches new to Kenya must obtain government approval to be
registered. Some church figures have voiced concern about a
new bill to regulate nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) in
Kenya, which might impose some government controls over church
projects. NGO's will henceforth have to reregister every 5
years, and those deemed not to act in the public interest may
suffer deregistration
Throughout 1991 activist churchmen were denounced by Parliament
and the press, and the organizers of the abortive July 28
prayer meeting, sponsored jointly by the Law Society of Kenya,
the Church of the Province of Kenya, and the National Council
of Christian Churches, were subjected to government pressure
(see Section 2 .b. ) .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Kenyans may travel freely within the country. In September
several Rift Valley politicians attending a political rally
purported to "ban" members of the FORD from entering the
Valley. They threatened reprisals against members of the
Kikuyu ethnic group and multiparty supporters settled in the
region. Implementation of these proposals is unlikely. Kenyan
law gives all Kenyans the right to settle and conduct business,
which includes obtaining land titles, in any area of the
country.
Kenya does not generally prohibit emigration of its citizens
but on occasion does prevent travel abroad by critics of the
Government. The Government does not regard issuance of
passports to citizens as a right and reserves the authority to
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issue or deny passports at its discretion. In 1991 the
Government seized or declined to issue passports to over 20
Kenyans. In two cases, the Government seized the passports of
persons returning from abroad who had made political speeches
during their trips.
In July labor leader Dennis Akumu and former parliamentarian
Martin Shikuku were removed from an aircraft they had boarded
to travel to London. Their passports were not taken, but their
right to travel was denied without any administrative or
judicial proceeding.
In 1991 large numbers of Somali and Ethiopian refugees fled to
Kenya after their governments collapsed. Kenya has accepted
most asylum seekers, though sometimes entry is delayed,
resulting in hardship and denial of assistance, and many
suffered police harassment. Thirty-seven Somali asylxim seekers
drowned when the Kenya Navy towed their boats to the open sea.
(see Section l.a.).
None of these refugees has been granted legal status other than
that of asylum seeker. About 50,000 refugees reside in camps,
and at least double that number live outside the camps, in
cities as well as rural areas. Refugees outside of the camps
are extremely vulnerable to arrest. Refugees who purchase fake
identity papers and visas put themselves even further at risk.
Conditions in the camps have caused several riots, one of which
led to a number of hospitalizations. The Government promised
to investigate the incident but has yet to do so.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens in 1991 had neither the right nor the ability to
change the one party system of government through the electoral
process. However, the year-end recommendations for
constitutional change would permit multiparty elections by
mid-1993 at the latest, which, if conducted freely and fairly,
would give Kenyans this right. At year's end, it was not clear
whether independent, as well as party-based candidates, would
be permitted to contest the elections. Although the President
said that each electoral district will be contested by a single
KANU candidate, since the KANU nomination process was abolished
in June, the selection mechanism within KANU remained unclear.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no local organizations solely devoted to
investigating human rights abuses, but the Law Society of
Kenya, some church groups, some periodicals, a few
organizations, and individual attorneys function as de facto
human rights monitors. However, through most of 1991 they
faced serious obstacles, including harsh government criticism,
restrictions on free speech and assembly, and, in some cases,
torture and harassment by the police (see Section l.a.). The
Government reacts negatively to criticism of its human rights
record, at home and abroad, and through its accusations of
association with "foreign masters" discourages Kenyans from
providing outside human rights groups with information.
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Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Kenya's Constitution and laws prohibit discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, religion, language, or social status.
However, the situation of Kenyans of Somali ethnic origin is a
major concern. Ethnic Somalis are the only ethnic group in
Kenya for which the Government requires an additional form of
identification, stating that they are Kenyan citizens.
In 1990 the Government reqiiired that ethnic Somalis have their
claim to Kenyan citizenship verified through a "screening"
process involving verification by a panel of Somali elders.
This screening effort continued through the first 3 months of
1990 and then was phased out, although its practical effects
remained. The screening has been widely criticized as
discriminatory, unconstitutional, and without basis in law.
Ethnic Somalis must still produce upon demand their Kenyan
identification card and a second identification verifying
"screening." Both cards are also required to apply for a
passport, and airlines have been required to submit passports
held by Kenyan Somalis for verification before issuing tickets
to such persons.
Members of all ethnic groups may run for office, and ethnic
representation at the minister and assistant minister level is
broad. The Asian community, numbering about 65,000, accounts
for a disproportionate share of the nation's economic wealth
and output, but very few Asians participate in electoral
politics. The Kikuyu remain the largest and richest ethnic
group in Kenya. But anti-Kikuyu language from ministers and
other officials entered the public domain in 1991 without
official rebuke, particularly in connection with Kikuyu land
purchases in areas traditionally inhabited by other tribes.
While there is no legal discrimination against women,
traditional culture and attitudes have long prescribed limited
roles for women. Women's roles are particularly restricted in
rural areas where they account for 75 percent of the total
agricultural work force. Rural families are more reluctant to
invest in educating girls than in educating boys, especially at
the higher levels. The number of girls and boys in school are
roughly equal at the primary and secondary levels, but men
outnumber women by almost two to one in higher education.
Though women are increasingly active in the modern economy, the
number of women in professional roles is still limited. The
number of female unemployed is double that of men. Women
sometimes receive lower rates of pay than men performing the
same job, and disparities in fringe benefits occur, e.g., some
businesses give housing allowances to men but not to married
women. Women are legally able to own property and businesses.
Polygamy is not legal for people married under the Christian
Marriage Act, but it is permitted for those who marry under
African customary law. Kenya's law of succession, which
governs inheritance rights, provides for equal treatment of
male and female children.
The Government strongly condemns extreme violence towards
women, specifically murder, female circumcision, rape, and
incest. In many cases, rapists, particularly of minors, are
given sentences of up to 14 years in prison. However, the
ambivalence of Kenyans to the abuse of women was graphically
demonstrated by the public response to a case of multiple rape
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and manslaughter at St. Kizito boarding school. In July, on a
Saturday night when few teachers or staff were at the school, a
group of 50 adolescent boys attending St. Kizito broke into the
crowded dormitory housing their female contemporaries. In the
panic that ensued, 19 girls suffocated, and 71 were raped.
Despite public expressions of horror at the event, many Kenyans
acknowledge that rapes are frequent in Kenyan schools. This
seems borne out by a published comment by the principal of the
school, who said: "The boys meant no harm, they just wanted to
rape. "
Domestic violence occurs in Kenya, but little information is
available on the extent of the problem. In practice, most
cases of domestic violence are settled outside of the courts.
The maximum legal penalty for wife beating is 5 years in
prison. Women may also sue for civil damages. Female
circumcision is illegal but still practiced by some Kenyan
ethnic groups on girls under the age of 16. The Government
officially discourages the practice but leaves it to women's
groups to actively oppose female circumcision through health
education programs. Murder or manslaughter charges are brought
when circumcisions result in death. There are press reports of
both male and female community-forced circumcisions, but
charges are never brought in such cases.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Save for the central Government's civil servants, all workers
are free to join unions of their own choosing. The law
provides that as few as seven workers may establish a union,
provided the objectives of the union do not contravene Kenyan
law and another union is not already representative of the
employees in question. The Government may deregister a union,
but the Registrar of Trade Unions must give the union 60 days
to challenge the deregistration notice; an appeal of the
Registrar's final decision may be brought before the High
Court. The Kenya Civil Servants Union was deregistered more
than 10 years ago by President Moi.
There are at least 33 unions in Kenya representing
approximately 350,0000 to 385,000 workers, or 3 percent of the
country's work force. Except for the 150,000-165,000 teachers
believed to be members of the Kenya National Union of Teachers
and four other smaller unions, which have been registered by
the Government, all other unions are affiliated with one
central body, the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) .
The Government created COTU in 1965 as the successor to both
the Kenya Federation of Labor and the Kenya African Workers
Congress. This amalgamation was effected allegedly to
eliminate instability and rivalries within the nation's trade
union movement .
COTU is independent of the Government and KANU in name only.
The 1965 decree establishing COTU gives the President the power
to remove from office the central body's senior leaders. Rule
5 of the COTU constitution accords nonvoting membership on the
executive board (COTU' j managing body) to a representative of
the Labor Ministry as well as of KANU. Moreover, COTU and its
Secretary General Joseph Mugalla are firmly allied with the
President and KANU against those who advocate greater
democratization. In June, seeking to keep pliant unionists in
office, the President offered to underwrite the costs of union
elections which he had announced some 5 months earlier. At
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KENYA
year's end, Mugalla was reelected Secrete «:y General, but his
opponents declared their intention to form a rival
Confederation. The Court of Appeals enjoined the Registrar
from certifying the election pending a hearing on a suit
brought by the opponents .
The Trade Disputes Act permits workers to strike provided that
21 days have elapsed following the submission to the Minister
of Labor of a written report detailing the nature of the
dispute. During this 21-day period, the Minister may either
mediate the dispute himself, nominate a person to investigate
and propose a solution, or refer the matter to the Industrial
Court, a body of five judges appointed by the President, for
binding arbitration. Once a dispute is referred to either
meditation, fact finding, or arbitration, any subsequent strike
is illegal.
The military, police, prison guards, and members of the
National Youth Service are precluded by law from striking.
Under the Trade Disputes Act, other civil servants, like their
private sector counterparts, may strike following the 21-day
notice period (28 days if it is an essential service, e.g. ,
water, health, education, air traffic control). However, the
Labor Minister may at any time preempt a strike involving civil
servants by referring the dispute to the Industrial Court for
resolution. Save for the wildcat strikes involving the bank
employees in November and Mombasa's dockworkers in December,
there were no significant strikes in 1991.
Internationally, COTU is now affiliated to both the
continentwide Organization of African Trade Union Unity and the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Its
affiliates are free to establish links to international trade
secretariats of their choosing. A veteran trade union leader,
associated with the political opposition, however, was
prevented from leaving the country in June (see Section 2.d.).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
While not having the force of law, the 1962 Industrial
Relations Charter, executed by the Government, COTU, and the
Federation of Kenya Employers, gives workers the right to
engage in legitimate trade union organizational activities.
Both the Trade Disputes Act and the Charter authorize
collective bargaining between unions and employers. Wages and
conditions of employment are established in the context of
negotiations between unions and management. The Government has
promulgated wage policy guidelines limiting wage increases to
75 percent of the annual rate of inflation. Collective
bargaining agreements must be registered with the Industrial
Court for the purpose of guaranteeing adherence to these
guidelines. In 1990 there were 1,875 agreements registered
with the court. Some 1 million workers (union and nonunion)
were covered by these accords.
The Trade Disputes Act makes it illegal for employers to
intimidate workers. Employees wrongfully dismissed for union
activities are generally awarded damages in the form of lost
wages by the Industrial Court; reinstatement is not a common
remedy. This is due in large measure to the fact that most
aggrieved workers have found alternative employment in the
lengthy period prior to the hearing of their cases.
While legislation authorizing the creation of export processii^
zones was passed in November 1990, such entities have been slow
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KENYA
to get off the ground. The first such zone, developed by a
subsidiary of Firestone East Africa, has only succeeded in
attracting a few investors. The Government has yet to decide
definitively whether the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act,
the Trade Unions Act, or the Regulation of Wages and Conditions
of Employment Act will be extended to the zone (see also
Section 6.e. ) .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution proscribes slavery, servitude, and forced
labor. Under the Chiefs' Authority Act, a local authority can
require people to perform community services in an emergency,
but there were no known instances of this practice in 1991.
People so employed must be paid the prevailing wage for such
employment. The International Labor Organization (ILO)
Committee of Experts (COE) has found these and other provisions
of Kenyan law to contravene ILO Conventions 29 and 105
concerning forced labor. The COE's 1991 report noted the
Government's intention to repeal or amend the offending
provisions of the law in order to bring them into compliance
with the Conventions. The Government, however, has not given a
definite timetable for the introduction of remedial legislation.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Employment Act of 1976 proscribes the employment in any
industrial undertaking of children under the age of 16. This
enactment applies neither to the agricultural sector, where the
overwhelming majority of the labor force is employed, nor to
children serving as apprentices under the terms of the
Industrial Training Act. Ministry of Labor officers are
authorized to enforce the minimum age statute. Given the high
levels of adult unemployment and underemployment, the
employment of children in the formal wage sector in violation
of the Employment Act is not a significant problem.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The legal minimum wage for workers in the wage sector varies by
location, age, and skills. On May 10, the minimum wage was
raised an average of 16 percent. At the bottom rung of the
adult minimum wage scale is the rural general laborer; the
highest minimum was paid in Nairobi and Mombasa to drivers of
heavy commercial vehicles. Violations of the minimum wage
guidelines are not a recurring problem in the modern wage
sector. Despite nominal wage increases, inflation over 20
percent and the precipitous decline in the shilling's value
substantially eroded workers' living standards during 1991.
Most workers continued to lead the most marginal of existences.
The Regulation of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act limits
the normal workweek to 52 hours. Nighttime employees, however,
may be employed for 60 hours a week. As is the case with
respect to minimum age limitations, the Act specifically
excludes agricultural workers from its purview. An employee in
the nonagricultural sector is entitled to 1 rest day in a
week. There are also provisions for annual leave and sick
leave. Concerning limits on overtime, Kenyan law provides that
the total hours worked (i.e., regular time plus overtime) in
any 2-week period by night workers may not exceed 144 hours;
the limit is 120 hours for other workers. The Ministry of
Labor is tasked with enforcing these regulations, but reported
violations are few.
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KENYA
The Factories Act of 1951 sets forth detailed health and safety
standards; the Act was amended in 1990 to encompass the
agriculture, service, and government sectors. The 65 health
and safety inspec.tors attached to the Ministry of Labor's
Directorate of Occupational Health and Safety Services have the
authority to inspect factories and work sites if they have
reason to believe that a violation of the Act has occurred, or
upon receipt of a complaint from a worker . As a result of the
1990 amendments, the Directorate's inspectors may now issue
notices enjoining employers from practices or activities which
involve a risk of serious personal injuries. Previously, only
magistrates were vested with this authority.
Such notices may be appealed to the Factories Appeals Court, a
body of four members, one of whom must be a High Court judge.
In practice, inspectors, who conduct 2,000 to 3,000 inspections
annually, generally respond only to worker complaints.
"Whistle blowers" are not protected by the Factories Act. On
May 31, the Government exempted enterprises in the export
processing zones from the occupational health and safety
requirements of the Factories Act.
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Lesotho has been ruled by a six-member Military Council since a
coup d'etat in 1986 which overthrew the single-party rule of
Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan. The Council Chairman, Major
General J. M. Lekhanya, was ousted on April 30, 1991, in an
internal struggle which caused the dismissal of another Council
member and the firing of two civilian members of the Cabinet.
Colonel (now Major General) Elias Phisoana Ramaema was chosen
by fellow officers in the armed forces to become the new
Military Council Chairman. Sworn in on May 3, the new Council
of Ministers is comprised of seven military officers and seven
civilians; there are two civilian assistant ministers.
The Military Council rules by decree, while the Council of
Ministers administers the day-to-day operations of government.
Shortly after assiiming office. Council Chairman Ramaema lifted
the 1986 ban on partisan political activity and reaffirmed
plans to restore constitutional rule — abolished in 1970 by
former Prime Minister Jonathan — by 1992. The National
Constituent Assembly, first convened in mid-1990, completed its
revisions to the 1966 independence Constitution in early July
and met again in late September to establish a constitutional
commission to solicit public comments on the revised text,
prior to final ratification of the document.
The Royal Lesotho Defense Force (RLDF) of about 2,000 troops is
responsible for internal and border security. The RLDF is
assisted by a police force of about 1,600 men and women.
Members of both forces occasionally beat or otherwise mistreat
detainees .
A landlocked country completely surrounded by South Africa,
Lesotho is almost entirely dependent on its sole neighbor for
trade, finance, employment, and access to the outside world.
Approximately 55 percent of the adult male labor force is
employed in South Africa's mines, and remittances from workers
(more than $230 million in 1988) are a critical factor in
financing imports. Economic recession in South Africa has led
to retrenchments in the mines and a sharp rise in unemployment
in Lesotho.
Human rights in Lesotho in 1991 remained circumscribed under
the military government, but certain aspects of the situation
improved over previous years. There was some progress toward
political and constitutional reform and in increased freedom of
speech, assembly, and association. However, police brutality
continued, and the security forces used excessive force in
quelling anti-Asian riots in May, in which many persons were
killed. No charges were brought against those responsible.
Other major problems included provisions for lengthy detention
and severe restrictions on women's rights. At year's end, it
was still too early to tell how the Government's reform program
would be implemented, whether it would, in fact, result in
citizens' ability to change their government, and what effect
it would have on the observance of other human rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Some extrajudicial killings continued to occur. Excesses by
law enforcement agencies continued, including fatal shootings
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LESOTHO
in May by police and army personnel attempting to quell violent
anti-Asian riots which broke out in Maseru and spread to other
towns in the western lowlands. Official figures put the death
toll at 35; other reports indicated as many as 80 or more may
have lost their lives. No charges are known to have been
brought in those instances .
In mid-March judgment was handed down by the Chief Justice of
the High Court in the trial of two military men accused of the
1986 murders of two former cabinet ministers and their wives.
Sergeant Ngoana-ngoana Lerotholi was found guilty of murder,
and Colonel Sekhobe Letsie (a former member of the ruling
Military Council) was found guilty as an accessory after the
fact. Both received several concurrent sentences, with Sgt.
Lerotholi given the death sentence (see Section I.e.).
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically related disappearances in
1991, nor were there any further instances of reported
abductions by South African authorities in Lesotho, as occurred
in previous years .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Reports of police brutality, including beatings of detainees,
continued during 1991. There were a disturbing number of
reports of random beatings of civilians by police or military
personnel, especially in the immediate aftermath of the
violence in late May. No known investigations or other
official measures were launched as a result of these
practices. Prison facilities in Lesotho are overcrowded and in
need of repair. One report indicated a prisoner was held in a
bathroom ankle-deep in water because all available cells were
occupied.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
In civil and criminal cases, persons arrested or detained have,
and avail themselves of, the right to immediate consideration
of habeas corpus appeals as well as the right to legal and
medical counsel. The 1981 Criminal Procedures and Evidence
Act, as amended in 1984, makes provision for the granting of
bail. Under the Act, the High Court is the only judicial body
empowered to grant bail in cases of armed robbery or suspected
homicide.
The Internal Security (General) Act (ISA) of 1984 provides for
so-called investigative detention without charge or trial in
political cases for up to 42 days (the first 14 days on order
of the police; the second 14 days on order of the police
commissioner; and the final 14 days on order of the Minister of
Defense and Internal Security) . During the second stage of the
detention, ministerially appointed "advisers" (all of whom have
been government employees to date) are available to report on
the health of the detainee, investigate whether the detainee
has been involved in subversive activities, and advise the
Minister of Defense and Internal Security whether there is a
need for continued detention. Detainees under the Act may make
representation about their own treatment only through the
adviser. The Act also allows for detention of witnesses in
security cases.
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LESOTHO
In addition, a 1986 amendment to the ISA allows the Minister of
Defense and Internal Security (currently the Chairman of the
Military Council) to "restrict" a person who, in the opinion of
the police commissioner, is conducting himself in a manner
prejudicial to public order, security, administration of
justice, or obedience to the law or lawful authority. In
mid-1991 former Military Council Chairman Lekhanya was first
limited to an 8-kilometer radius from his home near Maseru and
then restricted to the bounds of the property itself. No
reasons were made public for imposition of the latter
restriction in August, nor for its removal in September.
An independent journalist, Johnny wa ka Maseko, who was
expelled from Lesotho in 1988 for printing reports alleging
high-level corruption, was allowed to return to the country in
July following the change of government in early May. A South
African lawyer, who was expelled in 1986, has also been
permitted to return to Lesotho and has resumed his law practice
in Maseru.
Following his dispute with the Military Council in February
1990 and his subsecjuent exile in London, ex-King Moshoeshoe II
remained outside the country throughout 1991. The relaxation
of restrictions on political activity in mid-May opened the way
for a proroyalist party to advocate publicly for the former
King's return, and an active debate on the issue took place in
the opposition press. The Government has repeatedly said the
former monarch may return, as a private citizen, without other
conditions .
e. Denial of Fair Piiblic Trial
The judiciary consists of the Court of Appeal (which meets
semiannually), the High Court, magistrate's courts, and
customary or traditional courts, which exist largely in rural
areas to administer customary law. Judges on the High Court
are relatively independent; however, the Chief Justice, an
expatriate who serves a 2-year appointment, may be under some
pressure to act in ways that will ensure reappointment.
Magistrates appear more susceptible to governmental influence.
Court decisions and rulings are respected by the authorities
and are generally free of interference by the executive.
Accused persons have and use the right to counsel and public
trials. The courts have acted to limit infringements of law on
numerous occasions in past years, e.g., the April 1988
annulment on procedural grounds of the State of Emergency,
which, however, the Government quickly reinstituted.
Under the system of Roman-Dutch law applied in Lesotho, there
is no trial by jury. Criminal trials are normally adjudicated
by a single High Court judge who presides with two assessors,
who serve in an advisory capacity. In civil cases, judges
normally hear cases alone. The High Court also provides
procedural and substantive advice and guidance on matters of
legal procedure to military tribunals; however, it does not
participate in arriving at judgments. Military tribunals have
jurisdiction only over military cases.
A judicial inquest may be initiated by the Attorney General on
the authority of the Judicial Inquest Proclamation Number 32 of
1954. In November 1989, he initiated such an inquiry into the
1986 slayings of two former cabinet ministers and their wives.
In March 1991, the High Court ruled on murder charges against
two senior soldiers accused of these killings, finding one
guilty of murder and the other guilty as an accessory after the
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LESOTHO
fact. The case was heard in open court by the Chief Justice
(who ruled on matters of law), accompanied by two civilian
assessors (who ruled with him on matters of fact). Public
attendance was high throughout the trial, which was conducted
fairly and in accordance with Roman-Dutch judicial procedures.
Appeal is automatic in the event of a death sentence, and
Colonel Letsie also gave notice of appeal. In light of the
sheer volume of testimony resulting from this 6-month case, it
was anticipated that the appeal would not be heard before the
middle of 1992 at the earliest.
There were no known political prisoners in Lesotho at the end
of 1991.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In 1991 there were fewer reports of violations of individual
privacy by state authorities. Although search warrants are
usually required under normal circiomstances, the ISA provides
police with wide powers to stop and search persons and vehicles
and to enter homes and other places for similar purposes
without a warrant. Police conducted extensive searches of
private homes in residential areas, especially around Maseru,
in the wake of the riots in late May, looking for stolen
property. Several hundred persons were arrested and charged
with possession of stolen goods. Correspondence appears to be
monitored occasionally by government officials.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Human Rights Act of 1983 provides for freedom of expression
but subordinates this freedom to the needs of national
security. The proposed revised constitution includes a lengthy
section on protection of fundamental hioman rights and freedoms,
based primarily on the 1966 Constitution; all parties agree
with the Government on the need for some such bill of rights.
Following the 1986 coup, a formal ban on politics was announced
with stringent restrictions on freedom of speech and political
assembly. In particular. Government Order No. 4 of 1986
prohibited persons and groups from making political speeches
and from publishing or distributing political party materials.
This order was lifted on May 13, 1991, and political parties
became active in the weeks thereafter. Even before the ban on
organized political party activity was lifted, members of seven
of Lesotho's registered political parties participated actively
in debates on a wide range of political issues in the
Constituent Assembly. Debate in the Constituent Assembly was
frequently lively and was often critical of the Government;
daily reports were broadcast on the radio, and most weekly
papers carried some report of the discussions.
The Government controls the official media (one radio station,
a half-hour daily newscast on a local television channel, and
two weekly newspapers) and ensures that they faithfully reflect
official views. The Government rarely uses them to attack its
partisan critics. Opposition viewpoints were routinely
expressed in 1991 in two Sesotho-language weekly newspapers
published by the Roman Catholic Church and the Lesotho
Evangelical Church and in one independent English-language
weekly. (Another independent weekly and a bimonthly magazine
ceased publication in 1991 for financial reasons.) •
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LESOTHO
Academic freedom is generally respected, although some
professors and students complain about restrictions on their
ability to discuss academic and political issues. Beginning in
July, the National University banned partisan political
activity on campus — in part because several faculty members had
joined a new party, and there were fears the university would
suffer reprisals from other party followers. Student
representatives openly criticized the Government and called for
greater academic and political freedoms during public
ceremonies; no reprisals were known to have taken place.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The military Government's ban on "politics" was not interpreted
to require the dissolution of existing political parties, but
the ban did preclude political gatherings and rallies until it
was lifted in May. Following its lifting, party meetings and
rallies took place throughout the country, limited only by the
requirement for prior police notification. All meetings of the
appointed Constituent Assembly in 1991 were open to the
public. Nonpolitical organizations and professional groups are
freely formed, even encouraged, and are allowed to hold public
and regular meetings.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion in Lesotho. Free and open religious
practice is permitted and encouraged. Christianity is the
dominant faith of the majority of Basotho, and Roman
Catholicism has the most adherents, although less than half of
the population. There is a significant Protestant minority
composed of the Lesotho Evangelical Church, the T^glican
Church, and a number of other smaller denominations.
Conversion is permitted, and there is no apparent social or
political benefit or stigma attached to belonging to any
particular church. There are no barriers to missionary
activity or work by foreign clergy.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens generally are allowed to move freely within the
country and across national boundaries. In July, however, the
Minister of Interior ordered a prominent attorney to surrender
his international passport just before he was due to emplane
for London to attend a human rights conference sponsored by the
former King. Asserting that passports remain government
property, officials claimed there had been complaints from
other African governments over the subversive nature of the
conference and that travel for such purposes was in violation
of the laws governing passport eligibility. By late September,
the passport had been returned to the attorney. The Government
places no obstacles in the way of its own citizens who wish to
emigrate.
There are currently about 220 refugees registered with the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) who have
been granted asylum in Lesotho, the majority unaffiliated South
Africans. The local office of the UNHCR also reports over
4,000 South Africans in "refugee-like status," most of whom
have lived in Lesotho for many years. There is no forced
resettlement of refugees.
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LESOTHO
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens of Lesotho currently do not have the freedom to change
their government. However, in 1990 the military Government
announced its intention to hand over power to a democratically
elected government by the middle of 1992. In June 1990, it
convened a National Constituent Assembly which in July 1991
completed revisions to the independence Constitution of 1966.
A constitutional commission, drawn primarily from members of
the Assembly, held a series of 47 public meetings in late 1991
to discern public opinion before the final text is approved.
Voter registration for the 1992 elections began December 18.
At the end of the year, plans call for Lesotho to remain a
kingdom, under a constitutional monarch, with multiple parties
vying for leadership of a democratically elected Parliament,
and an independent judiciary. All Basotho citizens over the
age of 21 will have the right to vote. There are 15 registered
political parties, including one formed by, but not limited to,
women .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government in general has not been responsive on human
rights issues, particularly when the call for outside
investigation emanated from the domestic political opposition.
There are no internal organizations which concentrate on human
rights, either official or nongovernmental, although church and
other groups occasionally address human rights issues. There
are no overt restrictions on the establishment of such
organizations. Reports of alleged human rights abuses are
sometimes carried in the local press, particularly the church
newspapers and Lesotho's major independent weekly. There have
been no reports of reprisals against human rights activists
(primarily lawyers and clergy).
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Most citizens of Lesotho speak a common language and share
common historical and cultural traditions. Asians (primarily
ethnic Chinese and Indians) and South African whites are active
in the country's commercial life. In 1987 the Government
formulated a policy aimed at "localization" of Lesotho's
commercial retail trade and, under the Trading Enterprise
Order, called on foreign owners to enter into joint ventures
with Basotho nationals. Equity transfers would entail
compensation. To date, the localization order has not been
strictly enforced because of difficulties in identifying local
entrepreneurs to take over foreign-owned businesses, problems
in financing such takeovers, and concern over foreign reaction.
In late May, violence based on economic frustrations broke out
against small-scale merchants of Asian origin. Numerous
Chinese and Indian stores were burned or looted, police and
army troops were called in to quell the rioting, and over 35
people were killed (see Sections I.e. and l.f.). Government
officials were quick to reassure foreign investors that the
anti-Asian violence did not reflect government policy, and the
incidents were not repeated.
Although the question was briefly debated in the Constituent
Assembly in 1990, the Government has still not seriously
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LESOTHO
addressed the issue of women's rights. In Lesotho these rights
are severely limited by both law and custom, including in the
area of property, inheritance, and contracts, but women do have
the legal and customary right to make a will and sue for
divorce. Under Lesotho's customary law, a married woman is
considered a minor during the lifetime of her husband, with all
of the legal limitations that this status implies. She cannot
enter into any legally binding contract, whether for
employment, commerce, or education, without her husband's
consent. A woman married under customary law has no standing
in court and may not sue or be sued without her husband's
permission. Despite their second-class status, women in
Lesotho traditionally have been the stabilizing force in the
home and in the agricultural sector, given the absence of over
100,000 Basotho men who work in South Africa. More female than
male children complete primary and secondary schools.
Domestic violence, including wife beating, occurs, but, as
statistics are not available, the extent of the problem is not
known. In Basotho tradition a wife may return to her "maiden
home" if physically abused by her husband; in the common law,
wife beating is a criminal offense and defined as assault. A
1976 High Court case successfully reversed a Roman-Dutch legal
tradition which recognized a husband's right to chastise his
wife at will. While the Government has made some attempts in
the past to improve the economic prospects of women, no direct
action was taken in 1991 to improve their subordinate status in
society. Women's rights organizations are forming, including a
partnership of women lawyers which has expressed interest in
handling such cases. The local chapter of the International
Federation of Woman Lawyers has taken a lead role in educating
Basotho women as to their rights under customary and common law.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the legal right to join or form unions without
prior government authorization. Roughly 60 percent of
Lesotho's active male labor force between the ages of 20 and 44
seeks work in the Republic of South Africa, mainly in gold and
coal mines. At least 70 percent of the remainder is engaged in
traditional agriculture. The rest are employed mainly by the
Government and in small industries and enterprises in Lesotho.
A majority of Basotho mineworkers are members of the South
African National Union of Mineworkers (MUM) . Because the NUM
is a foreign organization, it is not permitted to engage in
union activities in Lesotho.
Like its predecessor, which since 1988 had been trying to
arrange a merger between Lesotho's two competing federations,
the current Government supported the formation of a single,
umbrella trade union center. Deep philosophical, political,
and ideological differences between the two federations impeded
efforts to consolidate. In 1991, however, the Lesotho Congress
of Free Trade Unions, which encompassed 24 affiliated
independent trade unions, and the Lesotho Federation of Trade
Unions which had 4, merged into one federation, the Lesotho
Labor Congress (LLC), representing the majority of unionized
workers. It remained to be seen at year's end to what extent
the new federation will be free of governmental or partisan
control .
Unionized workers represent only 10 percent of the total work
force, and the LLC accounts for three-guarters of those union
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LESOTHO
members. Four of the newer, more politicized unions did not
join the LLC but have instead formed the Congress of Democratic
Unions. Because the Government wants only one labor central,
it has not granted recognition to this umbrella organization,
even though all four of its member unions are legally
registered.
While a legal right to strike exists for workers in
nonessential services, in practice the procedure for calling a
strike is so lengthy and cumbersome that it discourages legal
strike actions and accounts for the prevalence of wildcat
strikes. The 1964 Trade Union and Trade Disputes Act
enumerates lengthy procedures which must be followed before a
strike is called. There were several, usually short, wildcat
strikes in 1991 against both foreign and domestic companies,
mostly over wages and conditions of work. Most were resolved
through compulsory government arbitration. A particularly
bitter strike broke out in July, with members of the Lesotho
Union of Bank Employees walking out when the management of two
foreign-owned international banks refused their demand for a
40-percent wage increase. Noting that the banking sector had
been ruled an "essential" service, the banks fired the striking
employees and reopened using managerial staff and newly hired
trainees; later, the management offered to rehire the dismissed
employees subject to a probationary period. Efforts by church
leaders and government officials to mediate bore little fruit.
The strike was broken, and only about two-thirds of the
strikers were rehired.
The new, combined Lesotho Labor Congress has maintained the
wide'st possible spread of international trade union links. The
Government imposes no obstacles to international affiliations
or foreign travel for labor union-related purposes.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
All trade unions in Lesotho enjoy the right in law to organize
and bargain collectively, but this right is only recently
coming into practice. Two sectoral agreements exist, and four
others are under active negotiation. An Unfair Labor Practices
Tribunal investigates unfair labor practices and charges of
antiunion discrimination and generally attempts to safeguard
worker rights. A government-appointed Labor Commission is
charged with, inter alia, monitoring wage and working
conditions and accepting, reviewing, and investigating worker
complaints .
Lesotho has several industrial estates grouping together
companies, mostly textile and apparel firms, engaged in
manufacturing for export. There are no prohibitions against
organized labor in these industrial zones, and in fact the
Government helped resolve some worker complaints in 1991
concerning unfair treatment. On the other hand, the new union,
formed by the merger of two rival organizations representing
clothing and garment workers, has met with apparent harassment
and intimidation. Several of its officers were arrested or
detained by the police in July, in apparent retribution for
holding meetings with union members to the displeasure of
expatriate factory management. The officers were quickly
released without being charged.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by the 1987 Employment
Act and not practiced.
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LESOTHO
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum age for employment in commercial or
industrial enterprises is 14. In practice, however, children
under 14 are employed in family-owned businesses. There are
prohibitions against the employment of minors in commercial,
industrial, or nonfamily enterprises involving hazardous or
dangerous working conditions. Basotho minors under 18 years
may not be recruited for employment outside of Lesotho.
Enforcement of these laws by inspectors of the Ministry of
Employment, Social Welfare and Pensions is lax. In Lesotho's
traditional society, life and working conditions for the
country's young "herdboys" tend to be much more rigorous and
demanding than conditions in the modern sector. Their
quasi-pastoral life, however, is considered a prerequisite to
manhood and is a fundamental feature of Basotho life,
tradition, and culture, beyond the reach of labor laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Wages in Lesotho are extremely low. The Government, upon the
recommendation of a tripartite wages advisory board, again
raised the statutory minimum wage rates in 1990 for various
types of work. These amounts are barely sufficient for a
minimum decent standard of living. Most wage earners
supplement their monthly income through subsistence agriculture
or remittances from relatives employed in South Africa. Many
employers in Lesotho now pay more than minimum wages in an
effort to attract and retain motivated employees.
Lesotho's 1967 Employment Act spells out basic worker rights,
including a 45-hour workweek, a weekly rest period of at least
24 hours, 11 to 12 days' paid leave per year, and pay for
public holidays. Employers are required to provide adequate
light, ventilation, and sanitary facilities for employees, and
to install and maintain machinery to minimize the risk of
injury. In practice, these regulations are generally followed
only within the wage economy and are enforced by inspectors
from the Department of Labor of the Ministry of Employment,
Social Welfare and Pensions. Staff shortages in the Ministry
of Employment limit effective enforcement to the major urban
areas.
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LIBERIA
Throughout 1991 Liberia remained a nation divided into two
parts and three armed camps as a result of the war . The
Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), headed by
President Amos Sawyer, represented a broad range of political
views, but it exercised administration over only Monrovia and
its immediate environs. About 50 percent of the total
population in Liberia resided in this area which is totally
within the defensive perimeter of the Economic Community of
West African States' (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) . The National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly
Government (NPRAG) , based on and supported by the National
Patriotic Forces of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor,
exercised political sway throughout the remaining 90 percent of
the country. The two other former warring parties, the
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), led by
Prince Johnson, and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) were
encamped in Monrovia. Both INPFL and AFL factions, while
monitored by ECOMOG, retained arms within their respective
camps, and the INPFL sometimes acted independently. Johnson on
several occasions killed a number of people, most of them
members of his force.
The economy, based primarily on iron ore, rubber, and timber,
was ravaged by the civil war. Gross domestic product for 1991
was no more than 25 percent of prewar levels. U.S. and other
Western relief agencies and nongovernmental organizations
initiated massive emergency operations in late 1990 to prevent
widespread starvation in both parts of the country. Those
operations continued through 1991.
When compared to the appalling civil war conditions of 1990,
there was some improvement in the human rights situation in
1991, especially in the Monrovia area controlled by ECOMOG
forces. However, the Interim Government's authority was
limited, and all Liberian military forces committed serious
human rights violations in 1991, including summary executions.
The NPFL in particular detained several thousand West Africans
throughout much of 1991, and NPFL soldiers reportedly killed
many Krahn residents of Grand Gedeh in midyear.
As a police force had only begun to be reconstituted in 1991,
and only in Monrovia, and most of them remained unarmed, ECOMOG
assumed this function to a large extent in Monrovia. The NPFL
policed the territory vinder its control, and, to a large
extent, both the INPFL and AFL carried out this function within
their camps. Soldiers from the warring factions regularly
abused their position by m.istreating civilians, usually in
attempts to extort money and goods. Despite the continuing
unstable security situation, there was some hope at year's end
for a political solution following peace initiatives conducted
by West African nations which led to general agreement on the
need for free, internationally supervised elections in 1992.
Implementation of the agreements is not assured. At the end of
1991, it was estimated that as many as 20,000 to 30,000
Liberians may have died in the conflict and approximately
600,000 more were refugees in neighboring countries.
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LIBERIA
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Indiscriminate killings declined sharply from the previous
year, although many incidents continued to be reported (see
Section l.g.). Prince Johnson, the leader of the INPFL, was
believed responsible for the killing in July of several
soldiers of his own movement, including senior Commando Moses
Varney. The INPFL Leader maintained that the soldiers had been
tried under internal procedures and executed when found
guilty. No details of the trials were made public. The IGNU
condemned the killings. Johnson was also reportedly
responsible for killing some civilians in September, but no
action was taken against him as a consequence.
According to two Liber ian religious leaders, NPFL soldiers
killed 20 Ghanaians in Since county in mid-February, and in
July several Ghanaian women from Fanti fishing communities
informed an international organization's representative in Cote
d'lvoire that the NPFL had killed their husbands. These
reported killings continued a pattern from the previous year
when NPFL followers allegedly killed Ghanaians and other West
Africans in retribution for their respective nations' role in
the conflict (see Section l.b. and l.d.).
NPFL Leader Charles Taylor reportedly ordered several NPFL
members executed following an aborted coup attempt in late
August. While Taylor publicly denied there had been a coup
attempt, he acknowledged that an NPFL officer had been
executed, ostensibly for killing five NPFL soldiers. According
to Monrovia's media, which claimed to have interviewed ex-NPFL
soldiers following the failed coup, up to 75 NPFL members were
executed (see also Section l.g.).
b. Disappearance
Disappearances were much less common in 1991 than in 1990, but
little new information surfaced about persons missing as a
result of the war. Many families remained divided among those
living in Monrovia, those in NPFL areas, and those who fled
Liberia and have not returned. Although there were many
returnees during the year, movement between Monrovia and the
NPFL areas was very difficult for most people. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) began a family
tracer program but located only about 30 percent of the missing
persons brought to its attention.
According to a Liberian religious leader, several Ghanaian
children disappeared in March in Buchanan following a visit by
ECOMOG intended to build confidence between it and the NPFL.
The Ghanaian children warmly welcomed ECOMOG vehicles, some
manned by Ghanaian soldiers. This affectionate display was
said to have enraged some NPFL soldiers who were believed
responsible for the children's disappearance shortly
thereafter .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
During the height of the civil war, many members of the three
warring factions rampantly indulged in acts of inhumanity.
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LIBERIA
Abuses in 1991 declined sharply but cases of inhuman treatment
continued. The most widely pub cized incident occurred in
February when INPFL forces infl Jted inhuman treatment on nine
members of the IGNU, including a cabinet minister-designate and
several members of the Interim Legislative Assembly. They were
stripped and flogged, and one was forced to sit in a mound of
driver ants while einother was made to. lick feces. Under
pressure from ECOMOG, the ICRC, and the Interim Government,
INPFL Leader Johnson released the detainees, excusing his
actions as necessary to call attention to alleged ECOMOG abuse
of INPFL soldiers.
Prior to the 1989 civil war, conditions in the nation's jails
were inhuman and hazardous to life and health. Prisoners were
often denied access to family and medical care; cells were
small, crowded, and filthy. Conditions at the notorious
maximum security facility at Belle Yella had long been of
concern .
During 1991 none of Liberia's prewar prisons were believed to
be still functioning, although the IGNU was reported to be
refurbishing one in Monrovia. NPFL Leader Charles Taylor
announced in March that the Belle Yella Prison would be
closed. He directed that its remaining prisoners be
transferred to their respective counties for retrial. There
was no information about the results of the transfer order.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There were few juridical protections to prevent arbitrary
arrest, even in the ECOMOG-controlled areas, as the INPFL
detention and abuse of nine Interim Government members for 3
days in February demonstrated (Section I.e.). In theory the
1985 Constitution provides specific legal safeguards for the
rights of the accused, including warrants for arrests and the
right of detainees to be charged or released within 48 hours.
Even before the civil war, these rights were freqpjently
violated, particularly in cases allegedly involving national
security. The Interim President repeatedly affirmed that his
Government would respect the 1985 Constitution and its
procedural safeguards, and in practice attempted to do so. In
late 1990, the IGNU outlawed the use of military stockades for
detaining civilians, a practice common under the previous
regime.
Early in 1991, undisciplined elements of the AFL on occasion
detained and threatened civilians deemed to be "rebel
sympathizers." After AFL commanders called for greater
discipline and in July formed a Ij.oard of inquiry to investigate
citizens' complaints of abuse, tnere appeared to have been some
lessening of AFL abuses .
NPFL forces detained up to 4,000 West African nationals,
primarily Nigerians and Ghanaians, behind NPFL lines during
much of 1991. The NPFL forces viewed the West Africans as
enemies and reportedly executed many in reprisal against
ECOMOG, which fought the NPFL in October-November 1990. In
March NPFL Leader Charles Taylor "released" the West Africans
from the detention camps but prohibited them from traveling to
Monrovia or crossing into neighboring countries. Approximately
300 to 500 Nigerians as well as a number of Ghanaians
eventually managed to make their way in small groups to
Monrovia. In late August, the NPFL announced "the first phase
of the repatriation process" for West Africans and allowed over
100 Nigerians to cross safely into Cote d'lvoire. The ICRC
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LIBERIA
assisted in the repatriation, and the Nigerians were followed
by several other groups, including Ghanaians and other West
Africans .
Following the September incursion by anti-NPFL Liberians into
western Liberia from Sierra Leone after an earlier NPFL
invasion into Sierra Leone, the NPFL forcibly detained 4
Western and 35 Liberian relief personnel working in the area,
accusing them of being "spies." In response the U.N. and
nongovernmental relief agencies suspended all relief operations
in NPFL areas until the detainees were freed. While the 4
Western nationals were released 2 days later, the 35 Liberians
were held for another 8 days .
A number of other foreigners were detained by the NPFL for
varying periods; all were eventually released.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The structure of Liberia's legal system is closely modeled on
that of the United States, with the Supreme Court at its apex.
In practice before the civil war, the system afforded little
protection for defendants due to corruption among court
officials, lack of training, and inordinate executive
interference. By mid-1990, the system had completely collapsed
along with the rest of civil authority, with justice in the
hands of military commanders of the warring factions. Many
public records in Monrovia, including those of the courts,
churches, and schools were looted and badly damaged during the
civil war. The registrar of public records estimated that over
80 percent of national record holdings were damaged, and 30 to
40 percent destroyed.
The IGNU began in 1991 slowly to reconstitute the court
system. Early in the year, it reestablished several
magistrate's courts in Monrovia, and in September swore new
circuit court judges into office. The IGNU, in an
unprecedented move, asked the Bar Association to recommend
candidates for judgeships. At the end of September, following
new West African peace initiatives, the IGNU and NPFL agreed
upon the composition of a five-member ad hoc Supreme Court.
The Court's stated purpose is to adjudicate electoral disputes,
but the full scope of its jurisdiction is still undecided. At
the end of the year, the Court had not yet been inaugurated.
In the areas under NPFL control, legal and judicial protections
were almost totally lacking. There were reports that the
authorities imposed capital punishment for armed thefts.
Another report said the NPFL executed suspected murderers after
"tribunal trials in life-for-life retributive justice."
Another source reported that armed robbery was discouraged in
NPFL areas because "the death penalty is automatic."
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Serious abuses of privacy by soldiers of all three forces
continued in 1991 although not on the scale of 1990. AFL
soldiers committed many armed robberies in the downtown
Monrovia area, including seizure of several vehicles assigned
to Interim Legislative Assembly members. They also illegally
occupied some private homes. The AFL brigade commander
publicly requested citizens to report abuses by AFL soldiers to
the proper authorities and ordered soldiers to respect the
rights of civilians but with only marginal effect. Only when
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LIBERIA
ECOMOG increased its patrols in downtown areas at midyear did
the situation improve somewhat, but abuses continued throughout
the year .
The situation was worse in NPFL-held areas. According to
Liberians who returned to Monrovia from Lofa County, NPFL
soldiers regularly demanded food and personal possessions from
village residents and often robbed and abused citizens. To
escape the harassment, many Liberians moved their families to
remote areas. Soldiers assigned to checkpoints demanded money
and goods for passage, from both Liberians and expatriate
relief workers.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Following the November 1990 cease-fire, fighting between the
three warring factions and the use of excessive force against
civilians sharply declined but did not end.
Perhaps the largest number of deaths occurred between July and
August when the NPFL moved through Grand Gedeh County.
According to survivors interviewed by the Western media and
human rights groups in Cote d'lvoire, as many as 1,500 people,
mostly of the Krahn ethnic group of former president Samuel
Doe, may have died. Others interviewed stated that the NPFL
entered their villages shooting indiscriminately. Independent
observers who visited the area confirmed that entire villages
were destroyed and that many inhabitants had fled into the bush.
There were many other instances of the use of excessive force
and violations of humanitarian law during the year. In January
over 1,000 new refugees, mostly Krahn, fled to refugee camps in
Tai, Cote d'lvoire. They reported that the NPFL was conducting
secret killings, raping women, looting homes, and stealing
cattle. In July-August, approximately 10,000 people, mostly
Krahns, fled across the border to Cote d'lvoire reporting that
the NPFL had attacked their villages, indiscriminately killing
men, women, and children. Independent observers reported
seeing jailed Krahns in chains.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
There was increased freedom of speech and press in 1991,
especially in Monrovia. However, people still had to be
careful in criticizing the various factions. Although NPFL
leader Charles Taylor affirmed publicly on several occasions
that his government supported free speech and criticism, both
Liberians and expatriates have been detained by his supporters
for comments made about the NPFL.
There was no press censorship in Monrovia, and the number of
newspapers in Monrovia grew rapidly, with as many as 13
separate newspapers reflecting a variety of opinion being
published at different times in 1991. A shortage of newsprint,
however, reduced this number by the end of the year. Unlike
the previous Doe regime, the Interim Government did not publish
its own newspaper. The INPFL sponsored a newspaper. The
Scorpion, with articles highly favorable to Prince Johnson and
the INPFL. The NPFL printed a monthly newspaper. The Patriot,
which was also sold in Monrovia but which stopped publication
late in the year. In December two newspapers describing
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LIBERIA
themselves as independent appeared in Gbarnga, capital of
NPFL-controlled territory.
Press freedom was not complete even in Monrovia. For example,
ECOMOG reacted negatively to an article published in May by The
Inquirer which alleged complicity by the ECOMOG field commander
with a reputed arms merchant. The editor was briefly detained
and asked to reveal the source of his information, which he
refused to do. As a result of this incident, the Interim
Government publicly called upon the press to be more
responsible in its reporting. This, in turn, was publicly
criticized by the Press Union of Liberia which claimed it had
"an intimidating" effect on the press.
The Interim Government supported a shortwave radio station
(ELBC), and its broadcasts from Monrovia were heard across most
of the country. ELBC news reports were generally favorable to
the IGNU. The Catholic Church-operated FM radio station,
previously shut down by the Doe Government, resumed operations
in May. The NPFL operated three radio and two television
stations in its areas. NPFL news programs supported Charles
Taylor and the NPFL, while discussing economic and social
problems in NPFL territory. The NPFL's FM station, part of
whose appeal is the current American music it broadcasts,
acquired increased power in October and can now be heard by the
majority of Liber ians, including those in Monrovia.
When Monrovian journalists accompanied ECOMOG in May to the
opening of the MPFL's legislative assembly in Gbarnga, a senior
NPFL military leader, who later was appointed its chief of
staff, attempted to detain two reporters and confiscate their
equipment for having interviewed local residents. He also
attempted to arrest a Monrovia radio reporter for "treason" for
having broadcast news about Interim President Sawyer. ECOMOG
press officers intervened to prevent the arrest.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
In 1991 political parties and other groups in Monrovia were
able to organize and to hold public meetings. New political
organizations appeared, including the True Whig Party which
Samuel Doe had outlawed shortly after seizing power in 1980.
Under IGNU sponsorship, a coalition of organizations held a
mass rally in August attended by up to 5,000 people to show
public support for the ECOMOG peacekeeping effort.
Freedom of assembly and association was generally more
restrictive in NPFL areas than in Monrovia. For instance, none
of the prewar political parties were known to have reorganized
or to have held public meetings during 1991 in NPFL areas.
According to Western and Monrovian press reporters on the
scene, some Liberians in NPFL areas who greeted ECOMOG soldiers
during the initial confidence-building visits in March with
chants of "we want Taylor," later spontaneously broke out into
chants of "we want peace" and "we want ECOMOG." Some reporters
stated that the people had been forced to assemble and chant
pro-NPFL slogans and that many were later punished for their
praise of ECOMOG. One Western news service reported five
people died from NPFL beatings following ECOMOG visits to
Kakata and Buchanan. However, NPFL justice minister Laveli
Supuwood dismissed the reports as "malicious."
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LIBERIA
c. Freedom of Religion
The 1985 Constitution states that freedom of religion is a
fxindamental right of all Liberian citizens, and in practice
there are no restrictions in Monrovia on freedom of worship.
There is no established state religion. Christianity has long
been the religion of the political and economic elite, while
the majority of the rural population continues to follow
traditional religions. Muslims account for about 20 percent of
the population. Mandingos, who are predominantly Muslim, were
targeted during the civil war by the NPFL as being pro-Doe, and
most mosques were closed in NPFL territory during the war.
However, other Liberian Muslims did not receive the same
treatment, and the action against the Mandingos was based
primarily on ethnic/political considerations rather than an
effort to repress religious freedom.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
While the Constitution provides every person the right to move
freely throughout Liberia and to leave or enter the country at
will, the previous Doe regime required exit visas for those
wishing to leave the country, and it maintained a "black list"
of those who were not permitted to depart. The Interim
Government announced in March that it was abolishing this
"xinconstitutional" policy.
Throughout the year reuniting families and returning displaced
persons were hampered by NPFL checkpoints, which made travel
very difficult on roads in and out of Monrovia. The NPFL
required employees of the various international relief agencies
to have passes approved monthly. In spite of difficulties,
many Liber ians transited the lines, often by paying bribes or
using guile to reach ECOMOG- controlled areas. During the
period April-September, nearly 60,000 moved to Monrovia through
these means .
Because of civil war abuses, approximately 600,000 Liber ians,
about 20 percent of the prewar population, remained as refugees
in nearby countries, mostly in Cote D'lvoire and Guinea.
Smaller numbers are in Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Nigeria.
Following the NPFL incursion into Sierra Leone in March, the
125,000 Liberians who had originally sought refuge near the
border in Sierra Leone were forced to flee to safer areas in
that country, or to Guinea or NPFL-held territory in Liberia.
Many who reached Sierra Leone's capital subsec[uently returned
to Monrovia by ship. Some refugees have also repatriated to
Liberia from Guinea, Cote d'lvoire, Ghana, and Nigeria. The
NPFL incursion also put Sierra Leonians to flight, and a
reported 12,000 sought refuge inside Liberia near the border at
Cape Mount .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Despite constitutional and legal guarantees of free and fair
elections, Liberians could not exercise their right to change
their government in 1991. However, there was limited progress
in the search for new political formulas to restore unity under
popularly elected leadership. In March-April, a second
All-Liberia Conference (ALC) occurred in Monrovia (the first
was held in August 1990 in The Gambia). The NPFL initially i
participated, but later withdrew. The second ALC created a new
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LIBERIA
Interim Legislative Assembly (ILA) . The six political parties
and the NPFL selected representatives according to their own
internal procedures, while the county representatives were
selected informally from among members of the respective
communities resident in Monrovia. Two seats were also allotted
to the country's 18 registered interest groups, and filled by
leaders from the Teachers' Association and the Trade Union
Federation. In August the IMPEL representatives resigned from
the ILA after their leader. Prince Johnson, withdrew his
support for the Interim Government. (The NPFL maintained its
separate legislature. The National Patriotic Reconstruction
Assembly, in Gbarnga.) The second ALC reaffirmed through a
more widely based conference the interim administration which
had resulted from the first ALC at Banjul. The IGNU is a
relatively broad-based government with representation from the
major political parties. Amos Sawyer was originally chosen
President by the participants at the first ALC, and he was
reaffirmed in that office by the participants in the second ALC.
Neither the legislature in Monrovia nor that in Gbarnga was
truly representative. However, the ILA in Monrovia purported
to function as a separate branch of government and both
confirmed and rejected IGNU appointees following public
confirmation hearings. It also subpoenaed members of the
executive to explain the actions of the Interim Government. In
contrast, the NPFL legislature was generally viewed as
subservient to NPFL leadership views.
Following a new series of peace initiatives during the second
half of 1991, conducted by the heads of numerous West African
nations in Yamoussoukro, Cote d'lvoire, the Interim Government
in Monrovia and the NPFL in Gbarnga agreed to hold free and
fair elections which, if the process continued, were expected
to take place during the first half of 1992. Under the
Yamoussoukro formula, the three warring factions would encamp
and disarm their military forces under ECOMOG supervision.
Subsequently an elections commission and an ad hoc Supreme
Court were established by IGNU and the NPFL, and the members
were appointed by mutual agreement. The electoral commission
held its first meeting on December 31 and was formally sworn in
several days later. By year's end, the ad hoc Supreme Court
had not yet met .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights .
On numerous occasions. Interim Government President Sawyer
declared the IGNU's commitment to human rights. Two fledgling
human rights groups formed in 1991 and conducted public
meetings and other activities. One issued the first of what it
hopes will become a regular publication on human rights. The
attitude of the NPFL government was not clear. Its conduct to
date has been less than exemplary. One human rights
organizations based in NPFL territory was established in 1991.
In August a representative of Africa Watch visited Monrovia and
later successfully traveled to NPFL areas. However, a
delegation of the New York-based Lawyers' Committee on Human
Rights, which also visited Monrovia in August, did not go to
NPFL areas because an NPFL escort failed to meet the delegates
as previously arranged.
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LIBERIA
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status.
The roots of the civil conflict can be found in the historical
division between the Americo-Liberians, who for over 150 years
dominated the political, economic, and cultural life of the
country, and the ethnic groups in the interior. The latter
frec[uently complained of government discrimination in many
areas, such as access to education and civil service jobs and
to infrastructure development. The coup mounted by Sergeant
Doe and other noncommissioned officers in 1980 was seen as a
revolution, with the interior groups taking power from the
Americo-Liberian elites. However, Doe's authoritarian,
military-based regime exacerbated ethnic tensions while
subverting the democratic reform process, exemplified in the
1985 Constitution, through rigged elections. During the Doe
regime, resentment grew over domination by, and government
favoritism toward, his tribe, the Krahns.
The 1985 Constitution prohibited discrimination based on ethnic
background, race, sex, creed, place of origin or political
opinion. However, it also provides that only "persons who are
Negroes or of Negro descent" may be citizens or own land,
denying full rights to many who have lived their lives in
Liberia. There was no indication that this prohibition had
been relaxed by either Monrovia's Interim Government or
Gbarnga ' s NPFL government .
The status of women in Liberian society varies by region, with
women holding some skilled jobs, including cabinet-level
positions, in both the IGNU and NPFL Governments. In urban
areas and along the coast, women can inherit land and
property. In rural areas, where traditional customs are
stronger, a woman is normally considered the property of her
husband and his clan and is not usually entitled to inherit
from her husband. Women in rural areas are responsible for
much of the farm labor and have had only limited access to
education. According to a recent U.N. study, females in
Liberia receive only about 28 percent of the schooling given to
males. In the massive violence inflicted on civilians during,
the conflict, women have suffered the gamut of abuses,
especially rape. Even prior to the war, domestic violence
against women was extensive but never seriously addressed by
the Government or women's groups as an issue. There were no
statistics on domestic violence against women, but it was
considered to be fairly common. Female circumcision was, and
almost certainly still is, widely practiced in rural areas.
During the height of the civil war, a person's language was
used to identify him or her by ethnic group. Those from groups
considered hostile frequently were summarily executed. The
cease-fire in late 1990 stopped most of these abuses. However,
NPFL reprisals against the Krahn, particularly in Grand Gedeh,
continued well into 1991 (see Section l.g.).
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution states that workers have the right to
associate in trade unions. Over 20 trade unions were
registered with the Ministry of Labor before the civil war,
representing roughly 15 percent of the work force in the wage
economy. Ten national unions were members of the Liberian
Federation of Labor Unions (LFLU) . However, the actual power
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LIBERIA
these unions exercised was limited. The previous government
did not recognize the right of civil servants or employees of
public corporations to unionize or strike. Like virtually all
other organized activity in the country, unions disappeared
during the height of the war in mid-1990, and union activity
remained limited in 1991. While some large-scale operations
involving rubber and other extractive industries partially
resumed in NPFL areas, it is not known if union activity
associated with these industries resumed.
In April 1990, the U.S. Trade Representative announced that
Liberia's status as a beneficiary of trade preferences under
the Generalized System of Preferences program had been
suspended as a result of the Doe government's failure to take
steps to provide internationally recognized worker rights. The
suspension remained in effect throughout 1991.
Labor unions have traditionally affiliated with international
labor' groups.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
In 1991 workers' rights to organize and bargain collectively
were moot because of the lack of economic enterprise,
especially in Monrovia where only a few businesses resumed
operations, usually with reduced staffing. With the important
exception of civil servants and employees of public
corporations, prior to the civil war workers enjoyed the right
to organize and bargain collectively. Labor laws had the same
force in Liberia's one export processing zone as in the rest of
the country.
The 1991 report of the Committee of Experts (COE) of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) reiterated that Liberian
labor legislation fails to provide workers adequate protection
against discrimination and reprisals for union activity, fails
to protect workers' organizations against outside interference,
and does not give eligible workers in the public sector the
opportunity to bargain collectively.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced labor, but even before the
civil war this prohibition was widely ignored in rural areas,
where farmers were pressured into providing free labor on
"community projects" which often benefited only local leaders.
Forced labor was used by some or all of the warring factions
during the civil war, especially for moving equipment and
supplies. Some vestiges persisted in 1991; for example, a
local newspaper reported that following the incursion into
Sierra Leone in March, the NPFL used forced labor in Lofa
County to move supplies to the border. According to the same
source, forced labor was also used to clean up several major
towns in Lofa County. There was at least one report of the
NPFL forcing local villagers to set up a communal farm to feed
its soldiers, also in Lofa County.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Under the Doe government, the law prohibited employment of
children under age 16 during school hours in the wage sector.
Enforcement by the Ministry of Labor, however, was very
limited. Even before the civil war, small children continued
to assist their parents as vendors in local markets and on
family subsistence farms. During the conflict, the NPFL and
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/
INPFL recruited young children, some less than 12 years of age,
as soldiers. Many of these children had been orphaned during
the war. While some children remained under arms, neither
group was believed to have recruited additional children as
soldiers in 1991.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The labor law provides for a minimum wage, paid leave,
severance benefits, and safety standards. Before the economy
collapsed, the legal minimum wage varied according to
profession but still did not provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and his family and had to be supplemented
by other sources of income, including subsistence farming.
There had also been health and safety standards, in theory
enforced by the Ministry of Labor. In view of the low level of
economic activity in divided Liberia during 1991, these various
regulations were not adhered to by many employers, and there
was no attempt at enforcement.
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When 1991 began. President Didier Ratsiraka, who had been in
power since 1975, and his party, the Vanguard of the Malagasy
Revolution (AREMA) , dominated the Government. By midyear, the
nation's "Active Forces" (a group of opposition political
parties, church groups, workers' syndicates, and private sector
groups) were organizing almost daily demonstrations that
challenged the Ratsiraka regime to meet demands for fundamental
political change. Civil servants also began a widely observed
strike that crippled the Government's administrative
apparatus. The Government consequently agreed to negotiate,
and on October 31 a compromise convention established an
interim Government which reduced the powers of President
Ratsiraka. This Government, headed by Prime Minister
Razanamazy and including many opposition members, is tasked to
provide a new constitution and elections within 18 months. The
National Assembly suspended its activities according to the
October 31 compromise, and transitional institutions were
established, including a 31-member High Authority of State, a
transitional administration, and a 130-seat Council for
Economic and Social Recovery. After much debate, a
transitional cabinet with considerable opposition membership
was named in mid-December. Strikes and demonstrations
continued although to a far lesser extent.
The gendarmerie (rural police) and the national police (urban
police) are responsible for internal security. At the year's
end, the Directorate General of Internal and External
Investigations and Documentation (DGIDIE) remained under the
authority of President Ratsiraka, although the DGIDIE director
also reported to the Prime Minister. In the past, the DGIDIE
and the police employed physical mistreatment of detainees,
particularly during interrogation, but reports indicate the
DGIDIE stopped such practices by mid-1990. The presidential
security guard, a unit of 1,800 men, remains under the direct
command of the President. In an October 25 statement, senior
officers of the military and the gendarmerie called on all
political leaders to move urgently toward a compromise,
demonstrating a degree of neutrality on their part.
Agriculture, especially rice production, dominates the Malagasy
economy. About 85 percent of the working population (39.3
percent of the country's 12 million inhabitants) are employed
in this sector, accounting for 80 percent of Madagascar's
export earnings. Rich in minerals, Madagascar also has a small
industrial base which accounts for 15 percent of the gross
domestic product. Personal incomes remain very low, and
unemployment remains high, particularly among youth (60 percent
of the population is under 25) . The strikes in support of the
opposition have had a serious negative impact on an already
weak economy.
Serious human rights abuses occurred during 1991, despite the
Government's increased tolerance of the freedoms of speech,
press, and assembly, and popular pressures for a more rapid
pace of political reform. In particular, while attempting to
control and disperse crowds of demonstrators in Antsiranana,
Antananarivo, and Mahajanga, security forces used tear gas,
stun grenades, and other tactics which killed and injured
numerous demonstrators (see Section l.a.). An effective
government capable of performing basic functions was not in
place for much of the year.
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RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reported incidents of targeted political killing
in 1991. However, on several occasions, security personnel
used force, sometimes excessive, to disperse demonstrators who
participated in marches. In some cases, the demonstrators
engaged in looting and other vandalizing activity. On August
10, opposition leaders led a crowd estimated at over 100,000 on
a march on the presidential palace of lavoloha, located about
13 kilometers outside the capital. The demonstrators passed
two security checkpoints without being hindered by security
forces. However, when the crowd began to pass a final
barricade approximately 1 kilometer from the presidential
palace, the army and presidential guard dispersed it, first
with teargas, then by dropping stun grenades from a helicopter
that had been positioned at the presidential palace and
reportedly firing rifles into the crowd. A group of civilians,
reportedly transported to Antananarivo from the south by the
Government, were interspersed among the soldiers and threw
stones at the retreating crowd. In the ensuing confusion, some
demonstrators spilled over from the road into bordering rice
paddies, which had been mined. Retreating demonstrators were
pursued, and medical personnel confirm that at least two were
shot in the back. At least 11 demonstrators were killed in
this incident, and over 200 injured. Another 20 died later of
their wounds.
Later on August 10 in the northwest city of Mahajanga, a group
of 12,000 to 15,000 demonstrators looted and burned private
businesses and government buildings. Reportedly, five were
killed and seven injured when security forces used tear gas and
stun grenades .
Again, on October 23, a group of demonstrators in the northern
city of Antsiranana attempted, despite verbal warnings and
warning shots, to enter a security zone. Subsequently, one
member of the security forces rolled an offensive fragmentary
grenade into the street. Reportedly, 2 demonstrators were
killed, and 76 injured, many as they fled through a
construction area.
In late July and early August, four persons were killed in the
port city of Toamasina during political demonstrations. Two of
the deaths allegedly occurred at the hands of vigilantes
belonging to the Militant Movement for Malagasy Socialism
(MMSM), the then governing political coalition; the third
victim was allegedly shot in the back by security forces. The
fourth victim, an MMSM supporter, was reportedly killed by
Active Forces' supporters.
With the weakening of the police and gendarmerie's ability to
keep order, mob action against suspected criminals became more
frequent in July and August. At least five alleged thieves
were chased, caught, beaten, and killed by angry crowds in four
separate incidents. Their bodies were burned, and no official
actions were taken to apprehend or punish those responsible.
50-726 - 92 - 8
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MADAGASCAR ' ''
b. Disappearance
Following the clash on August 10, opposition leaders claimed 57
persons who had participated in the march on lavoloha were
missing and had been killed and buried. Though requested to do
so, the opposition did not provide a list of names of those
said to be missing, and no relatives came forward in response
to an appeal by a local human rights group. The presidential
palace turned over two bodies to families of the deceased.
Prime Minister Guy Razanamasy set up a commission of inquiry to
formally investigate the events of August 10. Also, the
opposition-dominated High Authority of State announced an
investigation. By year's end, the Prime Minister's report had
been turned over to the Ministry of Justice, though its content
was not publicized.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
In the past, the DGIDIE (the intelligence unit) has beaten
prisoners in its custody, although there were no reports of
such abuses in 1991. The director of the DGIDIE, a judge
appointed in mid-1990, has attempted to reform the
organization, stating publicly in 1991 that the role of the
DGIDIE was to protect the rights of the individual.
Conditions in Malagasy prisons are harsh and life threatening.
The diet provided is inadequate, and family members must
augment inmates' daily food rations. Those prisoners without
relatives in the vicinity sometimes go for days without food
and some have starved in the past. Prison cells built for one
inmate are now housing up to eight. Each prisoner has on
average less than one square meter of space. Prisoners suffer
a wide range of medical problems that are not routinely
treated, including mainour ishment, infections, malaria, and
tuberculosis. The prison death toll rises significantly during
the winter months. A number of children live in the prisons
with their mothers, and there is prostitution by female inmates
in collusion with guards.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Legal safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention are not
always followed. According to the law, in a normal criminal
case, the detainee must be charged or released within 3 days
after arrest. An arrest warrant may be obtained but is not
always required. Generally, defendants in ordinary criminal
cases are charged formally within the specified time frame,
and, upon being charged, are allowed to obtain an attorney.
Counsel is readily available, and court-appointed counsel is
provided for indigents. Bail may be requested by the accused
or his attorney immediately after arrest, after being formally
charged, or during the appeal process. Denial of bail may be
appealed. The Malagasy penal code provides for a determination
of habeas corpus .
Despite these legal provisions, average pretrial detention time
exceeds 1 year, and 3 or 4 years of detention is common, even
for crimes for which the maximum penalty may be 2 years or
less. Prisoners may wait years in prison only to be found not
guilty, with no recourse. The judicial process, always slow,
was mired down even further in 1991 by a magistrates' strike in
support of the political opposition. During July and August,
several hundred prisoners walked away from their places of
incarceration when prison guards joined the strike.
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Under Malagasy law, persons suspected of activity against the
State may be detained incommunicado for 15 days, subject to
indefinite extension if deemed necessary by the Government.
Over the summer the opposition named a shadow government as
part of its strategy to contest power and instructed its shadow
ministers to ocfcupy government ministries. In July four of the
shadow ministers were detained by government security forces.
Two were detained while trying to enter ministry buildings; the
other two were taken into custody on the street . They were
held incommunicado and released several days later. While two
of the detentions were witnessed and one actually photographed,
the other two were not verified and were treated with some
skepticism in the press. The abductions were believed to have
been carried out by the Government's antiterrorist squad. None
of the incidents were ever investigated, and the guilty parties
remain unpunished. At the end of 1991, there were no persons
held under this provision.
In late July and early August, 57 arrests were made in the port
city of Toamasina during the demonstrations. The arrests were
authorized by the mayor and carried out by gendarmerie
"antigang" units who concealed their identities and security
affiliation. A Malagasy lawyer questioned whether these units
were legally empowered to make the arrests, stating that only
military police or gendarmes using proper arrest procedures
have that authority. It was reported that the detainees had
been denied access to counsel and to family members. All
detainees were confirmed released by late September.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Malagasy trials are public, and defendants have the right to be
present, to confront witnesses, and to present evidence.
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence under the Malagasy
penal code.
The 1975 Constitution provides for an independent judiciary,
and, in practice, the judiciary seems to function largely
without influence from the executive. However, the judiciary,
unlike the executive and legislative branches, is not a
separate branch of government. One aim of the 1991
magistrates' strike was constitutional reform to raise the
judiciary to the level of a separate government branch.
The judiciary has three levels of courts: lower courts for
civil and criminal cases carrying limited fines and sentences;
a Court of Appeals which includes a criminal court for cases
carrying sentences of 5 years or more; and a Supreme Court.
The judiciary also has a number of special courts designed to
handle specific kinds of cases under the jurisdiction of the
higher courts.
The Constitutional High Court, with a separate and autonomous
status, is a body for review of laws, decrees, and ordinances,
and for oversight of elections and certification of their
results. It is clearly separated from the judicial hierarchy.
Extralegal institutions known as "dina" also exist as a means
of conflict resolution. Dina are village-based pacts and exist
as specific agreements between villages. Technically, dina
handle only civil matters among villages; criminal cases are to
be turned over to the court system. In practice, the dina have
been used to settle cattle rustling cases, prevalent in the
south. Decisions by dina are not subject to procedural
protections of due process or to judicial review. Dina are
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traditional means of conflict resolution. Decisions are
considered just as long as the parties involved accept this
traditional concept.
A military court has jurisdiction over all cases involving
national security. The definition of national security is
largely a matter of interpretation by the authorities but
includes acts constituting a threat to the nation and its
political leaders, invasion by foreign forces, and riots that
could lead to an overthrow of the Government. In exceptional
cases, civilians may be tried in the military court if charged
with breaking military laws. Military courts, like civilian
courts, provide for an appeal process and are presided over by
civilian magistrates. The rank of the four military officers
comprising the court is determined by the rank of the accused.
There were no reports of political prisoners being held in
Madagascar at year's end.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The State does not generally intervene in the private aspects
of the lives of the people. The home is inviolable under
Malagasy tradition and law, though the Constitution permits
authorities, to enter homes where a suspect is caught in a
criminal act or where the owner explicitly consents to a
search. There is no known monitoring of telephones or
correspondence .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Press censorship was suspended in 1989 and formally abolished
in December 1990. Beginning in 1989, the print media have
openly criticized both the Government and the opposition.
Opposition parties, independent trade unions, professional
associations and others have benefited from regular access to
the newspapers and journals and often have their statements
pxiblished. Following the temporary reimposition of censorship
under the State of Emergency in July, the press first printed
both censored and uncensored editions and then, within a few
days, decided to ignore the censor because the Government did
not enforce the emergency censorship regulation.
By mid-1991, the state-owned Malagasy Radio-Television (RTM)
had begun to broadcast a weekly discussion program, often
featuring prominent opposition figures, and to televise live
each evening the French Antenne 2 network news. However, the
Government kept close watch over these important media
outlets. During May and June, the RTM provided limited
coverage of opposition activities, and in late June RTM ceased
coverage of opposition activities altogether. RTM personnel
joined the general strike in part to protest this tight
government control. While a portion of the RTM strikers
returned following the installation of a new cabinet led by
Prime Minister Razanamasy in late August, some of the remaining
RTM strikers created a private radio station. Radio Active
Forces, without benefit of a license from the Government. In
October Prime Minister Razanamazy gained control of television
facilities which had been moved to the presidential palace.
Since then, television news has covered the full spectrum of
political activities. A Sunday program was inauguarated in
October featuring lively debate among political figures.
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Academic freedom was in theory restricted by a constitutional
prohibition of any public lectures or teachings that condemn
the Socialist revolution. However, this provision was deleted
in the constitutional reform package presented by President
Ratsiraka to the National Assembly in June. In 1991 high
school students in Antananarivo were prevented from taking
their baccalaureate examinations by opposition demonstrators.
Teacher strikes which mingled opposition and union demands
largely paralyzed the public education sector during the second
half of the year .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Some legal restrictions remain on the right of assembly and
association. Municipal permits are required to hold public
meetings and may be denied by the Government on the grounds of
endangering national security. However, from the time the
protest movement began in May, Antananarivo municipal
authorities granted the opposition permission to hold their
rallies. Despite the State of Emergency, which technically
banned political meetings, municipal authorities continued to
permit opposition rallies to take place. However, in several
cities, the Government set up security zones which
demonstrators were not allowed to enter. The violent events
cited in Section l.a. took place as marchers crossed into these
security zones. Municipal authorization for rallies and
marches continued through year's end.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion. The
Government is secular, and there is no discrimination on the
basis of religious affiliation. Between 40 and 50 percent of
the population adheres to Christian beliefs, with the remainder
following traditional Malagasy beliefs, Islam, and other
faiths. Missionaries and clergy are permitted to operate
freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There is no restriction on travel within the country. All
Malagasy must obtain official approval for trips outside the
country. All residents of Madagascar (Malagasy and foreign)
require exit visas issued by the Ministry of Interior, but
these are seldom denied. There is no refugee population in
Madagascar .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
At the end of the year, this right remained in question as
Madagascar had not yet undergone fully free and fair general
elections. However, a transitional process intended to bring
about a new constitution and new elections by 1993 was under
way. Under these interim arrangements brought about by popular
pressure, governmental power had shifted substantially from
President Ratsiraka and the institutions of the 1975
Constitution to Prime Minister Razanamazy and the transitional
institutions established under the October 31 convention. The
legislature and Supreme Revolutionary Council had been
suspended in accord with the convention, and the nonelected,
transitional institutions that replaced them provided for
significant opposition representation. A 36-member Cabinet for
the transitional Government was named in mid-December in which
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the Active Forces held some key ministries and about 40 percent
of all seats; the Cabinet had no AREMA members.
Suffrage is universal, with no discrimination based on sex or
minority status. There is recognition among members of the
MMSM, the opposition parties, and civic organizations that the
electoral system must be reformed in order to prevent such
abuses as voter intimidation at the local level.
The electoral system is complex, with individual parties, not
the national Government, responsible for printing ballots and
distributing them to all voting sites. Costs associated with
ballots must be borne by the parties, and only those parties
garnering a minimum 10 percent of the vote are reimbursed for
those costs. A special legislative by-election was held on
February 3 to fill seats in three districts. The MMSM fielded
three candidates, while the the Active Forces chose to present
candidates from individual parties rather than the coalition.
In each case, the MMSM candidate won. Although there were
allegations of misuse of government assets in favor of the MMSM
candidates and voter intimidation, the widely respected
National Committee of Election Observers (CNOE) confirmed that
the MMSM candidates were in fact the winners. At year's end,
36 political parties were legally registered in Madagascar.
The Christian Council of Churches (FFKM) is at the forefront of
the constitutional reform movement and played a major role in
mediating the compromise solution of October 31 between the
Government and the Active Forces. The FFKM is composed of the
Anglican, Catholic, Lutheran, and Church of Jesus Christ
(Protestant reformed) Churches, representing about 50 percent
of the Christian churches operating in Madagascar.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Human rights groups are considered to be political groups under
Malagasy law and must register with the Government. At the
beginning of 1991, the National Committee of Election Observers
attempted to register as a nonpartisan, human rights group but
was denied registration by the Ministry of the Interior, which
insisted that CNOE should register as a political group. While
an appeal to the courts is pending, CNOE continues to function
and increasingly played a mediation role in 1991 during the
political crisis. In the last half of the year, a number of
new human rights organizations emerged, although in no instance
had the application process for their legal registration been
completed at year's end. Magistrates have been on strike for
several months, causing serious backlogs in the legal system.
The Government historically has not cooperated with groups
wishing to investigate alleged human rights violations. In
1991 it did permit visits by regional delegates of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to confer on
educational activities with regional representatives of the
Malagasy chapter of the Red Cross.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Madagascar is inhabited by approximately 12 million people,
mainly of mixed Malayo-Polynesian and African origins, and are
divided into 18 distinct groups based on regional and ancestral
affiliation. While legal discrimination does not exist.
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MADAGASCAR
favoritism based on regional origin is often a determining
factor in selecting personnel for positions in ministries and
the private sector. In addition, in 1991 supporters of the
President attempted to exploit ethnic tensions to counter the
oppo s i t i on movement .
An Indo-Pakistani community of about 24,000, primarily engaged
in commerce, has been in Madagascar since the early part of
this century. Few have integrated into local society,
preferring to retain their language, religion, and culture, and
most have opted to retain French rather than Malagasy
citizenship. There were several incidents of looting and
burning of Indo-Pakistani enterprises in the port cities of
Toamasina and Mahajanga during the months of June, July, and
August in connection with the protest demonstrations.
Women have traditionally played a prominent role in the
business and economic life of the country, with many of them
managing or owning business concerns or filling management
positions in state industries. Education at all levels is open
to women, but the participation of women in secondary and
higher studies is much lower than that of men. Women in rural
areas and among the urban poor face a greater degree of
hardship, bearing the traditional responsibilities of raising a
family and engaging in farm labor or other subsistence
activities. Under the law, wives have an equal say in choosing
where a married couple will reside, and they receive a more or
less equitable distribution of marital property in divorce
cases. In the case of the death of a husband, a wife inherits
one-half of the joint marital wealth. A widow receives a
pension; however, a widower does not.
According to various sources, including magistrates,
journalists, and women doctors, violence against women, such as
wife beating, is not widespread. Malagasy society tends to
resolve conflict through a combination of patience and
negotiation, and marital confrontation is not considered
acceptable; in the rare cases where physical abuse is detected,
police and legal authorities do intervene, although there is no
law dealing specifically with violence against women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Malagasy in both the public and private sector have the
right in law and in practice to establish and join labor unions
of their own choosing without prior authorization. Unions are
required to register with the Government, and registration is
routinely granted. However, the labor force of 4.9 million is
mostly agrarian (85 percent), and unionized labor accounts for
less than 5 percent of the total. Many unions are affiliated
with political parties.
In organizing workers during opposition rallies this year, the
Active Forces bypassed the unions and organized "strike
committees." These committees made the decision to strike or
not to strike for the opposition throughout the period of
political turmoil. Civil servants, with the exception of those
providing "vital services to the nation," and private sector
workers have the right to strike as provided for in the Labor
Code, and many strikes occurred in 1991, including a civil f
servants' strike which lasted over several months and brought
the Government to a near stop. Opposition calls for general
strikes to exert pressure on the Government were very effective.
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MADAGASCAR
Unions may freely form federations or confederations and
affiliate with and participate in international bodies. There
are Malagasy members in all three trade union internationals.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Both public and private sector union activity is governed by
the Labor Code of 1975, which provides for free unions and the
right to bargain collectively. The Code states that collective
bargaining may be undertaken between management and labor at
either party's behest. When there is failure to reach
agreement, the Ministry of Labor convenes a committee of
employment inspectors who attempt to resolve the matter. If
this process fails, the committee refers the matter to the
Chairman of the Court of Appeals for final arbitration.
Collective bargaining agreements are not routinely negotiated
but do exist. In 1991 the strike at the port of Toamasina was
ended by collective bargaining.
Although export processing zones are authorized in Madagascar,
none is currently functioning.
The Labor Code formally prohibits antiunion discrimination by
employers against union members and organizers. In the case of
antiunion activity, the union or its members may file a
petition in civil court challenging the employer. While union
activity in this country of high unemployment had been minimal
in the past, much of the unionized population was on strike
during the latter half of 1991. In the case of the civil
service, salaries were paid, though sometimes late, during the
extended period of the strike, despite acute shortages of funds
due to the dire state of the economy.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is explicitly prohibited by the Labor Code and is
not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Code describes a child as any person under the age of
18. The minimum age for employment is 14, and the use of child
labor is prohibited in those areas where there is apparent and
imminent danger. The Government enforces these child labor
laws relatively effectively in the small wage sector through
inspectors from the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and
Social Law. However, in the large subsistence agricultural
sector, many young children work with their parents on family
farms at much earlier ages. Similarly, in the urban areas,
many children earn a living as parking attendants, newspaper
vendors, and through other street trading.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Code and its enforcing legislation prescribe the
working conditions and wage scales for employees, to be
enforced by the Ministry of Labor and Social Law. The law
distinguishes between agricultural and nonagricultural work.
There is a 44-hour workweek in nonagricultural and service
industries. There are also provisions for holiday pay, sick
and maternity leave, and insurance. There are several
administratively determined minimum-wage rates in Madagascar,
depending on employment skills. The lowest (for unskilled
workers) is inadequate to ensure a decent standard of living.
Accordingly, such workers must supplement their incomes through
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MADAGASCAR
subsistence agriculture or reliance on the extended family
structure. Given insufficient enforcement measures, official
wage rates are sometimes ignored as high unemployment leads
workers to accept salaries below the legal wage.
The Labor Code has rules concerning building safety, machinery
and moving engines, operational safety, and sanitation
ostensibly enforced by the Ministry of Civil Service and the
Ministry of Labor and Social Law. Labor inspectors do
regularly visit industrial sites, and violations of Labor Code
rules are subject to inspection reports. If cited violations
are not remedied within a specified time frame, violators may
be legally charged and subject to penalties. Nevertheless, in
several sectors, protective measures are lacking due to the
expense of even minimal protective clothing and other
protective devices. To date, there have been no published
reports on occupational health hazards, although there is clear
evidence that they exist .
In any case, for 1991 discussions of enforcement of the Labor
Code were theoretical. Without a functioning government for
much of the year, and with the civil servants' strike, the
administrative apparatus was effectively out of operation.
220
MALAWI
Malawi's political, economic, and social development has been
dominated by Life President Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda ever since he
led the country to independence in 1964. Dr. Banda is also
life president of Malawi's sole legal party, the Malawi
Congress Party (MCP) . In practice, the Cabinet and Parliament
are subordinate to the MCP Central Committee. Only candidates
selected by the party and approved by the President may contest
parliamentary elections. Constitutional amendments and laws
passed by the Parliament mirror decisions already taken by
President Banda.
Police and party security organs — notably the Security and
Intelligence Service (SIS), the MCP Youth League, and the
Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) — closely monitor a wide range of
the population's activities. The police continue to commit
serious human rights abuses. In contrast, the army has
eschewed internal politics.
Small, densely populated, and landlocked, Malawi is a
predominantly agricultural economy operating under a relatively
free enterprise environment. Nearly 90 percent of the
population engages in subsistence farming. The main cash
crops, grown mostly on estates, are tobacco, tea, coffee, and
sugar. Since independence, and with good management, the
economy has grown steadily, with a major portion of that growth
in the agricultural sector.
Malawi's poor hxunan rights record stands in sharp contrast to
its economic achievements and humanitarian handling of Africa's
largest refugee population. In 1991 the Government and party
kept strict control on all aspects of political life, with
continued restrictions on speech, press, assembly, association,
and the right of citizens to change their government through
democratic means. Police abuse of prisoners and detainees,
including women, persisted. The Government continued also to
use arbitrary detention, especially under the Preservation of
Public Safety Act, to counter alleged opponents. The
Government released 88 political detainees in the first half of
1991, including Professor Jack Mpanje and several other
prominent persons long held without charge or trial. It did
not, however, release Orton and Vera Chirwa, who have long been
the focal point of international concerns about human rights
abuses in Malawi, and a number of other political detainees and
prisoners, estimated at year's end at between 15 and 20.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no political killings in 1991. However, Fred
Kazombo Mwale, a nephew of President Banda and a detainee since
June 1991, is believed to have died in November while in
custody. Kazombo suffered from high blood pressure,
exacerbated by the deleterious conditions of Nsanje Prison. In
the case of Mkwapatira Mhango, a leading Malawian dissident who
was murdered in Zambia in October 1989 (along with eight
members of his family), the five Malawians detained as suspects
by Zambian authorities were handed over to Malawian officials
in mid-1991. They were reportedly released 1 month later.
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Disappearance
There were no reported cases of disappearance for political
reasons in 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Allegations of institutionalized torture persist. Beatings
during arrest and detention are illegal but common. Guilty
officers are rarely disciplined. Human rights organizations
have reported that some criminal prisoners have been subjected
to "hard core" punishment in which the person is chained naked
to the floor of a cell and denied adequate food for 30 days.
Prison terms and conditions are harsh and frequently degrading,
particularly in Nyachikadza (Nsanje) prison on the Shire river
marshes in southern Malawi, where malaria is also a constant
danger. Women appear to be particularly ill-treated, including
at the country's main prison in Zomba . Reports persist
concerning sexual abuse of women prisoners by their warders.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under the Preservation of Public Security Act, the Minister of
Justice (a position held by President Banda) may order the
arrest, search, and detention of persons considered a threat to
public order. Persons arrested under this law may be, and
usually are, detained without charge or trial. The President
is supposed to review such cases every 6 months, but this
constitutional safeguard has had no noticeable effect on
presidential decisions.
Police officers may also arrest persons on their own authority
for up to 28 days before a formal detention order is issued.
Historically, persons often have been held for months before
being served detention p'apers, if ever. In 1990 improved
police performance helped to ensure that most new detainees
were processed properly within the 28-day limit, but it did not
prevent the Government from issuing detention orders in 1991 to
stifle any sign of dissent.
During the first half of 1991, the President, in an unexplained
surprise move, released 88 political detainees. None of them
was even given an official explanation as to why they had been
detained. Those released comprise more than 80 percent of the
number of known political detainees and included several
prominent figures.
Among those released were Professor Jack Mapanje, former head
of the University of Malawi's Department of Literature; Dr.
George Mtafu, Malawi's only neurosurgeon; and Margaret Marango
Banda, a prominent Anglican lay leader. Mapanje and Mtafu were
reinstated professionally but immediately went abroad to teach
and study. Others released without explanation included Brown
Mpinganjira, Ishmael Mazunda, Blaise Machila, L.W. Masiku, and
Ian Mbale.
Among new detentions in 1991 were the two daughters of Gwanda
Chakuamba Phiri, a former minister convicted and imprisoned in
1980 for an alleged coup plot. They were held for 2 months for
allegedly helping their father smuggle out of prison
correspondence that questioned the country's leadership and
direction. In May President Banda detained his nephew, 6 5 -year
old Fred Kazombo Mwale, and imprisoned him at Nsanje prison
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without charge. He died in November. Two of Kazombo ' s wives
were also detained, albeit in prisons with better conditions.
Kazombo reportedly had abused his position as de facto
patriarch of the President's family to seize lands from
neighboring smallholders.
George Chikuni, former Malawian Ambassador to South Africa, was
arrested in January 1990 for fiscal irregularities while
assigned to Pretoria. Chikuni was convicted of a misdemeanor
in 1991, and, after he had spent a year in jail, a magistrate
gave him a suspended sentence. The police refused to release
him, possibly because President Banda is known to have
personally expressed his displeasure over Chikuni ' s behavior.
Government secrecy precludes an accurate estimate of the number
of political detainees and prisoners in Malawi, but at the end
of 1991 experienced observers put the number at between 15 and
20, including Orton and Vera Chirwa (see Section I.e.). Martin
Machipisa Munthali, who was first detained in 1965, remained in
prison at year's end; he is now considered Africa's longest
serving political detainee. Aleke Banda, once a confidant and
likely successor to President Banda (no relation), was quietly
released from Mikuyu prison in late 1988 but is still
restricted to house arrest on the Mpyupyu prison farm near
Zomba . He is allowed periodic visits from family members.
Detained in 1980, Aleke Banda has never been charged. Dr. Dany
(Goodluck) Mhango, detained in 1987 after his brother
(Mkwapitira Mhango, murdered in Lusaka in 1989) published
hostile articles outside Malawi, remained in Mikuyu prison.
Mary Sikwese, sister of Fred Sikwese, remains in detention
after she complained about her brother's death while in police
custody in 1989. Frackson Zgambo, detained with Sikwese,
allegedly for espionage, also remained in detention.
Former teachers' association official Kalusa Chimombo has been
detained since 1978. Others detained include Sylvester Gondwe,
,he sales manager for a large petroleum distributor; he was
detained in September for unknown reasons, subsequently
dismissed from his job, and then released in December. Abdul
Juneja Lemani , a merchant from the Mwanza district, was
detained in November after allegedly expressing a lack of
confidence in the ability of the police to protect area
residents from border-crossing RENAMO forces.
While forced exile has not been used as a means of political
control, there is a small but constant exodus of persons who
leave for political reasons.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Malawi has both traditional and European court systems. Legal
counsel is permitted only in the modern courts. The right of
appeal exists in both systems. Both are empowered to try
capital offenses, including treason, but in practice the modern
courts hear mostly civil cases. Although constitutionally
mandated, neither judiciary is truly independent. Executive
interference in the modern court system is rare in civil cases
but common in those of a political or security nature, which
usually come before the traditional courts.
The European court system consists of magistrate's courts, the
High Court, and the Supreme Court of Appeal. The President
appoints the Chief Justice of the High Court and, after
consultation with the judicial service commission, other court
justices. The courts are open to the public, and defendants
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are charged publicly. Crowded dockets, however, can delay
serious cases from being heard for up to 4 years. In criminal
cases, the defendant waits in prison during the interval.
The traditional courts, which try over 90 percent of all
criminal cases, are the most accessible to the average
Malawian. Over 300 traditional courts, dispersed among
Malawi's 24 districts and 3 regions, hear several hundred
thousand civil and criminal cases each year. Traditional court
justices are appointed directly by the President, including to
the National Traditional Appeal Court. In practice, they are
drawn from the ranks of MCP officers and exercise their party
responsibilities concurrently. Police officials handle the
prosecution, and defendants conduct their own defense.
The executive branch seldom interferes in traditional court
cases involving customary (tribal) law but does so routinely in
political and security cases. The traditional courts were
designed by Orton Chirwa (the first Minister of Justice) to
handle small claims, family, and customary disputes in order to
accelerate the delivery of justice to Malawi's largely rural
and illiterate population.
Traditional courts were not empowered to try treason cases
until 1977 when President Banda sought to ensure the conviction
and subsec[uent execution of a secretary general of the Malawi
Congress Party who had allegedly plotted his overthrow.
Similarly, the President directed that Orton and Vera Chirwa be
tried by the traditional court in 1983 in which few, if any,
procedural safeguards are available. Banda subsequently
commuted the Chirwas' death sentences to life imprisonment.
Despite appeals from many human rights organizations, the
Chirwas' remained in prison at year's end, reportedly in poor
health. Orton Chirwa is now 73 years old.
The Forfeiture Act permits the Government to revoke the
property rights of those merely suspected of economic crimes,
such as illegal currency transactions. These revocations
sometimes have political overtones and have been heavily
weighted against the Asian community. However, the Act has not
been invoked in recent years, and in 1991 restitution of
certain properties seized earlier was made.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Co r r espondenc e
Police may enter houses of suspects at will under special entry
authority to conduct searches for incriminating evidence or
suspects. Telephones are routinely tapped, and an extensive
network of informers reports private statements and actions to
the Government. Authorities regularly open domestic and ■
international mail and sharply increased this practice in
1991. Malawi's security services feared the effects of
accelerating democratization trends in neighboring countries.
Malawian law permits the Government to designate certain
districts as "special areas" where citizens may be stopped,
questioned, and searched on the street. Most special area
districts are in the north. Although this has been an unused
statute in recent years, its residual effect has contributed to
the north's sense of disenf ranchisement .
«
Membership in the ruling Malawi Congress Party is not legally
mandatory, but it is frequently coerced, and membership is
expected of those who seek access to government services or
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entrance to local markets, even babies carried on their
mothers ' backs .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including;
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Free speech and press are severely circumscribed i Malawi. It
is an offense, punishable by 5 years' imprisonment, to publish
anything likely "to undermine the authority of, oc public
confidence in, the Government." It is punishable by life
imprisonment to send out of the country "false information"
which may be "harmful to the interests or good name of
Malawi." At least one journalist was arrested and held in 1991
under this provision. In practice, giving critical information
to foreign journalists can result in detention without trial.
Any discussion of Malawi's political future or speculation
about the President's age is prohibited, although the elderly
President's oft-predicted passing is now a common topic of
conversation. A few years ago, speculation about the eventual
succession would have guaranteed detention.
Malawi's two newspapers and government-owned radio exist
primarily to catalog the President's words and deeds.
Nevertheless, local media do not submit material to the
Government beforehand but exercise careful self-censorship.
Even so, journalists, including senior editors, have been
jailed for extended periods after overstepping undefined
boundaries. In July two editors of the daily newspaper were
detained by police for between 4 hours and 4 days when they
published an editorial that implied minor police corruption in
the traffic department. In the same month, the editor of a
monthly magazine was detained overnight when he published a
letter from the dean of the University of Malawi law school
that gave a legal interpretation of the country's strict dress
code that was contrary to the interpretation enforced by the
Inspector General of Police. The law school dean was also
briefly held.
Criticism of various government departments' efficiency does
appear in the newspapers and often in parliamentary debate.
While reporting on democratic tendencies in Malawi is taboo,
there was considerable print coverage, but no radio coverage,
of worldwide democratic developments during 1991, especially in
other parts of Africa. The multiparty movement in neighboring
Zambia received surprisingly impartial coverage.
The newly formed Journalists' Association of Malawi was
formally registered in 1991 and held a 1-week media workshop to
highlight the role of the press. The Association also
remonstrated with the Inspector General of Police when its
members were briefly incarcerated, a confrontation that would
have been inconceivable in Malawi only a few years ago. In
July the June issue of Africa South magazine was banned in
Malawi because it contained discussion of a report criticizing
widespread human rights violations.
Foreign journalists must request permission to enter Malawi and
must specify in advance the topics they intend to cover. They
are also asked to specify who they intend to interview. The
Government continues to permit some Western journalists to
visit Malawi.
Academic freedom is limited by the general restrictions on
speech and press. The long detentions of Professors Mapanje
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and Machila, who were finally released in 1991, remind
university professors of the definite bounds to academic
inquiry.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Political meetings are not permitted outside the framework of
the Malawi Congress Party. Persons may be imprisoned if they
further the aims of an "unlawful society," defined as "any
group considered to be dangerous to the good government of the
republic." A gathering of three or more persons may be
construed as an unlawful assembly under Malawian law.
Individuals and organizations can and do associate freely
concerning nonpolitical matters.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state or preferred religion, and religious groups
generally may establish places of worship and train clergy.
However, religious groups are required to register with the
Government, and an informal presidential decree that no new
religious groups should be registered in Malawi has taken on
the force of law. The ban has served to prevent legitimate
religious groups, such as the Mormons, from establishing a
registered presence in Malawi.
Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religious convictions, inter alia,
prevent them from joining the MCP or any other political party,
have been banned since 1967. Relations between the Government
and the Witnesses remain tense and regularly elicit hostile
outbursts from senior officials. Several Jehovah's Witnesses
are imprisoned for their religious beliefs. In October some
local officials publicly criticized Mozambican refugees who
were openly proselytizing for the Jehovah's Witnesses faith.
Many of these refugees, it turned out, were originally
Malawians who had fled Malawi's persecution of the Jehovah's
Witnesses during the 1970's. However, credible reports
indicate that several hundred were forcibly repatriated to
Mozambique.
Religious publications, like others, may not criticize the
Government or the party. Most religious groups are free to
establish and maintain links with coreligionists in other
countries, and members are free to travel abroad.
Malawi's sizable Muslim minority (estimated at 20 percent of
the population) conducts its religion and builds mosques
freely. Foreign Islamic organizations have funded the latter
with no governmental interference.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Legal provisions exist for testricting movement of those
convicted of political or criminal offenses. Denial of
passports on political grounds is common. Credible evidence
suggested that SIS agents followed persons suspected of
opposition to the Government out of Malawi in 1991. Civil
servants and employees of state-owned enterprises must obtain
written permission to travel abroad, even on vacation, although
such clearance now appears to be routine.
Formal emigration is neither restricted nor encouraged.
However, Asian residents and citizens, while free to travel
within the country, must nominally reside and work in one of
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four urban areas (Lilongwe, Zomba, Mzuzu, and Blantyre/Limbe) .
In Lilongwe, a planned capital, they must also live within
certain neighborhoods. During 1991 the Government did not
strictly enforce those restrictions.
Malawi hosts the largest refugee population in Africa. Over
900,000 Mozambicans — more than 10 percent of Malawi's
population — are now located in rural areas in nearly half of
Malawi's 24 districts. Some refugees live in camps, but many
live within or adjacent to existing villages. In both cases,
their presence has increased deforestation and put pressure on
scarce arable land. The strain on Malawi's economy, as well as
its transportation and social services networks, has been
severe. More recently, security from cross-border attacks has
become a greater concern. Public discontent at the burden has
been rising at an alarming rate, but in 1991 President Banda
again reaffirmed Malawi's commitment to offer asylum to all who
are forced to flee Mozambique's brutal civil war.
There were credible reports that hundreds of refugees were
forcibly repatriated because they were members of the Jehovah's
Witnesses, a banned religious group. Voluntary repatriation
has been very limited. The Government has cooperated with the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other
international relief efforts.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens of Malawi cannot change their national government
through democratic means. Major, and many minor, political
decisions are made by the President or his closest associates.
Opposition political parties are prohibited. In 1991 there
appeared to be emerging support at the grassroots level for a
multiparty movement, as some persons began to discuss more
openly a post-Banda political system.
The Malawi Congress Party structure provides for some choice
among candidates for party (every 3 years), parliamentary
(every 5 years), and other offices — all by secret ballot.
Nominees for political seats, however, are carefully selected
by the MCP and approved by the President. The National
Assembly, consisting of both elected and a few appointed
members, is mainly concerned with ratifying preordained
policy. Its independence and powers are broadly based in law
but highly circumscribed in practice.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Local nongovernmental human rights organizations are not
permitted. At best, human rights issues can be touched on
tangentially by the Malawi Law Society which, in recent years,
has been able to debate in public some aspects of existing law
with increasing candor. In November Justin Malewezi, the
nation's top civil servant and the government official most
closely involved with human rights issues, was fired.
Malewezi, an effective force for constructive change in Malawi,
had contributed to human rights reform, though his dismissal
seems not to be related to his work in that area. The
Government does not permit organizations such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty
International to visit prisons or conduct human rights
invest igat ions .
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Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Membership in the ruling party, the MCP, or its organs is not
open to Malawians of Asian or European descent. In addition
there are regional differences between the north and the rest
of Malawi. Northerners have experienced considerable
discrimination by the Government in the past, most recently in
1989, when President Banda lent his weight to a campaign that
resulted in many northerners losing jobs in the south and being
forced to return to their region or go into exile abroad.
Several of the most important political prisoners, including
Orton and Vera Chirwa, are from the northern region. Since
1990 the Government has made a concerted effort to downplay
regionalism as a domestic issue. Northerners continued to hold
important positions within the Government and Parliament, but
few are permitted to advance to high positions within the
police, the Government's primary instrument to enforce internal
security.
Asian residents, whether Malawian citizens or not, have been
compelled to transfer ownership of rural shops and trucking
businesses to ethnic Africans. Strict rules govern where
Asians may own property, although these were relaxed
considerably during 1991. Malawi's official government
hostess, C. Tamanda Kadzamira, has recently gone to
considerable lengths to draw Asian women into her new National
Women's Development Organization (CCAM) . Despite these
informal changes, many persons in the small but prosperous
Asian community of about 5,000 question their long-term future
in Malawi .
In Malawi women are ec[ual under the law, and tribal leadership
structures remain primarily matrilineal in the central and
southern regions of the country. However, in practice women do
not have opportunities equal to those of men. Historically,
most women have been unable to complete even a primary
education and are at a serious disadvantage in the job market.
The Government presently reserves for women 33 percent of the
places in the secondary school system, although the actual
number of attendees is less. The Government has also
cooperated closely with international donors seeking to enhance
educational opportunities for women at all levels, e.g., with a
U.S. -assisted $20 million program designed to improve the basic
education of girls.
In practice, women are also disadvantaged under the law through
ignorance. In 1991 the National Commission of Women in
Development, working with the CCAM and the Malawi Law Society,
held a well-publicized workshop and began work on the
publication and distribution of a bilingual handbook on women's
legal rights.
The Government is also slowly giving recognition to the
importance of women as agricultural producers, as approximately
70 percent of all smallholder farms and over 50 percent of
subsistence holdings are headed by women. When buying and
selling "saleable" property, men and women have equal rights.
However, with "customary" property (land in transition),
succession in the northern region reverts to male family
members, whereas succession in the southern region reverts to
female family members. The Ministry of Agriculture now has a
separate women's extension program specifically designed to
accommodate their needs. Women enjoy access to maternal health
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services and to extension programs, but infant and child
mortality remain extremely high.
Malawi continues to maintain a strict dress code for women.
Pants and shorts are not permitted in public, and dress length
must be below the knees. In 1991 the police began a strict
enforcement of these rules; several women were arrested and
fined.
Malawi has no tradition of violence against women; however, a
few small ethnic groups continue to practice female
circumcision.
Section 6 Worker Rights:
a. The Right of Association
Only nongovernment workers have the legal right to form and
join trade unions. Unions represent from 10 to 20 percent of
Malawi's small labor force in the money economy; most organized
wage workers are unskilled laborers on large agricultural
estates. Unions are required by law to affiliate with the
Trade Union Congress of Malawi (TUCM) . The TUCM, like both the
Employers Consultative Group and the Associated Chambers of
Commerce, is a private organization ostensibly independent of
the Malawi Congress Party, but in practice its activities are
highly circumscribed by the Government. Restrictive colonial
labor legislation has been subsumed largely intact into
Malawian law.
While technically legal, strikes are not tolerated in Malawi.
Ministry of Labor officers are quick to intervene at the first
hint of labor unrest. There were no efforts to strike in 1991.
The TUCM associates with international labor organizations and
is a member of the Organization of African Trade Union Unity
and the Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council which
is headquartered in Lilongwe.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers have the legal ri^ht to organize, but the law does
little to restrict antiunion discrimination by employers.
Complaints are resolved by the Ministry of Labor. When
employees and employers cannot reach agreement on a labor
issue, a labor officer from the Ministry of Labor meets with
the two sides in an attempt to reach a consensus. This is
usually successful. The labor officer does not decide the
outcome himself.
Collective bargaining is protected by law, but in practice its
use is limited by stark market realities. Skilled workers are
in demand in Malawi and have enjoyed relative success when
negotiating contracts. However, unskilled workers are in
oversupply, and this holds down their wages. The Government
does not intervene overtly in the collective bargaining process.
Management-labor councils (called "work committees") mediate
labor issues at the workplace. There are standing management-
labor councils in large industries and businesses. The
composition of these is generally half labor and half
management. Grievances of all kinds can be handled by these
committees (including wage issues) as long as they relate to
work at that particular place of employment. When wage
negotiations concern an entire industry nationwide, then the
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Government involves itself in the discussions, and again all
parties work until a consensus is reached.
There are no export processing or free trade zones in Malawi.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor, which was widely practiced during colonial times,
has never been formally outlawed, but it is opposed by the
Government and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum working age is 14, but this applies only to the
small urban wage sector where it can be enforced by labor
inspectors from the Ministry of Labor. The law concerns young
workers throughout the country, but it is less easily enforced
in rural areas. Overall, enforcement is not considered to be
effective. Also, because there is no law providing compulsory
education for children, many children are available for daily
employment. In the large subsistence agriculture sector, where
most Malawians work, children help on family farms at a much
younger age. Many also work on plantations, where they are
paid substantially less than the legal minimum wage.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Less than 15 percent of the work force is employed in the
formal wage sector. In May 1989, the Minimum Wage and
Conditions of Employment Act nearly doubled the minimum daily
wages in Malawi's three cities, but perhaps a quarter of the
work force receives less than the legal minimum wage because of
poor enforcement and because many workers are unaware they are
entitled to a minimum wage. The legal minimum wage is not
adequate for a decent living and is often supplemented by
additional employment. Minimum wages vary from urban to rural
areas. For those fortunate enough to hold paying jobs, wages
and working conditions are generally adequate to maintain
slightly better than a subsistence standard of living. Many
subsistence farmers supplement their earnings by working as
tenants on nearby estates. Labor laws address normal
employment practices but do not cover tenancy agreements, and
abuses are widespread.
The maximum workweek in Malawi is 48 hours or less . Workers
have Sundays and official holidays off from work or must be
paid overtime. Paid holidays and safety standards in the
workplace are required by law. However, enforcement of safety
standards by Ministry of Labor inspectors is erratic.
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In 1991 the 23-year-old, single-party military dictatorship of
President Moussa Traore was overthrown, leading to the
establishment of a transitional government which pledged to
establish a multiparty democracy with free elections by January
1992. The transition period was later extended to March 26,
1992. On March 26, 1991, after 4 days of intense
antigovernment rioting, a group of 17 military officers
arrested President Traore and suspended the constitution.
Within days, these officers joined with the Coordinating
Committee of Democratic Associations to form a predominantly
civilian 25-member ruling body, the Transitional Committee for
the Salvation of the People (CTSP) . The CTSP issued a
fundamental code, the basic governing document for the
transitional period, and appointed a civilian prime minister
and transitional government. A National Conference held in
August produced a proposed new constitution, political parties
charter, and electoral code. In a referendum on January 12,
1992, the new Constitution was approved. Lt . Colonel Amadou
Toumani Toure became Head of State during the transition period.
The country was affected by rebellious activity in the north,
which varied from politically motivated rebels seeking an
autonomous Tuareg state to simple banditry. Rebel activity,
which started in mid-1990, had subsided by the time the
previous government signed accords with two rebel groups in
January 1991. Dissident rebel elements continued sporadic
attacks in the early part of the year, which escalated after
the change of government. There were credible reports of
civilians killed and abducted by rebels, of extrajudicial
killing committed by the military, and of the theft by rebels
of vehicles belonging to private voluntary organizations
involved in food distribution. The transition Government made
strenuous efforts to find a political solution to the problem
and held a series of conferences of all parties in late 1991,
with more scheduled for early 1992.
Mali's armed forces number some 7,000 and are under the control
of the Minister of Defense. The gendarmerie (paramilitary
police) and local police forces have primary responsibility for
maintaining internal security. Military forces were deployed
throughout the northern regions of the country to deal with
insurgency and banditry. The military's credibility was
profoundly shaken when it used lethal force to put down the
antiregime demonstrations that led to the arrest of then
president Traore on March 26. Subsequently, the CTSP made
strenuous efforts to reestablish discipline among the troops
and to prepare officers for a changed role for the military
under civilian democracy, but problems remained, especially in
the north.
With an annual per capita gross national product of
approximately $290, Mali is one of the world's poorest
countries. Mali's economy rests primarily on subsistence
farming and animal husbandry, making it highly dependent on
good rainfalls for its economic well-being. The transitional
Government continued efforts to modernize the economy through
fiscal reform and made determined efforts to end government
corruption. Nonetheless, Mali remained heavily dependent on
external aid. Private enterprise was encouraged as part of
economic reform and liberalization programs.
Although there'were significant violations of human rights in
1991, especially those associated with the conflict in the
north and the end of the Traore regime, the change in
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government in most respects improved the human rights
situation. Political rights were greatly expanded, and freedom
of speech, press, assembly, and association increased
significantly. The new Constitution provides broad protection
of human rights and civil liberties. Because of good media
coverage of the events, more Malians became aware of their
rights and were less afraid to file complaints when these
rights were violated. At the end of the year, the transition
Government had taken many steps toward the establishment of a
multiparty democracy based on the rule of law, including
scheduling municipal, legislative, and presidential elections
for early 1992.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of targeted political killings. There
were, however, numerous instances of extrajudicial killing by
security forces using excessive force in putting down
antiregime demonstrations in Bamako and in dealing with the
rebellion in the north (see Section l.g.).
b. Disappearance
Rebels frequently abducted civiliams during raids on villages.
Some of them were released, others are known to be held by
rebels, but the whereabouts of still others are unknown.
Although there were no reported incidents of abduction or
hostage-taking attributcible to the Government, there reportedly
have been incidents in which persons detained by security
forces in the north have been killed (see Section l.g.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The new Constitution prohibits torture eind inhuman, cruel,
degrading, or humiliating treatment, and the transitional
Government made strides toward ending the physical abuse of
suspected persons which sometimes occurred during police
interrogation. Widespread publicity given to issues of human
rights made citizens more willing to complain, which
constrained individual police officers in their treatment of
arrestees. The transitional Government also improved
conditions in prisons, rebuilding the Bamako central jail,
improving food and medical services, and separating hardened
criminals from lesser offenders. In addition, it authorized
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to conduct
a seminar for prison officials on the treatment of prisoners.
Many prisons outside the capital, however, are still harsh and
are characterized by inadequate medical facilities and food
supplies.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Malian judicial system is based on the French model, and
the fundamental code and the new Constitution expanded the
rights of arrested individuals. Persons arrested must be
charged or released within 48 hours. Malian law does not
provide for release on bail, but detainees are sometimes
released on their own recognizance. Administrative backlogs
often cause delays in bringing people to trial. The new
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Constitution gives arrested persons the right to have a lawyer
of their choice present at all questioning; even before the
constitution was promulgated, persons began to demand that this
right be accorded them. Lawyers are quite active in making
sure detainees have representation; many provide pro bono
service.
A number of Tuaregs were detained by military authorities in
the wake of rebel and bandit attacks in the northern regions.
By November all those detained had been released, except for 22
persons who were transferred to Bamako and charged with
specific crimes. Those Tuaregs arrested during 1990 were
released after the signing of the Tamanrasset Accords in
January 1991.
At the time of the overthrow of the previous regime, the former
president, his family, all government ministers and members of
the party executive committee, and many others were detained.
Following investigations by a special commission of the
judicial police, the investigating judge formally charged all
former officials with specific violations of the law and
initiated detailed investigations of the cases, as required,
prior to trial. Two of the "former" president's children
continue to be detained without charge. Two other children and
one grandchild are being held in protective custody.
Detention of political demonstrators, which was sometimes
practiced by the previous regime, was discontinued under the
transitional Government. Many Malians who were in exile under
the previous regime returned to live in their country in 1991.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The transitional Government basically retained the existing
court structure, with two notable changes: it declared the
judiciary independent of the legislative and executive power,
and it abolished the special court of state security, which
operated outside the regular judicial system.
The Fundamental Code and the new Constitution provide for the
independence of the judiciary. However, the Ministry of
Justice appoints judges and supervises both law enforcement and
judicial functions. The Superior Judicial Council, which
supervises judicial activity, is headed by the President of the
Republic. The Supreme Court has both judicial and
administrative powers. Under the Constitution, there will be a
separate constitutional court and a high court of justice, with
the power to try senior government officials in cases of
treason.
Except in the case of minors, trials are public and defendants
have the right to be present and to have an attorney of their
choice. Defendants are presumed innocent and have the right to
appeal decisions to the Supreme Court. Many members of the
former government, including the former president and his wife,
were charged by the regular criminal court with corruption and
embezzlement; others have been formally charged with violations
of law in connection with the shooting of demonstrators during
the riots in January and March. The Government pledged to try
these persons in accordance with the law and prevented efforts
by some groups to use the National Conference as a popular
tribunal. No trials had begun by the end of the year. All
members of the former government reportedly had access to
lawyers.
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Another concern was a wave of vigilante justice which erupted
after the overthrow of the previous regime, but it declined by
the end of 1991. In the wake of massive jailbreaks and overall
lack of confidence in the security system, mobs in Bamako and
other towns on more than 15 occasions captured and killed
suspected thieves. However, special police units in several
cases rescued threatened individuals and treated them in
accordance with the law.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence .
Inviolability of the home is provided for in both the old and
new Constitutions and generally is respected in practice.
Police searches are infrequent, and warrants are issued by a
judge and recorded, though sometimes after the fact. Local
authorities sometimes seize and open mail extralegally .
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
In March, during 4 days of rioting and demonstrations which
preceded the overthrow of the previous regime, security forces
in Bamako and several other cities opened fire on
demonstrators, killing 216 and wounding 717. Some of the
killings occurred while demonstrators were looting and burning
government buildings; many others occurred as security forces
attempted to stop peaceful demonstrations. In addition, there
are credible reports that 65 persons died when security forces
set fire to a building into which demonstrators had fled. The
transitional Government arrested and charged a number of senior
military officials who were believed responsible for issuing
live cimmunition to the troops.
The Tuareg rebellion in the north resulted in the deaths of
many civilians, rebels, and Malian military and government
officials. The number of dead in the conflict is uncertain,
but at least 39 civilians were killed by Tuaregs in at least 29
attacks. In one case, the Government reports a woman was
killed by rebels after she refused to accompany them back to
their camp.
The military's response to these attacks included reprisals
against unarmed Tuaregs and Maurs. On November 14, soldiers
summarily executed 10 Tuareg civilians near Menaka in reprisal
for the killing of military dependents earlier that day,
according to credible reports. In Timbuktu on December 12,
soldiers murdered leading Tuareg notable and government
supporter Mohamadoum Ag Hamani and eight members of his
household following an attack, possibly by a Tuareg faction, on
the Governor's residence. There were confirmed reports that,
on May 21, a group of soldiers summarily executed 34 nomads in
Lere, and credible reports that in July they executed 15 more
near Tonka. The President repudiated such behavior, and the
Government reportedly transferred and disciplined the soldiers
involved, but no one was arrested or tried, largely out of
concern over possible military discontent should the officers
be publicly humiliated.
Aside from those who died or were wounded in rebel attacks and
army reprisals, many nomads lost cattle herds, and commercial
enterprises were destroyed. Rebels stole vehicles from private
voluntary organizations, making food distribution in the region
extremely difficult. The number of deaths in the conflict is
difficult to estimate. Credible reports put total civilian
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Tuareg deaths at the hands of the military at around 70. It is
likely that the Malian military and the various rebel and
bandit groups lost as many as 150 people each.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
With the installation of the transitional Government in March,
Malians enjoy virtually complete freedom of speech and press.
Both the Fundamental Code and the new Constitution contain
strong affirmations of these freedoms. At the National
Conference, citizens from all segments of society voiced
opinions, including often strong complaints, about government
policy and leaders and direct criticism of the President of the
Transitional Council, which were broadcast live on the
state-owned radio system.
There are some 15 independent newspapers and journals. The
government-owned newspaper and radio and television system are
open and give space to a wide range of views. In September the
transitional Government announced that it would allow the
creation of private radio and television stations, and a
subcommission was established under the Minister of
Communications to prepare regulations for private
broadcasting. By the end of the year, two private radio
stations were operating in Bamako.
Political meetings take place openly and without interference.
The political pressures which previously inhibited academic
freedom have all but disappeared.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
One of the first acts of the CTSP was to allow the free
formation of political parties and other associations. The
Constitution affirms this right. Some 46 political parties and
at least as many professional and special interest associations
were formed and operated freely. While no parties have
established formal ties with those in other countries, there
are no restrictions on their doing so. Permits must be
obtained for mass demonstrations, but these are now routinely
granted.
c. Freedom of Religion
Mali's status as a secular state is reconfirmed in the new
Constitution. The Government generally does not discriminate
on religious grounds. Although 90 percent of Malians are
Muslim, members of other religions practice their faiths freely
and are permitted to establish houses of worship and schools.
Christian missionaries of various faiths, including foreign
missionaries, operate freely. Proselytizing and conversion are
permitted, except in the case of the Baha ' i . The Government
prohibits publications in which one religious group defames
another; the Minister of Territorial Administration determines
whether such a publication is defamatory. This law is rarely
app 1 i ed , howeve r .
While administrative orders promulgated in 1977 prohibiting
Baha'i from meeting in groups of more than three people remain
in force, these orders are not enforced, and Baha'i practice
their faith without interference.
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d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement in Mali is generally unimpeded, although
police checks occur in which Malians and foreigners alike are
stopped, particularly at night. These checks are used
ostensibly to restrict the movement of contraband goods and to
check vehicle registrations. In practice, some police
supplement their salaries by assessing ad hoc fines or
confiscating goods. As part of its ant i corrupt ion campaign,
the Government attempted to end these abuses. An exit visa is
no longer required.
In recent years, Mali has both accepted and generated
refugees. Some 13,000 Mauritanian Peuhl refugees who fled
strife in their country in 1989 settled in Mali and were
generally absorbed into the local economy. Some 140 Liber ian
refugees who fled to Mali in 1990 were relocated to Cote
D'lvoire in 1991 under a program of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. In 1991 the insecurity in Mali's
northern regions led some 18,000 Malian Maurs and Tuaregs to
flee to Mauritania and thousands to flee to Algeria, perhaps
35,000, according to Malian government estimates. Several
thousand Tuaregs who had fled drought conditions in 1984-85 and
had begun to be repatriated to Mali in 1990 returned to Algeria
as refugees .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Cheuige Their Government
During 23 years of single-party military rule, Malians were
unable to change their government through peaceful means .
However, the Transitional Committee for the People's Salvation
(CTSP), which assumed power in March, laid the groundwork for
multiparty democracy in which citizens will be able to elect
their government and change it through peaceful means .
The CTSP is made up of 15 civilians representing organizations
which led the prodemocracy movement (including the national
labor union) and 10 military officers, led by Lt . Colones
Amadou Toumani Toure, who is Head of State for the transition
period. Upon assuming power, the CTSP appointed a transition
Government comprising mainly technocrats charged with
day-to-day operations of the Government and with conducting
elections planned for early 1992. The CTSP almost immediately
allowed the formation of political parties, with the only
restriction being a prohibition against parties based on
religion, ethnic group, region, or gender. By September there
were some 46 registered political parties.
In August a widely representative national conference adopted a
proposed new constitution, a political parties charter, and an
electoral code, which will be the basic documents of the new
political system. The new Constitution, which contains broad
provisions on civil rights and liberties, was adopted in a
referendum on January 12, 1992. It provides for direct
election of the President for a term of 5 years (with a limit
of two terms), direct election at the district level of members
of the National Assembly, a separation of executive,
legislative, and judicial powers, and control of the military
by the President. Members of the CTSP and military officers
who wished to stand for office were rec[uired to resign their
posts by the end of August. Members of the transitional
Government were excluded from running for office in these
elections. The Government immediately began preparations for
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the elections, and political parties started operations
throughout the country. The test of the system will come in
the elections and completion of transfer of power from the CTSP
to the newly elected president, including the return of the
military to their barracks, now scheduled for March 26, 1992.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The independent Malian Association for Human Rights (AMDH),
established in 1989, was prominent in the prodemocracy movement
and active in the drawing up of the new Constitution. Two of
its members sit on the CTSP. AMDH lawyers represent individual
cases of human rights violations before courts and work to
inform people of their rights. There was some concern that the
AMDH's representation on the CTSP and the involvement of its
president in a political party would jeopardize its
independence. The Fundamental Code and the new Constitution
make reference to the universal declaration of human rights.
The transitional Government addressed some human rights
questions much more forthrightly than did the previous
government and has been much more open with international
organizations concerned with human rights questions. It
replied publicly to Amnesty International's letters regarding
the military's killing of Tuaregs in Lere and Tonka in May and
July. It has invited the ICRC to observe the situation in the
north and published information about the ICRC's activities.
ICRC representatives are stationed in two northern towns and
are permitted to travel widely. They have visited persons
abducted by rebels and toured all civilian and military
detention facilities in the north. The Government also allowed
the ICRC and the local human rights association access to
members of the former government who were under arrest or being
detained.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Virtually all of Mali's ethnic and language groups are
represented at all levels of government and society, and suffer
little discrimination. The nomad populations are not
completely integrated into the economic and political
mainstream, however, and they resent being politically
dominated by other, more numerous ethnic groups. In April and
May, Tuareg and Maur nomadic groups became the target of ethnic
rioting in Gao and Timbuktu in reprisal for attacks by rebels
on the local population. While there was evidence of
complicity of some elements of the security forces, there were
also eyewitness accounts of police rescuing potential victims.
The Government attempted thereafter to try to reduce
interethnic strife as part of its overall efforts to restore
security in the north. At the end of 1991, tension and racial
polarization remained high throughout the north.
Although the new Constitution reaffirms that there shall not be
discrimination, social and cultural factors place men in the
dominant position in Mali. There are a number of women in the
professions and in important posts in government — three members
of the transitional Government are women — but economic and
educational opportunities for women are limited. Women live
under harsh conditions, especially in the rural areas.
According to a 1991 United Nations report, females in Mali
receive only 29 percent of the schooling of males.
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MALI
Traditional practice and existing Kalian laws place women at a
disadvantage with regard to family and property rights.
However, many newly formed women's organizations began actively
seeking the improvement of women's rights, and many questions
were addressed at the national conference, with the goal of
improving the condition of women.
Violence against women, including wife beating, is accepted in
Malian society, though there are no statistics to indicate how
widespread it may be. The society generally does not tolerate
spousal abuse resulting in physical injury and deals with the
problem informally at the village level; for example, a village
chief may intervene to stop the abuse and punish the
perpetrator. Legal action for redress of injury is not
normally available, although severe physical injury is grounds
for divorce. The issue of spousal abuse was not addressed by
the transitional Government. Many of the new women's
organizations and some independent journals campaign against
female circumcision, which is still a widely accepted practice
in Mali. The transition Government continued radio and
television broadcasts intended to discourage female
circumcision but did not pass legislation prohibiting the
practice.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The new Constitution specifically provides for the freedom of
workers to form or join unions and, unlike the old
constitution, does not limit them to the National Union of
Malian Workers (UNTM) . While most unions are still part of the
UNTM, higher education teachers left the teachers' branch of
the UNTM and created an independent union which has been
officially recognized by the Ministry of Education. The UNTM
was a leading force in the movement that led to the overthrow
of the previous regime. Three of its members, including its
President, now sit on the ruling Transitional Committee for the
People's Salvation (CTSP), though the UNTM has maintained its
independence from the Government .
The new Constitution provides for the right to strike. After
the fall of the previous government, there were several
strikes, some for higher wages, some for improved working
conditions, and some to demand different managers in state
enterprises. These strikes were generally resolved by
negotiations between the labor unions, the new Government, and
the economic entity involved. While strikes were rarely
allowed under the previous regime, the UNTM held a 2-day
general strike in January to demand higher wages and called a
general strike in March to demand the resignation of former
President Traore.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The change in government reduced some of the constraints on
workers' rights to organize and bargain collectively, notably
by ending the UNTM's legal status as the sole union. Wages and
salaries for those workers belonging to UNTM unions are still
set by tripartite negotiations between the Ministry of Labor,
the labor unions, euid representatives of the federation of
employers of the sector for which the wages are being set .
Workers in some industries also created associations which
started to function like unions to make demands and operate
outside of the tripartite system. The new Constitution does
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MALI
not address the question of antiunion discrimination. No
export processing zones exist in Mali.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The new Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor.
Although not sanctioned or upheld by law, debt slavery
reportedly exists in the salt mining communities north of
Timbuktu. Since the change of government in March, however,
many of those treated as slaves have refused to continue
working under those conditions.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 14, but with parents'
permission children may be apprenticed at age 12. In practice,
many employers ignore this regulation. In addition, children
in rural areas and in the informal sector are not protected by
laws against unjust compensation, excessive hours, and
capricious discharge. The labor inspection service of the
Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcement of child labor
laws. The law is reasonably effective in the modern sector but
has no effect on the vast number of children who work in the
informal sector .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Mali has a detailed Labor Code specifying conditions of
employment, including hours, wages, and social security
benefits. The legal workweek is 40 hours, with a requirement
for at least one 24-hour rest period. Workers must be paid
overtime for additional hours. There are legal minimum wage
scales, most recently adjusted in 1991, which are supplemented
by a required package of benefits, including social security
and health care benefits. While this could provide a minimum
standard of living if it went to support only one person, most
wage earners support extended families. In addition, most
people work in the informal sector, outside the realm of these
rules and conventions. The Social Security Code provides a
broad range of legal protection against hazards in the
workplace, and workers' groups have put pressure on employers
to respect parts of the regulations, particularly those
affecting personal hygiene. With unemployment high, however,
workers are sometimes reluctant to report violations of
occupational safety. While in theory the labor inspection
service of the Ministry of Labor oversees these standards,
there is limited enforcement due to the lack of inspectors.
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MAURITANIA
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania has been governed since 1984
by the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) under
the chairmanship of Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid 'Ahmed Taya, who is
also Chief of State. The Military Committee functions
nominally as a legislative body under the direction of
President Taya, while the President, assisted by his Council of
Ministers and a few close advisors, wields executive power.
In the latter half of 1991, the Government, in response to
mounting public criticism and international isolation, took
steps to encourage the development of multiparty democracy in
Mauritania. In July a new Constitution was adopted by
referendum, and subsequently ordinances were promulgated
permitting political parties, establishing freedom of the
press, and granting amnesty to all political prisoners. The
President announced that legislative and presidential elections
would be held before April 1992 and promulgated new electoral
laws. Several newly formed opposition parties intend to
contest the elections while challenging the fairness of the
electoral procedures announced to date .
Mauritanian security forces number between 16,000 and 18,000
and include the regular armed forces, the National Guard, the
Gendarmerie (a specialized corps of paramilitary police), and
the police. The Gendarmerie is directed by the Ministry of
Defense, while the National Guard and police come under the
Ministry of Interior. As in previous years, the security
forces continued to be responsible for widespread human rights
violations. The significant difference in 1991 was that, for
the first time, abuses perpetrated by the security forces were
directed in the main at a purge of their own ranks.
Most of Mauritania's 1.9 million inhabitants, either nomadic
herders or settled farmers, live within a subsistence economy.
Mauritania is burdened with numerous long-term economic and
social problems: drought, desertification, insect infestation,
extensive unemployment, rapid inflation, one of the highest per
capita foreign debts in Africa, minimal infrastructure,
inadecjuate health and education systems, and growing
urbanization. Low rainfall levels over the past years have
forced large numbers of nomads into towns, with a consequent
weakening of traditional Maur nomadic culture and a severe
strain on government resources.
Although the military leadership has tried carefully to
maintain control, the reform process shows some promise of
enabling Mauritanians to deal with their economic problems and
ethnic tensions in the future within the framework of a more
open political system. Meanwhile, the actual human rights
situation in Mauritania did not improve in 1991. In fact, the
arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture by the armed forces of
up to 3,000 persons represented a serious human rights
regression. Those arrested (almost exclusively from the black
Mauritanian Halpulaar ethnic groups) were accused of plotting
to overthrow the Government, but none of them was ever charged
with any crime. There is credible evidence that many, if not
all, of the detainees were subjected to harsh interrogation
technicpies and brutal torture, in some cases over a period of 7
months, in order to extract self-incriminating confessions.
Although the Government announced that all detainees were
released by mid-April 1991, approximately 500 remain
unaccounted for and are presumed dead. Of those who survived
the detention and torture, very few have been reintegrated into
the military (or, in the case of civilians, into their former
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MAURITANIA
jobs). On the other hand, the niimber of human rights abuses in
the riverine area bordering Senegal decreased markedly since
late 1990 as a result of a gradually improving political
atmosphere between the two Governments .
Some restrictions on freedom of the press were eased. The
right to a fair public trial, the right of citizens to change
their government, and worker rights remained restricted.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There continued to be a number of extrajudicial killings of
persons, particularly non-Arabic (Hassaniya)-speaking black
Mauritanians . Whereas most of the riverine violence in 1989
and 1990 ■■stemmed from mass expulsions and suppression of
resulting cross-border raiding, the nature of violence changed
substantially in 1991. Most disputes in the riverine area in
1991 arose from arguments over land and property, including
cases of Mauritanian expellees who returned home to find their
belongings had been expropriated.
Also in 1991, security forces continued their occasional
practice of arbitrarily killing non-Hassaniya-speaking blacks,
who make up the majority of the population living along the
Senegal river. For example, in September Mamadou Amadou Watt
was shot to death in his own home, reportedly by a national
guardsman. The victim and the perpetrator reportedly had
earlier disagreed over a bribe that the victim had refused to
pay. No one has yet been charged or arrested in this incident,
which took place in the town of Olologo in the Brakna region.
Although the frecjuency of these types of killings substantially
diminished in 1991, they continued to occur. As in previous
years, there were no reports of government inquiries into the
incidents or any efforts to punish those responsible.
The principal example of extrajudicial killing was the presumed
deaths of approximately 500 largely Halpulaar and Soninke
military and civilian personnel alleged to have attempted to
overthrow the Government. These persons were part of a larger
group — possibly as many as 3,000 — who were rounded up,
detained, and tortured in prison (see Section I.e.). To date
the Taya Government has not provided credible evidence of such
a plot, and critics claim the Government used this charge to
mask a purge of blacks from the military and civil service.
The results of an internal military investigation have not been
made public, and no one has been charged with or faced trial
for the tortures and deaths. It appears that the highest
levels of the military hierarchy — including several members of
the ruling CMSN--were involved and may personally have taken
part in torture or execution. Although two CMSN members were
placed on probation and removed from their commands for 6
months, presumably for their role in the events, they have now
been reintegrated, promoted to full colonels, and given new
responsibilities. Two other high-ranking officials said to be
implicated also received promotions during the year.
Furthermore, some of the officials named to the investigative
board may themselves have been involved in the incidents.
A local press investigation implicated the police in four
suspicious homicides in 1991. The Government has neither
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MAURITANIA
acknowledged these allegations nor taken any measures to
investigate them.
b. Disappearance
It is impossible either to enumerate or confirm instances of
disappearances in Mauritania for the past year. Of the many
(up to 3,000) Halpulaar and Soninke military officers, enlisted
men and civilians who were arrested and tortured in military
custody for involvement in an alleged coup attempt,
approximately 500 never returned to their homes. They are
presumed to have died, although the Government has refused to
confirm this.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Despite the Government's stated opposition to torture and the
legal prohibition against its use, the security forces—^
routinely mistreated persons in custody, particularly political
dissidents and black Mauritanians. Many of the detainees
arrested in the fall of 1990 in connection with the alleged
coup plot were subjected to particularly brutal interrogation
techniques, as security forces attempted to extract
self-incriminating confessions of involvement. According to
those who survived, scores of officers and enlisted men
participated in the mistreatment of prisoners. These incidents
took place in at least a dozen military bases, prisons, and
installations throughout the country.
The forms of torture included beatings, forced feeding of sand,
electrocution, anal rape, burning of genitals, denial of water
and food, and the so-called jaguar technique, in which victims
are bound and suspended upside down while the soles of their
feet are beaten. Prisoners detained at military installations
at Jreida and at Inal, for example, were held in cramped and
unsanitary quarters, denied adequate food and water, chained
for prolonged periods, frequently beaten, and forced to sign
confessions. One survivor from Jreida said that he had been
held in a single large room with roughly 100 other persons.
All prisoners were forced to sit in fixed positions, with
wrists chained to ankles. They were fed small portions of rice
and water twice daily. They had no separate access to toilets,
and as sanitary conditions rapidly deteriorated, many became
ill with beri-beri and other gastrointestinal disorders. This
witness estimated that 15 to 20 of the prisoners with whom he
was confined were taken away and never returned, so he presumed
that they had been killed. Another Jreida survivor stated that
he was held in solitary confinement for many days in a one-room
cell measuring one square meter, so that he was forced to sleep
diagonally with his legs propped against one wall. He received
one piece of bread daily, along with a bowl of rice mixed with
sand.
Survivors from the military facility at Inal, where up to 200
prisoners reportedly died, have said that some of the detainees
there were tied by their testicles to the rear of
four-wheel-drive vehicles and dragged at high speeds through
the desert. Several detainees, including Captain Lome
Abdoulaye, a former senior officer in the Mauritanian Navy,
died as a result of this particular treatment. It was also at
Inal that 28 prisoners were hung simultaneously on November 28,
1990, ostensibly "in celebration" of Independence Day. A
survivor of military custody at Nema stated that his accusers
tied him to a tree, removed his trousers, and tied ropes to his
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MAURITANIA
genitals. They then pulled the ropes tightly each time the
victim refused their demands to confess to involvement in the
alleged coup plot. The same witness said that a senior officer
at Nema tortured another victim by setting him afire. A
survivor of the military installation at N'Beika stated that he
had been buried alive in the sand, threatened with a pistol to
his head, and kicked in the face. This survivor is now blind
in one eye.
In June police officers in Nouakchott used nightsticks to
disperse a peaceful protest by female relatives of those who
had been tortured and killed in prison. Police singled out
Halpulaar women in the crowd, beating and kicking them. As a
result, 10 protesters were hospitalized, 5 with serious head
injuries.
In late June and early July, four members of the Union of
Mauritanian Workers (the national trade union) were tortured
while in police custody. The four had been arrested in the
aftermath of a street fight that broke out on June 28 between
union members and police officers. All four were severely
beaten and subjected to the "jaguar" treatment. One victim
also suffered cigarette burns on his lips and nostrils.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Although Mauritanian law requires expeditious arraignment and
trial, access to legal counsel, and the right of appeal, these
rights are frecjuently not observed, particularly in cases of
political dissidents or persons suspected on national security
grounds. They are somewhat more often observed in ordinary
criminal cases. The courts are required to review the legality
of a person's detention no more than 72 hours after his or her
arrest. Until recently, however, it was common practice to
detain prisoners incommunicado for prolonged periods without
charging them for any crime and without judicial review.
In late June and early July, security officers arrested several
opposition leaders, including seven prominent members of the
United Democratic Front, a dissident (and then illegal)
organization. These persons were sent into internal exile at
various locations around the country, where they remained in
incommunicado detention for several weeks. They were released
in a general amnesty at the end of July and were never charged
with any crime.
As stated elsewhere, the Government in late 1990 began
arresting non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians in the
military as well as civilian sectors. By the end of the year,
between 1,500 and 3,000 persons had been arrested and held
incommunicado. More than 300 of the former detainees have been
dishonorably discharged from the military without explanation.
Some also apparently have been denied back pay and other
benefits due them.
In addition to the incidents described above, there continued
to be credible reports in 1991 of arrests, intimidation,
prolonged detention, and expulsion committed by security forces
in communities along the Senegal river.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There are three types of courts: the Shari'a, the special
courts, and the State Security Court. The legal system
functions primarily under the Shari'a (Islamic law). While the
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judiciary is nominally independent, many observers believe that
judges take their cues from the Government when sentencing
opponents of the regime. The Ministry of Justice administers
the Shari'a and selects judicial personnel. The use by Islamic
judges of extreme physical punishments, such as amputations, is
no longer practiced in Mauritania. The Government also is
slowly eliminating a number of unqualified Shari'a judges.
Judges cannot be tenured until they have completed 7 years of
service.
Commercial and banking offenses, traffic violations that cause
bodily harm, and offenses against the security of the state
fall under the jurisdiction of the special courts, which
supposedly render judgments on the basis of laws modeled after
the French example. The effective implementation of justice in
these courts is particularly problematic because the majority
of Mauritanian judges have been trained neither at the
university level nor in the French juridical tradition.
In theory, all defendants, regardless of the court or their
ability to pay, have the legal right to be present with legal
counsel during the proceedings. Defendants may confront
witnesses and present evidence. They may appeal the sentences
of the ordinary courts but not those of the State Security
Court .
Mauritanian law specifies that all persons, including
foreigners, have the right to their property and possessions,
and may be deprived of them only by a court decision. In 1991,
as in previous years, the practice of justice in Mauritania
continued to differ substantially from its theory, particularly
as a result of the wide discretionary powers allowed in
practice to the forces of order in rural jurisdictions and to
the lack of trained public defenders. The right to a fair
public trial was often abused, particularly in the riverine
area.
While it is true that large-scale confiscations and expulsions,
such as those that occurred in the previous 2 years, were not
repeated in 1991, there were nevertheless occasional reports of
extrajudicial deportations by security forces in the riverine
area. None of those expelled had recourse to the courts. In
many cases, the homes and property of deportees were
subsequently expropriated by the Government. The Government
has always maintained that many, if not all, of the persons who
fled or were expelled were in fact Senegalese nationals, and
that their Mauritanian identity documents were fraudulent. As
of late 1991, the Government had failed to set up procedures to
permit access to the courts by expellees who wished to obtain
confirmation of their citizenship and the right to return to
Mauritania. However, in the general context of improving
relations with Senegal, informal arrangements with security
forces resulted in a number of expellees returning home.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under Mauritanian law, judicial warrants are recpaired to
perform home searches. This requirement is often ignored in
practice in "national security" cases. There were in 1991
repeated reports of government surveillance of suspected
dissidents. Intimidation and harassment of
non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians in the Senegal river
valley also continued on a regular basis.
50-726 - 92
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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Mauritanians in the latter half of 1991 experienced for the
first time limited freedom of speech and press. Ironically,
the new climate of liberalization was an indirect result of the
mass detention, torture, and execution of those alleged to have
plotted to overthrow the Government . As evidence of the
arrests and deaths came to light in early 1991, the Mauritanian
public began to demand an explanation from the authorities.
Wien no such explanation was forthcoming, the public reacted in
a way it had not before: in print. Ant i government tracts,
newsletters, and petitions began circulating in Nouakchott and
other major cities. These were followed by articles in
international magazines and newspapers, as those who had
survived the incidents reported them from abroad. By early
summer, public outrage over the tortures and executions had
reached a fever pitch, and opposition leaders were for the
first time calling for Taya's ouster and a complete reworking
of the political system. In the face of these demands.
President Taya on July 25 promulgated ordinances permitting the
creation of political parties and a free press.
Since that time a lively competition has developed among more
than a dozen weekly papers, all of which have become
increasingly bold at criticizing the Government, particularly
for its perceived insensitivity to, and condonation of, human
rights abuses. The papers have formed an independent press
association, which was successful at heading off censorship of
at least one publication. However, both the press and the
parties operate within tightly circumscribed limits. All
newspapers and political parties must register with the
Ministry of Interior, for example. There is still only one
daily paper, which is published and controlled by the Ministry
of Information. Furthermore, the independent weeklies reach
only a limited audience, not only due to financial constraints
but also because the majority of Mauritanians cannot read.
Access to television and radio, to which large numbers of the
population presumably listen, remains the unique preserve of
the Ministry of Information. However, the Government has
stated it will give the opposition parties radio and television
air time during the electoral campaign.
The regime continued to sanction publishers for any public
conments it considered a threat to state security, particularly
those criticizing the Government's ethnic policies. For
example, the Government halted publication of the August 1991
issue of the magazine Mauritanie Demain, which contained
first-hand accounts of Halpulaars who had survived torture
while in military confinement. In practice, freedom of
expression continues to be restricted. Most Mauritanians
criticize government policies only in conversations with
friends and relatives. Military personnel are under tight
surveillance, and views expressed to military colleagues in
private that could be construed as even mildly critical of the
Government are likely to cause intense interrogation by
military security officers.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although Mauritanian law guarantees the rights of assembly and
association, all political movements and activities had been
prohibited until just recently, and most groups operated
clandestinely or from outside the country. Even under the new
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MAURITANIA
ordinances legalizing political parties, all groups must be
registered with the Minister of Interior and obtain permission
for large meetings or assemblies. By year's end, the Interior
Ministry had recognized 12 political parties, all of which held
open, regular meetings. Despite some government harassment,
several of the parties also organized large rallies, drawing
thousands of participants. In late November, the Government
was criticized for denying a party permit to a group of
self-proclaimed radical Islamists. The Government justified
its action by citing the new Constitution, which forbids the
establishment of parties based on religion.
c. Freedom of Religion
Islam is the official religion of Mauritania. Virtually all
citizens are Muslim. Mauritanian Muslims are prohibited from
entering non-Islamic houses of worship and from converting to
another religion. Proselytizing by non-Muslims and the
construction of Christian churches and other non-Islamic houses
of worship are prohibited. The Roman Catholic community in
Mauritania has five churches, which operate freely as long as
they restrict their services to resident foreigners.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Traditionally, there have been few restrictions on movement
within Mauritania, where nomadism has long been a way of life.
However, following the rupture of relations with Senegal in
1989 and the attendant violence in the riverine area, local
authorities imposed and enforced at their own initiative
dusk-to-dawn curfews in some villages. This practice continued
in 1991, though on a much-diminished level. Although
Mauritanians since 1985 have not needed exit visas to travel
abroad, there are recurrent reports that some
persons — primarily antiregime activists and
non-Hassaniya-speaking blacks — were- denied passports for
unexplained, and possibly political, reasons.
The 100,000 or more Mauritanian nationals expelled from Senegal
and Mali in 1990 and earlier were largely reabsorbed into
Mauritania through govermnent and private means by the end of
1991. However, as some of them were settled on land belonging
to expelled Mauritanian residents, the seed of future trouble
has been planted if those expelled eventually return.
Approximately 55,000 expelled Mauritanian residents are still
resident in camps in Senegal, awaiting a political settlement
between the two countries which could include terms for
repatriation or indemnification. These refugees, plus an
additional 13,000 Halpulaar refugees in Mali, were expelled
from or fled Mauritania beginning in 1989.
Mauritania has become the refuge for some 18,000 Tuareg and
Maur refugees fleeing from ethnic strife in Mali's northern
regions. They live in camps largely supported by an
international effort led by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) . Finally, as a result of the
ongoing conflict in neighboring Western Sahara between Morocco
and the Polisario Front, a small number of refugees from the
Western Sahara have settled in Nouadhibou and other northern
towns and have been successfully absorbed into Mauritanian
society.
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Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
In 1991 citizens did not have this right. However, the Taya
Government in the latter part of 1991 took steps in the
direction of a multiparty system, scheduling presidential
elections for January 24, 1992. Legislative elections are to
be held before April 1992. At year's end, all political power
continued to rest in the hands of the military regime.
The Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) continued
to wield all executive and legislative functions. Membership
is limited to military officers, who occupy ministerial
positions or important military and security posts. The CMSN
is comprised predominantly of Maurs. Non-Maur membership on
the CMSN and in other senior civilian and military positions
has decreased in the wake of ethnic tensions.
The Government uses a quasi-political organization, the
Structure for the Education of the Masses (SEM), to mobilize
people to carry out local improvement projects, to relay policy
initiatives, and to serve as a channel to discuss grievances.
SEM's are found at all governmental levels down to villages and
neighborhoods. In practice, most significant grievances,
including violence, are discussed at the family, clan, or
tribal level first and passed along to influential governmental
figures of the saune family or tribe. In late 1991, there was
rising public sentiment against the SEM's, which according to
many were a conduit for patronage and election fraud in the
municipal elections held in previous years. Opposition parties
were demanding that the SEM's be dismantled.
The parties criticized the Government for the way it
implemented the new Constitution and for its control of
election planning. The parties also demanded that Taya step
down in favor of a transitional government. Taya made several
unilateral concessions but did not accede to the opposition's
principal demands for a delay of the elections and the
installation of a neutral transition government.
The opposition argued that the new Constitution was neither
drafted in consultation with opposition leaders nor approved by
a majority of the population. The Constitution was adopted in
a controversial July referendum; the opposition disputes the
Government's claims that 85 percent of the population went to
the polls and that 96 percent of those voting favored adoption
of the document. Notwithstanding the complaints about the
electoral process, four persons, including President Taya, are
candidates for the Presidency.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The only officially recognized human rights organization within
the country is the Mauritanian Human Rights League. Many
Mauritanians and international observers no longer consider the
League a viable or independent organization. Not since July
1989 has it publicly commented on or questioned the
Government's human rights excesses. A new human rights
organization is in gestation but had not been legally
recognized by the Ministry of Interior by the end of the year.
In the wake of the 1989 dispute with Senegal and the 1990/early
1991 detentions and deaths, the Taya regime took a defensive
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MAURITANIA
posture toward h\inian rights investigations. It refused to
appoint an independent commission to investigate the incidents,
despite continued pressure from foreign countries and
international nongovernmental organizations. It objected to
the activities of Amnesty International and Africa Watch, both
of which published reports on human rights abuses in
Mauritania. "It also objected to actions by the United States
Government, including the suspension of military assistance and
congressional hearings into the human rights situation in
Mauritania. However, in December, a visiting Mauritanian
presidential counselor invited Amnesty International and Africa
Watch to visit Mauritania to observe the human rights situation
first hand.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Mauritania is situated geographically and culturally on the
divide between traditionally nomadic Arabic (Hassaniya)-
speaking Maurs of the north and the sedentary black cultivators
of the African south. The interaction of these two groups
produces complex cultural diversity as well as ethnic tensions
in Mauritanian society. Historically, the Hassaniya-speaking
white Maurs have dominated the political and economic system.
Taken together, the Hassaniya-speaking black Maurs and
Mauritania's non-Hassaniya-speaking blacks outnumber the white
Maurs by a considerable majority. This racial majority is by
no means cohesive, however, because black Maurs identify in
many ways more closely with the white Maur population. White
Maurs hold the dominant positions in government, state
enterprises, business, and religious institutions, and many
non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians have long contended
that this situation is a result of ethnic and linguistic
discrimination.
It has been a longstanding policy of the Government to promote
Arabization and the use of Arabic as the country's principal
language. Although French is still widely used as well,
particularly among black Mauritanians, the new Constitution
enacted in July 1991 eliminates French as an official
language. Non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians also
charge that the Government's 1983 land reform law is
increasingly being misused to allow white and black Maurs to
encroach on fertile land in the Senegal river valley that had
been traditionally their preserve. Mauritania's dry and
inhospitable climate has contributed to the hostile feelings
between livestock raising Maurs and farming blacks. A
decade-long drought has increased the traditional flow of
nomads from the north into the more fertile southern regions,
further exacerbating tensions.
The longstanding ethnic divisions within Mauritanian society
came dramatically to the fore in April 1989. The events of
that period resulted more from an eruption of underlying ethnic
hostilities than from officially sanctioned government policy.
However, the extrajudicial expulsions that followed were
clearly based on ethnicity. Only non-Hassaniya-speaking blacks
were deprived of citizenship and deported. The resulting
cross-border raids were thus carried out by non-Hassaniya-
speakers, and security force reprisals were therefore directed
solely against these groups.
Theoretically, women have legal rights to property, divorce,
and child custody. In practice, both marriage and divorce can
take place without the woman's consent. Although there is a
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MAURITANIA
somewhat lower percentage of women than men educated at the
university level, there are no legal restrictions on education
for women. Women do not wear the veil, may operate
automobiles, and may own and manage their own businesses. The
Government is encouraging the entry of women into the
professions, government, and business, and a number of women
have moved into senior or midlevel government positions in
recent years. In late 1991, there were two women at the
highest levels of government: the Assistant Director of the
President's Cabinet and an Advisor to the President. However,
many Mauritanian women feel that these positions are more
symbolic than substantive.
The Government has been instrumental in opening up new
employment opportunities for women in areas traditionally
reserved for men, such as hospital work. According to
Mauritanian law, men and women must receive equal pay for equal
work; Mauritania's two largest employers, the Civil Service and
the State Mining Company, SNIM, respect this law.
Violence against women occurs, but no data exist to indicate
its extent. The police and judiciary have been known to
intervene in domestic disputes, but only recently has the
Mauritanian media begun to investigate this. The Government
has taken no position nor issued any statements on violence
against women or on female genital mutilation (circumcision), a
tradition in some areas of southern Mauritania where the most
dangerous form, inf ibulation, is practiced. This custom is
seldom, if ever, practiced in the north, and some evidence
indicates that the incidence of female circumcision is
diminishing in the modern, urbanized sector.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers are free to establish unions at the local and national
level. There are currently 36 trade unions in the country.
All, however, must be affiliates of the Union of Mauritanian
Workers (UTM) , by law the country's only central labor body.
The UTM's traditional independence from the Government was
broken in 1991 when its leadership, responding to members'
anger at the continued detention of military prisoners, called
an unsuccessful general strike. Through a combination of
strong-arm tactics, co-optation, and successful inside
maneuvering, the Government undercut the union leadership,
discredited the strikers, and installed a tame replacement UTM
leadership. UTM members arrested after street fighting in June
were tortured (see Section I.e.).
Although Mauritanian law grants workers the right to strike, in
practice strikes rarely occur, due to government pressure.
Under Mauritanian law, tripartite arbitration committees,
composed of union, business, and government representatives,
may impose binding arbitration that automatically terminates
any strike.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions are free to organize workers without government or
employer interference. According to the UTM, close to 90
percent of industrial and commercial workers in Mauritania are
members of unions. The laws providing workers' protection
against antiunion discrimination are regularly enforced. True
collective bargaining is limited by the Government ' s leadership
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MAURITANIA
role. Wages and other benefits are decided informally between
individual unions, employers, the Government, and the UTM. In
addition, employees or employers may bring labor disputes to
three-person labor courts that are overseen jointly by the
Ministries of Justice and Labor. Labor leaders regard these
courts as unbiased and effective. There are no export
processing zones in Mauritania.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Slavery was officially abolished in Mauritania several times,
most recently in 1980, but many persons whose ancestors were
slaves still occupied positions of servitude in 1991. This was
due in part to the economic hardships they would have
encountered if they had left. However, in some areas persons
were sometimes held against their will and forced to perform
unpaid labor. Human rights organizations claim that slavery
persists and charge that the Government has taken no
significant practical steps to eradicate the practice. Several
reports indicated that some instances of forced labor involved
young children.
d. Minimxim Age for Employment of Children
Education is not compulsory in Mauritania, but Mauritanian law
specifies that no child may be employed before the age of 13 in
the agricultural sector without the permission of the Minister
of Labor, nor before the age of 15 in the nonagricultural
sector. The law provides that employed children aged 14 to 16
should receive 7 0 percent of the minimum wage, and those from
17 to 18 should receive 90 percent of the minimum wage. There
is limited enforcement of child labor laws by the few
inspectors in the Ministry of Labor. In practice, much younger
children in the countryside pursue herding, cultivation, and
other significant labor in support of their families'
traditional activities. In accordance with longstanding
tradition, some children serve apprenticeships in small
industries, but overall, child labor in the nonagricultural
sector does not appear to be widespread.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The guaranteed minimum wage for adults was raised at the end of
1991 but even so it barely enabled the average family to meet
its minimum needs. The standard, legal nonagricultural
workweek in Mauritania cannot exceed either 40 hours or 6 days
without overtime compensation, which is paid at rates that are
graduated according to the number of supplemental hours
worked. Reliable data on actual wage levels is scarce.
Enforcement of the labor laws is the responsibility of the
Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor but in practice is
limited by the shortage of qualified personnel.
In April 1990, the Senegalese Confederation of Workers (CNTS)
submitted a representation to the International Labor
Organization (ILO) , charging the Government of Mauritania with
violating several ILO conventions. The CNTS detailed the
Government's "deportation and banishment of its own black
African citizens" and specified numerous sectors in which
significant numbers of non-Hassaniya-speaking blacks were
dismissed without cause and, in many cases, deprived of basic
rights.
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Mauritius, a parliamentary democracy and a member of the
Commonwealth of Nations, is governed by an elected prime
minister, a council of ministers, and a legislative assembly.
In December the Legislative Assembly voted to change Mauritius'
status within the Commonwealth, effective March 12, 1992.
Under the amended Constitution, a Mauritian-born president
nominated by the Prime Minister and confirmed by the Assembly
will replace the British Monarch as Head of State. Like the
Governor General under the previous system, the President's
powers will be largely ceremonial. Fair and orderly elections,
supervised by an independent commission, at national and local
levels take place at regular intervals. There are four major
political parties, which reflect a range of ideological views,
and several smaller parties. Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth's
current coalition received a broad mandate in general elections
in September .
A paramilitary Special Mobile Force of some 1,200 men and a
240-man Special Support Unit are responsible for internal
security. These forces, under the command of the Commissioner
of Police, are largely apolitical, well trained, and backed by
a general duty police force of approximately 4,000 men.
The economy is based on export-oriented manufacturing (mainly
textiles), sugar, and tourism. The rapid economic growth of
the mid-1980 's has slowed as a result of labor shortages. The
Government, with the help of international donors, is
attempting to diversify the industrial base to favor high
technology, capital-intensive production.
The Government generally continued to demonstrate respect for
basic human rights. Political and civil rights, including the
freedoms of speech and press, are protected under the
Constitution and respected in practice. The Prime Minister
established the Garrioch Committee in 1990 to conduct an
independent review of several controversial laws generally
considered to be repressive, specifically the Public Order Act
(POA), which permits detention without charge or trial, the
Industrial Relations Act (IRA), which limits the right to
strike, and the Newspapers and Periodicals Act, which makes it
illegal to publish false news. By the end of 1991, the
Committee had completed its report to the Government on all
legislation but the IRA.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of government-inspired political or
extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of the disappearance of persons for
political causes.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and inhuman punishment are prohibited by law, and there
were no reports of degrading treatment or punishment. There
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MAURITIUS
have been several allegations in the media of police
mistreatment of suspects, but follow-up investigations failed
to confirm any abuses.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under the Constitution, detained persons have the right to a
judicial determination of the legality of their detention.
Although the time limit for making this aetermination is not
specified in law, in practice it is usually made within 24
hours. Bail is commonly granted. The Public Gathering Act
(PGA), which replaced the Public Order Act based on
recommendations from the Garrioch Committee, no longer allows
for indefinite detention without charge or trial.
Exile is legally prohibited and not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Mauritius' judicial system, modeled on that of Great Britain,
consists of the Supreme Court, which has appellate powers, and
a series of lower courts. Final appeal may be made to the
Queen's Privy Council in the United Kingdom and is routinely
made in the cases of death sentences. About 50 percent of
Supreme Court rulings referred to the Privy Council are
reversed. There are no political or military courts.
The Governor General (as of 1992 the President), in
consultation with the Prime Minister, nominates the Chief
Justice and, in consultation with the Chief Justice, nominates
the senior puisne (associate) judges. The Governor General
nominates other judges on the advice of the Judicial and Legal
Service Commissions. The legal system has consistently
provided fair, public trials for those charged with crimes.
Defendants have the right to private or court-appointed
counsel. The judiciary is also charged under the Constitution
with ensuring that new laws are consistent with democratic
practice.
Recently several prominent legal specialists have been critical
of government interference in the judicial process and have
warned against undermining the independence of the judiciary.
In particular, this criticism coincided with the Government's
handling of the Boodhoo and Ballah cases. (In the 1989 arrests
of Harish Boodhoo, the well-known leader of the Mauritian
Socialist Party (PSM), and Vedi Ballah, the editor of the PSM
newspaper. The Socialist, the authorities held them for 3 weeks
and 1 week respectively before bail was granted. They were
charged under the now defunct Public Order Act with giving out
false information that could cause a public disturbance.)
There were no political prisoners in Mauritius at year's end.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The sanctity of the home is guaranteed by law and generally
respected in practice. The search of personal property or
premises is allowed only under clearly specified conditions by
court order or by police decision if an illegal act has been
committed. There have been credible reports that the
Government's intelligence apparatus occasionally opens mail and
carries out surveillance of local opposition leaders and other
major figures.
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MAURITIUS
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is protected by the Constitution
and local tradition and is generally respected in practice.
Debate in the Legislative Assembly is lively and open. Sixteen
privately owned daily, weekly, and monthly newspapers present
varying political viewpoints and freely express partisan
views. However, newspapers are subject to the legal
constraints of libel laws, vrtiich, under the 1984 Newspaper and
Periodicals (Amendment) Act, can be used by the Government to
limit press criticism, as was done in the Boodhoo and Ballah
cases .
The Government owns the two television and three radio stations
(one strictly educational), which broadcast in 12 languages and
dialects. Television and radio tend to reflect government
editorial and programming policies. Opposition politicians
have accused the Broadcasting Corporation of political bias in
its local news coverage. The political opposition successfully
challenged the television stations to permit its candidates
programming time on the eve of general elections in September.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Mauritians enjoy the right to form associations, including
political parties, trade unions, and religious organizations,
although in practice all such organizations need government
approval in order to operate officially. Mauritius has a
multitude of such private organizations. Political, cultural,
and religious assemblies are commonplace.
Although police permission is required for holding
demonstrations and mass meetings, such permission is rarely
refused. Registered political parties and alliances held
numerous public rallies in the leadup to general and municipal
elections in September and October. All rallies were peaceful.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion in Mauritius. Hindus are a
majority, but Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and others openly
practice, teach, and proselytize their religions without
prejudice. All religious institutions receive state subsidies
in proportion to their memberships. There is no
state-sponsored discrimination against any ethnic or religious
community. The Government facilitates the travel of Mauritians
who make the hajj. Foreign missionaries are not allowed to
enter the country without a prior request from a local
religious organization.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on freedom of movement within the
country. Foreign travel and emigration are also unrestricted.
However, there is no blanket guarantee of repatriation, and
there are no general criteria for processing repatriation
applications. Applications from Mauritians abroad who lost
their citizenship after acquiring a second nationality
(estimated to be several thousand) are handled on a
case-by-case and sometimes arbitrary basis. This remains an
issue of political debate as more Mauritians abroad seek to
reclaim their Mauritian citizenship.
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MAURITIUS
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have the right and ability to change their government
through democratic means. Mauritius is governed by a freely
elected, unicameral Legislative Assembly, with executive
direction coming from a Council of Ministers, currently headed
by Prime Minister Sir Anerood Jugnauth, whose Alliance
coalitions won elections in 1983, 1987, and 1991. The Governor
General has the right to desigiiate the person charged with
forming a new government following parliamentary elections or
in a parliamentary crisis. Parliamentary, municipal, and
village council elections are held at regular intervals. All
citizens 18 years of age and over have the right to vote and
run for office.
In the Legislative Assembly, up to 8 members are appointed
through a complex "best loser" system designed in part to
ensure that all ethnic groups are adequately represented. The
governing (three-party) Alliance coalition now controls 59 of
the 66 seats. The four major political parties and the smaller
parties often match the ethnicity or religion of their
candidates to the composition of particular electoral
constituencies.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged violations
of Human Rights
Several local human rights groups monitor developments without
governmental restriction. There have been no known requests by
international organizations to investigate human rights
violations in Mauritius.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Although Mauritius has a Hindu majority, the covintry's active
press and strongly egalitarian traditions mitigate against
discrimination in all forms. However, tensions based on
ethnicity and caste do exist.
Traditionally, women in Mauritius have occupied a subordinate
role in society, but the Government has tried to promote
equality by eliminating various legal restrictions, e.g., in
laws dealing with emigration and inheritance and, in 1990,
removing a legal bar to women serving on juries. Also, in 1989
the Government appointed "equal employment opportunity
officers" in the major ministries to oversee women's activities
and to ensure the promotion of women's interests. Nonetheless,
women still cannot transmit citizenship to their foreign-born
children, and foreign husbands of Mauritian women cannot .
automatically obtain residency and work permits (as can foreign
wives of Mauritian men) . Women still face de facto
discrimination, including in education. For example, women are
discouraged from studying traditionally male-dominated fields
such as engineering, medicine, and law.
According to the Ministry of Women's Rights and Family Welfare,
physicians, attorneys, and religious and charitable
organizations, violence against women is prevalent, although no
reliable statistics have been gathered. There are no special
provisions in Mauritian law concerning family violence. Police
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authorities are generally reluctant to became involved in cases
of wife beating. In June 1989, the Ministry of Women's Rights
and Family Welfare established a family counseling service,
managed by the National Council of Women, one of whose
principal tasks is to provide counseling and legal advice in
cases of spousal abuse. Also, a Mauritian nongovernmental
organization, S.O.S. Women, has recently been launched. (See
Section 6.e. concerning wage inequalities.)
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Mauritius has an active trade union movement. Almost 300
unions represent about 110,000 workers, more than one-fourth of
the work force. Of the 300 unions, 110 have less than 50
members. Unions are free to organize workers in all sectors,
including the export processing zone (EPZ) which employs about
90,000 workers, but in practice there are a variety of
constraints under the 1973 Industrial Relations Act (IRA), such
as the need to get government approval to register new unions.
Unions have also been deregistered in the EPZ in recent years.
Less than 10 percent of EPZ workers are believed to be
unionized. Unions can press wage demands, establish ties to
domestic political parties and international organizations, and
address political issues. Three of the five trade union
activists who ran in the August 30, 1987, general elections
were elected to the Legislative Assembly on the government
slate.
In theory, unions have the right to strike. However, in labor
disputes, the IRA requires a prestrike 21-day cooling-off
period followed by binding arbitration, which has the effect of
making most strikes illegal. Participation in a strike not
approved by a court is sufficient grounds for dismissal.
Refusal to follow IRA procedures during a mid-1988 textile
plant strike led to the imprisonment of three union leaders for
several days and in 1990 to the firing of 14 strike leaders of
the Central Electricity Board Staff Association and the calling
in of the Special Mobile Force to operate the power stations.
There were no significant strikes in 1991.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
While the right of association is guaranteed by law, the
collective bargaining process has been distorted in Mauritius.
The IRA addresses collective bargaining and allows it in
theory, but in practice its provisions for establishing wages
bear little resemblance to the traditional collective
bargaining process, and the Government's restraints on that
process render it ineffective.
The Government has established a National Remuneration Board
(NRB) whose chairman is appointed by the Minister of Labor.
The NRB establishes minimum wages for 26 categories of private
sector workers (sugar, tea, transport, etc.) which apply
equally to workers in the EPZ. Although originally established
to set minimum wages for nonunion workers, the NRB has
broadened its powers and now issues remuneration orders that
establish minimum wages, bonuses, housing and transportation
allowances, and other benefits for almost all private sector
workers. About 85 percent of all private sector workers
(including unionized workers) are covered by NRB orders.
Employers and unions are free to negotiate wages and benefits
above the minimums established by the NRB, but this is rare.
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MAURITIUS
NRB remuneration orders set minimum wages by sector but also
establish a wage structure based on length of service and job
classification. NRB orders thus set wages for skilled and
experienced workers whose earnings are well above the minimum
wage. Wages and benefits for civil servants are established by
the Pay Research Bureau (PRB) which prepares a wage scale for
the civil service each year on the basis of the annual
Chesworth Report recommendations.
The Government has also established a tripartite committee,
including employer and trade union representatives, which meets
once a year and is chaired by the Minister of Finance. It can
recommend only wage increases based on inflation. Its
recommendations are not always unanimous, however, and the
Government makes the final decision based on all the
information it receives.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts
(COE) noted again in 1991 that the IRA does not give workers'
organizations sufficient protection against acts of
interference as provided for by ILO Convention 98 on the right
to organize and collective bargaining. The Garrioch Committee
continued to review throughout 1991 the IRA, but it had not
reported its recommendations by the end of 1991.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law and not
practiced. However, under the IRA, the Minister of Labor can
refer industrial disputes to compulsory arbitration,
enforceable by penalties involving compulsory labor
provisions. The COE has criticized this as being in conflict
with ILO Convention 105 on forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum work age for employment of children is 15. The
Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing child labor
laws. In practice, there is minimal enforcement of these
laws. While there are cases of children below 15 working
illegally in the EPZ, the large, established EPZ factories do
not hire children under 15. In fact, it is unusual to see
employees much younger than 18. Education is compulsory and
strictly enforced through age 12.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minim\im wages are legislated, differing along employment sector
and gender lines. Women are paid less in the agricultural
sector on the assumption that their productivity is lower in
this physical, labor-intensive work. In the EPZ, the minimum
wage is equal for men and women. Conditions of employment,
including wage and leave conditions, are generally sufficient
to afford an acceptable standard of living for workers in the
agricultural, service, and manufacturing sectors. However, the
current statutory rate paid for unskilled labor is barely
sufficient to provide a worker with a minimum standard of
living, and much depends on the additional benefits offered.
The Government mandates minimum wage increases each year based
on inflation.
A maximum workweek of 45 hours is allowed, but excessive
overtime continues to be a problem in the EPZ. Following
complaints that EPZ employers imposed long hours of overtime on
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MAURITIUS
employees — about 10 to 20 hours per week, making for a 55- to
65-hour workweek — the Government established a committee to
address these issues, but by the end of 1991 it still had
issued no report. In addition, some EPZ employers still
require women to work at night.
The Government sets health and safety standards, and conditions
are inspected by Ministry of Labor officials. Enforcement is
minimal and ineffective due to the small number of inspectors.
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MOZAMBIQUE
In 1991 Mozambique continued to be governed by President
Joaquim Chissano and menibers of the National Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) . The secret-ballot,
multiparty elections called for in the 1990 Constitution were
postponed, pending the outcome of peace talks in Rome between
the Government and the insurgent Mozambican National Resistance
(RENAMO). The Government passed legislation in 1991 governing
the new, multiparty system and, by year's end, 14 new political
parties had formed and held public meetings. Only FRELIMO,
though, had officially registered. At its Sixth Party
Congress, FRELIMO formally adopted social democracy as the
party's philosophy, replacing Marxism-Leninism, and held its
first secret-ballot elections for party leadership.
Since the late 1970 's, the Government has been under attack
from RENAMO, which is estimated to have as many as 20,000 men
under arms. Peace talks between the Government and RENAMO
began in mid-1990 under Italian mediation and were still under
way at year's end. Sporadic fighting, however, continued
between the Armed Forces of Mozambic[ue (FAM) and RENAMO in all
of the country's 10 provinces, including attacks on the
outskirts of the capital, Maputo.
The security forces include the 60,000 FAM soldiers, a people's
militia, and, until mid-1991 when it was abolished, the
Mozambican National Security Service (SNASP), which in the past
had been frequently charged with human rights abuses. In
September the President signed legislation creating a new
security force, the State Information and Security Service
(SISE). Several top officials of the former SNASP were
assigned to other government departments. Unlike its
predecessor, the new organization does not have the power to
arrest and detain suspects, and the Government's declared
intent is to limit SISE to legitimate intelligence and security
functions. At year's end, it was too early to evaluate SISE's
human rights record.
Approximately 80 percent of the population is employed in
agriculture, mostly on a small-scale, subsistence level. Major
sources of foreign exchange are seafood and agricultural
products, especially cashews, tea, sugar, and cotton. The
Government continued its efforts to move to a market-oriented
economy, but growth was extremely poor for the second year in a
row. Continued attacks by RENAMO on economic targets severely
hampered production and internal trade; approximately 5 million
people — a third of the nation's population — are thought to be
dependent on international food aid.
Human rights abuses continued in 1991, with the most blatant
arising out of the continuing civil conflict. Widespread
reports detailed massacres directed against civilians,
kidnapings, torture, and looting. RENAMO was responsible for
the vast majority of these atrocities, but government forces
also committed serious abuses. Other major human rights
problems included harsh prison conditions; the use of
arbitrary, incommunicado detention, especially by the SNASP;
incidents of military indiscipline and harassment of civilians;
forced recruitment; and citizens' inability to change their
government .
The new Constitution represented a major step toward
safeguarding basic rights, but it also contains a number of
qualifying clauses which subordinate the new freedoms to
"national security" and "foreign policy interests." By the end
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MOZAMBIQUE
of 1991, it was unclear how the Government would implement key
provisions of the Constitution and a series of new laws enacted
in 1991 governing press, nationality, and labor. However, as
political parties were allowed to form and meet without
government intervention and labor disputes were being aired
publicly, people were increasingly confident and willing to
voice dissenting views, criticize government actions past and
present, and openly challenge FRELIMO/government orthodoxy.
The success of the new Constitution and a multiparty system
will depend heavily on resolution of the conflict with RENAMO,
which has long demanded the establishment of a multiparty
system but denounced the Government's unilateral implementation
of the Constitution and legislation on political parties.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known or suspected cases of the Government
targeting persons for political killings in 1991. Both sides
were responsible for the deaths of civilians in the course of
the civil war, with the great majority of the killings
attributed to RENAMO forces (see Section l.g.).
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of government-perpetrated
disappearances. However, thousands are missing due to the
conflict, often as a result of kidnapings in areas affected by
the war. RENAMO, in particular, regularly holds civilians
against their will, often employing them as porters or forcibly
impressing them into their military forces.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment of Punishment
The new Constitution expressly prohibits torture. During the
prosecution of the war, however, both government and RENAMO
forces tortured prisoners and civilians. There were numerous
reports that government troops and security personnel beat and
extorted money from civilians. Several soldiers were convicted
for such crimes in 1991 and sentenced to prison terms, fines,
and expulsion from the armed services. RENAMO 's attacks on
civilians continued unabated in 1991. According to many
reports, RENAMO beat and mutilated people and forced family
members to witness or participate in the torture of their
relatives. Former RENAMO soldiers claimed that threats of
beating, torture, and execution were used to keep coerced
recruits from escaping.
Prison conditions remained very poor. For example, the local
press reported three persons in the Beira jail died in July as
a result of diseases caused by contaminated food; further, the
jail, which has a capacity for 70 inmates, was holding 216 at
one point. Since 1988 the Government has allowed international
human rights groups access to prisons where national security
prisoners (mainly RENAMO soldiers and sympathizers) are held,
both those already convicted and those awaiting trial. In past
years, there were reliable reports of torture, including
beatings, submersion in water, deprivation of food and sleep,
and prolonged isolation. It is not known to what extent these
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MOZAMBIQUE
cJbuses occurred in 1991, but instances of torture by security
police have reportedly declined sharply since 1988.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The law requires that most detainees be charged or released
within 30 days. However, persons accused of the most serious
crimes, i.e., security offenses or those requiring a sentence
of more than 8 years, may be detained for up to 84 days without
being formally charged or investigated. With court approval,
such detainees may then be held for two additional periods of
84 days while the police complete their investigation. While
detained persons have the constitutional right to counsel and
to contact relatives or friends, this right is often not
respected. In some cases, detainees may be released from
prison while the investigation proceeds, but the bail system in
Mozambicjue remains ill-defined. The law provides that if the
prescribed period for investigation has been completed and no
charges have been brought, the detainee must be released. In
practice, however, this law is often ignored, in part because
of the severe lack of administrative personnel and trained
lawyers to monitor the judicial system, and in part because
citizens are often unaware of their rights, particularly those
granted under the new Constitution, and do not demand them. As
a result, there continued to be throughout 1991 a large backlog
of prisoners awaiting trial, despite reported government
efforts to speed up pretrial investigations. Detainees often
spend many months, even years, in pretrial status.
The SNASP, abolished in September, had broad powers to arrest
persons accused of political and economic crimes against the
State, such as espionage or sabotage. It often used these
powers arbitrarily, mainly against anyone suspected of
sympathizing with RENAMO, and held detainees indefinitely,
often incommunicado. Its successor, the SISE, no longer has
this power. In theory, security detainees now have the same
legal rights as ordinary criminal detainees.
The number of political detainees awaiting trial, as
distinguished from those who had been convicted, was unknown at
year's end. There were an estimated 700 security prisoners at
the end of 1990; that figure was thought to be lower in 1991,
though no concrete data were available. It is unknown how many
of these were awaiting trial. Most of those being held are
accused of sympathizing with, or committing crimes on behalf
of, RENAMO.
In June and July, 21 persons were arrested for allegedly
attempting to overthrow the Government. Two of the suspects
were released shortly after their arrest, and three more were
released in September for lack of evidence. The Attorney
General said the State would ensure a fair and legal trial.
The new Constitution expressly prohibits the expulsion of any
Mozambican citizen.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Mozambique has two complementary justice systems: the
civil/criminal, which includes customary courts, and the
military justice system, both under the administration of the
Ministry of Justice. At the apex of both systems is the
Supreme Court. Military courts, including brigade courts and
provincial military courts for specified military-related
crimes, are administered jointly with the Ministry of Defense.
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MOZAMBIQUE
Crimes committed by senior military officials are handled
directly by the Supreme Court. Appeals, including military
cases, may be made to the Supreme Court, where two judges are
designated to handle military matters.
Since the establishment of the Supreme Court in 1988 and the
abolition of the Revolutionary Military Tribunal, persons
accused of crimes against the State are tried in common
civilian courts under standard criminal judicial procedures.
For example, persons arrested in July for allegedly attempting
to overthrow the Government are being tried in civilian
courts. Although all accused persons are in theory presumed
innocent and have the right to legal counsel and the right of
appeal, these rights are not always applied. A judge may order
a trial closed because of national security interests or to
protect the privacy of the plaintiff in cases concerning rape.
Trials in the regular civil and criminal court system are
generally public and fair, but the entire process suffers
severely from the Government's inability to reduce a large
backlog of cases.
In addition to the regular courts at the provincial and
district levels, there are customary courts at the local level
which handle matters such as estate and divorce cases. The
proceedings are usually conducted in public by a trained
representative of the Ministry of Justice, assisted by two or
four popularly elected lay judges instructed to exercise common
sense and to apply locally accepted principles.
The 1990 Constitution establishes an independent judiciary and
provides for the selection of judges by other jurists,
replacing the prior system of administratively appointed
justices. Under the new Constitution, the President appoints
seven members of the Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice
and Assistant Chief Justice, from career jurists. An
additional 9 to 18 "citizen judges" are elected by the National
Assembly. The practical impact of these and projected changes
on the independence of the judiciary remains to be tested.
Several of the new political parties continued to maintain that
the Government was still holding political prisoners as well as
operating reeducation camps, although no new evidence emerged
in 1991 to support those claims. The Government continued to
deny the charges and said that all political prisoners have
either been granted amnesty, pardoned, or were dead.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Despite provisions for privacy in the new Constitution, in
areas of active insurgency homes are entered at will by
security and police forces. Civilians living in these areas
are often forced to move to government-protected villages. The
population concentrated in the secure villages suffers from
malnutrition, disease, and high mortality rates.
It is widely assumed that surveillance devices are employed to
monitor local and international telecommunications systems and
that mail is periodically inspected, even though the new
Constitution expressly prohibits such surveillance.
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MOZAMBIQUE
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Both government (FAM) and RENAMO forces were again responsible
for violations of humanitarian law in 1991, although RENAMO
abuses continued to be much more widespread and systematic.
Attacks against civilians were reported frequently, and, given
the remoteness of much of the countryside, many more attacks
undoubtedly went unreported. Since it began in the late
1970 's, the conflict is estimated to have cost approximately
500,000 lives and left millions of Mozambicans homeless and
living on the edge of starvation.
There is no estimate of the number of killings in 1991 by
government forces, but there have been credible reports,
including allegations by refugees, of abuses by government
forces. According to press and eyewitness reports, government
soldiers regularly attacked residents of Matola-Rio, killing
and torturing many persons and looting property. In another
incident, security forces shot into a crowd of citizens during
a protest in Sofala province over the payment of salaries,
wounding three adults and killing a child. There were also
numerous complaints of forced recruitment by government troops.
Senior officials repeatedly urged the security and military
forces to respect the population, and in some cases legal
charges were brought against undisciplined soldiers. In one
such case, a military court sentenced two officers to 12 and 15
years in prison, respectively, for killing a civilian accused
of being involved with RENAMO. In 1991, 66 police were brought
before an internal commission of the police department for
crimes ranging from attacks on citizens to theft. According to
the Government, 46 of these police had been disciplined or
expelled from the force. The others were still being
investigated.
Atrocities by RENAMO are well documented; the rebel group
continued to execute or kidnap noncombatants after attacks on
villages, often hacking or burning people to death and later
displaying body parts, apparently to intimidate would-be
resisters. For example, such atrocities were widely reported
in national and international media after RENAMO overran the
the town of Lalaua in Nampula province in August. There were
numerous other such abuses during the year. RENAMO also
continued to forcibly impress civilians, including children,
and to attack relief convoys, health workers, and clinics. By
year's end, allegations of armed attacks by both RENAMO and FAM
on refugee camps in Malawi were a growing concern.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The new Constitution provides for freedom of expression and the
press, but it also permits the Government to restrict these
freedoms for various reasons, including national defense
considerations. The new press law holds that, in cases of
defamation against the President or ambassadors accredited to
Mozambique, truth is not a sufficient defense. Criticism of
these persons, however, is not prohibited. In practice, there
was increased freedom of speech with the advent of several new
political parties. Some political opposition leaders voiced
harsh public criticism of the one-party political system, and
there was more open discussion within FRELIMO at its party
congress.
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MOZAMBIQUE
There is no formal prior press censorship in Mozambique.
However, many journalists have stated that they are held to
unwritten and sometimes vague guidelines by their media
directors, who are, in turn, appointed by the Government. The
journalists claim that this encouraged self-censorship.
In general, press freedom improved in 1991. According to media
sources, official interference was almost nonexistent by year's
end. The media ran stories on corruption, official
incompetence, and incidents of military and police abuse of the
civilian population. Journalists stated publicly that they had
received death threats from the military to stop stories on
army press-ganging but were apparently not intimidated and
continued to report the story. Editorials and commentaries
rarely criticized FRELIMO and never directly criticized the
President. However, the press reported, in full and without
penalty, strong criticism of FRELIMO and the Government by the
new political parties.
All mass media, including radio and television, are owned by
the Government, except for one privately owned newsmagazine.
The National Organization of Mozambican Journalists declared
its independence from FRELIMO in 1991. It lobbied vigorously
for a less restrictive press environment and pressed the
Government for a liberal interpretation of the new press law.
This new law permits private media and allows private
investment in state-owned media. Foreign journalists are
welcome, and foreign radio broadcasts and television are
received without interference.
No formal restrictions on academic freedom exist, but in
practice teachers are subject to the same self-censorship as
the media.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association. Legislation enacted in 1991 set up guidelines for
registering as a political party, as well as for holding public
demonstrations (see Section 3). Opposition political groups
met during the year and held congresses and press conferences
with no government interference.
While the requirements for holding public demonstrations are
not onerous, the Government's overly strict application of the
rules made it difficult for some groups to exercise this
right. The Government halted or prohibited several public
demonstrations on technical grounds. Some FRELIMO party
officials have defended this approach, insisting that security
concerns take precedence over freedom of assembly.
c. Freedom of Religion
Both the original and the new Constitutions mandate strict
separation of church and state and provide for the freedom to
"practice or not practice a religion." The Government does not
require religious organizations or missionaries to register,
and foreign missionaries are readily granted visas. The new
Constitution gives religious institutions the right to own
property and allows private entities, including presumably
religious institutions, to operate schools.
Relations between the Government and religious organizations,
tense in the early years after independence, continued to
improve in 1991. The Government agreed in principle to return
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MOZAMBIQUE
many properties expropriated from religious organizations in
the post independence period, and some property was returned in
1991.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The new Constitution provides for freedom to travel within the
country and abroad and prohibits exile or revocation of
Mozambican citizenship for political reasons. The Government
no longer requires citizens to obtain permits from local
authorities in order to travel throughout the country.
Citizens in insecure areas are often forced to move to
governnient-protected villages.
Given the civil conflict, there are few refugees from other
countries in Mozambique. At the end of 1991, only 358 refugees
received assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) with the full cooperation of the
Government. There were no reported cases in which refugees
were forced to return to countries where they have a
well-founded fear of persecution.
There are an estimated 1.4 million internally displaced people,
living mainly in displaced persons camps scattered throughout
the country. In these camps, they receive emergency aid from
the Government and from the international community. Over 1.5
million Mozambicans have left their homes for refuge in
neighboring countries. Over half have gone to Malawi, others
to South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia, and Swaziland.
The Government readily accepts and aids repatriates; in recent
years, an estimated 234,000 have returned on their own
initiative, or through UNHCR voluntary repatriation programs
coordinated with neighboring governments. Outflow, however,
still exceeds repatriations.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens did not have the ability to change their government in
1991. Although the 1990 Constitution provides for multiparty
elections, RENAMO and most of the new opposition parties
indicated that they would, not participate in elections before a
political settlement was reached to end the longstanding civil
war. Consequently, the Government postponed national elections
indefinitely pending the outcome of the Rome peace talks with
RENAMO, at which issues related to the holding of future
multiparty elections were also being discussed. An accord
reached in Rome in November altered several aspects of the
political parties law passed by the Government in 1991 but
preserved the commitment to hold early elections.
The post independence single-party constitution established a
system that effectively allowed the President, the FRELIMO
Politburo, and the Council of Ministers to control policymaking
and implementation. The new Constitution officially ended the
leading role of the FRELIMO party, although the
FRELIMO-dominated Government will remain in office pending new
elections. The new Constitution calls for a strong presidency,
but it also strengthens the legislature by allowing a
two-thirds majority to override what is essentially a
presidential veto. It also provides for eventual
constitutional review of legislation by the Supreme Court.
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MOZAMBIQUE
The Constitution provides for an unlimited number of political
parties. Under the political parties law promulgated in 1991,
a legally recognized political party must demonstrate that it
has no racial, ethnic, or religious exclusiveness and must
demonstrate support in all provinces. (The November accord on
political parties law would eliminate this latter
recjuirement . ) Fourteen different parties had formally
announced their formation by the end of 1991; only FRELIMO,
though, had officially registered.
The success of the new Constitution and a multiparty system
will depend heavily on RENAMO's intentions. While RENAMO has
long demanded the establishment of a multiparty system in
Mozambique, it denounced the Government's unilateral
implementation of the new Constitution and legislation on
political parties.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged violations
of Human Rights
There are no local organizations that monitor human rights
abuses, although there are no legal obstacles to the formation
of such groups. The Government is receptive, however, to some
international human rights monitoring groups. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) maintains
offices in Maputo and Beira, but its relations with the
Government suffered in 1991 following the discovery of military
and police uniforms in an ICRC donation shipment. The
Government accused the ICRC of providing uniforms to RENAMO,
which the ICRC denied. By the end of the year, however, the
matter had subsided, and relations were improving.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits such discrimination, and there does
not appear to be any systematic persecution on the basis of
ethnicity or race. Nonetheless, the FRELIMO Government has
tended to include at all levels a disproportionate number of
southerners, mostly from the Shangana ethnic group. White,
Asian, and mixed-race Mozambicans are also heavily represented
relative to their numbers in the population. This is not the
case, however, in the military where no whites and few
mixed-race Mozambicans serve. Most observers, both Mozambican
and foreign, believe that ethnic imbalance in governmental
positions results from the greater educational opportunities
available to southerners and nonblacks under the former
colonial administration and not from deliberate government
policies. During its Sixth Congress in August, FRELIMO
broadened the regional and ethnic base of the party by creating
slates of candidates for the Central Committee from all
provinces .
Racial issues figured in political debates in 1991. During the
discussion over the new nationality law, several National
Assembly members argued that Mozambican citizenship should be
limited to persons of black Mozambican origin, excluding
whites, Indians, and mixed races; the final legislation did
not, however, adopt that definition. Some of the new political
parties also played on racial themes as they worked to define
themselves. During its party congress, the Liberal Party of
Mozambique (PALMO) attacked the role of whites and mixed races
in the Government and the economy, though it publicly retreated
from these statements later.
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MOZAMBIQUE
The leadership of the RENAMO insurgents is predominantly from
the Shona-speaking ethnic groups who live near the Zimbabwean
border. There is no indication that the conflict between the
Government and RENAMO is primarily motivated by ethnicity,
although ethnic and regional factors may play some role, and
tribal factors may explain some of the violence. Historical
accident appears to be responsible for the ethnic composition
of the RENAMO leadership; the Shona was the group culturally
and geographically most accessible to the Rhodesian
intelligence organization, which established the forerunner to
RSIAMO in the late 1970 's. Since then RENAMO has recruited
from all ethnic groups and has not emphasized ethnic issues in
its corranuniques or in its negotiating positions.
The new Constitution forbids discrimination on the basis of sex
and mandates eqfual rights and responsibilities for women.
Family law requires that women have equal property rights and
rights over the children in any marriage. In practice, women
are under represented in the professions and in educational
institutions at all levels. Over 80 percent of Mozambican
women are peasant farmers, and most have had little education
or access to good health care. Mozambique has one of the
highest maternal mortality rates in the world. The
Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) has made a long-term
project of studying the traditional practices of the various
ethnic groups and challenging, through grassroots educational
progreims, those practices believed detrimental to women.
FRELIMO made a concerted effort to increase the representation
of women in the party, electing in 1991 a Central Committee
with a 35-percent female membership.
According to medical and other sources, violence against women,
especially wife beating, is fairly widespread in Mozambique,
especially in rural areas. The police do not normally
intervene in domestic disputes, and cases are rarely brought
before the courts. The Government has not addressed the issue
specifically, and its influence is weak, especially in many
rural areas affected by the war. The OMM is campaigning to
change pviblic attitudes on violence against women and other
practices, such as female circumcision and bride-price
payments, which continue in some rural areas. Female
circumcision is found most frequently in coastal areas,
particularly among Muslim groups.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The 1990 Constitution specifies that all workers are free to
join or not join a trade union. A new labor law passed in
December further protects workers' rights to organize and to
engage in union activity at their place of employment.
However, at the end of 1991, all trade unions were still
incorporated into a central labor union confederation, the
Organization of Mozambican Workers (OTM), which was loosely •
affiliated with the FRELIMO party until late 1990, when it
declared itself independent. In late 1991, the Assembly
approved legislation clarifying the right of labor groups to
form independent trade unions. By the end of 1991, no other
independent unions had yet been formed.
For the first time, the new Constitution explicitly provides
for the right to strike, though it restricts this right for
government employees, police, military personnel, and employees
of other essential services. Following the wave of wildcat
266
MOZAMBIQUE
Strikes in 1990, the Government introduced a set of provisional
guidelines which have the effect of delaying strikes but which
nevertheless conferred de facto recognition on ad hoc labor
committees to act as independent negotiating units in place of
OTM. These guidelines require prior notice of strike activity,
exhaustion of other alternatives, presentation of a list of
demands, and appointment of a negotiating committee. According
to government reports, strikers in several subsequent walkouts
adhered to the guidelines. However, in 1991 there was much
confusion regarding the Government's interpretation of the
provisional guidelines, the new labor law, and the right to
strike.
During 1991 wildcat strikes continued in several sectors,
though with less frequency than in 1990. Strikers continued to
rely on ad hoc committees to press their demands rather than on
the OTM leadership with its close ties to the Government and
FRELIMO. While the new OTM leadership hoped to convince labor
of its new independent role, at the end of 1991 many OTM
leaders continued to hold prominent positions in FRELIMO.
Strikers in several industries were able to win their demands
from management, though a strike among air traffic controllers
dragged on throughout the year, with the Government taking an
ambivalent position.
The Constitution and labor legislation guarantee unions the
right to join and participate in international bodies. The OTM
is not affiliated with any non-African international trade
union organization; it is a member of the Organization of
African Trade Union Unity and the Southern African Trade Union
Coordinating Council.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The new labor law protects workers' rights to organize and to
engage in collective bargaining. It expressly prohibits
discrimination against organized labor. In late 1991, the
Government decreed that it would no longer set all salary
levels. Negotiating wage increases was left in the hands of
the existing unions. Though some unions have begun the process
of negotiating new wage levels, it is too early to tell how
successful they will be or whether they will be able to gain
the confidence of workers. During most of 1991, workers chose
to bargain with employers through legally recognized ad hoc
committees, with mixed results. The law requires Government
arbitration if labor and management fail to reach agreement.
There are currently no export processing zones in Mozambique.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law, and there have
been no reports of such labor practices by the Government.
RENAMO reportedly forces kidnaped civilians to perform various
support functions, including porter ing arms and supplies and
growing food for combatants. There were also reports of forced
conscription by the FAM.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Child labor is regulated by the Ministry of Labor. In the wage
economy the minimum working age is 16. Because of high adult
unemployment, there are few children in regular wage
positions. However, children commonly work on family farms or
in the urban informal sector, where they perform such tasks as
267
MOZAMBIQUE
watching cars or collecting scrap metal. In addition, many
children are kidnaped by RENAMO and forced to serve as soldiers
or laborers for the rebels.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Ministry of Labor enforces minimum wage rates in the
private sector. Public sector rates are enforced by the
Ministry of Finance. Violations of minimum wage rates are
usually investigated only after workers register a complaint.
It is customary for workers to receive benefits such as
transportation and food. The minimum wage is not adequate to
sustain an average urban worker's family. Workers must turn to
second jobs, if available, as well as work garden plots to
survive. An estimated 80 percent of the work force is engaged
in subsistence agriculture, which is not covered by minimum
wage legislation. The standard legal workweek is 44 hours.
In the small, modern sector, the Government has enacted health
and environmental laws to protect workers. On occasion, the
Government has closed firms for noncompliance with these laws,
but enforcement by the Ministry of Labor is irregular,
particularly under current economic conditions.
268
NAMIBIA
Namibia achieved its independence under United Nations
supervision on March 21, 1990, following 74 years of South
African rule. The new nation is a functioning multiparty,
multiracial democracy, whose Constitution contains an
entrenched bill of rights, providing for freedom of speech,
press, assembly, association, and religion. The Government is
headed by Sam Nujoma, leader of the South West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO), which won Namibia's first free election
in November 1989. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA),
SWAPO 's major opposition, and five small parties are also
represented in the National Assembly.
The main security force is the Namibian Defense Force (NDF) ,
comprised of former troops of the People's Liberation Army of
Namibia (PLAN — SWAPO' s military wing) and of the South West
African Territorial Force (SWATF) — forces that battled each
other in the years prior to independence. The NDF and a small
national police force, responsible for maintaining internal
security, receive professional training from the United Kingdom
and other countries, including the United States. Key officers
received human rights-related instruction from the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) . Nonetheless,
security force members were responsible for a number of human
rights abuses during the year.
The Namibian economy has two major components — a modern market
sector that produces most of its wealth and a traditional
subsistence agricultural sector (mainly in the north) that
supports most of its labor force. The mainstays of the market
sector are mining, ranching, and fishing, still mostly
controlled by white Namibian businessmen. Throughout 1991 the
Government stressed the leading role of the private sector and
encouraged new investment by indigenous and foreign
entrepreneurs on the basis of a new investment code adopted in
December 1990.
Namibia continued to enjoy a wide range of civil and political
liberties in 1991 with much public discussion of citizens'
rights and obligations. Controversy continued, however, about
accounting for missing detainees formerly held by SWAPO in
Angola and Zambia and by South African authorities in Namibia
and, to a lesser extent, about refugee issues. In June the
Government requested ICRC assistance in investigating the
identities and circumstances under which Namibians died or
disappeared during the liberation struggle. The problems of
racial discrimination and disparities, especially in education,
health, and working conditions, and of discrimination and
violence against women continued in 1991. There were
continuing credible reports of NDF personnel torturing or
abusing civilians despite strong condemnation by officials.
Approximately 30 persons were convicted and dismissed from
service for offenses against civilians, including such matters
as theft, assault, and rape.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or other extrajudicial
killings during 1991. Several charges of politically motivated
killings remained unresolved from previous years, including
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NAMIBIA
that of Anton Lubowski, a senior SWAPO official who was shot
outside his home in Windhoek by an unknown gunman in September
1989.
In October the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of a white
man, Hendrik van Wyk, who was convicted for the unprovoked
assault and murder of a black man, Johannes Haufiku, and
sentenced to 12 years in prison. The Chief Justice said that
the Court would impose heavy sentences of imprisonment as a
deterrent in cases of violence motivated by racism. A black
former member of PLAN, convicted of murdering a white farmer
and gravely wounding his wife, received life imprisonment.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances occurring during 1991.
Most, if not all, earlier disappearance cases involved either
persons detained by SWAPO in Angola or those arrested and
unaccounted for by the former South African authorities prior
to independence. The number of SWAPO detainees still not
accounted for has been estimated to range from the 256 listed
in 1989 by the Special Ad Hoc Committee of the U.N. Transition
Assistance Group to the 1,400 noted by the Namibian National
Society for Human Rights (NSHR) and the Parents' Committee.
The disparity in numbers will continue until a full
investigation by the Government and the ICRC is completed.
The whereabouts of people detained by the former South African
(SA) administration in Namibia also remained unclear.
According to a 1990 NSHR report, the whereabouts and fate of 59
people remain unknown.
In June the Government formally rec[uested ICRC assistance in
determining the identities and whereabouts of Namibians who
died or disappeared during this period. In October SWAPO
appointed a liaison officer to facilitate the transmission of
tracing rec[uests between the ICRC and the Government. In
October the Government also asked the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Governments of South Africa,
Zambia, Botswana, and the People's Republic of Angola to
appoint similar liaison officers. As the year ended, none of
the four neighboring Governments had done so.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Namibian Constitution states that "no persons shall be
subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment." Although they are greatly reduced from the
preindependence period, there were a number of reports of
torture or other inhuman treatment by police and military
forces during 1991. Following the theft in August of uraniiom
oxide from the Rossing mine, the National Union of Namibian
Workers (NUNW) charged that three of its members suspected of
the theft were beaten and tortured during interrogation. All
three reportedly had wet plastic bags pulled over their heads,
and two, with arms and legs bound, were hung from a broomstick
resting between two office desks. They pressed charges, which
were under investigation as the year ended.
According to the NUNW, three policemen were expelled from the
police force earlier in the year for "torturing" prisoners, but
no specifics were available. There were also several shootings
and other forms of harassment against civilians by members of
the NDF. The Government publicly urged citizens to come
270
NAMIBIA
forward with allegations of abuse by police or military forces
so that disciplinary measures could be taken. Of several dozen
NDF members tried by military courts for offenses against
civilians, some 30 were found guilty and dismissed from the
armed forces. It is not clear how many of these cases involved
torture or other human rights violations. The NSHR reported
that Paulus "Katemo" Johannes was subjected to severe torture
while in police detention in Ruacana. He was accused of being
a spy for UNITA and was held for 5 months without trial. His
torturers reportedly tightened wire around his head in order to
exert maximum physical as well as psychological pain. The NSHR
referred his case to the High Court, which ordered his release
in early May. An investigation by the Prosecutor General into
the circumstances of his detention was continuing as the year
ended .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution forbids arbitrary arrest or detention.
According to the Constitution, persons who are arrested must be
informed of the reason for their arrest "promptly, in a
language they understand," and they must be brought before a
magistrate within 48 hours of their detention. A trial must
take place within "a reasonable time," or the accused must be
released. The accused are entitled to defense by a legal
counsel of their choice; the State will provide a lawyer for
the indigent. These rights and protections have generally been
afforded in practice since independence. However, in April the
NSHR charged the police and the NDF with unconstitutional
arrests and detentions without trial. The Government has made
no response to these charges. There is a reported backlog of
cases awaiting trial due to a lack of magistrates; a number of
judgments rendered by inadequately trained magistrates have
been overturned upon review by the Prosecutor General. Other
delays have resulted from the paucity of legal counsel — less
than 100 lawyers are currently engaged in private practice in
the country; no more than 10 of these are black.
There were no reports of Naunibians being exiled in 1991.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Namibia has an independent judiciary, and under the
Constitution all citizens have the right to a fair trial.
Neimibia has retained the Roman-Dutch court system it inherited
from South Africa as well as tribal courts. In the formal
system, there are three levels: magistrate's courts, the High
Court, and the Supreme Court. The latter also serves as the
court of appeals and as a constitutional review court. The
Supreme Court is also charged with hearing cases of persons who
claim to have been tortured by former South African authorities.
The tenure of sitting judges was unaffected by the 1990 change
in government. Traditional courts have dealt with minor
criminal offenses, such as petty theft and infractions of local
customs. A presidential commission was to make recommendations
on the prospective jurisdiction of tribal courts, which have
functioned at the village level among members of the same
ethnic group. The Constitution guarantees that persons
claiming violation of their fundamental rights may seek redress
in court and request free legal advice from the Ombudsman,
In the post independence period, the right to a fair trial has
been afforded in practice. However, there have been charges of
racial bias in court decisions.
271
NAMIBIA
In September three persons were given sentences, which ranged
from a $180 fine to 4 years' imprisonment, for their supporting
roles in an aborted coup attempt in mid-1990. SWAPO party
leaders and other organizations led public demonstrations to
protest the perceived leniency of the sentences and demanded
that the Government impose harsher penalties. However, the
SWAPO-led Government refused to do so, noting the
constitutional separation of powers and the independence of the
judiciary and that it respected the courts' determinations.
Redress for alleged crimes by the SADF prior to independence
hinged on the outcome of a landmark case brought before the
Namibian courts in September 1990, for which a judgment was
rendered in October 1991. In this case, Israel Mwandingi
sought damages from the Namibian Government and the Ministry of
Defense after being shot in the back by the SADF, SWATF, or SWA
police in a 1987 shooting in Ongwediva, northern Namibia. The
court upheld his contention that Namibian authorities — as
successors to the South African Government and its Ministry of
Defense — were liable for damages. No amount for such damages
had been determined as of year's end, however.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The legal requirement that arresting officers must have a
warrant and the constitutionally safeguarded right to privacy
were respected in practice in 1991.
No evidence exists that unlawful electronic surveillance or
interference with correspondence are conducted against Namibian
citizens .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a . Freedom of Speech and Press .
The Constitution provides for these fundamental freedoms,
including academic freedom in institutions of higher learning,
and it states these rights may not be suspended in time of war
or during a state of emergency. In practice, these freedoms
have been respected since independence.
All radio and television services are operated by the
government-owned Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC); a
broadly representative government-appointed board sets policy
for the NBC. Although the NBC routinely gives prominent
coverage to the activities of government officials, it also
provided significant coverage to opposition spokespersons and
issues.
Print journalism in Namibia is free and vigorous. At present
there are three daily, one semiweekly, and four weekly
newspapers of general interest. One (a weekly) is published by
the Government, and several others are affiliated to political
parties. There was no apparent self-censorship by journalists,
aside from the constraints of libel laws (which impose stricter
limits with regard to public figures than does U.S. law) and a
general circumspection with regard to the person of the
President. Within the local media council, however, one
newspaper can charge another with erroneous reporting, which
has resulted in editorial retractions. There are no
restrictions on academic freedom.
272
NAMIBIA
b. Freedom of Assen±)ly and Association
The new Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association. During 1991 various organizations, including
political parties and religious groups, held large meetings and
public gatherings without interference. These included
demonstrations against the perceived lenient sentences meted
out to three persons for participating in a 1990 coup plot and
protests to several municipal governments over poor housing and
sanitary conditions in the still largely segregated townships.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion, and Namibians have enjoyed freedom
of religion since well before independence. There are no
restrictions on the activities of particular religious groups
or on foreign clergy members and, in contrast to the
preindependence period, no restrictions on internal or foreign
travel of church leaders.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution guarantees the rights to move freely
throughout Namibia, to reside and settle in any part of
Namibia, and to leave and return to Namibia, and these rights
are respected in practice. During and after the transition to
independence, a total of 42,736 Namibian exiles (returnees)
returned to the country as part of the UNHCR repatriation
program, which ended in June 1990. Many returnees have since
encountered difficulties in reintegrating into life in Namibia,
and the majority in 1991 faced continued unemployment.
The Government had not developed a consistent policy on
refugees or asylum seekers by the end of 1991 and was still
reviewing the possibility of acceding to the Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees. Sporadic incidents occurred in
which persons seeking refugee status were deported or jailed
upon their arrival in the country. Police at a northern border
post detained one Kenyan and two Zairean nationals seeking
refugee status for several months before informing U.N.
officials. Despite growing public criticism, the Government
continued to review on a case-by-case basis the requests of 128
persons classified as refugees by the UNHCR. Of this group,
two were held in Windhoek central prison; the remainder were
given unofficial temporary residence with the proviso that they
make plans to leave the country as soon as possible.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens exercised their right to change their Government in
nonracial, multiparty elections held in 1989 and characterized
as free and fair by the United Nations' special
representative. The Constitution establishes a bicameral
parliament, the National Assembly, and calls for free general
elections by secret ballot every 5 years and regional elections
every 2 years. As 1991 ended, only the lower house was
functioning. The Government promised regional elections for
the crucial second parliamentary chamber, the National Council,
in 1992.
Seven political parties are currently represented in the
Namibian National Assembly. The SWAPO-led Government has 45 of
the 78 seats in the Assembly, and the DTA, the major opposition
273
NAMIBIA
/
party, holds 21 seats. Five small parties are also
represented. The DTA, together with the other non-SWAPO
parties in Parliament, can block constitutional changes, which
require a two-thirds majority of all members.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
During 1991 local organizations such as the National Society
for Human Rights (NSHR), the Parents' Committee, and the Legal
Assistance Centre (LAC), operated freely, criticizing the
Government's handling of the preindependence SWAPO detainee
issue, the treatment of refugees, the repatriation of exiled
children of SWAPO members, the conduct of the presidential
security guard, and other matters. Unlike the Parents'
Committee and the LAC, which existed before independence, the
NSHR is a new, private Namibian human rights organization,
established in early 1990. Like the Parents' Committee, its
principal focus is on the SWAPO detainee issue and accounting
for persons who disappeared while in custody under the previous
government. The LAC is highly regarded for its assistance,
especially to indigent defendants. It also follows the
detainee issue, but its current primary focus is on legal
education, for which it coordinated with the Ministry of
Education to develop a constitutional curriculum for schools
and lectures on human rights issues for police cadets and
defense force trainees.
International human rights organizations are free to visit and
to discuss human rights issues with governmental and
nongovernmental representatives. In February the Government
hosted a Swedish-funded week-long conference on human rights
for public officials. In June the Government formally asked
the ICRC to help investigate the identities and circumstances
under which Namibians died or disappeared during the
independence struggle (see Section l.b.). In October the
Government announced its intention to establish a Human Rights
Information and Documentation Center in early 1992 and
submitted funding proposals to UNHRC and other donors.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, creed,
sex, or religion and specifically prohibits "the practice and
ideology of Apartheid." In December the National Assembly
enacted a bill to outlaw racial discrimination and to punish
its perpetrators with severe fines or prison sentences. Racial
discrimination continued in 1991 to be a very sensitive
political issue. As a result of many years of South African
administration, racial and ethnic discrimination were
institutionalized in Namibian society to the same extent as in
South Africa itself. This was particularly true with respect
to serious inec[ualities in education, health, housing, and
employment, which nonwhites complain are not being adec[uately
addressed by government action. In a highly publicized
incident, a white hotel manager in the Northern town of Out jo
was accused of refusing service to two black Namibians (one was
a Deputy Minister and Member of Parliament). In proceedings
beginning in October, the courts sought to determine whether
the manager's actions were in fact racially motivated and thus
in contradiction of Article 10 of the Constitution. (For a
discussion of white/black disparities, see Section 6. a.)
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NAMIBIA
Women's rights are guaranteed by the Constitution, but in
practice discrimination against women, especially stemming from
pervasive cultural and traditional practices of all races,
persists. There are also inequalities in the law and in
employment and educational opportunities. For instance, under
existing community property laws, married women of all groups
are defined as legal minors and may not legally acquire or
purchase property or enter into a legal contract without the
signature and consent of the husband. At present, any property
brought into a marriage by a woman is transferred to the
ownership of her husband, who has the authority to decide its
disposition without her consent. A woman is considered a ward
of her father until she marries; then she becomes a ward of her
husband. The law also does not currently compel men to provide
economic support for their children in case of divorce, with
the result that there are many indigent mothers. Women are not
barred from pursuing higher education but tend to be directed
to certain educational fields and areas of employment, such as
clerical and secretarial work, teaching, and domestic service.
Several women's groups are working to change these inequalities
to ensure that constitutional guarantees for women are put into
practice. In one positive development during 1991, traditional
leaders stopped taking communal land rights away from widows.
Violence against women is reportedly widespread, particularly
wife beating and rape. The courts have traditionally treated
cases of wife beating as assaults, but because of traditional
attitudes regarding the subordination of women, most such cases
do not reach the courts. In addition, many cases of wife
beating are not reported to the authorities. Others, which are
brought to the attention of the police, are reportedly
dismissed as frivolous, and the alleged perpetrator is not
charged. Women's groups and other women's rights advocates
contended that rape and wife beating were not taken seriously
by police, claiming that police prefer not to interfere in
domestic disputes and that prosecutions of rape and convictions
for it are the exception. In October, however, the Namibian
High Court condemned the application of the "cautionary rule"
in cases involving sexual assault as contrary to the
Constitution and held that the same standards of evidence
should be applied for rape cases as for other crimes. Women's
groups and the LAC applauded this decision.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Namibia's Constitution provides for freedom of association,
including freedom to form and join trade \inions, a right that
will be extended to public servants, farm workers, and domestic
employees under a new Labor Code tabled in Parliament at the
end of the year. It is to be debated and enacted early in
1992. Approximately half of Namibia's 200 , 000-person wage
sector work force is organized to some degree. Less than 20
percent of the total economically active population is
unionized. Very few of the country's 36,000 rural laborers are
organized. Unions are independent of government and may form
federations and confederations, of which there are several.
The principal trade union federation is the National Union of
Namibian Workers (NUNW), a SWAPO-aligned federation of 7
industrial unions which claims a membership of over 70,000.
Most workers in the mining industry, the country's key export
sector, are members of the NUNW-af filiated Mineworkers Union of
Namibia (MUN) . Some union leaders are also SWAPO officials and
275
NAMIBIA
have served in the National Assembly. In December several
prominent union leaders were elected to SWAPO's Central
Committee. The NUNW, however, now expects labor leaders to
resign if appointed to high government office. The current
NUNW leadership does not hesitate to promote its concept of
workers' interests even when their positions are not in line
with government policies. The Confederation of Namibian
Christian Social Trade Unions (NCSTU) and other unions claim to
be nonpartisan and in practice confine their activities to
labor-management relations. The Ministry of Labor and Manpower
Development encourages broad cooperation within the labor
movement, while supporting trade union pluralism and
maintaining a strict policy of noninterference with internal
union matters. , Trade unions have no difficulty registering,
and there are no government restrictions on who may serve as a
union official.
Namibian workers, except for those providing essential
services, enjoy the right to strike once conciliation
procedures have been exhausted. The proposed Labor Code will
extend the right to strike to public servants, farm workers,
and domestics. Under the Code, strike action could only be
used in disputes involving worker interests, such as pay
raises. Disputes over worker rights, including dismissals,
would have to be referred to the Labor Courts or for
arbitration. Legally striking workers would gain protection
from dismissal under the proposed Labor Code.
There has yet to be a legal strike in Namibia. Nevertheless,
during the first year of independence there were at least 30
reported work stoppages over pay, dismissal, and pension
issues, with most actions lasting for no more than a few days.
In no case had the strikers exhausted existing procedures for
settling disputes. A series of wildcat strikes in Windhoek
during September-November 1990 led to the tear gassing of a
bakery sit-in and the mass firings of transport and security
workers. During 1991 labor unrest abated, with short work
stoppages reported among nurses and construction workers, among
others.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) has been
instrumental in assisting Namibia with the drafting of the
proposed new Labor Code. Trade unions are free to exchange
visits with foreign trade unions and to affiliate with
international trade union organizations, and they exercise this
freedom without interference.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
In 1985 the Supreme Court of what was then South West
Africa/Namibia recognized the right of collective bargaining
without intervention by other government agencies. The
proposed Labor Code lays down minimal standards, in accordance
with international labor practices, and guarantees employees
the right to bargain individually or collectively. At present,
collective bargaining is not widely practiced outside the
mining and construction industries; wages are usually set by
employers. Even in the minirig sector, union officials complain
that the lack of access to financial information on companies
heunpers effective negotiation.
When a dispute cannot be resolved directly, the first recourse
for workers is to request that the Cabinet create a
conciliation board under the Wage and Industrial Conciliation
Ordinance of 1952, with a mediator and representatives of both
50-726 - 92 - 10
276
NAMIBIA
sides. The proposed Labor Code retains the conciliation board
mechanism under the supervision of the Labor Commissioner.
Conciliation boards have mostly been used in wage disputes and
to a lesser extent to negotiate working conditions, overtime
hours, and reinstatement of dismissed employees. Under the
proposed Labor Code, if union recognition cannot be obtained by
consensus, it can be sought through recourse to a labor court.
Current law does not effectively prohibit antiunion
discrimination by employers against union members and
organizers. Employers do not have to recognize a union and may
dismiss members and organizers if they wish. However, the new
Labor Code would empower the labor courts to remedy unfair
labor practices. The new Labor Code explicitly forbids unfair
dismissals, which may also be brought on appeal to the labor
court. No formal complaints of discrimination were filed in
1991, although union officials regularly hear such complaints.
At present, there are no export or offshore processing zones or
facilities in Namibia. One is planned, and the Prime Minister
has stated that the workers in such zones will be protected by
the Labor Code.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law, but during the June 1991
Land Reform Conference, there were reports that farm workers
sometimes receive little or no compensation for labor and are
strictly controlled by farm owners. There were also reports at
the conference that some farm workers are still subject to
physical punishment by their employers, although there were no
formal complaints filed with the Ministry of Labor in 1991. Of
all Namibian workers, farm labor is the least organized for
collective action.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 15 years. Age regulations
are generally enforced in the wage sector pursuant to the
Employment Act of 1986. However, children below the age of 15
often work on family and commercial farms and in the informal
sector. Boys in the rural areas traditionally start herding
livestock at age 7, and street vending by children is becoming
a more common sight in urban areas. The proposed Labor Code
empowers the Ministry of Labor inspectors to enforce
prohibitions on child labor, including minimum ages of 16 for
underground work and 18 for night work. The labor courts are
now able to hear criminal charges against violators.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no statutory minimum wage law in Namibia. The
proposed Labor Code does not establish a minimum wage, but it
provides for the creation of a wages commission by the Minister
of Labor to determine appropriate living wages. Unskilled
workers in the relatively high paying mining sector earn about
twice the amount urban unskilled laborers earn. Domestic
workers earn much less. Since basic living costs in Windhoek's
traditionally nonwhite townships are high, most nonwhite
workers have difficulty maintaining a decent standard of
living. Union leaders hope to make extensive use of the wage
commission procedure to redress past inequalities and achieve
the goal of a "living wage" for all Namibians. However, an
unemployment rate of more than 25 percent and chronic
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NAMIBIA
double-digit inflation tend to turn wage negotiations into
efforts to maintain real wage levels.
White Namibians earn significantly more on average than their
black compatriots. In large part this is due to their
ownership of most of the country's productive resources and
past preferential access to education that enables them to take
advantage of the skilled labor shortage. Moreover, even when
access was guaranteed, educational facilities for black
Namibians were vastly inferior to those which whites enjoyed.
Allegations continue to surface that nonwhite skilled employees
often earn less than their white counterparts doing the same
job or whites performing unskilled tasks. Perhaps because they
are under greater public scrutiny, state-owned enterprises are
often accused in the press of engaging in discriminatory hiring
and pay practices. However, there have been no reported court
cases involving racial discrimination in the workplace.
The standard legal workweek was 46 hours, which would be
reduced to 45 hours by the proposed Labor Code. If the
employee freely agrees, up to 10 hours of overtime per week is
currently allowed at time-and-a-third pay. Overtime would be
increased to time-and-a-half and double for Sundays /holidays
under the proposed Code. Legally, more than 10 hours per week
of overtime have to be approved by the Government. The new law
will also mandate annual leave (21 days), sick leave (36 days),
and a yet-to-be determined amount of maternity leave. Most
employees are entitled to 21 calendar days of leave per year.
In practice, these provisions are not rigorously observed or
enforced.
Government-mandated occupational health and safety standards
are set by law, and the Labor Code empowers the Ministry of
Labor to strengthen applicable regulations and enforcement
through inspections and criminal penalties. The Labor Code
also requires employers to ensure the health, safety, and
welfare of their employees and provides for the right to remove
oneself from dangerous work situations. At year's end, the
Government was conducting a national survey in an effort to
upgrade health and safety standards. Improvement of safety
conditions is a key trade union concern, particularly in the
mining sector where safety campaigns by the mining companies
have reduced the combined reportable injury and fatality rates.
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NIGER
Under growing public pressures, the authoritarian
military-civilian regime, headed by General Ali Saibou,
peacefully turned over power to a National Conference which met
from July 29 to November 3. The Conference involved 1,200
conferees from a comprehensive array of nationally
representative groups. During its deliberations, it declared
itself the nation's authoritative governing body, suspended the
1989 constitution, dissolved other institutions (the National
Assembly and the National Council of Development) and dismissed
all ministers and turned over day-to-day government operations
to secretaries general. It also debated a wide range of
political, economic, and social reform policies and planned
presidential, legislative, and municipal elections for late
1992 or early 1993. In November the Conference chose Prime
Minister Amadou Cheiffou to head a 15-month Transitional
Government and also elected a 15-member High Council of the
Republic (HCR) to assure execution of conference decisions.
General Saibou was retained as ceremonial Head of State. At
year's end, Niger awaited a new constitution, to be submitted
to a national referendum in 1992.
The military, which had been in power since 1974, made no
effort to intervene in the reform process but remained a force
behind the scenes. In addition to the military, Nigerien
security organizations include the gendarmerie and the national
police. There were occasional reports of human rights abuses
by these organizations, although fewer than in previous years.
The National Conference directed the Directorate of State
Security, a political investigative organ which formerly
reported to the Presidency, to report to the Prime Minister
during the transition. Civilians headed the ministries charged
with supervision of the security services.
Niger is an extremely poor country with an economy based
largely on cultivating subsistence crops, raising livestock,
and exploiting some of the world's largest uranium deposits.
Drought cycles, desertification, a 3.4 percent population
growth rate, and the declining world demand for uranium have
undercut an already marginal economy. Due in part to the
nation's focus on major political changes, the economy and
World Bank reform programs reached a virtual standstill.
Respect for, and protection of, human rights expanded
significantly in Niger throughout 1991. In early 1991, human
rights organizations were formed, were fully recognized, and
operated without hindrance for the first time. Prior to the
July opening of the National Conference, and as pressure for
democratization increased. President Saibou instituted new laws
which widened freedoms of the press and of association and
fully legalized the multiparty system, first announced in
November 1990. At the National Conference, citizens from all
social strata had the opportunity to state their opinions,
become involved in politics, and criticize government policies
and officials, including the Head of State. The National
Conference held public hearings to explore the Government's
role in two 1990 incidents of human rights abuses. These
hearings revealed allegations of large-scale killings and
torture. Despite the steady improvement in human rights
policies, individual law enforcement officials continued to
commit human rights abuses.
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NIGER
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for tlie Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political and extrajudicial killings
in 1991. The National Conference conducted a public hearing
into two 1990 incidents. One occurred on February 9, 1990,
when security forces fired on violent student protesters,
killing three. The other occurred in May 1990 when military
forces in Tchintabaraden and nearby villages responded to
antigovernment Tuareg assailants with excessive force, killing
many of the Tuareg. The Government claimed 63 were killed,
while others claimed there were upward of 300 deaths. The
conference also heard evidence that Tuareg insurgents in
Tchintabaraden had caused nine deaths and determined the need
to investigate those incidents more fully. The National
Conference suspended senior military, police, and civilian
officials implicated in both incidents, pending completion of
the investigations and possible trials. The investigations had
not been completed by year's end.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated abductions or
disappearances in 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The National Conference denounced the authorities' use of
torture revealed during the public hearing of the 1990
Tchintabaraden case. There were no reports of systematic
torture of political prisoners or detainees during the year,
but random instances of abuse by individual law enforcement or
prison officers occurred. Specifically, they inflicted
physical pain on detainees to extract confessions. In one
instance in 1991, military personnel severely beat several
townspeople in retaliation against civilians who had attacked
an unarmed soldier.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Although the suspended constitution, still considered partly in
effect, contains legal prohibitions against arbitrary
detention, this prohibition was rarely respected in 1991. In
theory, the law requires that an arrested person be either
charged or released within 48 hours. In special cases, the
public prosecutor, who is also the head of the judicial police,
may authorize one renewal of the 48-hour detention period. In
practice, unauthorized delays beyond the established 48-hour
period frequently occurred, and prisoners often spent months in
jail awaiting trial. Failure of the police or public
prosecutor to respect the 48-hour rule does not require
dismissal of the case against a suspect.
Once charged, a suspect may be further detained by order of the
examining magistrate. In practice, however, charged suspects
are often held beyond the legal time limits prescribed
according to the nature of the crime and may be in jail as long
as a year awaiting completion of the magistrate's
investigation. Defendants are allowed access to a lawyer of
their own choice. Bail is available for crimes carrying a
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NIGER
penalty of less than 10 years' imprisonment. In practice,
widespread ignorance and lack of financial means prevent these
rights from being exercised fully. There were no new reports
of political detainees or prisoners in 1991.
Exile is not used as a means of political control in Niger, but
persons have exiled themselves voluntarily in the past. Many
exiles returned to Niger in 1991 to form parties and
associations and to participate in the National Conference.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Niger's civil legal system is an amalgam of French, Islamic,
and customary law. Traditional courts often handle village
property disputes, which are brought to the civil courts when
not resolved. Civil and criminal cases not involving security-
related acts are tried publicly. Defendants have the right to
be present at their trials, to confront witnesses, and to
present evidence. Niger's penal code affirms the judicial
principle of presumption of innocence. Defendants have the
right to counsel at public expense if they are minors or if
they are indigent and face the prospect of a sentence of 10
years or more. Both the defendant and the prosecutor may
appeal the verdict, first to the Court of Appeals and then to
the highest court, the Supreme Court. Both Courts are
obligated to hear appeals. The Court of Appeals reviews
questions of fact and law while the Supreme Court reviews only
the application of the law.
The suspended constitution calls for an independent judiciary.
In practice, however, it has been common for government
officials and others to use their influence to affect judicial
proceedings through political pressure and family influence.
The State Security Court and the Special Court for Embezzled
Funds, the two courts which formerly functioned outside the
normal criminal framework and sometimes in secret, ceased to
function in 1991. The mandate of the State Security Court
expired when no new judges were named. The Embezzlement Court
was abolished by the National Conference. The executive
privilege of pardon for convicted criminals was not exercised
in 1991.
In April the Government tried before the State Security Court
44 Tuareg prisoners accused of introducing arms illegally into
Niger, undermining state security, and conspiring against the
State in Tchintabaraden in May 1990. The trial was held in
public, and all defendants were acquitted and freed due to lack
of evidence .
The National Conference created a commission on crimes to
investigate over 180 political, economic, and social "crimes
and abuses" committed since independence. The Conference
conducted public hearings on a selection of these crimes, which
at times began to resemble extrajudicial proceedings. The
Conference never passed final judgment on any crime, although
it suspended a few senior officials and placed others under
house arrest, pending the outcome of the investigations. The
crimes commission was charged with completing its work by
January 1993, with possible extension, and submitting dossiers
ready for trial to the High Court of Justice, a special court
created by the National Conference exclusively for this purpose.
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NIGER
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence .
The police are required to have a search warrant to enter homes
and then may do so only between the hours of 6 a.m. and 9 p.m.
However, when in hot pursuit of a suspected criminal, the
police are permitted to conduct searches in homes and buildings
without a warrant, at any time. In practice, searches are
conducted at all hours. There were no reports in 1991 of other
violations of privacy, such as interference with correspondence.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedonj of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and of the press increased dramatically in
1991, with free speech being most in evidence during the
National Conference. Buttressed by a national labor federation
strike, the Association of Nigerien Journalists declared
complete autonomy from the Government at the end of March
1991. This change led to a relaxation of many of the
restrictions on the government-controlled media prior to the
National Conference. Le Republicain, an independent weekly,
and several smaller private publications were launched in
1991. The National Conference was covered openly by the press,
including the government media. On October 29, the National
Conference issued Act 26, declaring full liberty for the media
and creating a Superior Council of Communication to guarantee
this freedom. Students and faculty at the university and
secondary-school levels and at professional institutions
continued to play a prominent role in the democratization
process. Academic freedom was respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although the 1989 constitution authorized freedom of assembly
and association, these rights were fully exercised for the
first time only in 1991. Throughout the first half of 1991,
students, labor unions, and independent associations held
demonstrations, some of them violent, to protest government
policies .
In May the law governing associations was amended to permit all
kinds of groups, except those that are ethnically or regionally
based. The law previously limited the right of association to
six groups: youth, students, sports and culture, foreign,
religious, and charity. In 1991 the number of opposition
parties and associations mushroomed to include 3 human rights
organizations and some 25 political parties.
c. Freedom of Religion
Niger reaffirmed its status as a secular state at the National
Conference. While the population is nominally over 90 percent
Muslim, the practice of other religious beliefs is permitted.
Foreign missionaries may live, work, and travel in Niger but
must obtain permission to do so. On December 3, the Baha'i
faith was granted full legal status. Until then, it was
practiced despite a 1984 law prohibiting it.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Travel within Niger continued to be monitored. Police
checkpoints outside major cities and towns were kept in place.
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NIGER
though checks were less systematic in 1991. Some women are
cloistered and must be escorted outside the home by male family
members, usually only after dark. Neither emigration nor
repatriation is restricted. Niger is a party to the Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees and has cooperated with the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in assisting the
3,700 Chadian refugees registered in Niger as of May 1991. In
October about 1,500 Chadian refugees left Niger voluntarily,
primarily to go to Chad, Nigeria, or Cameroon. Approximately
2,000 refugees remained in Niger, most of them women and
children.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Although the right of citizens to change their government was
not exercised through the electoral process, in 1991 citizens
changed their government through peaceful means. The National
Conference, composed of delegations representative of various
groups in Nigerien society, declared itself the nation's
authoritative governing body and proceeded peacefully to
consider multiple reforms in the executive, legislative, and
judicial areas. Neither President Saibou nor the military
resisted the transfer of authority. The conference continued
in operation for over 3 months, finally electing a Transitional
Government, headed by Prime Minister Amadou Cheiffou, to govern
Niger pending secret, universal, and multiparty elections,
projected for late 1992 or early 1993. President Saibou
continued as Head of State, but his office became strictly
ceremonial. A High Council of the Republic, composed of 15
civilians elected by the National Conference, was formed to
assure the implementation of the Conference's decisions
throughout the transition. It also was to share unspecified
legislative powers with the Prime Minister in the absence of an
elected national assembly.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Nongovernmental, independent human rights groups were created
for the first time in Niger in 1991. Three such groups
investigated allegations of human rights abuses reported to
them by volunteer sources. After verifying the reports, the
human rights groups protested to local authorities. Where no
action was taken, human rights groups contacted higher
authorities and, in some instances, issued public announcements
to promote corrective action. Throughout 1991 the three groups
operated freely and judged these procedures to be effective in
countering human rights abuses. In March, prior to the
expansion of the law governing associations, the Committee for
the Defense of Victims of the Tchintabaraden Repression was
formed to press for an investigation of the events of May 1990,
with a view toward eventual prosecution of implicated security
forces. Although it never acqiiired legal status, the Committee
was not constrained by the Government and was still operating
at the end of 1991.
Amnesty International (AI) visited Niger three times in 1991
prior to the National Conference. In February the Government,
citing safety concerns, refused AI permission to travel to
Tchintabaraden to investigate the killings in May 1990. With
this exception, there was no interference with AI visits,
including AI ' s attendance at the trial of 44 Tuareg prisoners.
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NIGER
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
In 1991 the process of democratization ended the traditional
domination by the Djerma ethnic group (21 percent of the
population) in government and military service. The Hausa
(over 50 percent of the population), Tuareg, and Fulani (Peul)
ethnic groups participated fully in the National Conference and
received equal consideration for transition government
candidacies and positions. However, the Tuareg and Fulani
(together 21 percent of the population), two historically
nomadic groups in transition still have less access to
government services. Toward the end of the National
Conference, Tuareg members expressed increasing dissatisfaction
with continued government inattention to their problems. At
year's end, there were increasing numbers of Tuareg attacks on
government installations.
By tradition and practice, and through specific aspects of
Islam, women occupy a subordinate place in Niger ien society.
Males have considerable advantages in terms of education,
employment, and property rights. Male attendance heavily
outweighs female attendance at all educational levels. Only 25
percent of Niger ien children of primary school age actually
attend schools, with progressively smaller percentages
continuing into or through elementary and secondary school.
Approximately 60 percent of the children finishing primary
school are male. Consequeiitly, male literacy (15 percent) far
exceeds female literacy (6 percent). Child labor practices
outside the formal sector also inhibit education for young
girls and were sharply criticized at the National Conference.
Niger's traditions incline employers to favor men as
employees. Prevailing Islamic laws of inheritance, marriage,
and divorce discriminate against women.
Certain discriminatory social practices persist. For example,
girls as young as age 10 may be contracted into marriage,
despite legal prohibitions against marriage for girls younger
than 14. Violence occurs against women and children and
includes wife beating, but the extent of this problem is
unknown. Such violence is considered antisocial behavior in
Nigerien society, and women often turn to both traditional and
modern judicial authorities in cases of abuse. Female genital
mutilation (circumcision) occurs but is limited to a few small
ethnic groups. Niger has participated in international
conferences on this subject but does not regard it as a major
domestic problem and has not addressed the issue publicly.
A small number of women participate in the professions. About
one-third of Nigerien doctors and less than one-tenth of
Niger's magistrates are women. Women in the civil service, the
largest formal sector employer, represent only 24 percent of
all civil servants and are confined to lower level positions.
Though few in number, professional women receive wages
equivalent to those paid males.
The government-supported Nigerien Women's Association, with a
network which has developed commercial cooperatives and social
programs for village women, was criticized at the National
Conference for misrepresenting women's concerns and for its
affiliation with the former ruling party. Since 1988, several
women's associations have emerged, including associations of
female traders, educators, bankers, and, in 1991, jurists.
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NIGER
In May thousands of women, including members of the Nigerien
Women's Association, publicly protested the absence of women in
the preparatory committee for the National Conference. As a
result, 5 women were placed on the 72-member committee. Women
were also included in subsequent delegations to the Conference
and headed two conference committees. Three women were
elected to the 15-member High Council of the Republic.
Among the first complaints made to the National Conference were
complaints about the poor status of women. A subcommittee on
improving the condition of women and children proposed a number
of measures to reduce discrimination against women. The
conference discussed in depth measures to alleviate the heavy
physical labor required of rural women, to widen women's access
to credit, and to provide equal opportunity in the
administration, including at the ministerial level. The
Conference also recommended a wider mandate for family
planning, especially with respect to the use of contraception.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Approximately 90 percent of Niger's work force is employed in
the largely subsistence rural sector, which is not unionized.
In the small modern economy, all workers have the legal right
to establish and join trade unions. The only existing labor
federation, the National Union of Nigerien Workers (USTN) ,
represents 27 unions, or 30 percent of the approximately 60,000
salaried workers in Niger. Another five unions are
nonaffiliated. All union organizations are independent of
Niger's new political parties and participated in the National
Conference as representatives of their constituencies.
In 1990 and 1991, prior to the National Conference, the USTN
used strikes, including the threat of a general strike, to
induce political and economic policy changes with an ultimate
view to democratization. Union intervention helped maintain
opposition control over the National Conference and also
widened freedom of the press. Workers also struck on the eve
of the National Conference as a tactic to obtain pay increases
and improvement of benefits before the Conference addressed
overall pay levels. Between 1990 and 1991, according to union
officials, 75 percent of unionized workers had participated in
a strike. In 1991 there were strikes by taxi and truck
drivers, industrial workers, water and electricity workers, and
diplomats. A strike at the public utilities company caused the
removal of its government-appointed executive managers.
Despite the frequency of politically motivated strikes in 1991,
the Government provided compensation for time lost during work
stoppages .
The USTN is a member of the Organization of African Trade Union
Unity and abides by that organization's policy of having no
formal affiliations outside the African continent. Individual
unions, however, such as the Teachers' Union of Niger, are
affiliated with international trade secretariats.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is legally authorized, but, in practice,
it is circumscribed by government participation in the
negotiating process. A government representative is present at
most negotiations and in certain circumstances acts as binding
arbitrator. A basic framework agreement, negotiated by the
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NIGER
USTN's predecessor, the employers, and the Government, has been
in force since 1972. The agreement covers basic work
conditions, work contract elements, and union activities, but
not wages. Individual unions may bargain for more favorable
work conditions.
The Labor Code, which is based on International Labor
Organization (ILO) principles, prohibits antiunion
discrimination by employers, and the USTN reported no such
discrimination in 1991. There are no export processing zones
in Niger .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Niger's Labor Code prohibits forced or compulsory labor.
However, black or darker-skinned Tuaregs reported to the
National Conference that in remote areas of Niger white or
lighter-skinned Tuaregs subjected many of their group to slave
labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
To work, children aged 12 and 13 must have special
authorization from local labor inspectors. Children between
the ages of 14 and 18 may be employed, subject to legal
provisions limiting hours (4.5 hours meiximum per day) and types
of employment (no industrial work) . Although child labor laws
apply throughout the economy, local labor inspectors who
enforce these laws inspect only workplaces in the formal
sector, located primarily in urban areas. However, children
generally do not work in the formal sector. Child labor is
common in the unregulated subsistence agriculture and informal
trade sectors, where most Niger iens are employed. Children
often work for their families under harsh conditions that do
not comply with the Labor Code's provisions.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is a legal minimum wage for salaried workers. According
to union officials, this wage is not sufficient to provide a
decent living for workers and their families. The legal
workweek is 40 hours. However, certain occupations requiring
irregular hours are authorized longer workweeks, with a maximum
of 72 hours. The Labor Code also prescribes occupational
safety and health regulations that are enforced by the labor
inspectors in the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and
Professional Training. Because of staff shortages, however,
this office focuses mainly on safety violations in the mining,
building, and industrial sectors. According to a ministry
official, compliance is often difficult to enforce because
workers may not be fully aware of the safety risks posed in
their jobs and may refuse to wear protective clothing due to
Niger's hot climate, although for the most part, employers
provide adequate safety equipment.
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NIGERIA
Nigeria is ruled by a military regime, the Federal Military
Government (FMG), headed by President Ibrahim Babangida, who
came to power following a 1985 coup. A 19-member Armed Forces
Ruling Council (AFRC) is the country's main decisionmaking
organ, and its decisions, promulgated by decree, are the
supreme law of the land. A 25-member, mixed military-civilian
cabinet presides over executive functions. President Babangida
controls both the AFRC and the Cabinet. Civilian chief
executives elected in December and inaugurated in January 1992
replaced military governors as head of each of the 30 states.
A presidentially appointed administrator heads the Federal
Capital Territory, Abuja.
During 1991 the FMG continued its measured steps toward
returning Nigeria along its own, firmly directed path toward
democratic, civilian rule by 1992 (see Section 3). Nationwide
voter registration exercises and party congresses at the ward,
local government, and state levels were conducted. Party
primaries, marred by widespread allegations of fraud, were held
to select gubernatorial and state legislative candidates.
State general elections by open ballot voting (see Section 3)
were held on December 14. A national census that will be the
basis for apportionment in the future civilian government was
conducted in November. In his year-end speech. President
Babangida announced that the controversial open ballot system
of voting, used in December, would be used again for the 1992
national elections, with certain unspecified modifications.
Responding to pressure from various ethnic and regional groups,
the FMG made radical changes in the Nigerian political map with
the creation of 9 states (now 30) and 136 new local government
areas (now 589) .
The FMG enforces its authority through the federal security
system — the military, the State Security Service, and national
police — and through the courts. As in the past, police and
security service officials committed numerous human rights
violations, including arbitrary arrests, detention without
trial, and excessive use of force.
Most of Nigeria's population of over 100 million is rural,
engaging in small-scale agriculture. The country depends on
oil revenues for over 90 percent of export earnings and to pay
for 80 percent of its budgetary expenses. In 1986 the FMG
initiated the Structural Adjustment Prograim (SAP) to address
economic problems exacerbated by the fall in oil revenues which
began in 1981. The SAP has had mixed results. In 1990, for
the third consecutive year, Nigeria's real gross domestic
product (GDP) increased by more than the population growth
rate. However, the SAP has led to growing public opposition.
Unemployment is widespread, and underemployment is high in
urban areas. Inflation rose sharply in 1991 due to excessive
government spending. Extreme disparities of income exist, and
the majority of Nigerians continue to live in poverty.
Human rights in Nigeria continued to be circumscribed in 1991.
The sections of the 1989 Constitution providing for individual
liberties can be superseded by AFRC decrees; Decree Two in
particular abridges due process with its broad detention
powers. Major problem areas in 1991 included: extrajudicial
killings, often involving the use of excessive force by
security forces; police brutality; poor prison conditions;
official mistreatment; arbitrary detentions; the lack of fair
trials; and press closures. Law enforcement personnel are
seldom, if ever, tried and punished for killings, torture, and
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NIGERIA
Other abuses. Ethnoreligious tensions between Muslims and
Christians erupted again in communal rioting, resulting in
hundreds of deaths in two major disturbances. There continue
to be only two government-mandated political parties. The use
of open ballot voting was heavily debated during the year, with
many Nigerians asserting that it disenfranchised significant
numbers of voters.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Continuing a trend from previous years, use of excessive force
by police officers was common: in May, a Rivers state
government commission of inquiry, investigating the deaths of
over 20 persons in a disturbance in late 1990, recommended that
120 policemen be prosecuted for acts of brutality during the
disturbance. To date, however, no criminal charges have been
filed.
In March, seven unarmed persons were fatally shot by Lagos
police, who alleged, contrary to witness accounts, that the
seven were armed robbers. The Federal Ministry of Justice in
December demanded prosecution of the policemen involved in the
slaying of the seven; the decision results from findings of an
investigatory panel headed by a Deputy Inspector General of
Police.
In another highly publicized case, a Lagos businessman was
killed by police on May 15. Eyewitness accounts indicated
brutality and contradicted the police claim that he was
accidentally killed by a stray bullet. Policemen are to be
tried for the murder. In several other cases, police
reportedly killed persons while attempting to extort money from
them, then claimed the victims were armed robbers shot in
self-defense. There are also reports of criminal suspects
being killed in jail or after being brought under police
custody. One credible human rights group estimated at least
three extrajudicial killings per month by police or security
agents. In November, the Lagos State Commissioner of Police
announced that a Police Inspector would be tried for the murder
of an unarmed motorist at a police checkpoint.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported politically motivated disappearances.
However, FMG detention practices have the effect of causing
many detainees to be "missing" for extended periods (see
Section 1 .d. ) .
c. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Piinishment
The 1989 Constitution prohibits torture and mistreatment of
prisoners, and Nigerian law provides criminal sanctions for
such excesses. However, there were numerous credible reports
that police regularly beat suspects to extract criminal
confessions. In December the national daily Pionch publicized
the death of an 18-year-old trader while in police custody in
the town of Kano, and the Committee for the Defense of Human
Rights (CDHR) protested the deaths of two Lagos men, apparently
beaten to death while in police custody in November.
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NIGERIA
Mistreatment of both male and female prisoners by guards and
security officials were regular occurrences. Inmates often
beat others at the behest of or with the consent of prison
guards. Motorists at police checkpoints and pedestrians were
often harassed and sometimes beaten by police officers trying
to extort money. A leading member of a human rights
organization was beaten at a police checkpoint, and several
U.S. citizen summer interns working with the organization were
harassed. There have been no known government investigations
or disciplinary proceedings to punish those responsible for
alleged abuses within prisons; investigations of abuses at
police checkpoints are uncommon, though not unprecedented.
Several student union leaders, detained in the aftermath of the
threatened nationwide student strike in late May, complained of
mistreatment by prison officials. Some of the students alleged
that, under the threat of torture and after having been beaten,
they were intimidated into signing false statements naming
several human rights activists as the instigators of the
student strike and ensuing campus disturbances. At least two
student leaders went on a temporary hunger strike to protest
their treatment.
Conditions in Nigerian prisons continue to be life threatening
due to disease and malnutrition. The Civil Liberties
Organization (CLO), one of Nigeria's leading human rights
groups, reported that lack of food and potable water was
universal (approximately 50 cents per day is spent on each
prisoner for food) . Many prisoners do not have adecpaate
clothing and, according to credible sources, some go virtually
naked. Severe overcrowding forced some prisoners to sleep in
rows or in shifts. Inmates are sometimes manacled in their
cells or placed in solitary confinement for long periods
without justification, according to human rights groups. Time
outside the cell for exercise is minimal. Most cells are
poorly ventilated and filthy. Vermin are rampant, and most
long-term prisoners suffer respiratory ailments or various skin
diseases. Although most institutions have clinics, medical
care is inadequate. One credible source indicates that female
prisoners may give birth in prison with little medical
assistance or postnatal care. Prison-born children can remain
there for some time, without adeqiiate nutrition or schooling.
The CLO estimates that over 2,000 inmates die yearly as a
result of the poor prison conditions. In 1991 the CLO also
instituted lawsuits to force the FMG to improve conditions or
close some of the worst prisons. The suits are pending. The
FMG, acknowledging shortcomings in the prison system,
established the National Committee on Prison Reform in 1990.
The Committee was charged with reporting on prison conditions
and recommending improvements to the Attorney General in 1991.
It had not reported its findings by the end of the year.
During the year, however, the FMG released over 2,600
prisoners — some elderly and terminally ill — for humanitarian
purposes and initiated construction plans for new prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The 1989 Constitution provides for trial within 3 months for
the criminally accused in most cases. However, inefficient
administrative procedures, petty extortion, and bureaucratic
inertia resulted in many detainees and prisoners being held for
protracted periods, sometimes years, without charge or trial.
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Over 40 percent of Nigeria's 60,000 prisoners are awaiting
trial or have not been charged, according to credible estimates.
Police officers are empowered to make warrantless arrests if
there is reasonable suspicion of an offense, or if they witness
commission of an offense. These provisions give police
officers wide discretion, which is frequently abused. Under
the law, the arresting officer must inform the accused of the
charges at the time of arrest and take the person to the
station for processing within a reasonable time. The suspect
must be given the opportunity to engage counsel and obtain
bail. Credible reports indicate that the police did not
generally adhere to these procedural safeguards and often held
suspects incommunicado, under harsh prison conditions, for
extended periods without informing them of their rights or the
charges against them.
Arbitrary detentions of ordinary citizens occurred throughout
1991. Motorists and pedestrians detained by police were
sometimes jailed for purposes of extortion. There were
instances in which police, after unsuccessful searches for
criminal suspects, detained the suspect's relatives.
Decree Two of 1984, the State Security (detention of persons)
Decree, provides that the FMG may detain without charge persons
suspected of acts prejudicial to state security or harmful to
the economic well-being of the country. When invoked. Decree
Two suspends the detainee's civil liberties. Decree Two also
contains a judicial ouster clause intended to prohibit judicial
scrutiny of acts under its purview. In 1990 the FMG amended
Decree Two, shortening the time a person may be detained
without charge from 6 months to 6 weeks, naming the Vice
President as the only authorized signatory of detention orders,
and creating a review panel to make recommendations for the
release or continued holding of detainees.
Nonetheless, many Nigerians still consider Decree Two the main
threat to their basic freedoms because the judicial ouster
clause encourages arbitrary detention with impunity for the
arresting officers. H\iman rights groups charged that the
review panel rarely met and detention orders were generally
renewed without review. Additionally, there are credible
reports that the provisions for effecting a detention under the
Decree were not always followed. Sources reported that many
persons were detained without a prior order signed by the Vice
President and that police and security officials subsequently
forged detention orders.
Decree Two was used in 1991 to detain and silence persons for
antigovernment actions or statements. In the aftermath of a
May and June national student strike and campus disturbances,
the FMG said it had detained approximately 200 student leaders
across the country, including the national executive officers
of the banned National Association of Nigerian students (NANS),
which had called the strike. Many of the students were
detained under Decree Two; others were simply detained without
charge. Many of the student leaders were detained over 2
months before, being released in August and September . The FMG
has not announced whether all detained students have been
released, and human rights groups have been unable to determine
if all have been released because the FMG never disclosed the
identities of the detainees.
Four journalists were detained for an article implicating
police in the shooting deaths of two students during a campus
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disturbance in Lagos, and two human rights activists were
briefly detained in connection with student disturbances.
Among the most publicized Decree Two detentions in 1991 were
those of Gloria Mowarin and Dorah Mukoro, girlfriend and wife,
respectively, of two fugitive officers implicated in the April
1990 coup attempt. Both women were detained shortly after the
unsuccessful coup. Mukoro was held with her children, one of
whom was born in detention. These detentions appear illegal
even under Decree Two, since the Government was holding the
women for acts they did not commit. In August Mrs. Mukoro and
her children escaped from detention. The FMG is still holding
Ms. Mowarin despite a February court decision quashing her
detention on technical grounds. A number of relatives of other
suspected coup plotters are also under detention, but the exact
number is unknown.
Many criminal suspects were held under Decree Two, although the
measure was not intended to apply to common crimes. As a
result, these suspects can also be held indefinitely after
charges are filed, and detention orders renewed, sometimes for
periods exceeding the maximum penalty for their alleged
offenses. This practice has not been discouraged by the
Government .
The FMG continued a process, begun in 1986, of reviewing the
cases of persons detained, convicted or charged under various
decrees during the previous military administration
(1984-1985). The exact number of such cases reviewed was
unknown but believed to be few.
There were no instances of forced exile as a means of political
control .
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Decree One of 1984, the Basic Constitution (modification and
suspension) Decree, left the institutional framework of the
judiciary relatively intact, but set up a parallel system by
transferring jurisdiction over certain major criminal offenses
from the courts to special tribunals, weakening the regular
court system in the process. The independence of the judiciary
has also been challenged seriously by the AFRC's assumption of
the role as the final arbiter and by promulgation of decrees
that prohibit judicial intervention.
Under these decrees, the AFRC has transferred jurisdiction over
cases involving corruption, currency violations, armed robbery,
and a variety of miscellaneous offenses, such as drug
trafficking and illegal oil sales, from the civilian judicial
system to special tribunals. In these cases, those charged
have access to legal assistance, bail (except in the case of
armed robbery), and the right to appeal (except in the case of
armed robbery and conviction under the civil disturbances
decree). Prior to a decree passed in July 1991, military and
police officers sat on these tribunals as coequals with a
civilian judge. Pursuant to the new decree, only sitting or
retired civilian judges can be on the tribunals. Nevertheless,
these tribunals still do not provide full procedural safeguards
normally granted the criminally accused. A leading human
rights group, the Constitutional Rights Project (CRP), reported
that the Recovery of Public Property Decree and Tribunal
substitute a presumption of guilt for the presumption of
innocence which customarily attaches in criminal proceedings.
Sentences by these special tribunals are generally severe.
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Convictions for armed robbery by the Special Robbery and
Firearms Tribunals carry the death sentence with no right of
appeal, although the sentence must be confirmed by the state's
governor before it is carried out. Conviction under the
Treason and Other Offenses Tribunal (established in 1986) also
carries the death sentence and provides for appeal only to the
joint chiefs of staff. Its recommendations cannot be appealed
but are subject to AFRC confirmation. Legal observers remain
particularly critical of the mandatory death penalty without
right of appeal, especially for cases involving armed robbers
who have been sentenced to death for thefts of small amounts of
money. Moreover, the CRP reported that rates of conviction in
these tribunals over several years were 93 percent, and in one
particular tribunal 100 percent.
The regular court system is composed of both federal and state
trial courts, state appeal courts, the federal Court of Appeal,
and the federal Supreme Court. Courts of first instance under
the 1989 Constitution include magistrate or district courts,
customary or area courts, religious or Shari'a (Islamic)
courts, and, for some specified cases, the state high courts.
The nature of the case usually determines which court has
jurisdiction. In principle, customary and Shari'a courts have
jurisdiction only if both plaintiff and defendant agree to it,
though in practice fear of legal costs, delay, and distance to
alternative courts encourage many litigants to choose these
courts. Under the 1989 draft constitution (scheduled to come
into full effect in 1992) Shari'a courts are limited to
followers of Islam and to only those states that establish them.
Trials in the regular court system are public and generally
respect constitutionally guaranteed individual rights. These
include a presumption of innocence, the right to be present at
a public trial, to confront witnesses and present evidence, and
to be represented by legal counsel. There is legal provision
for bail, but the Nigerian Bar Association and human rights
groups charge that bail is underutilized. As a result, many
accused persons remain in jail while awaiting trial for petty
offenses. Bail is denied to those charged with murder, armed
robbery, and drug offenses.
Public complaints about judicial corruption were frequent in
1991. There are credible claims that some judges sought
government advice before deciding cases where the Government
was a litigant; long adjournments are frequently granted in
wrongful imprisonment cases filed against the Government.
There were also credible reports that judges and security
agents pressured individuals to drop suits against the FMG or
state governments. Few released detainees or closed newspapers
filed or pursued suits against the FMG.
Nevertheless, within a complex legal system, in which the AFRC
has encroached on the traditional role of the judiciary,
Nigeria's courts have an established legal tradition, and a
number of judges seek to uphold it. For example, in a lawsuit
filed by several human rights groups against the temporary
closure of the Guardian family of publications in May, the
presiding Lagos State High Court judge issued a temporary
injunction barring the Lagos state government from any further
press closures during the pendency of the suit.
Some observers allege that there are political prisoners in
Nigerian jails, but they cannot provide specific information
and often do not distinguish between detainees held without
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charge and those convicted of political offenses. The number
of politically motivated detentions at any one time varied
widely during the year, from a handful to over 200 after the
May-June student disturbances.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Nigerian society is generally free of arbitrary interference by
the State in the private lives of its citizens. Provisions of
the 1989 Constitution guarantee the rights of privacy in the
home, in correspondence, and in oral electronic communications.
While there have been isolated instances of unauthorized forced
entry by security forces, the State does not carry out general
surveillance of the population.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of speech and press
The 1989 Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the
press, but it also reserves for the federal and state
Governments the exclusive right to own and operate radio and
television stations, the most important media for reaching the
public. There are no restrictions on ownership of print media,
and, despite considerable government intimidation, there is a
lively press. Among the many Nigerian daily newspapers are
seven privately owned national dailies with large circulations,
one daily owned by the federal Government, and another in which
the federal Government owns a majority share. Many states
operate their own daily or weekly newspapers. In some states,
privately owned dailies compete with state papers. Several
weekly newsmagazines vie for national readership.
Criticism of the Government is tolerated to a substantial
degree, and there is open discussion of political, social, and
economic issues. However, officials frequently caution
journalists, both publicly and privately, on their
responsibilities and the limits of acceptable press activity.
Although there are no published guidelines or decrees directly
limiting freedom of speech and the press. Decree Two
prohibitions against acts prejudicial to state security or
economic stability cast an expansive shadow, and most
journalists make a well-considered decision before publishing
sensitive news articles. The issues considered most sensitive
by the Government continue to be identifying top government
officials with corruption, publication of subjects the
Government believes are incitements to riot or which undermine
state security, and subjects which fall under "disrupting the
transition to civilian rule program." As a result of these
sensitivities, as well as the FMG's proven disposition to take
action against offending publications, self-censorship is
common .
Journalists who did not exercise self-censorship were targeted
during the year. The Guardian news publishing group (three
newspapers and three magazines) was closed by the Lagos state
government after the Guardian Express published an article
implicating the police in the deaths of two students during a
campus disturbance in late May. The editor and three
journalists from the paper were detained for several days.
From March 8 to March 21, John West publications (three
separate publications) was closed by security agents after one
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of its papers, the Lagos News, carried an article linking first
lady Maryam Babangida to a Lagos socialite who is the key
figure in a sensational corruption scandal; editors of the
paper were detained for 2 days. Without being charged for any
criminal offense or being granted a hearing, foreign journalist
William Keeling of the London-based Financial Times was
deported after writing an investigative report on government
expenditure of windfall oil revenues accrued through the
temporary oil price increase during the Gulf crisis. In
September the editor of a state-owned newspaper was demoted by
the newspaper's board of directors for placing an unflattering
picture of the President's wife on the newspaper's front page.
The Government and journalists continue to disagree on the
Media Council Decree of 1988, which still has not been
implemented because private journalists refuse to participate
in the council as contemplated under the Decree. The Decree
establishes licensing and educational requirements for
journalists. It also empowers the Media Council, to be
composed of government officials and journalists from
government and private media, to subpoena journalists and
require them to divulge sources of news articles.
Academic freedom, although generally respected, ccime under some
restrictions in 1991. There were no reports of censorship of
books or other academic publications or of the intimidation of
faculty. However, some campus groups allege that the state
security service maintains an active undercover presence on
campuses and reports directly to the Government and sometimes
university authorities on acts or attitudes considered
threatening to national security.
The National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) remained
officially banned for alleged radical activities. A NANS
national executive meeting was disrupted by Lagos antiriot
police in early April. In late April, NANS called for a
nationwide student strike to pressure the Government into
meeting demands ranging from ending the Structural Adjustment
Program to providing guaranteed minimum stipends to all
university students. There were protests and disturbances on
several campuses, resulting in three confirmed student deaths.
Some students and human rights group claim, although without
strong corroborating evidence, that many of the disturbances
were instigated by students employed or encouraged by the
Government to disrupt peaceful NANS demonstrations. In the
aftermath of the disturbances, the NANS national executive
officers were detained, and overall approximately 200 students
were detained. Several schools were closed and student union
activities were banned or severely restricted by campus
authorities. Many of the NANS leaders have also been expelled
or suspended from their schools.
Violent gang-like student groups popularly known as "secret
cults" disrupted order on several campuses during the year, and
the Government took measures to curtail their activities.
Several hundred students were interrogated by security agents
and scores were arrested. Campus authorities formed anticult
boards of inquiry which have suspended or expelled scores of
suspected cult members across the country. Human rights
observers and some student leaders assert that the boards did
not provide fair hearings and that these proceedings were
sometimes used to remove dissidents and student union leaders
from campus .
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b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Nigeria's 1989 Constitution assures all citizens the right to
assemble freely and to associate with other persons in
political parties, trade unions, or other special interest
associations. Permits are not normally required for public
meetings indoors, unless administrative approval is needed to
use a government facility. Permits are required in many areas
for outdoor gatherings, but the requirement is routinely
overlooked by both the authorities and the organizations
holding the meeting or rally. In most states, open air
religious services away from a church or mosque continue to be
prohibited.
Nigerians form and participate in a wide variety of special
interest organizations, including religious groups, trade
groups, women's organizations, and professional associations.
Organizations are not required to register with the Government
and are generally permitted free association with other
national and international bodies. Following violent religious
disturbances in March 1987, however, the Government required
that religious groups be sanctioned by either the Christian
Association of Nigeria or the Supreme Council for Islamic
Affairs. Only two political parties, both organized by the
FMG, are permitted.
On December 18, the FMG rescinded the 1987 and 1989 decrees
that prohibited hundreds of present and former officials and
politicians from engaging in political activity or running for
elective office during the transition to civilian rule. Within
days of the FMG decision, 13 prominent politicians who had been
arrested on December 2 for violating the decrees were released
from custody, and charges against them were dropped. Although
official language rescinding the decrees had not been
promulgated at year's end, it is understood that all Nigerians
excpet those convicted of offenses committed while in public
office are now permitted to participate in politics, including
running for election to the National Assembly and the
Presidency in 1992.
c. Freedom of Religion
The 1989 Constitution prohibits the federal and state
governments from adopting any state religion. This is adhered
to in practice, though some Christians maintain that Islam
provides a political advantage and called on the FMG to
publicly state that Nigeria is not a member of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference. Constitutional provisions
guaranteeing freedom of religious belief, religious practice,
and religious education are generally respected. Nonetheless,
it is commonly reported that members of one ethnic group may
discriminate against those of another, and this discrimination
may take the form of bureaucratic obstacles and delays in the
construction of churches or mosques.
Religious publications and travel are unrestricted.
Missionaries and foreign clergy, though limited by quotas, are
permitted to work in Nigeria and have not encountered official
harassment or mistreatment.
Tensions between the Muslim and Christian communities remain
high in some parts of the country, particularly the north. In
Bauchi state, ethnoreligious fighting erupted in April,
resulting in hundreds of deaths and substantial destruction of
property in the state capital. Both Christian and Muslim
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populations blame government for failing to act promptly to
quell the violence and both cite instances of police and army
personnel taking sides in the disturbances. Katsina state was
also the site of violent religious disturbances in April when
fundamentalist Muslims, disturbed over what they perceived as
articles derogatory toward Islam appearing in the state
newspaper, attacked government buildings and clashed with
police. Many persons were arrested, and approximately 70 were
convicted and jailed for various offenses by a tribunal
established especially to investigate these disturbances.
In October there was a major outbreak of violence with
religious overtones in Kano. Gangs of Muslim and Christian
youths fought running street battles, killing an estimated 200
persons and wounding many others. There was extensive damage
to homes and shops. The immediate cause of the violence was
reportedly a Christian effort (a revival meeting) to win
converts in this strongly Muslim city. In contrast to the
fighting in Bauchi, the military intervened quickly, imposing a
dusk-to-dawn curfew and ordering security forces to shoot
rioters on sight. A Muslim congregation had been denied
permission to celebrate an Islamic holiday at the same venue, a
local stadium, only weeks before. While a Board of Inquiry has
been convoked, figures on arrests have varied widely, and there
were no convictions by year's end.
In the wake of violent disturbances in the northern state of
Kaduna in 1987, the Government instituted a ban, still in
effect, on all religious organizations on postprimary campuses,
while reaffirming the right of individual students to practice
their religion in recognized places of worship.
Publication of advertisements paid for by religious
organizations remain banned, although the ban is not strictly
enforced, and advertisements occasionally appear in the press.
Religious programming on radio and television, both government
controlled, remains limited in some areas. The 1982 ban on the
Maitatsine Muslim sect, the source of bloody disturbances in
1982, remains in effect. The group still exists but is closely
monitored by the police.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Nigeria's Constitution entitles its citizens to move freely
throughout the country and reside where they wish. The
Constitution also prohibits expulsion from Nigeria or the
denial of exit or entry to any Nigerian citizen. Nigerians
travel abroad in large numbers, and many thousands study
overseas. Exit visas are not required. However, the
Government occasionally prevents travel for political reasons.
A leading human rights activist has not been able to travel
abroad since August 1990 when his passport was seized by
security agents, and security agents in October seized the
passport of a lawyer active in the human rights community. In
the latter instance, a December court ruling enabled the
attorney to retrieve his passport on an interim basis for
medical travel. Further hearings are to be held on the case.
Under Nigerian law, wives — including expatriates — must have the
permission of their husbands to take their children out of
Nigeria. Security officials in the past have prevented wives
from leaving with children, but there were no known instances
of such interference in 1991. Citizens leaving Nigeria have
the right to reenter. Citizenship cannot be revoked for any
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reason. No known penalties have been levied against the
thousands of Nigerians who have emigrated, settled abroad, or
acquired another nationality. However, Nigeria does not
recognize dual nationality, and naturalization in another
country does not exempt a person from Nigerian laws.
Nigerian law and practice permit temporary refuge and asylum in
Nigeria for political refugees from other countries. Nigeria
supports and fully cooperates with the Lagos office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) . The
country presently hosts an estimated 1,500 refugees each from
Liberia and Chad. Treatment and repatriation of refugees is
normally conducted in accordance with UNHCR standards. In 1991
several hundred Chadian refugees were voluntarily repatriated,
continuing a practice from previous years. No refugees were
reported expelled in 1991.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The 19-member AFRC headed by President Babangida is the highest
political authority in the land. There is no nationally
elected legislative body, and citizens do not have the right to
change their national government through the electoral
process. However, during the year, the FMG continued its
closely controlled program of political transition to civilian
government. The FMG has dictated the creation of only two
political parties, complete with political manifestos,
constitutions, and financing, with the exclusive right to
compete for public office. One is the National Republic
Convention (NRC) , the party "slightly to the right," and the
other is the Social Democratic Party (SPD), "the party slightly
to the left." Nationwide voter registration programs were held
in early August.
The political parties held ward, local government, and state
congresses to verify party membership lists and help select
party candidates for state elections. After postponements
caused by the creation of new states, both the NRC and the SDP
conducted gubernatorial primaries where nominees were chosen by
direct vote using an open ballot voting system. Under this
system, party members cast votes by standing in line behind
photos of their preferred candidates (the December state
general elections were also by open ballot.) The FMG announced
that the open ballot system, after certain modifications, would
also be employed for the 1992 national elections. Many critics
claim that the open ballot system subjected voters to coercion
and social pressure, particularly in rural areas, and, in urban
areas, discouraged civil servants and business people from
voting out of fear of losing their jobs or government
contracts, respectively.
The two parties engaged in political campaigning and activity
throughout the year. Generally, their activities were
peaceful. There were, however, instances of both interparty
and intraparty violence. While most of the violence was
limited to minor altercations, there were some fatalities and
destruction of property. In most cases, the perpetrators were
never apprehended, but the Government regularly issued strong
warnings against political violence.
The October gubernatorial primaries were marred by widespread
fraud on the part of candidates, party officials, and some
electoral officials. After weeks of legal and bureaucratic
tugs of war between candidates over contested results, the FMG
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annulled results in 9 states and disqualified 11 candidates.
In those cases, fresh primaries were held on December 5, with
fewer reports of irregularities. The gubernatorial and state
house of assembly elections on December 14 passed with little
turmoil. There were only isolated reports of violence and
electoral manipulation. The NRC won 16 of the 30 gubernatorial
contests, while the SDP gained control in more of the
unicameral state legislatures. Some of those results may be
subject to challenge.
Traditionally, Nigerian politics have been male dominated,
though women do not face legal impediments to political
participation or voting, and the FMG has actively promoted
their involvement. During the 1990 party elections, women in
various parts of Nigeria, including the traditionally
conservative north, won positions in the NRC and SDP. In 1991
there were several women who campaigned vigorously for state
and national offices.
Hundreds of former Nigerian government officials, both civilian
and military, were prohibited from participating fully in the
transition process until the decree instituting such a ban was
rescinded on December 18 (see Section 2.b.). Though their
right to vote had never been denied, they are now eligible to
campaign and run for office. Many prominent Nigerians from
across the political spectrum called for the lifting of the
prohibition.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The human rights committee of the Nigerian Bar Association
monitors the domestic human rights situation and occasionally
speaks out against human rights abuses. At least six major
local groups are active exclusively in human rights matters:
the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, led by a
prominent Lagos physician; the Nigerian Council for Human
Rights, chaired by a leading Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN);
Human Rights Africa, led by a prominent Lagos lawyer; the Civil
Liberties Organization (CLO), led by several Lagos attorneys
and journalists; the National Association of Democratic
Lawyers; and the Constitutional Rights Project, headed by the
former national secretary of the CLO. Nobel laureate Wole
Soyinka frequently spoke out on human rights issues as did
various respected political figures and academicians.
The human rights groups, Soyinka, and, to a lesser extent, the
Nigerian Bar Association made strong public statements against
the open ballot voting system, substandard prison conditions,
police brutality, erosion of the jurisdiction of the courts,
and, most importantly, the continued use of Decree Two and
other forms of detention without charge. Some of these groups
also publicly opposed the FMG's endorsement of former head of
state Olusegun Obasanjo for United Nations Secretary General.
A former president of the Nigerian Bar Association, Bola
Ajibola, who also served as chairman of its Human Rights
Committee, continued to hold the post of Attorney General and
Minister of Justice. He has been severely criticized by human
rights activists for his defense of Decree Two. He was
nominated by the FMG and elected in December to the
International Court of Justice despite public opposition from
many in the human rights community. While most human rights
monitors were relatively free from government interference in
1991, attorneys Femi Falana and Alao Aka-Bashorun were detained
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and questioned in connection with the threatened national
student strike in late May.
The Nigerian Vice President in October threatened two local
hiiman rights groups after they publicly opposed the Obasanjo
and Ajibola nominations. Questioning the patriotism of the
groups, the Vice President said the FMG would act against any
group receiving foreign funding and whose activities could
destabilize the Governinent . To date, no action has been taken
against either group.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no official policy of discrimination against any of
Nigeria's 250 ethnic groups, and laws do not favor one group
over another. The 1989 Constitution requires that governmental
employment and the provision of government services reflect
"federal character," i.e., proportioning of public employment
and government services to reflect the ethnic and regional
distribution of the country's population. The FMG generally
makes a conscious effort to strike a balance among different
groups in its decisionmaking and in appointments to key
government positions. Ethnic and regional hiring quotas are
observed in most public sector employment. However, Nigeria
has a long history of tension among its diverse ethnic groups,
and tradition continues to impose considerable pressure on
individual government officials to favor their own ethnic or
religious group. Religious and ethnic favoritism or harassment
persist. Persons not indigenous to their state of residence
frequently experience difficulty, e.g., in finding employment
and enrolling their children in the schools of their choice.
Women have always had some economic power and have exerted
influence in Nigerian society through women's councils, family
connections, and to a much lesser extent, mainstream social,
economic or political organizations. As primary school
enrollment increases, girls and young women are gaining greater
access to education. However, according to U.N. data, females
get only 27 percent of the schooling of males. There has been
a dramatic increase in the number of women obtaining university
degrees and becoming professionals, including teachers,
lawyers, doctors, judges, senior government officials, media
figures, and business executives. However, despite some
economic independence, women suffer discrimination in
employment and experience social prejudice.
The pattern of discrimination against women varies according to
the ethnic and religious diversity of Nigeria's vast
population. In some states, husbanas can prevent their wives
from obtaining employment or passports. In many states, a
woman cannot own property in her own right and as a widow
cannot inherit her husband's property, which in the absence of
children usually reverts to the husband's family. Women do not
receive ec[ual pay for equal work, and male professionals
receive fringe benefits not extended to their female
counterparts. Women find it extremely difficult to acquire
coninercial credit or obtain tax deductions or rebates as the
heads of households. Single mothers face added
discrimination. Credible sources report that a highly
qualified candidate was denied appointment as a trial court
judge solely because she was a single mother. The Ministry of
Justice has pledged to investigate this charge.
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While violence against women exists, there are no statistical
data to help determine the extent of the problem. Police do
not normally intervene in domestic disputes. Reports of wife
beating are common, especially from rural areas, where women
are generally uneducated and unlikely to use the legal system
due to traditional pressures and ignorance of the law.
Moreover, in very traditional areas it is questionable whether
the courts would actively intervene to protect a woman who has
formally accused her husband, if the level of alleged abuse
does not exceed customary norms .
The Government publicly opposes female circumcision, which
reportedly affects close to 50 percent of the female
population. The most dangerous form, inf ibulation, is still
practiced in some areas. However, because of the deep cultural
roots of this practice, the Government has relied primarily on
education through women's and public health organizations to
help induce change in attitudes rather than trying to
criminalize the practice. Public education has had some
effect, but change has been slow. The Government also opposes
the selling of young girls for marriage by poor rural families,
again primarily through educational means. There are no
estimates of the extent to which this practice is carried out.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Nigerian workers, except members of the armed forces and
employees of government services designated essential by the
FMG, may join trade unions. In February 1990, the FMG
dissolved the Customs, Excise and Immigration Staff Union and
added its members to the list of essential occupations. The
Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) has called on the FMG to
reinstate the Union.
Employers are obliged by law to recognize trade unions and must
pay or deduct a dues checkoff for employees who are members of
a registered trade union. In 1981 organized labor claimed 3
million members out of a total work force of 30 million. Since
then, the available work force has increased as the population
has grown, while trade union membership has probably declined
due to low economic growth.
While the trade union movement has had, within limits,
considerable latitude for action, it has been subject to
government oversight, particularly during the past 3 years.
Despite provisions in the 1989 Constitution and Nigeria's
ratification of 29 International Labor Organization (ILO)
conventions, government decrees, and policy continue to
restrict labor freedoms. A 1978 decree established a single
central labor body, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), created
42 (now 41) industrial unions through forced mergers, and
deregistered all other unions.
In recent years the Government has publicly announced its
intention to merge the present 42 unions into 19. During 1991
the Government said little on the subject, while the NLC has
its own possible merger plan (which would reportedly result in
21 unions), aimed, in its view, at strengthening the labor
movement. The Nigerian Union of Journalists has filed suit
against the NLC to stop its NLC-proposed merger with the Radio
and Television Workers Union. The suit has not been decided,
and some legal experts question whether the NLC, in the absence
of a government decree, can force the merger of unions.
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The 1991 Report of the ILO Committee of Experts (COE)
reiterated its criticisms of the Nigerian Labor Code, including
the single trade union system, the ban on organizing for
certain categories of workers, the broad powers of the
Government to supervise union accounts at any time, and
restriction of the right to strike through compulsory
arbitration in other than essential services.
The right to strike is recognized by law, except in the case of
essential services as defined by the Government. During 1991
strikes were relatively few and of short duration and focused
primarily on pay and benefits.
NLC president Paschal Bafyau has publicly endorsed the Social
Democratic Party (SDP). Government officials have warned that
under the transition to civil rule program it is illegal for an
organized body such as the NLC to engage in partisan politics.
Thus far, neither Bafyau nor the NLC have been sanctioned for
backing the SDP.
In August the FMG amended a policy held since 1975 which
permitted international labor affiliation only with the
Organization of African Trade Union Unity and affiliated
pan-African labor federations. The old policy provided for
criminal fine and imprisonment of individuals and proscription
of unions for violating the ban. Decree 35 of 1991 partially
repealed the ban by allowing affiliation with other,
non-African international labor organizations but only for
training and educational assistance.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The labor laws of Nigeria permit both the right to organize and
the right to bargain collectively between management and trade
unions. Collective bargaining is, in fact, common in many
sectors of the economy. Nigerian law further protects workers
against retaliation by employers for labor activity through an
independent arm of the judiciary, the Nigerian Industrial
Court, which handles complaints of antiunion discrimination.
The FMG, however, retains broad authority over labor matters.
In many areas of contention, the unions often take their
demands directly to FMG authorities rather than to the
employers. At the same time, the FMG can intervene forcefully
to end debate on issues which its feels contravene the
government's essential political or economic programs. In
January the FMG abolished the uniform wage structure for all
government entities. Now each tier of government — federal,
state, local, and state-owned firms — must negotiate its own
level of wages, benefits, and conditions of employment.
Organized labor will now have to bargain with each governmental
employer, and there is apprehension that this may weaken
labor's bargaining position. President Babangida laid the
cornerstone for an Export Processing Zone on November 8, but
the Zone is not expected to be operational before 1993.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Nigeria's 1989 Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory
labor, and this prohibition is generally observed.
d. Minimum Age of Employment of Children
Nigeria's 1974 Labor Decree prohibits employment of children
under 15 years of age in commerce and industry and restricts
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other child labor to home-based agricultural or domestic work.
The Labor Decree does allow the apprenticeship of youths aged
13 to 15, but only under specific conditions. Apprenticeship
exists in a wide range of crafts, trades, and state
enterprises. With respect to apprentices over the age of 15,
their activity is not specifically regulated by the
Government . These laws are enforced by the Ministry of
Employment, Labour, and Productivity only sporadically,
particularly in the rural areas where most Nigerians live.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Nigeria's 1974 Labor Decree also established a 40-hour
workweek, prescribed 2 to 4 weeks of annual leave, and set a
minimum wage for commerce and industry. In January 1991, the
Government announced a 50-percent increase in the minimum wage,
but labor leaders were not satisfied with the new figure,
believing that it did not represent much of an increase since
it also included many allowances previously given or permitted
a reduction in the benefits of some workers. Labor also
complained that government and private employers were slow to
implement the new wage scale, and there were numerous local
strikes and work stoppages in protest. During one wage-related
demonstration in Kwara state, three people were killed when
workers clashed with antiriot police.
The 1974 Decree contains general health and safety provisions,
some aimed specifically at youth and female workers,
enforceable by the Ministry of Employment, Labour, and
Productivity. Employers must compensate injured workers and
dependent survivors of those killed in industrial accidents.
The ineffectiveness of the Ministry in enforcing these laws in
the workplace is regularly criticized by labor unions.
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At the beginning of 1991, Rwanda was a one-party state ruled by
Major General Juvenal Habyarimana and the party he founded, the
National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) .
Habyarimana took power in a nonviolent coup in 1973. On July
1, 1990, Habyarimana initiated a move to multiparty democracy,
which developed momentum in 1991. With growing public
pressures for reform and a continued insurgency from Rwandan
exiles, the President and the MRND-controlled legislature, the
National Development Council (CND), amended the 1978
Constitution in June to replace the one-party State with a
multiparty political system. The CND passed the Political
Parties Law in July, and by August the Government had
registered five political parties, including a revised MRND.
At year's end, the date for elections and the convening of a
national conference had become major issues between the
Government and the political parties. At least three of the
parties want to convene a national conference to speed
political change. In late 1991, the Government entered into
lengthy negotiations with the opposition parties in an attempt
to create a transitional government composed of a coalition of
all major parties. When these negotiations stalled, the Prime
Minister-Designate formed a Government on December 30 without
the opposition.
The Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) include two branches, the army
and the gendarmerie. In 1991 the FAR grew to nearly 30,000
soldiers to meet intensive attacks at the Rwanda/Uganda border
by Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) guerrillas. These attacks
were a continuation of the war that broke out in October 1990,
when Rwandan guerrillas, mainly Tutsis long in exile, invaded
from Uganda. (The ethnic conflict between Hutus, 85 to 90
percent of the population, and the Tutsis, 10 to 14 percent,
has deep historical roots; in November 1959, the Hutu
population overthrew the Tutsi monarchy and ruling oligarchy,
and thousands of Tutsis took refuge in Uganda.) In January the
RPF briefly captured the northern town of Ruhengeri. In
response, the Government arrested thousands of suspected RPF
supporters, mainly Tutsis, bringing to more than 8,000 the
number arrested since the 1990 invasion, all under the state of
emergency (SOE) powers of October 1990.
The RPF threat also generated random violence by the populace
and the military against ethnic Tutsis, primarily in the
northern provinces of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. Credible reports
indicated that over 200 persons lost their lives in this random
violence with some deaths attributed to government security
forces. An official inquiry has been ordered. Careful
government efforts prevented the violence from spreading to
other regions at a time of extraordinary political and ethnic
tension in the country. A cease-fire agreement negotiated on
March 29 was violated almost immediately. In September
regional Heads of State, meeting under the auspices of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) , called for both sides to
respect the cease-fire and to begin a political dialog to end
the conflict. At the end of the year, there had been little
progress toward a solution. Approximately 100,000 Rwandans
have been displaced by the fighting, some of whom were moved
back from the border by Government security forces.
The overwhelming majority of Rwandans are subsistence farmers.
There is little industry, and food production has barely
managed to keep pace with the high population growth rate.
Rwanda's economy depends heavily on exports of coffee and tea
and on foreign aid. Rwanda reached agreement with the World
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Bank and the International Monetary Fund on a structural
adjustment program in February, but at year's end it had not
stimulated economic growth, which remained dependent on ending
the war .
During 1991 human rights remained circumscribed, although there
was some improvement as the threat from the RPF stabilized and
public participation in the political process increased.
Starting in March, the Government released unconditionally
8,000 suspected RPF supporters detained following the January
attack, and in April it announced a limited pardon program that
resulted in the release of or reduced sentences for persons
already tried and convicted. The political changes brought
increased freedom jof speech and freedom of the press, with
nearly 60 independent newspapers available in 1991 compared
with a dozen in 1990. However, the Government also carefully
tried to control the guality of change and, on three separate
occasions, cracked down on some journalists for criticism of
persons in the Government and what the Government termed
sensationalist reporting. At the end of the year, all
journalists arrested in mid-1991 were free, although some have
cases or appeals pending before the courts. Intimidation of
the independent press resumed in December. Eighteen persons,
tried and convicted in the period December 1990-January 1991
for being RPF supporters, remained in prison.
Major human rights problems in 1991 included extrajudicial
killings by security forces during the conflict with the RPF,
incidents of torture and pervasive beatings of detainees,
widespread arbitrary arrests (mostly persons of Tutsi ethnic
origin), discrimination against women, and the inability of
citizens to change their government.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Ethnic violence erupted in northern Rwanda in January following
the RPF attack on Ruhengeri. It was exclusively directed
against Tutsi residents near the border with Uganda, known as
the Bagogwe, who were suspected of sympathizing with the
rebels. An estimated 200 to 300 civilians lost their lives in
this random violence. Reports indicated that both security
forces and local civilian groups were involved in these
killings. Even after the RPF threat receded, there were
credible reports throughout the year of isolated acts of
violence against Tutsis. Some government officials were
accused of condoning the ethnic violence. The Ministry of
Justice announced an inquiry into these charges but at year's
end had not issued a report or made arrests.
b. Disappearance
There were no known disappearances due to government action.
However, there were massive arrests, releases, and
displacements of people due to the war and ethnic conflict.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Security forces, including police, occasionally use torture
during detention as a part of interrogations, and routine
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beatings seem to be pervasive at the time of arrest. The major
roundup of suspects following the January attack on Ruhengeri
was accompanied by severe beatings and other forms of brutality
against hundreds of suspects on their way to prison. Aside
from massive overcrowding following the January events, prison
conditions improved with the release of most of the Tutsi
detainees and prisoners in the pardon program. Delegates of
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regularly
visit prisoners in Rwanda. Diplomats and human rights groups
often have access as well.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Except for suspects caught in the act of committing crimes,
arrests are required by law to be made with a warrant following
an investigation. Under the law, persons may be detained for
no more than 48 hours without a warrant. In most cases,
charges must be stated formally in the defendant's presence
within 5 days of arrest. Failure to meet these requirements
constitutes grounds for dismissal of charges and release of
those arrested. However, in practice under the state of
emergency, which began in October 1990, normal procedures of
arrest and detention were frequently ignored. Most of the more
than 6,000 persons arrested after the January attack on
Ruhengeri were picked up during random police roundups of
suspected persons, mainly of Tutsi ethnic origin.
Persons arrested by Rwandan security forces for political
crimes may be detained indefinitely without being formally
charged. Political crimes are acts judged to be against the
interests of the State and therefore under the jurisdiction of
the security court. Under broad preventive detention
provisions, persons may be held for 30 days if public safety is
believed to be threatened, if the accused might flee, or if the
penalty carries a minimum sentence of 6 months. At the end of
that period, judicial review is mandatory. Detention may be
prolonged indefinitely for 30-day periods. Persons charged
with serious crimes often must wait up to 6 months before
trial. Detainees may appeal their incarceration, and the
appeal must be heard within 24 hours by a competent judicial
authority.
In March the Ministry of Justice announced the release of more
than 8,000 detainees, including some 2,000 persons detained in
1990 after the October invasion. Among those released were 14
military officers held without trial for nearly 3 years on
charges of participating in the murder of a prominent colonel.
In September the Rwanda Association for the Defense of Human
Rights (ARDHO) publicly alleged that civilians were being
detained in military facilities, without the knowledge of the
normal law enforcement or judicial authorities. In the same
press release, ARDHO also reported that some persons released
from detention had been arbitrarily confined to rural areas
without proper court orders and thus constrained from resuming
work in urban areas. ARDHO charges of extrajudicial detentions
and banishment to rural areas are credible, but reports of such
instances are infrequent.
Exile is not practiced as a form of political punishment.
However, thousands of Rwandans, mainly Tuts is, have been in
exile for years in Uganda and other neighboring countries.
Between 2,000 and 4,000 such exiles and/or their children
comprised the body of the RPF invasion force. Past government
policies prevented the exiles from returning, and the 1991
amnesty was designed to remove this obstacle. In 1991 the
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Government began planning for the return of exiles, including
identification of reintegration sites and preparation of an
amnesty law. In October the CND passed two laws which will
grant blanket amnesty to Rwandan refugees/exiles who choose to
repatriate and restore civil rights to persons deprived of them
for political reasons.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Rwanda has three separate court systems for criminal/civil,
military, and state security cases. All cases except those
involving state security may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The State Security Court has jurisdiction over
national security charges such as treason. If procedural
violations (points- of law) are alleged in security cases, these
may be brought before the Supreme Court, the Cour de
Cassation. If such violations occur, the Court can send the
case back to the State Security Court for retrial by a
different panel of judges.
The judiciary is statutorily independent and expected to apply
the Penal Code impartially, but in practice the Government
exercises influence in political and security cases. All
judges are appointed by the President and may be dismissed upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Supreme
Council of Magistrates, formerly headed by the President. The
Ministry of Justice also controls the operating budget for the
judicial system. In 1991 constitutional changes eliminated the
President's role in the Supreme Council of Magistrates.
Although the President retains the authority to appoint persons
to the bench, candidates must be proposed by the Council. The
administration of justice has been hampered by poor management
and a generally low level of education among civil servants.
All defendants are constitutionally entitled to counsel, but,
because of a shortage of lawyers, defendants often are not
represented at trial by professional counsel. There are only
about 30 private lawyers in Rwanda, most of whom work in
Kigali, and approximately 100 officially recognized "legal
agents" who may represent defendants in court. Family and
other nonprofessional advisers are permitted. Trials are
public .
Bail is not available under Rwandan law. The majority of
Rwandans awaiting trial or sentencing enjoy provisional
release, which is routinely granted, provided that the
defendant is not likely to flee justice, has a fixed residence,
and is not likely to harm anyone or need protective custody.
At the end of 1991, no political prisoners were known to remain
in Rwandan jails. Of the some 8,000 persons arrested following
the October 1990 invasion, 18 remained in jail. In April the
Minister of Justice announced a limited presidential pardon for
persons arrested and sentenced following the October 1990
invasion as well as for common law offenders. Innocent
Ndayambaje, a former university student imprisoned in 1986 and
convicted in 1990 for violating the prohibition against forming
political parties, was released on April 29. In addition, six
journalists were arrested in 1991 and variously tried and
convicted, or released without charges. Three still have their
cases pending before the State Security Court (see Section
2.a. ) .
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f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Rwanda's Constitution provides for the respect of privacy of
individuals, correspondence, and communications and declares
that the home is inviolable. Rwandans are subject to
occasional interference in their private lives. While police
are required to have warrants before entering a private
residence, in practice authorities gain entry into homes
without warrants, often using the pretext of checking required
documentat ion .
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
In addition to the ethnic violence unleashed by the RPF
invasion (see Section l.a.), there was an undetermined number
of deaths, including civilian deaths, caused by the fighting
between FAR troops and RPF guerrillas. The intense fighting at
the beginning of the year, which involved fairly large units,
gave way at the end of the year to sporadic guerrilla
incursions along the northern border with Uganda.
The conflict also resulted in many injuries to civilians.
Moreover, as a result of the fighting, an estimated 90,000 to
120,000 persons fled from their homes, some of them to Uganda.
In response to a government appeal, the ICRC and the European
Community provided food and medicines for these people. The
ICRC began to phase out its assistance at the end of 1991. The
Government has allowed the ICRC to visit persons taken prisoner
in the guerrilla conflict at the border. The Government
acknowledged holding at year's end 15 prisoners of war captured
in the course of the conflict with the RPF.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Rwanda's Constitution provides for freedom of speech and
press. In 1991 individual critics, opposition political
parties, and watchdog associations frequently called to account
government policies and personalities, using the newly
organized independent press or mass political rallies in
various parts of the country as vehicles for their criticism.
Broadcast media in Rwanda are limited to one radio station
owned and operated by the Government. With the legalization of
political parties, the government -owned radio began to report
opposition party activities and to publicize their messages to
the population. It also provided each party 12 minutes of free
air time each week. Rwanda has no television.
Independent newspapers proliferated in 1991 from about 12 in
1990 to over 60 by the end of the year. Most engaged in
frequent criticism of government policies and personalities.
Even official government newspapers ran some stories critical
of the Government .
The Government responded in several ways to what it considered
irresponsible reporting by the independent press. The
legislature passed a controversial press law in August that
defines the legal framework within which the press may work.
The legislation was signed into law by the President at the end
of the year. The Government arrested six journalists from
independent newspapers in the last half of 1991. Two were
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tried and convicted of contravening sections of Rwanda's penal
code that protect government officials from libel. Both were
temporarily free pending appeal at the end of 1991. Another,
accused of sympathy with the RPF, was free pending review of
his case before the State Security Court. Two others, who
worked on the same newspaper, had their cases tied to his. The
sixth was released with no charge brought. In December,
independent journalists came under increased pressure to curb
criticism of the Government and government officials. The
internal security service arrested with warrants, interrogated,
and released several leading journalist critics. In the first
such case, the journalist was severely beaten and forced to
sign a statement promising not to write critical articles in
the future. The journalist has filed a complaint with the
judicial system.
Due to the October 1, 1990, invasion, the national university
was closed and remained closed for the duration of the
1990/1991 academic year. The university, however, reopened
October 7, 1991. As a result of the introduction of political
parties and a rapidly expanding private press, academicians and
students freely expressed their political and personal views in
and outside of the classroom. Political tensions, reflecting
national political tensions, developed in November over campus
elections, but the university remained open, and no violence or
disorder occurred.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The amendment of the Constitution in June effectively abolished
compulsory membership in the formerly sole party. People are
now free to join the party of their choice. Some prominent
members of the ruling party, including seven members of the
elected legislature, have declared themselves for newly
registered parties. Both the Government and opposition parties
began holding mass political rallies regularly in all parts of
the country, except in combat zones.
Permits are still required for large group meetings. No
political party reported being denied a permit to meet.
Despite presidential urging to local officials to be impartial
in implementing democratic pluralism, credible reports continue
to circulate of intimidation and arbitrary discrimination on
the part of local officials toward persons favoring or
suspected of favoring political parties other than the MRND .
Opposition party organizers reported harassment by local
authorities, who, for example, declined to rent loudspeaker
equipment to them or delayed issuance of permits, sometimes
until the last minute.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is guaranteed by Rwanda's Constitution and
is generally accorded to religious communities. However, the
Government refuses to recognize the Jehovah's Witnesses, which
it considers a subversive association rather than a religious
organization .
Christianity predominates in Rwanda, with the largest segment
of the population adhering to Catholicism. Muslims constitute
a small minority but freely practice their religion throughout
the country. Foreign clergy are able to practice their
religion and to organize missionary activities. There are no
restrictions on construction of places of worship, training of
clergy, religious publishing, or religious education.
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d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement and residence within Rwanda is restricted
by laws and regulations which require all residents to hold
national identity cards and residence and work permits (see
Section 5). People who wish to spend more than 3 days in a
township other than their own must obtain permission from the
authorities of the area they will be leaving and visiting.
Police conduct periodic checks, especially in urban areas, and
return all those not registered in the locality to their own
township. Property owners who do not require tenants to show
valid documentation are subject to fines and even
imprisonment. Undocumented tenants are subject to expulsion.
Wartime measures implemented after the October 1990 invasion of
Rwanda, which remain valid indefinitely, severely limit freedom
of movement within the country for Rwandans and foreigners
alike. Under the state of emergency, checkpoints exist at key
points on main roads and outside most towns, authorizations are
required for travel between prefectures, and a nighttime curfew
remains in effect throughout the country. Passports for
foreign travel are normally obtained by Rwandans who seek them,
and emigration is not restricted.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and other sources, there are an estimated 200,000 to
500,000 Rwandan refugees in neighboring countries. Most are
ethnic Tutsis who fled Rwanda during the revolution of 1959,
which overthrew the Tutsi monarchy and subsequent ethnic
violence associated with independence in 1962. In the past,
the Government cited lack of land and heavy population density
as reasons precluding large-scale repatriation of refugees,
although it did permit return on a case-by-case basis. After
the October 1990 invasion of Rwanda, President Habyarimana
publicly recognized the refugees' right of return and called on
the international donor community to assist Rwanda in receiving
large numbers of refugees. Throughout 1991, the Government
worked with the UNHCR and the international community in
planning for the return and reintegration of refugees opting
for repatriation. Refugees were unable to repatriate in 1991,
however, due to the continued conflict between the Government
and the RPF. In August, under a bilateral agreement with the
Republic of Tanzania, Rwanda accepted the return of 7,000
Rwandan citizens who arrived in Tanzania after 1986.
Rwanda hosts almost 30,000 refugees, mainly Hutu, from
Burundi. Approximately 19,000 of these arrived in 1972,
fleeing massacres in Burundi. Most have been integrated into
Rwandan society, although they retain Burundi citizenship and
refugee status. Some of these refugees sought voluntary
repatriation in 1991 from refugee camps in northern Rwanda near
the zone of conflict. Most of the Burundi refugees who had
fled to Rwanda following ethnic disturbances in 1988 were
denied permanent asylum by the Rwandan Government and
subsequently repatriated. Of the remaining 1,000, some 150
have been permitted to attend secondary school and remain in
Rwanda. At the end of 1991, Rwanda received another 10,000
refugees from Burundi who were assisted by the UNHCR and the
Rwandan Red Cross .
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Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government.
While citizens did not have this right in 1991, the
Constitution was amended in June to provide for a multiparty
democracy. The Constitution provides for President Habyarimana
and the MRND-dominated legislature, elected in 1988 under the
single-party system, to continue in office until the next
elections, which remain to be set by the President in
consultation with political party leaders. Meanwhile, the
President has recognized the parties as legitimate
representatives of the Rwandan people. While negotiations
continued until the end of the year for formation of a
transition government under a Prime Minister, the President and
the MRND retained their dominance of the Government and the
political process. The new Constitution, drafted by the
broad-based Commission of National Synthesis, provides for the
President and Members of the Parliament to be elected to 5-year
terms by universal adult suffrage and by secret ballot. The
President's tenure is limited to two 5-year terms. The new
Political Parties Law came into force in July, and nine parties
were registered by the end of 1991. One is essentially the
continuation of the former single party. Three parties have
formed a consultation committee to cooperate in the opposition.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The first local organization to monitor and report on human
rights practices in Rwanda, the Rwandan Association for the
Defense of Human Rights (ARDHO) , was established in September
1990. It issues press releases (see Section l.d.), makes
representations to public officials calling attention to
alleged human rights abuses, and seeks redress on behalf of
victims. The Government has not attempted to interfere in
ARDHO ' s activities, and its members include several
high-ranking government officials.
Rwanda cooperates with visiting delegations from such human
rights groups as Amnesty International (AI) and the ICRC. An
AI observer monitored the trials of suspected RPF collaborators
that began in December 1990. Africa Watch sent a mission to
Rwanda in November 1991 to interview refugees and war victims.
Resident diplomats and ICRC officials visited Rwandan prisons
on several occasions following the arrests of citizens in the
wake of the attack on Ruhengeri in January to inspect
conditions and interview detainees.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides that all citizens are equal before
the law, without any discrimination because of race, color,
origin, ethnicity, clan, sex, opinion, religion or social
standing. Rwanda's Political Parties Law bans parties based on
ethnic origin or religious affiliation. Ethnicity, however, is
a sensitive issue as a result of Rwanda's ethnic imbalance and
its historical legacy. About 85 to 90 percent of the
population is Hutu and 10 to 14 percent Tutsi. In a 1959
uprising, the Hutu majority overthrew the Tutsi monarchy to end
a longstanding feudal system.
In November 1990, the Government officially rescinded the
controversial legal requirement that ethnic origin be listed on
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identity documents. However, the documents had not been
revised at the end of 1991, and an existing ethnic quota system
continues to be practiced, with widely differing results. This
system allocates sought-after positions in academia, the civil
service, and the military to members of Rwanda's principal
ethnic groups in proportion to their numbers. In practice,
this policy limits access of Tutsis to education and important
positions in the Government and military. Tutsis are, however,
well represented in private business and the clergy.
Despite the language in the Constitution, women continue to
face serious de facto discrimination. Women have fewer
opportunities for education, employment, and promotion, and
they perform most of the subsistence agricultural labor.
Women's rights to property are limited, and women are not
treated equally in divorce proceedings. The President has been
an outspoken advocate of women's rights, encouraging family
planning efforts and promoting women to positions of
responsibility in the Government. However, he has yet to sign
into law a new family code, passed by the National Assembly in
1989, that would change Rwandan laws concerning marriage,
divorce, the status of children born out of wedlock, child
custody, and other elements of family law. The proposed
changes, affecting some strongly held traditions, have
generated fierce controversy, not least among women who see
some of its provisions, such as the limitations on the size of
the marriage dowry, as threatening to their social status.
There are currently few organizations promoting women's
interests in Rwanda, but their numbers are growing. A women's
association, URAMA, was formed in 1989. Two organizations
dedicated to assisting women in business established national
headquarters in 1990. Also, there is an association of women
lawyers and another of women parliamentarians.
Violence against women is socially accepted in the less
developed rural areas, but it is neither encouraged nor
permitted by law. Wife beating exists, but there are no
studies available to help indicate the extent of the problem.
When reported, wife beating is punished by the courts, but
rarely do these cases come to litigation. Neither the
Government nor URAMA has addressed the issue of violence
directly.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The economy consists predominantly of small-scale subsistence
farming. There is very little industry and hence few workers
in the modern wage economy, which accounts for perhaps 7
percent of the work force in both private and public sectors.
The amended Constitution explicitly guarantees citizens the
right of association and freedom to create professional
associations and labor unions. However, labor organizations
have only recently begun to develop. Union membership (open to
all salaried workers) is optional.
The Central Union of Rwandan Workers (CESTRAR) separated from
the Government and the MRND as part of the package of political
reforms under the new Constitution. CESTRAR leadership focuses
on nonwage-related work conditions and on providing training
opportunities and credit union facilities to its members.
CESTRAR members have the right to strike with the approval of
the executive committee. No strikes were reported in 1990 or
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RWANDA
1991. CESTRAR is affiliated with the Organization of African
Trade Union Unity and the Organization of Central African
Workers. In its 1991 report, the Committee of Experts (COE) of
the International Labor Organization (ILO) asked that the
Government revise legislation governing agricultural workers in
order to provide them the same right of association the law
grants to industrial workers.
In November the Government recognized an independent union
representing Rwandan health professionals, the Union
Association of Health Personnel in Rwanda. Two additional
unions have presented their statutes to the Government for
recognition: The Association of Christian Unions, representing
public and private sector workers, small businessmen and
subsistence farmers; and the Interprofessional Union of Workers
of Rwanda, which was disbanded when CESTRAR became Rwanda's
sole union in 1984.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Constitution grants workers the right to defend their
rights through collective actions. The Labor Code grants the
right to engage in collective bargaining with employers within
the framework of the CESTRAR. There are no legal bars to
antiunion discrimination, but such discrimination does not
occur in practice. Approximately 75 percent of the small
industrial work force is unionized, but few of these workers
are covered by genuine collective agreements. There are no
export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced and Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law and is not known to occur in
practice. Most citizens are expected to participate in
community service programs once a week as part of the national
development program.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Except in the subsistence agriculture sector, which is the area
of employment of most Rwandans, children under 18 are not
permitted to work without their parents' or guardian's
authorization, and they may work at night only under
exceptional circumstances on a temporary basis. The Minister
of Labor may grant work permission to a child under 14. Child
labor outside the agricultural sector is uncommon.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wage rates in the small modern economic sector are set
by the Ministry of Labor. The minimum wage is inadequate to
provide a decent standard of living for urban families and is
often supplemented by work in small business or agriculture.
Government offices and most private sector companies have a
45-hour workweek, as fixed by ministerial decree. Rwandan wage
earners in both the public and private sectors are accorded one
weekday afternoon free for participation in sports and leisure
activities. Hours of work and occupational health and safety
in the modern wage sector are controlled by law but only
loosely enforced by labor inspectors from the Ministry of Labor.
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SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE*
Sao Tome and Principe held its first ever multiparty elections
in early 1991, resulting in the defeat of the former
Marxist-oriented ruling party and its president. The new
President, Miguel Trovoada, is a former prime minister who
returned to Sao Tome in 1990 after 10 years in exile. The
multiparty National Assembly — now dominated by the former
opposition, with the former sole party relegated to a minority
role — is taking a more active part in the governing process,
including in some cases, introducing significant changes in
legislation.
Police power is administered by a 300-member paramilitary force
which reports to the chief of security police in the Ministry
of Defense. The Angolan contingent, which supplemented Sao
Tome's small armed forces since 1978, withdrew completely in
1991, following the opposition victory. The approximately 30
Cuban advisers in the country have been shifted to medical and
development roles, and Cuban security advisers have been
withdrawn.
The Sao Tome economy is characterized by heavy dependence on
one crop, cocoa, and large state-owned plantations. In 1991
the National Assembly passed a law permitting private ownership
of land, specifying criteria to prevent unbridled foreign
ownership of land. In addition, several former state cocoa
plantations are now being managed by private foreign or
nongovernmental ■ organizations . Despite these positive steps,
the Sao Tomean economy is virtually prostrate due to the
downturn in world cocoa prices and years of mismanagement.
Stringent austerity measures were adopted in August at the
insistence of the World Bank.
The human rights situation improved markedly in 1991 with the
peaceful, democratic transfer of power, the first in the
country's history. The elections were characterized by the
free expression of opposing views and the absence of violence
or evidence of significant fraud. The country now faces the
much more difficult task of making a multiparty system work and
ensuring that the Constitution's guarantees of rights and
freedoms continue to be observed in practice.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or other extrajudicial
killing by the Government in 1991.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
*There is no resident American Ambassador in Sao Tome and
Principe. Information on the human rights situation is
therefore limited.
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SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no reports of such abuses in 1991. The new
Constitution states explicitly that no one shall be subjected
to torture or cruel and inhuman punishment. Prison conditions
are known to be- harsh and unpleasant, but did not result in
known deaths during 1991.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There was no evidence of arbitrary arrest or detention in 1991,
but there is very little information available on the laws
regulating these practices or the manner in which the
authorities carry them out. The 1990 Constitution provides for
the right to challenge the legality of detention through habeas
corpus procedures.
In August five former senior officials were prevented from
leaving the country. Formal charges were later filed against
two of them for criminal misuse of foreign assistance funds;
the others were permitted to travel outside Sao Tome.
With the election of Miguel Trovoada (himself a former exile)
as President, political exile is no longer used as a means of
suppressing opposition. Some opponents of the former
government may voluntarily remain outside the country.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The new Constitution states that all citizens, regardless of
economic means, have the right of access to the courts for
redress of any action that violates rights recognized by the
Constitution. The right to a fair public trial and appeal is
explicitly provided for in the Constitution and is protected in
practice. In most criminal cases, the accused are given a
hearing and are sentenced by a judge. There is no tradition of
independent defense counsel or jury, though there is a
provision for court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants.
However, these rights are exercised within the context of an
overburdened judicial system marked by a shortage of judges,
lawyers, and operating funds, which results in long delays in
judicial proceedings. Under the previous government, the
courts were not independent in political and security cases,
and it remains to be seen if the 1990 political reforms will
result in a fully independent judiciary. At year's end, there
were no political detainees or prisoners, and no recent cases
of charges being brought for political offenses.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Constitutionally, personal identity and the right to privacy
are inviolate, as are privacy of the home, correspondence, and
private communication. Foreign advisers in the security
services have left the country, and the new Government has
ended the intrusive practices of the past.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of expression and freedom of the press are provided for
in the new Constitution. The legislative and presidential
campaigns in January and March were conducted openly, with full
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opposition access to government-controlled print and broadcast
media, which include a television station, a radio station, and
an intermittent newspaper. Broadsides and pamphlets critical
of the Government have begun to appear and circulate freely.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Under the new Constitution, citizens have the right to meet
peacefully anywhere, to demonstrate within the provisions of
the law, and freely to form associations. Under its terms, no
citizen may be forced to belong to an association or forced to
remain in one. The multiparty electoral process in early 1991
involved many meetings of different groups, including those
opposed to the former government. In addition to the political
parties (including the former sole party) nongovernment-
sanctioned professional and social organizations have emerged
and operate without apparent hindrance from the authorities.
Functions sponsored by cultural and social organizations, as
well as cooperative and professional associations, still
require government authorization. This is customarily given,
however .
c. Freedom of Religion
Religious freedom is provided for in the new Constitution and
observed in practice. The three major religious communities
are Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Seventh-Day Adventist.
There are no restrictions on the activities of foreign clergy.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens move freely around and between the island of Sao Tome
and the smaller island of Principe, 90 miles away. Because
interisland transport is only by slow ferry or twice weekly
flights by propeller airplane, such travel is difficult. Under
the new Constitution, citizens have the specific right to move
freely to any part of the national territory and are free to
emigrate and to return. The Government continues to require
exit visas for Sao Tomeans wishing to travel abroad.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
In 1991 Sao Tomeans exercised their right to change their
Government. The legislative elections in January resulted in a
stinging defeat for the former sole party, the Movement for the
Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (MLSTP), which garnered
only 30 percent of the vote and was reduced to a minority role
in the National Assembly. In presidential polling in March,
Miguel Trovoada, who had returned only 9 months before from 10
years of exile in France, received 81 percent of the vote after
then president Pinto da Costa withdrew, and his party did not
field a candidate. The MLSTP accepted its defeat with some
difficulty but in 1991 increasingly assumed its role as an
opposition party. In addition to the MLSTP, four parties
contested the legislative elections. President Trovoada was
elected independently of any party affiliation, though it was
understood throughout the electoral process that he and the PCD
(Partida de Convergencia Democratica) were committed to working
together should they be elected.
Political power is exercised by the directly elected President
through the Prime Minister and Cabinet appointed from the
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SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
majority party in the National Assembly. The President has
explicit, direct authority in foreign affairs and defense, but
economic and social policy are formulated by the Prime Minister
and his Cabinet. Women have the right to participate fully in
the political life of the country and to hold public office.
However, for cultural reasons, only a few have gained such
office.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Since the elections, a few small domestic groups, which have
the monitoring of human rights as one of their objectives, have
formed. Sao Tome and Principe traditionally has had limited
contact with international human rights groups, though this may
change as the country relies more heavily on United Nations,
World Bank and International Monetary Fund support and advice.
The previous government invited Portuguese observers to monitor
the elections. They certified them as free and fair.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Sao Tomean population (94,000 on Sao Tome, 20,000 on
Principe) is relatively homogeneous within a common
Luso-African culture. The inhabitants of Principe often feel
neglected by the central Government, an attitude exacerbated by
the current economic crisis. The new Constitution states that
all citizens are equal before the law regardless of sex, race,
social origin, political tendency, creed, or philosophic
conviction, and that women are equal to men in rights and
duties, with the right to full participation in political,
economic, social, and cultural life.
Notwithstanding this constitutional provision, women encounter
substantial discrimination. Even more than men, women face
drudgery and low wages on the large cocoa plantations. Only a
small number of women have gained access to professional
positions. Violence against women in Sao Tome and Principe is
believed to be infrequent and is not part of the traditional
social context. There is no specific information available,
however, on the frequency of wife beating or other forms of
domestic violence. Police rarely intervene in domestic
disputes, and, as far as is known, the Government has not
addressed publicly the issue of violence against women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The new Constitution guarantees freedom of association and
provides for the right of workers to strike within the terms of
the law. The former ruling party MLSTP had an affiliated trade
union, which existed mainly on paper. Since the political
changes that swept the country, workers have not yet organized
new unions. Most salaried workers in the country work on the
large state-owned "empresas" (plantation-like agricultural
enterprises) and do not often leave the estate, which generally
provides all community facilities. Since the transition to
multiparty democracy began, there have been a number of strikes
over pay, benefits, and working conditions in the public
sector. Workers at the central bank, several of the government
ministries, and the electrical and water monopoly all struck
for pay increases and job security. These strikes were outside
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SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
the frcimework of any formal union, however. No punitive action
was taken against the strikers, many of whose demands were
satisfied as a result of the strikes. There are no legal
barriers to the ability of trade unions to federate and to
affiliate internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The new Constitution provides for the right of workers to
organize, and collective bargaining is now legally permitted.
However, the Government remains the determining force in
setting wages and working conditions, and, as the country's
main employer, it will likely retain this role for the
immediate future. Because of mismanagement, neglect, and
unproductivity of state-run empresas, workers are sometimes not
paid salaries for up to 6 months, though this situation is
better on the eight empresas now under private management.
There are no laws prohibiting antiunion discrimination. There
are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law and is not
practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
A legal minimum employment age of 18 years in the modern wage
economy is generally respected in practice. The Ministry of
Justice, Labor, and Public Administration is responsible for
enforcing this law. However, in the subsistence agricultural
sector, children work on family plots from an early age.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no legally mandated minimum wage, though it is set as
an administrative requirement. The beginning salary for an
empresa worker is not sufficient to provide a decent living for
workers and their families. Empresa workers survive by running
up debts at the company store, which are deducted from their
"paper" wages. Workers are provided free (but poor) housing,
rudimentary medical care, and access to the subsidized company
store. The standard workweek is 40 hours. The implementation
of a structural adjustment program (backed by the World Bank)
has led to measures such as a sharp devaluation of the currency
and reductions in food subsidies, which have caused short-term
economic hardships for empresa workers and others. Eight of
the 15 state-owned farms are now under private management, and
the conditions of workers on these estates are slowly improving
as cocoa production increases and modern management techniques
replace Socialist collective farming. Basic occupational
health and safety standards are contained in the Social
Security Law of 1979. These are ostensibly enforced by
inspectors from the Ministry of Justice, Labor, and Public
Administration, but how effectively is not known.
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SENEGAL
Senegal is a republic with an elected president and a
unicameral legislature. There are 17 legal political parties,
although the Socialist Party has dominated politics and
controlled the Government since independence from France in
1960. Abdou Diouf, who has been President since 1981, was
declared reelected with J3 percent of the vote in the liotly
contested president;ial electloiis-xif. ..laas Ittie results of which
were openly disputed by the opposition until 1991). In April
two opposition parties joined the Government, accepting five
ministerial-level positions, including Minister of State, the
Government's highest ranking position after the Prime
Minister. In 1991 an electoral reform commission involved all
but one political party (that chose not to participate) in
substantially revising the electoral code: lowering the voting
age to 18, limiting presidential term.s of office (two 7-year
terms), and addressing virtually all of the weaknesses cited by
opposition parties.
The Senegalese armed forces (about 19,000 men, including the
paramilitary gendarmerie) is a professional, disciplined
organization which traditionally remains aloof from politics
and is respected by the population. In the first part of the
year, the army exchanged shots almost weekly with the
Mauritanian army across the Senegal river. Reportedly, at
least six Senegalese civilians were killed by gunfire from the
Mauritanian side of the border. The exchanges tapered off
toward July when face-to-face talks began between the two
Governments .
Separatist-related violence in the Casamance continued between
January and May, resulting in 87 casualties, of which 22 were
reportedly unarmed combatants. On May 31, a cease-fire
agreement was signed between the Government and the
proindependence Movement of the Democratic Forces in the
Casamance (MFDC) . There have been no further reports of
violence. Civilian security forces are fairly well trained and
generally respect the laws they enforce; those who do not
sometimes face criminal prosecution. However, there were
credible reports that both military and civilian security
forces were involved in torture and killings of noncombatants
in the Casamance in 1990 and 1991.
Senegal has a mixed economy with a substantial private sector.
It is overwhelmingly agricultural, with more than 70 percent of
the labor force engaged in farming, largely peanut production.
Since 1983 Senegal has actively pursued a structural adjustment
program, with the support of the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank, and major bilateral donors, designed to
liberalize the economy and stimulate economic growth. There is
concern, however, about the short-term political impact of the
austerity reforms, particularly in Dakar, where high
unemployment and deteriorating social conditions contributed to
civil unrest in the past. The unrest abated in 1991, but the
economy remains fragile.
Senegal's generally good human rights record continued to be
marred by credible reports of torture and extrajudicial
killings in the Casamance. However, reports of such abuses
lessened considerably with the end of the separatist-related
violence in the Casamance in May. All persons detained or
imprisoned in connection with the separatist movement were
released in May and later amnestied, along with all persons
imprisoned or awaiting trial for acts connected to the protests
following the 1988 elections. Government security forces were
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SENEGAL
removed from the Casamance region, the military governor was
replaced by a civilian, and the dialog between the Government
and the MFDC continues. Other areas of human rights abuse
include failure of the Government to establish responsibility
for torture and deaths of persons in detention by civilian and
military officials in 1990, and some restrictions on freedom of
the press and on the rights of women. Electoral code revisions
agreed to by the Government and opposition parties appear to
have removed virtually all of the procedural concerns arising
out of the disputed 1988 elections. The effect of the changes
will be demonstrated conclusively only when the next elections
are held in 1993 .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from;
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were credible reports of such killings in connection with
separatist-related violence in the Casamance (see Section l.g.).
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The authorities generally respect the legal prohibition on
physical abuse, but detainees are sometimes subjected to abuse,
usually during the "garde a vue" (detention) period between
arrest and appearance before a magistrate. This abuse usually
consists of beatings and denial of food, water, and clothing to
prisoners. The two reports of extrajudicial killings by
government troops noted in Section l.g. involved severe
beatings of suspected Casamance rebels that led to their
deaths. There were other word-of-mouth reports of abusive
treatment of persons detained by both sides between January and
May in the Casamance dispute. No complaints were lodged, and
the Ministry of Justice was not asked to investigate any of the
above situations.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and
this is generally respected in practice. The Senegalese legal
system is patterned after the French. Warrants, issued by
judges, are required for arrests. A person suspected of a
crime may be legally held without charge for 48 hours after
arrest and may be held up to 72 hours if ordered by a public
prosecutor; this period legally may be doubled in case of
crimes against the security of the State.
During this period of detention, the prisoner has no access to
family or attorney; but after a charge is lodged, both family
and attorney may visit. More extended "temporary" detention or
custody is permitted when civil authorities determine that
there is a threat of civil disturbance or that a person is a
threat to himself or others. Temporary custody is valid for a
maximum period of 6 months, but it may be renewed for
additional 6-month periods if the investigating magistrate
certifies that more time is recjuired to complete the
investigation. There is no limit to the number of times it may
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SENEGAL
be renewed. These laws are generally respected by law
enforcement officials in ordinary cases.
The Government used its legal powers to detain persons
suspected of belonging to the MFDC or of participating in
violence connected to Casamance separatist activities. Until
May, over 400 people were in detention. No trial date before
the State Security Court had been fixed. On May 27, President
Diouf ordered the release of all detainees and canceled all
arrest warrants issued for persons suspected of involvement in
separatist-related activities. On May 31, the Government and
the MFDC signed a cease-fire agreement, and on June 28, the
National Assembly passed a bill of amnesty for all persons
arrested in connection with the Casamance events. No prisoners
connected to the separatist movement remain in jail, and there
is no pending prosecution. The same legislation also amnestied
over 100 people charged during the troubles following the 1988
elections, including three men awaiting trial for fire-bombing
a vehicle in 1988. There were no known political detainees
being held at year's end. Exile is not used as a means of
political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Senegal has an active and well-trained judiciary, which is
constitutionally independent of the executive, the legislature,
and the armed forces. Court officials are lawyers who have
completed several years of required apprenticeship. Defendants
are presumed innocent until proven guilty. Trials are public,
and defendants have the right to a defense attorney from the
time the case is presented before an examining magistrate.
While there is a provision for defendants to have a lawyer at
public expense, it is not funded and does not occur in
practice. Defendants have the right to be present in court, to
confront witnesses, and to present evidence.
Ordinary courts are presided over by a panel of judges which in
criminal cases includes a panel of citizens as a form of jury.
Magistrates are appointed by decree and in principle are not
subject to government or political intervention; however, low
pay, poor working conditions, and family and political ties
make magistrates vulnerable to outside pressures. There are
four categories of special courts: the High Court of Justice,
the State Security Court, the Court for the Repression of the
Unlawful Accumulation of Wealth, and the military courts. The
High Court of Justice, created for the sole purpose of trying
high government officials for treason or malfeasance, has never
met.
The State Security Court, consisting of a judge and two
assessors, has jurisdiction over cases involving politically
motivated crimes. All cases involving Casamance separatists
before the State Security Court, including the cases of five
MFDC members who had been extradited from Guinea-Bissau and
convicted of plotting against the security of the State, were
dismissed and amnestied; the cases involving Mauritanians
charged with espionage continued at year's end. The "illegal
enrichment" Court, which has judged only three cases since it
was created in 1981, is not presently active. The military
court system has jurisdiction over offenses committed by
members of the armed forces during peacetime. Civilians may
not be tried by military courts. There is a right of appeal in
all courts except the State Security Court, the "illegal
enrichment" Court, and the Military Tribunal.
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There were no political prisoners at the end of 1991.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary invasion of the home, and
there is relatively little government interference in the
private lives of Senegalese citizens, particularly in rural
areas. Search warrants are normally required and may be issued
only by judges and in accordance with procedures established by
law. In practice, searches without warrants occasionally take
place. There is no evident pattern of monitoring the private
written or oral communications of citizens. Some of those
opposition figures who believed their phones had been tapped
thought that the practice ended in 1991.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The violence in the Casamance region of Senegal, which began in
1982 with sporadic attacks on Senegalese security forces by
armed members of the MFDC and intensified in 1990, abated in
early 1991 and almost completely ceased in May when a
cease-fire agreement was signed between the Government and the
MFDC.
However, there are two independent reports of government forces
beating and killing people in custody in the Casamance in early
1991. The Government said that because no formal complaints
were filed with the Ministry of Justice, no investigation would
be undertaken. Between January and May, the separatists killed
about 17 villagers and wounded 5 others. Approximately 21
armed incidents between separatists and government forces of
all kinds were reported in the Casamance during that period,
resulting in 3 deaths and 16 wounded among government forces,
and about 46 deaths and an unknown number of wounded among the
separatists .
In January a nongovernmental human rights organization issued a
report covering events of the last 6 months of 1990 that gave
detailed accounts of the execution by government troops of 9
prisoners and the torture of 12 others. The report stated that
the Government had not issued clear guidelines on the rules of
engagement and had never given orders not to kill or torture
prisoners. The Minister of Justice, in a public letter, denied
the allegations, asserting that Senegalese security forces
conformed to the law in maintaining order and did not carry out
torture or extrajudicial executions. He did not address the
specific cases described in the report except to say that
Senegalese authorities had conducted preliminary investigations
into the deaths of six people mentioned in the report.
According to the Government, the investigations were later
dropped for lack of sufficient evidence. The Government
released no information regarding the two military
investigations begun in 1990 of alleged unlawful deaths.
In late December, two Socialist Party figures were killed in
the Casamance in what appeared to be a targeted assassination.
The recognized leaders of the MFDC publicly denied
responsibility. Also in late December, in two separate
incidents Senegalese military shot people who allegedly failed
to heed warnings to halt.
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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press are protected in the Constitution,
although journalists' activities are circumscribed by legal
restrictions against expressing views which discredit the
State, incite the population to disorder, or disseminate 'false
news." While Senegal's only daily newspaper is controlled by
the ruling Socialist Party, it extended its coverage of the
activities of opposition parties in 1991, and there are many
regularly published magazines and newspapers reflecting a broad
range of political opinion from conservative to Marxist. The
wide variety of political views expressed in the independent
press is often critical of the Government and its programs;
government officials, politicians, and the political parties
participating in the Government are not immune.
In 1991 the government-owned broadcast media extended their
coverage of political opposition parties. In the past very
little news and information about opposition party activities
had been disseminated through radio and television. More
equitable access to the electronic media emerged as a principal
opposition demand during and after the 1988 elections. In
April 1991, a national advisory commission for broadcasting was
established to oversee radio and television coverage of
political party activities. At the same time, two political
parties formerly in opposition joined the Government. Since
then, the news coverage of political parties both within and
outside of the coalition Government has increased
significantly. The coverage has included political meetings,
press conferences, and interviews of opposition leaders, who
have not hesitated to make their opinions known. Further
liberalization of the state-controlled broadcast media included
changes in the statutes governing television, which altered its
status as a government entity and had the aim of providing
greater independence. The Government has also given permission
to Radio France International to begin transmissions in Senegal
and to a French company to operate a pay-television channel.
The cases against the journalists of the opposition newspaper,
Sopi, filed in 1989 and 1990, have been settled. The editor of
Sopi, convicted in 1990 of spreading false news, completed a
6-month prison sentence early in 1991. All other Sopi cases,
including the conviction of a National Assembly deputy for
complicity in offending the Chief of State, were dismissed as a
result of a June 28 amnesty decree affecting all those charged
in connection v/ith the protests of the 1988 elections. The
deputy is now a minister in the coalition Government. Since
the formation of the new Government, Sopi has refrained from
criticizing the President or the Government. Publishers are
required to register with the Central Court prior to starting
publication, but such registrations are routinely approved.
Publications, including foreign publications, critical of the
Government, are rarely censored or banned in Senegal.
In general, academic freedom is enjoyed by the schools and the
universities .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
In general, Senegalese freely exercise their constitutional
rights of assembly and association, although demonstrations or
protest meetings against government policies are closely
monitored by security services. Prior authorization for public
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demonstrations is required. In 1991 there were few public
political demonstrations, a change from 1990 which saw many.
Senegalese wishing to form associations must register them with
the Ministry of Interior (except for business-related
associations, which are registered with the Ministry of
Commerce) . By law and in practice, the Interior Ministry is
obliged to register such groups, so long as the objectives of
association are clearly stated and are not in violation of the
law.
c. Freedom of Religion
Senegal is constitutionally a secular state, and freedom of
religion is a legal right, which exists in practice. Islam is
the religion of 94 percent of the population, but no attempt
has been made by the Government to introduce Shari'a law.
Other religions, the major one of which is Roman Catholicism,
are freely practiced. Missionary activity is permitted, and
foreign Protestant missionaries are active in several regions
of the country. Conversion is permitted, and there is no
discrimination against minority religions. Adherence to a
particular religion confers no official advantage or
disadvantage in civil, political, economic, military, or other
sectors. Both Islamic and Christian organizations publish
periodicals. Koranic and Catholic schools exist alongside the
public school system, and the Mouride Brotherhood is
constructing an Islamic university in its headquarters city of
Touba.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution states that all citizens have the right to
travel and establish themselves freely anywhere in Senegal, a
right respected in practice. Exit visas are not required for
travel outside the country. There is no restriction on
emigration, and repatriates are not disadvantaged on their
return to Senegal. A Senegalese citizen by birth may not have
his citizenship annulled for any reason. A naturalized citizen
may have his citizenship revoked if it is proved in a court of
law that he obtained his citizenship fraudulently or if he has
been convicted of a crime and has been a citizen less than 15
years .
In 1989 ethnic violence between Senegal and Mauritania resulted
in a flood of refugees and displaced persons. Throughout 1991,
refugees continued to trickle over the river into Senegal. The
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) recorded
63,442 registered refugees in 275 Senegalese sites along the
river border with Mauritania as of July. They are free to
circulate within Senegal and are not subject to forced
repatriation. The Governments of Senegal and Mauritania began
formal discussions in August on issues of indemnification and
compensation, but diplomatic relations had not resumed by
year's end, the border was still closed, and there had been no
discussion on the return of refugees.
As a result of the violence in the Casamance region, the UNHCR
reported in August that it was assisting 5,000 Senegalese
refugees from the Casamance in Guinea-Bissau. There were also
several hundred refugees in The Gambia, and an estimated 2,000
displaced Senegalese in Ziguinchor, the region's largest town.
Some of the latter two groups may have returned to their
villages, but there are no official records of their numbers or
movements .
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In May Senegal gave refuge to Hissan Habre after he was deposed
in 1990 as President of Chad.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Senegal has a multiparty political system and universal
suffrage for all citizens over 21. Presidential and
legislative elections have been held concurrently every 5
years, most recently in 1988. As a result of electoral code
reforms, presidential elections will be held hereafter every 7
years. There are no restrictions in law or practice against
women or minorities voting or participating in politics.
The Socialist Party has dominated Senegalese political life
since independence. Political opposition leaders' claims of
fraud in the 1988 election ceased in 1991 when President Diouf
invited four opposition parties to join his Government. Two
parties accepted, including the largest and most vocal of the
opposition, the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS). Five
ministerial-level positions were given to the two parties;
Abdoulaye Wade, President Diouf 's chief opponent in the 1988
presidential elections, accepted the post of Minister of State,
the highest ranking position in the Government after the Prime
Minister .
In April President Diouf convoked a national commission to
reform the electoral code, which opposition parties had
strenuously criticized, particularly for lax voter
identification and only an optional secret ballot. The
opposition cited weaknesses in the electoral code as one of the
reasons for boycotting local elections in 1990. The electoral
reform commission, headed by a widely respected jurist,
included all political parties, save one that refused to
participate. The new code, approved by the National Assembly
in September, addresses virtually all of the concerns voiced by
opposition parties in 1988 and 1990. Among its extensive
changes, it lowers the voting age to 18, limits the
presidential term of office to two terms of 7 years each,
mandates a secret ballot in all elections, tightens the system
of voter identification, and involves all participating
political parties in key aspects of election administration.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are at least eight Senegalese human rights organizations,
including the Association of African Jurists and the
Association of Young Senegalese Lawyers. All are free to
publicly criticize the Government, although none have directly
done so on issues related to the Casamance.
The Government allows human rights groups such as Amnesty
International to investigate allegations concerning human
rights abuses in Senegal and responds to requests for
information about those allegations. The ICRC, with the
approval of the Government, maintains an office in Dakar.
Senegal actively promotes international standards for human
rights practices; it sponsored the African Charter on Human and
People's Rights of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and
was a founder of the OAU's African Human Rights Commission in
1987.
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Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that "men and women shall be equal in
law." While officially there is no discrimination in Senegal
based on race, religion, or language, the country is
predominantly Muslim. Islamic customs, including polygamy and
Islamic rules of inheritance, generally prevail, especially in
the rural areas. Despite government encouragement and
increased educational opportunities, females still get less
than one-third of the schooling of males. Modifications of the
family code adopted by the National Assembly in 1988 reinforced
women's rights to divorce, alimony, child support, and
employment .
However, Islamic and Senegalese customs persist, and women are
still confined largely to traditional roles, notably engaging
in heavy field labor in the large subsistence agricultural
sector. Traditional inheritance and land tenure practices make
it difficult for women to own land and to acquire sufficient
collateral to obtain bank credit. Women usually marry young
(the majority by age 16 in rural areas), average about seven
live births, and die relatively young. About 67 percent of
women aged 40 to 45 live in polygamous unions.
Violence against women, usually wife beating, is not uncommon,
particularly in rural areas, but there are no accurate
statistics, and the extent of the problem is not known. Police
do not normally intervene in dom.estic disputes, and women are
reluctant to go outside the family for redress. Persons
convicted of rape may be sentenced up to 10 years in prison —
more if the victim is a minor.
Female genital excision is not practiced by Senegal's largest
ethnic group, the Wolofs, but it is performed on girls
belonging to other ethnic groups. One study concludes that 20
percent of Senegal's women have undergone one form or another
of genital mutilation; the average age of girls when subjected
to the practice is 9 years. Inf ibulation, the most extreme and
dangerous form of genital mutilation, is practiced only by the
Toucouleur and Peulh ethnic groups; perhaps 6 percent of
Senegalese women have undergone this operation. There are no
laws or regulations prohibiting this practice. However, in
1990 President Diouf established a new ministerial-level office
responsible for women and child welfare. The incumbent — one of
three women with ministerial rank in the Government — has
promoted programs to educate village women to the dangers of
excision. The semiofficial daily newspaper carries occasional
news and feature stories condemning the practice.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers are free to form or join unions of their own
choosing. A minimum of seven persons, each having worked
within their profession for at least 1 year, may form a union
by submitting a list of members and a charter to the Ministry
of Interior. A union can be disbanded by the Ministry if the
union's activities deviate from the charter. Although unions
sometimes fail to obtain initial recognition, once received it
is virtually never withdrawn. Even though they represent a
small percentage of the working population, unions wield
significant political influence, primarily because of their
ability to disrupt essential services. Unions have the right
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SENEGAL
to strike (guaranteed by the Constitution). There were a
number of strikes in November and December. Most were by
government employees such as post office workers and teachers,
and most were short-lived.
The National Confederation of Senegalese Workers (CNTS), the
largest union organization, has close ties to the ruling
Socialist Party dnd is entitled to considerable numbers of
government positions. While ostensibly an independent umbrella
organization, the CNTS has supported government policies. The
Secretary General of the CNTS is at the same time a Vice
President of the National Assembly, a member of the Socialist
Party's governing Political Bureau, and one of President
Diouf's key advisers and supporters. There are three rival
organizations: the Democratic Union of Senegalese Workers
(UDTS) (composed mostly of manual workers in the private
sector), the Coordination of Autonomous Trade Unions (CSA)
(composed of the largest autonomous teachers' and urban transit
workers' union and two smaller organizations), and National
Union of Autonomous Syndicates of Senegal (UNSAS) (a federation
of two other autonomous teachers ' unions and the powerful
electrical, health and communications workers' union).
Senegalese unions are active in regional and international
labor organizations. The CNTS is the dominant Senegalese
member of the Organization of African Trade Union Unity. Some
of the autonomous unions referred to above are members of the
Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions, or
affiliated federations, and have close ties with Senegalese
Marxist parties.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Senegalese unions have the right by law to organize and to
bargain collectively, and these rights are protected in
practice. There are also legal prohibitions on antiunion
discrimination by employers against union members and
organizers. There are no known instances of workers being
forcibly discouraged from exercising these rights. The
Ministry of Labor will intervene in disputes between labor and
management when requested, and it plays a mediation and
arbitration role in private and state-enterprise sectors.
Senegalese labor laws apply in principle to all industrial
firms, including those in the export free zone in Dakar.
However, firms operating in the zone and those eligible for
benefits under the Investment Code enjoy certain exceptions to
the Labor Code which were introduced in 1989. These firms do
not need prior government authorization to dismiss employees
and may hire workers on the basis of temporary contracts for a
period of up to 5 years.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There were no reports of forced labor in Senegal, and it is
prohibited by law.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 16 for apprenticeships and 18
for all other types of work. Inspectors from the Ministry of
Labor closely monitor and enforce these restrictions within the
formal wage sector, that is, the area of the economy over which
the Government can exercise some supervision, such as
state-owned corporations, large private enterprises, or farmers
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SENEGAL
gathered into cooperatives. On the other hand, children under
16 are frecjuently employed in the much larger traditional
sector, and minimum age and other workplace regulations are not
seriously enforced on family farms in rural areas and in small,
privately owned businesses.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Legislation mandating a monthly minimum wage has been in force
since independence in 1960. The actual rate is determined by
the Ministers of Labor and Finance after negotiating with
unions and management councils. Recent CNTS efforts have
concentrated on raising the minimum wage for unskilled
laborers, which, according to the unions, is not considered
sufficient to maintain a decent standard of living. Workers
must frequently supplement incomes through second jobs,
reliance on the extended family, and personal debt. Within the
formal economic sector, Senegalese law provides for acceptable
conditions of work, including standard workweeks (40 to 48
hours per week for most professions), annual leave benefits
(usually 1 month per year), and a variety of health and safety
regulations. These regulations are incorporated into the Labor
Code approved by the National Assembly and are supervised by
Ministry of Labor inspectors. Enforcement, however, appears to
be uneven, especially outside the formal wage sector.
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SEYCHELLES
Until recently, Seychelles was a one-party state ruled by
President France Albert Rene, who took power in June 1977 in a
military coup d'etat. The present Constitution, adopted in
1979, abolished all political opposition to the ruling
Socialist party, the Seychelles People's Progressive Front
(SPPF), and established a strong presidency, which appoints
ministers, and a People's Assembly of 22 elected party members
and several appointed members. However, in December President
Rene announced a transition to multiparty democracy to begin in
January 1992. Multiparty elections for delegates to a
constitutional commission are slated for July 1992 and a draft
of a new constitution is to be submitted to a national
referendum by the end of 1992.
The Government has full control of Seychelles' security
apparatus, which includes about 800 army personnel and a
people's militia of about 2,000. Collectively, these units
amount to roughly 5 percent of the total population. The
Seychelles' police force has engaged in surveillance against
private citizens suspected of antigovernment sentiments, and
both military and police personnel have been responsible for
occasional instances of police brutality.
Although private enterprise and private property are permitted,
the public and quasi-public sectors drive the economy. The
Government, through the Seychelles Marketing Board, other state
organizations, and banking regulations, controls the
importation, licensing, and distribution of virtually all goods
and services and exercises significant control over all phases
of the economy. Tourism is the most important sector, directly
accounting for over 10 percent of the gross domestic product.
Human rights remained circumscribed in 1991. For most of the
year, direct political opposition to Government policies was
not tolerated. The present Constitution does not provide for
fundamental human rights but rather includes them in a preamble
as a goal of the people of Seychelles. The Public Security
Act, which allows the President to order indefinite detention
in security cases, has served to intimidate real and potential
opposition elements. In 1991 the Government arrested and
detained several persons for circulating antigovernment
materials. At the end of the year, however, several dissidents
were permitted to return, and the Government had begun to allow
more open political debate.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no confirmed instances of such killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution expressly forbids torture. Nonetheless, in
1991, security forces occasionally used excessive force and
abusive practices when apprehending or detaining suspects.
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SEYCHELLES
In addition, security forces periodically harassed or roughed
up persons believed to be supporting a new underground
political party.
In April local dissident Jean Francois Ferrari was twice
assaulted by state security forces during two separate
arrests. The Government did not discipline the security force
members involved. On July 4, Ferrari was attacked by two
private individuals, apparently working on behalf of elements
in the state security forces. The two persons were
subsequently charged with assault but had not been prosecuted
at year's end. Ferrari was arrested again in November and
subsequently released.
Frank Francois Kilindo, a dockworker arrested in May for
circulating antigovernment literature, was held at the maximum
security facility at Police Bay for 3 weeks where he was
interrogated at length and forced to sign a confession about
his involvement in a new underground political party. In
mid-June, the Government allowed the Anglican Archbishop to
visit Kilindo briefly, and he was released shortly thereafter.
Living conditions at Police Bay prison are Spartan and have not
improved since church leaders were allowed to visit the prison
in November 1990. Prisoners must perform hard labor, and
recalcitrant inmates may be subjected to physical abuse or
solitary confinement. Access to the facility is severely
limited, and inmates cannot receive printed or broadcast news
from the outside world. Only prisoners on good behavior are
allowed visits by family members, and even these visits are
rarely allowed. In general, no other visitors are permitted at
the facility, although the Government did allow a visiting
expert on prison reform to view it in September.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Penal Code provides that persons arrested must be brought
before a magistrate within 48 hours. In nonpolitical cases,
this provision is applied in practice, and the detainee can
effectively seek judicial review of the legality of detention
(habeas corpus). Bail is available in most cases, as is free
legal counsel for indigents.
Police sometimes hold persons for 24 hours for "questioning"
regarding alleged antigovernment activities. In particular,
persons who seek to mobilize public opinion against the
Government run a serious risk of being held for such
interrogation. In late 1989, the Attorney General determined
that the period of initial detention could be extended to 48 or
even 72 hours, provided that an active investigation was being
conducted "with reasonable dispatch." Defense attorneys have
excellent access to detainees and to the police and can readily
ascertain whether there is an active investigation.
The Public Security Act allows for indefinite detention in
security cases and has been used in the past to intimidate
human rights activists and other critics of the Government.
Arrests and detentions under this Act are considered
administrative rather than criminal in nature, and the
procedural protections applicable in criminal cases generally
do not apply.
There were a small number of politically motivated detentions
in 1991, both under the Penal Code and the Public Security Act,
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SEYCHELLES
including Frank Francois Kilindo and Jean Francois Ferrari (see
Section I.e.). Kilindo was detained for 3 weeks under the
Public Security Act, and Jean Francois Ferrari was detained
briefly twice, on one occasion for throwing his passport on the
floor of the People's Assembly to protest the new, restrictive
Passport Act passed in March. On three other occasions in 1990
he was taken in for questioning about ant i government literature
found during searches of his home.
A number of prominent persons have been in exile, including
former President Mancham, but President Rene announced in
December that all exiles were free to return home. Opposition
activist Dr. Maxime Ferrari returned in October, and following
Rene's announcement Mancham stated his intention to return.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system is patterned on English common law (e.g.,
public trial by jury), but it is also influenced by the
Napoleonic code, particularly in civil matters (e.g., torts and
contracts). The judiciary includes the magistrate's (or small
claims) court, the Supreme (or trial) Court, and the Court of
Appeals. Judges, primarily from African and Asian countries,
are provided under arrangements with the Commonwealth of
Nations. In ordinary cases, they have exhibited some
independence from the Government, although they are sometimes
subject to government pressure. For instance, in January the
President refused to renew the contract of a foreign judge
after he decided a politically sensitive case against the
Government. Most political and security cases are handled
outside the court system. There are few procedural safeguards
in such cases.
The police are responsible for investigating crimes, but the
Attorney General's office decides whether to prosecute.
Criminal cases are heard by a magistrate or by the Supreme
Court, depending on the gravity of the offense. A jury is
called only in cases of murder or treason. The State bears the
burden of proving the defendant's guilt, and the defendant has
the right to be present at the trial and to confront
witnesses. Trials are public, and the defendant has the right
to appeal. In addition, indigent defendants are provided free
legal counsel.
The President exercises quasi-judicial powers. He has not only
appointment authority but also broad detention authority when
public security is involved. Seychelles law requires that a
member of the armed forces be tried by court-martial unless the
President decrees otherwise. At the end of 1991, there were no
known political detainees or prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The authorities have broad powers of search and seizure without
a warrant, and they have used this authority in the past to
suppress dissenting opinion. In 1991 the police searched the
homes of at least two persons suspected of possessing
"seditious" literature. In October persons believed to be
acting on behalf of government security forces ransacked the
home of Raymond de Speville, an outspoken local dissident. The
Government can legally open domestic and international mail,
and it is widely believed that it does so regularly. It is
also widely believed that in the past the Government assigned
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SEYCHELLES
citizens to eavesdrop on conversations in the workplace and
elsewhere to report on possible opposition plots. This
monitoring activity has apparently decreased in recent years,
most likely because many opponents were in exile.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including;
a. Freedom of Speech and Pross
Although theoretically protected under the 1979 Constitution,
freedom of speech is restricted. There is no criticism of the
President or the Government in Parliament, although specific
issues are debated and reported in the media.
The Government controls the principal newspaper and all local
radio and television broadcasting. Legislation provides up to
3 years' imprisonment for anyone "who, with intent to bring the
President into hatred, ridicule, or contempt, publishes any
defamatory or insulting matter whether in writing, print, or by
word of mouth, or in any other manner." This same legislation
authorizes a 2-year sentence for anyone who "prints, supplies,
distributes, reproduces, or has in his possession or control"
any publication banned by the Government for security reasons.
State-owned radio and television stations do not broadcast
programs critical of the Government. Occasionally, however,
the local clergy broadcasts independent views during weekly
religious programs. The country's two largest religious
denominations, the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches,
alternate each week broadcasting a live Sunday church service,
using free radio time supplied by the government-owned radio
station. In 1991 both Churches took advantage of this air time
to comment on social and political issues, with the Catholic
Bishop and the Anglican Archbishop delivering important sermons
on democracy and the proposed referendum on mult ipartyism.
Anglican priest Wavel Ramkalawan, who was banned from the
airwaves because he broadcast an antigovernment sermon in
October 1990, was permitted to resume broadcasts in December.
Following Rene's announcement of mult ipartyism, government
officials indicated that measures would be taken to establish
more independent media.
Foreign broadcasts are widely listened to and are uncensored.
However, the Government has increased its range of available
controls over broadcasts and telecommunications originating in
Seychelles through the Broadcasting and Telecommunications Act
of 1988. This Act authorizes the Government to restrict the
transmission of messages and to prohibit the broadcast of any
material deemed objectionable. The Act also allows government
officials to enter any premises and examine any apparatus.
The Ministry of Information publishes the only local daily
newspaper, the Nation. The Nation generally presents the news
with a progovernment slant and does not publish independent
viewpoints on political matters. In September the Government
tentatively approved separate requests by local dissident Jean
Francois Ferrari and another person to start two new
newspapers. A "trial issue" of Ferrari's newspaper was
published in December with a limited circulation. The first
general circulation issue was scheduled for publication in
January 1992. The Catholic Church publishes a lively monthly
magazine. Echo des lies, which often runs editorials and
letters criticizing the Government. Because of the magazine's
antigovernment stance, the President threatened a libel suit
against the magazine in 1990 and asked the Catholic Bishop in
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SEYCHELLES
1991 to fire the editor; the Bishop refused. In general,
international publications are imported and sold without
hindrance.
The Government has sought to prevent the importation of
pamphlets printed by its opposition abroad, including those
sent by facsimile transmissions, but these restrictions were
apparently relaxed following the announcement of
multipartyism. In 1990 the police ordered the local cable and
wireless company to send messages to all fax subscribers
warning them that transmission or receipt of "seditious,
subversive, abusive or obscene" material could result in
criminal prosecution and disconnection of their fax machine.
Despite this warning, former President Mancham and other exiled
opposition leaders continued to send ant igovernment materials
via fax throughout 1991. Police have occasionally seized
locally produced political tracts being distributed on the
street .
There are no universities in Seychelles, and higher education
is generally limited to practical training and vocational
school. The local faculty is largely apolitical and,
consequently academic freedom has not been an issue.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
In the past, the Government has been quick to move against
unauthorized demonstrations and has made arrests under an old
British colonial law which prohibits unlawful assembly without
a government permit. There were no such arrests in 1991, but
security forces did intervene in October to end an impromptu
speech by oppostion leader Maxime Ferrari, who was addressing a
small rally at the airport upon his return to Seychelles. All
associations, clubs, and other organizations require government
permission to organize, which is usually granted for
nonpolitical groups. As noted above. President Rene announced
in December that opposition political parties (with a minimum
of 100 members) would be permitted to register in January 1992.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no religious persecution in Seychelles, and church
services are widely attended. The Roman Catholic, Anglican,
and other Christian denominations worship freely, and Muslims
and Hindus are unrestricted in their religious practices. In
general, the Government routinely approves local church
requests to bring in foreign missionaries. Roman Catholics
make up about 90 percent of the population of Seychelles, and
Anglicans account for another 5 percent.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on internal travel. Historically,
Seychellois have been free to travel abroad as well, although
in 1991 the People's Assembly passed the Passport Act, which
allows the Government to deny passport services to any
Seychellois citizen if the Minister of Defense (currently the
President) finds that denial is in "the national interest."
The new law was proposed after the Supreme Court ruled in 1990
that the Government had no basis for refusing to renew the
passport of exiled dissident Kathleen Pillay. Under the new
Act, there is no recourse to judicial review.
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Until President Rene's announcement in December, the Government
had refused to allow the return of certain exiled opposition
figures. It used the new Passport Act in July to deny a
passport application by Andre Uzice, an exiled opponent living
in England. Uzice was issued a passport and allowed to return
in December, however. In October the Government forced the
airlines to deny passage to exiled dissident Kathleen Pillay,
but Pillay was permitted to return to Seychelles later in the
year .
There were no known asylum requests in 1991.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Since 1979, when the present Constitution came into effect,
there has been only one legal political party, the Seychelles
Peoples Progressive Front (SPPF). However, opposition parties
are to be permitted beginning in January 1992. While
previously citizens could not legally and peacefully change the
one-party system, if the Government carries out the promised
reforms, citizens will have the right to freely change the
Government. Under the present system. President France Albert
Rene wields far-reaching power, both as President of the
country and Secretary General of the party.
The present Constitution provides that the SPPF will nominate
only one candidate for President of the Republic; the nominee,
who must be a party member, runs unopposed and is elected by a
yea or nay vote of the electorate every 5 years. President
Rene was the only candidate in the June 1989 presidential
election, receiving over 96 percent of the vote. The People's
Assembly is largely s\ibordinate to the President and the party
and routinely approves all bills proposed by the Government.
There are no restrictions in law or practice against the
participation of women or minority groups in politics.
On December 4, President Rene announced that Seychelles would
make a transition to a multiparty system, with registration of
new parties beginning in January 1992. This measure had been
ratified by a SPPF party congress on December 3. Multiparty
elections for delegates to a constitutional commission are
slated for July 1992. The Commission is to draft a new
constitution which will be submitted to a national referendum
before the end of 1992.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no private human rights groups in Seychelles. Given
the restrictions on freedom of speech and press and government
harassment of any activity deemed political, any local groups
attempting to publicly criticize government human rights
practices would face serious obstacles.
Recjuests for information from foreign organizations are sent to
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who acts as an
interlocutor between human rights groups and the Government.
There were no known requests for investigations in 1991. A
representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross
visited Seychelles in 1991 for an administrative meeting with
the local Red Cross. He also met with a government official
during his stay.
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SEYCHELLES
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no discrimination in housing, employment, education,
or other social services based on sex or on racial, ethnic,
national, or religious identification. Women enjoy high status
in this essentially matriarchal society. They have the same
legal, political, economic, and social rights as men.
Violence against women, particularly wife beating, does occur
in Seychelles, but, according to medical personnel, it is not
widespread and is not tolerated by the Government or the
courts. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, a private civil
complaint may be brought before a magistrate, free of charge,
to impose a bond "to keep the peace" of up to approximately
$200 on someone using or threatening violence against another.
This provision in the Code is used by women against their
harassers, and it is quite effective. Married women may easily
obtain exclusion orders against abusive husbands and freqxiently
do. Violence against women, whether domestic or otherwise, is
considered assault and is subject to criminal prosecution.
Police have no hesitation in intervening in domestic disputes
in which violence has occurred or is threatened.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers do not have the right to form or join unions of their
own choosing, nor are the unions independent of the Government
or the ruling party. All workers (except for some temporary
workers) belong to the National Workers Union (NWU) by virtue
of the fact that a percentage of their social security
contributions is given to the NWU. The SPPF controls the NWU's
funds and appoints its leaders. Workers and their leaders have
no legal right to strike or initiate any industrial action
except with the permission of the SPPF Central Committee.
There were no strikes in 1991.
Workers are permitted to elect their shop stewards (also called
Works Committee Members), but all candidates are screened by
the NWU Executive Secretariat, which has the power to dismiss
an elected shop steward.
The Committee of Experts of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) noted again in 1991, as in previous years,
that the system of trade union monopoly under the direction of
a political party is contrary to ILO Convention 87 on Freedom
of Association, which Seychelles has ratified. The NWU's only
international affiliation is with the Organization of African
Trade Union Unity, but it maintains close relations with the
Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
With only one, party-dominated union confederation permitted,
there are serious limitations on the workers' right to
organize. The NWU constitution calls for union members to be
protected "from victimization in the carrying out of legitimate
trade union activity" and requires its Executive Board to
investigate shop steward dismissals to ensure that the
dismissal is not based on union-related activities. In the
event of a disagreement between the NWU and a company over a
shop steward's dismissal, the party would make the final
determination.
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SEYCHELLES
Free collective bargaining is not practiced in Seychelles. The
Government has the right to review and approve all collective
bargaining agreements from the public and private sectors.
There is little flexibility in the setting of wages. The
government and state-owned companies, which employ about 70
percent of the labor force, have mandatory wage scales for
their employees, based on job classification. Wages in the far
smaller private sector are generally set by individual
agreements between employer and employee, subject to the
Government's right of review and approval in collective
bargaining cases.
In practice, private employers often refer to public sector
wage scales when setting salary levels, although they
frequently pay somewhat more than the Government in order to
attract cjualified workers. The Employment Act of 1985,
Seychelles' basic labor law, vests the Ministry of Employment
and Social Affairs with authority to establish and enforce
employment terms, conditions, and benefits. Although
amendments passed in 1990 resulted in a modest simplification
and liberalization of the basic labor law, the amendments did
not significantly modify the Government's dominant role in
setting terms and conditions of employment.
There are no export processing zones in Seychelles.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law and does not
exist in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 15, and children are required
to attend school until the 10th grade or the age of 17,
whichever occurs first. The Government encourages children to
attend a year of National Youth Service (NYS) before entering
the work force at the age of 18 or going to the polytechnic
school for vocational training, and it discourages public or
private sector employment of workers under 18 years of age.
The Government offers voluntary short-term (up to 6 months)
work employment programs for school leavers not participating
in the NYS. Children in these programs receive a training
salary which is below the minimum wage. The Government
effectively enforces its child labor laws through regular
inspections by the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs
(see below) .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Seychelles has a complicated minimum wage scale which depends
upon job classifications. Given the free public services that
are available, primarily in the areas of health and education,
a single salary at the low end of the pay scale does provide a
family with a decent, if Spartan, standard of living. Many
families deal with Seychelles' high cost of living by earning
two or more incomes. The Ministry of Employment and Social
Affairs has responsibility for enforcing minimum wage
regulations. Due to a labor shortage, the de facto minimum
wage is considerably higher than that legally required, and
there would be little reason for a worker to accept less than
the minimum wage.
The maximum workweek varies from 35 to 48 hours, depending on
the economic sector. Each full-time worker is entitled to a
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SEYCHELLES
half-hour break per day and a minimum of 21 days of paid annual
leave. Workers are permitted to work overtime up to 60
additional hours per month. The Government enforces these
ceilings, though it is possible that some occasional abuses do
occur .
The Government issued comprehensive, revised occupational
health and safety regulations in October 1991. The Ministry of
Employment and Social Affairs is responsible for enforcing
these regulations. Inspectors enforce safety standards through
regular workplace visits, and the Government protects the
identity of workers who complain of hazardous conditions.
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Under its 1978 constitution. Sierra Leone was a one-party state
with a dominant President and a unicameral Parliament which in
practice was largely advisory. President (General) Joseph
Momoh and the All People's Congress Party (APC) continued in
power in 1991. However, responding to growing public pressures
for political reform, including within the APC, the President
signed into law on September 24 a new Constitution which calls
for multiple parties and strengthened legislative and judicial
branches of government. Adoption of the new Constitution had
been preceded by lengthy deliberations of the National
Constitutional Review Commission, a constitutional referendum
in August, and the formation on September 23 of an interim
Government under the President until the modalities for
eventual free elections could be negotiated. The new
Constitution provided for the legalization of other political
parties, effective October 1. By the end of the year, seven
political parties had been formed.
The security structure includes the Republic of Sierra Leone
Military Forces (RSLMF), which during 1991 doubled in size to
approximately 7,000 men. It is responsible for dealing with
external threats and civil disturbances in the country. The
RSLMF was preoccupied with countering the occupation of
portions of Sierra Leone territory by Charles Taylor and his
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) . While official
information was sparse, unconfirmed reports indicated there
were a number of armed actions in 1991 in which both sides
committed human rights abuses, including summary executions.
Over 70 percent of the 3.9. million population is involved in
some aspect of agriculture, mainly subsistence farming. Sierra
Leone is rich in minerals, including titanium-bearing rutile,
gold, and diamonds, the export of which generates most of the
■country's foreign exchange. The economic reform program, with
its imposed austerity, continued to generate public criticism.
At over 100 percent per year. Sierra Leone's inflation rate is
a very serious problem which the Government has had only
limited success in controlling.
The human rights situation improved in 1991 with the adoption
of a new Constitution providing for a number of basic rights
and the promise of a democratic political system, including a
strengthened Parliament and more independent judicial system.
There were increases in freedoms of speech and press and,
potentially, for assembly and association as political parties
began to form in late 1991. However, at the end of the year
there had been little real change in the government/one-party
dominance, and the extent of abuses arising out of the military
actions in the southeast could not be determined. Major human
rights abuses included extrajudicial killings, torture,
mistreatment of criminal detainees, life-threatening prison
conditions, lack of fair trials, and de facto discrimination
against women. The NPFL incursion into Sierra Leone has
seriously disrupted Sierra Leonean society and may have an
adverse impact on democratization. Military attitudes toward
the political reform movement remained unknown at the end of
1991.
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RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known cases of political killing. (See Section
l.g. for reports of civilians summarily killed by the RSLMF and
the NPFL, a dissident Liberian occupation force.)
b. Disappearance
There were unconfirmed reports of the disappearances of
captured suspected NPFL rebels from Sierra Leone prisons.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although the Constitution prohibits torture, reports continued
of police mistreatment of suspects during arrest and
interrogation. There were no known cases of responsible
officials being punished by the Government. (See Section l.g.
for reports of mistreatment of civilians by the RSLMF and the
NPFL . )
Prison conditions did not improve in 1991. Pademba Road Prison
in Freetown, which was built to accommodate several hundred
prisoners, now has an inmate population of over 1,000. Much of
this increase was a result of the invasion by the NPFL and the
continued war in the eastern border region. Deaths in prison
are common due to malnutrition and inadequate medical
supplies. The Government recognized the need for prison reform
and in August replaced its Director of Prisons, but it remained
unclear at year's end what reforms, if any, would be put in
place by the new interim Government. The 1989 report of a
presidential commission to investigate prison conditions has
never been made public.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The 1991 Constitution reduced the period of permissible
detention without charge to allow investigation of criminal
complaints from 28 days to a maximum of 10 days for cases of
capital offenses, offenses carrying life imprisonment, or
economic or environmental offenses. Other offenses carry a
maximum detention period of 72 hours. The new Constitution has
not been in effect long enough to determine whether past police
practices will be significantly altered. Detainees are
guaranteed access to legal counsel, families, and medical care,
but authorities do not always respect these guarantees unless
detainees demand compliance and have the means to afford
counsel .
The Government provides legal representation for the indigent
only in the case of capital offenses. Lack of counsel in other
cases frec[uently leads to abuse. Many indigent detainees are
ignorant of their rights and assume, sometimes correctly, that
law enforcement or judicial authorities will be paid to rule
against them by the accuser. The Society for the Protection of
Human Rights provides pro bono legal counsel to some indigent
detainees; in at least six cases, attorneys were able to secure
the release of detainees on grounds of false imprisonment
stemming from lack of initial legal representation.
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Police and security agencies may recommend to the President
that a person be detained indefinitely on suspicion of
threatening the national security. During a state of
emergency, the President may also invoke the Public Emergency
Act, which permits indefinite detention and suspends the right
to a hearing unless the detainee is charged with a capital
offense. This Act has never been invoked.
There are reports that the Government holds up to 150 security
detainees. These include both Sierra Leoneans and Liber ians
suspected of supporting the NPFL/rebel invasion of Sierra
Leone. In May 1991, the ICRC visited 113 persons detained in
connection with the NPFL/rebel invasion of Sierra Leone. The
ICRC requested permission for followup visits but has not yet
received it.
Former Liberian Senator Kerkura Kpoto was held for 7 months on
charges of involvement in the incursion and released on October
30, 1991. When he was released. Senator Kpoto said that he had
not been mistreated.
There were reports of foreign nationals being held and
mistreated by security forces which suspected them of being
foreign mercenaries.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
While the Constitution provides for fair and public trial,
there are often long delays in bringing cases to trial, and the
judiciary is subject to political influence and manipulation.
Sierra Leone has two judicial systems: the regular court
system and the local or traditional court system. The regular
court system consists of the Supreme Court, an intermediate
Court of Appeals, a High Court of Magistrates, and magistrates'
courts. Defendants are allowed counsel of their choice, but
many persons cannot afford legal representation. Decisions by
lower courts may be appealed. Indigenous ethnic leaders
preside over the local courts and administer tribal law, e.g.,
in many family matters. The local courts are often the only
legal institution in rural areas.
The 1991 Constitution includes provisions designed to
strengthen the judiciary's independence, such as the removal of
judges only through impeachment, including a two-thirds vote of
Parliament, and mandatory retirement at age 65. Long delays of
up to 2 years in bringing cases to trial and lack of trained
personnel serve to circumscribe judicial independence. Judges
still take handwritten notes on court proceedings, which in
itself can lead to inaccuracies in records and further delays
in legal action.
There were no known political prisoners being held at the end
of 1991.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary invasion of the home, and
the Government does not generally interfere with the rights of
privacy and family. In security cases, however, authorities
have the power to enter homes without a search warrant.
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g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
On March 23, troops of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL) attacked two border posts in Sierra Leone, killing 14
people. This wa? just the first in a series of cross-border
incursions by the NPFL. The ensuing conflict led to human
rights abuses by both sides in the conflict.
NPFL troops were responsible for the deaths of many civilians;
however, the number of deaths cannot be reasonably estimated.
There are numerous credible reports of atrocities committed by
NPFL troops. In Pendembu, for instance, there were reports
that civilians were burned alive or killed for failing to
answer questions correctly. In one case, a Catholic
parishioner was killed for ringing the church bell.
In reprisal, government troops took action against the
intruders and those suspected of aiding them. Following the
NPFL seizure of Pendembu, RSLMF troops arrested an unknown
number of alleged NPFL supporters. Credible eyewitnesses
reported that some of those being held were then executed.
Newspaper reports indicated that rebel captives were being
mistreated and showed pictures of them being paraded naked.
Outside observers also expressed concern for the civilian
population in the war zone, especially after the Sierra Leone
Government declared that anyone remaining in cleared rebel
areas along the border would be considered a rebel.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech is legally guaranteed, but the Government may
abridge freedom of expression under the Constitution if it
deems national security to be endangered. In practice, the
Government generally tolerates public criticism by citizens and
academics. In various 1991 forums, there was discussion of the
need for multiparty democracy and the Government's record on
human rights. In particular, there was much discussion of new
political parties, and future party leaders began
organizational steps even before parties were legalized on
October 1 .
There are at least 12 active newspapers, of which only 2 are
considered to be government controlled. Most journalists
practice self-censorship; in particular, they avoid criticizing
the President himself but do criticize some of his policies.
Journalist Franklin Bunting Davis was sued for libel and
arrested. He was released upon posting bond, and the case
continues in the courts.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The new Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
guarantees the right to form economic, social, and professional
organizations. Until the new Constitution took effect on
October 1, these rights were limited in practice to APC
organizations. By the end of 1991, seven political parties had
been formed. Demonstrations are generally not permitted but,
in the case of unauthorized demonstrations, police normally do
not intervene unless violence occurs.
50-726 - 92 - 12
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SIERRA LEONE
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is guaranteed by the Constitution, and
religious tolerance is practiced in Sierra Leone. Muslims, the
largest religious group. Christians, animists, and adherents of
other faiths practice their beliefs freely, and they can
publish and distribute religious materials without government
interference. A wide cross-section of Sierra Leoneans
participated in the annual hajj (Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca).
The Government partially subsidizes participation in the hajj.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on freedom of movement within the
country, foreign travel, or emigration and repatriation.
Repatriates are not discriminated against by the Government.
Sierra Leone, a party to the U.N. Convention and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, hosts approximately 10,000
Liberian refugees. Sierra Leoneans displaced by the NPFL rebel
incursion totaled 236,000 at the end of the year. These large
numbers of refugees and displaced persons have placed a serious
strain on the national economy. The Government is assisted by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in providing
relief aid to 7,250 refugees in one large camp near Freetown.
Refugees are not forced by the Government to return to
countries in which they have a fear of persecution.
Nevertheless, many persons have fled the country due either to
fighting along the Sierra Leone-Liberia border or out of fear
of being considered by the Government or civilians as NPFL
sympathizers. Of the estimated 125,000 Liber ians who had found
refuge in Sierra Leone in early 1991, all but 10,000 have fled
to Guinea or returned to Liberia.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Under the new Constitution, citizens are promised the right to
change their government through direct elections of the
President and Members of Parliament by secret ballot. This
right had not been tested in 1991, and President Momoh and the
APC were still firmly in charge. The Government committed
itself to early free elections which foreign observers may be
invited to monitor, but no dates had been set by the end of the
year. Continued fighting against the NPFL incursion could also
jeopardize the timing of these elections.
In theory, the unicameral House of Representatives, now
controlled by the APC, will have increased powers vis-a-vis the
executive, e.g., approval of certain appointed officials and a
limited veto power. The President will be limited to only two
terms of office.
A traditional system of local government operates in the
provinces. Paramount Chiefs are fleeted for life by the
members of the local chiefdom councils. Several women have
been elected Paramount Chief. They wield considerable
authority in local issues. There are no special conditions or
restrictions that significantly limit any elements of the
population from playing a fair role in the system. The
President has announced his support for election of town and
city councils to replace appointed councils.
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Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongoverninental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Sierra Leone Bar Association's Society for the Preservation
of Human Rights (ASPHR) monitors human rights developments.
The Government allows visits by international human rights
organizations, including the International Committee of the Red
Cross (see Section l.d.).
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no officially sanctioned discrimination on the basis
of sex, religion, language, or social status. There continue
to be complaints of favoritism in political appointments and in
military commissions and promotions, particularly members of
President Momoh ' s Limba ethnic group, who hold many significant
positions in the Government. Citizens of non-African descent
face political restrictions, e.g., citizens of Lebanese origin
may hold Sierra Leonean passports but may not run for
Parliament .
Women in Sierra Leone are guaranteed equal rights by the
Constitution, and women are represented in many occupations.
However, the status of women varies widely in different parts
of the country and depends heavily on the traditions of their
ethnic group. These values affect the amount of education
women received. Women appear to have equal access to
education, but in fact, according to a recent U.N. study,
females only receive about one-fourth as much schooling as
males. Women in rural areas, in particular, are rarely
encouraged to attend school. At the university level, men
predominate .
Violence against women, especially wife beating, is most common
among the more traditional elements of society. The police are
unlikely to intervene in domestic disputes except in cases of
severe injury or death. Few cases of violence against women
come to court. Neither the Government nor the APC women's
group has specifically addressed this issue. Female
circumcision is legal and widely practiced, especially in
traditional tribal groups. As the education of women
increases, many families are not allowing their daughters to
undergo this operation which is tied to the women's secret
society initiation rites. Shrouded in secrecy, these societies
are a strong force in women's lives. Tradition guards these
rites and works against change.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of association is provided for in the Constitution.
Workers, including civil servants, have the right to join trade
unions of their choice. Unions are independent of the ruling
All People's Congress. Individual labor unions have by custom
joined the Sierra Leone Labor Congress (SLLC), and all unions
are members of the SLLC. Membership is, however, voluntary.
There is no legal prohibition against the SLLC leadership
holding political office, and its president holds appointive
office in Parliament. Under the Trade Union Act, any five
persons may form a trade union by applying to the Registrar of
Trade Unions, who has statutory powers under the Act to approve
the creation of trade unions. Applications for approval by the
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Registrar may be rejected for several reasons including
insufficient numbers of members, proposed representation in an
industry already served by an existing union, or incomplete
documentation. If the Registrar rejects an application, his
decision may be appealed in the ordinary courts.
Approximately 60 percent of the *?orking population in urban
areas, including government employees is unionized, but unions
have been less successful in organizing workers in the
agricultural and mining sector.
Unions have the right to strike without exception. During
1991, teachers, health care workers, and other civil servants
staged strikes demanding immediate payment of salary arrears.
In several instances the Government eventually paid overdue
salaries .
Unions are free to form federations and confederations and
affiliate internationally, and there are no restrictions on
international travel and contacts.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The legal framework for collective bargaining is the Regulation
of Wages and Industrial Relations Act. Collective bargaining
must take place in trade group negotiating councils, each of
which is comprised of an equal number of employer and worker
representatives. Most enterprises are covered by collective
bargaining agreements on wages and working conditions. The
SLLC provides assistance to unions in preparing for
negotiations in which the Government can intervene in case of a
deadlock .
The law prohibits any discrimination against union members.
Complaints of discrimination against unions are made to the
Industrial Court for Arbitration. Individual trade unions
investigate alleged violations of work conditions and ensure
that employers take the necessary steps to correct abuses.
There are no export processing zones in Sierra Leone.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Under the Chiefdom's Council Act, compulsory labor may be
imposed by individual chiefs requiring members of their
villages to contribute to the improvement of common areas.
There is no penalty for noncompliance. This practice,
customary in Sierra Leone, exists only in the rural areas.
The International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee of
Experts reiterated in 1991 its previous request to the
Government to repeal or amend this provision of the Act, which
contravenes ILO Convention 29 on Forced Labor. The Government
did not take such action in 1991.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment of children is officially 18
years, but in practice there is no enforcement of this minimum
age. There is no government entity specially charged with
enforcement of existing minimum age standards. In rural areas,
children at early ages work seasonally on subsistence family
farms. Because the adult unemployment rate is as high as 60
percent, there are few children involved in the industrial
sector. Children often engage in street trading. Young Sierra
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SIERRA LEONE
Leonean children are reportedly hired by foreign employers to
work overseas, primarily as domestics, in appalling conditions
for extremely low wages. There has been no systematic
collection of information to document the extent of the
problem. The Government, however, has ordered the compilation
of a list of all children employed by Lebanese nationals,
believed to be the primary recruiters of the children, and is
reportedly considering raising the minimum employment age to 21.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no legislated minimum wage. Workers' purchasing power
has declined dramatically in recent months, and most workers
have to pool incomes with their extended families and engage in
subsistence food production in order to maintain a minimum
standard of living.
The standard legal workweek is 38 hours (8 hours on Monday
through Thursday and 6 hours on Friday) .
Within the Ministry of Labor, there is an inactive Health and
Safety Division. Health and safety regulations are included in
collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the trade
unions, but there is no evidence of systematic enforcement of
these safety standards. Trade unions provide the only
protection for workers who file complaints about working
conditions. Initially, the unions make a formal complaint
about a hazardous work condition. If this is rejected, the
unions can issue a 21-day strike notice.
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SOMALIA
The 21-year rule of Mohamed Siad Barre ended in January 1991,
when Siad fled an uprising in the capital, Mogadishu. Efforts
to establish a new government have stalled repeatedly, with
central and southern clan factions involved in repeated bitter
fighting. Foreign embassies were evacuated in January and
most, including that of the United States, remain vacant. The
successors to Siad, 10 or more clan-based factions, exercise
varying degrees of control in their home regions. The two most
powerful groups are the United Somali Congress (USC) ,
predominantly of the Hawiye clan, located in central Somalia,
including in Mogadishu, and the Somali National Movement (SNM),
predominantly of the Isaak clan, located in northwestern
Somalia. Siad Barre and his supporters regrouped to form yet
another faction in southwestern Somalia, home of Siad's Marehan
clan. Elements of the large Darod clan family, of which the
Marehan are a small segment, fought the USC while trying to
distance themselves from Siad.
In January the USC proclaimed a provisional government which
none of the other factions recognized. In May the SNM declared
an independent "Somaliland Republic" which neither the other
factions nor any foreign countries recognized. In July, at a
meeting in Djibouti, six factions — including the USC and two
Darod movements but not the SNM — agreed to form an interim
government, under the old 1961 constitution, with a 2-year term
of office until elections could be held. The six factions
announced a 72-member cabinet, headed by Ali Mahdi Mohamed as
President. However, their efforts to establish a government
were aborted by fighting between factions of the USC, i.e. Ali
Mahdi ' s Abgal subclan and General Mohamed Farah Aideed's Habr
Gedr subclan. In Noven±)er and December, thousands of people
were killed in Mogadishu, and at year's end Somalia had almost
ceased to exist as a state, and Somali society had increasingly
diintegrated into chaos and general disregard for human rights.
Somalia's security forces consist of clan militias and the
uniformed police. Remnants of the former Somali National Army
(SNA), which disintegrated when Siad fell, are scattered among
the militias according to clan loyalties. Armed bands
associated with the USC engaged in indiscriminate killing of
members of other clans in Galkayo and Brava, as well as in
extensive pillage and rape. Uniformed police units,
reconstituted in Mogadishu and in the SNM-controlled north,
continued a tradition of professionalism, despite a lack of
resources. In Mogadishu the police struggled unsuccessfully to
confiscate weapons and suppress criminal gangs. Secret police
organizations probably existed but were minuscule compared to
Siad Barre 's former extensive internal security apparatus.
Continued internal warfare in 1991 drastically slowed the
rudimentary pastoral and agricultural economy; disrupted
infrastructure, including water supplies; and international
telecommunications links. Malnutrition and disease were
widespread, especially in the southern and central regions,
particularly among vulnerable groups such as mothers and small
children. At year's end, the fighting in Mogadishu disrupted
international food relief efforts.
Serious human rights abuses occurred often in a country racked
by war, anarchy, and poverty. Neither President Ali nor
General Aideed, the most prominent clan leaders, showed any
determination to retjuire respect for human rights by their
various armed forces. Undisciplined militias killed, looted,
and raped. Several prominent political figures were killed
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SOMALIA
either for revenge or simply because of their clan
affiliation. Combat often produced disproportionate numbers of
women and children killed or wounded, suggesting a pattern of
clan-motivated revenge. Security forces sometimes summarily
executed persons suspected of banditry.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Among the approximately 20,000 people killed in the chaos of
early 1991 were several well-known political figures. Hashi
Weheliye Malin (Abgal Hawiye clan) and Ha j i Musse Bokor
(Majertain clan), two senior opposition leaders attempting to
arrange a cease-fire during the January fighting, were killed,
apparently on orders from Siad Barre. During the same period
Hawiye gangs killed Abdalla Mohamed Fadil, a Somali of Yemeni
ancestry who had served as assistant prime minister and
commissioner for northern reconstruction in the Siad
government, and Professor Ibrahim Mohamoud Abyan, a Dolbahante,
former president of the Somali National University, who led a
coalition of veteran politicians known as the Manifesto Group.
In September two adult sons of the elderly chairman of the
chamber of commerce, Haji Osman Ahmed Robleh (Abgal Hawiye),
were killed along with their wives and children. It is unclear
whether they were deliberately targeted or were random victims
of fighting in Mogadishu that took several hundred lives.
Somali activists in the United States and Canada published
lists of dozens of "elders" in various regions who were
allegedly victims of political killings.
According to credible reports, the USC chairman. General
Aideed, ordered his militia to execute summarily suspected
robbers and looters, sometimes within minutes of capture. A
militia commander in the northern city of Hargeisa is reported
to have carried out similar executions, and authorities in
other areas probably conducted much the same kind of campaign
against crime. Dozens, probably hundreds, of suspected bandits
suffered summary execution.
b. Disappearance
Some disappearances occurred when groups resembling death
squads attacked people because of their clan background and for
the opportunity to loot their property. Some of the
perpetrators were undoubtedly members of clan militias. Local
authorities did not condone these killings, but were unable to
prevent them. Such disappearances would have been hard to
distinguish from the thousands of people who disappeared as the
result of mass migrations to avoid conflict, deaths from
disease among refugee and displaced populations, and killings
in battle. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
has established a tracing network, covering a large part of the
country, which handles thousands of messages per month as
family members try to relocate one another. There is no known
compilation of disappearances. Most will likely remain
unsolved.
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c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
In the uprising against Siad Barre, Somalia's internal security
apparatus was shattered and the doors of the country's prisons
were opened, allowing some 20,000 prisoners, including violent
criminals, to go free. Because of these events, there were
probably far fewer instances of torture by secret police than
in previous years. Temporarily at least, harsh treatment of
prisoners and deplorable prison conditions also ceased to be
relevant problems. Mogadishu Central Prison, a medieval castle
with seriously inadequate sanitation, resumed operations June
30. Its fate in the subsequent fighting is not known.
With increasing disorder, other forms of degrading treatment
increased; militia forces and bandits allegedly committed rape
on a massive scale (see Section l.g.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Information on these subjects is lacking, although at the
Djibouti conference the factions reportedly agreed to use the
1960 penal code based on the Napoleonic Code. It appears that
arbitrary arrests and detentions decreased substantially, in
part because local security forces were weak and disorganized,
in part because the new authorities were less zealous than
their predecessors in detaining suspected opponents. At year's
end, the SNM and possibly other factions held an unknown number
of former members of Siad's army as prisoners of war. The
feuding factions in Mogadishu held an unknown number of persons
in detention. Some local authorities as well as the interim
Government granted the ICRC access to detainees, but chaotic
conditions throughout Somalia made it difficult for the ICRC to
maintain access and systematically pursue detainee visitations.
There were credible reports of clan factions abducting members
of unfriendly clans and holding them hostage as insurance
against attacks on their own people. The USC militia, for
example, allegedly abducted 200 Majertain from the town of
Galkayo; SNM militia allegedly abducted 116 Warsangeli from
Erigavo and kept them in an open-air holding pen. There were
no known instances of exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The regular judicial system collapsed with the end of the Siad
government. There is little available information about the
successor authorities' efforts to revive and operate court
systems. In April, Radio Mogadishu announced the establishment
of an Islamic court. No details were given. Later, Radio
Mogadishu announced that regular courts and prisons hoped to
resume their functions by June 15. In the north, the SNM
announced that it was adopting Shari'a law, but how this worked
in practice is not known. It appears that none of the factions
created a version of the Siad government's National Security
Court, which tried political cases in secret with no regular
rules of procedure.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Because all telephones were out of service, and the post office
stopped functioning for more than 6 months, phone tapping and
interception of mail ceased, for the time being, to be
significant problems.
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g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The January uprising produced thousands of casualties and
violations of human rights. Siad Barre shelled Mogadishu with
field artillery, inflicting heavy casualties on clans he
considered enemies. One Siad loyalist distributed flyers
urging a war of extermination against non-Darod clans. The
insurrectionists in Mogadishu gave no quarter to Siad's forces;
members of the hated "Red Hat" presidential guard were left
unburied where they died.
At about the same time, armed Hawiye gangs began attacking
Darod neighborhoods in Mogadishu. There are credible reports
that hundreds of unresisting people — mostly Darod but Hawiye as
well — were killed in ethnically motivated violence. Other
reports, which cannot be confirmed, indicated people were
hacked to death with axes or killed by other brutal methods.
Mogadishu's population dropped by half or more as hundreds of
thousands of Darod residents and between 7,000 and 15,000
Isaaks fled the killing.
Atrocities were not limited to Mogadishu. On February 10, USC
militias entered the ancient coastal town of Brava in pursuit
of Darod forces. Although welcomed by the Bravanese (a people
of mixed Persian, Portuguese, Arab, and African ancestry) the
USC thoroughly looted the town. During their 36-day
occupation, repeated waves of USC combatants, many 14 to 16
years old, came through town looting, killing, and raping. USC
forces reportedly shot dead about 120 Bravanese, raped young
girls in front of their parents, and repeatedly robbed houses
and businesses. Girls carried away when the USC left Brava are
still missing.
Darod organizations in the United States estimate that 500
civilians were killed, 1,000 wounded, and 200 taken hostage in
the February attack by USC forces on Galkayo in north-central
Somalia. Although the numbers may be inflated, the allegation
appears to be based on fact .
In the northwest, the SNM forces attacked and looted Borama;
about 80,000 people fled into Ethiopia. SNM units also raided
villages in Sanaag Region; Darod organizations in the United
States claim that civilian casualties in these raids ranged
into the hundreds, including children and some politically
active elders. Corroboration of numbers is lacking, but it
appears that the incidents did happen.
In addition to the SNM offensive, the USC attacked refugee
camps at Jalalaqsi and other locations in south central
Somalia. Opponents of the USC claim that thousands of refugees
were killed in these raids.
In December a Belgian ICRC worker died after being shot in
downtown Mogadishu, as well as a Somali Red Crescent worker who
tried to protect him. In early January 1992, a Bulgarian
UNICEF doctor was machine-gunned by assassins in the
northeastern town of Bosaso. By year's end, the resumption of
fighting in Mogadishu had almost brought international
humanitarian relief efforts to a halt. An ICRC official
reported, according to the international press, that 60 percent
of the children in some areas suffered from severe malnutrition.
Although some commanders controlled their troops better than
others, there are no reports of members of clan militias or
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SOMALIA
other security personnel being disciplined or otherwise called
to account for hximan rights abuses.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
When Siad Barre fell, restraints on speech disappeared.
Prominent politicians expressed controversial views; in March,
Mohamed Omar Jama, a member of the 1990 Manifesto Group,
accused the USC of persecuting Darods. Members of the
Mogadishu Government denounced Jama, accusing him of being in
league with Siad Barre, but took no action against him. In the
north, the SNM's political control may have discouraged
expression of unsanctioned views.
Radio Mogadishu continued to broadcast as the voice of the
USC. A rehabilitated Radio Hargeisa was similarly controlled
by the SNM. The Mogadishu television station was destroyed
during the January fighting and had not been rebuilt by year's
end. There was no private broadcasting in Somalia.
By March there were at least six newspapers publishing in
Mogadishu. Largely independent of factional control, these
papers carried on a lively commentary as the clan struggles
unfolded. By October over 22 "newspapers" operated in
Mogadishu, mainly printed on photocopy machines. It is not
known how many survived the fighting of November and December.
Academic freedom was a moot question, as the Somali National
University remained closed after Italian professors fled.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The demise of Siad's security apparatus opened new possibil-
ities for peaceful assembly and association. People began to
demonstrate, seemingly undeterred by the climate of violence
and insecurity. By June peaceful demonstrations in favor of
peace, demanding more food, or calling for an end to crime were
occurring almost daily in Mogadishu. People in Mogadishu not
only supported General Aideed's campaigns for the USC
chairmanship and against the Darod, they also demonstrated
against Aideed and in favor of USC participation in the
conference held in Djibouti with other clans. Demonstrations
also occurred in the SNM's capital, Hargeisa. Information is
lacking on freedom of assembly in other parts of the country.
c. Freedom of Religion
Nearly 100 percent of the population is Muslim, predominantly
of the Sunni sect. The fall of Siad Barre 's regime, which was
both secular and fearful of religious opposition, eliminated
constraints on the practice of Islam. Political figures
declared their solidarity with Islam, and the SNM's Somaliland
Republic adopted Shari'a law and described itself as an Islamic
state, though what that meant was unclear. The practice of
religions other than Islam ceased in 1991 because practically
all non-Muslims were evacuated from Somalia. In Mogadishu
vandals looted, defaced, and burned the Catholic cathedral.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
With the breakdown of government, movement within Somalia was
unconstrained except by the risks of encountering bandits or
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SOMALIA
the militias of hostile clans. Hundreds of thousands of people
moved into the countryside or traveled great distances to their
home regions to avoid the fighting and clan-motivated killings
in Mogadishu and other cities.
Government controls on foreign travel also ceased, but for most
Somalis the practical difficulties of international travel
became acute. Air transport services were suspended, and
foreign embassies and their visa sections closed. Somalis
living overseas were free to return home if they were not
deterred by the dangers and the difficulty of travel.
Practically all 350,000 refugees believed to be in the country
fled back into Ethiopia. These included ethnic Somali
(Ogadeni) refugees from Ethiopia and Ethiopian Oromos, camped
in Somalia since the 1977-78 Ogaden War. As a result of the
SNM campaigns early in the year and the continuing reluctance
of most Isaaks to return to their homes despite the SNM
victory, the number of Somali refugees in Ethiopia reached
500,000, up from 370,000 at the end of 1990. About 100,000
Isaak refugees in eastern Ethiopia did return to northwestern
Somalia by the end of 1991.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Despite the end of the Barre regime, people still did not have
the right to change their government through democratic means.
However, as the year unfolded the people exerted considerable
influence, mainly through large demonstrations, on political
developments. General Aideed won an indirect election as
chairman of the USC with genuine popular support, yet when he
vetoed USC participation in the Djibouti Conference he was
overruled by public opinion favoring national reconciliation.
When politicians in northern Somalia tried to stop short of
declaring independence, they were overruled by grass roots
demands for secession.
At the end of 1991, for all practical purposes Somalia did not
exist as a unified state. No general elections could be held,
and the clan based movements functioned much like local
one-party states; there was debate within the
organizations — sometimes erupting into battles in which
hundreds were killed — but no competing political parties. The
role of women in the political events of 1991 was minimal,
except as victims.
Section 4 Government Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Although the Association of Somali Lawyers formerly was
involved with human rights issues, their activities in 1991
were unknown. The various authorities' attitudes toward human
rights organizations were unclear. No international human
rights groups attempted to send delegations to Somalia for
investigative purposes.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Eighty percent or more of the population are ethnic Somalis.
The Somali majority looks down upon the minorities of Bantu and
Asian extraction. Somalis also view as inferior members of
several small client or "outcast" clans, who are relegated to
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SOMALIA
certain low-prestige occupations and who rarely intermarry with
members of majority Somali clans.
Racial tensions are a minor problem, however, compared to
animosities and rivalries between ethnic Somalis based on clan
affiliation. These are the fundamental cause of the country's
continuing civil conflict. Siad Barre's favoritism towards his
family and members of the Marehan clan, and corrupt
accumulation of wealth by Siad's cronies, were common
grievances among the clans which rebelled against Siad's rule.
Somali women suffer discrimination in education, work, and
family matters. About 96 percent of female Somalis cannot
read, and females receive about one-third the schooling of
males. A year of turmoil in Somalia seriously weakened women's
rights as recognized in the 1990 Constitution. The intentions
announced by some officials to promote greater adherence to
Islam and the adoption of Shari'a law in northern Somalia
indicated that religious practices will probably become more
conservative. Nevertheless, at least one women's group
(associated with the USC) continued in existence, working to
counter fundamentalist pressures to reduce women's rights.
Female circumcision remained a common practice, including
Pharaonic circumcision, the most extreme and dangerous form.
However, the risks of undergoing circumcision in the midst of
war and famine may have led some families to delay subjecting
their daughters to the procedure. The chances of getting
medical attention in case of infection or other complications
of circumcision were even less in 1991 than in past years. The
Siad Barre government opposed female circumcision and organized
campaigns against it; attitudes of Somalia's new governing
authorities toward female circumcision are unknown.
The absence of alcohol in Somali culture and the tradition that
the family protects a daughter after her marriage help shield
women against domestic violence, such as wife beating. There
are suggestions, however, of these constraints breaking down
under the strains of civil war, anarchy, and urban life.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution adopted in October 1990 granted workers the
right to form independent unions and to strike, but this reform
was not implemented in practice before Somalia descended into
anarchy. It is unknown if any unions are functioning in the
current situation or if there were any strikes during 1991.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
No instances in 1991 of collective bargaining are known, nor
were there any known cases of antiunion discrimination. There
are no export processing zones in Somalia.
c. Forced or Compulsory Labor
There were no known instances of forced or compulsory labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
During the Siad years the minimum age for employment was 15,
but the law was widely ignored, with considerable child labor
on the margins of the wage economy. Civil war and anarchy have
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SOMALIA
probably made these conditions worse, with street children
engaged in begging and thievery more often than work or
education, which are increasingly unavailable.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
During the Siad years there was no legal minimum wage.
Inflation reduced salaries in the public sector to the
equivalent of a few dollars a month. To survive, government
workers resorted to corruption and outside business activities.
In theory the small modern sector of Somalia's economy had an
8-hour workday, 6 days per week, with limits on overtime.
Workers were entitled to paid holidays, annual leave, and other
benefits. Laws set minimum safety and health standards in the
workplace, and in theory inspectors from the Ministry of Labor
enforced these standards. Because of inflation and low
productivity, these benefits were mostly fictional. In 1991
political instability and economic contraction further
undermined working conditions for those persons lucky enough to
be employed.
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SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa's reform process continued in 1991 but was
accompanied by frequent and widespread political violence,
which claimed at least 2,050 lives from January through
November, according to the Human Rights Commission (HRC) . The
remaining statutory "pillars of apartheid" were toppled,
security legislation revised, and political prisoners freed.
These actions, along with progress toward constitutional
negotiations between the Government and the opposition,
prompted the relaxation of many international sanctions against
South Africa, including those imposed under Title III of the
United States' Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) .
An historic national Peace Accord was concluded on September
14. Principal signatories included the Government, the African
National Congress (ANC), and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).
A "patriotic front" meeting of ant iapartheid forces occurred on
October 25-27, and the long-awaited all-parties talks were held
on December 20-21. Most of the major parties participated in
this historic event called the Convention for a Democratic
South Africa (CODESA) . The participants agreed to future talks
and created several ongoing working groups at this opening
round of CODESA. An agreement was reached between the South
African Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) to facilitate the return of South Africa's
estimated 30,000 political exiles.
Meanwhile, the country's black majority remains disenfranchised
and continues to suffer from pervasive discrimination under
remaining apartheid-related laws and practices, as well as from
the substantial deprivation that is the legacy of apartheid.
South Africa continues to be ruled by a parliamentary-style
government elected by a small white minority of the country's
residents. Whites (13.5 percent of the population) retain the
monopoly on formal political power. The Afrikaner-dominated
National Party has formed every national government since
1948. Under the 1984 tricameral Constitution, which,
consistent with the doctrine of apartheid, prescribes the basic
rights and obligations of people according to their racial or
ethnic origin, blacks (numbering 28.2 million or 75.5 percent
of the population) are denied the right to vote in national
elections and to be represented in Parliament. While the
present parliamentary system allows representation in separate
chambers for those classified by the Government as "colored"
(mixed race) and Asian, whites control key ministries and the
executive branch, which is headed by a state president with
extraordinarily strong powers. The "colored" and Asian
(largely Indian) minorities (8.4 percent and 2.6 percent of the
population, respectively) also suffer extensive racial
discrimination and the effects of now-renounced policies,
including those which dictated in which "group areas" members
of various racial groups had to live.
Between 1976 and 1981, the Government granted "independence" to
4 of 10 "homelands" it created for South African blacks,
thereby stripping an estimated 8 million black people of their
South African citizenship. South Africa is the only country
that has recognized the "independence" of these homelands.
Their status is included on the CODESA agenda. The homelands
of Bophuthatswana and Transkei continue to hold prisoners
accused of attempting to overthrow those regimes, although all
but one of the Bophuthatswana coup plotters were released by
the end of the year. Some government reforms, including
revised security legislation and increased freedom, of political
expression, have not been implemented in the homelands, with
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SOUTH AFRICA
the result that certain types of human rights abuses are more
prevalent there. As a result of the homelands' own security
legislation, restrictions are especially severe with regard to
freedom of assembly and press and the right to fair trial.
Bophuthatswana and Ciskei are consistently cited by the HRC for
repressive security actions.
White control of the Government is backed by a powerful defense
and police establishment. Under President de Klerk, however,
the role of the security establishment in domestic and foreign
policymaking and security funding overall have decreased
significantly. The Government declared violence-prone
localities "unrest areas" 20 times during 1991 — permitting
detentions, the imposition of curfews, and the confiscation of
dangerous weapons— in affected areas of Natal and the Transvaal.
Allegations persist that "hit squads" and a "third force,"
involving rightwing extremist elements of the security forces
or hired mercenaries, were active in fomenting township
violence. Witnesses to violence have also alleged that in some
cases South African Police (SAP) and South African Defense
Force (SADF) personnel not only did not stop perpetrators, but
even protected and transported them. In September the HRC
issued a report which claimed that the Government had a double
agenda, engaging in negotiation while at the same time
"destabilizing and subverting" the opposition's bargaining
position through violence. The Government denied such
charges. The Peace Accord established special mechanisms
designed to investigate allegations of government complicity in
the violence, and prompted widespread discussion of codes of
conduct for the SAP and SADF. The 1990 Harms Commission Report
singled out the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) , a clandestine
SADF special unit, for a number of past human rights abuses,
including the murder and intimidation of human rights
activists. No prosecutions have as yet ensued. In January
Supreme Court Justice Kriegler, contrary to the Harms
Commission findings, ruled that a former CCB member had told
the truth in implicating the head of the SAP's forensic
division in the murder of an ANC activist. That matter is
still under litigation.
In addition to the ANC, extraparliamentary organizations
include the IFP, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and the
Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) . The IFP, while open to
all races, has remained largely an ethnic Zulu and regional
(Natal) party. Mangosuthu Buthelezi is both the Chief Minister
of the KwaZulu homeland and the president of the IFP. Ongoing
conflict since the late 1970 's between Buthelezi 's movement and
the ANC has been one of the principal sources of violence in
South Africa. Despite a historic meeting on January 29 between
Buthelezi and Mandela, factional violence among their followers
continued. The Peace Accord was cited by both as a significant
oppo.rtunity to qiiell such violence.
In July it was revealed that the Government had secretly funded
transportation to two Inkatha rallies and supported an
Inkatha-af filiated labor union. The ANC responded by renewing
charges of government involvement in the "factional" violence
and stepped up demands that the existing Government yield to an
impartial interim authority to oversee the transition process.
In response to this scandal, the Minister of Defense and the
Minister of Law and Order were replaced by persons less
controversial and less strongly affiliated with the security
establishment. President de Klerk also reiterated the
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SOUTH AFRICA
Government's willingness to consider appropriate transitional
governing arrangements.
South Africa's economy, while protecting the freemarket and
property rights of the white population, has suffered from
government enforcement of apartheid-related laws and
restrictions, recently repealed, on black property and
employment rights. The economy, which features a
well-developed industrial sector and extensive agricultural and
mineral resources, is currently in a mild but protracted
recession. During 1991 there was no real growth. Since the
mid-1970 's, black unemployment levels have increased
significantly, and per capita income among blacks has
stagnated. With roughly 350,000 black entrants to the labor
market each year, present black unemployment is estimated at 40
percent nationwide and significantly higher in the homelands.
Apartheid laws increased the income disparity between whites
and blacks and have restricted the buying power of black
consumers. The current debate on the structure of a
postapartheid economy focuses on appropriate policies to reduce
this income disparity.
The homelands, which comprise 13 percent of South Africa's
area, are generally fragmented parcels of land in impoverished
rural areas, housing over 43 percent of the population.
Outside the homelands, a growing black urban population of more
than 10 million persons lives in massive townships on the
periphery of large cities. Human rights groups estimate that 7
million black South Africans do not have permanent shelter and
are living in areas in contravention of the Illegal Squatting
Act.
The repeal of the Population Registration, Group Areas, and the
two Land Acts, amendment of the Internal Security Act, the
release of political prisoners, return of exiles, and an agreed
role for the UNHCR, plus renewed access to prisoners by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
representative of a continuing improvement in human rights in
South Africa in 1991. Despite unprecedented levels of
violence, which threatened at times to overwhelm the process,
negotiations toward a new constitutional dispensation — which it
is generally believed will fundamentally improve the protection
of human rights — remained on course. Nonetheless, persons of
color in South Africa continued to face discrimination,
restrictions on due process rights, and the deprivation caused
by generations of educational, employment, housing, and other
legally enforced inequalities. There were some further
positive developments in the area of worker rights, but legal
inequities, wage disparities, and societal attitudes continue
to disadvantage South African women.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The death toll from political violence, most often in the form
of factional fighting or of criminal elements using
factionalism as a disguise, continued at a high level
throughout South Africa in 1991 (see Section l.g.). The
1990-1991 levels of violence are the highest in South Africa's
history.
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SOUTH AFRICA
The number of deaths in police custody has declined from
previous years, due in part to the sharp decline in the number
of detainees. In 1991 at least 10 persons died in detention,
according to the HRC and media reports, including Cornelius
Maqoma, who collapsed and died in police custody in Sebokeng,
and Peter Masilo, who died after allegedly resisting arrest in
Sharpeville. A suspected car thief, Johannes Theme, died of
pneumonia and brain hemorrhages in Newlands, Johannesburg. A
Johannesburg inquest court magistrate found that three
policemen and the alleged car theft victim, who was permitted
by the police to enter Mr. Theme's cell, were responsible for
his death. The magistrate pointed out that the police had
falsified their testimony and cell register to cover up their
actions .
Investigations of previous years' deaths continued. On July
29, five policemen of the Welverdiend Unrest Investigation Unit
were suspended and charged with assault and attempted murder in
connection with at least 17 violent deaths since January 1990.
The HRC reported that rightwing hit squads are actively
operating and were responsible for over 50 deaths or attempted
murders of ANC and PAC members, unionists, and civic
activists. In most of these cases there have been no arrests.
No prosecutions have yet ensued from police investigations.
The September 1990 Harms Commission Report found that, while
there were no state-sanctioned "hit squads" as such, evidence
pointed directly to the participation of the SADF ' s CCB in at
least two murders of antiapartheid activists. No decisions to
prosecute had been taken by the concerned Attorneys General by
year's end. The government auditor acknowledged in February
that $3.5 million had been paid out for CCB purposes between
April and July 1990 — even though the Defense Minister had
assured Parliament that operations had ceased in February
1990 — and that the Defense and Finance Ministers had given
verbal consent for CCB operations without the State President's
knowledge. In a subsequent court case, a judge ruled against
SAP forensic chief Neethling's defamation suit against a
newspaper, describing testimony to the Harms Commission by
former police captain Dirk Coetzee as credible. Coetzee had
asserted that Neethling's organization was behind the murder of
antiapartheid activists. Neethling has appealed the decision.
Targets of alleged hit squads have frequently been
ANC-af filiated, such as Congress of Traditional Leaders Head
Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, his stepfather, and his driver,
who was murdered the day before the scheduled start of the
judicial inquest into the Chief's death. A man claiming to be
a former military intelligence agent confessed to being a
member of an SAP/SADF hit squad that he says carried out the
Chief's assassination on February 25 in Pietermar itzburg. The
inquest is continuing.
Six policemen, including two white senior officers, went on
trial for the murder of 11 persons — including 6 women and 2
children — in a 1988 attack on a home in Natal 's Trust Feeds
Township. At the inquest, it was found that circumstantial
evidence linked two special constables to the murder. At their
trial, which began in October, the two admitted to being the
gunmen but said that others were involved, including the two
senior officers who had ordered the attack and then told them
to "disappear" — which they did by joining the KwaZulu police
force. These and two other men were arrested and have been
suspended pending the outcome of their trial.
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Other alleged victims of hit squad-type violence included
Mziwonke "Pro" Jack of the ANC, gunned down on June 19 in Cape
Town, and Bheki Mlangeni of the Independent Board of Inquiry
into Informal Repression, who was killed in March by a bomb
concealed in a tape player. In the Mlangeni case, a police
investigation was completed on October 5 and, after being
considered by the Witwatersrand Attorney General's office, is
now closed. The Government said that as no perpetrator was
found, there will be no prosecution. A privately funded
forensic scientist refused to sign the forensic report on
Mlangeni 's death because he was denied access to vital
information. Township councilors, such as Moses Khumalo of
Diepmeadow, were targets of assassins presumed to be
ANC-af filiated. IFP leader Thomas Gcabash was murdered on
December 17 by unknown assassins. In September the HRC, in its
publication "The New Total Strategy," accused elements of the
security forces of continuing efforts to destabilize black
communities, using acts of both commission and omission to
foment violence. Both President de Klerk and ANC President
Nelson Mandela are on a rightwing "hit list" of prominent
political figures, according to a December 22 statement by the
SAP.
The Government has been somewhat responsive to claims of police
brutality. A 29-man team to investigate allegations of
politically motivated violence was created in January, headed
by a major general. The team has begun to show some results,
including the suspension of four special constables and two
police officers pending charges for 11 murders in 1988 (the
Trust Feeds killings). The Commission on Violence and
Intimidation, an independent body established under the
National Peace Accord, was also conducting several
investigations into police violence at year's end.
b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of antigovernment figures
disappearing while in police custody in 1991. The June 1988
disappearance case of Maisha "Stanza" Bopape, a Community
Research and Information Center staff member and township
activist, remains unresolved despite international attention.
Police state that he is considered a fugitive from justice,
while friends and family believe he has been killed.
Significant numbers of activists who had left the country or
had gone into hiding have begun to reappear and, as necessary,
apply for indemnity under government -ANC agreed criteria and
procedures governing political offenders.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Court testimony and sworn affidavits indicate that beatings and
torture of security detainees occurred in 1991. Alleged
perpetrators included police officials charged with
investigating crimes, SADF members, and homelands military
units. Despite many charges of abuse by lawyers and human
rights activists, few security officials were suspended or
prosecuted in 1991. Thirty former Umkhonto We Sizwe
(MK — military wing of the ANC) operatives, detained by the ANC
in Tanzania and Uganda in the past 10 years for alleged crimes
against the movement, claimed that they had been tortured on
the orders of MK Chief of Staff and ANC National Executive
Committee (NEC) member Chris Hani and other top ANC officials.
Upon the return of these detainees to South Africa, Nelson
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Mandela said the ANC would attempt to "reconcile" with them,
implicitly admitting the truth of some of the claims.
Common methods of torture allegedly used by both the security
forces and opposition groups include severe beatings, prolonged
periods of solitary confinement, suffocation, sleep
deprivation, and forcing detainees to stand for lengthy periods
of time. Sick and wounded detainees were sometimes handcuffed
to their beds. ANC detainees claimed they were put in solitary
confinement in a ditch for long periods of time, beaten, and
interrogated. Murder by "necklacing" (setting fire to a
gasoline-soaked tire wedged around a person's body) continued
to be a feature of the ongoing factional violence. Other forms
of torture were also meted out by self-appointed groups of
township residents known as "people's courts." Court-ordered
whipping is still used by the Government to punish minor
offenders .
In July a Soweto woman claimed to have been assaulted,
blindfolded, and beaten with the metal end of a safety belt by
police officers looking for a missing firearm. Police
spokesmen said an investigation had been launched.
In prisons, harassment due to supposed political affiliation
and denial of medical attention have been reported. Some
hunger strikers in Bophuthatswana allegedly were assaulted by
prison wardens, then denied medical attention by prison
doctors. The ICRC was allowed access in May to monitor the
condition of inmates staging hunger strikes in nonhomelands
prisons on the grounds that they should have been released as
political prisoners. These prisoners have generally been
treated in accordance with internationally accepted standards.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The number of detentions decreased significantly in 1991 in
South Africa, including in the so-called independent homelands,
according to HRC statistics. Consistent with an undertaking
made in its August 6, 1990, agreement (the Pretoria Minute)
with the ANC, the Government introduced in 1991 legislation
amending the Internal Security Act of 1982. The legislation,
entitled the Internal Security and Intimidation Amendment Act,
1991 (ISIAA), was signed into law by State President de Klerk
on June 29. It repealed, inter alia, sections of the 1982 Act
authorizing the notorious "consolidated list" of persons,
bannings, and indefinite preventive detention. As amended, the
law places an absolute limit of 10 days on the period during
which, under Section 29, persons suspected of terrorism or
subversion may be detained for interrogation without the
approval of a judge of the Supreme Court. The law also
requires that a physician and a magistrate visit the detainee
every 5 days. Visits by relatives and the detainee's legal
representative are permitted during the 10-day period unless
there is reason to believe that such access will hamper the
police in their investigation. In a published comment on the
ISIAA, the nationwide Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR)
organization concluded that, while the amendments were laudable
in many respects, far more needed to be done (e.g., reducing
further the 10-day detention period) before the new Act
conforms with the legal norms and constitutional principles of
most Western democracies.
Detention of persons without charge is also permitted under
regulations applicable to "unrest areas" declared under Section
5(a) of the Public Safety Act (PSA) of 1953. Detentions are
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authorized for up to 30 days "if necessary for combatting or
prevention of public disturbance, disorder, riot, or public
violence or the maintenance or restoration of public order." A
detainee or a relative may apply at any time to the Supreme
Court for a determination whether the detention meets this
legal standard. Unlike Section 29 of the Internal Security
Act, judicial review is not precluded at any time after
detention.
The HRC reported that, as of November 30, no one was then being
detained under the ISIAA or the PSA ("unrest areas') in South
Africa, excluding the "homelands." The year-to-date totals
were 21 under the PSA and 94 under the ISIAA.
In December the HRC listed four persons as currently detained
under security legislation in the Transkei. The HRC reported
the following totals through November 30 for numbers of
detainees held in the "independent" homelands: Transkei (5),
Bophuthatswana (258), Venda (0), and Ciskei (529). Despite the
lifting of its State of Emergency in March, Bophuthatswana in
particular continued to come under heavy criticism from human
rights monitors for its widespread use of detention powers
under its Internal Security Act of 1979. During an
October-November State of Emergency in the Ciskei, over 400
people were detained. In October two American citizens were
among those detained by Bophuthatswana authorities for over 48
hours for witnessing a small, peaceful protest in Mmabatho by
the Black Sash human rights organization.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The South African judiciary is headed by the appellate division
(Court of Appeals) of the Supreme Court in Bloemfontein and six
regional supreme courts. The appointment of the country's
first nonwhite judge occurred during 1991. Judges, appointed
to the bench by the State President, serve until age 70 and may
not be removed from office except by impeachment by
Parliament. By tradition, judges of the appellate division and
the Supreme Courts are appointed to the bench from the ranks of
the elite corps of South African Supreme Court practitioners
( "advocates" ) .
South Africa has an adversarial system of criminal justice
drawn from a mixed heritage of Roman-Dutch and English
jurisprudence. Trials of lesser offenses are heard by
magistrates, who are career employees of the civil service in
the executive branch. More serious offenses, including capital
crimes, are tried in the supreme courts. The presiding judge
or magistrate determines guilt or innocence. Juries were
abolished in 1969. Judges in capital and other serious cases
are empowered to appoint two assessors who serve as fact
finders and who have the power to overrule the presiding judge
on questions of fact but not on questions of law.
Defendants in criminal cases may retain legal counsel, but a
1990 study showed that 85 percent of those convicted in
ordinary criminal cases had no representation. The idea of
public defense was given a significant boost by the formation
of a widely representative group, comprising members of the
government-supported Legal Aid Board and all the major legal
organizations, dedicated to laying the groundwork for such a
system. A pilot public defender's office was opened in
Johannesburg, and plans are under way for further such
demonstration projects. In October, in the case of State vs.
Mthwana, a full bench of the Court of Appeal effectively
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overturned a 1988 lower court decision in the Khanyile case
that a failure to provide representation was an irregularity
rendering a trial unfair. At the same time, however. Chief
Justice Corbett, in his concurring opinion, essentially threw
the entire question to the legislature by insisting that "the
ideal of the provision of free legal representation to all
indigent persons accused of serious crime... is a sine qua non
of a complete system of criminal justice, and any system which
lacks it is flawed." (As a matter of practice, courts usually
appoint counsel in capital cases in which the defendant cannot
afford a lawyer.) There continued to be reported cases of
inordinately lenient sentences meted out, usually by
magistrate's courts, in cases involving white perpetrators and
black victims.
Persons charged with common crimes are presumed innocent until
proven guilty, although Parliament has modified the general
presumption of innocence for many security offenses. Both
security-related and common criminal cases are tried in
civilian courts.
While the South African judiciary has displayed willingness in
many instances to discover ambiguities in parliamentary decrees
and apply common law principles in support of fundamental
rights, the power of the judiciary at all levels continues to
be circumscribed by the principle of parliamentary sovereignty,
under which judges possess no authority to alter, strike down,
or refuse to enforce properly drafted and enacted laws of
Parliament. Prominent opposition lawyers have called for a
complete overhaul of the country's white-dominated court system
as a necessary part of the creation of a nonracial democracy.
There was discussion in 1991 of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including the concept of "democratic community
courts" which would be consistent with certain cultural
traditions and responsive to the needs of the community. In
October the South African Law Commission issued the final
version of its March 1989 draft report on the protection of
individual rights which called for, inter alia, the creation of
an independent judiciary and a justiciable bill of rights.
These principles have been endorsed by the Government, the ANC,
and several other potential parties to negotiations for a new
South African constitution.
The Government-ANC Pretoria Minute of August 1990 included an
arrangement for the release of persons deemed under the
agreement to be political prisoners and the granting of
indemnity for nonprisoners convicted or suspected of political
offenses (mostly exiles; see Section 2.d.). In the face of
continuing ANC and human rights groups' criticism of government
implementation of the arrangement (including its failure to
meet the April 30, 1991, target date set forth in the Pretoria
Minute), the Government agreed to the formation of an "audit
committee" comprising representatives of the Departments of
Justice and Correctional Services, LHR, and the HRC . It also
agreed to unfettered LHR and ICRC access to the country's
prisons for the purpose of thorough notification of the
prisoner release process. The audit committee was later
replaced by a government -ANC "screening committee," which
continues to function.
As of December 31, 6,541 applications for release had been
received by the Department of Justice. Of this number, 1,291
applicants had been released, while 4,782 had their
applications refused. As of December 31, approximately 270
release applications were still being processed. (Denied
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applicants had further rights of "appeal" to an advisory body
comprising, mainly, three judges or former judges, and
established to make recommendations to the State President.
ANC nominees to the body, however, refused to serve because of
objections to the body's procedures and mandate.) The
remaining 200 or so applications comprised those submitted
after the deadline.
In the context of a review and subsequent lifting of U.S.
sanctions under Title III of the CAAA, it was determined in
July that all political prisoners within the meaning of the Act
(and as defined in this report) had been released. Of the
1,000-plus nonhomelands prisoners identified as "political" by
the HRC and the ANC in April-June 1991, approximately 230 who
had applied for release remained incarcerated at the end of the
year, according to the South African Department of Justice. As
of December 31, the so-called independent homeland of
Bophuthatswana had released all but 3 of the 166 prisoners
considered to be "political" by the ANC and human rights
organizations pursuant to the Pretoria Minute criteria.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
During 1991 South Africa's Parliament continued the
dismantlement of the legal system of apartheid, which
previously intruded into virtually every area of private life.
All remaining "pillars of apartheid" were repealed. The June
repeal of the Group Areas Act means that racial integration in
residential areas is no longer a crime. On the other hand,
racial discrimination by private landlords and property owners
is not explicitly prohibited by law, and de facto
discriminatory practices are widespread (see Section 5).
Legislation, enacted in June following repeal of the Group
Areas Act, enables local neighborhoods to establish their own
"norms and standards" regarding local living conditions.
Although the bill specifically prohibits racial discrimination,
critics of the legislation expressed concern that it could be
used to perpetuate discriminatory practices. Despite the
repeal of the Population Registration Act (see Section 3), the
race classification of persons born before the effective date
of the repeal remained valid for some purposes, including
racially based voting and pension laws and military
conscription for white males.
Parliament also repealed the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, which
limited black land ownership to the homelands. However, blacks
deemed to be citizens of one of the so-called independent
homelands still face legal restrictions on where they can
live. By law, they are required to obtain work permits in
order to reside in urban areas outside their homelands,
although these laws no longer are being enforced.
Inadequate available housing has resulted in an increased
squatter population. Despite government efforts to develop a
more realistic policy toward illegal settlements, provincial
and local authorities continued to pressure squatters to move.
Under the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, all
landowners — whether public or private — are required to remove
"unauthorized" structures from their property. As a result,
even when private landowners raise no objection, police often
threaten to fine the squatters. In other cases, owners hire
security firms to evict the squatters, usually without regard
to the health, welfare, or alternate housing arrangements for
the dislocated.
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The repeal of the Land Acts failed to provide for either
resettlement or compensation of the estimated 3.5 million
persons who previously had been forcibly removed from their
land. A dramatic challenge to the Government's refusal to make
restitution occurred in April when several dozen black families
reoccupied land known as Goedgevonden farm near Ventersdorp,
from which they had been forcibly evicted in 1978. The area to
which they were relocated subsequently became part of the
"independent" homeland of Bophuthatswana, causing them to lose
their South African citizenship. Shortly after these families
returned, an estimated 1,000 white farmers attempted to destroy
their shacks and forcibly return them to Bophuthatswana. The
SAP defended the squatters with tear gas and shotgun fire,
wounding four white farmers. The Government maintained that,
although the black families were indeed illegally squatting on
government property, their eviction could only be legally
effected through the courts. Subsequently, a court order was
granted allowing the squatters' eviction but, with the aid of a
human rights organization, the order was appealed. During the
ongoing appeal process, the squatters have remained at
Goedgevonden Farm. The Government controls access to the farm,
however, and human rights groups complain that the squatters
are denied ready access to food and water .
Under existing "unrest area" designations, police are free to
make warrantless searches, seizures, and arrests. In fact,
according to human rights lawyers, warrants are unusual for any
search and seizure of a black home, and one lawyer with over 20
years' experience said he had never actually seen one. Police
surveillance of opposition groups has continued, including
infiltration of organizations and bugging of activists' homes.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
In 1991, according to official sources, over 2,165 people died
in political violence and unrest in the country. The number of
deaths was particularly large in Natal and the Johannesburg-
Pretoria area. The HRC estimates the number of unrest-related
deaths at 2,050 through December 30, including 98 persons
killed by security forces. The SAP stated that 145 police
officers were killed in 1991.
According to human rights monitors, political violence in Natal
and the Johannesburg-Pretoria area, primarily attacks between
ANC/COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) supporters
and members of Inkatha, has left a death toll in excess of
3,190 since July 1990, with thousands more wounded and
thousands of homes burned and damaged. The causes of this
violence include the power struggle between Inkatha and the
ANC/COSATU, as well as personal revenge, socioeconomic
frustration, common criminal activity, and resentment of
police, both black and white.
According to Inkatha figures, at least 28 Inkatha leaders were
assassinated in 1991, including former Inkatha Youth Brigade
National Secretary Mbhekiseni Gwala, who was shot dead in Natal
in November, and IFP Table Mountain leader Thomas Gcabashe,
killed on December 17. An ANC spokesman reported on November 7
that more than 60 ANC leaders had been killed during 1991 in
political violence.
In many of the incidents of violence in 1991, growing tensions
between township dwellers and squatters (largely pro-ANC) on
the one hand and predominately Zulu-speaking hostel residents
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(largely Inkatha supporters) on the other was the kindling to
which individual incidents provided the spark. There were
frequent charges that police either were involved in or
condoned attacks by Inkatha supporters on ANC supporters.
Hundreds of people died as the warring sides battled each other
with knives, spears, and guns, including automatic weapons such
as AK-47's.
In March residents of the Johannesburg area township of
Alexandra, who were holding a vigil for a victim of violence,
telephoned the police because residents had seen about 200 men,
thought to be Inkatha partisans, massing in the area the night
before. On the day of the vigil, the men attacked, and 15
people were killed and 16 were injured by spears and automatic
weapons. The police, despite being within hearing distance of
the attack, did not intervene.
In May the cycle of violence in the Johannesburg-area townships
of Alexandra, Sebokeng, Tembisa, and Soweto led to over 2,574
"unrest-related" arrests, according to the HRC . A triggering
incident was the funeral of Inkatha member and Diepmeadow Mayor
Moses Khumalo, following which residents claim they were
attacked by mourners. News video footage showed men walking
past police vehicles, and the police driving by twice without
taking action. At least 24 people were killed.
ANC members in Khayelitsha, Cape Town also alleged that police
were involved in or covering for attacks on them in the
township. Following a massacre which claimed 27 lives in
Swanieville, a township near the Transvaal town of Krugersdorp,
an Inkatha spokesman acknowledged that Inkatha members had
attacked the Swanieville squatter camp in retaliation for an
earlier abduction of two hostel residents. Human rights groups
claimed police involvement, citing squatter residents' claims
that the police had escorted the more than 1,000 hostel
residents back to their hostel and had refused to help those
under attack. Police spokesmen stated that the attack took
place "while the local riot unit was busy changing shifts."
Beginning in 1990, a new form of terror has been visited on
township residents. Armed men have attacked over 12 trains
full of commuters in the Soweto area, causing over 30 deaths in
1991. In late October, for example, at least 9 persons were
shot or stabbed to death and 39 hurt when armed men attacked
two commuter railway stations in Soweto. On September 8, three
gunmen opened fire on a crowd of Inkatha supporters in the
Johannesburg-area township of Thokoza, killing 23. This set
off a cycle of violence which left over 100 dead and at least
111 injured. A September 11 grenade attack on a bus in Thokoza
resulted in the death of one person and serious injury to six.
The next day, a lone gunman armed with an AK-47 sprayed bullets
in a crowded bus in the nearby township of Vosloorus, killing
four passengers. Disruption of the September 14 Peace Accord
may have been the aim of the perpetrators in these September
incidents .
Although some of the attackers are presumed to be common
criminals, there are persistent and serious allegations that
some of the attackers are members of hit squads or are trained
by a third force interested in maintaining terror and
uncertainty in the township residents. The existence of such
hit squads and a third force has not yet been proved but is
widely believed in South Africa. Hit squads are allegedly
small, trained units formed to assassinate leaders of opposing
organizations or groups. The third force is said to be a
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loose, clandestine grouping of rightwing elements, both in and
out of government, who fundamentally disagree with President de
Klerk's policies. Their tactics are said to include inciting
violence in order to pit one group against the other — e.g.,
Inkatha against the ANC — with the aim of disrupting
negotiations toward a new, democratic South Africa.
The ANC and others have long claimed a third force existed; the
IFP recently stated that it accepted the possibility. In July
Felix Ndimene, a former SADF operative, confessed to having
taken part in SADF-sponsored cross-border destabilization
campaigns. He alleged that other members of the unit were
responsible for some of the train attacks. Nelson Mandela
cited this as further evidence of "third force" backing of the
train attackers, pointing out that they carried out their
attacks in a well-organized fashion and in silence — which led
him to believe they were foreign mercenaries.
The Government responded to this violence chiefly by declaring
20 magisterial districts encompassing 25 affected townships to
be "unrest areas." Under this declaration — pursuant to the
Public Safety Act — substantial extraordinary powers are vested
in the police, including the ability to impose curfews,
confiscate dangerous weapons, and detain suspects (see Section
l.d.). The ANC and other groups have charged that, despite
these unrest declarations, the security forces have not
intervened effectively to prevent violence or in many instances
have been deliberately slow in their interventions to favor IFP
groups .
A serious effort, spearheaded by church and business leaders,
to bring the IFP, the ANC, and the South African Government
together to stop the violence reached fruition in September
with the signing of the Peace Accord (see Section l.a.). The
Accord, which includes statutory provisions to be enacted by
the Government as well as many new mechanisms, aims to curb
violence, create more security force oversight mechanisms, and
improve the system of bringing violent criminals to justice.
With all sides' attitudes so hardened after years of conflict,
however, the effectiveness of the implementation bodies remains
to be seen.
Incidents of rightwing violence in 1991 included the bombing of
a previously all-white school in Pretoria in July slated to be
used by children of returning ANC exiles, and the December
bombings of a mixed race school in Klerksdorp and of COSATU's
offices in Pretoria. The rightwing Boer Republican Army
claimed responsibility for all of these bombings. Other
bombings occurred in late December and continued into early
1992. Three white protesters were killed, 4 policemen were
shot, and more than 50 people were injured on August 9 when
State President de Klerk addressed National Party supporters in
Ventersdorp. Rightwing groups had threatened that de Klerk
would not be allowed to speak in the Conservative Party
stronghold, and several thousand showed up — matched by almost
equal numbers of police. Members of the crowd attacked a taxi
carrying three black men and a coffin, firing bullets at the
taxi and injuring one man seriously. Police fired on the
crowd, killing three people.
In some instances, the perpetrators of rightwing violence were
tried and punished. In March two members of the rightwing
Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB), David Botha and Adriaan
Smuts, pleaded guilty to 7 counts of murder and 27 counts of
attempted murder for their attack on a Durban bus in October
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1990. On September 13, they were each given seven death
sentences. They stated that they acted to implement the policy
of the rightwing group Orde Boerevolk that for every white
person killed by a black, 10 blacks must die.
There were also instances of killings and use of excessive
force by security forces. In March, 12 residents of the
Johannesburg-area township of Daveyton were killed by police.
According to witnesses, the police confronted a group of
residents preparing for a rumored Inkatha attack, gave them 10
minutes to disperse, and then began randomly firing at the
crowd before the 10 minutes were up. A policeman was also
killed in the confrontation. An inqxiest judge found that the
police had used excessive force in dispersing the crowd and
that six unknown township residents had murdered the police
officer. The Attorney General will decide whether to press
charges. A judicial inquest into the September 1990 deaths of
42 people killed by security forces in the Transvaal township
of Sebokeng revealed that the police had used excessive force,
perjured themselves, and falsified evidence before a military
inquiry. Members of the SADF were found guilty on 4 counts of
murder and 10 of causing grievous bodily harm against people
who had posed no reasonable threat. IFP members were alleged
to have been responsible for the other 38 deaths, but the judge
found insufficient evidence to so rule.
As of year's end, no action had been taken by the provincial
Attorney General on the recommendations of a commission
concerning a March 1991 incident in Sebokeng in which police
killed 12 people and wounded over 250 when they opened fire on
protesters presenting a petition to the local police station.
The Commission, headed by Justice Richard Goldstone, blamed the
police for excessive use of force, lack of discipline, and
failure to follow proper procedures, and recommended that the
Attorney General investigate the actions of certain policemen.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
South Africans speak freely on most issues and, although a
number of concerns remain, the reforms launched by President de
Klerk on February 2, 1990 continue to expand speech and press
freedoms. Segments of the country's almost totally white-owned
mainstream press, as well as the opposition press, continue to
engage in vigorous criticism of the Government and its policies.
Although the most onerous regulations constraining press
freedoms fell away in 1990 with the end of the state of
emergency, several cases remain pending against journalists who
were charged under the regulations. Journalists and human
rights activists are quick to point out that a number of
restrictive laws remain on the books for use at the
authorities' discretion.
During the 1991 parliamentary session, the Government amended
the Internal Security Act, abrogating provisions that had made
advocating communism a crime, prohibited publication of
statements by "banned" people, and disqualified formerly banned
people from membership in Parliament or the legal profession.
Also dropped was the requirement that persons seeking to
register a new newspaper post a fee of up to $14,000. However,
under the law, journalists may still be detained for up to 14
days for alleged violations under other sections of the Act.
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Under Section 29b of the Police Act, a journalist who publishes
untrue information about the police without having "reasonable
grounds" for believing it to be true may be subject to a fine
of up to $3,500 or a prison sentence of up to 5 years, or both.
Several professional media organizations have complained that
journalists have been harassed and prosecuted unjustifiably
under Section 205 of ~ the Criminal Procedures Act, which
empowers a magistrate to order someone to appear before him if
that person "is likely to give material or relevant information
as to any alleged offense, whether or not it is known by whom
the offense was committed." Refusal to comply can be punished
by up to 5 years' imprisonment.
Journalists have continued to complain of police interference
in violence-torn regions declared "unrest areas," in which
security forces have legal authority to remove or arrest
persons at the scene of any unrest.
Critics note that, although the Law Commission and the media
council have compiled detailed lists of laws which continue to
restrict freedom of speech in South Africa, neither of these
lists has been released or acted upon. Although enforcement of
the laws has been sporadic, the existence of the laws, together
with the experiences during the emergency restrictions in years
past, has, in the critics' view, continued to exert a chilling
effect on press freedoms. They say self-censorship has become
common, with editors regularly surrendering substantial editing
responsibility to their lawyers.
Publications that continue to test their rights find themselves
paying expensive legal fees for advice prior to publication and
for the defense of their actions in court. During 1991, one of
the major press freedom cases involved the opposition
Afrikaans-language Vrye Weekblad and English- language Weekly
Mail, relatively small publications whose economic viability is
threatened by costly legal battles. The papers were sued by
police Lt . General Neethling, who claimed personal defamation
in a suit funded at taxpayer expense for printing allegations
that he had been involved in police hit squad activities. The
papers defeated the suit and were awarded court costs . Vrye
Weekblad was also sued by the Witwatersrand Attorney General
von Lieres und Wilkau over articles which accused the Attorney
General of a "vendetta" against the newspaper. Although the
Attorney General was awarded $7,000 in damages, he was ordered
in October to pay both sides' legal costs — about $60,000.
These decisions may afford some protection against suits based
on media criticism of public figures.
Rightwing political activists continued to resort to violence
and intimidation of journalists and public figures. Throughout
the year, journalists charged that rightwing activists, usually
members of the AWB, assaulted or threatened them. ANC Deputy
President Nelson Mandela was shouted down by rightwing whites
while attempting to deliver a guest lecture at the University
of Pretoria on April 29, and on August 9 rightwing groups
fought with police while attempting to disrupt an address by
State President de Klerk to a National Party meeting in
Ventersdorp.
Journalists do not fear political intimidation from rightwing
extrapar liamentary groups only. Complaints early in the year
by journalists, most of them black, of threats and intimidation
by local ANC activists escalated until ANC Deputy President
Walter Sisulu and several ANC senior executives held a 7-hour
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meeting with black editors and journalists on July 1 to
reassure them of the organization's commitment to press freedom.
The Government exercises a near monopoly on television and
radio broadcasting through the state-owned South African
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), although access to the
airwaves is also available to radJo and television stations
broadcasting from the so-called independent homelands and to
M-Net , which is owned by four major newspaper publishing
groups. M-Net was authorized in late 1990 to carry news
programs subject to restrictions on air times but has not yet
begun to do so. While the Government professes that SABC is
politically independent, a wide range of the political
spectrum, including the ANC, the liberal-leaning Democratic
Party and the rightwing Conservative Party, characterizes SABC
as an editorial arm of the ruling National Party. However,
SABC has made substantial efforts to broaden the scope of
political opinion broadcast to South Africans in the past year,
with virtually every major political leader or newsmaker
appearing on radio or television public affairs programs.
Under the Publications Act (applicable to most periodicals with
the exception of newspapers), the importation, possession, and
publication of politically or morally "undesirable" works is
prohibited. Materials subject to censorship include those
found to be "indecent or obscene" or "blasphemous," or which
constitute a "threat to the security of the state, the general
welfare, and the peace and good order." Determinations are
made by the governmental directorate of publications and
routinely appealed to the Publications Appeal Board; they are
not subject to judicial review except in rare instances.
During 1991 the Directorate of Publications and Publications
Appeal Board continued to permit publications that once would
have been banned for political reasons, while prohibiting
publications or films ruled to be obscene or blasphemous.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Previous security restrictions on antiapartheid organizations
continue to be relaxed, and most of these organizations have
taken advantage of the changed political climate to participate
openly in the political debate for a new dispensation in South
Africa .
The 15-year ban on outdoor political gatherings, in operation
under the Internal Security Act, ended on March 31. However,
under still-existing legislation, specific gatherings can be
and have been banned by any of the 350 district magistrates or
by the Minister of Law and Order. Also, while the Internal
Security Act remains on the statute books, the Minister has the
power to reinvoke the blanket ban at some future date,
according to the HRC.
Police forcibly broke up demonstrations and protest marches
when no demonstration permission was sought or granted. A
Democratic Party meeting in Meloding Township, near the Orange
Free State town of Virginia, was broken up on June 6. The
police claimed the meeting was illegal because more than 25
people were present; allegedly, they refused to tell the
meeting participants what section of the law they were using or
give their names. Later it was discovered that a local by-law
was used to declare the meeting illegal. On April 6, the
Krugersdorp town council refused to allow a planned
ANC/COSATU/South African Communist Party march protesting
delays in the Pretoria Minute prisoner release process. In
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Bophuthatswana, repression remained at a high level; numerous
protest and political meetings were summarily broken up.
Permission was denied to hold many other such meetings.
COSATU claimed that 5,000 demonstrators at a June 15 march in
the Eastern Transvaal town of Witbank were teargassed and
ordered to disperse.- The town council had refused permission
for the march, and roadblocks and barricades were set up.
Police have denied that the march took place or that they
teargassed anyone.
The designation of an unrest area also prohibits free
association after curfew hours (usually 9 p.m. to 4 a.m.),
allows police to search homes without a warrant, restricts
gatherings, allows for the dispersal of gatherings using force,
and grants indemnity against prosecution for the security
forces.
In the so-called independent homelands of Bophuthatswana and
Ciskei, all meetings of more than 20 people (except church,
tribal, or sports gatherings) require magisterial permission.
Without such sanction they are unlawful and may be broken up by
the security forces with "such force as may be necessary."
Bophuthatswana branches of the ANC say they often apply for
permission to hold a meeting and do not receive a response.
The power to ban and restrict persons continues in effect in
all four of the "independent" homelands.
c. Freedom of Religion
There are numerous religious denominations and an estimated
3,000 independent black churches. Religious groups may worship
freely without government interference.
The Defense Act provides alternative service options for
pacifist religious objectors, although some persons in this
category have served prison terms. On January 29, President de
Klerk announced a reduction from 6 years to 3 years in the
length of sentences for both nonreligious and religious
conscientious objectors. The latter 's alternative service
period is one-half of the total length of the period of
military service. The policy of whites-only conscription is
under review. In July the Attorney General halted all
prosecutions of conscientious objectors pending the completion
of a report on the issue. There were no conscientious
objectors in prison at the end of the year.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Since the repeal of the Pass Laws in 1986, black South Africans
have not had to carry government- is sued passes proving their
right to be in an urban area. "Independent" homeland citizens
still require work permits for employment outside their
homelands, but South African authorities no longer rigorously
enforce this regulation.
As far as is known, no passports were denied to antiapartheid
activists in 1991. Blacks assigned to an "independent"
homeland may now obtain South African passports. The Minister
of Home Affairs continues to have absolute discretion to revoke
or refuse to issue a passport without giving any reasons for
his action.
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South Africa is not a party to the international conventions on
refugees. It does not formally recognize any form of refugee
status and regards Mozambicans entering South Africa as
economic migrants. The Government and monitoring groups
estimate that 250,000 Mozambicans displaced by civil strife
have entered South Africa; most of them are considered illegal
aliens by Pretoria. Approximately 200,000 of these refugees
live in the homelands of Gazankulu and Kangwane . South African
nonprofit organizations, the ICRC, and other international
donor agencies provide relief assistance in the homelands. The
Government permits access by international observers to areas
where these refugees are found. Other refugees work as farm
laborers in the Eastern Transvaal where they are allowed to
live with temporary 3- and 6-month government residence
permits, or in the Johannesburg-Pretoria areas where they are
often paid less than South Africans in the same jobs.
According to one humanitarian group, some refugees live and
work under conditions approaching slavery.
Apprehended Mozambicans who cannot prove they have permission
to reside in South Africa are forcibly repatriated without an
interview to determine whether they can safely return. This
practice was given new legal foundation on October 1 with entry
into force of the new Aliens Control Act, which gives
immigration officers greater internal control over aliens. The
Act allows immigration officers to enter private premises
without warning and posts a maximum penalty of 5 years in
prison for harboring illegal aliens.
In 1990 the ANC and the Government reached agreement on
procedures for the indemnification and repatriation of
political exiles, with a target date of April 30, 1991, for
such indemnifications. As of September 25, some 8,000 persons
had received indemnity, with 215 applicants being refused.
With the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the
South African Government and the UNHCR in September, the way
was paved for repatriation of political exiles. No
applications for indemnity received under UNHCR auspices were
refused in 1991. By December large-scale repatriation under
the UNHCR had begun .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Under the present Constitution, the extent to which South
African citizens have the right to change their government
depends on their race. The black majority still lacks the
right to vote in national elections or otherwise to participate
meaningfully in the political system. The opening of CODESA in
December 1991 marked the beginning of negotiations on a new,
nonracial constitution.
The 1983 Constitution created a tricameral Parliament with
separate chambers for whites, "coloreds," and Asians. The
respective groups are represented in the tricameral Parliament
in a racial ratio of four white/two "colored'Vone Asian.
Members of each house are elected from separate racially based
voter rolls. Each house has primary responsibility for its
"own affairs," i.e., legislation affecting its own racial
constituency. The State President has complete discretion to
decide which issues are of general concern and are therefore to
be treated by all three chambers. Matters that usually are
considered general affairs include foreign policy, defense,
national security, and black affairs. The terms of the 1983
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SOUTH AFRICA
Constitution ensure control by the white House of Assembly over
general affairs.
The National Party, which has a large majority in the white
House of Assembly, has controlled South African political power
and legislative affairs since its first parliamentary victory in
1948. In late 1990, the National Party opened its membership
to all races and, during the subsequent 1991 parliamentary
session, 34 members of the "colored" House of Representatives
joined the National Party, which became the official opposition
in that chamber. In August President de Klerk appointed one of
the new "colored" National Party members, Abraham Williams, as
Deputy Minister of National Education.
The church-business initiative which led to the signing of the
Peace Accord helped transfer a measure of responsibility in the
areas of law and order and justice from the Government to a
multiparty forum. Transitional arrangements for other areas of
governance are also high on the agenda of CODESA.
The repeal in 1991 of the Population Registration Act ended the
requirement that children born in South Africa be classified
according to race. Accompanying legislation provided that the
population register "as it exists at the commencement of this
Act" shall remain in effect until the current Constitution is
repealed. Therefore, although children born after June 1991 no
longer are assigned to racial groups, the race classification
of persons born before this date remains valid for the
completion of voters' roles. Thus, blacks' rights to vote and
hold office currently remain limited to their respective
homelands or, in the case of more than 10 million urban blacks,
to their townships near white urban areas.
Political rights vary within South Africa's 10 black
homelands. During the period 1976-1981, the Government
declared four homelands "independent" nations (Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei), although South Africa is the
only country that has ever recognized their "independence."
Rampant corruption and other factors inspired successful
military coups in Transkei, Ciskei, and Venda. At the end of
1991, all three remained under military governments.
Bophuthatswana continues to be governed as a one-party state.
There is consensus that the "independent" homelands will be
reintegrated into South Africa, and the matter is on the CODESA
agenda .
Within the existing homeland structures, "citizens" and
residents elect delegates and are governed by assemblies that
are partly elected, partly appointed. The percentage of
elected delegates in homelands assemblies ranges from 17 to 65
percent, with a median of 45 percent. The Government is no
longer pursuing its former policy of encouraging the
"independence" of the six "self-governing" homelands.
The only voting rights which urban blacks are currently able to
exercise are those granted under the Community Councils Act of
1977 and the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982. The latter
Act elevated the formal status of black municipal authorities
to that enjoyed by white municipal governments. However, black
local governments still face critical problems of limited
powers, inadequate financial resources, and lack of political
credibility. Voter participation in township elections is
extremely low, and in fact there is considerable public
pressure within townships to abstain from voting.
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With the repeal of the Group Areas Act, blacks, "coloreds," and
Indians are no longer barred from residing in areas formerly
restricted to whites. However, existing provincial ordinances
still prevent nonwhite residents from voting in municipal
elections. No attempt has yet been made to change these
ordinances. In 1991 Parliament did pass legislation giving
municipalities the right to form administrative links, or even
to combine with their adjoining black townships. Results of
such linkages could include creation of a single municipal tax
base but not necessarily a nonracial voters' roll. As of
December, several municipalities had taken some steps to
include representatives of other races on joint management
committees, but no agreements had been reached on the
incorporation of white municipalities with black townships.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Hxoman Rights
In 1991 there was notably increased cooperation between the
Government and human rights monitoring groups, continuing the
trend begun in 1990. LHR, the Black Sash, HRC, the Legal
Resources Center, the South African Council of Churches, the
University of the Witwatersrand Center for Applied Legal
Studies, the Human Rights Trust in Port Elizabeth, the National
Anti-Repression Forum, the Independent Board of Inquiry into
Informal Repression, and other groups are involved in a wide
range of human rights issues. LHR and HRC served jointly with
the Departments of Justice and Correctional Services in a
political prisoner "advisory committee," although the committee
was short-lived.
Despite improved government attitudes, domestic human rights
monitors and lawyers report continued threats of surveillance,
detentions, and hit squads (e.g. Mlangeni). Salley Sealey, a
monitor with the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal
Repression, was detained on September 24 in Khotsung, near
Car letonville, an area in which the local police have been
accused of obstructing justice and fomenting a destabilization
campaign. She was accused of "insulting a police officer" and
"intimidating the police." She was released on bail and faces
charges. Black Sash workers were detained in Bophuthatswana in
October for a small, peaceful protest of the homeland's poor
human rights record.
The extent to which the Government has evolved in its attitude
toward human rights and related organizations is reflected by
the agreement reached in August 1991 between the Government and
the UNHCR allowing an official UNHCR presence within South
Africa, albeit for the limited purpose of the South African
political exile repatriation program.
After a 1986 vote by an International Red Cross conference in
Geneva to expel a South African delegation, the Government
reduced the ICRC staff in South Africa to eight persons.
Negotiations between the Government and the ICRC to increase
this number began during 1990 but were not resolved during
1991. Although the Government did not comply with a 1990 ICRC
request for access to detainees, regular ICRC visits to
prisoners recommenced in 1991 after a few years' hiatus, and in
general the Government has become more flexible in its approach
to the ICRC.
During April-May 1991, in connection with the Pretoria Minute
prisoner release process, a team of ICRC representatives was
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allowed free access to all 200-plus prisons within the
Department of Correctional Services, and interviewed 1,400
prisoners in 61 South African prisons. The ICRC also
experienced some improvement in access to prisoners in several
of the "independent" homelands but still has less access to
prisoners in the homelands — particularly Bophuthatswana — than
it has within the South African Department of Correctional
Services .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
South Africa's black majority and, to a lesser extent, Asian
and "colored" communities still face extensive racial
discrimination despite the repeal during the 1991 legislative
session of the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas
Act, and the Land Acts. While these measures removed major
statutory discriminatory legislation, de jure discrimination
still exists, including separate and unequal pensions,
educational systems, and subsidies. De facto, it is still
difficult for nonwhites to purchase homes or to acquire
property in certain "white" areas or to be gainfully and
meaningfully employed according to their abilities.
In some localities, groups and individuals — including
officials — have tried to perpetuate discriminatory laws by
enacting membership requirements and/or rules intended to limit
and restrict nonwhite access to both public and private
facilities. For example, there have been numerous reports of
nonwhites being denied entry to libraries, parks, and swimming
pools through arbitrary regulations, such as user fees, which
would disqualify them. The Government established nearly 2
years ago the Independent Development Trust to address social
inequities (particularly for blacks) through locally based
development projects focusing on housing, education, and
health. Although jobs are no longer designated "for whites
only," employment opportunities for blacks remain limited — in
large measure because of their inferior educational system.
Unemployment for blacks is estimated at 40 percent. The gap in
white and nonwhite pensions was narrowed in 1991.
Females in all racial groups — particularly blacks — still suffer
from legal, cultural, and economic discrimination. Democratic
Party Member of Parliament Carole Charlewood described this
discrimination to the media as "ancient and pernicious." The
Democratic Party has called for an equal opportunity ombudsman
and a South African ministry for women's affairs which would be
tasked to assess the impact on women of cabinet proposals and
bills. Gender discrimination is underscored by the fact that
the husband's legal primacy over his wife still exists. For
example, married women may not own a house in their own name.
Black women may not own land, an offshoot of local African
traditional law. When a black man dies, he usually passes a
house to his son, father, or brother — not his wife. Apart from
codified law, traditional legal rulings work to negate progress
for many women. Lobola (a "bride price") is prevalent, but not
legally required, among the black population.
Employment opportunities for nonwhite women are still found
mainly in the domestic and factory sectors. In September the
National Manpower Commission outlined proposals to improve the
working conditions and salaries for domestic workers. If the
proposals were adopted, domestic workers would, among other
things, receive a "living wage" plus basic benefits such as
paid holidays, pensions, and medical aid. They would also be
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SOUTH AFRICA
entitled to trade union representation. Opponents of the bill
point out that up to half the domestic workers currently
employed might lose their jobs if employers have to conform to
the proposal .
Violence against women of all races is a serious problem,
particularly because there is very little legal redress.
Spouse abuse is not recognized, and rape within marriage is not
considered a crime. A husband may be charged for assault
accompanying rape, but courts will not convict upon the
evidence of a woman alone. Family murder/suicide is prevalent;
the husband is the usual perpetrator, and in white families the
weapon is usually a gun. There are no government-subsidized
programs or advice centers for abused women, except for
overextended welfare and social workers.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
South Africa's Labor Relations Act entitles all workers in the
private sector to freely join labor unions of their choosing.
Legislation in 1979 granted blacks full status as employees
with the right to form free and independent trade unions.
Black union membership has increased some 10-fold since then.
Although reliable statistics are unavailable, it is likely that
as many as 2.5 million workers were members of trade unions in
1991, and probably more than half of those members were black.
Broad estimates of the percentage of the work force organized
range between 30 and 40 percent of nonagr icultural workers.
The Labor Relations Act does not cover domestic servants,
farmworkers, or public servants, hindering trade union
organizing in those sectors.
South Africa's unions are independent of direct government
control. The legacy of apartheid, however, continues to
impinge on all nonwhite workers and unionists, limiting their
political rights and access to the legal process. As unions
increasingly assumed the role of voicing black worker demands
for political rights, the Government in the past imposed
specific restrictions on their activities. It lifted the last
of these restrictions on February 2, 1990.
The Government did not directly interfere significantly with
union activities in 1991. Nevertheless, there were instances
in which authorities denied permits for trade union marches and
demonstrations, used tear gas and batons against demonstrators,
and arrested participants in such activities. Additionally,
the leadership of COSATU, South Africa's largest trade union
federation, protested that the police continue to harass them.
Three senior COSATU leaders, including its general secretary,
were tried on charges of kidnaping and assault in July,
stemming from an August 1990 incident in which they brought an
alleged police spy to their headquarters and forced him to
participate in an impromptu press conference. They were found
guilty on October 16, fined the equivalent of $700, and given
suspended 1-year sentences. In passing sentence, the
magistrate took into account COSATU' s history of harassment and
surveillance by the SAP. The Government admitted that it
secretly financed a COSATU rival, the Inkatha-1 inked United
Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA), for 5 years until July
1991. COSATU accuses UWUSA of violent and sometimes lethal
attacks on its members. Similarly, the Government admitted
financing an ostensibly private labor relations consulting firm
in an effort to influence labor affairs.
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SOUTH AFRICA
Some of South Africa's trade union federations are closely
linked with political organizations. COSATU is formally
aligned with the ANC and SACP, and is a major political force
in its own right. UWUSA is closely associated with Inkatha.
South Africa's second largest trade union federation, the
National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), remains ostensibly
independent from political groups, but has close connections to
the PAC and AZAPO.
South Africa extended the right to strike, long enjoyed by
white workers, to all private sector workers regardless of race
in 1979. Since then, work stoppages triggered by collective
bargaining disputes — and occasionally by political issues — have
been commonplace. The first 6 months of 1991 were relatively
quiet, leading analysts to speculate that greater concern for
job security among workers in the face of recessionary
conditions lowered the level of strike action. The number of
strikes surged, however, in the third quarter to bring total
activity up to the level of the previous year. Wages were the
main cause of strikes, almost two-thirds, followed by
grievances, dismissals, and discipline.
In early November, the largest nationwide strike in the
country's history took place. Over 3 million workers,
representing 70 to 80 percent of the industrial force,
participated in a 2-day general strike, protesting the
introduction of a value-added tax and the Government's attempts
to carry out economic and other reforms without agreement o.f
black labor and political groups. Trade unions are planning
further protest actions for early 1992.
South African law prohibits all public employees from
striking. Each minister, in consultation with appropriate
offices and advisory bodies, determines annual wage increases
for his ministry, and legislation governing each public service
sector establishes machinery for collective bargaining with
staff associations and dispute resolution. In most public
service sectors, disputes are referred to the appropriate
minister and then to arbitration or mediation, if necessary.
Recently, increased efforts to unionize public workers have
resulted in illegal public sector strikes becoming
commonplace. Strikes in the public sector accounted for 31
percent of all strikes in the first half of 1991, compared to
24 percent for the whole of 1990 and 1 percent in 1989. Public
employers and workers settled their disputes through
negotiations in most cases, and occasionally through mediation.
South Africa does not restrict union affiliation with regional
or international labor organizations. Government restrictions
on foreign funding have not affected these affiliations.
In 1988 COSATU lodged a complaint with the International Labor
Organization (ILO) against the Government, claiming that
amendments made that year to South Africa's Labor Relations Act
gave preference to racially constituted unions and abridged the
right to strike. The Government declined to accept ILO
jurisdiction over the complaint until February 1991 when it
invited the organization to send a fact-finding mission to
South Africa. The ILO mission did not take place in 1991, but
the Government, unions, and employers appear to support a broad
investigation of South Africa's labor law by an ILO team of
experts .
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SOUTH AFRICA
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Excluded for years from the statutory system of industrial
councils, black unions developed a collective bargaining
tradition of their own. Nonstatutory collective bargaining
relations were established by agreement at the enterprise
level, based on majority representation. The Government does
not interfere directly with union organizing in the private
sector and has generally not intervened in the collective
bargaining process. South African law prohibits discrimination
by employers against union members and organizers, and disputes
over recognition and other antiunion activities are rare.
Parliament passed amendments to the Labor Relations Act in
February. The amendments, based on unprecedented talks in 1990
between government, business, and trade unions, rolled back
changes made 3 years earlier which were widely considered to be
antiunion. During their talks, the three parties signed an
agreement, the "Laboria Minute," in which the Government
pledged to extend basic trade union rights to farm, domestic,
and public sector workers and to consider restructuring the
Minister of Manpower's advisory body, the National Manpower
Commission (NMC) . COSATU in turn agreed to participate on the
NMC. COSATU has since accused the Government of delaying the
fulfillment of its pledges and in October pulled out of the
NMC. COSATU continues to urge the Government to extend all
basic labor legislation to farm, domestic, and public sector
workers .
Collective bargaining is freely practiced throughout the
country. The major exceptions are public servants, farm
workers, and domestic servants. In addition. South Africa's
labor law does not apply to the homelands, whose own labor
legislation has generally not matched South Africa's. There
have been clear signs that many homelands have discouraged
trade union organizing. A thousand strikers at a Transkei tea
plantation were teargassed by police in August. Nevertheless,
trade union organizing and activity is on the increase in
almost all of South Africa's homelands. A series of strikes in
the past 2 years has prompted many homelands to reconsider
their labor legislation. Transkei and Ciskei have brought
their labor legislation closer to international standards.
Similar steps appear to be under way in Venda, KwaNdebele,
Lebowa, and Gazankulu. In contrast, Bophuthatswana passed new
industrial relations legislation that tightens limits on trade
union activity and renews previous prohibitions on South
African unions organizing there. The legislation awaits the
proclamation of the Bophuthatswana Manpower Department to
become law.
Private mediation services are available and have been
voluntarily sought by management and black trade unions to
resolve industrial disputes. The Labor Relations Act
establishes an Industrial Court to rule in labor -management
disputes, and its decisions appear to be balanced. The most
common complaints filed with the Court concern dismissals,
followed by unfair labor practices. A labor Court of Appeals
oversees the Industrial Court and can overturn its decisions.
South Africa has no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
South Africa does not constitutionally or statutorily prohibit
forced labor; however, it is against the country's system of
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SOUTH AFRICA
Roman-Dutch common law. It is not widely practiced, but
reports have appeared of Mozambican refugees being used as
slave labor on South African farms. The extent of the problem
and the accuracy of the reports concerning exploitation of
these often desperate people are unclear.
d. Minimum, Age for Employment of Children
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act prohibits the employment
of minors under age 15 in most industries, shops, and offices.
The Mines and Works Act prohibits persons under 16 from working
underground. There is no restriction, however, on the age of
agricultural workers. Child labor legislation is only
partially enforced by the responsible authorities at the
Ministry of Manpower and the Mineral and Energy Affairs
Ministry. One of the best known and documented instances of
underaged employment is young boys employed in black township
coalyards .
Education is compulsory for all white and "colored" children
until they reach age 16 or pass the 10th grade, and for Indian
children until age 15. There is no compulsory education for
black children in South Africa, including in the homelands.
The Department of Education and Culture effectively enforces
compulsory education for white children but not for nonwhites.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no legal minimum wage in South Africa. The Labor
Relations Act instead provides a mechanism for negotiations
between labor and management to set minimum wage standards
industry by industry. At present, over 100 industries,
covering most nonagricultural workers, come under the
provisions of the Act.
A recent survey by the Labor Research Service (LRS) found that
the average minimum wage increase for laborers in negotiated
industrial agreements in 1990 was 21.9 percent, well above the
inflation rate of 14.2 percent. Yet of 17 sectors which the
survey covered, only one paid a minimum wage above what the LRS
estimates to be a "living wage." Further, the average minimum
wage was some 30 percent below the living wage. Wages paid
unskilled workers, especially domestic servants and
agricultural workers, are often significantly less.
Attention to health and safety issues has increased in recent
years. The state-funded National Occupational and Safety
Association claims that the Ministry of Manpower effectively
enforces government-legislated minimum standards for the
workplace environment. While its figures are disputed by some,
the Association claims that the number of workers suffering
disabling injuries annually has dropped significantly over the
last decade. Most industries have a standard workweek of 46
hours (which is also the well-enforced legal maximum), as well
as vacation and sick leave. Overtime is voluntary and limited
to 10 hours a week. The law does not mandate a 24-hour rest
break. The Basic Conditions of Employment Act which legislates
minimum workplace standards does not apply to agricultural
workers and domestic servants. Their work conditions and those
of workers in the homelands are sometimes far less advanced
than in the rest of South Africa.
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SUDAN
Sudan is ruled by Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir and a group of
officers in the Sudanese People's Armed Forces (SPAF), who
overthrew Sudan's democratic government in 1989. The coup
leaders formed a National Salvation Revolution Command Council
(RCC) of 15 military officers (reduced to 12 in 1991), imposed
a strict curfew, suspended Sudan's 1985 transitional
constitution, abrogated press licenses, and dissolved all
political and trade union institutions. The Omar Government
controls most of Sudan, excluding large areas of the South
controlled by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement
(SPLA/M), led by John Garang. The RCC Government has since
become closely identified with the National Islamic Front
(NIF), a political party ostensibly banned in 1989 with other
political parties. NIF members and supporters hold important
positions throughout the Government, police, security forces,
the judiciary, academia, the media, business, and banking.
Numbering about 100,000, the SPAF is responsible for Sudan's
internal and external security, assisted by a large
multiorganizational security apparatus and police force.
Martial law remained in effect in 1991, as did a State of
Emergency (SOE), permitting various arbitrary government
actions. The Omar Government greatly increased the size of the
paramilitary force, the Popular Defense Force (PDF), which is
closely linked to the NIF. A small number of these units were
deployed in the civil war zone.
The civil war continued unabated in 1991, with many civilian
casualties. Military operations by both sides have left large
areas of Sudan largely unpopulated and plagued by banditry,
especially along the Ugandan, Chadian, and Zairean borders.
Government forces, sometimes assisted by PDF units, continued
to attack and kill civilians. In August a faction within the
SPLA in Nasir, in southeastern Sudan, split with SPLA/M leader
John Garang. The Nasir group accused Garang of committing
human rights abuses, including forced conscription of children,
arbitrary detentions, torture, and execution of opponents. In
November the war became more violent as serious fighting broke
out around Bor/Mongolla between the Nasir group and Garang s
SPLA faction. Thousands, mostly civilians, died as a result of
this fighting, which was marked by tribalism. Between 100,000
and 200,000 people, primarily women and children, were
displaced by the violence to areas south. In November the SPLA
resumed shelling of Juba, resulting in approximately 70
civilian deaths. The SPLA split delayed government-SPLA/M
talks scheduled for October in Abuja, Nigeria. The Nasir
group, in contrast to Garang, publicly advocates the separation
of the South.
Sudan's primarily agricultural economy has been devastated by
the costly civil war, hyperinflation, high unemployment, up to
780,000 refugees from neighboring countries, and 4.5 million
displaced Sudanese. Although people are largely free to pursue
private interests and hold private property, there is a long
history in Sudan of pervasive government control of the
economy. New government economic policies to privatize
inefficient state-owned firms and stimulate private sector
investment have had little effect.
The human rights situation in Sudan remained grave in 1991
because of the civil war and RCC efforts to strengthen
government authority. The RCC repressed speech, press,
assembly, association, and political choice, engaged in
arbitrary arrest and detention without charge, and tried
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civilians in unfair trials by military courts. Government
security services operated with little restraint, often
mistreating and harassing citizens and torturing civilians
suspected of opposing the regime. The Government did release
300 political detainees in June, but its NIF-inspired drive to
Islamicize Sudanese society and institutions markedly increased
religious intolerance and discrimination against non-Muslim
citizens.
In March a new penal code, the Criminal Act of 1991, instituted
harsh punishments nationwide, including amputation and
stoning. Although the southern states are currently exempt
from these Islamic prohibitions and penalties, the 1991 Act
provides for a possible future application of Islamic law
(Shari'a) in the South. The Shari'a and the Arabization and
Islamicization of society are major causes of southern
disaffection. Critics have long pointed to the parallel
institutions established by the RCC to ensure fundamentalist
control of such important groups as the military (formation of
more ideologically motivated PDF units), the judiciary (special
security courts), and labor (steering committees). Abuses
relating to the civil war included indiscriminate bombings,
forced conscriptions, confiscation of relief supplies, rape,
and pillage.
During the year, there were important instances of improved
cooperation with international food relief efforts by the
Government and the SPLA/M. However, these instances of
cooperation coincided with many more instances of mutual
hostility and interference. At year's end, the continuation of
the war and the ambivalence of the Government and the two SPLA
factions toward relief operations continued to threaten large
segments of the southern and western populations with
starvation.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Government and SPLA/M forces were involved or implicated in
numerous instances of extrajudicial killing, and other abuses
of civilians in the civil war (see Section l.g.). There were
credible reports of politically and religiously motivated
killings of several persons by a PDF-related group operating in
Juba.
In July a southern resident of a displaced camp in Khartoum
reportedly died as a result of a beating by security personnel
who entered the camp late at night.
Following the August split within the SPLA/M, the SPLA/Nasir
group accused John Garang of summarily executing without due
process several of his political rivals. The Nasir group
specifically cited three such killings and charged that two
SPLA members, among others, died under torture.
In January the Government released five members of the Abu
Nidal organization who had been convicted of killing seven
persons in a 1988 terrorist attack on the Acropole Hotel in
Khartoum, after they had served a minimal sentence. This
leniency is in marked contrast to sentences being decreed under
Sudan's judicial system. Throughout the year reports persisted
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that several camps exist in Sudan in which people are trained
in the use of weapons and explosives. These camps and
individuals have reputedly been linked to specific known
terrorist organizations.
In July security forces fired upon unarmed students and killed
one student in antigovernment demonstrations at the University
of Khartoum. Although the university administration called for
an investigation into this incident, no such investigation was
carried out.
b. Disappearance
Approximately 25 civilian residents of Kadugli, in southern
Kordofan, mostly Nubans , disappeared in 1991. Tl:;ey were
believed to have been executed by military forces on suspicion
of collaborating with the SPLA/M. Routine disappearances of
people suspected of collaborating or supporting the SPLA/M
occurred in the civil war zones. The SPAF or government-
sponsored militias were believed to be responsible for these
disappearances .
In May an Ethiopian national, an employee of the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) , was arrested in the
USAID building in downtown Khartoum. Despite repeated
diplomatic protests and a belated government response that he
had escaped from custody the day after detention, the
employee's whereabouts remained unknown.
Following the split in the SPLA in August, a medical official
from southern Sudan was kidnaped on Kenyan soil and taken to
Kapoeta in Sudan by a group loyal to John Garang.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Formerly uncommon in Sudan, torture and other forms of physical
mistreatment by official and unofficial security forces were
widespread in 1991. Various security organizations used
commandeered safe houses (known as ghost houses) to hold
incommunicado persons suspected of activity against the
Government, including journalists, businessmen, and students.
Following demonstrations at the University of Khartoum in July
and September, suspected student ringleaders were badly beaten.
Detainees in ghost houses were subjected to varying forms of
torture, including whipping and clubbing; electric shock; the
kicking of ribs or kidneys; binding of hands for long periods;
blindfolding for days at a time; immersion of hands in boiling
water; suspension from ceiling fans; and psychological torture,
such as mock executions.
Prison conditions are harsh, especially in Shalla prison in
Darfur. Political detainees and suspected SPLA/M sympathizers
held there early in 1991 were confined with criminals and the
mentally ill and subjected to overcrowding, deprivation of
water under conditions of extreme heat, unsanitary living
conditions causing typhus and other diseases, lack of medical
treatment, and denial of access to family and friends. In late
1991, Osman Siraj and other prominent political prisoners were
moved to Shalla. Detainees were also held on the roof of
security headquarters in Khartoum in overcrowded conditions and
in searing heat with limited food and inadequate toilet
facilities. Others were forced to remain spread-eagled or on
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their knees with hands on their heads along the outside walls
of security buildings for extended periods.
The new 1991 Criminal Act based on Shari'a law prescribes
corporal punishments, called "Hudud," for certain offenses.
Hudud punishments include amputation, stoning, and lashings.
While sentences were handed down during the year applying each
of these punishments, none had been carried out by year's end
except for lashing — which was routinely carried out in the
North. The penalty for drinking alcohol, for example, is 40
lashes .
In August the SPLA/Nasir breakaway group, without citing
numbers, accused John Garang of torturing some SPLA officers to
silence dissent.
d. Arbitrary arrest. Detention, or Exile
Neither the 1991 Criminal Act nor the superseded 1983 Penal
Code deal with periods of detention and security arrests. On
April 29, General Omar declared that all detentions would
henceforth be subject to judicial review. However, in June the
National Security Act was amended to permit detention for up to
72 hours, extendable for 1 month with justification, which is
not defined in the Act. It also states that precautionary
detention "to preserve the general security" may be authorized
by the RCC for 3 months. A person thus detained should be
notified "in suitable time" — interpreted as within these 3
months — of the reasons for his detention. The RCC may extend
precautionary detention for another 3 months with proper
notification, but the judge or prosecution may reject this
extension and release the detainee. Bail is permitted except
in murder and in checking infraction cases. Indigent
defendants are provided with legal counsel by the Government.
After the coup on June 30, 1989, the Omar Government arrested
many prominent persons from many fields and declared a
nationwide State of Emergency (SOE), which continues in effect
and gives the Government wide-ranging arbitrary powers. The
number of detainees reached several hundred by 1990, especially
after the alleged coup attempt of April 1990. On April 29,
General Omar announced the release of 300 political detainees,
claiming they represented all political detainees held in Sudan.
Although the 300 political detainees were eventually freed by
June, approximately 70 persons remained imprisoned without
charge after the April 29 amnesty. Most had been in jail for
over a year. At least one of those freed by General Omar's
amnesty was rearrested shortly thereafter. By the end of 1991,
about 65 political detainees remained in prison in Sudan. This
number does not include the many who were arrested, kept in
ghost houses or security offices, and then released, a large
number which varied at any one time. Military authorities in
southern, central, and western areas also incarcerated numerous
persons without charge on suspicion of cooperation or sympathy
with the SPLA/M.
The SPLA/Nasir group accused John Garang of arbitrarily
detaining, without consulting the SPLA high command, many SPLA
members solely because they differed with him or challenged his
authority. According to the SPLA/Nasir group, some of these
persons have been detained for more than 6 years; one senior
SPLA officer reportedly died while in custody.
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There were no known cases of involuntary exile from Sudan in
1991.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Under the previous governinent , the Sudanese legal system
involved extensive guarantees of due process, including public
trials before a three-judge panel and appeals to higher courts.
The Omar Government made the judiciary subservient to the
executive. One of the RCC's first decrees on June 30, 1989,
transferred all power over Sudan's Constitution and laws to the
RCC. The judiciary was transferred to the Ministry of Justice,
and the Chief Justice, formerly elected by sitting judges, was
appointed by General Omar. The RCC removed over 200 judges
considered ideologically unacceptable and replaced them with
RCC appointees closely affiliated with the National Islamic
Front. The new judges favor a strict application of Shari'a.
In November 1989, the RCC also passed the Special Courts Act,
which provided for special security courts to try persons
accused of a wide range of violations, e.g., of constitutional
decrees, emergency regulations, some sections of the penal
code, and drug and currency violations. The special security
courts may be composed of three military officers or any three
competent persons; those created thus far have had both
military and civilian judges. Attorneys may sit with
defendants as "friends of the court" and advise them; but may
not normally address the court. Sentences are usually severe
and implemented immediately, except that death sentences must
be referred to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the
Head of State. Defendants may file appeal briefs with the
Chief Justice. In 1991 most security cases were tried in these
courts .
Thus, at the end of 1991 the RCC court system involved the
regular courts, both criminal and civil, the parallel special
security courts, military courts intended mainly for military
personnel, and tribal courts which continue to be important in
rural areas where disputes largely involve land, water, and
family matters. On March 22, courts were instructed to apply
the new 1991 Criminal Act; civil cases continued to be handled
largely according to the Civil Transactions Act of 1983.
While the southern states are currently exempted from sections
in the 1991 Criminal Act, the Act permits the possible future
application of Shari'a to the South, if the legislative body so
decides. There were no reports in 1991 that Islamic
punishments were being carried out by the courts in
government-controlled areas of the South. The SPLA/M has
continued to call for a secular Sudan and the repeal of Shari'a.
The Attorney General's office allegedly monitors trials of
political prisoners, but its influence over the process is
limited. In September approximately 56 persons, members of the
military, retired military, and a number of civilians were
tried in a military court for alleged coup plotting in August.
These unfair trials were held in secret, at night, and none of
the defendants had legal counsel. In November sentences were
handed down for 52 of these alleged coup plotters. Eleven
persons were sentenced to death although General Omar commuted
10 of these sentences to life imprisonment and 1 death sentence
to 10 years' imprisonment. Sentences for the other defendants
ranged from 20 years' imprisonment to suspended sentences
predicated on good behavior.
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Portions of the South are outside effective judicial
procedures. Some reports suggest that army units summarily try
and punish those accused of crimes, especially offenses against
civil order.
The SPLA/M controls large areas of the South. Reports
indicated that a" rudimentary system of justice based on village
leaders was being used in some of these areas. A trusted
village elder is appointed to adjudicate disputes, as well as
to collect taxes and recruit soldiers and labor for the
SPLA/M. SPLA/M officials can be tried and reportedly have been
punished for criminal offenses.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Government surveillance in Sudan, outside the combat zones, was
rare before the coup. By 1991 surveillance was pervasive and
constrained only by resources and manpower. Despite their
release from house arrest in April, former prime minister Sadiq
al-Mahdi and former Communist Party chief Mohammad Ibrahim
Nugud, as well as other prominent former political detainees,
remained under constant surveillance. The University of
Khartoum and even some Christian church services were targeted
for surveillance. Mail, including that delivered by courier
service, was sometimes opened and read, and registered mail was
examined by government officials before being sent.
The Government has instituted neighborhood "popular committees"
to control the rationing system for subsidized basic
commodities and to monitor household size and composition.
They also furnish documents essential for obtaining an exit
visa from Sudan. These committees, tasked with reporting
suspicious neighborhood activities, amount to a government
informer system. In October a Khartoum state official
announced that the popular committees would begin to assist the
police in maintaining law and order to "safeguard the internal
front . "
Searches without warrants continued in 1991 often in nighttime
raids, particularly in cases of suspected political or economic
crimes. Searches for alcohol in private homes, including some
houses of foreigners, also occurred frequently.
Security officers investigate Sudanese suspected of "excessive"
contact with foreigners and harass and question some Sudanese
employees of foreign embassies.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Government forces, government-affiliated militias, and the two
factions of SPLA/M frequently used excessive force and violated
humanitarian law by attacking civilian targets. Neither side
in the civil war has made any attempt to investigate or punish
those responsible.
The Sudanese Air Force (SAF) continued to bomb indiscriminately
several towns, killing civilians. For example, in August and
September, the SAF bombed Kapoeta, headquarters of the SPLA/M
and of the southern relief program, killing at least 1 civilian
and wounding 40. In September the SAF bombed Maracha in Uganda,
killing four civilians and wounding six, including two
schoolchildren.
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SPAF soldiers prevented civilians from leaving the besieged
town of Juba, and land mines planted indiscriminately caused
numerous civilian deaths and limited agricultural cultivation.
The Government has used the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) Act of
1989 to place tribal militias under government control through
incorporation into the PDF. Those tribal militias are small in
number in comparison with the main PDF core of Islamic Front
supporters, but they were responsible for many human rights
abuses in attacking their longstanding tribal opponents,
particularly the Dinka, who are the most important source of
support for the SPLA/M. In 1991 the Rizeigat and Missiriya
tribes, among the most feared of the militias, and some members
of the Fertit tribe, concluded a cease-fire with the SPLA. As
a result, in 1991, unlike past years, there were few reports of
depredations by these armed militias. The SPLA's military
successes in the South, which expanded the areas under their
control, may have compelled these militias to make peace with
the SPLA/M.
Tribal militias elsewhere, particularly in the Nuba mountain
area of southern Kordofan, continued to pillage and rape the
population. There were reports of widespread arrests and
killings of civilians by government forces in September and
October. The Nubans, perceived as hostile to the Government,
increasingly became the targets of violence by government
forces. The introduction of new PDF units to the civil war
zone resulted in the razing of villages and the indiscriminate
killing of civilians, particularly near Wau in Bahr al-Ghazal.
In September a mine planted on the runway in Wau damaged an
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) aircraft and
injured its crew.
There were thousands of deaths and numerous human rights
violations in the civil war in 1991, largely as a result of
intra-SPLA fighting. Large numbers of civilians were killed
late in the year in the fighting, marked by tribalism, between
the two SPLA groups near Bor in southern Sudan. In November
and December, the SPLA/M resumed shelling of Juba, resulting in
approximately 70 civilian deaths. This violence and SPLA
attempts to conscript southern males forcibly caused a heavy
refugee influx, numbering in thousands, into neighboring
countries. There was a persistent report that the SPLA
forcibly conscripted at least 10,000 male minors.
There was no clear picture of the prisoner of war (POW)
situation in Sudan. According to human rights critics, the
Government has rarely taken POW s in the civil conflict,
instead executing SPLA members or suspected sympathizers. No
progress has been made by humanitarian organizations seeking
access to detainees held by the various factions.
Darfur in western Sudan continued to be a scene of humanitarian
abuses. Although the Government launched a much publicized
campaign to disarm the tribes in Darfur in order to reduce
crime, the Government reportedly exempted favored groups from
this requirement and concentrated on the Fur and other non-Arab
groups. According to an unconfirmed report in September,
government forces in Darfur, targeting criminals, also
indiscriminately bombed civilians from helicopters. There were
no reports on numbers of casualties.
Interference by the Government and the two SPLA factions with
food relief efforts, the limited availability of safe land,
rivar, and air corridors, government obstruction and lack of
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medical treatment added to the causes of death in the areas
affected by the civil war in 1991. The relief situation
remained precarious at year's end, and thousands of civilians
were dependent on intermittent cooperation by the three
combatants with each other and with donors and relief
agencies — while fighting escalated.
As the year unfolded, there were also important instances of
improved cooperation by botn the Government and the SPLA/M with
international relief operations in the South. Nevertheless,
both the Government and the SPLA/M remained suspicious of
relief efforts, believing that they benefited the other side.
Active interference with relief efforts by both the Government
and the SPLA/M continued throughout 1991. Heavy mining on some
southern roads by government forces also greatly obstructed
movement of relief convoys by land. Movement of food supplies
by land to Juba, the largest town in the South, continued to be
blocked by the SPLA/M, forcing the 300,000 residents to rely on
the uncertainties of an extremely expensive airlift.
In western Sudan, the Government was especially slow to
cooperate with international efforts to provide food to the
victims of a severe drought. Although the situation later
improved, thousands may have perished because of government
intransigence and lack of cooperation in the relief effort.
Thousands in the west remained at risk of starvation at the end
of 1991.
Civilians engaged in relief efforts suffered mistreatment by
some local townspeople, attacks by armed militias, and
occasional military harassment.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Since the 1989 coup, freedom of speech has been severely
restricted. Debate in some government-sponsored conferences
was occasionally open and at variance with government policies
but was only tolerated within government-controlled confines.
The 300 detainees released through General Omar's April amnesty
were required to sign statements forswearing antigovernment
activities. Sudanese abroad who made statements criticizing
the Government were reportedly the targets of surveillance and
threats .
All private publications have been banned. Two government-
controlled general daily newspapers. Modern Sudan and National
Salvation, and the weekly English-language newspaper New
Horizon and the English monthly Sudanow do not criticize
government policies, but they occasionally go beyond stated
government positions in their Islamic fundamentalist and
anti-Western attitudes. Radio, television, and the Sudanese
News Agency (SUNA) are under government control and reflect
government policies.
In November General Bashir announced that he would assume the
Minister of Culture and Information portfolio and also pledged
that the media, under his direction, would undergo "great
changes" in its programming to "reflect Islamic values."
The RCC pursued a selective policy in 1991, permitting some
foreign journalists to visit and report, while refusing visas
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to others. Reporting by international news agencies within
Sudan proceeded normally.
Academic freedom in Sudan was generally respected in the past,
but the Islamic-fundamentalist orientation of the- Government
has made many professors reluctant to expound their views
freely. Following antigovernment demonstrations in July and
September, the Government viewed the faculty at the University
of Khartoum with particular suspicion, and security
organizations began questioning some academics about their
political opinions (see Section 5).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are severely restricted. Declaration of the SOE
and of martial law on June 30, 1989, effectively eliminated the
right to protest. Most nongovernment-sponsored demonstrations
in 1991 were forcibly broken up by police, and, in the case of
demonstrations at the University of Khartoum in July, by
security forces. In July residents of a destroyed shanty town
demanding compensation were permitted to protest before a
government building.
On June 30, 1989, the RCC dissolved all political parties and
effectively disbanded all nonreligious groups. Blamed by the
Government for most of Sudan's problems, political parties
remained banned in 1991, and RCC officials vowed Sudan would
never return to a multiparty system. However, the RCC favored
members and supporters of the National Islamic Front (NIF), a
party ostensibly banned in 1989 with all other political
parties but increasingly identified with the RCC Government.
NIF members and supporters were well placed throughout
government, the security forces, academia, the media, business,
and commerce.
c. Freedom of Religion
Sudan is a multireligious country in fact and has been so in
law, but tolerance of non-Muslims has sharply deteriorated.
Islam and Christianity are formally recognized as religions of
Sudan, and adherents of other beliefs are not legally prevented
from worshipping. Muslims are a majority in the North,
although there are also over 4.5 million displaced persons,
most of whom are originally from the South (an area
predominantly animist and Christian). Proselytizing by Muslims
is allowed, as is proselytizing by Christians of non-Muslims;
but proselytizing of Muslims is discouraged; apostasy for
Muslims under the 1991 Criminal Act is punishable by death.
The Foreign Missionary Society Act of 1962 subjects public
Christian religious activity to close government supervision.
Among other provisions, the Act forbids the construction of
churches without government permits, and none has been issued
for more than 10 years. The Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference
(SCBC) and the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) regularly
protest against the Act, which is often capriciously
interpreted by local officials.
As religious tolerance deteriorated steadily in 1991,
non-Muslims religious leaders spoke of "open persecution."
Four missionary nuns in Khartoum were threatened with
expulsion, and one expatriate priest was expelled in July, the
first in many years. Beginning in May, Christian activity was
ordered halted in El Duiem and Damazin; in September a priest
was expelled from Damazin by local authorities. In Khasm al
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Ghirba, authorities stopped the construction of a house for
nuns despite the issuance of permits. In August a Catholic
priest and four catechists were arrested in Dongola and
questioned about their religious activities. Homes of
Christians and displaced persons near Dongola were searched by
government security forces.
Christian religious personnel have had their passports
confiscated and were not permitted to leave the country without
the approval of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Christians
were also increasingly uneasy over reports that PDF units
dispatched to the South are urged by government officials to
fight a "jihad" or holy war against unbelievers. In Gedaref
one building used for Christian services was occupied by the
PDF, and church services in several cities continued to be
monitored by security officers.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement in Sudan continued to be hampered in 1991
by the civil war, a poor transportation infrastructure, and
government restrictions. Authorities maintain lists of
Sudanese citizens not permitted to travel, and security
officials sometimes make arbitrary decisions on issuance or
cancellation of exit visas. Some personnel of foreign
nongovernmental organizations (NGO) were reluctant to leave the
country for fear that the Government would not grant them
reentry visas.
Although in practice most Sudanese have experienced little
difficulty in leaving the country, numerous individual citizens
and some categories of persons (such as journalists or security
suspects) are often refused exit visas. Some former political
detainees are also forbidden to travel outside Khartoum.
Sudanese not in this category may move about the country
freely, although they are required to carry identity cards and
those found without them at one of the numerous checkpoints may
be summarily beaten. This regulation appeared to be applied
especially to southerners in northern urban areas. The Omar
Government tightened internal travel restrictions on foreigners
(especially diplomats), principally by requiring travel permits
which can be very difficult to obtain.
Increased enforcement of a new conscription law prevents young
men of applicable age from obtaining domestic travel permits
and from leaving the country without first obtaining an
exemption from authorities. A married Sudanese woman must have
the permission of her husband or another male relative to
travel abroad, and regulations specify that unmarried Sudanese
women must travel with a family member or other sponsor. The
travel restrictions for women, generally ignored before the
June 1989 coup, have since been increasingly enforced.
Foreigners must register with the police on entering the
country, obtain permission to move from one location to
another, and register again at the new location within 3 days
of arrival.
After the 1989 coup, the RCC Government imposed a curfew in
much of Sudan, and suspected curfew violators are subject to
detention or summary floggings. Regulations also strictly
limit the amount of hard currency in cash ($50) a traveler may
carry out of Sudan. Death sentences have been handed down for
violators of currency regulations.
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Although information from SPLA/M-controlled areas is more
limited, once a permit is granted by the SPLA, travel by NGO
personnel in these areas is relatively easier than in the North.
The Government continued forcibly to resettle persons displaced
by famine and civil war, largely southerners and westerners,
from several sites in Khartoum to other desolate and barren
locations outside Khartoum proper or to equally squalid
transient camps within the city. In June, July, and August,
after demolishing their homes as "illegal dwellings," the
Government moved 6,000 families from one section in Omdurman to
another area devoid of water and other basic necessities. Late
in the year, the Government announced another plan to move an
estimated 104,000 displaced persons to a desolate expanse of
desert. At one displaced camp where infant mortality rates
were particularly high, the Government threatened any
nongovernmental organization attempting to distribute food or
establish clinics in the camp. In December government forces
forcibly relocating residents of displaced camps outside
Khartoum opened fire, killing at least 12.
In late May and early June, hundreds of thousands of Sudanese
refugees fled camps in western Ethiopia and returned to
southern Sudan following the overthrow of Ethiopian leader
Mengistu. The SPLA/M encouraged the wholesale return of the
refugees, claiming it was only trying to protect their lives.
Many suspected, however, that the SPLA/M used the refugees to
provide protective cover for its forced egress from Ethiopia,
since the new regime in Addis Ababa stated it would no longer
tolerate an SPLA presence in Ethiopia (as the Mengistu regime
had done) .
The overall refugee situation in Sudan changed little in 1991
with the exception of an influx of about 51,000 Ethiopian
ex-military and civilians after the fall of the Mengistu
government. Most of these "new" refugees were successfully
voluntarily repatriated to Ethiopia by November 22 under
auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) . In addition, about 1,000 Eritrean families per day
spontaneously repatriated to Eritrea during the second half of
1991.
At the end of 1991 the refugee population (largely composed of
Ethiopians, Chadians, and Ugandans) was about 780,000, of whom
some 370,000 were assisted by the UNHCR. There were no reports
of forcible repatriation of refugees in Sudan in 1991. Sudan
has generally accorded refugees good treatment although the
Government impeded full UNHCR and NGO access to the newest
Ethiopian refugees in the Kassala area in June. Resettlement
of refugees by the UNHCR to third countries proceeded smoothly
in 1991. However the U.S. refugee processing program was
disrupted by Gulf War evacuations and the Government's desires
to slow the program near the end of 1991. New registrations of
Ethiopians for resettlement in the U.S. program were suspended
after November 21, 1991.
Refugees may not become resident aliens or citizens of Sudan,
regardless of the length of their stay. However, large numbers
of refugees have been tolerated in the cities, especially the
capital area. In urban areas, reports are common of police
harassment and petty thievery against refugees, notably against
Ethiopians. Refugees face beatings for minor infractions of
the law, administrative obstruction, and delays, and are forced
to pay small bribes to obtain everything from work permits to
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food-ration cards. Refugees seldom have recourse to the legal
system when attacked by policemen.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The people of Sudan had neither the right nor the ability to
change their government peacefully. In September 1989, the
RCC's "Third Constitutional Decree" established a new
governmental system for Sudan, featuring a head of state
(General Omar) with sovereign powers. The all-military RCC
continued as the legislative authority. It approved a cabinet
consisting of a prime minister and other ministers to handle
day-to-day administration. The courts were brought under the
Head of State's supervision and were specifically forbidden to
review acts of the RCC or the Head of State. Claiming
sectarian bickering was harmful to Sudan, they abolished all
political parties, seized (and later distributed) the parties'
assets, and detained (albeit in relatively mild conditions) the
leaders of the major precoup parties.
In October 1990, the RCC concluded a national dialog conference
which rejected both a multiparty and one-party system in favor
of a political structure based on ascending levels of
nonpartisan consultative assemblies. The recommendations
parallel ideas of the National Islamic Front. Although the
establishment of the new political system was to have begun in
1991, this did not occur.
The military Government publicly assigned a high priority to
ending the civil war. However, by the end of 1991, despite
Nigerian mediation, there had been little movement on the
issue. John Garang's leadership of the SPLA was challenged by
a small group of his commanders, who control sizable areas in
the South and who have called for an interim period of
separation of the South from the North. This represents a
break from Garang's consistent advocacy of a united Sudan.
Major differences between the SPLA and the Government also
revolve around the extent of Shari'a law and what constitutes
"legitimate political forces" to participate in peace
negotiations. Heretofore, the Government insisted that only it
and the SPLA should participate in negotiations; the SPLA wants
the officially banned political parties and trade unions also
to take part. By the end of 1991, the SPLA split had become a
serious impediment to peace efforts.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government has tried to stamp out any domestic criticism
and has been very defensive about foreign criticism of its
human rights performance. In 1991 it frequently and vehemently
denied any human rights abuses in Sudan. Almost all of the
relatively few local human rights activists have been arrested
and detained, often under very harsh conditions.
Before the coup, several organizations monitored human rights
in the country, including the Sudan Human Rights Organization
(SHRO), the Sudan Bar Association (SEA), the Sudan Catholic
Bishop Conference (SCBC), and the Sudan Council of Churches
(see). The SBA was dissolved by the Government after the coup,
and its assets were confiscated and leading members detained or
placed under restriction. Throughout 1991 the Bar Association
was under control of a government steering committee with a
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government -appointed chairman. The SHRO was also dissolved by
government decree, and a request for reinstatement was
ignored. In 1991 the Government created a new organization
called the Sudan Human Rights Organization, but having no
connection to the previous group. Among the new Organization's
purposes are defending the Government from unfounded attacks
and protecting the reputation of Sudan. It has issued no
statements critical of the Government. The SCBC and the SCC
still exist and monitor and publicize human rights problems,
especially those involving religious discrimination.
In 1991 the RCC permitted the U.S. Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights to visit the Sudan to examine the situation of the
refugees and of the displaced. The U.N. Human Rights
Commission began deliberations on the human rights situation in
Sudan following complaints it received against the Government.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Sudan's population of 24.5 million (1989) is a multiethnic mix
of over 500 Arab and African tribes, with scores of languages
and dialects. In general, Sudan is composed primarily of two
cultures — Arab in the North and central areas and black African
in the South. Sudanese governments have historically been
dominated by northern Muslims (about 16 million) . Some
southern tribal groups, especially non-Arabs and non-Muslims,
have demanded greater economic and political power and greater
recognition of Sudan's cultural diversity.
Discrimination in the North by the Muslim Arab majority against
displaced non-Arabs from the South is common. Residents of
Arabic-speaking areas who do not themselves speak Arabic are
discriminated against in education, jobs, and other
opportunities. The University of Khartoum's entrance
examinations also favor Arabic speakers, and impending
Arabization of instruction in higher education (including at
the University of Juba currently located in Khartoum) will add
to this advantage. Government plans to impose Arabic
examinations in Juba resulted in rioting by secondary school
students in September. In order to be considered for higher
education, students now must pass examinations in four
subjects — English, mathematics, Arabic, and religious studies.
Widespread popular attitudes in northern areas also stereotype
dark-skinned non-Arabs as inferior and lazy, leading to much
informal discrimination against them.
In government-controlled areas of the South, there is evidence
of a policy of Islamicization; civil servants and other
officials have been replaced by ideological supporters of the
National Islamic Front. Forced retirement of non-Muslims and
non-NIF supporters has become widespread. In the North, some
non-Muslims have lost their jobs in the civil service, in the
judiciary, in banking, and other professions. Businesses owned
and operated by non-Muslims experienced overt discrimination,
such as denial of trading licenses or petty harassment. There
was one credible report that a Christian was denied the right
to testify in court because of his religion.
Sudanese laws continue to favor men, and women traditionally
have segregated roles. Islamic laws of inheritance award
additional property to men, while concurrently assigning them
the duty of caring for their extended families. Discrimination
against women in professional positions also reportedly
increased, and reports were received of police harassment of
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women workers in the informal sector. Education is open to
both sexes, and many women obtain university training, but
women traditionally receive less education and have fewer
opportunities than men. Some women, however, have been active
in the professions; some 100 women are now serving as judges.
Although not numerous, women are found in both the police and
the military. They are also increasingly visible in the PDF.
On November 16, General Omar assumed the Minister of Culture
and Information portfolio and issued directives to prevent
dancing between the sexes and to require women working in
government offices and female students and teachers to assume
Shari'a dress. Subsequently, a high official defined Shari'a
dress as nondecorative clothing covering the entire body except
for the face and hands. In inveighing against Western fashion
and behavior. General Omar warned the new regulations would be
strictly enforced.
Female genital mutilation (circumcision) is prevalent in
Sudan. Reports indicate that this practice, although illegal,
is widespread, especially in the North. Some reports suggest
that over 90 percent of northern women have been circumcised,
with consequences that include severe urinary problems,
infections, and even death. The so-called Pharaonic
( inf ibulation) circumcision, the severest of the three types,
is the most common and is usually performed between the ages of
4 and 7 years. Because few physicians will perform the
operation, it is most often done by paramedical personnel in
improvised, unsanitary conditions, with severe pain and trauma
to the child. The operation is expensive — approximately $111
for a 10-minute procedure. Southern women displaced to the
North reportedly are increasingly visiting circumcision on
their daughters, even if they themselves are not circumcised.
Among certain southern tribes, forcible sexual intercourse is
common. No blame attaches to the practice, although the man
involved must pay a price (often in livestock) to the woman's
family if she becomes pregnant. In the same area, wives are
often received on a trial basis lasting up to 4 years. The
husband may dissolve the marriage during this time by returning
the wife to her family, although he must pay a price for each
child born during this time. Such wives are reportedly often
able to contract further marriages and are not stigmatized by
having been returned.
Although the extent to which violence against women, especially
wife beating, occurs is difficult to document, the practice
reportedly is common in Sudan, especially in polygamous
fcimilies. It is not, however, discussed as a public issue, and
police do not normally intervene in domestic disputes. There
were no court cases involving either circumcision or violence
against women in 1991. However, for a variety of cultural
reasons, many women would be reluctant to file a formal
complaint of such abuse. The Government has not addressed the
issue of violence against women. Women refugees are
particularly vulnerable to harassment and sexual abuse. Sexual
favors are reportedly demanded of them by some Sudanese
officials in exchange for performance of official duties.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Sudan had a strong labor union movement during the Sadiq
government, but the RCC's Constitutional Decree Number One of
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June 30, 1989, abolished labor unions and forbade strikes.
Stiff punishments, including the death penalty, were prescribed
for violations of labor decrees. Union offices were closed,
and union assets frozen. Government officials condemned union
activists as "Communists," although most Sudanese' unions were
resolutely anti-Communist. Many labor activists were dismissed
from their jobs or detained. Although most unionists were
later freed, a few remained in detention without charge at the
end of 1991.
In September 1989, General Omar announced the legalization of
preliminary steering committees to manage union affairs,
pending the drafting of new laws on union organization. Under
this rubric, the Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation (SWTUF),
the leading blue-collar labor organization with about 800,000
members, was restored with its leadership unchanged and its
assets returned, but under tight government control through a
steering committee. Apart from SWTUF, there is a professional
and employees' trade union federation, which has replaced four
previously existing white-collar labor organizations.
Other steering committees were established in 1990, often
including many of the precoup leaders. These committees
remained under control of the Government, which could and did
dismiss their members. No new labor law was enacted in 1991,
and unions continued to operate solely by government sufferance.
The Government continued to forbid strikes, and there were
none. Unions remain free to join federations and affiliate
with international bodies.
In 1991, the U.S. Government suspended Sudan's receipt of trade
benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences because of
its violation of workers' rights.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Constitutional Decree of June 30, 1989 also suspended the
right to organize and bargain collectively. These rights were
restored to organizing committees in September 1989.
Government control of the steering committees and continued
absence of labor legislation allowing union meetings, filing of
grievances, and other union activity, reduced the value of
these rights. Although local union officials raised some
grievances with employers, few carried them to the Government.
There are no export processing zones in Sudan.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Sudanese law prohibits forced or compulsory labor. In 1991,
however, the Government forced approximately 60,000 displaced
persons in Khartoum to work in the year's harvest. This
program eventually failed from a lack of funds. As there were
no government plans to transport these persons back to
Khartoum, this program was seen as yet another government
effort to resettle forcibly the displaced population.
Slavery persisted in 1991. It exists in those remote areas
where government control is weak and where displaced persons,
particularly Dinka, fleeing the war zones come into contact
with armed groups. Informed sources suggest there could be
thousands of slaves in Sudan, largely women and children doing
agricultural and domestic work and serving as concubines. In
1991, as a possible result of peace agreements between the
tribal militias and the SPLA, there were no new reports of
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Dinka being taken into slavery. There were reports, however,
that these militias were demanding payment for the return of
each Dinka woman and child taken as slaves in years past. It
was not clear at year's end whether the intra-SPLA fighting,
marked by Nuer-Dinka tribal rivalries, would also result in the
taking of slaves.
The SPLA/M often forced southern men to work as laborers or
porters or forcibly conscripted them into SPLA ranks. In
disputed territories this practice was implemented through
raids, while in SPLA/M-cont rolled areas it was done through the
SPLA/M-appointed village leader.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
There is no compulsory education legislation in Sudan. The
legal minimum age for workers is 16. This law is enforced by
the Ministry of Labor in the official or wage economy, but
poverty in Sudan produces widespread child labor in the
informal economy. In rural areas, children from a very young
age assist their families with agricultural work.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The workweek is currently limited by law to 6 days and 48
hours, with a day of rest on Friday. The legislated minimum
wage, enforced by the Ministry of Labor, remains at the 1988
level which is insufficient for subsistence in urban areas, and
workers often must rely on farming, second jobs, or help from
the extended family. Salaries in private industry are
generally higher than those in the public sector. Laborers
receive an extra month's pay for each year's labor. Most
workers are given allowances for transportation, and some
receive housing allowances.
Although Sudanese laws prescribe health and safety standards,
working conditions are generally poor and enforcement by the
Ministry of Labor is minimal . Unemployment and underemployment
are major problems, especially among young people. Even
graduates of prestigious schools often have difficulty finding
employment .
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Swaziland is governed as a modified traditional monarchy with
all executive, legislative, and judicial powers ultimately
vested in the King. Advised by the Queen Mother, traditional
figures, and cabinet ministers, he rules according to Swazi law
and custom, never codified but ultimately determined by himself
and his advisors. Swaziland's Government combines modern and
traditional elements — a cabinet, parliament, and independent
courts which follow Western law — and a tribal hierarchy with
"national" courts which follow traditional Swazi law and
custom. The Cabinet is appointed by the King from among
Members of Parliament and is responsible to him. A
Westminster-type constitution containing a bill of rights was
imposed on Swaziland at independence by its former colonial
ruler, but it was repealed by King Sobhuza II in 1973 on the
grounds that it was incompatible with the Swazi tradition of
decisionmaking. In 1978 the King established the Tinkhundla
system, which allows limited democratic participation at the
district level while giving the King and a small electoral
committee the power to determine parliamentary representation
(see Section 3) .
National defense is provided by the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense
Force, consisting of 3,000 troops. The Royal Swaziland Police
is the primary internal security organization. Both the police
and the defense force are controlled by civilian authorities.
Swaziland has a free market economy, with relatively little
government intervention in the marketplace. The majority of
Swazis are engaged in subsistence agriculture, though a
relatively diversified industrial sector now accounts for the
largest component of the formal economy. The economy relies
heavily on the export sector, composed primarily of large,
foreign-owned firms.
In 1991 political rights remained seriously circumscribed, and
there continued to be important restrictions on the freedom of
speech and assembly. In August eight persons who spoke at a
political rally were arrested and charged with having
participated in an illegal political meeting. All were freed
on bail, and the case against them was subsequently dismissed
when the State withdrew all charges. Notwithstanding these
arrests, the authorities encouraged open public debate on the
need for political change, especially in the press and in a
series of public meetings beginning in September. Other human
rights problems included mistreatment of prisoners and
discrimination (and violence) against women. Six persons
detained in 1990 without charge under Swaziland's 60-day
detention order were released in March. At the end of 1991,
there were no persons in detention under this law, though it
remained a deterrent to dissent.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no allegations of such killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
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c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is not generally practiced, but there are occasional
reports by prisoners of police and military threats and
beatings. In one such confirmed report, a handcuffed prisoner
was punched and kicked by a police officer during questioning.
Such complaints generally come from criminal, not political,
prisoners. There were no instances of police officers being
tried, punished, or otherwise disciplined for such abuses.
Defendants occasionally claim that the courts have accepted
confessions extorted by the police, but the credibility of such
claims is difficult to ascertain. Caning can be administered
to youths involved in either petty or violent crimes.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Swazi law requires warrants for arrests in all but certain
circumstances. These exceptions, however, are poorly defined,
and police who have strong suspicions about a suspect do not
normally seek a warrant. Arrestees are allowed to consult with
a lawyer of their choice, and provision for bail exists.
Police occasionally fail to charge suspects within the 48 hours
required under uncodified regulations.
In another category known as "administrative detention," a 1978
law permits the Government to hold any person without charge or
trial for a renewable period of 60 days. Detention under this
law may in theory be appealed to the High Court under that
Court's general power to review the constitutionality of the
law itself, but to date no such appeal has been heard, and the
law itself specifically prohibits any court appeal of a
detention order. In practice, the only appeal available under
the 1978 detention order is one made directly to the Monarch.
The law has generally been used against political opponents
viewed by the Government or the Monarch as threats to internal
security or stability. It was invoked in 1991 to renew
detention orders first issued against six persons in 1990.
These six persons, who included five political activists and
royal family member Prince Mfanasabili Dlamini, were all
released in late March. No persons were in administrative
detention at year's end, but its existence continues to inhibit
political activity.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The modern judiciary consists of the Court of Appeals, the High
Court, and magistrates' courts, which are independent of
executive and military control and free from intimidation from
outside forces. In magistrates' courts, the defendant is
entitled to counsel at his or her own expense. Court-appointed
counsel is provided in capital cases or when difficult points
of law are at issue. There are well-defined appeal procedures
up to the Court of Appeals, the highest judicial body. Some
members of the regular judiciary are appointed from the bars of
other countries with compatible legal systems.
In treason and sedition cases, the King has powers to
circumvent the regular judiciary by appointing a special
tribunal, which may adopt rules and procedures different from
those applied in the High Court. In 1987, for example, the
last time a special tribunal convened. King Mswati III issued a
decree that authorized a special tribunal to try offenses
committed against the King and Queen Mother. This decree
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permitted secret sessions, forbade the accused from having
legal representation, and did not allow an appeal.
In traditional courts, to which ethnic Swazis may be brought
for relatively minor offenses and violations of traditional
Swazi law and custom, formal legal counsel is not allowed, but
defendants may speak on their own behalf and may be assisted by
informal advisors. Sentences are subject to review and to
appeal to the High Court and the Court of Appeals. Accused
persons who desire counsel can insist that their cases be
transferred from the traditional courts. Because there is some
jurisdictional overlap between the two court systems, there is
occasionally confusion over which court should hear a case. By
law, the public prosecutor has the authority to determine which
court should hear a case, but, in practice, it is usually the
police who do so. Police usually choose the court in which
they believe a conviction is most likely.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The law generally requires that a warrant be issued by a
magistrate before police may search homes or other premises.
However, the law also provides police officers with the rank of
subinspector or higher the right to search without a warrant if
they have what they consider reasonable cause to believe
evidence can be obtained that might otherwise be lost through
delay in obtaining a warrant. While searches without warrants
occur occasionally, the issue of legality of evidence, or the
method by which evidence is obtained, rarely arises in court.
There is no evidence that the Government systematically
monitors private correspondence or conversations, but the Swazi
police have been known to apprehend and interrogate persons
reported to have made objectionable statements about the King
during the course of private conversations or in telegraphic
correspondence. In May, for example, a local journalist was
charged with sedition on the basis of comments he allegedly
made while drinking at a bar. He was free on bail at year's
end.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech, especially on political matters, is
limited. Public criticism of the immediate royal family and of
national security policy is generally forbidden. The secretary
of the Law Society was threatened in early January with
detention without charge when he publicly criticized the
current detention law.
The Parliament serves as a foriom for examination and criticism
of government policies, but matters are seldom pressed to a
vote and, when they are, unanimity is usually the result. In
May a Member of Parliament, P. D. Dlamini, was fired from his
job at a company in which a royally controlled holding company
has a substantial stake. It is widely accepted that Dlamini
was ousted because of his outspoken criticism of certain royal
counselors made on the floor of Parliament. He subsequently
fled the country briefly because he feared he would be detained
under the 60-day detention law. He later returned to Swaziland
and to an active role in Parliament, but he has not been
reinstated in his job.
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Swazis have a number of traditional forums through which they
can express discontent, including direct dialog with their
chiefs, community meetings, Tinkhundla meetings, and National
Libandlas (special councils, nicknamed "People's Parliaments,"
in which all Swazis are permitted to participate). However,
the National Libandla has not met since mid-1990, and many
Swazis view it and other traditional forums as an obsolete
means for expressing their political views.
The media, both government-controlled and private, practice
self-censorship, refraining from criticism of the royal family
or from reporting in advance the movements of the King or Prime
Minister. However, in 1991 the private print media
increasingly criticized and questioned other actions of the
Government and established political structures. The
Government controls Swazi radio and television stations and
indirectly influences, through one of the King's trust funds,
one of the two daily newspapers. Private companies and church
groups publish several newspapers and magazines. One church
group owns and operates a radio station.
In July the Government announced new regulations whereby all
press inquiries to government agencies would be channeled
through an unwieldy interministerial information committee.
Although considered a restraint on the press, the new
regulations were not enforced in 1991. In late September, the
Government announced a ban on newspaper reporting of public
comments on the Tinkhundla system, apparently in reaction to
widespread, and accurate, reports of public criticism of the
Government. The ban was rescinded the next day, and the
Government described the ban as "an error."
The Government has occasionally proscribed publications,
including foreign publications, deemed to be prejudicial to the
interest of defense, public safety, or public health. There
have been no such bannings since 1985, and the ban on the two
magazines proscribed at that time was lifted by Parliament in
1991.
Academic freedom is also limited by the practice of
self-censorship and the prohibition of overtly political
gatherings (see Section 2.b.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
King Sobhuza's 1973 decree prohibits political parties and
meetings of a political nature and demonstrations in any public
place without the consent of the Commissioner of Police. The
Government occasionally uses this power to stop meetings or
harass groups which might embarrass it. In August eight people
were charged with having organized and participated in an
illegal political meeting. The charges stemmed from the
inaugural meeting of the Swaziland Youth Congress, or SWAYOCO,
at which several speakers criticized the existing political
system and called for democratic reforms. Of the eight,
several had previously been tried and acquitted of treason but
later detained in 1990 under the 60-day detention order. In
this instance, three of the eight were detained briefly and
then freed on bail, while the others were simply charged and
released. The case was dismissed in late November when the
Government withdrew all charges against the eight.
In March, as followup to the November 1990 incident in which
Swazi police and defense forces brutally broke up a student
sit-in at the University of Swaziland, the Government
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established a judicial commission of inquiry led by the acting
Chief Justice. Hearings in 1991 were held in camera. At
year's end, there remained widespread skepticism about whether
the results of the inquiry would ever be made available to the
public and, if so, about their credibility.
Alleged members of underground political groups, such as the
People's United Democratic Movement or PUDEMO, are believed to
be kept under surveillance and occasionally harassed by police.
Except for the King's 1973 decree, there are no formal legal
barriers to freedom of association. Trade associations and
professional bodies exist and maintain relations with
recognized international bodies in their fields.
c. Freedom of Religion
Swaziland is hospitable to all religious believers. It
considers itself to be a Christian country and permits a wide
variety of foreign missionary activity. Organized religions
are free to establish places of worship and train clergy, to
publish religious texts, and to undertake religious travel
outside the country. At the same time, the authorities promote
the observance of Swazi customs. Problems arise when these
customs conflict with religious beliefs. Church condemnation
of traditional Swazi ceremonies, for example, has led in the
past to the arrest and deportation of church figures. However,
no such incidents have occurred since 1987.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Swazis may travel and work freely within Swaziland. Those who
have left the country may freely return. While there have been
no cases of the Government denying citizenship privileges,
including travel documents, since 1986, ambiguities in
Swaziland's citizenship law can be exploited to deal with
politically unpopular persons. Swazi men with adequate funds
generally can obtain a travel document to travel in the region,
but, under both modern and traditional law, married women
require the husband's permission to apply for a passport. In
practice, this law makes it more difficult for women than men
to obtain one.
Swaziland treats refugees from neighboring states well. About
7,000 primarily ethnic Swazis from South Africa, who fled the
South African "homeland" of KwaZulu, reside in Swaziland (6,000
as registered refugees). Recent years have seen a large influx
of Mozambican refugees. While approximately 34,700 are
officially registered by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) , it is believed that an additional 30,000
or more Mozambicans may be in Swaziland as illegal immigrants.
Swaziland permits the UNHCR to interview those who seek refugee
status and grants asylum if the person can establish a
well-founded fear of persecution or physical danger if
repatriated. Illegal aliens who cannot establish their refugee
status, however, are usually deported. Many immigrants
identified for deportation serve extended time in detention
while arrangements for their repatriation are made. This delay
is due to the absence of an agreed repatriation procedure with
Mozambique, rather than a policy to penalize illegal immigrants.
Small groups of young South Africans fleeing violence in South
Africa continued to arrive in Swaziland in 1991. The
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Government, together with the UNHCR, has worked to send these
refugees on to their desired destinations, normally African
National Congress (ANC) training centers in Zambia and
Tanzania. None was forcibly repatriated.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Swazi citizens do not have the right to change their government
through democratic means. Political parties are outlawed, and
an overt, organized political opposition does not exist. The
King rules in conjunction with the Queen Mother.
Traditionally, decisionmaking has been by consensus, with the
King soliciting advice from the royal family, the senior
chiefs, the Cabinet, Members of Parliament, and other
interested parties. Still, the King can legally accept or
dismiss advice as he sees fit. Legislation is passed by the
Parliament and is then submitted to the Monarch for assent,
which may be withheld. The King can also legislate by decree.
Swazis participate indirectly in the selection of Members of
Parliament through the Tinkhundla system. The King can
dissolve Parliament and call new elections, normally held every
5 years. Parliamentarians (50 in the House and 20 in the
Senate) are chosen in a complex process involving the
interaction of a 7-member electoral committee, 40 traditional
districts, 80 electors, and the King's appointive powers. The
district-level Tinkhundla meetings do allow a measure of
democratic participation, but village elders control the
nominating process, and voting is not by secret ballot.
In 1990 the King announced procedures for considering reform of
the Tinkhundla system, e.g., to permit direct election of
Members of Parliament, as recommended by the 1990 National
Libandla. In September the Masitsela Committee began a series
of meetings in each of the districts to solicit public comment
on the political system. The ensuing debate was remarkably
open and largely critical of elements of the Tinkhundla
system. King Mswati has promised to appoint a second committee
to consider the public comments and to present recommendations
for Tinkhundla reform to the King.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In 1991 the Human Rights Association of Swaziland was
established. Though still not officially registered by the
Government, it operated freely in 1991 and spoke out on several
occasions together with other groups, such as the Law Society
of Swaziland and the Swaziland Trade Union Federation, on
important human rights issues.
While the Government does not encourage activities by
international nongovernmental human rights organizations, it
received and cooperated with an Amnesty International team
which visited in March to investigate the 60-day detention law.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Swazi law and social traditions give rise to subtle forms of
discrimination against nonethnic Swazis. For example,
ambiguities in the citizenship law often make it more difficult
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for nonethnic Swazis to obtain travel documents and other
privileges accorded more readily to ethnic Swazis.
Women have traditionally occupied a subordinate role in Swazi
society, and the dualistic nature of the legal system
complicates the issue of women's rights. Because traditional
marriage is governed by uncodified Swazi law and custom,
women's rights are often unclear and change according to where
and by whom they are interpreted (e.g., parents, village
elders, police, government officials). In both traditional and
civil marriages, wives are legally treated as minors, although
many women who marry under civil law mistakenly believe that in
doing so they will be accorded the legal status of adults.
However, this is legally possible only if the parties to the
marriage sign a prenuptial agreement providing such status.
In practice, changing socioeconomic conditions and urbanization
are breaking down these barriers to equality, and wives now
routinely and successfully execute contracts and enter into a
variety of transactions in their own names. However, they
still often recjuire their husbands' permission to borrow money,
open a checking account, leave the country, and, in some cases,
take a job. Divorce is discouraged by families, but is now
common. In traditional marriages, children are considered to
belong to the father and his family if the couple divorces. In
cases in which children are born out of wedlock, which is
common, they are considered to belong to the mother. In
traditional marriages, a man may take more than one wife. A
man who marries a woman under civil law legally may not have
more than one wife, although in practice this restriction is
sometimes ignored.
Marriage is further complicated because couples often marry in
both civil and traditional ceremonies, creating problems in
determining which set of rules applies to the marriage and to
subsequent questions of child custody and inheritance in the
event of its termination. This is a less common problem than
in the past, however. The Swaziland Council of Churches opened
a legal aid center in 1988 which provides free information on
issues such as marriage and maintenance laws.
Physical abuse of women, particularly wife beating, is common,
despite traditional strictures against this practice. Women
have the right to charge their husbands with assault under both
the traditional and modern legal systems and frequently do so
in extreme cases when the intervention of extended family
members fails to end such violence. The traditional courts,
however, can be unsympathetic to "unruly" or "disobedient"
women. The modern courts are more likely to convict wife
beaters, but sentences frequently amount to no more than
several months in jail or a fine, or both.
In the workplace, the Employment Act of 1980 forbids employers
to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, sex, or
political affiliation. It recjuires equal pay for equal work.
However, men's average wage rates by skill category are in some
sectors three times those of women. The Swaziland Federation
of Trade Unions' Special Women's Wing is focusing on the issues
of wage discrimination and maternity benefits, as well as other
sex-based discriminatory practices. In 1991 this organization
continued to highlight the issue of sexual harassment of female
employees by male employers, which is believed to be
widespread. Legal protection from sexual harassment is
addressed in the Swazi legal code, but its provisions are vague
and largely ineffective in halting this type of discrimination.
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Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Industrial Relations Act (IRA) of 1980 affirms the right of
trade unions to exist, organize, and associate freely. Persons
in all sectors of the economy, including the public sector, are
permitted to join unions. Unions are able to operate
independently of government or political control, contingent
upon their acting as economic, rather than political,
organizations .
Unions are free to draw up their own constitutions within the
framework of the IRA. The Act specifies a number of provisions
which must be addressed in a constitution. These include
provisions for election of officers by secret ballot, annual
meetings open to all members, fees, grounds for suspension of
members, and expenditure of union funds. The union
constitution must be approved by the Labor Commissioner, who
can strike out or amend provisions which violate the law.
Unions maynot be dissolved as long as they adhere to the
regulations of the IRA. Unions which fail to maintain proper
registration with the Labor Commissioner may be dissolved, but
this authority has never been exercised.
For several years, including 1991, the International Labor
Organization's (ILO) Committee of Experts (COE) has noted
discrepancies between the IRA and ILO Convention 87 on freedom
of association and ILO Convention 98 on the right to organize
and bargain collectively, both ratified by Swaziland in 1978.
The several concerns of the COE include the broad powers
accorded government officials to control union activity and the
strictures on the ability of workers to form unions and
associate with other unions at home and abroad.
The IRA details the steps to be followed when disputes arise,
including what determines a legal or illegal strike. The Act
empowers the Industrial Court to settle employment disputes and
grievances and may enjoin a union from striking. While
historically strikes have been rare in Swaziland, and Swazi
tradition is to avoid confrontation, consciousness of workers'
rights is growing rapidly. When disputes arise, the Government
often intervenes to try to reduce the chances of a strike,
which may not be legally called until all avenues of
negotiation have been exhausted. The Labor Commissioner can
then issue a 14-day postponement of a strike, which can be
extended upon presentation of further documentation. There
were a number of strikes or threatened strikes in 1991, all of
which highlighted the growing consciousness of workers and the
continued reluctance of some employers to accept organized
labor unions. Disputes freqxiently centered on the issue of
recognition of unions by management or more straightforward
issues such as pay. In August a bitter pay dispute at a local
commercial bank escalated into a 2-day nationwide shutdown of
the banking system before being settled.
The IRA requires approval by the Minister of Labor on union
applications for international affiliations. The Swaziland
Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU), the union umbrella
organization, is a member of the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity. The SFTU also represents Swazi labor in the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the
Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council.
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SWAZILAND
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The IRA provides for the right to organize and bargain
collectively and outlaws antiunion discrimination. Employers
are obliged to recognize a union when it achieves 40-percent
membership among employees. Disputes in this area are referred
to the Labor Commissioner and the Industrial Court, if
necessary. The Court is limited by the law in several
respects, however. It may not, for example, order
reinstatement in cases of unfair dismissal and is limited in
the compensation it can order in such cases to an amount
ec[uivalent to 6 months salary. Employers can prohibit
employees from attending union meetings on company time if the
union has not achieved the 40-percent membership level required
for recognition. However, members of legally recognized unions
must be allowed to attend union activities. Although many
employers habitually resist recognition and force the issue
into the Industrial Court, the Court has generally ruled in
favor of the unions on this issue.
While collective bargaining does occur, it is not widespread.
The Government issues directives on wage levels and thus
restricts the bargaining process. The Industrial Court may
refuse to register agreements in the event of nonobservance of
these government directives. The COE has criticized this as a
violation of ILO Convention 98.
There are no export processing zones in Swaziland.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is legally prohibited and does not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Employment Act of 1980 prohibits the hiring of a child
below the age of 15 in an industrial undertaking, except in
cases where only family members are employed in the firm or in
technical schools where children are working under the
supervision of a teacher or other authorized person.
Legislation limits the number of night hours which can be
worked on schooldays and limits such work overall to 6 hours
per day or 33 hours per week. Employment of children in the
formal sector is not customary. However, it is widely believed
that children are frequently employed below the minimum age in
the agricultural sector, particularly in the country's eastern
cotton growing region.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no overall minimum wage, but rather a sliding scale of
minimum wages depending on the type of work. Most workers
receive a minimum of 14 days' annual leave after each period of
12 months of continuous service. These standards are upheld in
the formal sector, and generally provide a worker and family
with an adequate standard of living within the context of Swazi
society.
There is a labor/management/government-negotiated maximum
48-hour workweek in the modern sector, enforced by the
Commissioner of Labor, except for security guards, who work up
to six 12-hour shifts per week. All workers are legally
entitled to 1 day of rest per week under the Employment Act and
the Wages Act .
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SWAZILAND
Extensive legislation protects worker health and safety in
Swaziland. The Government sets safety standards for industrial
operations and encourages private companies tp develop accident
prevention programs. Recent growth in industrial production
has necessitated more government action on safety issues. In
1986 only 20 safety inspections by the Labor Commissioner's
Office took place, none in manufacturing industries. In 1990
there were 38 "health and safety inspections (8 in manufacturing
industries). This total is down sharply from 1989 because of
staffing gaps in the Labor Commissioner's office. There were
1,368 cases of occupational illnesses and accidents reported to
the Ministry of Labor in 1990, of which 44 were fatal.
Although these figures represent an increase over previous
years, they are not out of proportion with the rapid growth in
industrial employment.
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TANZANIA
The United Republic of Tanzania is a one-party state.
Political direction for the party, the Charaa Cha Mapinduzi
(CCM), and the Government is provided by a party-chosen elite
headed by Ali Hassan Mwinyi , who became President in 1985 and
party chairman in August 1990 following the retirement of
former party chairman and president Julius K. Nyerere. The
CCM, under Mwinyi, who was reelected to a second 5-year term as
President of the Republic in October 1990, lays down
fundamental political and economic policies and monitors their
implementation. The party attempts to control activity at all
levels of society through its system of lO-family cells. The
islands of Zanzibar and Pemba are integrated into the Union's
governmental and party structure, but the Zanzibar Government
exercises a considerable degree of autonomy.
The police have primary responsibility for maintaining internal
security. They are supported by the Tanzanian People's Defense
Force (TDPF), with some 30,000 personnel, and by paramilitary
forces and a large citizens' militia. The Government has
granted quasi-legal status to citizens' patrols to counter
lawlessness, especially crime in the urban areas and cattle
rustling in the rural areas. While the armed forces
traditionally have not been a source of human rights abuses,
evidence indicates that police routinely beat suspects during
interrogations .
One of the world's poorest countries, Tanzania also has one of
the highest rates of population growth. Its overwhelmingly
agricultural economy has suffered from inefficient economic
policies and unfavorable trends in international trade.
Reforms undertaken since 1986 included higher prices paid to
farmers for their products, rescheduled foreign debt payments,
and sharp devaluations of the currency. These stimulated
growth rates, which remained at an estimated 4 to 5 percent in
1991. Zanzibar's high rate of unemployment has been a factor
in its growing separatist sentiment.
Human rights in Tanzania remain severely restricted, despite
the incorporation of a bill of rights in the Constitution in
the mid-1980 's providing, inter alia, for freedom of movement,
speech, religion, and association. Of particular concern were
reports of torture, extrajudicial killings, and corruption of
the legal system. In addition, political activity outside the
single party was tightly circumscribed. Nevertheless, 1991 saw
a markedly increased level of political criticism and debate
following President Mwinyi ' s appointment of a commission to
review Tanzania's political system and Constitution. The
Government permitted open criticism in independent newspapers
and public meetings on official corruption and political
mismanagement. In Zanzibar and Pemba, opposition campaigns
continued throughout the year against union with the mainland.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Reports of such killings continued in 1991. Musa Membar, a
Tanzanian dissident who hijacked an Air Tanzania airliner 9
years ago and forced it to fly to London, died in Muhimbili
Hospital in Dar es Salaam on May 25. Membar, leader of the
exiled Tanzania Youth Democratic Movement, had served an 8-year
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prison sentence in the United Kingdom for the highjacking. In
attempting to return to Tanzania in September 1990, he was
arrested at the border and detained without charge under the
Preventive Detention Act. According to government officials,
Membar fell seriously ill while in detention and was admitted
to Muhimbili Hospital around May 18. Officials claim that
Membar died of complications from AIDS; however, Membar ' s
brother, Yassin, and other dissidents maintain that his death
was the result either of torture or of an intentional injection
of the AIDS virus. According to British doctors, Membar tested
HIV negative prior to his release from prison in 1990. As
Membar was buried without public notice and without an autopsy
having been performed, no conclusive evidence concerning the
cause of his death is available.
The Government's possible complicity in the death in custody of
a prominent Burundi exile political dissident, Remy Gahutu,
also remained unresolved at the end of 1991. Clinical
information released after an autopsy indicated the presence of
insecticide in Gahutu 's body; government officials attributed
this to Gahutu 's years as a farmer, although traces of the
poison in stomach washings indicated recent ingestion. Prior
to his death, Gahutu had been in official custody for 17 months.
Nonpolitical extrajudicial killings occur in the form of mob
justice and vigilantism, in both urban and rural areas. In the
cities, mobs on occasion chase down a suspected thief in
response to a victim's call for help and beat the suspect to
death. Beginning in late 1990, the Minister for Home Affairs,
Augustine Mrema, established compulsory service of urban men in
traditional defense groups known as Sungusungu and Wasalama;
previously, these groups operated only in rural areas as
associations of local villagers formed to combat cattle
rustlers and other criminals. The people's militia laws, as
amended by Parliament in 1989, bestow quasi-legal status,
including powers of arrest, on the traditional Sungusungu and
Wasalama groups. However, the press in 1991 reported numerous
cases of beatings and theft by Sungusungu patrols. Prosecution
of such cases is rare and is contemplated only if beatings
cause death. In September a theft suspect was hacked to death
by the victim's neighbors in Dar es Salaam; no one was arrested
or prosecuted for the death.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported cases of disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits the use of torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment, and government officials condemn these
practices whenever cases are made public. Police, however,
routinely threaten and beat suspected criminals just after
their apprehension in order to obtain quick confessions.
Further beatings and torture continue if the suspect does not
break down. Officials are seldom if ever tried and punished
for such abuses. Tanzanian prisons are overcrowded and
unsanitary. Local observers report that conditions are
substantially worse than Tanzania's depressed economic
conditions warrant, with prisoners forced to do hard labor with
little food and no medical care.
Numerous, credible reports of torture and mistreatment by
African National Congress (ANC) security personnel of
50-726 - 92 - 14
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TANZANIA
ANC-defector detainees and alleged South African government
spies at ANC refugee camps in Tanzania continued in 1991, even
after the ANC's announcement in May that all detainees had been
released. Since national liberation movements in Tanzania
enjoy a kind of extraterritorial status, Tanzanian officials
refuse to intervene when cases are brought to their attention.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Criminal Procedure Code, amended in 1985, requires that a
person arrested for a crime, other than a national security
charge under the Preventive Detention Act, be charged before a
magistrate within 24 hours and be permitted the right to
defense counsel (see Section I.e.). These amendments, however,
also restrict the right to bail, reduce the number of bailable
offenses, limit judges' discretion in granting bail, and impose
strict conditions on freedom of movement and association when
bail is granted. In a landmark case in 1991, the Court of
Appeal ruled that Section 148(5)(e) of the Act — which could be
used to deny bail to persons not considered dangerous to
society — was unconstitutional.
Under the Preventive Detention Act, the President of Tanzania,
upon written order, may order the arrest and indefinite
detention without bail of any person considered dangerous to
the public order or national security. The Act was amended in
1985 to require the Government to release detainees within 15
days of detention or inform them of the reason for their
detention. The detainee was also allowed to challenge the
grounds for detention at 90-day intervals.
Former Zanzibar Chief Minister Seif Sharif Hamad, who fell from
grace in 1988 for criticizing the party chairman and CCM
policies, was detained in May 1989 for unlawful assembly.
Following a search of his residence, he was officially charged
with illegal possession of secret government documents. The
Government of Zanzibar released Hamad on bail on November 20,
1991.
On September 5, supporters of civil rights activist James
Kapalala demonstrated against the Government's refusal to
register his civil and legal rights movement. Twenty-seven
persons were arrested, detained, and initially denied bail.
They were granted bail on September 18. On November 22,
Mapalala and two of his supporters, along with opposition
leader Chief Abdullah Fundikira and several of his supporters,
were arrested and charged with forming political parties
contrary to the Societies Ordinance. All were released later
the same day on their own recognizance.
There were no publicized or known cases of political detainees
or prisoners held at year's end. However, according to
numerous reports, police officials in the countryside
frequently lock up persons who have had disagreements with
local government or party officials. The individuals are not
charged and are usually released within a few days.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Justice in Tanzania is widely criticized as both corrupt and
inefficient, thus bringing into question the defendant's
ability to receive a fair public trial. The legal system is
based on the British model, with modifications to accommodate
customary and Islamic law in civil cases. Criminal trials are
open to the public and the press; courts must give reasons on
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TANZANIA
the record for holding secret proceedings. Criminal defendants
have the right of appeal. Military courts do not try
civilians, and there are no security courts. Defendants in
civil and military courts may appeal decisions to the High
Court and the Court of Appeal. While the judiciary is
constitutionally mandated to operate independently from the
executive branch, the Government exerts influence in many
cases. In addition, judges who render decisions unpopular with
senior police or government officials may find themselves
subject to pressure or may be transferred and reassigned.
Government officials also routinely ignore judicial rulings.
Members of the legal community, including judicial officers,
have complained that the legal system is corrupted through
bribery. In 1991 Supreme Court Justice Moses Mwakibete became
the first Tanzanian judge ever to be tried for corruption, the
maximum penalty for which is removal from office. No decision
about the case had been rendered by the end of 1991. Police
and lower court officials are often bribed to delay the process
of investigation and trials. There are reports of prisoners
waiting 10 years because they could not bribe their way through
the system. Although the 1985 amendments to the Criminal
Procedure Code were supposed to lessen court congestion, an
average case still takes 2 to 3 years to come to trial. Cases
may be delayed even longer, during which time the defendant
often remains incarcerated under abysmal conditions.
A Ugandan citizen, Moses Oguti, claimed that he had been
imprisoned without charge for over 1 year and that his
detention had been ordered by his former employer, a charitable
nongovernmental organization known as the Mission to the Needy,
because of his threats to publicize financial mismanagement and
theft of donations. In October Minister of Home Affairs
Augustine Mrema ordered Oguti 's release and an immediate
investigation of his claims against the organization.
In 1991 the most celebrated case remained that of former
Zanzibar Chief Minister Self Sharif Hamad. After numerous
postponements and rescheduling, and repeated harassment of
Hamad's Kenyan lawyers by security officials, his trial began
in September. After 2 months of legal maneuvering, the
Government of Zanzibar released Hamad on bail on November 20,
1991. Court proceedings on the charges against him continue,
and he has been forbidden to hold or attend meetings or to
leave Zanzibar without permission. He is able, however, to
receive visitors and give interviews.
Zanzibar's court system generally parallels the mainland's
legal system, but retains Islamic courts to handle Muslim
family cases such as divorce, child custody, and inheritance.
Cases concerning Zanzibar constitutional issues are heard only
in Zanzibar's courts. All other cases may be appealed to the
Court of Appeal of the United Republic of Tanzania.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Although party membership is voluntary (an estimated 2.1
million Tanzanians are CCM members), the party structure
permeates the private lives of all citizens. The CCM has party
cadres at all levels of society. Individual cells vary in size
from single-family homes to large apartment buildings, and may
contain from 10 to 200 persons. Unpaid "10-cell" leaders are
the party officials responsible for resolving problems at the
grassroots level and reporting to authorities any suspicious
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TANZANIA
behavior, event, or noncompliance with compulsory night patrol
service within their neighborhoods.
The Criminal Procedure Act of 1985 authorizes police officials
(including members of the people's militia) to issue search
warrants; however, the Act also authorizes searches of persons
and premises without a warrant if necessary to prevent the loss
or destruction of evidence connected with an offense or if
circumstances are serious and urgent. In practice, warrants
are rarely requested, and police and other security services
search private homes and business establishments at will.
Tanzanian security services monitor the telephones of many
Tanzanian citizens, such as journalists and academics, and
scrutinize correspondence. The security services also closely
monitor the activities of foreign residents.
Various ordinances allow the removal of "undesirable" or
destitute persons from one area to their prior place of
residence or origin if no work is found for them (see Sections
2 . d . and 6 . c . ) .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is provided for under the
Constitution. However, these rights have been restricted in
practice, although somewhat less so in 1991, and the Government
and the party maintain powerful levers to control the press.
There is substantial government and party ownership and control
of the media.
Former party chairman Nyerere initiated a wide-ranging public
debate over the merits of Tanzania's one-party political system
in February 1990, which continued throughout 1991. Much of
this debate was covered in the government-owned media but was
discussed more extensively in the several privately owned
newspapers. These newspapers contained political articles
severely critical of the Government and party and provided
coverage of statements by Tanzania's few outspoken dissidents.
Government and party newspapers also printed critical articles
and letters, and reported critics' press conferences and
statements .
The mainland Government owns the only English-language daily
newspaper, the national press agency (Shihata), and the
mainland radio facility. The Zanzibar Government operates a
radio station and a television station. The Swahil i-language
newspaper Uhuru, which has a daily circulation of 100,000, is
owned by the party. The Newspaper Act allows government
seizure without a warrant of any publication and withdrawal of
the license to publish at any time. Despite these
restrictions, a privately owned weekly business newspaper and
three tabloid-format newspapers that cover political topics are
now being published.
The official media, representating the CCMs ideological
stance, publicize and defend the party's and the Government's
programs based upon extensive guidance from the Ministry of
Information. Editorials are often written by senior government
officials. There is no formal censorship, but journalists,
even in the new, more liberal atmosphere, still exercise
considerable self-censorship in criticizing government policies
or officials. In August the Government announced plans to form
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a press council, ostensibly to handle complaints against the
press and to uphold standards of professionalism in
journalism. However, many journalists expressed concern that
the council will institutionalize the Government's latent
censorship.
Visiting foreign journalists must register with, and obtain a
permit from, -the Government which can be a time-consuming
process, sometimes requiring intervention from a high-level
official. The importation of foreign publications is permitted.
Academic freedom is officially assured, but restricted in
practice. Most academics are employed in government-run
institutions and have hesitated to broach sensitive subjects in
their classrooms and publications. On May 12, 1990, the
University of Dar Es Salaam was closed by the Government
following student boycotts over questions of corruption, poor
facilities, and representation. After the expulsion of 13
student leaders, the university reopened in January 1991. In
April the popular Vice Chancellor of the University of Dar es
Salaam was removed over the protests of faculty and students
and given an alternate assignment by President Mwinyi , who also
serves as Chancellor of the University. In July three
outspoken professors at the University were transferred to
positions at other institutions; after another public outcry,
one transfer was rescinded and a second changed to an
attractive diplomatic assignment. Students, formerly forced to
join party-controlled organizations, began to form their own
associations in 1990-1991.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although Tanzanians enjoyed an unprecedented opportunity in
1991 to freely discuss political alternatives, the Government
continued to restrict freedom of assembly and association.
Under the Societies Ordinance, any new association must be
approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs. In the countryside,
peasant farmers are required to join agricultural cooperative
societies controlled by the ruling party, which have forced
farmers to sell their crops at below-market prices, to buy
products from government monopolies, and to accept lengthy
delays — up to 2 years — in payments. No competing organizations
have been approved.
Permits must be obtained from the Government for any public
meeting, political or otherwise, and are normally granted if
the meeting is for a nonpolitical purpose. However, requests
from multiparty advocates to hold seminars in several regions
of the country were rejected in late 1991. Multiparty
advocates called off a planned mid-November demonstration in
support of President Chiluba's election in Zambia after senior
government officials announced the police would forcibly
prevent the assembly. In March, the Administrator General of
Trustees revoked the registration of the Tanzania Legal
Education Trust (Tanlet) after multiparty advocates proposed to
hold a seminar under its sponsorship. Tanlet filed suit in the
High Court to block the deregistration; at the end of 1991, the
case was still pending.
After repeated unsuccessful attempts to register his civil and
legal rights organization, a leading dissident, James Mapalala,
called for a public demonstration to protest the Ministry of
Home Affairs' refusals; 27 of the demonstrators were arrested
(see Section l.d.). Mapalala officially declared the
establishment of a new political party, called the Civic
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Movement, on November 6; on November 22, he and two of his
supporters were arrested and charged with forming a political
party contrary to the Societies Ordinance. Another opposition
figure. Chief Abdullah Fundikira, and several of his supporters
were arrested the same day. Fundikira had previously announced
his intention to form a political party in early 1992. All six
were released on their own recognizance the same day. In late
December, the Minister of Home Affairs formally rejected
Fundikira 's application to register the UMD as a legal
association and threatened further legal action against UMD
organizers.
A number of professional, business, legal, and medical
associations exist, but have only begun to address political
topics. Candidates for office in major sports clubs and
cooperatives are screened by the appropriate government
ministry, which also supervises their elections.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution and is
respected in practice. Missionaries are allowed to enter the
country freely to proselytize, and Tanzanians are allowed to go
abroad for pilgrimages and other religious purposes. The
Jehovah's Witnesses, who were banned in Tanzania for many
years, have been allowed to return and to register as an
organization and have been permitted to proselytize since 1988.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Apart from the Zanzibari requirement for documentation for
travel between Zanzibar and the mainland, short-term travel
generally is not restricted within Tanzania, but citizens must
follow national employment directives stipulating the nature of
employment and location of residence. For years city dwellers
unable to show proof of employment during police checks have
been forced to return to rural areas as the Government has
sought to control increasing pressure on urban resources.
Despite official policy (and constitutional guarantees) of
freedom of movement and settlement, in some areas party
officials still force peasants to live and work in collective
(Ujamaa) villages. The Human Resources Deployment Act of 1983
requires local governments to ensure that every resident within
their areas of jurisdiction engages in productive and lawful
employment. Those not so employed are subject to transfer to
another area where employment is available.
Passports for foreign travel can be difficult to obtain. Tax
clearances and approval from the central bank are required in
order to buy airline tickets, and those planning to travel or
emigrate are subject to intense scrutiny by police and tax
authorities. Tanzanians who leave the country without
authorization are subject to prosecution on their return. The
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act empowers the courts to try
Tanzanians who commit offenses outside the country. Although
it is legally possible for citizenship to be revoked, there
have been no reports that this has been done in recent years.
Parliament passed a bill in 1986 requiring the registration and
identification of everyone over the age of 10 who resides in
Tanzania, apparently in an effort to control foreign
businessmen.
With some exceptions, Tanzania generally has a liberal policy
towards refugees and displaced persons. At the end of 1991,
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there were an estimated 265,000 refugees and displaced persons
in Tanzania, with the largest group (200,000) from Burundi. In
1989, 15 Burundian refugees, whose repatriation was requested
by the Burundi Government for allegedly plotting against it,
were jailed by a Tanzanian ministry order. One of the 15, the
leader of the Burundi opposition group Palipehutu, died in
detention in August 1990 (see Section l.a.). In July 1991, the
others were rqleased from jail and sent to a refugee settlement
in southern Tanzania. Since the settlement is otherwise
composed of Mozambican refugees, the transfer was seen as an
attempt to keep the group isolated fom the rest of the Burundi
refugee community which is located in the far western part of
the country. All Somali refugees who had been detained in 1990
awaiting a decision on their status were released from prison
in early 1991 as new waves of refugees from Somalia entered the
country. Kenyans are denied access to asylum procedures in
Tanzania. Toward the end of the year, South African exiles who
have extraterritorial status in Tanzania began to be
repatriated to South Africa.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Tanzanian people cannot legally remove the party in power
or change the one-party system. However, in 1991 there were
growing pressures, including within the party, for a multiparty
political system. Multiparty advocates were led by the
National Committee for Constitutional Reform (NCCR) . In late
1991, opposition leader James Mapalala announced the formation
of a new political party called the Civic Movement. The former
Chairman of the NCCR, Chief Abdullah Fundikira, also announced
his intention to form a political party in early 1992, to be
called the Union for Multiparty Democracy. Both Mapalala and
Fundikira were arrested on November 22 and charged with
violation of the Societies Ordinance, then released on the same
day (see Section 2.b.) While the Government exercised
restraint in responding to these challenges, official
pronouncements made it clear that one-party rule would continue
to be enforced, at least until the recommendations of the
presidential commission are released in March 1992 (see
below). In this context, on the mainland wide-ranging debate
and discussion have been officially encouraged. In Zanzibar
and Pemba, however, attempts to organize political activity
against union with the mainland continued to be suppressed.
All candidates for Parliament must be party members; any member
of Parliament stripped of party membership loses his or her
seat in Parliament. A 1985 amendment to the Constitution
allows voters to choose between two CCM-selected candidates for
75 percent of the 255 seats in the union Parliament. The
remaining 25 percent are appointed by the Government and
party-related organizations. Candidates are vetted and
approved by the CCM Central Committee, which often ignores the
preferences expressed by local party caucuses. Elections for
both the Presidency and Parliament are held every 5 years, most
recently in 1990.
While voting is by secret ballot, reliable observers report
that CCM officials ensure that the correct candidates are
elected by appropriate majorities. Many Zanzibaris, for
example, believe that the 1985 and 1990 elections in the
islands were fraudulent. During the elections on Zanzibar,
reliable observers noted that public sector employees were told
to register to vote or face dismissal, and some 400 civil
servants in Pemba who refused to register to vote were sent
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TANZANIA
home on compulsory leave without pay. Most were reinstated in
1991; however, many were rehired at lower level positions than
those they had held previously. Zanzibar election procedures
are similar to those for the mainland, with the final selection
being made by the Central Committee of the CCM, thus allowing
the mainland CCM leadership to decide who will hold office.
In February President Mwinyi appointed a commission, led by the
Chief Justice of the High Court, to gather public opinion on
the appropriate political system for Tanzania and to report to
him by March 1992 on recommendations for changes, if any, in
the system and Constitution. Repeated, reliable reports
indicated that local party officials often seek to harass and
intimidate persons who make antiparty statements to the
commission. However, by the end of the year, statements by a
variety of government and CCM officials indicated the
acceptance of an expected recommendation to open the political
system to competing parties.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Because of government opposition (see Section l.d.), there are
no local groups devoted solely to monitoring human rights
abuses in Tanzania. The Government resents outside inquiries
into alleged violations of human rights. Representatives of
international human rights groups have visited Tanzania, but
persons they interviewed were subsequently questioned by the
police. The New York-based Lawyers Committee For Human Rights
issued a 7-page circular on the continued imprisonment of
former Zanzibar Chief Minister Self Sharif Hamad, which was
distributed widely.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution does not permit discrimination based on
nationality, tribe, origin, political affiliation, color,
religion, or lifestyle. However, the Barabaig people of
central Tanzania have been subject for many years to government
discrimination. The Barabaig and their attorneys maintain that
the Government has illegally dispossessed them of their
traditional lands in order to implement a government-run
agricultural project. They have also accused project employees
of beating them, killing their cattle, and despoiling tribal
graves and religious sites. The Government has suppressed
attempts by the local independent press to cover the story; it
has also resisted Barabaig efforts to seek legal redress.
The Asian community has declined by 50 percent in the past
decade to about 40,000 (plus 4,000 in Zanzibar). A
business-oriented minority in a society historically committed
to socialist policies and remaining both culturally and
economically exclusive, the Asians are regarded with
considerable antipathy by many African Tanzanians, in part
because of the Asian community's disproportionate influence in
key sectors of the economy. Despite this, there are no laws or
official policies discriminating against them. As the
Government's economic policies evolve and greater stress is
given to the private sector, Asians are encouraged to invest in
areas previously reserved for the public sector and are a force
in the reawakening economy.
Both party and government constitutions endorse equality in the
workplace. Nevertheless, strong traditional norms still divide
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TANZANIA
labor along sexual lines and place women in a subordinate
position. Women face widespread discrimination in access to
educational opportunities, for example, and in the countryside
are largely relegated to farming and raising children.
Statistics for 1979, the latest available, showed 97 percent of
economically active women were engaged in agriculture, the vast
majority on small family farms.
Progress on women's rights has been more noticeable in urban
areas, where traditional values are weaker, but even there and
in the public sector, which employs 80 percent of the salaried
labor force, certain statutes restrict their access to some
jobs or their hours of employment. According to a 1986
estimate, women constituted less than 14 percent of the wage
employment sector, and in 1991 most women were still
concentrated in lower salaried civil service positions such as
clerks, secretaries, and telephone operators. A manpower
survey showed that women occupied 20.1 percent of high and
midlevel positions, but they have little access to
decisionmaking positions.
The overall situation for women is even less favorable in
heavily Muslim Zanzibar. Women there and in many parts of the
country face discriminatory restrictions on inheritance and
ownership of property because of concessions by the Government
and courts to customary and Islamic law. While provisions of
the Marriage Act provide for certain inheritance and property
rights for women, application of customary. Islamic, or
statutory law depends on the lifestyle and stated intentions of
the male head of household. The courts have thus upheld
discriminatory inheritance claims, primarily in rural areas
where individuals practice a traditional lifestyle.
Violence against women is widespread. Legal remedies exist but
in practice are difficult to obtain. Traditional customs
subordinating women remain strong in both urban and rural areas
and are often upheld by local magistrates. The husband has a
free hand to treat his wife as he wishes, and wife beating
occurs at all levels of society. The Government has no
programs to inhibit this abuse.
Although officially discouraged by the Government, female
circumcision is still performed in approximately 20 of the
country's 130 mainland ethnic groups. Government officials
have called for changes in customs which adversely affect
women, but no legislation has been introduced which would
specifically restrict the practice of female circumcision. In
1991 a woman, accused of murder after a girl on whom she had
performed a circumcision died, was discharged by a High Court
justice. Seminars sponsored by various governmental and
nongovernmental organizations are regularly held in an attempt
to educate the public on the dangers of these and other
traditional practices. Health authorities state the practice
is declining, but nongovernmental sources maintain it is on the
rise, especially in central Tanzania.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers do not have the right to form or join organizations of
their own choice. The right of association is still limited to
one labor union organization, formerly named JUWATA and now
named the Organization of Tanzania Trade Unions (OTTU), to
which all unionized workers belong. In August at an
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TANZANIA
extraordinary congress representatives of JUWATA declared the
federation's independence and the end of its former role as a
mass organization of the country's sole political party, the
CCM, while at the same time pledging continued affiliation to
the party. Legislation institutionalizing the restructuring of
the trade union federation under the new name of OTTU was
introduced in Parliament in late October. The bill drew wide
criticism from the legal community, some Members of Parliament,
and others for denying the right of workers to form their own
trade union or unions. JUWATA has since been officially
renamed OTTU, though its organization and policies remain
unchanged .
OTTU, like its predecessor JUWATA, represents approximately 60
percent of the workers in industry and govern.Tient but in
reality has little influence on labor policy. Most business
and labor leaders doubt that OTTU will actively protect worker
rights during the projected 3-year transitional, restructuring
period, culminating in union general elections in 1994.
Workers have the legal right to strike only after complicated
and protracted mediation and conciliation procedures leading
ultimately to the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court
receives direction from the Minister of Labor and Youth
Development (who was also the Secretary-General of JUWATA until
July). If OTTU is not satisfied with the decision of the
Industrial Court, it can then conduct a legal strike. These
procedures can prolong a dispute for months without resolving
it. Pending a resolution, frustrated workers often stage
impromptu wildcat strikes and walkouts.
Although most strikes are in effect illegal (there were no
legal strikes in 1991), there were no reports of government
prosecutions against workers involved in walkouts and
disputes. However, in April two representatives of
approximately 60 primary teachers in Kigoma rural district were
detained by the police and forced to give statements after an
alleged illegal meeting over salary grievances. Work stoppages
by doctors at Muhimbili medical center in July, teachers at the
college of business education in August, nurses and other
workers at Aga Khan Hospital in Dar es Salaam in September, and
workers at the Kwimba district hospital in Mwanza in September
did not result in arrests or prosecutions.
OTTU has not changed JUWATA ' s policy of limiting its
international affiliations to regional and pan-African trade
union organizations, including the Organization of African
Trade Union Unity and a newly created East African National
Trade Unions Consultative Council.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is protected by law but limited to the
private sector. Wages for employees of the Governm.ent and
state-owned organizations, which account for the vast bulk of
the salaried labor force, are set by the Government; OTTU does
not bargain collectively on behalf of government employees.
Although OTTU may negotiate on behalf of most private sector
employees with the Association of Tanzania Em.ployers,
collective agreements must be submitted to the Industrial Court
for approval. The Committee of Experts (COE) of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) observed again in 1991
that these provisions are not in conformity with ILO Convention
98 on Collective Bargaining and the Right to Organize. There
are no export processing zones in Tanzania.
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TA.NZANIA
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Employment Ordinance prohibits forced labor. However, for
a number of years the COE has observed that provisions of
various Tanzanian laws are incompatible with ILO Conventions 29
and 105 on forced labor. Again in 1991, the ILO's June
conference criticized the Government's failure to amend the
offend'^ng laws despite the fact that a drafting effort has been
under way for several years. Specifically, the Human Resources
Deployment Act (1983) requires every local government authority
to ensure that able-bodied persons over 15 years of age not in
school engage in productive or other lawful employment. In the
past, massive police raids were used to round up persons who
had no evidence of employment. The law has recently been
interpreted more leniently, but concern over the high crime
rate and the increase in the number of street beggars
encouraged the Government to again conduct police raids against
the urban unemployed, including a May roundup of beggars in Dar
es Salaam. Many regional and district authorities pass laws
requiring farmers to plant specified cash and food crops and to
keep minimum acreages under cultivation. Penalties for
violating these requirements include fines and imprisonment.
Enforcement of such laws tends to be haphazard at best, however.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
By law children under the age of 15 are prohibited from
working, but this provision applies only to the formal wage
sector in both urban and rural areas and not to chilaren
working on family farms or herding domestic livestock. Persons
between the ages of 15 and 18 may be employed, provided the
work is safe and not injurious to health, but they are not
allowed to work between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. Enforcement by the
Ministry of Labor and Youth Development in the formal wage
sector is good but sporadic to nonexistent in the rapidly
growing informal sector.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is a legal minimum wage for employment in the formal
sector which was increased in July. However, OTTU often
negotiates higher minimum wages on an employer-by-employer
basis, depending on the financial status of the business. A
worker paid at the minimum rate, even when supplemented with
various benefits such as housing and transport allowances and
food subsidies, could not provide an adequate standard of
living for a family.
In July President Mwinyi announced a change from a 6-day
workweek to a 5-day, 40-hour workweek for government
employees. Most private employers retained a 6-day, 40-hour
workweek schedule for workers. Working hours in the private
sector are regulated. In general, women may not be employed
between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Several laws regulate safety in the
workplace, and an occupational health and safety factory
inspection system, set up with the assistance of the ILO, is in
place, managed by the Ministry of Labor and Youth Development.
Its effectiveness, however, is minimal. OTTU officials have
claimed that enforcement of labor standards is fairly effective
in the formal sector, but no verification studies have been
performed. Local observers note that enforcement of labor
standards is nonexistent in the informal sector.
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TOGO
In 1991 rapidly escalating demands for political and economic
change dramatically altered Togo's political system. In power
for 24 years, Gnassingbe Eyadema was still President at the end
of the year but with greatly reduced de jure authority as the
National Conference, which met in July and August, installed a
new transitional Government, headed by Prime Minister Joseph
Kokou Koffigoh, with the objective of establishing a
democratic, multiparty system. The Conference's 971 members
were nominated by the Government, opposition political parties,
traditional elites, socioprofessional groups, and geographic
regions .
Among the Conference's many actions was the adoption of an
interim Constitution which established the Prime Minister as
Head of Government and in charge of the military. The
Constitution also incorporated many fundamental rights,
including freedom of speech, assembly, and association. It
placed ultimate power in a legislative body — the High Council
of the Republic — and created an independent judiciary. The
final delineation of powers between the President and Prime
Minister remained to be determined. The Conference set a
timetable for a constitutional referendum and presidential and
legislative elections for the period from February to June 1992.
The transition to a multiparty democratic system was thrown
into turmoil by actions of the military in October and again in
November and December. In October elements of the military,
including the Presidential Guard, occupied the radio station
and attempted to kidnap Prime Minister Koffigoh. At least
five, and probably more, civilians were killed in the first
takeover of the radio station on October 1. Following the
attack on the Prime Minister, unarmed civilian militias
attacked and looted the houses of supporters of President
Eyadema .
On November 28, elements of the Togolese army again took over
the radio station, surrounded the Prime Minister's office, and
randomly shot civilians. On December 3, after the troops
physically attacked his offices, the Prime Minister surrendered
and was taken unharmed to the President's residence. Many
Togolese believe that President Eyadema played a role in the
military uprisings, even though he denies it and worked on all
three occasions to restore calm.
Prime Minister Koffigoh announced and the High Council of the
Republic approved a 23-member government of national unity on
December 30. Thirteen members of the previous government were
retained, and three members of President Eyadema ' s former
government party, the Rassemblement du Peuple Togalaise (RPT),
were added along with two human rights advocates.
The state security apparatus — the armed forces, the National
Police (Surete), and the Gendarmerie — were called upon
fregTjently by the Eyadema Government in the first 6 months of
1991. The National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) estimated
that 100 people were killed and 1,000 injured in the 10 months
of demonstrations and strikes before the Conference began.
With rare exceptions, security forces respected orders given by
President Eyadema not to use live ammunition against
demonstrators but still used with deadly effect tear gas,
concussion grenades, and wooden clubs. Members of the Togolese
army are believed to be responsible for most of the deaths of
28 civilians whose bodies were recovered from a Lome lagoon in
April. Neighborhood militias, organized to counter possible
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TOGO
military action against the civilian population before the
National Conference, in some cases turned into vigilante groups
following the Conference in the absence of an effective police
presence. By the end of 1991, they were believed to have
killed in Lome as many as 30 persons suspected of theft and
other crimes.
Togo has an annual per capita gross domestic product of under
$500. Approximately 80 percent of its 3.4 million people are
engaged in subsistence agriculture, but Togo also has a lively
commercial sector. Togo's economy stagnated in 1990 and 1991
due to uncertainty over the political situation as well as
inadequate rainfall and declining terms of trade for its
principal exports, coffee, cocoa, and cotton.
The Eyadema regime committed serious human rights abuses as it
attempted to counter the rising public demands for change.
These abuses included the excessive use of force by security
forces, resulting in many deaths, and the harassment of
government critics. There were also abuses by those
demonstrating against the regime, including attacks on police
facilities and vehicles, individual policemen and soldiers, and
general destruction of property. The President gradually made
concessions to the opposing forces, notably in April with the
promulgation of a political party charter and a general amnesty
and subsequently in June by cooperating with the convening of
the National Conference. Following the announcement of the
political party charter, 22 parties were registered, and
several hundred political opponents of the Eyadema Government
returned to Togo. By midyear, Togo's human rights situation
had improved significantly with the installation of the
transitional Government and institution of a democratic interim
Constitution. The National Conference brought out the
extensive human rights violations committed in the past under
the Eyadema regime. For example, witnesses asserted that 109
persons had died from torture over a period of years in the
prison at D'Agombio. An important task facing the new
Government in 1992 will be to change the laws and practices
that permitted the previous extensive human rights abuses.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from;
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political killing, but there were
numerous instances of extrajudicial killings. As demands for
political change and economic betterment escalated in 1991, the
number and severity of clashes between security forces and
opponents of the Government increased and spread throughout the
country. The most serious disturbances occurred in Lome, Keve,
Sokode, Tsevie, Atakpame, Kpalime, Aneho, Notse, Vogan, and
Dapaong. With the exception of President Eyadema ' s home
region, few areas of the country were left untouched by
violence. The CNDH informed the National Conference that 100
were killed and 1,000 injured in the disturbances which began
in October 1990 and continued through June 1991. The CNDH has
accounted for 74 of the deaths by name or cause of death.
Prior to November 1991, the security forces repeatedly used
excessive force in countering demonstrations for political
reform. In March the security forces disrupted the
opposition's first major rally and touched off violent
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TOGO
disturbances, in which at least two persons were killed,
including a policeman. Shots fired by Presidential Guard
members resulted in at least two deaths in Lome on April 5, and
another fatality in Keve during an April demonstration was
caused by nervous gendarmes firing into a hostile crowd.
Nearly all other casualties apparently occurred as a result of
beatings and the indiscriminate use of tear gas and concussion
grenades .
On April 11, following several days of violent clashes between
demonstrators and security forces, 28 bodies, including two
children and a pregnant woman, were recovered by local
residents from a lagoon in the Be section of Lome. Two
international human rights groups and an Eyadema government-
appointed commission initiated inquiries, but had not reported
by year's end. The CNDH unanimously concluded that the army
was responsible for the deaths. Subsequently, two members of
the military publicly admitted their participation in the
deaths. According to the CNDH ' s report, security forces
clashed with government opponents forcing many people
(demonstrators and bystanders alike) off a narrow bridge into
the shallow lagoon. Deaths resulted from beatings, close-range
explosions of tear-gas and concussion grenades, and drowning.
Other deaths were attributed to beatings by security forces at
other locations in Lome with the corpses later deposited in the
lagoon. The President continues to deny any wrongdoing by the
military.
Violent clashes took place on the campuses of the University of
Benin and the Technical Lycee on March 12-14. Rival student
and ethnic groups clashed with each other and with security
forces. Traditional weapons — clubs, bows and arrows, and
machetes — were used in the melees which left at least 4
students dead and countless injured. On November 28, after
surrounding the office of the Prime Minister and taking over
the radio station, soldiers opened fire on civilians in various
neighborhoods of Lome. According to hospital reports, 19
civilians were killed and 54 seriously injured; there were
additional unreported casualties.
b. Disappearance
No disappearances were reported during 1991. Dindigoue Nayone,
reported missing after speaking out against the Government
during a May 1990 student union meeting, returned to Togo in
April from Chad. His welfare and whereabouts was an issue with
striking university students. His return was facilitated by
the French and Togolese Governments and the CNDH. He remained
in protective custody for several months after his return,
reportedly at his own request, but met frequently with
journalists and human rights activists.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no reported incidents of torture in 1991. However,
delegates to the National Conference, as well as witnesses
organized by the CNDH, presented extensive and detailed
accounts of torture administered during the past 24 years of
the Eyadema Government at military camps and prisons,
especially at Yade (Otadi), Mandouri, D'Agombio (Kaza), and
Mango. The majority of those tortured were held for political
offenses or on charges of sorcery. Witnesses asserted that 109
persons had died from torture during incarceration at
D'Agombio. Most, but not all, of the deaths appeared to have
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TOGO
occurred prior to 1986. Practices included beatings, forced
labor, sexual abuse, denial of food and water, drowning, and
exposure to poisonous insects and snakes. Punishment of
officials for human rights abuses under the Eyadema Government
was rare. The National Conference demanded that offenders be
held accountable, but no action had been taken by year's end.
Prison conditions remained very harsh in 1991 with serious
overcrowding and inadequate food and medical care.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under current Togolese law, which has not yet been amended by
the new Government, persons arrested may be held incommunicado
without charge for 48 hours, with an additional 48-hour
extension if the case is deemed serious or complex. In
practice, most detentions conform to this provision. Although
persons accused of "political crimes," such as defaming the
President, may be arrested and detained without limit, such
action was not taken during 1991. Prefects (governors) have de
facto authority to order detention at will, a power which was
exercised in some areas against antigovernment demonstrators.
Security officers also have unrestricted arrest and detention
powers in cases involving national security.
Owing more to a shortage of qualified judicial personnel than
intent to evade required judicial procedures, a substantial
number of nonpolitical prisoners are held for long periods of
time — in some cases 6 months or more — before being brought to
trial.
The Eyadema Government frequently used, as a harassment
technique, both arbitrary arrest and intensive interrogation of
journalists and others (see Section 2.a.). For example, in
mid-January, Bassirou Ayeva, a journalist with the government
newspaper, representing Sokode citizens resident in Lome, sent
a letter to the independent newspapers explaining why his
organization believed that Sokode was underdeveloped. He was
held by gendarmes for about 48 hours for questioning, then
released.
A general amnesty covering political acts, a key opposition
demand, was promulgated on April 12. Several hundred opponents
of the Eyadema regime returned from self-imposed exile, some
with the cooperation of the CNDH, and many participated in the
National Conference. A government decision to arrest, under
defamation laws, Andoch Bonin, an outspoken Eyadema critic,
following his return under the amnesty was reversed after the
National Conference expressed its opposition, and after the
general public threatened civil unrest.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Under Eyadema the judiciary was not independent of the
executive, and the President intervened repeatedly in the
judicial process (see Section 2.a.). The interim Constitution
declares the judicial system independent of the executive and
legislative branches. It remains, therefore, to be seen what
practical effect this constitutional provision will have for
the conduct of justice in Togo.
The judicial system employs both African traditional law and
the Napoleonic Code in trying criminal and civil cases. The
Supreme Court stands at the apex of the Napoleonic court
system. The criminal process begins with pretrial
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TOGO
investigation by a special judge who examines the adequacy of
the evidence and decides on bail. The number of judges is
inadequate, but the court system functions well for most
routine cases. Trials are open to the public, and judicial
procedures are respected. Defendants have the right to
counsel, and lower court decisions may be appealed to two
higher courts. In rural areas, the village chief or council of
elders may try minor criminal and civil cases. Those who
reject the traditional ruling may take their cases to the
regular court system, which is the starting point for cases in
urban areas .
Under statutes which remain in effect but unused, procedural
safeguards for fair trial are lacking in security and political
cases. Special courts handle cases related to public security
(State Security Court), embezzlement of public funds (Tribunal
for Recovery of Public Funds), and violent crimes (Court of
Assizes). The State Security Court has not convened in 6
years. Persons who embezzle large sums generally remain in
jail until the money is repaid.
Under the general amnesty, the Government released 19 persons
convicted of participation in the 1986 coup/invasion attempt.
Seven of the 19 had received death sentences and another 3 life
imprisonment. At the end of the year, there were no political
prisoners or detainees being held.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In criminal cases, searches of private residences are
authorized by a judge or senior police official. In political
and national security cases, the security forces need no prior
authorization. In the months preceding the National
Conference, security forces routinely and randomly entered
residential compounds without search warrants. The new
Government has ended the former practice of opening mail and
monitoring telephones. During the transition, the police and
gendarmerie continue to maintain domestic intelligence
services, but they are no longer focused on the political
opposition. The transitional Government's efforts to eliminate
the domestic activities of military intelligence have not been
completely successful.
According to credible reports, members of the army in civilian
clothes set fire to the residence and automobiles of opposition
leader Yao Agboyibo on March 16 following the disturbances.
Mrs. Agboyibo was manhandled, but she and her children were
allowed to leave before the house was burned. A residence
belonging to opposition leader Edem Kodjo was burned on
December 3. No one was injured.
The practice since 1974 of requiring all persons to have
Togolese or Muslim first names in order to qualify for
government benefits was abandoned. Many people, including the
Prime Minister, have reverted to their Christian names.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
While Togo achieved freedom of speech and of the press in 1991,
the military rebellion in November and December led to
harassment of the independent press. The independent press
expanded from two papers in early 1990 to approximately 26 at
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TOGO
the end of 1991. The majority were weekly or biweekly. In
all, over 30 independent newspapers appeared in 1991, but a
number suspended publication due to financial and market
realities. The two radio stations, one television station, and
one newspaper remain government owned.
In the official media, coverage of local political developments
became consideraJDly more balanced after the start of the
National Conference. Beginning in April, a weekly program
featured government representatives and leading members of the
opposition debating freely on government television. Radio and
television provided live coverage of almost all of the National
Conference proceedings.
Prior to midyear, the Eyadema Government took steps to limit
press freedom. In late 1990, the Government introduced a new
press code which covered all printed materials destined to be
distributed, sold, or rented, as well as records, audio and
video cassettes, photographs, and films. The code introduced
numerous fines and penalties for journalists, editors,
printers, and vendors if a published article was found by court
officials to be untrue or defaming.
While the Government presented the code as a long overdue
updating of French law, it was used twice in January, when
press articles were considered as antigovernment . In one case,
Koffi Kpe Homawoo, editor of Courrier du Golfe, was questioned
extensively about articles written about the army and the
government newspaper. The charges against him were dropped on
the day before the scheduled trial. A second editor, Komi
Gabriel Agah, of Forum Hebdo , was summoned for 2 days of
questioning about two series of articles, one alleging military
brutality and the second about underdevelopment in a regional
capital. That investigation was later suspended. Finally,
approximately 1,000 copies of Forum Hebdo were seized, without
the authorizations required by law, although additional copies
were distributed the next day with difficulty.
In early April, the Eyadema Government again used the new code,
to file charges against Kangni Foly, editor of La Parole, for
an editorial which discussed the President's distribution of
public funds. Charges were again dropped on the day before the
trial .
Uniformed men ransacked the offices of Forum Hebdo on December
9, following distribution of its postrebellion edition.
Employees were injured by the intruders and by their efforts to
escape the two-story building. Sidewalk vendors of the paper
were also reportedly harassed by the military.
Teachers and students were in the forefront of efforts to
expand freedom of association and expression as well as to
secure more general political reform. Concerns about academic
freedom were not central to campus protests. However, some
professors expressed reservations about university
self-censorship which developed as a result of disciplinary
actions against professors who in previous years addressed
human rights and other sensitive issues.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly and association, except for religious
purposes, was tightly controlled in pre-1991 Togo. Permits
were required for all nonreligious organizations and public
gatherings. Only one political party, the government-sponsored
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Rass emblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT), was permitted. During
early 1991, various human rights activists and organizations,
without government authorization or challenge, held public
meetings to publicize their organizations and to educate the
public on various human rights topics.
Government control was further eroded by students who formed
action committees and organized strikes to press political and
campus reforms and by the formation of the Front of
Associations for Renewal (FAR). FAR was one of three umbrella
organizations of human rights organizations, political parties,
and student groups which negotiated with the Government prior
to the National Conference. Government attempts to prevent
FAR ' s first public rally on March 16 resulted in a violent
confrontation between the security forces and opponents of the
Government .
Following negotiations between FAR and the Government on March
18, which resulted in the legalization of political parties,
party meetings and scheduled public rallies were held without
government interference. Opposition groups held two large
public meetings in the government stadium in May and June, the
latter in the midst of a general strike, with the Government's
concurrence.
The National Conference ended the automatic membership of all
Togolese in the former government political party, disbanded
the party itself, and required that its assets be returned to
the State. When the party was reconstituted under the same
name but complying with the terms of the Political Party
Charter, it was banned by the High Council of the Republic. It
was this banning which led to ethnic violence and the military
rebellion against the transitional Government.
c. Freedom of Religion
The interim Constitution provides for religious freedom. It
remains unclear whether the transitional Government will
enforce existing statutes that require all religious groups to
qualify under one of seven categories lasted by the Ministry of
Interior. Upon obtaining Ministry permission, qualifying
groups are then unrestricted in their religious practices.
They may publish religious material, conduct services, and
teach their faith. Non-Togolese clergy are welcome to reside
in Togo, proselytize, and engage in other religious activities.
The Jehovah's Witnesses and several small apostolic/celestial
groups in the past have been denied official permission to
practice their beliefs. While this has prevented these groups
from publicized, open worship, in 1991 they continued to
practice their faith in private.
Local religious groups are free to maintain contacts with
coreligionists in other countries. There are no restrictions
on travel for religious purposes. All official religious
observances are ecumenical in nature, and the Government does
not favor any specific religion. Membership in authorized
religious groups has no bearing on civil service promotions.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Free movement (including domestic and foreign travel,
emigration, the right to change residence or workplace, and the
right to return to the country) is generally allowed. In the
past, in issuing passports and visas, the Government controlled
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the emigration of professional Togolese and kept known
political dissidents under scrutiny. Since the advent of the
transitional Government, there has been a relaxation of these
controls .
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (ITNHCR)
recognized some 433 refugees in Togo on June 30, 1991, although
the actual number is undoubtedly higher. In the past, the
Government kept a close watch on political refugees, and
refugees from countries with which Togo enjoys good relations
were reluctant to register with the UNHCR for fear that the
Togolese Government would provide their governments with
information about them.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens',
to Change Their Government
Although people did not use the electoral process, in 1991 they
changed their government from a one-party state to a multiparty
state under the transition Government. President Eyadema and
his party, the RPT, still remained forces on the scene, but
throughout the year they had to make concessions to growing
opposition forces supported by public opinion. This
transformation was accomplished after 10 months of
negotiations, strikes, large demonstrations, and street
violence. The National Conference's 971 members, nominated by
the Government, opposition political parties, traditional
elites, socioprofessional groups, and geographic regions,
adopted the interim Constitution, elected an interim Prime
Minister and Legislative Assembly, and scheduled a
constitutional referendum and legislative and presidential
elections for the period between February and June 1992.
The interim Constitution provides for basic political and human
rights, including freedoms of expression, assembly, speech, and
religion. A constitutional drafting committee was announced in
mid-October. It will write a new permanent constitution to be
submitted to the people. The political party charter enacted
in April after negotiations between the Government and
opposition forces also remains in effect. The interim
Constitution greatly reduces the power of the President,
transferring most of his previous powers to the transition
Prime Minister, who is Head of Government and head of the
military forces. The Legislative Assembly during this period
is responsible for implementation of the decisions of the
National Conference.
The role and loyalty of the military remained unclear at year's
end, but it generally supported the President throughout 1991.
The key cadres are from the President's northern region.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Eyadema Government in 1987 approved and facilitated the
establishment of the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) to
investigate reports of human rights abuses. During 1991 the
CNDH acted virtually independently in investigating charges of
abuses by government agents, including the lagoon deaths and
other killings. It assisted in the return of Dindigoue Nayone
(see Section l.b.) and several former regime opponents under
the general amnesty. The CNDH also organized a presentation to
the National Conference to highlight human rights abuses during
the Eyadema regime.
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Activists reported that during the CNDH ' s early years some
people were deterred from filing complaints by government
pressure or fear of harassment .
Other independent human rights organizations proliferated in
early 1991, both as human rights watchdogs and as
protopolitical parties before the adoption of the political
parties charter. International human rights organizations have
communicated directly with the CNDH and the Human Rights League
concerning individual cases.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Before President Eyadema took power in 1967, southern ethnic
groups dominated Togo. A northerner, President Eyadema made a
serious effort to integrate all ethnic groups into the
political structure. The important exception was the security
forces, which are still dominated by northern ethnic groups.
Commerce and the professions are the preserve of southerners.
Ethnic rivalries, dating from precolonial times, have been
exacerbated by the civil unrest of the preconf erence period and
by the subsequent lack of effective law enforcement. During
the spring, threats against northerners residing in both rural
and urban areas of the south resulted in some injuries,
particularly in the Kpalime area, and in the decision of large
numbers of northerners to return to their native area. In the
north, two small groups attacked one another in October,
leading to 28 deaths and over 100 serious injuries. There was
a report of ethnic violence at Aneho, near the border with
Benin. Much of the pro- and anti-Eyadema violence in October
also had an ethnic cast, as northerne^rs tended to support the
President while southerners led the fight against him. Most
political parties, except for the former government party, are
dominated by southerners.
Togolese women have formal equality with men under the law, and
women's economic and social rights are set forth in the Family
Code adopted in early 1980. While this Code guarantees various
women's rights, including maternity leave benefits, in
practice, women continue to be subjected to discrimination,
especially in education, pension benefits, and traditional
law. Far fewer women than men receive university education,
and the number of women graduates from secondary schools is
low. In the urban economic sphere, women dominate both local
market activities and commerce with Togo's neighbors, often
amassing considerable wealth in the process.
However, harsh economic conditions in rural areas leave women
with little time for anything other than taxing domestic and
agricultural field work. Unlike civil law, customary or
traditional law — which affects the vast majority of
women — discriminates against women, e.g., it gives all property
to the male in the event of separation or divorce. The new
Government has pledged that it will review and strengthen the
Family Code.
Women participated in the political changes through membership
in associations and political parties, teachers' unions, and
protest groups. Only 20 to 25 women were delegates to the
National Conference, and 5 are in the 79-member interim
Legislative Assembly. One woman has been appointed as a
minister in the transitional Government.
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Violence against women, including wife beating, occurs, but its
extent is not known, as it rarely comes to public attention,
including in the press. Mechanisms exist within both the
traditional extended family and formal judicial structures for
redress, but the police rarely intervene in domestic violence
cases. Female circumcision is practiced by a few northern
ethnic groups but is gradually diminishing. While the
Government has undertaken a campaign to make women throughout
Togo aware of their expanded opportunities under the new Family
Code, it has not specifically addressed the issue of violence
against women or female circumcision. A government-sponsored
national women's organization publicized women's health,
educational, and welfare issues, and private groups have now
been formed to address similar concerns.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Prior to 1991, the right of association was effectively limited
by the reguirement that all workers pay dues to the National
Confederation of Togolese Workers (CNTT), which was formerly
associated with the ruling party. This gave the CNTT a de
facto monopoly on the labor movement, although trade unions
could and did exist outside of the CNTT. In August the
National Conference suspended the automatic withholding of CNTT
dues for all workers, which had been criticized for years by
the International Labor Organization, and it froze CNTT ' s
assets. A number of trade unions left the CNTT, some of which
have affiliated with two new federations: The Labor Federation
of Togolese Workers (CSTT) and the National Union of
Independent Syndicates (UNSIT) .
Strikes were cominonplace in 1991. Workers generally won
significant pay raises and other concessions. Many of the
strikes were in support of political reform. While some of the
strikes did not comply with applicable laws, the Government did
not prosecute strikers, although some people were convicted of
charges related to strike-related violence. They were later
pardoned .
The various federations and unions are free to associate with
international labor groups.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Labor Code guarantees workers the right to organize and
bargain collectively. The CNTT had a role in collective
bargaining when it was the de facto monopoly labor federation,
but it acted more as a spokesman for labor interests within the
Government and party than as an independent labor federation.
In 1991 the CNTT, as well as the newly created labor
federations and the independent unions, took more independent
negotiating stances. Collective bargaining took place in a
number of sectors throughout the year.
While the interim Constitution is silent on worker rights, the
1974 Labor Code prohibits antiunion discrimination.
A law allowing the establishment of export processing zones
(EPZs) was enacted in late 1989. A number of companies have
received EPZ status, and about a dozen have begun operations.
The EPZ law provides exemptions from some provisions of
Togolese labor law, notably the regulations on hiring and
424
TOGO
firing workers. Employees of EPZ firms may not enjoy the same
protection against antiunion discrimination as do other workers.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Although the law is silent on the question, forced or
compulsory labor does not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Code prohibits the employment of children under the
age of 14 in any enterprise. Some types of industrial and
technical employment require a minimum age of 18. These age
requirements are generally enforced in the formal sector in
urban areas by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor. However,
in the urban informal sector and m rural areas even very young
children traditionally help their families.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wages are set by the Government for different
categories. Workers cannot maintain a decent standard of
living at these wages and must often supplement their incomes
through second jobs or subsistence farming.
Labor practices are regulated by the Labor Code. The Code
stipulates that there should be equal pay for equal work
regardless of sex, and this provision is generally observed in
the formal sector. Working hours of all employees in any
enterprise, except for agricultural enterprises, must not
normally exceed 40 hours per week; at least one period of 24
hours of rest per week is compulsory; and workers must receive
30 days of paid leave each year. Enforcement is weak and these
provisions are not universally respected, however.
Health and safety standards in the workplace are determined by
a technical consulting committee in the Ministry of Labor,
which may levy penalties on employers who do not meet the
conditions. In practice, the Ministry's enforcement of the
various provisions of the Labor Code is limited. Larger
enterprises are required to provide medical services for their
employees and usually attempt to respect occupational health
and safety rules, but smaller firms often do not.
425
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President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement
(NRM) took power in January 1986 after a 5-year guerrilla
struggle against the regimes of Milton Obote and Tito Okello.
Museveni replaced their parliamentary structures with an
unelected interim government headed by the National Resistance
Council (NRC) . Competitive nonparty elections in 1989 expanded
the NRC and brought in representatives from all parts of the
country. Later that year the transition to civilian government
promised for 1990 was postponed 5 years to allow consultations
on a new constitution. Museveni continues to exercise
authority through the NRC, an appointed cabinet, and the armed
forces. Opposition parties have grown increasingly active in
defiance of a ban on partisan political activity. Neither the
political opposition, the judiciary, the Inspector General of
Government, nor any other institution serves as an effective
check on executive power.
The National Resistance Army (NRA) is the key security
structure in Uganda. The army was expanded tenfold between
1986 and 1991, increasing its political power within the
Government. The wholesale absorption of the armies of previous
regimes and rebel groups eroded discipline within the NRA.
Soldiers and deserters have committed armed robberies, torture,
and murder. Some of those apprehended have been punished, and
the NRA has accepted liability for some abuses perpetrated in
the field. The Government claims that 10 soldiers have been
executed since 1989, and 30 more are under sentence of death
for crimes against civilians. The army, along with local
defense forces and village "spear and arrow" groups, also
performs police functions in rural areas. The Ugandan police
have been expanded in recent years, but much of the force is
corrupt, ill-trained, and poorly equipped. The Internal
Security Organization (ISO) is responsible for intelligence and
security.
Uganda's economic growth rate slowed to below 3 percent in 1991
from 3.2 percent in 1990 and over 6 percent in preceding
years. This was due primarily to the collapse of coffee prices
in 1989. Efforts to diversify the economy have increased
exports of tobacco, cotton, and tea, but coffee still provides
roughly 70 percent of the country's export earnings. As a
result of a deepening current account deficit, foreign aid
contributed 60 percent of government spending in 1991. In
accordance with reforms supported by the International Monetary
Fund, the number of government ministers was reduced from 72 to
38, and a reduction of 60,000 in the civil service was
announced. Inflation, which was brought down to 25 percent in
1990, is again on the rise. Little progress has been made to
alleviate rural poverty.
In 1991 the continuing insurgency in northern Uganda remained
the principal cause of most human rights abuses. Rebels
abducted, disfigured, raped, and killed civilians. NRA
operations in the area from March to June resulted in mass
detentions and incidents of rape and summary execution. About
1,000 persons the Government alleges were soldiers were
convicted of desertion and sentenced to 5- to 10-year prison
terms in administrative hearings without the benefit of due
process. Outside areas of unrest, there continued to be some
abuses: the Government arrested potential political opponents
and journalists, and prisoners were mistreated. At the end of
1991, over 150 Ugandans arrested since 1986 were awaiting trial
on treason charges. In response to criticism of its human
rights record, the Government established a high level ad hoc
426
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committee to address the situation, with a particular focus on
conditions in military barracks. The committee, however, had
not yet begun to function by year's end. Other problem areas
were the denial of peaceful assembly and association, the
inability of citizens to change their government through
democratic means, and persistent societal discrimination
against women. None of the five commissions of inquiry set up
to investigate human rights abuses in previous years had
released their findings by the end of 1991.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There is no evidence that the Government sanctioned political
killings in 1991; however, the army and police were responsible
for many civilian deaths (see Section l.g.). Policemen and
soldiers have also been implicated in armed robbery, extortion,
and murder outside of areas of insurgency.
b. Disappearance
Hundreds of civilians were uprooted by conflict, and not all
were accounted for by the end of 1991. Most of those detained
by the army were subsequently released or reappeared in
barracks or prison. An unknown number were abducted by rebels,
some of whom later escaped. No government-sponsored
disappearances are known to have occurred in 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
During the first half of 1991 the NRA reportedly tortured
prisoners in the field and in barracks. Suspects were
frequently beaten when apprehended and sometimes hobbled by
blows to the ankles. Some detainees were bound by the hands
and feet or suspended by the elbows behind the back and
beaten. Daily caning of some detainees resulted in festering
sores which bred m.aggots and caused death. A subcounty
chairman from Mbale was severely tortured by soldiers,
suspended by the hands for 2 days and beaten, causing paralysis
and temporary deafness. In a few instances, detainees were
shot or bayoneted in the feet, jabbed with nails and pins, and
burned with cigarettes and molten objects. In response, the
army replaced the general in command of the antirebel operation
in the North and launched an investigation, which was not
completed by the end of the year .
Eighteen prominent northerners, including former Minister of
State for Foreign and Regional Affairs Omara Atubo and NRC
members Zachary Olum and Irene Apio Julu, were beaten and
humiliated after their arrest on treason charges in April. One
suffered a fractured wrist, another internal bleeding, and most
incurred bruises as a result of being "frog marched" — cuffed by
the ankles and beaten as they were forced to shuffle along to
the aircraft that took them to Kampala. The Government
acknowledges that the 18 were tortured before they were brought
to detention in Kampala. Allegations that they have been
tortured since their arrival in Kampala have not been
substantiated.
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Beatings are occasionally administered at police stations.
Some 435 Muslim youths arrested in March for rioting were
allegedly tortured by the police. Most police torture,
however, is done in an unofficial capacity. Policemen
sometimes supplement their incomes by torturing or killing
civilians for a fee.
The InternationaJ Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited 23
prisons, 26 police stations, and 31 military barracks and NRA
detachments throughout Uganda in 1991. The Inspector General
of Government (IGG) visited three police stations and found no
evidence of torture. Planned IGG visits to other police
stations, prisons, and barracks were not carried out for lack
of resources. The visits were a genuine effort to ensure
proper treatment of prisoners, but their value was limited by
being arranged with the police in advance.
Conditions of detention are uniformly harsh. Food and sleep
deprivation is common since Luzira Prison, intended for 600
inmates, currently holds 2,000. Unhygienic conditions and
water shortages have caused epidemics of dysentery. Supplies
intended for detainees are often diverted for sale. Prisoners
do not have access to proper medical care, due in part to a
lack of transport and facilities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under Ugandan law, a suspect must be charged within 24 hours of
his arrest and brought to trial within 480 days. Neither
requirement is scrupulously enforced. The Public Order and
Security Act of 1967 (the "detention order") permits unlimited
detention without charge but was not invoked in 1991.
Treason is often used as a holding charge while investigations
are undertaken. Over 150 Ugandans arrested between 1986 and
1991 are awaiting trial on treason charges in 9 major cases.
Many appear to have been arbitrarily arrested. No evidence had
been presented by year's end against the 18 northern
politicians arrested in April, despite repeated assurances by
government officials of concern for the importance of their
case. The only offense committed by some was apparently to
advocate multiparty politics. Defense attorneys attempted
unsuccessfully to have the case dismissed on the grounds that
the charges were so vague as to be "fatally defective." The
High Court dismissed the petition on the grounds that the
defendants would simply be rearrested.
In August, 34 of 43 suspects held since 1988 in another treason
case were released for lack of evidence. The nine remaining
suspects, including prominent businessman Joseph Lusse, were
still being held for trial at the end of 1991. It is alleged
that they conspired to overthrow the Government by force of
arms and set up a training camp for that purpose in Mukono
between July and September 1988. Many other opposition figures
remained in detention on suspicion of treason at year's end.
In March and April, the NRA rounded up thousands of villagers
in the north and herded them into stadiums, military camps, and
open fields for screening. Over 2,000 were held without
shelter in Gulu stadium on March 30. Several hundred were
detained in Kitgiam. About 1,000 — who the Government claims are
soldiers — were convicted of desertion and sentenced to 5- to
10-year prison terms in administrative hearings without the
benefit of due process. Most of these were being held at
year's end in barracks and prisons around the country.
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Exile is not used as a means of political control. A
presidential amnesty for former rebels is in effect and applies
to opponents in exile. Those who return, however, may be
prosecuted for criminal acts they may have committed. A number
of prominent opposition figures have taken advantage of the
amnesty.
e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial
The right to a fair trial in Uganda is circumscribed by a
serious backlog of cases, a refusal by military authorities to
respect civilian court orders, the use of military field
tribunals in remote areas, and an inadequate system of judicial
administration .
The Ugandan court system consists of magistrate's courts, the
High Court, and the Supreme Court. The judicial system
contains procedural safeguards modeled after British law,
including the granting of bail and appeals to higher courts.
Members of the legal profession are highly educated and
generally respected. Accused persons, if brought to trial,
generally receive a fair public hearing, although the process
of justice is slow. There are no legal aid services for the
general public. The independence of the judiciary is limited
by the President's power to dismiss High Court and Supreme
Court judges. The President appoints the members of a judicial
service commission which must concur in all dismissals.
Resistance Councils (RC) in rural areas have authority to
settle civil disputes, such as questions about land ownership
or payment of bills at the local level. RC decisions may be
appealed in magistrate's courts. When an RC chairman exceeded
his authority by sentencing a woman to death for witchcraft,
and a local mob carried out the sentence, the RC officer was
charged with murder. Suspected thieves and other offenders
caught committing a crime are often subject to mob justice.
They are beaten or even killed without due process. Those
administering this justice are rarely prosecuted.
Military tribunals hear charges against soldiers, and any
soldier accused of a capital offense must be assigned counsel.
Punishment is strict, and several MRA soldiers have been
executed after being convicted by military tribunals. Those
found guilty serve time in civilian prisons. An NRA legal aid
scheme was established in August to defend soldiers in civil
and criminal cases on a limited basis. The NRA code of conduct
provides for field tribunals to dispense justice in remote
areas. An unknown number of soldiers and civilians were
executed by order of field tribunals in the spring.
The military persists in detaining people who have been
acquitted in courts of law. Military authorities commonly
ignore court orders to release detainees.
A 1989 law permitting the establishment of special magistrate's
courts in areas of insurgency has never been implemented.
Nevertheless, like the detention order, it is unlikely to be
revoked. Commissions charged with reforming and updating the
laws have not functioned for years.
The NRA claims that its detainees are military personnel —
deserters or rebels--not subject to civil law. They were
apparently denied due process, being convicted en masse without
appearing before courts-martial. They have not had access to
family, friends, or lawyers. Many have been tortured. Most of
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the persons held without charge in military barracks prior to
1991 have been released, except those charged with capital
offenses .
About half of those imprisoned in Uganda have not yet been
brought to trial. Government statistics show that some
detainees have been on remand for 5 years, and more than 500
have been held without trial for over 480 days. Prosecutors
have reportedly lost some 900 case files. In 1991 preparations
were under way to clear the backlog by releasing those who have
been held longer than the term to which they would likely be
sentenced. However, judges have proven unwilling to release
those charged with capital offenses even after 480 days.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In 1991 roads and communication channels were blocked and
house-to-house searches carried out in the army's
cordon-and-search operations in Gulu, Lira, Kitgura, and Apac
districts. Search warrants, which are required by law, were
not obtained for these operations.
Outside of areas of insurgency, the Government does not
generally intrude in the privacy, family, or home of citizens,
and there is no indication that the Government interfered with
private correspondence in 1991.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Abuses by both rebel and military forces escalated sharply in
northern Uganda in the spring. The NRA undertook a "final
offensive" against the insurgent United Democratic Christian
Army (UDCA) . UDCA rebels assassinated RC chairmen and others
associated with the NRM Government. They raided villages for
supplies, conducted forced recruitment, and abducted boys and
girls for porters and "wives." The rebels often disfigured
their victims, cutting off ears, fingers, noses, or genitals.
The Secretary of State for Defense, Major General David
Tinyefusa, told the Uganda Human Rights Activists organization
on May 11 that there was "no time to take captives" during the
cordon-and-search operation. Helicopters may have been used to
bomb civilian targets. There were unconfirmed reports of
civilian deaths and injuries caused by bombing missions on July
8, July 28, and July 30. After the offensive in the four
northern districts, the UDCA was reduced to small groups
engaged in banditry to survive. Tinyefusa was replaced by
General Mugisha Muntu at the conclusion of the operation.
Reports of abuses dropped off sharply following the change in
command .
Skirmishes around Gulu town early in March led to the shooting
of civilians and the burning of property. Later that month
security forces shot and killed several civilians when a public
meeting began to disperse before a government speaker had
arrived. The Government admits that 5 were killed; the
opposition Uganda People's Congress (UPC) claims that the
number was over 100. Also in March, villagers and peasants
were forcibly displaced from Loro village in Apac district by
the NRA.
At the end of March, soldiers in northern towns began
systematic house-to-house searches, detaining thousands of
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civilians who lacked poll tax receipts or other documentation
showing that they were legitimately employed or residents of
the area. They were often held without shelter or facilities
for days. An unknown number, probably less than 100, were shot
outright .
Some suspected rebels were reportedly forced into pits and
suffocated with smoke from fires lit around the edge.
According to some reports, NRA units herded villagers into huts
and burned them to death. In April, 22 were allegedly
incinerated at Karyoke, 14 others at Angole Awere, and an
unspecified number in other burning incidents in Gulu.
In the eastern Teso region, rebels of the Uganda People's Army
(UPA) engaged in low intensity insurgency throughout 1991. NRA
operations against the UPA did not entail the widespread
excesses seen in the north. However, the Government's Local
Defense Units (LDU) were responsible for numerous abuses.
LDU's are composed mainly of former rebels armed by the NRM to
protect villages from attack. Lacking discipline, they
frequently beat civilians, rape and pillage, and shoot
suspected rebels. The rebels have taken revenge on the same
villagers, particularly relatives of LDU members. The
Government has not disciplined the LDU's for these abuses.
Several thousand Ugandans were displaced in the southwest
during 1991 due to fighting on the Rwanda border. Civilians as
well as NRA troops have been killed as a result of combat
between the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Rwandan army.
Policemen and soldiers harass and kill civilians in nominally
peaceful areas. In one case a detachment commander and his
deputy were arrested for the murder of an RC chairman who had
reported their mistreatment of civilians. Both soldiers and
policemen are reliably reported to have taken prisoners for
ransom. Corruption and extortion have led to numerous cases of
harassment or violence as well as unlawful detention.
The Government has been slow to investigate reports of
extrajudicial killings, especially in areas of rebel activity.
It pleads a lack of office support and transport to carry out
investigations. However, soldiers have been punished for human
rights violations in the field under terms of the NRA code of
conduct. About 10 executions were reported in the press in the
first half of 1991, the same number that the Government claims
were executed in the 3 years since 1989.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech is restricted by a ban on partisan political
activity. Political parties may not hold press conferences or
organize public rallies. In the 1989 National Resistance
Council elections, candidates were prohibited from mentioning
party affiliation. In 1991 several outspoken politicians were
arrested, beaten, and charged with treason (see Section l.d.).
These arrests undoubtedly tightened self-censorship among
others. Despite these restrictions, open debate occurs in the
NRC, the media, and public forums. Public figures openly
criticize government policies, corruption, and human rights
abuses .
Over a dozen newspapers publish a wide range of viewpoints
covering the political spectrum. Despite the ban on partisan
431
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activity, several parties publish newspapers to promote their
views. The Democratic Party (DP) publication. The Citizen, is
often critical of government policy, as is the pro-DP magazine
Exposure. The NRM owns the New Vision, which has .accurately
reported on corruption in government and human rights abuses by
the NRA. It has also reprinted exaggerated allegations of
human rights abuses in Uganda that have appeared in foreign
publications to discredit the Government's critics.
Although the press enjoys considerable freedom, the NRA
detained some journalists during "Operation North," and others
have been arrested on sedition, defamation, and other charges.
John Baptist Kyeyune, editor of The Citizen, was arrested for
sedition after criticizing a NRA plan to disburse cash to
soldiers in lieu of food rations. He was released on bail, and
his case had not come to trial by the end of the year. Saul
Katabarwa, editor of the weekly Guide, was arrested for
defaming the Minister of Justice in November and later released
on bail. Captain Roland Kakooza, publisher of Economy and
Mulengera and an employee of the NRM secretariat, was also
charged with sedition in October. The Government canceled the
accreditation of British Broadcasting Corporation stringer
Epajjar Ejalu for allegedly filing opinionated stories. Teddy
Seezi Cheye, editor of Uganda Confidential, was issued a
criminal summons for selling a nonregistered publication, but
charges were dropped. Unlike the regimes that preceded it, the
NRM Government has not instituted formal censorship. However,
the legal provisions for doing so are still in force.
Uganda Television and Radio Uganda are controlled by the
Government . They disseminate NRM views but also broadcast
discussions of public policy that reflect a variety of opinion.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
All associations in Uganda must register with the Government.
Permits for public gatherings must be obtained from police
authorities, who have the right to deny the permit in the
interest of public safety. Although political parties are not
banned, political activity is not allowed; thus large
gatherings are usually held either on government-sponsored or
religious occasions. In rare cases, permits have been denied
to fundamentalist religious groups for fear of public
disturbances. Professional associations operate without
hindrance, as do international service associations.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion in Uganda. Christianity, Islam,
Hinduism, and African traditional religions are freely
practiced. Conversion between religions is not obstructed.
Foreign missionaries and other religious figures are generally
welcome in Uganda. There is no government control of religious
publications, even those with an antigovernment bias.
Religious leaders frequently speak out publicly on topics
relating to their followers' welfare, addressing in particular
human rights, security, and political issues.
In March four policemen were killed by Muslim demonstrators
protesting a decision by the Ugandan Supreme Court concerning
the authority of a rival Muslim leader. There were no reports
of casualties among demonstrators; 435 youths of the Tabliq
sect were arrested and charged with the murders. Four of their
number were separated for their own protection after being
sentenced to death by their colleagues as police informants.
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In December murder charges against all but 10 of the youths
were dropped, and 1 was released for lack of evidence. At the
end of the year, 10 were still held at Luzira prison on murder
charges, and 224 continued to be held for rioting and
maliciously damaging property.
The Jehovah's Witnesses experienced problems receiving
residence permits and constructing houses of worship in 1990.
In 1991 the Church was denied the status of a nongovernmental
organization because it does not allow its followers to
participate in civic duties. As a result, the Church cannot
legally host foreign missionaries, and most have been required
to leave. Some adherents of the Church have been questioned
about their allegiance to the state, and some have been warned
by district officials not to hold services.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement was severely curtailed during military
operations in the north. The four affected districts were
cordoned off for 3 months. Roadblocks — notably one at Karuma
bridge on the main route to the north — prevented many civilians
from entering or leaving the region. Routine commerce was
restored to much of the north during the summer. Travel in the
east, and particularly Karamoja in the northeast, remains
difficult due to sporadic attacks by armed bandits.
Ugandans are free to emigrate and to travel abroad.
Uganda accommodates refugees from Sudan, Rwanda, Kenya, Zaire,
and other countries. There were 149,000 registered and an
estimated 150,000 unregistered refugees in Uganda in 1991.
Most of the latter are Rwandans who have lived in Uganda since
the early 1960's. A further influx of 9,000 resulted from the
invasion of Rwanda from Ugandan territory by the Rwandan
Patriotic Front in October 1990. The number of Sudanese
refugees in Uganda increased from about 59,000 at the beginning
of the year to 67,000 at the end of 1991. Most of the new
Sudanese refugees were young men fleeing forced conscription by
the Sudanese People's Liberation Army. There were no instances
of expulsion or forced repatriation of refugees in 1991.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Ugandan citizens cannot change their government by democratic
means. Representatives are popularly elected to local RC ' s
which in turn elect representatives to higher RC's up to the
National Resistance Council. Special district and women's
representatives, cabinet ministers, presidential appointees,
and "historical members" also serve on the NRC President
Museveni serves as chief executive. Minister of Defense, and
Chairman of the National Executive Council. He was not elected
and has never faced a vote of confidence. District
administrators, who can overrule RC's, are also directly
appointed. There are no meaningful checks and balances on
presidential power. Since independence in 1962 Uganda has
never had an orderly change of government, and the NRM has
failed to provide that opportunity for 6 years.
A 21-member constitutional commission appointed in December
1988 conducted seminars throughout the country and solicited
proposals on Uganda's future form of government. The
consultative process was completed in 1991, and a draft
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constitution is expected to be completed by June 1992. The
process of ratification has not yet been determined. The
Government proposed that the draft constitution be submitted to
the NRC and the NRA Council for ratification, while others have
called for a constituent assembly to be elected for the
purpose. President Museveni has pledged that the future
constitution will be based on the preferences of the public
rather than on a NRM blueprint.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Although the NRM created several bodies to address human rights
abuses in Uganda, no official findings have ever been issued.
The Uganda Human Rights Commission was created to investigate
abuses perpetrated before 1986, but its work has been hampered
by lack of resources. The Office of the Inspector General of
Government (IGG) was originally charged with investigating,
inter alia, human rights abuses, but in October President
Museveni directed it to focus solely on corruption. In August
the President named an official ad hoc committee to investigate
the status of persons held on remand and in military barracks,
but the committee had not visited any places of detention by
the end of the year .
There are two local, nongovernmental organizations that deal
with human rights: the Uganda Human Rights Activists and the
Uganda Law Society. Two human rights conferences were held
during the year. Both conferences included open criticism of
the Government's human rights record and of the lack of a
permanent official body charged with investigating abuses.
Representatives of Amnesty International met officials of the
Uganda Law Society, the Ministry of Justice, the Uganda Human
Rights Activists, and the Commission of Prisons in August.
However, the Government did not permit them to visit prisons
except in the presence of prison officers. The New York Bar
Association and other human rights groups also carried out
inquiries in Uganda in 1991. The Bar Association issued its
report in July which was highly critical of human rights
conditions in the country. Nevertheless, release of the report
was covered in the local media.
In April the Human Rights Unit in the Commonwealth Secretariat
held a workshop for Ugandan, Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Zimbabwean
officials in Mukono.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Africans of three ethnic groups — Bantu (south), Nilotic
(north), and Nilo-hamitic (east) — constitute most of the
population. Of these groups, the Bantu is the largest and
includes the Baganda, which, with more than 1 million members,
is the largest tribe. Ethnic divisions have been aggravated by
civil conflict. The Acholi and Langi of northern Uganda feel
oppressed by the Bantus of the south. They point to the NRA's
harsh tactics in the north, low investment in the region, and
Bantu overrepresentation in the Cabinet, ministries, and the
military command as evidence of discrimination. The
Banyankole, Baganda, and other Southern tribes, in turn, fear
and distrust the northerners who have traditionally dominated
the military. Many Ugandans disdain the Karamojong as violent
and underdeveloped, an attitude encouraged by the group's
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penchant for raiding cattle. The NRM's broad-based cabinets
were intended to knit these groups together, but ethnic
discrimination persists.
The Government has made a determined effort to redress
discrimination based on sex. Women hold positions of
responsibility at all levels of government. In the NRC, 38
women hold positions, and 4 are cabinet ministers. A Ministry
of Women's Affairs was established in 1988. Women have been
appointed judges, and women representatives to the NRC were
elected from each district in 1989. Women are represented on
the Uganda Human Rights Commission, the Education Policy Review
Commission, and the Uganda Constitutional Commission. At the
end of 1991, labor laws relating to women were reviewed by the
National Organization of Trade Unions, the Federation of Uganda
Employers, and government ministries.
Discrimination against women, especially in rural areas,
continues as a result of traditional and family laws.
Customary laws which discriminate against women are still
recognized in the areas of adoption, marriage, divorce, burial,
devolution of property on death, or other matters of personal
law in which customary law is recognized. Women may not own or
inherit property or have custody of their children under
customary law. Adultery by men is treated more leniently than
adultery by women. Women jeopardize their Ugandan citizenship
by marrying a foreigner, whereas foreign women who marry
Ugandans automatically receive Ugandan citizenship. The
Ugandan Women's Lawyers Association estimates that 50 percent
of marriages in Uganda are polygamous. Women do most of the
agricultural work. The International Federation of Women
Lawyers established a legal aid clinic in Uganda in 1988 to
deal with disputes rising out of these inequities.
President Museveni and other Government officials have spoken
out against violence against women, and in 1990 the NRC passed
a law which allows the death penalty for rape. Wife beating
remains a pervasive problem, however, and, fearing divorce or
embarrassment, women seldom report such abuse to the
authorities. Some women continue to view wife beating as a
customary practice and are not aware that it is against the
law. The Ugandan Women's Association distributes a leaflet
entitled "Wife Beating is Against the Law" to inform women of
their rights. In 1991 the Federation of Uganda Women Lawyers
Association published a research report "Violence Against Women
in Uganda" which found that such violence is endemic in Kampdla
district. Most Ugandan ethnic groups do not engage in female
circumcision, and the Government actively discourages the
practice where it does occur, mainly among tribes in Eastern
Uganda .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Ugandan law recognizes the right of workers to form unions, but
in practice that right only applies to private sector workers.
In November 1990, the Deputy Minister of Labor announced that
the law would be amended to allow civil servants to unionize.
The National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU) is a national
labor federation which all unions in Uganda are required to
join. NOTU has long demanded that teachers, nurses, lecturers,
professors, and other public workers should be permitted to
form unions .
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NOTU's influence on the overall economy remains marginal, since
about 90 percent of the Ugandan work force consists of peasant
farmers. Even among industrial workers, high inflation and
lack of transportation have made it difficult for individual
unions to organize, especially outside the major commercial
centers of Kampala and Jinja.
The right to strike is also recognized by law, but the
Government expects all efforts at reconciling labor disputes to
be exhausted before workers resort to strikes. They must first
submit their grievances and notice to strike to the Minister of
Labor. Under the Trades Disputes Arbitration and Settlement
Act, the Industrial Court hears trade disputes referred to it
either by the Minister of Labor or the parties to the dispute.
NOTU has proposed that the right to strike be recognized in the
future constitution.
Three successful strikes occurred in 1991. In May six
Tanzanian instructors at Soroti flying school went on strike
after going unpaid for 8 months. In July TUMPECO workers also
struck over unpaid salaries. In September employees of the
Kakira sugar works won a 70-percent wage increase after
shutting down the factory and blockading the premises.
A tripartite committee composed of NOTU, the Federation of
Uganda Employers (FUE), and relevant government ministries was
instituted in mid-1991 to recommend amendments to outdated
labor laws, many of which were enacted 30 years ago. On May 1,
the committee announced the reintroduction of an industrial
training council and submitted a new employment act to the
Attorney General. The Ministry of Public Service announced an
implementation and monitoring board to handle the reduction of
workers and justify layoffs in the civil service. NOTU freely
exercises the right to affiliate with and participate in
regional and international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is recognized by
law and established in practice. Unionization and collective
bargaining are common in the industrial wage sector but are
much less significant in the agricultural sector. Although the
National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers exists,
the vast majority of small cultivators organize themselves on
the basis of cooperatives for the purpose of selling their
crops. Union officials are not harassed, and unions have
access to the Industrial Court.
There are no export processing zones in Uganda.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is prohibited by law. No inspections or
sanctions are in place to enforce the law, but there is little
evidence of forced labor in Uganda.
Under the NRA code of conduct, soldiers tried by military
tribunals may be sentenced to forced labor as part of their
punishment. At present applications for discharge are made on
an individual basis; in practice, soldiers who want to leave
simply desert. The National Resistance Army Bill of 1991
introduced a 9-year term of service for enlisted men.
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d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Employers are prohibited from recruiting workers below the age
of 12. The minimum age is widely expected to be raised by the
proposed Employment Act. Many children are nevertheless
employed out of economic necessity. Enforcement of mimimum age
restrictions by the Ministry of Labor is limited.
e. Acceptable Conditions o£ Work
No explicit minimum wage policy exists in Uganda. Wages are
set by negotiation between unions and employers or by the
boards of directors of state-owned industries. This results in
glaring wage discrepancies between the civil service and the
private sector. A government worker does not earn enough to
provide a decent living for a family. Thus, many find second
jobs, grow their own food, or engage in pilferage or corruption
in order to feed their families and pay school fees. Although
there is no legal maximum workweek, the normal workweek is 48
hours, and time and a half must be paid for each additional
hour worked .
The only occupational health and safety legislation in place is
contained in the outdated Factories Act of 1954, which
concentrates on engineering aspects of work and does not
address many present day working hazards. It is enforced by
the Ministry of Labor's Department of Occupational Health but,
in practice, little inspection takes place due to lack of
resources .
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President Mobutu Sese Seko, having ruled Zaire for 26 years,
has molded a highly personalized and centralized governmental
system. Until 1990 his Popular Movement of the Revolution
(MPR) was the sole legal party, and all government institutions
were considered its organs. Faced with rising popular
dissatisfaction, he announced in April 1990 the beginning of
democratic reform that would lead to a new constitution and
three-party elections. However, opposition discontent
continued and resulted in the President's acceptance of less
restricted pluralism. By the end of 1991, approximately 300
political parties had registered. Many of the new parties, it
was charged, were created at the instigation of the Government
itself to divide the opposition.
During this period, the opposition also pressured President
Mobutu into accepting a National Conference (NC) which,
following a series of postponements, was convened in August.
From the start, the NC was stymied by boycotts and by
widespread suspicion of delegate-rigging and rules
manipulation. In September an army mutiny and civil riots
followed by countrywide disturbances exacerbated the sense of
governmental crisis. Attempts to organize an opposition-led
coalition government were aborted when President Mobutu
dismissed Prime Minister-designate Etienne Tshisekedi. The
latter refused to acknowledge Mobutu's 1974 Constitution.
Following the dissolution of a short-lived administration under
Prime Minister Bernard Mungul Diaka, President Mobutu named
Nguz A Karl-I-Bond Prime Minister. At year's end, serious
doubt existed as to the ability of the Nguz Government to lead
the country and about the willingness of President Mobutu to
cooperate with opposition forces in solving the governmental
crisis. The National Conference, which had been suspended,
reconvened in December, but it is unclear to what extent it
will be allowed to exercise sovereignty and chart the political
future of Zaire.
In addition to the armed security forces (including "elite"
units, such as the Special Presidential Division-DSP), security
services include the National Service for Intelligence and
Protection (SNIP), the Military Intelligence and Security
Service (SARM), the Civil Guard, and the National Gendarmerie.
The Gendarmerie, while a branch of the military, is charged
with providing basic police services in the absence of national
or local police forces. Elements from virtually all of these
forces engaged in looting during the mutinies in September and
October. As a result of these incidents, there remained
serious questions as to what de facto or de jure chain of
command existed within the armed forces. All of these
agencies, along with the armed forces' DSP, were employed to
quell internal dissent and were responsible for human rights
abuses, including arbitrary harassment, physical mistreatment,
and unauthorized detention. There are unconfirmed reports of a
secret, special operations force (see Section l.b.). While
human rights guidelines were issued to the security forces in
1990, there has been no discernible improvement in their
observance of human rights.
Zaire's mixed economy has been stagnant for an extended period
owing to crumbling infrastructure, mismanagement, capital
depletion in the state-owned corporations, and official
corruption. In 1991 export earnings declined precipitously.
The inflation rate at the end of the year was almost 4,000
percent, and annual per capita income had fallen to less than
$100. The September 23-24 riots included systematic looting
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and ransacking of commercial and industrial sites, thus
undermining investor confidence and resulting in the loss of at
least 100,000 wage-paying jobs in the Kinshasa area alone.
Human rights in Zaire remained seriously restricted in 1991.
As in previous years, Zairians remained subject to arbitrary
detention and physical mistreatment. The justice system was
crippled by political interference, a shortage of trained
personnel, and a prolonged magistrates' strike. Despite
increased openness in the political dialog, politically
motivated violence and harassment continued. In early
September, Kinshasa party offices of two opposition parties,
the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) and the
Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans (UFERI), were
attacked in separate incidents, resulting in loss of life,
multiple injuries, and property damage. During the violence of
September 23-24 and subsequent rioting in October, a large
share of looting and plundering was carried out by security
forces. Although over 1,000 military personnel and deserters
were subsequently arrested by authorities, security personnel
nonetheless have continued to victimize and dispossess private
citizens .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Zairian security forces have often employed excessive force in
responding to public demonstrations. Protests by the political
opposition and others opposed to conditions in Zaire have
frequently resulted in loss of life; the frequency of these
incidents and the rarity of disciplinary action indicate that
the use of excessive and lethal force is condoned by the
authorities .
Controversy continues to surround the University of Lubumbashi
incident of May 1990, in which masked commandos assaulted
students in a nighttime raid and inflicted an unknown number of
deaths and injuries. The Government resisted an independent
inquiry to determine the actual number of casualties or fully
identify the perpetrators. The Government eventually
acknowledged that one student had been killed (independent
estimates vary widely, with some alleging over 100 deaths). As
a result of the official government investigation, 15
government officials were brought to trial in March 1991 on
charges ranging from murder to failure to assist persons in
danger. In May the Zairian Supreme Court handed down
convictions for 10 of the 15, including the former governor of
Shaba, Kogalialo Ngbase (sentenced to 15 years for murder),
former regional commander Lokiyo (12 years), former
documentation officer Uba (10 years), and former immigration
officer Gata (13 years). A student activist, Digekisa Piluka,
was also tried in the same proceeding but escaped detention and
fled to asylum in Belgium prior to his conviction and
sentencing to 13 years and 6 months in prison. Despite these
convictions, the extent of the involvement of security forces
in the Lubumbashi attack has not been and may never be
adequately addressed, leaving considerable question as to
whether all those responsible have been brought to account.
The United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) was
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ZAIRE
permitted to send an investigator to conduct a closely
monitored 1-day inquiry. The UNHRC Report has not yet been
released .
Several additional incidents of violent suppression of protest
or unrest occurred during 1991. In the Shaba region community
of Luena, seven persons were killed and six wounded in a
confrontation with gendarmes on July 16. The victims had
assembled at Gendarmerie headquarters to protest the arrest
hours earlier of a member of the ■ youthwing of UFERI . Although
Gendarmerie officials later claimed to have fired into the
crowd in self-defense and insisted they had been faced with a
well-armed mob, these claims are widely disputed by credible
observers .
On September 2, Civil Guard troops and gendarmes responded with
lethal force to disperse opposition party militants who had
formed a march and blocked streets to protest stalemate at the
National Conference. At least two persons were killed in the
random gunfire employed by security forces. Gendarmerie troops
also invaded a UDPS office on the same afternoon, wounding two
persons, one fatally, in the ensuing melee.
b. Disappearance
Reports of disappearance in Zaire are frequent but, by their
nature, difficult to verify. There is widespread belief among
the Kinshasa population that security forces employ short-term
abduction as a means to intimidate the population. Following
disturbances in Kinshasa, on December 3, 1990, human rights
groups reported the disappearance of some 170 young activists
who had taken part in the protests. While many of these were
later released, as many as 50 were still in government custody
in February 1991 without having been formally charged.
Similarly, after the 1990 Lubumbashi assault, there were
reports of missing students. Many of these students were
subsequently accounted for. However, as the incident has never
been adequately investigated to the satisfaction of independent
observers, it has been impossible to ascertain whether any of
the students remain missing.
The independent press, human rights observers, and private
citizens attributed mysterious disappearances during the year
to a secret special operations force, allegedly formed within
the security services, with the mission of carrying out
abductions and other forms of intimidation. The existence of
the unit, popularly known as "Les Hiboux" (the owls — a name
shared by a unit of the DSP) has not been acknowledged by the
Government in any context or otherwise verified.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is forbidden by Zairian law, and its use is proscribed
by official policy. However, it is common for security
personnel to employ beating and other forms of mistreatment in
routine criminal interrogations. As noted above,
disproportionate force is frequently used to disperse public
demonstrations. One of the most unusual reports of cruel
treatment in 1991 involved the use by security forces in April
of an apparently modified water cannon to spray scalding water
on demonstrators in the Limete district of Kinshasa. Doctors
at Kinshasa Mama Yemo hospital reported dozens of admissions
for water-burn treatment following the incident.
440
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Private citizens continue to be beaten and robbed by security
officials. Security personnel were reported to have taken
advantage of a curfew imposed following the September 23-24
disturbances to enter private homes and remove occupants'
belongings. Reports of physical abuse and robbery by security
personnel have persisted since the lifting of the curfew.
Prisons in Zaire are primitive, ill-equipped, underfinanced,
and overcrowded. Illness and malnutrition constitute the most
immediate threat to the well-being of inmates. In July the
national radio service broadcast a report indicating that
prisoners in the Bandundu central prison had not been provided
with food or medical care for the previous 2 months and that
"many" had died as a result.
The human rights organization Voice of the Voiceless (VSV) , in
a report issued in January, cited deteriorating conditions in
prisons across the country as a cause of increased prisoner
morbidity. VSV reported that, in a 2-week period during
November 1990, 10 deaths were recorded in Makala prison in
Kinshasa and 51 in Kassapa and Bolono prisons in Lubumbashi,
mainly due to poor nutrition and primitive conditions. In May
the Zairian League of Human Rights (LZDH) noted that Makala
prison had been unable to provide food to prisoners for a
period of 5 consecutive days during that month and alleged that
"several" prisoners had died each day during the period. The
LZDH report also cited the lack of medical treatment at Makala
and reported that at least 42 prisoners were in urgent need of
attention.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under Zairian law, a warrant is not required for the arrest of
a suspect for a crime punishable by more than 6 months
imprisonment. Any law enforcement officer having the status of
"judicial police officer" is empowered to authorize arrest.
This status is vested in senior officers of each of the
security services. The law also provides that arrestees must
be brought before a magistrate within 48 hours for a hearing.
If sufficient grounds for arrest are presented, the magistrate
may order continued detention for an initial period of 15 days,
followed by renewable 30-day periods.
In practice, these safeguards against arbitrary detention have
not had a significant effect, and long periods of detention
without recourse to due process or judicial review are common.
Judicial oversight of detention centers is mandated by law but
is largely nonexistent. This chronic shortcoming, due in part
to a lack of personnel and material infrastructure, was
exacerbated by a magistrates strike in May over inflation-
ravaged wages and poor working conditions (see Section I.e.).
National Security Council guidelines issued in 1990 to end
unlawful and incommunicado detentions and the practice of
internal exile await implementation and thus have had minimal
impact on security force behavior. While military judicial
procedures carry roughly the same legal safeguards as those
provided for civilians, these too are frequently disregarded.
Traditionally, persons detained for political reasons have been
held by nonjudicial means such as administrative detention,
house arrest, or internal exile. These cases are rarely
brought to trial .
441
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Long periods of incarceration without trial (or even charges
being filed) are common for many detainees. In May the LZDH
reported that it had identified 91 prisoners in Makala prison
who had been held for 1 year or more without charge. In the
same report, it cited 116 cases where inmates recommended for
conditional release by the authorities nonetheless remained in
prison .
As many political detainees are held for only short periods, it
is impossible to determine the actual number of political
detainees or prisoners at any given moment. Although the
National Security Council, in its 1990 reform declaration,
acknowledged the existence of political detainees for the first
time, the Government has never provided an accounting of the
extent of the practice.
Internal exile appears to be losing favor as a means of
detention — there were no known new cases in 1990 or 1991.
Also, in mid-1991 former army chief of staff General Mukobo
Mudende was released from a 1987 banishment order restricting
him to the remote village of Isangi.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is not independent of the executive branch and
has been consistently responsive to priorities and objectives
set by the Government and the Presidency.
The capacity of the judicial system to deliver fair and
impartial justice in civil and criminal disputes has been
further compromised by a longstanding pattern of corruption and
intimidation by central government authorities, especially in
politically sensitive cases and those involving property «nd
labor disputes. These limitations of the system were
compounded in 1991 by the magistrates' strike which placed the
courts in a state of general paralysis, effectively eliminating
them as an avenue of recourse for most citizens. Magistrates
continued to perform duties in cases deemed important and
operated a duty officer system to provide minimal court
functions but otherwise largely ceased to perform their
duties. The strike ended in December, but the conditions
giving rise to it remained largely unresolved at year's end.
The Zairian legal system is based on Belgian and customary
law. It includes the district courts, appellate courts in each
region, the Supreme Court, and the Court of State Security.
While most cases are initiated at the local level, charges of
misconduct filed against "high officials" (e.g., ministers and
governors) are taken directly to the Supreme Court.
The Constitution provides defendants with the right to a public
trial and defense counsel. The right of appeal is provided in
all cases except for national security, armed robbery, and
smuggling cases adjudicated by the Court of State Security.
When a defendant is unable to afford his own lawyer, the law
provides for court-appointed defense counsel at state expense
in capital cases, all proceedings before the Supreme Court, and
other cases where requested by the court concerned. In
practice, these guarantees are applied unevenly at best. Many
defendants may never meet counsel or, if so, only after months
of detention and interrogation. With only 500 lawyers and 600
magistrates in all of Zaire, the modern legal system is unable
to meet the country's judicial needs, even when functioning
effectively. The majority of legal disputes in Zaire are,
therefore, adjudicated by local administrative officials or
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ZAIRE
traditional authorities with predictably varying compliance
with acceptable procedure. The Ministry of Citizens' Rights
and Liberties, created in 1986 to act as the ultimate guarantor
of human rights in Zaire, had virtually no impact as a watchdog
against human rights abuses and focused instead on industrial
and property conflicts and civil disputes. It was absorbed by
the Ministry of Justice in 1991.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
While the law requires security forces to have a warrant prior
to searching a home, security forces in practice enter and
search private homes at will. The privacy of homes and offices
of political opposition leaders is routinely violated (see
Section 2 . b . ) .
In the aftermath of the nationwide urban rioting and looting of
late September-October 1991, security forces entered the homes
of private citizens under the guise of seeking recovery of
stolen goods and seized personal possessions for their own use.
Although it is widely believed that Zairian security services
open private mail and tap telephone conversations, these
practices have not been documented.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These rights suffered serious setbacks in 1991. While the
Constitution provides for the citizen's right to express
opinions and feelings freely, these rights are subordinate to
"public order and good conduct." Until the recent past, these
limitations had a chilling effect on public discourse.
Beginning in 1990, the limits of political dialog and debate
expanded considerably. Although the broadcast media remained
under government control, an energetic free press emerged in
Kinshasa and, to a lesser extent, in other cities. Over a
dozen independent newspapers in Kinshasa began aggressively
reporting on national and international events.
The sincerity of President Mobutu's commitment to democratic
reform, his personal finances, governing style, and 26-year
record in power were the frequent targets of scrutiny by the
independent press. The views of opposition party leaders and
democratic reformers were openly discussed and debated.
The impact of an independent press, however, was largely
limited to Kinshasa. Distribution to the interior is severely
limited by transportation and other obstacles, and very few
papers leave the city limits. Moreover, the security services
blocked wider distribution in the interior, in some cases, by
buying up any surplus copies which may have been available for
distribution by air.
The Government's tolerance of print medium independence
diminished in 1991. There were serious incidents of harassment
of editors and publishers, apparently with the intent of
influencing treatment of the news through intimidation.
Security forces vandalized the offices of several Kinshasa
newspapers and detained and held for interrogation members of
their staffs.
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The most concerted intimidation effort was directed against
editor Essolomwa Khoy and the staff of Elima, a Kinshasa daily
which was arguably the most professionally run- paper in the
country and also a harsh critic of President Mobutu.
Essolomwa, who had been arrested in 1990, was arrested again in
May 1991 after having published an article critical of the
conduct of the 'Zairian armed forces in Rwanda. On October 16,
uniform-clad persons ransacked Elima offices and started a
fire. Essolomwa vowed to continue publishing, but on October
27 the Elima press room was completely destroyed by a massive
explosion of unexplained origin. In the aftermath, many
smaller independent papers vanished temporarily because print
shops did not want to risk servicing them.
Radio and television, the only media which are capable of
reaching nationwide audiences, remain under the control of the
Government. Nightly newscasts report government activities in
the most favorable light and, with some short-lived exceptions,
assume a proregime and pro-Mobutu slant when reporting on
controversial subjects. Perhaps in reaction to the
liberalizing trends in the print sector early in the year, some
individual broadcast journalists attempted to sway policy at
the Office of Zairian Radio and Television (OZRT) toward more
liberal treatment of the news. OZRT increased, albeit
meagerly, its presentation of alternative views in radio and
television broadcasts in 1991, broadcasting in July a two-part
debate focused on the planned National Conference. During the
aborted October effort to forge a coalition government, parties
aligned against the MPR received increased coverage on nightly
newscasts .
In the confusion surrounding the foreclosing of negotiations
for a coalition government, dissident telejournalists seized
control of broadcast facilities in late October, apologized on
the air for biased coverage, and demanded the resignation of
the president of OZRT. For 1 day a standard videotape of the
President, which normally opened and closed all news
broadcasts, was taken off the air. Authorities acted quickly
to reassert control, however, temporarily replacing dissidents
with military personnel and a few loyalist journalists willing
to resume past broadcasting practices.
Foreign journalists are permitted to operate in Zaire. In
spite of the confused situation in Zaire since September 23,
foreign journalists have been able to enter Zaire to report on
the security and government crisis.
The university system in Zaire was largely disf unctional in
1991 due to student unrest and the Government's inability to
pay faculty. The 1991 university year had not begun at year's
end. While scholars continue to publish independent works,
government tolerance of academic freedom was largely untested
in 1991.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right of the people to assemble peaceably has never been
firmly established in Zaire. Nonetheless, in 1991 political
movements were allowed sufficient freedom to build party
organizations, hold rallies, and otherwise conduct their
affairs in an open fashion. While less common than in the
past, there continued to be incidents of harassment and
violence perpetrated against independent groups, creating an
atmosphere of uncertainty concerning the security of public and
private gatherings. In September party offices of the UDPS and
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UFERI parties were ransacked in two separate incidents.
Security forces in the first case and MPR activists in the
second appeared to have seized on the general urban unrest as
an opportunity to assault and intimidate political opponents of
the status quo.
Zairian security forces are not trained to perform effective
crowd control and often respond to unsanctioned gatherings
(either organized or spontaneous) with unwarranted or
disproportionate force as a preemptive measure or out of
concern for their own well-being. On October 21, an orderly,
peaceful march by 15,000 opposition supporters, expressing
solidarity with embattled erstwhile Prime Minister-designate
Etienne Tshisekedi, was subjected to a tear gas attack by
security forces even though it posed no apparent threat to
public safety. In the ensuing panic, several persons were
injured, some seriously.
President Mobutu's disestablishment of the MPR as the nation's
sole legal political movement (with mandatory universal
membership) has freed private organizations of some
constraints, and they are now free to organize and conduct
their affairs without political obligations being imposed upon
them by the Government .
c. Freedom of Religion
Religious freedom is recognized in the Constitution, but there
are significant restrictions on some groups. The population is
about 50 percent Catholic, 36 percent Protestant and
Kimbanguist (a Zairian Christian church), and 5 percent Muslim.
Indigenous beliefs and religious traditions are also strong.
Officially recognized religions are free to establish places of
worship and to train clergy, but the process for becoming
officially recognized is fairly restrictive. The Jehovah's
Witnesses and a number of other small religious groups and
sects, banned in 1986 on charges of subversive activities or
fraud, remained banned in 1991. Most recognized churches have
external ties and expatriates are allowed to proselytize.
There is no legally favored church or religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
All citizens, refugees, and permanent residents must carry
identity cards, and police and soldiers sometime set up
checkpoints on major roads to inspect papers. While passports
and exit permits are in principle available to all citizens,
the Government has interfered with individual travel in the
past by denying these documents.
The Government has practiced a liberal asylum policy,
permitting refugees and other displaced persons to enter freely
and providing adequate land for refugee camps or resettlement.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
maintains a permanent office in Kinshasa and is the lead
international agency on refugee affairs. There were no known
incidents of forced repatriation of genuine refugees in 1991.
Some 465,000 refugees and other displaced persons are currently
in Zaire, including about 300,000 Angolans. The number of
Sudanese refugees in the northeastern corner of Zaire rose from
40,000 to over 110,000 in 1991 and was still growing, while the
number of Burundis rose from 13,000 to 43,000.
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ZAIRE
Approximately 61,000 Zairians are registered as refugees in
neighboring countries. An estimated 7,000 to 10,000 persons,
many of them non-Zairian, fled from Zaire to the Congo during
the September civil unrest. Would-be returnees are dealt with
an a case by case basis.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens still did not have this right in 1991. However, moved
in part by political reform efforts in neighboring countries,
they signified their desire for change through demonstrations
and support for the emerging opposition parties, notably the
"Holy Union" alliance of several of the larger opposition
parties such as UDPS, the Christian Social Democratic Party,
and (for a time) UFERI . At year's end. President Mobutu,
backed by the military and the MRP, still continued to control
the Government, even though his power was ebbing in the face of
the worsening economic crisis and continuing public and
international demands for reform. In responding throughout the
year, the President moved to control the pace of political
reform, in part by splitting the opposition. In October, for
example, at a crucial moment in the process he dismissed Prime
Minister-designate and UDPS leader Etienne Tshisekedi, who had
been charged with forming a government of national unity, and
instead nominated Bernard Mungul Diaka, the head of a small
party with disputed opposition credentials. Mobutu resisted
calls for a National Conference through the first half of the
1991. Once the National Conference was under way, the
Presidency, the MPR, and the United Democratic Front (FDU-a new
Mobutuist political grouping) engaged in intensive
behind-the-scenes efforts to exert control over the process.
Thus, at the end of 1991, while over 300 political parties had
been formed and the President had promised freely contested
elections for all offices, including the Presidency, it
remained an open question whether this would actually occur.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Several independent Zairian human rights organizations have
been active since early 1990, including the Zairian League of
Human Rights, the Voice of the Voiceless, and the Zairian
Association for the Defense of Human Rights. All of these have
been aggressive in reporting and documenting human rights
abuses as well as in issuing reports on the Government's
ability to provide the population with basic human needs
(health care, education, etc.). These organizations operate
openly and have not been subject to harassment despite the
consistently critical tone of their reports.
The Government has consistently rejected efforts by
international and private human rights organizations to
investigate individual cases of alleged human rights abuse.
The refusal to permit an outside incjuiry concerning the
Lubumbashi incident of 1990, despite demands by the Government
of Belgium, local officials, and others, is an example of the
Government's willingness to endure international criticism
rather than allow independent investigation. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) maintains a resident office
in Kinshasa and monitors general conditions in Zairian
prisons. At times, ICRC access to prisons has been impeded by
the Government .
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ZAIRE
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Zaire's diverse population of 34 million includes over 200
separate ethnic groups. Four indigenous languages have been
accorded official status, while French is the language of
government, commerce, and education. The President has been
careful to divide political offices among ethnic groups, but
members of his own Ngbandi tribe are disproportionately
represented at the highest levels of the security and
intelligence services. In addition, the Special Presidential
Division, the best equipped and trained element of the armed
services, is overwhelmingly dominated by members of the
President's ethnic group.
Women occupy a secondary role in traditional Zairian life.
They are the primary farm laborers and small traders while also
exclusively responsible for chi Idrear ing . In the
nontradit ional sector, it is common for women to receive less
pay for equal work while few can aspire to positions of high
responsibility and salary. Women receive less education than
men. A recent U.N. study indicates that females in Zaire
receive only one-third of the schooling of males. While women
are represented in the professions and civil service and have
held cabinet positions in the past, it remains rare for a woman
to occupy a position in which she would exercise authority over
male professionals.
Women are required by law to obtain their spouse's permission
prior to engaging in routine legal transactions, such as
selling or renting real estate, opening a bank account,
accepting employment, or applying for a passport. A 1987
revision to the family code does permit a widow to inherit her
husband's property and provides some protection for a married
woman's right to control her own property and receive a
property settlement in the event of divorce.
Neither the Government nor women's organizations have addressed
the issue of domestic violence. This issue has also been
ignored by the press and human rights groups, despite general
acknowledgement that it occurs and indeed may be common.
Female circumcision is not generally practiced in Zaire, but it
is believed to occur to some extent among some isolated groups
in northern Zaire.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Before 1990 the labor movement was limited by statute to the
National Union of Zairian Workers (UNTZa), which was an
integral part of the MPR. After the President promised on
April 24, 1990, to allow labor pluralism to coincide with the
promised political liberalization, the UNTZa declared itself
independent of the MPR and reorganized itself with new
leadership chosen through elections which were deemed by most
outside observers to be relatively free and fair.
Several new labor organizations emerged in 1990-91, most of
which are organized according to occupational groups. Some
have antecedents in labor organizations which existed in the
early years of Zaire's independence. While most have yet to
receive official government recognition, several have already
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ZAIRE
had an impact in the workplace by employing various means
(including wildcat strikes) to push for improvements in pay and
conditions .
The right to strike is recognized in Zairian law, but, because
the law also provides for lengthy (and mandatory) arbitration
and appeal proqedures, legal strikes have been rare.
Nonetheless, strikes have occurred. The most important strike
in 1991 was the magistrates' strike and a civil service work
stoppage. The civil servants' strike has since ended. While
the Government has used force to put down strikes in the past,
there were no attempts to coerce workers to return to their
jobs in 1991.
UNTZa participates actively in the continentwide official trade
union body, the Organization of African Trade Union Unity, and
maintains ties with a number of foreign trade union
organizations. The new unions are only beginning to explore
establishing foreign labor ties.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Over the past several years, the UNTZa has negotiated nearly
1,000 collective bargaining agreements. Under an existing
arrangement between the UNTZa and the Zairian Employers
Association (ANEZA) , wages and prices have been fixed jointly
on an annual basis with only minimal government supervision.
This system, which had functioned fairly well prior to 1991,
broke down as a result of the rapidly depreciating purchasing
power of Zaire's national currency and at year's end had not
yet been replaced by an alternate system. Neither the UNTZa
nor the emerging new unions have demonstrated the capability to
protect worker interests or defend worker rights in the current
environment .
The Government has yet to promulgate revisions to the Labor
Code promised in 1990, which would strengthen provisions of the
law safeguarding the right to form unions and bargain
collectively. These revisions also would protect workers
against antiunion discrimination. While UNTZa has gained a
large measure of credibility since its break from the MPR, its
inability to generate revenue and internal competition for
positions of authority have weakened its capacity to
effectively represent workers.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law in Zaire, and there is no
indication that it is imposed extralegally .
d. Minimum Age and Employment of Children
The legislated minimum age for employment is 18 years, although
minors 14 years and older may be legally employed with the
consent of a parent or guardian. Employment of children of all
ages is common in the informal economic sector and in family
subsistence agriculture. Neither the labor unions nor the
Ministry of Labor make an effort to enforce child labor laws;
however, larger enterprises do not commonly exploit child labor.
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ZAIRE
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The majority of Zairians are engaged in subsistence agriculture
or small-scale commerce outside the formal sector. In 1991
already meager wage levels in the modern economy were
devastated by inflation rates measured in four digits. The
minimum legal daily wage do3s not provide a decent living for
employees and their families, and workers must rely on the
extended family and subsistence agriculture to survive. Public
sector remuneration for all but the highest level does not
approach a minimum subsistence wage; public employees typically
work at a second "real" job or resort to corrupt activities.
The maximum legal workweek in Zaire is 48 hours with one
24-hour rest period reguired every 7 days. The Labor Code
specifies health and safety standards, ostensibly enforced by
the Ministry of Labor, but there is little enforcement in
practice. Minimum wage, safety, and health standards are not
applied to employees engaged in subsistence agriculture.
449
ZAMBIA
Zambia's transition from a de jure one-party to multiparty
state featured adoption of a new Constitution and was capped by
presidential and legislative elections on October 31, in which
labor leader Frederick Chiluba defeated long-time President
Kenneth Kaunda for the Presidency. Chiluba 's Movement for
Multiparty Dempcracy (MMD) won an overwhelming majority in
Parliament over the ruling United National Independence Party
(UNIP) . Despite a number of campaign abuses, primarily by
UNIP-forces, the elections, hel4 under the scrutiny of a large
number of domestic and international observers, were fair and
orderly.
The new Constitution, which provides for a number of
fundamental rights, represents a compromise betweeri the
preference of UNIP for a strong Presidency and MMD ' s demand for
a strengthened Parliament. It gives Parliament the power to
ratify major appointments, including those of the Chief
Justice, the Attorney General, and others, and the right to
approve the establishment or dissolution of government
ministries and departments.
The Zambian police, operating under the Ministry of Home
Affairs, have primary responsibility for maintaining law and
order. Divided into regular and paramilitary units, the police
also supervise a volunteer vigilante force which is frequently
accused of human rights abuses. The Zambian Intelligence and
Security Service (ZISS) is charged with intelligence and
counterespionage responsibilities while the armed services are
used for internal security. Abuses by the security forces can
be and occasionally are challenged in court, and abusers found
guilty are punished. However, the Government has seldom taken
the initiative to investigate reports of abuses, and security
forces regularly kill suspects and detainees; such claims
rarely have been challenged.
The Zambian economy is heavily dependent on its majority
state-owned copper industry, the only significant source of
foreign exchange. A decline in world copper prices, compounded
by falling production due to mismanagement, failure to invest
in maintenance, and the siphoning off of revenues for purposes
other than copper production, has plunged the Zambian economy
into serious recession for a number of years. Agricultural
production, in which over half of the population is engaged,
mainly at the subsistence level, has suffered from severe
drought and government policies, e.g., low prices paid to the
farmers and expensive food subsidies given to the large urban
population. The Kaunda Government was unwilling to introduce
austerity programs — principally reduction of the subsidies on
mealie meal — and as a consequence, fell into arrears with the ■ '
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),
causing the IBRD to suspend its programs in Zambia. In
1990-1991, inflation of over 100 percent and deteriorating real
wages prompted strikes in many sectors and helped bring about
the end of the Kaunda era.
The human rights situation improved steadily in Zambia as the
year unfolded. The reintroduct ion of democratic pluralism and
popular ferment for political and economic change resulted in
unprecedented freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and
increased parliamentary and public challenges to the
Government. There was vigorous judicial protection of
constitutional rights, including the right of citizens to
change their government. The state of emergency (SOE), which
had been in effect for 27 years, ended in November, 7 days
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ZAMBIA
after the elections, in accordance with the new Constitution.
Despite these positive developments, there were a number of
human rights abuses during the year, including torture and
other mistreatment of detainees and excessively long
detentions. Discrimination against women remains a problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were five known political killings during the year and
numerous extrajudicial killings. Four MMD officials were
murdered by UNIP members in Luanshya, and an MMD supporter was
beaten to death by UNIP supporters in Lusaka. UNIP leaders
claimed these killings were individual acts and not a result of
government or party instructions. There is no evidence to
contradict that claim. The Government and the police are
treating the murders as criminal rather than political acts.
As the year ended, the trial of the seven UNIP suspects had not
yet begun. Suspects in the murder of the MMD supporter in
Lusaka are awaiting trial.
Security forces frequently kill criminal suspects during
apprehension or while the suspects are in custody. Between
January and September, more than 30 suspects were shot dead by
police. For example, in May a paramilitary policemen killed a
street vendor, provoking a near riot. In August and September
alone, police killed over 20 persons. Such killings are rarely
investigated, and explanations that suspects were shot while
resisting arrest or trying to escape are not generally
challenged.
b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of government-inspired disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture, but police and military
personnel resorted to excessive force when apprehending or
interrogating detainees or prisoners. In May police announced
that the volunteer vigilantes would be replaced by trained
community constables, but at year's end, this program had not
been implemented.
Victims can and do sue the Government for abuses by the
security forces. According to press reports, an 84-year-old
headman successfully sued the State for defamation and assault
after police beat and starved him for 8 days on an alleged
charge of stock theft; a Chingola student testified that a ZISS
officer shot him through the mouth; two aggravated robbery
suspects told the Ndola High Court that they were severely
beaten by police with fan belts and cable wires while their
colleague was shot dead; and three youths who sued the Attorney
General and sought damages for being subjected to one meal a
day at a police station in Lusaka. The verdicts in these cases
were not publicized. In October the State was ordered to pay
three men $300 each as compensation for false imprisonment when
they were detained without explanation for a night. Also in
October, a paramilitary officer who beat a man to death during
crowd control duties was sentenced to 5 years at hard labor.
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ZAMBIA
Due to fear or ignorance, however, few victims file complaints
of torture and other mistreatment at the hands of the security
forces. When charges are brought and there is strong evidence
against the security forces, the Government pays damages and
settles out of court, thereby avoiding publicity or a public
record of the case.
Conditions in Zambian prisons are harsh and life threatening.
Tuberculosis, anemia, and chest infections are rampant in
prisons due to low protein diets, lack of clean water,
substandard food, severe overcrowding, and poor sanitation and
medical facilities. In many prisons only one meal a day is
served. Lusaka Central Prison, built early in the century to
incarcerate less than 200 inmates now houses over 1,000. In
June the Minister of Home Affairs told Parliament that 306
prisoners died from various diseases while serving sentences
between 1985 and 1990, and in July Prime Minister Malimba
Masheke expressed government concern with prison conditions.
However, by year end, no new funds had been allocated, and the
overall prison situation had not improved.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Government released all political detainees and prisoners
in July 1990; new political detentions did not occur.
Various security laws provide broad powers of detention, and in
practice administrative detentions are widespread. An
indeterminate number of foreign nationals are held for
extremely long periods of time awaiting deportation. One
detainee, James Kakoma, said he had been detained since 1983
while another, Peter Moyo, said he had been held as a
prohibited immigrant since 1979. On October 15, according to
the Zambia Daily Mail, 50 prohibited immigrants at Lusaka
Central Prison were beaten by prison wardens following a
protest against alleged prolonged detention. Some of the
immigrants were reportedly in detention since 1980.
In regular criminal cases, a detainee must be charged and
brought before a magistrate within 24 hours, but there are
delays at each step of the process, and deadlines are
frequently missed due to police inefficiency or lack of
transportation to bring a suspect before a magistrate.
Delayed judgments occur at every level of the judicial process
and have been a growing concern to the Zambian legal
community. In December 1990, the Chief Justice assured the Law
Association of Zambia (LAZ) that the problem of delayed
judgments would be resolved. The LAZ recommended that judgment
not delivered within 6 months should trigger misconduct
proceedings against a judge and criticized the Supreme Court
for being a major culprit in failing to dispose of cases on
time. In March the Supreme Court in turn criticized prison
authorities for failing to bring prisoners to present their
appeals. In one case, a prisoner convicted in 1981 and
released in 1989 finally came up for appeal in 1991.
The Preservation of Public Security Act (PSA), which gave the
President broad discretion under the SOE to detain or restrict
the movements of persons and to order that persons be arrested
and detained for indeterminate periods, expired with the State
of Emergency on November 8, 1991.
The State of Emergency was a major issue in the election
campaign. The SOE gave police officers of assistant inspector
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ZAMBIA
rank and above power to arrest without a warrant and detain a
person for up to 28 days. In practice, the SOE was used early
in the campaign to refuse permits to rally to opposition groups
until the courts stopped the practice. An international
election observer, former President Jimmy Carter, found that
use of the SOE served as a tool for police to issue or deny
permits for political rallies, impose official or unofficial
curfews, and generally intimidate or abuse opposition parties.
On October 3, the Vice President of LAZ accused the Government
of using the SOE to detain people on political grounds, to
expropriate property, and to detain people for 28 days or more
to facilitate investigations into petty crimes.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system consists of the Supreme Court with
appellate powers and a series of lower courts, of which the
High Court is the most important. Although presidential
detainees were not guaranteed public trial, such trials were
usually public in the few instances when they occurred. In
most cases, presidential detainees were eventually released
without having been tried.
In ordinary cases, the law provides a number of protections for
defendants, including protection during interrogations. It
provides for the right to legal representation at one's own
expense or through legal aid; the right to give evidence under
oath in criminal procedures; the right to give an unsworn
statement; and the right to remain silent.
In security cases, accused persons enjoyed few of these
protections. The President in the past had the power to
appoint and transfer judges, and some attorneys maintain that
this fact swayed court decisions in cases in which the
executive branch had a particular interest. However, the new
Constitution increased the Parliament's role in the approval of
judicial personnel, and during 1991 the judiciary demonstrated
significant independence in rulings protecting the political
opposition's freedom of speech, right to associate, and right
to buy air time on radio and television (see Sections 2. a. and
2.b. ) .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The inviolability of the home is provided for in law and is
generally respected, except in past cases relating to the SOE
or to roundups of suspected illegal aliens and black
marketeers. In such cases, security forces had broad powers
and often entered the homes of suspects without search
warrants. Following the lifting of the SOE, the new Minister
of Legal Affairs announced that police may no longer conduct
searches of homes or other properties without warrants. One
credible UNIP opponent claimed that his incoming and outgoing
mail was tampered with in 1991. However, there was no
independent confirmation of mail or telephone monitoring.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including;
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedoms of speech and press were increasingly exercised in
1991. As a result of popular pressure and the ensuing
nationwide debate on democratic pluralism, there was
unprecedented criticism of the one-party system of government
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ZAMBIA
and its leaders, including the former President. President
Chiluba promised in the campaign to ensure freedoms of speech,
press, and assembly.
Early in the year, however, the Government, including President
Kaunda, tried to suppress coverage of MMD activities in
UNIP-publications and in government-owned newspapers. In
February a High Court judge ruled that the President had denied
Zambians their constitutional freedom of expression by banning
the newspapers, television, and radio from covering the
opposition. As a result of this and other court actions
throughout the year, the official and UNIP newspapers gradually
increased coverage of all political activities and viewpoints,
and alternative private newspapers proliferated, despite
official intimidation and threats against suppliers, printers,
and distributors. In particular, the Weekly Post and
opposition papers like the Daily Express gained great respect
and credibility for their reporting on corruption.
In September a court injunction forced the Zambia National
Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) to air opposition
advertisements, and in October the Press Association of Zambia
filed a successful injunction against the government-appointed
Director General of ZNBC and the managing editor of the Times
of Zambia. The injunction restrained both men from occupying
their offices or performing their duties until after the
elections on the grounds that the two were partial in reporting
on political activities.
Academic freedom is respected in Zambian society, and educators
are outspoken in their opposition to political influence on the
education system. However, when students at the University of
Zambia Lusaka campus became embroiled in the debate on
democratic pluralism, the Government temporarily shut down the
university. President Kaunda said the closure was intended to
prevent students from triggering riots and looting and
implementing plans for the Speaker of Parliament or the Chief
Justice to take over the Presidency in an interim government.
Student leaders denied the allegations.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
During 1991 the courts routinely ruled in favor of greater
freedom of peaceful assembly and association. When Zambia
became a multiparty state in December 1990, the UNIP leadership
tried to exclude from Parliament those members who changed
their affiliation to join the opposition party. The Supreme
Court overturned a lower court and found that parliamentarians
who joined the >5MD could keep their seats in Parliament. In
March nine MMD members, including party president Frederick
Chiluba, were acquitted of unlawful assembly and belonging to
an illegal society. In other cases, the courts ruled against
government attempts to prevent the opposition from meeting
without a police permit, to evict marketeers for belonging to
the MMD, and to restrain conference centers from renting
meeting space to opposition parties.
After the various court rulings, police became generally
evenhanded in issuing permits for peaceful multiparty rallies
and on occasion demonstrated considerable professionalism in
defusing potentially explosive situations between parties at
political rallies. In several instances where ruling party
supporters harassed or attacked opposition supporters, the
police arrested UNIP vigilantes or other instigators.
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ZAMBIA
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution and
respected in practice. Zambia has no state religion, and
adherence to a particular faith does not confer either
advantage or disadvantage. Christian missionaries from a wide
variety of faiths operate in the country.
In a departure from past liberal practices, soon after taking
office in November, the Minister of Information banned an
Islamic radio program on the grounds that Zambia is a Christian
country. The Vice President quickly reversed the decision as a
violation of human rights and reinstated the program.
The Government has prohibited the Jehovah's Witnesses from
proselytizing, but they function openly, and their freedom to
refrain from participating in various secular activities such
as voting, singing the national anthem, and saluting the flag
is respected.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Under the UNIP Government, police roadblocks were common, and
vehicles were commonly searched for illegal immigrants,
poaching, and other crimes. Police used these opportunities to
steal goods from travelers. Shortly after the Chiluba
Government took office, the Minister of Legal Affairs
abolished road blocks.
In Lusaka in September and October, an unofficial dawn-to-dusk
curfew was imposed in townships. The Government claimed that
the curfew was instituted to curb a rise in crime. However,
the LAZ, the MMD, and residents of the townships claimed that
the curfew and related police patrols were intended to impede
opposition candidates and supporters from door-to-door
campaigning in the evening hours. In one reported incident,
paramilitary officers beat a newspaper reporter for being out
of doors after 8 p.m. Since the October 31 elections, there
have been no official or unofficial curfews in Zambia.
In several instances, the UNIP government withheld or withdrew
passports to prevent foreign travel by persons whose political
or criminal activities were considered inimical to Zambian
interests. On November 26, the Supreme Court ruled that a
passport is not a privilege but a right to which every Zambian
citizen is entitled.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
estimates that in 1991 there were approximately 140,000
refugees in Zambia, pricipally from Angola, Mozambique, Zaire,
South Africa, and Namibia. Some Angolans entered Zambia after
the final throes of the armed conflict in Angola. Repatriation
of these and of the older Angolan refugee population began in
1991; large-scale repatriation is projected for 1992. Most of
the approximately 2,000 African National Congress (ANC) exiles
departed Zambia in 1991 although there was also an influx of
young South Africans fleeing the violence in their country.
While the ANC has imprisoned defectors and detainees in Zambia
in the past, there were no known ANC prisoners held by the
organization in Zambia in 1991. The ICRC has been tasked with
following up on the detainee issue in southern Africa.
The Zambian authorities handed over to the Malawi Government in
midyear five Malawian suspects held in the 1989 assassination
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in Zambia of Mkwapatira Mhango, a leading opponent of President
Banda, and eight members of his family. The Malawi Government
reportedly released the five suspects shortly after their
return to Malawi, although this could not be indejjendently
confirmed .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
During 1991 popular demand for political change increased, and
the right of citizens to change their government was visibly
demonstrated in the multiparty, secret ballot elections October
31. The new President, trade union leader Frederick Chiluba,
and his party, the MMD, stressed throughout the campaign their
dedication to a democratic political process, including
increased parliamentary control and safeguarding basic human
rights. The MMD also stressed the importance of m0ving toward
a free market economy. In the legislative elections, the MMD
won a sweeping victory over UNIP, gaining 125 of the 150 seats
in Parliament. In addition to UNIP and the MMD, four other
parties fielded candidates. UNIP swept Eastern Province, where
19 of its 25 seats were won but picked up only 6 more seats in
the remaining 8 provinces. No independent or third-party
candidates were elected.
Parliament has yet to make any significant changes on
appointments other than electing a new Speaker, Robinson
Nabulyato, who was previously Speaker from 1968 to 1988, and
choosing a former UNIP government official who became a founder
of MMD, Sikota Wina, as Deputy Speaker.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government neither encourages nor hinders inquiries or
visits by human rights organizations. The LAZ Human Rights
Committee has operated without hindrance under both the UNIP
and MMD governments. A new organization, the Women's Lobby
Group, seeks to ensure legal and societal rights of women.
During the runup to the elections. President Kaunda at first
refused to permit foreign monitors to observe the election but
later reversed his position and invited a cross-section of
international groups, including the Carter Center, the United
Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the Nonaligned
Movement and the Commonwealth of Nations to send monitors to
Zambia. In addition to the international observers, domestic
monitoring groups, the Zambia Independent Monitoring Team and
the Zambia Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee actively
recruited and trained Zambians to monitor polling stations and
counting centers and report on whether the election process was
free and fair. Representatives of the churches, press, women's
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, the Law
Association, and university students participated in the
monitoring effort. Despite some abuses, the ensuing elections
were judged free and fair by international and domestic
observers .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The population of almost 8 million comprises more than 70
Bantu-speaking tribal groupings. Economic and social needs are
met on a generally nondiscriminatory basis. The Constitution
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of 1991 prohibits discrimination based on race, tribe, sex,
place of origin, marital status, political opinions, color, or
creed.
Under civil and constitutional law, women are entitled to full
equality with men in most areas. Government and opposition
leaders encourage women to become involved in the political
process. In practice, women are increasing their participation
in Zambia's social, economic, and political life and gaining
representation in the professions and higher education. Women
deputy government ministers, judges, parliamentarians, managing
directors, and other professionals do exist. However, in
Zambia women remain subordinate in many ways. As a major
component of the rural work force, according to one report,
women provide 80 percent of the labor involved in food
production and 50 percent in cash crop production. Statistics
provided in April 1991 by the Central Statistics Office show
that women are severely disadvantaged compared to men in formal
employment (4 percent women versus 25 percent men), in
unemployment (65 percent women versus 35 percent men), and in
literacy (54 percent women versus 76 percent men).
Although legally, Zambian men and women doing the same job are
to receive the same pay, in 1986 the average monthly earnings
were much less for women than for men in each industry owing to
the higher rate of employment for men and lower salaries for
comparable work by women. In rural areas, women earned eight
times less than men, whereas in urban areas, women earned three
times less than men on average. There is no legal redress for
women who are refused employment on the basis of sex.
Customary law and practice, contradicting Zambia's Constitution
and codified laws, place women in subordinate status with
respect to property, inheritance, and marriage. Under
traditional customs, all rights to inherit property rested with
the deceased man's family. The widow and her children were
entitled to nothing. The Intestate Succession Act, passed in
1989, guarantees widows a 20-percent share and children a
50-percent share in the inheritance of a deceased man's
property. Despite this legal provision, ignorance, apathy, and
fear render the enforcement of this law generally ineffective.
Similarly, most divorced women are unaware that under the
maintenance law, ex-husbands can be compelled by magistrate's
courts to maintain their families after divorcing their wives.
Women's groups representing the major political parties, a
nonpartisan organization created in 1991 called the Women's
Lobby Group, and professional women's associations have been
active in educating women about their rights.
There are no reliable statistics on the extent of violence
against women, including wife beating. Domestic assault is a
criminal offense, but in practice police are often reluctant to
pursue reports of wife beating or other forms of abuse. In
addition, women are often ignorant of their rights, and there
is substantial societal pressure placed upon women not to
prosecute cases of domestic violence. According to women's
rights advocates, nondomestic violence against women is not
generally tolerated by traditional or civil authorities.
Victims usually report attacks, and legal action is taken.
However, in June a senior police officer said that there had
been an increase in cases of rape and defilement and appealed
to the public to report officers who did not respond to reports
of such cases. In crimes against women where rape, serious
injury, or death occurs, men — including husbands — may receive
sentences up to, and including, the death penalty. On
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November 22, the Supreme Court confirmed the death sentence of
a man who killed a woman for refusing to have sex with him.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Zambia has a history of strong labor union organizations,
dating from the establishment of the copper mines during the
1930' s. According to the Minister of Labor, 50 percent of
Zambia's 380,000 formal sector workers are unionized. Zambia's
19 large national unions are organized by industry or
profession. Until 1991 only one union per industry was legal,
and all unions were members of the Zambia Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU), the sole legal confederation under the
Industrial Relations Act of 1971. The ZCTU is democratic,
regularly conducts open elections to select its leadership, and
frequently criticizes government policy on subjects such as
wages, economic policy, conditions of service, and labor
representation in party and government organs. During the
political campaign, the ZCTU threw its support behind the MMD
and former ZCTU chairman, now President, Frederick Chiluba.
Deteriorating economic conditions and sharp increases in the
cost of living led to widespread labor unrest in 1991 and
numerous strikes, boycotts, and "go slows." Under existing
legislation, strikes are permitted only after all other
recourse has been exhausted. In practice, virtually all
strikes are illegal, since they almost always commence before
the mandatory process of mediation has run its course. The
Government normally has relied on persuasion and continued
mediation to end strikes once they have begun. Most strikes
have terminated with increased wage settlements and without
government action against the unions.
In January 1991, President Kaunda signed into law the
controversial Industrial Relations Act (IRA) of 1990. The Act
revises the law relating to trade unions, the ZCTU, the
Industrial Relations Court, recognition of collective
agreements, settlement of collective disputes, strikes and
lock-outs, essential services and works councils. Under the
new and old Acts, all workers have the right to strike except
those in the Zambia defense force, judicial service, police
force, prison service, and security intelligence service.
The ZCTU and the Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE) view the
new IRA as an attempt to undermine organized labor and
employers organizations. Under the Act, unions previously
under the umbrella of the ZCTU are disaffiliated and can only
rejoin the ZCTU or any other national or international union or
association if a two-thirds majority of members vote to do so.
The ZCTU sued the State over the new IRA on the grounds that
the two thirds vote requirement was inconsistent with the right
to freedom of association and expression. On March 22, the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) lodged
a formal complaint with the International Labor Organization
(ILO) that the new IRA violates ILO conventions. The
Government argued the opposite, that in fact the law improved
workers' rights of association and freed unions from compulsory
association with the ZCTU. Although the IRA was legally still
in effect at the close of 1991, the new MMD Minister of Labor
called portions of the Act unconstitutional, unreasonable, and
unworkable and promised to present the issue to the Cabinet
soon with an eye toward repeal. After the elections, the ZCTU
joined a number of other African countries in abandoning the
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policy of the continentwide official trade union body, the
Organization of African Trade Union Unity, which prohibits
affiliations outside Africa, and was accepted as a member of
the ICFTU.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The new IRA gives the Minister of Labor the right to
unilaterally deny the right to unionize to any person, trade,
or industry. The Act reduces the ZCTU's jurisdiction in
internal affairs of a union and perpetuates the existence of
heretofore UNIP-dominated works councils. The works councils
have powers that can conflict with union-employer relationships
and that usurp some of the responsibilities normally reserved
for decision between unions and employers, such as conditions
of service, recruitment, salary assessments, transfers,
bonuses, and safety issues.
In February, before lodging its complaint with the ILO, the
ICFTU urged President Kaunda not to enforce the new IRA or a
bill on wages and working conditions in the public services.
The ICFTU argued that application of these laws would put an
end to collective bargaining and would cripple the trade union
movement by ending the check-off system. These antiunion
provisions will probably be scrapped when the new IRA is
reviewed.
The new IRA was condemned by both workers and employers
organizations as being designed to cripple trade unions and
employers organizations. The thrust of the legislation was to
give the Government, not employers, more power to control the
creation and dissolution of unions, collection of dues, and
operation of workers councils. At the same time, the law
specifically prohibited an employer or any person acting on his
behalf from preventing or deterring an employee from taking
part in the formation of a trade union, joining a union,
participating in the activities of a trade union, becoming an
officer, or being elected or appointed to hold office.
Similarly, employers were prohibited from dismissing,
penalizing, or discriminating against any employee who
exercised those rights, or from taking any action against an
employee on the grounds that he was or was not a member of a
trade union.
Following the announcement in 1990 that export and customs free
zones would be established, no further action was taken.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited by the
Constitution. Forced labor is prohibited except as consequence
of a sentence or court order, by members of the military, by
conscientious objectors in lieu of military service, as labor
required during wartime or other national emergency, or in the
conduct of communal or civic obligations. These prohibitions
are observed and not abused.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
According to the Minister of Labor, the minimum age for
employment of children is 16. This and other age restrictions
apply to the industrial sector, where, because of adult
unemployment, there are few employees under age 16. The Labor
Commissioner effectively enforces the law in industry. There
is, however, little enforcement for the vast majority of
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Zambians who work in the subsistence agricultural and domestic
service sectors, where persons under age 14 are often
employed. In urban areas, children commonly engage in street
trading. According to a Central Statistical Office survey
published in April 1991, in 1986 approximately 15 percent of
the 12 to 14 age group was in the rural or urban labor force.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
In 1991 the Government established a minimum monthly wage rate
for all employees except professionals, plus housing and
transportation allowances. However, each industry may also set
its own minimum wage rates above the legal floor through
collective bargaining. In industries where collective
bargaining is not effective, the Minister of Labor and Social
Services sets the minimum wage rate for employees in positions
such as delivery assistants, general workers, and office
orderlies. These "minimums" are insufficient to provide an
adequate standard of living. Most Zambian workers must
supplement their incomes through second jobs, some subsistence
farming, or reliance on the extended family.
The normal workweek is 40 hours, but it is not a legal
maximum. The legal maximum workweek for nonunionized workers
is 48 hours. The minimum for full-time employment is 40
hours. Maximum limits for unionized workers vary. For
example, the legal maximvmi for unionized guards is 72 hours per
week. There are legal requirements for annual leave (2 days
per month of service) .
Zambian law regulates minimum health and safety standards in
any industrial undertaking. Enforcement of industrial safety
in the mines is the responsibility of the Department of Mines.
In March the state-owned mining company reported that disabling
injuries had been reduced by 32 percent. Factory safety is
handled by the Inspector of Factories under the Minister of
Labor, but staffing problems chronically limit enforcement
effectiveness. The Inspector of Factories reported in January
that 280 workers were injured, 5 fatally, in various industrial
accidents during 1990.
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Zimbabwe is governed by President Robert Mugabe and his
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) which
has dominated the legislative and executive branches of
government since independence in 1980. Although the
Constitution allows for multiple parties, and several small
parties exist, in 1991 they were weak, poorly financed, and
faced periodic intimidation by government security forces. As
a result, they posed little serious challenge to the control of
the government by ZANU-PF.
The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) is responsible for
maintaining law and order. The Central Intelligence
Organization (CIO) and the Police Internal Security and
Intelligence (PISI) units are attached to the President's
office. In 1991 the President relieved the CIO and PISI of
their powers to arrest, detain, and interrogate suspects in
internal security cases. In some instances, particularly in
the cases of suspected South African spies and the Mozambican
National Resistance (RENAMO) rebels, the CIO and PISI have
violated the new restrictions on their powers. The CIO has
been accused of human rights abuses, including the use of
torture .
Zimbabwe's economy has strong agricultural and m.ining sectors
and a diversified industrial base. Economic growth has
generally matched the rate of population growth, but new
investment has been inadequate to generate jobs for the large
number of secondary school graduates. Unemployment is over 30
percent . In February the Government embarked on a
comprehensive Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP).
which projects a transition to a largely m,arket-or iented
economy within 5 years.
The year 199 1 witnessed the appointment of independent judges
to the High Court, the appearance of several independent
periodicals, the founding of a new political party, and more
movement toward free collective bargaining. However, a number
of human rights violations continued, notably deaths in police
custody, the mistreatment of detainees, forced repatriation of
some refugees, and irregularities in the national city council
election campaign. On occasion the Government acted to
restrict freedom of assembly and association, and traditional,
often illegal, discrimination against women continued. The
controversial 11th amendment to Zimbabwe's Constitution, which
entrenches hanging and whipping in the Constitution and opens
the way for the acquisition of land for resettlement, took
effect in April .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.
There were no confirmed political killings or summary
executions by government security forces in 1991. However, one
ZANU-PF politician died under circumstances which suggested it
might have been politically motivated.
Also, two opposition politicians died in mysterious accidents.
In March Amos Dlamini and Kenneth Ncube, two officials of the
Bulawayo-based Open Forum, a political discussion organization,
were killed after allegedly being struck by a car while walking
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at the side of the Bulawayo-Harare highway. Dlamini was a
veteran member of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU),
and before the accident he told a reporter that he was wanted
for questioning by security officers regarding the activities
of the Open Forum, which had become popular among intellectuals
disillusioned with ZAPU's merger with ZANU.
In 1991 five people died in police custody under questionable
circumstances. The family of Edmore Muroyiwa, who died in
police custody at Harare police station in August, has sued the
police. The ZRP claimed that Muroyiwa hanged himself with a
rope made from strips of a blanket, following his detention on
suspicion of car theft. An independent newspaper account cast
considerable doubt on the police version of the incident,
noting that Muroyiwa was the owner of the car he was accused of
having stolen and had no prior arrest record.
The September issue of Horizon Magazine, an independent
monthly, claimed that two ZANU-Ndonga (an opposition party)
officials, Albert Mtewa and Elisha Machisa, died in a Chipinge
prison in late 1990 as a result of ClO-administered beatings.
The death certificates state that the men died of natural
causes, and there is no proof to the contrary. It is not
disputed that CIO arrested the men and illegally held them
without charge on suspicion of aiding RENAMO forces.
RENAMO forces operating across the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border
continued to commit atrocities in Zimbabwe and Mozambic[ue.
There were no reports of killings of innocent civilians in
1991, in contrast to the last 3 years when RENAMO cadres
reportedly killed more than 300 Zimbabweans.
b. Disappearance
No new cases of disappearance attributable to the Government
were known to have occurred. The Government has not made a
serious effort to account for the persons, estimated from at
least 80 to 400, who disappeared in 1982-1985, almost all of
whom were from Ndebele ethnic regions.
There were no new abductions by RENAMO forces reported in
1991. Reportedly 54 Zimbabweans were abducted by RENAMO in
1990.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture has long been a problem in Zimbabwe. Under the State
of Emergency (SOE), detainees in security cases were often held
incommunicado and tortured by CIO officials.
While the SOE was lifted in 1990, firsthand reports in 1991
indicated that torture continued to be employed in some
security cases, especially cases involving suspected South
African and RENAMO agents. Senior government officials
strongly deny that torture is condoned but admit that isolated,
unauthorized instances have occurred. No CIO officials were
prosecuted for such abuses in 1990 or 1991. Credible reports
indicate that security officers on a routine basis physically
abused displaced Mozeimbicans suspected of being RENAMO
supporters .
Police brutality in political and ordinary criminal cases is
also a problem. Student demonstrators protesting legislation
which they believe curtails academic freedom leaped from
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third-Story windows to flee club-wielding police in October.
In an effort to instill discipline in the police force, the ZRP
hierarchy has decided to deduct all damages for illegal arrests
and physical abuse from the salaries of the offending officers.
Zimbabwean prisons are overcrowded, and the treatment of
prisoners is dehumanizing. Due to prison procedures and the
physical structure of the prisons," even minimal respect for
individual privacy is often lacking.
In 1991 the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) conducted seminars
for police officers that were intended to help the ZRP learn to
act within the framework of the law; it was seeking approval
from the Government to provide similar training for the CIO.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The police must by law inform an arrested person of the charges
against him before he is taken into custody. Also, a person
arrested on a criminal charge must have a preliminary hearing
before a magistrate within 48 hours, but the law is often
disregarded if a person is not legally represented. At the
hearing the magistrate decides whether the arrested person
should be released on bail or held in custody until trial.
Pretrial rights are generally respected, but occasionally
magistrates and police officers do not inform defendants of
their rights.
Playwright Denford Magora had his passport seized in November
and was arrested and held for 48 hours in December by the PISI
unit. Magora 's detention followed the staging of a
controversial play about the Government.
It is still possible for the Government to apply a wide range
of legal powers under the Official Secrets Act or the Law and
Order (Maintenance) Act (LOMA). Originally promulgated 30
years ago and widely used to prosecute political opponents, the
LOMA has extremely wide and vague sections on political and
security crimes and gives extensive powers to the police and to
the Minister of Home Affairs and the chief executive. However,
the Government has been loath to invoke the LOMA since July
1990, fearing that its oppressive provisions might be declared
unconstitutional. People may only be detained under the
Official Secrets Act if they are suspected of spying or of
passing classified material or information about military
matters to those without a bona fide need to know.
There were no known political detainees being held at year's
end. No information is available on the number of persons
being detained by military forces due to the conflict with
RENAMO.
Exile is not used as a means of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Zimbabwe's legal system is based on a mixture of Roman-Dutch
law, English common law, and customary law. Every defendant
has the right to select a lawyer of his or her choosing. In
civil cases an indigent may apply to have the Government supply
an attorney, while in capital cases the Government will provide
an attorney for all defendants unable to afford one. In
practice, however, approximately 90 percent of defendants are
not represented by counsel. The right to appeal exists in all
cases and is automatic in cases where the death penalty is
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imposed. Trials are open to the public except in certain
security cases, e.g., those involving alleged South African
agents .
The Customary Law and Local Courts Act of 1990 created a
unitary court system, consisting of headmen's courts, chiefs'
courts, magisterial courts, the High Court, and the Supreme
Court. With the restructuring of the courts, customary law
cases can be heard at all levels of the judiciary, including
the Supreme Court. The village and community courts were
replaced by assistant magistrates' courts, chiefs' courts, and
headmen's courts. Headmen and chiefs can hear limited
categories of customary law cases in disputes not exceeding
$100 and $200, respectively.
The judiciary is generally independent. In January Chief
Justice Anthony Gubbay attacked constitutional amendment 11,
which was passed in December 1990, criticizing inter alia the
reintroduction of hanging and whipping as punishment for
juvenile offenders, and the compulsory acquisition of property
by the State. He said the amendment's language will remove the
powers of the judiciary to intervene in the event of unfair
compensation for commercial farm land compulsorily purchased by
the Government for resettlement. In response. President Mugabe
said judges should not interfere with Parliament's political
decisions, and those judges unhappy with laws passed should
quit. The Attorney General castigated the Chief Justice for
commenting on a case before it came before the court. However,
judges are not fired or transferred for political reasons. The
Government generally abides by court decisions even when it is
strongly opposed to the rulings.
Although there are at present 500 lawyers in Zimbabwe, there is
a severe shortage of experienced magistrates. Zimbabwe's
judicial system is hard pressed to cope with ordinary criminal
cases. The 3-year lag in case and law reporting ended in 1990
as the Legal Resources Foundation received a government
contract and brought the cases up to date. However, the
production of records for review and appeal remains a problem.
Following President Mugabe's July 1990 amnesty for 1,400
prisoners, local human rights organizations agreed with Home
Affairs Minister Mahachi's assertion that no political
prisoners remain in Zimbabwe. However, in 1991 the Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) expressed concern about
the continued detention of 36 former dissidents. Most of them
are former guerrillas from the ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People's
Revolutionary Army) of current Vice President Joshua Nkomo .
Another is the former chauffeur for Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole,
the self-exiled leader of the ZANU-Ndonga party. Some, but not
all, were legally convicted of crimes, including robbery and
murder. The CCJP has argued that the dissidents should have
been released under the amnesty.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution formally protects citizens from arbitrary
search or entry, and after the lifting of the SOE these
protections are generally respected. It is widely believed,
however, that the Government monitors private correspondence
and telephones, particularly international communications.
The GOZ relocated over 3,000 squatters in 1991. In July police
raided a squatter settlement near the Mozambican border and
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razed at least 72 dwellings. In September armed police burned
the homes and property of some 300 squatter families in
Masvingo province after the families had been served with
eviction orders. A source close to the squatters said the
burning of the homes appeared to be in response to a letter
sent by the squatters' lawyers appealing against eviction
orders. The families (who are Zimbabwean citizens) are now
living in the open. That same month, almost 2,000 Harare
squatters were temporarily moved 40 kilometers from the capital
to camps with inadequate sanitation and services; public access
to these camps was denied. The Government began to build
permanent housing for the majority of these squatters in
November .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of expression but allows
for legislation to limit this freedom in the "interest of
defense, public safety, public order, state economic interests,
public morality, and public health." In practice, the
Government interprets broadly its power to discourage free
speech. At public events it is generally assumed that speakers
are under surveillance and may be subject to follow-up
questioning by the CIO if their remarks are judged too
controversial. The LOMA provides for the prosecution of
persons who make racially inflammatory remarks.
Zimbabwe's major print media (five English-language newspapers
and one vernacular broadsheet) belong to the Mass Media Trust,
a holding company heavily influenced by the Government and
ruling party. There is no opposition press per se, but a small
independent press, consisting of an economic weekly, a
political weekly, a Sunday tabloid, and three monthly
magazines, carefully monitors government policies and opens its
pages to opposition critics. Despite its displeasure with
these publications, the Government has taken no punitive
measures against them. However, all are plagued by chronic
financial woes and the shortage of government-controlled
newsprint .
Two new independent publications in 1991 challenged the
Government's hold on the media. Former Parade Magazine editor
Andrew Moyse, who first captured the public's attention in 1988
with detailed exposes of scandals and corruption in senior
government circles, launched Horizon Magazine in September.
Former journalist Herbert Munangatire and a small group of
leading businesspersons and retired politicians began
publication of the Sunday Times to rival the
government-controlled Sunday Mail.
The Government controls mainstream media through indirect
ownership, editorial appointments, directives to editors, and
removal of wayward editors. Progovernment media officials
generally hew to the government and party line. The
government-influenced press in 1991 carried more critical
articles and editorials than in previous years. The most
influential of the media in reaching the public, radio and
televison, are entirely government owned. Government
domination of the mass media restricts the free flow of
information and impedes the emergence of an informed public.
Justice Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa said there is a tendency to
use the Official Secrets Act to cover the blunders and corrupt
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practices of government officials. Mnangagwa also pointed to
several other pieces of legislation, including the Censorship
and Entertainment Act, the Printed Publications Act, and the
Postal Telecommunications Act, all of which can restrict a free
press .
Academic freedqm suffered a setback in 1990-1991. The
University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act, passed by Parliament in
November 1990 after a hurried debate, greatly restricts the
independence of the University from government influence and
extends the disciplinary powers of the university authorities
against staff and students. During his July commencement
address. University Vice Chancellor Walter Kamba announced his
resignation, citing interference from politicians as the reason
for his resignation.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution formally provides for the right of assembly
and association for political and nonpolitical organizations,
including a broad spectrum of economic, social, professional,
and recreational activities. In law and in practice, however,
there are serious obstacles to the full exercise of this right,
particularly in the case of political associations. The
broadest authority for restricting these freedoms is contained
in the LOMA. Since the lifting of the SOE, the Government has
relied on the LOMA to limit freedom of association or assembly.
The SOE ' s expiration means that organizations including
political parties are no longer required to request police
approval to hold political meetings or stage rallies. The
police need only be given 7 days' notice of public meetings;
private meetings do not require notification. In 1991,
however, police officers acted as if permission was required,
effectively canceling at least six meetings, including a
meeting of the Kwekwe-based Southern African Human Rights
Foundation and a Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) meeting in
Bulawayo. Other ZUM conclaves were disrupted by the police on
the grounds that they were illegal, including a Gweru meeting
in May which resulted in party members being detained for 48
hours. On August 1, the High Court ruled that ZUM did not
require police permission to hold political meetings. However,
some police officers ignored the landmark High Court ruling
when they barred a Democratic Party meeting in Kezi,
Matabeleland South.
Organizations are generally free of governmental interference
as long as their activities are viewed as nonpolitical.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is respected in Zimbabwe. There is no
state religion. Denominations are permitted to worship openly,
pursue social and charitable activities, and maintain ties with
affiliates and coreligionists abroad. Religious belief is
neither a handicap nor an advantage in terms of professional or
political advancement.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Travel at home and abroad is not generally subject to official
restrictions, although restrictions have been occasionally
applied to prevent anticipated government criticism before
foreign audiences. This practice does not appear to be
widespread .
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Immigration is not restricted, although persons who have left
the country are not guaranteed the right to return if they were
not born in Zimbabwe. Applicants must be able to demonstrate
proof of livelihood. Some repatriates from South Africa are
suspected by the Government of being in the employment of 'the
South African intelligence services.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) , at the end of 1991 the registered refugee population
was estimated at 100,000; 97,000 were Mozambicans located in
five rural camps along the eastern border. The remainder,
mainly South Africans, were located in Harare and Bulawayo. In
a change from past practices, the Government has permitted
UNHCR officials unrestricted access to Mozambican refugee
camps. Another 100,000 Mozambicans, many of them migrant
farmers, are self-settled in rural areas in the east. In 1991
some Mozambican males of military age were reportedly turned
over to the Government of Mozambique, which pressed them into
compulsory military service. Men in this age group are now
being relocated into the official camps.
Senior government officials have said publicly that RENAMO
guerrillas infiltrate Zimbabwe in the guise of these Mozambican
refugees and have declared their intention to repatriate most
of them. In 1991 Zimbabwe sought to keep sections of its
border closed to new refugees, thus seriously constricting the
right of asylum. Firm figures are not available, but in 1991
an estimated 2,000 refugees were forcibly repatriated to
Mozambiqiie. Mozambicans intercepted at the border are first
interviewed by security forces to identify RENAMO sympathizers;
neither the Zimbabwe Refugee Committee officials nor the UNHCR
participates in the initial screening process.
In 1991 Zimbabwe refused to grant refugee status to several
former African National Congress and Pan-Af r icanist Congress
members because they were suspected of being South African
agents, forcing them to seek refuge in other countries. The
Government also refused to grant refugee status to a member of
the Swazi-based People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO),
who had publicly criticized the Swazi monarchy.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government.
Citizens have the legal right to change their government
through democratic means, but the March 1990 elections called
into question their ability to exercise that right. In those
elections, 274 candidates from 5 parties and 11 independent
candidates were duly nominated for the 120 contestable seats.
As a consequence of the ZANU-ZAPU unity agreement and the
ruling party's capture of 117 of these seats, there is no
effective parliamentary opposition. However, 1991 saw
increasingly frequent challenges to the Government by ZANU-PF
backbenchers, creation of a new opposition party, and more
critical media coverage of public issues and government
leadership.
President Mugabe and his Cabinet are the preeminent political
figures, and the ruling party — ZANU-PF — is the dominant
political organization in the country. Following the amendment
of the Constitution in 1987 to create a strong executive
presidency, Robert Mugabe, who previously served as Prime
Minister, became in 1988 both the Head of State and the Head of
Government. Elected in 1987 by an electoral college made up of
the two houses of Parliament, the executive president was
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ZIMBABWE
selected by popular election in 1990 to a term of 6 years. The
President appoints both Vice Presidents and th,e rest of the
Cabinet, who serve at his pleasure.
Under an earlier constitutional amendment (number 9) the
bicameral Parliament, which included a House of Assembly and a
Senate, was changed in 1990 to a unicameral body, the
Parliament of Zimbabwe. The small but vigorous group of
backbenchers in the Parliament has confronted the Government on
a number of issues, in particular • the 1990 debate on a
one-party state, manipulation of the media, the reintroduction
of school fees, investment, resettlement, and unemployment.
Their comments have received extensive coverage in both the
government-influenced and the independent press.
The net result of several constitutional amendments has been
the concentration of power in the executive branch of
government. The ability of Members of Parliament (M.P.) to
debate freely and openly is also affected by the amendments.
If a Member of Parliament "crosses the floor," e.g., changes
his party allegiance, or is declared by his party to have
ceased to represent its interests in Parliament by being
critical of its policies, or is expelled from that party,
perhaps for activities totally unrelated to performance as a
parliamentarian, such an M.P. immediately loses his seat and a
by-election has to be held. This provision makes M.P.'s more
submissive to the party line and tends to reduce Parliament to
a mere rubber stamp of party policies.
Although the polling itself appeared free and fair, there were
serious irregularities in the 1991 election campaign for the
national city council, which affected the outcome. Harare Town
Clerk Edward Kanengoni was at the center of the controversy
surrounding nomination procedures and the voting roll. Both
ZUM and independent candidates accused Kanengoni of denying
them free access to nomination forms, of intimidating persons
who nominated opposition candidates, and of general
administrative malfeasance. Nevertheless, independent and ZUM
candidates won 6 of the 25 contested seats in the Harare city
council elections.
In rural areas, only homeowners may vote in council elections.
Farmworkers, who predominate in the areas, do not have the
right to vote in these local elections, ensuring that
commercial farmers, overwhelmingly white, are elected to
represent them in rural councils. In metropolitan areas, save
Bulawayo, a similar situation exists. In the wealthy suburbs,
only homeowners may vote, but in the high density areas renters
are accorded the right to vote in city council elections.
Wealthy areas are accorded one council representative per 3,000
voters, while high density districts have one council person
per 8,000 voters. The Minister of Local Government has the
right to change the regulations concerning voting rights in
council elections but has not chosen to exercise his power, and
the opposition parties have not challenged these voting
regulations in the courts, although the Zimbabwean Constitution
provides for one person, one vote.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government permits private local human rights groups to
operate in Zimbabwe. However, it monitors their activities, in
particular those of the CCJP which investigates complaints from
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ZIMBABWE
private persons about human rights abuses in Zimbabwe and
conveys its findings to the Government. Other groups which
promote human rights include the Central and Southern African
Legal Assistance Foundation (CASALAF), the Southern African
Human Rights Foundation (SAHRF), and the Harare-based Legal
Resources Foundation which oversees the operation of the
Bulawayo, Gweru, and Masvingo Legal Projects Centers with their
libraries and information centers, legal aid clinics, and
paralegal programs.
The Government has been critical of nongovernmental
organizations, e.g.. Amnesty International is still not
permitted to operate in Zimbabwe, although Africa Watch's
executive director was permitted to visit Zimbabwe in October.
In January the police attempted to prevent SAHRF from holding
its inaugural conference. The police banned the conference,
seized the passports of SAHRF members, and pressured St.
Edward's Catholic Church into withdrawing permission to use its
hall as the site of the conference. SAHRF sought an injunction
and was permitted to hold a conference in February.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) operates a
regional office in Harare and cooperates with the UNHCR to
assist Mozambican, South African, and other refugees.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Government services in Zimbabwe are provided on a
nondiscriminatory basis, and the Government has been able to
work with the previously "whites only" infrastructure in urban
areas to provide health and social services to all citizens.
In many rural areas, however, the neglect of the
preindependence period still leaves the Government struggling
to provide minimal care. Blacks on most commercial farms are
still mainly dependent on white farmers to meet basic health
care and educational needs.
In social terms, Zimbabwe remains a racially stratified country
despite legal prohibitions against official discrimination.
While schools, churches, and clubs are all integrated, there is
limited but increasing social interaction among racial groups.
The colored (mixed race) community has complained of
discrimination in the allocation of civil service jobs and in
the purchase of government-controlled housing, which are
exclusively reserved for blacks by the Harare City Council.
There are, however, two colored (mixed race) ministerial-level
appointees .
The actual status of women in Zimbabwe contrasts with their
legal status. Since independence the Government has enacted
major laws aimed at enhancing women's rights and countering
certain traditional practices, some of which are based on the
view of women as dependents or minors. For example, the Legal
Age of Majority Act and the Matrimonial Causes Act recognize
the capacity of women to act independently of their husbands or
fathers to own property. Judges on the high courts have
adjudicated cases upholding women's rights, including the right
of women to inherit property. In 1991 the Women in Law and
Development Africa-Zimbabwe office mounted a national campaign
to gain inheritance rights for women.
Nevertheless, many women remain disadvantaged in Zimbabwean
society. Ignorance of reforms, illiteracy, economic
dependency, and prevailing social norms prevent rural women in
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ZIMBABWE
particular from benefiting equally from these changes. Despite
legal prohibitions, women are still vulnerable to entrenched
customary practices that operate against their personal rights.
Among these persistent practices are "kuzvarira," the practice
of pledging a young woman to marriage with a partner not of her
choosing; "lobola," the customary obligation of a groom to pay
a bride price to the parents of a would-be wife; and "ngozi,"
the customary practice of offering a young girl as compensatory
payment in interfamily disputes.
The Zimbabwean Marriage Guidance Society has described lobola
as the biggest obstacle to the establishment of equality
between men and women as the practice implies, "I paid for you,
so we cannot be equal." Lobola has become a commercial venture
as many parents, mostly fathers, charge huge sums of money for
their daughters. In July the Child Protection Society issued a
report which stated that the prevalence of ngozi beliefs among
Zimbabweans remains high and that women are deliberately
exploited and regarded as units, not only of production and
reproduction but also as currency that can be a medium as
circumstances demand.
A considerable expansion of the nation's education system has
resulted in an increase in the absolute number of girls being
educated but has not altered the pattern of male domination of
the higher levels of education. Though legislation prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of gender, women are
concentrated in the lower echelons of the work force and in
urban areas face harassment in the workplace. Fear of losing
employment prevents women from reporting sexual harassment at
work. Nongovernmental organizations have spoken out against
the public harassment of women, especially the police "cleanup"
campaigns aimed at stopping prostitution but which target
innocent women as well.
Domestic violence against women, especially wife beating, is
common and crosses all racial and economic lines in Zimbabwe.
Consequently, several social welfare organizations, including
the Harare-based Musasa Project, have organized counseling and
research programs aimed at stemming violence against women.
Women's rights activists have noted that every police station
in Zimbabwe has handled at least one case of a woman killed by
her husband, and one rural police station reported 76 deaths of
women killed by husbands in the past 3 years. Minister of
Community and Cooperative Affairs Mujuru said, "I have yet to
come across anyone who does not know of a relative, friend, or
neighbor who has been battered."
The number of reported rape cases has increased substantially.
The most recent police figures show that, during 1990, 2,643
reports of rape were made to the police countrywide, with the
majority involving girls under 14. According to a newspaper
editorial, the actual figure is 20 times greater than the
officially recorded statistics. A Bulawayo magistrate
disclosed he was dealing with an average of five rape cases per
week involving subteenage girls, and the Government is
considering increasing the power of magistrates to sentence
rapists to more than the current maximum of 7 years. The
Women's Action Group has urged police to improve their services
by giving women a full explanation of court procedures and
possible defense attorney tactics before they appear in court.
The Government has assigned community relations liaison
officers to police precincts to counsel victims of sexual
assault .
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ZIMBABWE
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Labor Relations Act states that workers shall have freedom
of association, the right to elect their own representatives,
publish newsletters, and set programs and policies which
reflect the political and economic interests of labor. Workers
are free to form or join unions without prior authorization,
but the Government may refuse to register them. The Act
permits only one union per industry (although the Government
registered a second railway union in 1991) and specifies that
workers may establish workers' committees, which exist side by
side with unions, in each plant. The Act specifies further
that workers' committees and trade unions must be registered
with the Ministry of Labor, but it also seeks to protect
workers' organizations from arbitrary government interference.
The Zimbabwe High Court ruled in 1991 that the Act does not
give the Labor Minister the power to suspend or deregister the
national labor center, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
(ZCTU). In practice, the Government does not try to inhibit
the unions' freedom to organize or to elect officerfi, nor has
any union been threatened with deregistration as a disciplinary
measure .
About 17 percent of the salaried work force is organized in 22
trade unions which are members of the ZCTU, the umbrella
confederation of the trade union movement. ZCTU officers are
elected by the delegates of affiliated trade unions at biennial
conventions, most recently in September 1990. While the ZCTU
was created by the Government shortly after independence to
unite the fragmented unions that previously existed, neither
the Government nor any political party has a preponderant
influence in the trade union movement today. The ZCTU and the
Government frequently clash on economic and political issues.
The ZCTU is the only legal trade union central. Others are
prohibited in practice. However, employee associations, such
as the public service association, are not affiliated with the
ZCTU. Most trade unions suffer from meager budgets which
prevent them from conducting a greater range of organizing and
educational activities.
Workers have the right to strike provided the union advises the
Government 2 weeks in advance of its intention to do so. Until
the lifting of the state of emergency in 1990, the right to
strike was further limited by the right of the Government to
declare a specific industry to be essential and therefore not
subject to strike action. In practice, the Government employed
a broad interpretation of what constitutes essential industries.
In July air traffic controllers staged a 5-day work stoppage,
demanding higher pay and better working conditions. The action
was a follow-up to a similar strike in 1990 when the Government
promised various allowances which were never received. The
Government promised to award these allowances by September 1991
but had not done so by year's end. Posts and
Telecommunications employees engaged in a 1-day strike in
November. Disputes over wages and conditions of service
resulted in slowdowns in various industries in January,
September , October , and November .
The ZCTU and its officials are free to associate with
international labor organizations and do so actively. The most
notable example during the year was the ZCTU ' s affiliation to
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
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ZIMBABWE
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Labor Relations Act provides workers with the right to
organize but is silent on the right to bargain collectively.
Workers' committees are empowered to negotiate with the
management of a particular plant the conditions of labor in the
workplace. Wage negotiations take place on an industrywide
basis. In the" case of a union-organized industry, the
employers' association meets directly with a particular trade
union. In certain cases when there is no trade union
representing a specific industry, representatives of the
organized workers, i.e., the professional associations, meet
with the employers' association under the mediation of labor
officers from the Ministry of Labor.
As part of its economic recovery program, the Government
announced in 1990 the commencement of free collective
bargaining between workers and employers. It pledged to
withdraw from the practice of using Ministry of Labor-appointed
employment boards to recommend conditions of service and wage
structures. Starting in 1990, boards were chosen by the
employers and the unions to negotiate for wages and salary
increments. The Government announced that in the future the
Ministry's role in collective bargaining is only to monitor,
vet, and register agreements. Registration can include
rejection of agreements of which the Government does not
approve. In 1991 the Government rejected agreements with the
Municipal Workers and the Posts and Telecommunications Workers,
all of whom are government employees. In 1991, for the first
time, the Government did not set a minimum across-the-board
wage increase for all workers, and wage agreements were reached
in employment councils and boards without any parameters set by
the Government, other than the statutory minimum rates which
were well below the prevailing rates.
Antiunion discrimination is prohibited by law and regulation.
In fact, the Government believes it is responsible for
assisting workers with legislation and intervention with
employers. The Labor Relations Act provides considerable job
security for workers. For example, under the Act, a worker may
not be fired without the Labor Ministry's concurrence. Labor
relations officers are authorized to handle worker grievances
within the plant. Their decision may be appealed to the
regional hearing officer of the Ministry of Labor, and finally
to a special labor relations tribunal over which a judge from
the Supreme Court or High Court presides.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is prohibited by law and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The labor regulations stipulate the minimum age for employment
in the formal sector at 18 years, but it is possible to begin
an apprenticeship at age 16. In this sector, minimum age
regulations are generally enforced by the Ministry of Labor.
However, the Government does not attempt to enforce these
regulations for children employed in household enterprises,
such as family farms. In 1991 there were credible newspaper
reports that preadolescent children were being employed in
increasing numbers as domestics and were being paid a monthly
average wage of half the minimum wage for adult domestics.
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ZIMBABWE
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Conditions of labor are regulated by the Government according
to industry. The Government publishes labor regulations for
each of the 22 industrial sectors. These regulations specify
minimum wages, hours, holidays, ana required safety measures.
In 1991 the Government specified minimum wage increases only
for domestics and gardeners, but due to an ineffective
monitoring system many such workers are remunerated below the
minimum wage. The maximum legal workweek is 54 hours, and the
law prescribes a minimum of one 24-hour rest period per week.
The employer also usually provides housing, food, and medical
care to workers. On commercial farms, the employer may provide
schooling for the workers' children. The minimum wage is not
generally sufficient to sustain a decent standard of living.
In many instances, workers must rely on second jobs, extended
family help, or some subsistence farming to meet a minimum
standard of living.
Labor relations officers from the Ministry of Labor are
assigned to monitor developments in each plant to ensure that
government minimum wage policy and occupational health and
safety regulations are observed. Safety in the workplace is a
major problem, however, due primarily to the fact that there
are too few inspectors and that many of the basic legal
protections do not apply to the vast majority of the farm,
mine, and domestic workers.
473
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
Antigua and Barbuda, a small two-island state, is a
parliamentary democracy and a member of the Commonwealth of
Nations. It is governed by a prime minister, a dabinet, and a
bicameral legislative assembly. The Governor General, with
largely ceremonial duties, is the titular Head of State and
serves as the representative of the British Monarch. The
Constitution requires general elections at least every 5
years. Prime Minister V.C. Bird, Sr . , and his Antigua Labor
Party (ALP) hold 15 of the 17 seats in the House of
Representatives. The Governor General appoints the 17-member
Senate with the advice of the Prime Minister and opposition
leader .
Security forces consist of a police force and the Antigua and
Barbuda Defense Force, a 90-person infantry unit. .The police
are organized, trained, and supervised according to British law
enforcement practices. The security forces have a reputation
for respecting individual rights in the performance of their
duties .
Antigua and Barbuda has a mixed economy, with a strong private
sector. Following 6 years of high economic growth, Antigua's
economy slumped to a 6 percent growth rate in 1990 and slipped
further into recession throughout 1991. A slowdown in the
tourism sector, Antigua and Barbuda's major industry, caused by
significantly reduced international travel due to worldwide
recession and concern over developments in the Perisan Gulf,
was blamed for the declining growth. A large and growing
external debt combined with the pressures of meeting payroll
demands of an oversized public sector workforce, continued to
concern the Government .
The Constitution provides for political and civil rights, which
are generally respected in practice. However, government
control of the electronic media continued to result in almost
no access for opposition parties or persons presenting opinions
opposed to government policies; during 1991, the Government
used its monopoly of the electronic media to censor news
reports about political challenges against ruling party
members. An amendment to the law to allow flogging as a
penalty in rape cases drew protest from one human rights group.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or other extrajudicial
killings .
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance or politically motivated
abductions .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel or inhuman
treatment of prisoners or detainees, and these prohibitions are
generally respected in practice. However, in 1990 Parliament
amended the law to permit flogging as a penalty for rape. One
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ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
human rights organization protested to the Prime Minister that
flogging constitutes cruel, inhviman, or degrading punishment.
There were no reported floggings as a penalty for convicted
rapists during 1991.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention,
which do not occur in practice. Criminal defendants have the
right of judicial determination of the legality of their
detention. Detainees must be brought before a court within 48
hours of arrest or detention. There were no reports of
involuntary exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system is modeled on that of the United Kingdom
and is part of the Eastern Caribbean legal system. Final
appeal may be made to the Queens's Privy Council in the United
Kingdom and is invariably made in the case of death sentences.
There are no military or political courts. Criminal defendants
are assured a fair, open, and public trial. In capital cases
the Government provides legal assistance at public expense to
persons without the means to retain a private attorney. There
are no political prisoners in Antigua and Barbuda.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were no reports of arbitrary interference with privacy,
family, home, or correspondence in 1991. The police must
obtain a warrant before searching private premises.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech, the press, and
other forms of communication. These provisions are generally
respected. However, the Government dominates the electronic
media, the only daily source of news. The Government owns one
of the two radio stations and the single television station. A
son of the Prime Minister owns the second radio station while
another son is the principal owner of the lone cable television
company. The cable service also operates a channel that
occasionally features local programming. The government-
controlled media reports regularly on the Government's
activities but rarely on those of the opposition political
parties .
ABS radio and television regularly censor and manipulate news
that could be potentially damaging to the Government. During
public demonstrations in 1991 to protest the Government's
apparent reluctance to implement reforms recommended by
independent commissions set up to investigate the possible
involvement of Antiguan government officials in the diversion
of Israeli arms to Colombian narcoterrorists, the Government
refused to permit selected reports filed by the regional
Caribbean news agency to be aired on local stations.
One weekly newspaper representing the opposition publishes a
variety of opinions.
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ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the right of peaceful assembly.
Public meetings and organized demonstrations are held without
police interference. Required permits for public meetings are
issued by the police and are normally granted. Permits for
political rallie-s were routinely granted during 1991. Permits
for several protest marches were also granted without
hindrance, although march routes were sometimes altered by the
police.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is unrestricted exercise of religious freedom. The
population is overwhelmingly Protestant, but adherents of other
religious denominations practice their religion and proselytize
openly without government interference. All groups are free to
maintain links with coreligionists in other countries.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Neither law nor practice restricts the right of citizens of
Antigua and Barbuda to move about within the country, to travel
abroad, or to emigrate.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Antigua and Barbuda has a multiparty political system
accommodating a wide spectrum of political viewpoints. All
citizens 18 years of age and older may register and vote by
secret ballot. The Constitution requires general elections at
least every 5 years. The Government is obligated by law to
hold voter registration during a fixed period each year, and
parties conduct their own registration drives free of
government interference. The last general elections were held
in March 1989 and were won by the ALP. With 15 of the 17 seats
in the House of Representatives, the ALP retains the power that
it has held since 1951, except for a period of opposition from
1971 to 1976. One seat is held by United National Democratic
Party. (UNDP) leader Baldwin Spencer, who is also the designated
leader of the opposition. The remaining seat represents the
Barbuda constituency, and is held by Hilbourne Frank, a
political independent who leads the Barbuda faction advocating
secession from the union with Antigua. The opposition has
charged that the ALP's longstanding monopoly on patronage and
its influence on the economic life of the country made it
extremely difficult for opposition parties to attract
membership and financial support. During 1991, public dissent
over government policy came more from competing ALP factions
than from the opposition UNDP, which has been increasingly
quiescent .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
While there are no governmental restrictions, no local human
rights groups have formed to date. There were no requests for
human rights investigations or inquiries during 1991.
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ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, creed,
language, or social status, and it is generally observed.
However, while the role of women in society is not legally
restricted, tradition tends to limit women to home and family,
particularly in rural areas, and to restrict their career
options. These traditional roles are changing, however. The
Government has begun programs to provide enhanced educational
opportunities for both sexes as well as family planning
services. The Directorate of Women's Affairs (previously the
Women's Desk), has worked energetically, with some success, to
help women advance in government and the professions, but
progress is slower in the private sector. The Women's Desk was
founded a decade ago with one director and a secretary; the
Directorate now employs, in addition to the Executive Director,
three professionals and clerical and support staff. In 1991
the Directorate continued educational programs for women in
such areas as health, crafts, and improving business skills.
Most violence against women in Antigua probably goes
unreported. Gauging the extent of the problem is difficult,
due to the lack of accurate data, and is compounded by the
reluctance of women in many cases to testify against their
abusers. Police may be reluctant to interfere in cases of
domestic violence, and some women charge that the courts are
too lenient.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to associate freely and to form labor
unions. Although fewer than 50 percent of Antigua and
Barbuda's workers belong to unions, the important hotel
industry is heavily unionized. Unions are free to affiliate
with international labor organizations and do so in practice.
Antigua and Barbuda has two major trade unions: the Antigua
Trades and Labor Union (ATLU) and the Antigua Workers Union
(AWU) . The ATLU is associated with the ruling ALP, while the
AWU is somewhat more loosely allied with the opposition UNDP.
The AWU is the larger and more active of the two major unions.
The right to strike is recognized by the Labor Code. This
right may be limited in a given dispute by the Court of
Industrial Relations. Once either party to the dispute
requests the court to mediate, there can be no strike, a
provision of law that the International Labor Organization's
Committee of Experts again criticized in 1991. Because of the
delays associated with this process, in practice labor disputes
are often resolved before a strike is called. There were no
strikes in 1991.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Labor organizations are free to organize and bargain
collectively. Antiunion discrimination is prohibited by law,
and there have been no reports of its practice. There are no
areas of the country where union organization or collective
bargaining is discouraged or impeded. There are no export
processing zones.
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ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution forbids slavery or forced labor, and they do
not exist in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law provides a minimum working age of 13, which is
respected in practice. Responsibility for enforcement rests
with the Ministry of Labor, which is required by law to conduct
periodic inspections of workplaces. While there have been no
reports of minimum age employment violations, the political
strength of the two major unions and the powerful influence
which the Government has on the private sector, combine to make
the Labor Ministry very effective in the enforcement of this
issue.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The law permits a maximum 48-hour, 6-day workweek, but in
practice the standard workweek is 40 hours in 5 days. Workers
are guaranteed a minimum of 3 weeks of annual leave and up to
13 weeks of maternity leave. Different minimum wages for
different work categories were established by law in 1981.
Most minimum wages would not provide a decent standard of
living for workers and their families, but in practice the
great majority of workers earn substantially more than the
minimum wage. Increases in the minimum wage were recommended
in 1989, but there was no action to implement the
recommendation in 1991. There are no occupational health and
safety laws or regulations.
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ARGENTINA
Argentina is a federal, constitutional democracy with a
president elected through an electoral college for a single
6-year term, a bicameral legislature, and an independent
judiciary. Traditionally, the executive is the dominant
branch. Since the end of military rule in 1983, there have
been two national presidential elections and several midterm
elections for Congress and provincial governorships. In May
1989, the voters elected Justicialist (Peronist) Party
candidate Carlos Menem as the nation's President. The
inauguration of Menem on July 8, 1989, marked the first
constitutional turnover of the presidency from one
democratically elected president to another from an opposing
party since 1916. Midterm elections for provincial governors
and the Chamber of Deputies took place in 1991. Candidates in
recent elections have represented the political spectrum from
conservative to far left.
The President is the constitutional Commander in Chief, while a
civilian Defense Minister oversees the armed forces. The
federal police report to the Interior Minister; provincial
police are organized under provincial constitutions and report
to locally elected provincial governors. However, past
military uprisings. President Menem' s unpopular 1990 pardon of
former military Junta members convicted of human rights abuses,
and intimidation of judges in certain cases indicate continuing
problems in the area of military submission to civilian
authority.
Argentina, one of South America's wealthiest countries, has a
mixed agricultural and industrial economy. Agricultural
exports, particularly grain, represent the major source of
foreign exchange earnings. To reverse a long-term economic
decline that culminated in the hyperinflation of 1989, the
Menem administration has undertaken an ambitious economic
reform program to reduce and rationalize the public sector,
open the economy, and stabilize financial markets. These
reforms have been supported actively by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American
Development Bank. The Government continued to be in arrears on
its external debt, which totals over $50 billion; however,
partial payments were resumed in 1990.
Argentines enjoy a wide range of constitutionally protected
freedoms and individual rights. However, during 1991 there
were incidents of torture and extrajudicial killing by police,
intimidation of judges and other officials by rightist and
leftist groups, including some members of the security forces,
and continued discrimination against women.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no credible reports of politically motivated
killings carried out by government forces in 1991. There were,
however, several cases of killings or attacks which attained a
high degree of notoriety because of strongly political
overtones. In April the case of the National Administrator of
the Customs Service, retired General Rodolfo Echegoyen, who
allegedly committed suicide in late 1990, was reopened amid
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ARGENTINA
allegations that he was killed because he was investigating
high-level corruption, including money laundering, in the
Customs Service. In May a controversial film director,
Fernando Solanas, was wounded by masked assailants in Buenos
Aires. The assault, which was condemned by the Government,
occurred just a day after Solanas had reaffirmed in court a
magazine article charging President Menem with corruption and
electoral fraud".
Police were indicted in several cases in which their use of
excessive force or of weapons resulted in unlawful killing.
Some observers believe that police often use deadly force
without sufficient cause. In November a policeman in Buenos
Aires killed a motorist after the latter reportedly refused to
pay a bribe. The responsible officer was suspended, and the
case was under investigation at year's end.
Fifteen policemen in Cordoba were arrested in June for
torturing to death a man suspected of being a drug trafficker.
A student arrested during a rock concert in Buenos Aires in May
died, allegedly from a beating administered by police while he
and others were being transferred to the police station. On a
judge's order, the officers involved were detained on minor
charges. The student's family has initiated a civil suit
against the police, which remains before the courts. In Bahia
Blanca, in December 1990, a teenaged girl was allegedly raped
and killed by several policemen.
In September 1990, a young woman named Maria Soledad Morales
was raped and murdered in Catamarca province, unleashing a
sordid scandal that had not yet subsided by the end of 1991.
The failure of then-Governor Ramon Saadi, whose family has
dominated Catamarca provincial politics, to pursue the case
vigorously led to widespread charges of a coverup. Mass
demonstrations and marches to protest the local government's
failure to bring the murderers to justice gave the case
national exposure at a time when former Governor Saadi was
running for reelection. In April President Menem named a
federal administrator to run the province's affairs until the
election of a successor in regularly scheduled provincial
elections late in 1991. A federal investigation into the
Morales case revealed serious irregularities in all three
branches of the provincial government. The police apparently
tried to cover up the crime, in which the prime suspect is the
son of a Peronist congressional deputy and Saadi ally. The
province's police chief has been accused of malfeasance, the
autopsy was improperly performed, and high-level police and
court officials have resigned. The suspect was still in jail
at year's end, pending the outcome of an ongoing investigation.
Government officials and private persons were the objects of
threats and intimidation in 1991, probably by members of the
military or rightist supporters. Judicial investigations into
allegations of abuse of authority or corruption are sometimes
hindered by violence against judges and other judicial
authorities. There were several instances in which judges
were the victims of threats, bombings, shootings, and other
attempts at intimidation. A member of the Buenos Aires federal
appeals court, Jorge Casanovas, hearing the case against
military officers who staged an unsuccessful mutiny in December
1990, received threatening anonymous telephone calls. His
apartment was fired upon in June, and three human skulls
inscribed with the names of his children were sent to him in
July. Other judges on the appeals court, which at the same
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ARGENTINA
time was considering an extradition request for a narcotics
trafficker, received similar anonymous calls. Judges hearing
the money laundering case against President Menem' s
sister-in-law were also threatened. In July three journalists
received menacing anonymous letters from a group calling itself
the Peronist Moralizing Command. The Mothers of the Plaza de
Mayo, a group formed to demand an accounting of the thousands
who disappeared during military rule, also received anonymous
telephone threats, and their Buenos Aires office was
vandalized. The Government enhanced police protection for the
judges and conducted a routine investigation of the threats,
but no arrests had been made by year's end. A senior Ministry
of Interior official denied the existence of "parapolice"
groups but admitted that some police officials might be
involved in instances of intimidation.
b. Disappearance
There were no confirmed disappearances directly attributable to
the police or armed forces in 1991.
However, in late November and early December federal police,
acting in cooperation with judicial authorities under the
direct guidance of the Interior Minister, arrested a dozen
active duty and retired federal police officers and charged
them with a series of kidnapings for ransom of prominent
Argentines, most of whom were Jewish. Some of those believed
to have been kidnaped by this band have never reappeared and
are presvutied dead. The gang had apparently been in operation
for more than a decade, originating during the military regime
of 1976-83. Three of those arrested were high ranking, active
duty police officers. Large amounts of ransom monies were
recovered, and police were continuing their investigation and
seeking suspected accomplices at year's end. There is no
indication that any of the abductions were politically
motivated.
There were several other cases of prominent Argentines being
kidnaped by what are thought to be nonpolitical , criminal
groups seeking to extort large sums of money from their
families. In August the governor of Cordoba province accused
the police and judicial authorities in neighboring provinces of
protecting the kidnapers of three prominent Cordoba residents.
The charge was denied as a "political maneuver" related to the
impending elections. In June a court in Mar del Plata
sentenced a retired navy officer to 3 years in prison for the
1976 kidnaping of a teacher.
Judicial proceedings in the complex, highly emotional efforts
to ascertain the whereabouts and identity of children of those
who were "disappeared" by the security forces during the
1976-1983 military dictatorship appear to have stalled.
Disciplinary proceedings brought against two prosecutors in
1989 who were investigating these cases were still pending at
year's end. The Government has done little to support the
investigation and resolution of these cases.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
The Constitution prohibits torture, and the criminal code
provides penalties for torture which are similar to those for
homicide, 8 to 25 years in prison. However, police brutality
is a continuing and serious problem, and prosecutions are
481
ARGENTINA
rare. During 1991 there were several cases in which police
officers were either charged or sentenced to prison for torture
or other abuses. In one incident, a 17-year-old youth was shot
by police on the top floor of an abandoned highrise building
bordering the presidential residence in suburban Buenos Aires.
Police procedures in the case were under review at year's end.
Reacting to the~ widespread publicity generated by cases of
police violence and by the arrest — and subsequent release — of a
police subcommissioner charged with torturing detainees to
extract confessions (see the 1990 country report), the
Government made limited efforts to prevent or control police
brutality. In January the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission of the Organization of American States called on the
Government to provide monetary compensation to a man arrested
and tortured by the armed forces in 1975.
Prisons are overcrowded, with poor medical facilities and a
reported inadequacy of food. In one instance, inmates with
acquired immodef iciency syndrome (AIDS) who were confined in a
prison hospital were manacled to their beds to prevent them
from escaping or spreading the infection. Following extensive
media coverage of the case, prison officials discontinued the
practice.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Argentina has a well-developed penal code containing explicit
protections of individual rights and controls on police arrest
and investigatory powers. Arrests require probable cause or a
judicial order, and the law provides for a judicial
determination of the legality of detention. These legal limits
on police power are not always respected in practice. Holding
suspects for several days is common. Most instances of torture
or abuse of prisoners tend to occur during this early period of
detention. In September a bill became law which limits to 10
hours the time that police may hold detainees for investigation
before charging or releasing them and grants prisoners the
right of communication. In July the Buenos Aires Appeals Court
ruled that police must immediately inform a judge when anyone
under 18 years old is arrested.
Involuntary exile is not permitted or practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Argentina's judicial system is generally fair and independent,
albeit often slow and cumbersome. The Constitution and penal
code provide for trials before judges and appellate review of
all judicial rulings, including those of military courts.
Federal Courts interpret constitutional protection against
"arbitrary" trial procedures to permit wide-ranging review of
criminal prosecutions. Army officers sentenced by a military
court for their participation in the December 1990 military
revolt had their sentences reviewed, and in some instances
reduced, by the Buenos Aires Federal Appeals Court in August
1991. The Government subsequently asked that the sentencing be
reviewed again. As in most civil law countries, trial by jury
does not exist. Judges render verdicts on the basis of written
evidence. The police have legal authority to adjudicate
misdemeanor cases, which are often decided by senior police
officials. The legal system provides public defenders for
indigents, but caseloads exceed the system's capacity to
provide tnem in all cases. Delays and overcrowded court
482
ARGENTINA
dockets continue to impede the legal process. A continuing
dispute between the judiciary and the executive over the
salaries of employees of the judiciary has resulted in wildcat
strikes and work-to-rule measures by court employees. These
actions further slowed the judicial process.
On November 29, both houses of Congress passed legislation that
significantly enhanced the ability the victims of human rights
abuse and their family members to file claims against members
of the armed forces for mistreatment dating from the 1976-83
military regime. The legislation also improved the chances
that victims and their families might receive monetary
compensation. Human rights groups remain skeptical about how
effectively the legislation will be enforced.
The right to bail is provided by law and observed in practice.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There is constitutional protection against unreasonable search
and seizure, and the State generally does not intrude
arbitrarily into the private lives of persons. However, there
continue to be credible reports that security agencies tap
telephones of political personalities and human rights
organizations .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Argentina enjoys an essentially free and vigorous press. The
national debate on press and media freedom, led by the National
Editors and Publishers Association (ADEPA) , intensified in
1991. ADEPA' s president noted in April that press freedom had
increased despite the media's aggressive campaign to uncover
official fraud and corruption. Nevertheless, ADEPA and the
media continued to report and denounce anonymous threats and
attacks against journalists, such as bombings. The Government
joined in these condemnations. ADEPA and the media also
reproached the Government for actions that threatened the
media, such as closing down magazines, forcing journalists to
reveal sources, imposing a value-added tax on magazines and
newspapers, and illegally searching two newspaper offices in
Cordoba to locate documents related to the Morales murder case
(see Section l.a.) and a story on official corruption. In 1991
several bills were introduced in Congress to strengthen press
freedoms, especially the right of a journalist to refuse to
reveal sources. At year's end none of these initiatives had
yet been enacted into law.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
All groups and political parties are free to organize and
assemble. In 1991 major political parties, the labor movement,
human rights organizations, ethnic communities, and other
groups were able to hold mass rallies without interference.
The only exception was a ban on the use of the swastika and the
term "National Socialist" by a neo-Nazi group.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for the free exercise of religion.
Missionaries for any religion are permitted to enter Argentina
483
ARGENTINA
and proselytize, and the non-Catholic population is growing.
Argentina's Jewish community, Latin America's largest at an
estimated 300,000, practices its religion without legal
restriction.
Nevertheless, 1991 saw the emergence of a neo-Nazi organization
and overt expressions of anti-Semitism. More than 100 graves
in the Jewish cemetery at Berazategui in Buenos Aires province
were desecrated and destroyed on the night of April 28.
Subsequently, two known neo-Nazis were arrested and charged
with the crime. One, Horacio Carrondi, had been a member of
the army intelligence service until 1986. Judges investigating
the Berazategui desecration received telephone threats, and
anti-Semitic, neo-Nazi graffiti were painted on cemetery and
court house walls. In the wake of the profanation, a federal
judge prohibited an Argentine neo-Nazi organization called the
Nationalist Workers Party from displaying a swastika. The
court order was defied. In May a synagogue in San Salvador,
Entre Rios province, was attacked and partially destroyed.
President Menem strongly condemned these incidents.
In September the Government sent to Congress a new law
governing religious communities. The bill reaffirms
universally accepted religious freedoms, eliminates the
obligation of non-Catholic groups to register with the State,
and extends to non-Catholic groups that choose not to register
such benefits as military exemptions for ministers and
seminarians and the opportunity to teach religion in public
schools.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
International and internal travel as well as emigration are
unrestricted. Refugees are not forced to return to countries
from which they have fled. In July six Iraqi Kurds and an
Iranian, stowaways on a freighter, requested and were granted
political asylum in Argentina. In April the Government
announced that it was studying the possibility of an amnesty
for some 150,000 illegal residents, similar to an amnesty
granted in 1984 to 156,768 persons.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Since September 1983, Argentina has held several national
elections to choose federal, provincial, and local officials.
These elections were generally free, fair, and democratic, with
universal suffrage. Some allegations of fraud were made in a
few provinces. The Justicialist (Peronist) Party currently
controls the executive and, in an alliance with smaller
parties, the legislative branches of government. Political
parties from a wide ideological spectrum are represented in
Congress as a result of the 1987, 1989, and 1991 elections, and
even more parties hold office in individual provinces.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Hximan Rights
The Government cooperates fully with international human rights
organizations, which enjoy unrestricted access in Argentina.
Domestic human rights organizations operate openly, despite
occasional and anonymous threats and harassment.
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ARGENTINA
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination based on sex, race, religion,
language, and social status. However, Argentine women must
contend with bias rooted in the sociocultural traditions of the
country and face de facto discrimination in certain job areas.
In November the Congress approved and President Menem signed a
measure that would require political parties to designate women
for at least 30 percent of the positions on their slates for
national office. Women's organizations strongly and
vociferously supported this measure, but experienced
politicians have expressed doubts about how the Government can
effectively implement and enforce this law.
Violence against women is not approved by society or the
Government, but such abuse, including domestic violence such as
spouse beating, does exist. According to various groups
representing women, there is a continuing increase in the
number of abuse cases being brought to their attention and
before the courts. They credit this to greater public
awareness of this problem and to the increased socioeconomic
problems affecting many Argentine families. Still, reliable
statistics on the problem of physical abuse of women are
scarce. Sexual harassment is also being given greater
attention. In November a male official of the actors' union
was expelled for sexual harassment. Informed observers state
that more women are coming forward to denounce various types of
harassment and abuse encountered at home and on the job.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Labor Movement, which represents about one-third of the
national work force, is an important independent economic and
political force. Trade unions are independent of the
Government. The vast majority of union leaders are allied to
the ruling Justicialist Party and are active in the Peronist
movement. There is, however, a great deal of internal division
and rivalry within the Peronist General Labor Confederation
(CGT), based on personality, ideological differences, and
opposition to the Administration's economic policies. These
divisions, and the success of President Menem 's free market
economic reforms, have weakened the political power of labor
unions .
The right of association was enhanced by legislation passed in
1987 and 1988 which restored some laws and rights suspended by
previous military governments, but segments of these laws have
been criticized as restricting the ability of rival union
organizations to organize and bargain collectively. An
administration-sponsored labor reform package presented to
Congress in September would eliminate many of these
restrictions on organization and collective bargaining. Trade
unions are free to associate with international organizations,
and many Argentine unions are affiliated with, and active in,
international trade union groups. The Government actively
cooperated with the International Labor Organization (ILO) in
investigating complaints by Argentine and international trade
union groups concerning possible violations of worker rights in
collective bargaining, job security, freedom of association,
conciliation, and the right to strike.
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ARGENTINA
Unions have the right to strike, subject to compulsory
conciliation and arbitration by the Labor Ministry. Workers
have the right to receive their salaries while on strike until
the Labor Ministry orders compulsory conciliation. Strikes by
employees of state-owned enterprises dominated 'the strike scene
in 1991. Most of them were triggered by the Government's
administrative reorganization plan that is designed to reduce
the size and cost' of the public sector, modernize
administrative procedures, and privatize outmoded state
enterprises. In September the Government announced the
possibility of declaring all politically motivated strikes
illegal, a step which would give it the right to dismiss
striking employees.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
By law, labor and management have a binding collective
bargaining process which sets wage levels on an industrywide
basis. The State's involvement in this process is limited to
ratifying the agreements, which provides them with legal
status. The Government directly sets wages for civil servants
and employees of state-owned enterprises, generally following
consultations with the unions. As part of a broadly based
labor reform package, the Administration announced in 1991 its
intentioil to introduce draft legislation that would change the
rules under which unions organize and elect their leadership
and change the operation of the collective bargaining mechanism
as well. Although specifics had not been made public by year's
end, the announced intent of the reform legislation is to free
unions from the monolithic political and economic control of
old-line leaders and introduce more democratic practices.
Antiunion discrimination is prohibited by law, and
we 11 -developed mechanisms are in place and functioning to
resolve complaints. Some provinces provide rights and
obligations beyond those provided under federal law.
There are no officially designated export processing zones in
Argentina. Federal labor law and regulation applies uniformly
throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is illegal and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Employment of children under 14 years of age, except within the
family, is prohibited. Minors aged 14 and 15 may work in
restricted types of employment but not more than 6 hours a day
or 35 hours a week. The same law applies to minors 16 to 18
years of age, although competent authorities may allow
exceptions. Violators are tried before the appropriate
courts. Enforcement of child labor laws has lessened as the
economic situation has led many families to have as many
members employed as possible.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The official minimum monthly wage in Argentina, which was
increased in March 1991 and then remained constant until year's
end, was insufficient to provide a decent standard of living
for workers and their families.
Argentina offers comprehensive protection of worker rights.
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ARGENTINA
The maximum workday is 8 hours; the workweek is 48 hours.
Premiums must be paid for work beyond these limits. Rules
governing vacations and occupational health and safety are
comparable to those in Western industrialized nations and are
enforced by the Government and labor unions in the formal
economy. There is, however, a large informal economy which
employs an undetermined number of people, including children.
This sector is difficult to police, and employers often are
able to deny basic rights and benefits to employees because
employees fear losing their jobs if they report Labor Code
violations to the authorities.
487
THE BAHAMAS
The Bahamas is a constitutional, parliamentary democracy and a
member of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Queen is the
nominal Head of State and is represented in The Bahamas by an
appointed Governor General. The Progressive Liberal Party
(PLP) has governed since 1967 under Prime Minister Sir Lynden
0. Pindling and was last reelected in the June 1987 general
elections.
The Police and a small Defense Force are answerable to civilian
authority and generally respect laws protecting human rights.
However, there have been continuing credible reports that
police have physically abused detainees, both Bahamian citizens
and foreigners.
The economy is based on tourism, which accounts for nearly half
of The Bahamas' gross national product. The second most
important economic sector is financial services, particularly
offshore banking.
The Constitution provides for the protection of fundamental
human rights and freedom from discrimination on the basis of
sex, race, religion, national origin, or political opinion.
The principal human rights problems relate to abuse of
detainees and prisoners by police and prison guards and the
miserable condition of the prison system, growing antagonism
toward the Haitian migrant community, and the Government's
monopolization of the local media.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Politically motivated killings are not known to occur, but
there are occasional killings of detainees in official
custody. The results of the coroner's inquest into the 1990
killing of Dwayne Bannister while in police custody (see 1990
Report) had not been made public by the end of 1991 despite
requests from the Grand Bahama Human Rights Organization.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of abductions, secret arrests, or
government-sanctioned clandestine detentions during 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel or degrading
treatment or punishment. The police generally respect the
constitutional safeguards prohibiting such practices, but there
were credible charges that in some cases police investigators
and prison guards resorted to intimidation and physical abuse
of detainees. An American citizen reported that he was beaten
with a nightstick and a metal-tipped rubber hose by guards at
Fox Hill prison in August 1991. His allegations were confirmed
by other prisoners, and the Ministry of National Security
ordered an investigation. The Police Criminal Investigation
Department (CID) was still conducting its investigation at
year's end. Charges against the alleged victim were dropped
and he was released from prison and deported. The Grand Bahama
Human Rights Organization is investigating approximately 30
488
THE BAHAMAS
cases of alleged police brutality during 1991. There are
charges that Haitians in jail and prison are abused more
frequently than are Bahamians; a pregnant Haitian woman was
beaten while being held at Fox Hill prison. Illegal Haitian
migrants detained in The Bahamas are subject to pressures and
harassment related to their status.
Conditions at Fox Hill prison. The Bahamas' only prison
facility, remain deplorable. The maximum security facility is
grossly overcrowded and seriously understaffed. The
Government, citing budgetary constraints, temporarily abandoned
plans to construct a new $6-million prison facility at Fox
Hill. Consequently, as many as six male prisoners are housed
in 6 by 8-foot cells designed to hold no more than two.
Sanitation facilities are primitive, usually consisting of a
plastic bucket in each cell. There is no running water
available in the cells; a jug of drinking water, which is
supposed to be supplied to each prisoner daily, is often not
supplied unless the prisoner has paid a trustee. Prison guards
generally determine whether a prisoner's illness requires
medical attention. During 1991 a diabetic prisoner developed
gangrene and her condition deteriorated due partly to the poor
prison diet .
Recognizing the serious problems at Fox Hill, the Government
took a number of steps in 1991 to attempt to ameliorate the
situation. A commission was appointed by the Government to
examine prison conditions and make recommendations for
improvement. In addition, the Government agreed to a dialog
with U.S. Department of State and Department of Justice
officials to discuss prison problems. The Government also
requested that U.S. medical specialists examine some prisoners
and has expressed interest in entering into a prisoner exchange
agreement with the United States. Two U.S. Bureau of Prisons
doctors visited The Bahamas in October 1991 and examined U.S.
and Bahamian prisoners. The physicians agreed to submit a
report of their findings to the U.S. Department of Justice to
be passed on to the Government of The Bahamas.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention.
Arrests are openly conducted and, when required, judicially
issued warrants are obtained. Warrants are not required in
cases of suspected narcotics or firearms possession. Detainees
are charged within 48 hours and allowed access to an attorney
of their choice. The right to a judicial determination of the
legality of an arrest is respected, and there is a system
permitting bail, except for foreigners. The Government is
obligated to provide legal representation to destitutes in
cases involving capital crimes. Illegal migrants, including
Haitians, Chinese, and a few Cubans have the right to retain
legal representation but are generally held at Fox Hill prison
pending deportation unless they can arrange private means for
their repatriation. As a result, illegal migrants may be held
at Fox Hill for weeks or months while repatriation arrangements
are being made.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Bahamian legal system is based on English common law but
shares some features of the U.S. legal system. The judiciary
is independent, appointed by the executive branch on the advice
of the Judicial and Legal Services Commission, and conducts
fair and public trials. Defendants enjoy a presumption of
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THE BAHAMAS
innocence and the right to appeal. The Constitution entitles
defendants to counsel, and lawyers have access to their
clients. Legal representation at public expense is provided
only in capital cases. An overburdened and archaic judicial
system often results in execessive pretrial detention and
prison overcrowding; trials can often take as long as 2 years
from time of arxest to eventual conviction or acquital.
There are no political prisoners.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Cor r espondenc e
As a rule, the Government does not interfere in the private
lives of its citizens. The Constitution prohibits arbitrary
entry, search, or seizure and reqiiires a court order for the
entry into and search of private property. Aside from
restrictions on prison mail, the Government neither censors
mail nor restricts receipt of foreign correspondence or
publications .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for the right of free expression, a
right that is usually respected in practice. The political
opposition freely criticizes the Government. Three daily and
two weekly newspapers are privately owned and express a variety
of views on matters of public interest; they are frequently
critical of the Government and its policies. There has
traditionally been a tendency toward self-censorship when it
comes to identifying by name government officials or private
individuals who may be involved in controversial issues. The
threat of libel suits under laws unchanged since the 19th
century results in cautious treatment of stories about fraud,
corruption, or moral turpitude. As the 1992 legislative
elections approached, however, government and opposition
members become increasingly strident in trading accusations.
The hotly debated Parliamentary Elections Bill, which was
passed on December 13, will make it an offense to use "foreign
radio or television stations to broadcast any material having
reference to an election in The Bahamas, with the aim of
influencing an election, other than pursuant to arrangements
made with the Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas for the
broadcast to be received and retransmitted by the
Corporation." Those found in violation of this provision could
face a fine of $2,000 and/or 2 years in jail, after which they
will be ineligible to register or vote for 7 years. Additional
provisions in the bill include penalties against persons
accused of "heckling" at political rallies and requires that
all "bills, posters and placards bear the name and address of
the publisher." On a more positive note, the bill will also
establish an Electoral Broadcast Council to monitor campaign
coverage by the Broadcasting Corporation of The Bahamas for
fairness. Government officials claim that the new law will
allow the opposition freer access to national television and
radio.
The New Providence Human Rights Organization and the Grand
Bahama Hiiman Rights Organization have protested certain
provisions of the legislation and have lodged a complaint with
the Caribbean Human Rights Network. They also plan to take the
matter to the Supreme Court and were in the process of lodging
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THE BAHAMAS
a formal complaint with the Organization of American States at
year's end. The government claims that the law is similar to
current legislation in force in the U.K. and Canada.
The Government holds a monopoly on local radio and television
broadcasting, and opposition initiatives to secure private
ownership of radio stations have been thwarted by the
Government's majority in Parliament. The radio and television
network covers the views of the Government and the activities
of government ministers exhaustively; the lead items on the
domestic news are usually ministerial speeches. Opposing
viewpoints and opposition activities received increasing
coverage in 1991. The Government does not restrict the
ownership of satellite antennas, and many Bahamians have access
to international news programs on satellite television, as well
as to direct reception of radio and television from southern
Florida. Foreign publications enter the country freely.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the rights to free assembly and
association. These rights are respected in practice. Private
associations are permitted, but groups must obtain permits to
hold public demonstrations. Such permits are freely granted.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is full freedom of religion in The Bahamas. There is no
favored or official state religion, and the majority of church
members belong to Protestant denominations.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Bahamians and residents of The Bahamas enjoy free movement
within the country, and Bahamians face no impediments to
foreign travel or emigration. Passports are liberally granted
to Bahamian citizens.
The Bahamas is not a party to the 1967 U.N. Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees. In the past, Cuban asylum seekers
were treated as illegal immigrants, and some were held in
prison until a third country, usually the United States,
arranged to admit them. However, during 1991 the treatment of
Cuban asylum seekers improved as the Bahamian Government issued
temporary work permits to nine Cuban men and worked with
private groups to arrange temporary housing for Cuban women and
children.
The presence of an estimated 30,000-40,000 Haitian migrants in
The Bahamas became a volatile social, economic, and political
problem in 1991. Hundreds of Haitians were repatriated in 1991
and others were detained at Fox Hill prison (some for 6 months
or longer) pending repatriation. Deportees are held for
repatriation until there is a sufficient number to fill a plane
or boat. There are occasional reports of abuse during roundups
and deportations. In June 1991 a Haitian illegal migrant was
apprehended by police and held in Fox Hill prison for 2 months
pending deportation, at which time he was transferred to the
Criminal Detention Center of the Prison, accused of committing
several crimes, and was allegedly beaten by prison guards. The
man was held in prison for nearly 6 months without being
charged and was finally deported in December 1991. The
Government works with the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) to determine whether applicants are legitimate
491
THE BAHAMAS
refugees. According to UNHCR officials, Haitian deportees
interviewed to date have not been legitimate refugees. The
Bahamian Government and the Government of Haiti conducted talks
on a migrant repatriation treaty during 1991. The Government
of The Bahamas took a hard line during the first round of talks
in September, declaring that a formula must be devised to
reduce the Haitian migrant community as soon as possible.
Further talks on the migrant repatriation treaty were suspended
due to the September 1991 coup in Haiti.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Bahamas is a constitutional democracy with a multiparty
political system, governed by an elected Prime Minister and
Parliament. The political process is open to all elements of
society, and citizens 18 years of age and older are eligible to
register and vote. In the 1987 elections, 92.8 percent of
those registered actually voted. Registration is on a nonparty
basis .
The two principal political parties are the governing
Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) and the opposition Free
National Movement (FNM) . The PLP led the country for 6 1/2
years of internal self-government from January 1967 until
independence in July 1973, and has held power under Prime
Minister Sir Lynden 0. Pindling since then. The PLP currently
holds 32 of 49 seats in Parliament's House of Assembly, while
the FNM holds 17. The last general election in June 1987
returned the PLP to power with a clear parliamentary majority.
Challenges by the opposition based on charges of electoral
fraud produced no changes in the results. The 1991
Parliamentary Elections Bill provides for inspectors to conduct
inquiries to determine the accuracy of the register of voters
and also provides for the use of indelible ink to stamp voters'
hands in order to prevent multiple voting. The next general
elections must take place by June 1992. The political
opposition continues to allege bias in employment, promotions,
and the provision of government services, based on political
party affiliation.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are four local human rights groups: The Grand Bahama
Human Rights Organization, the New Providence Human Rights
Organization, the Abaco Human Rights Organization, and the
National Association for the Protection of Human Rights. These
organizations are allowed to operate freely in The Bahamas;
they report objectively on alleged human rights violations.
The Government placed no restrictions on their activities
during 1991.
No international human rights organization sought to visit The
Bahamas to investigate human rights conditions during 1991 and
were turned away. However, Americas Watch claimed in August
that the Government refused it access to the prison system.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for individual rights and freedoms
regardless of race, place of origin, political opinion, creed,
or sex of the individual. However, the Constitution does
492
THE BAHAMAS
distinguish between the sexes in that it does not provide
Bahamian women the ability to bestow citizenship upon their
foreign-born spouses. Women participate fully in Bahamian
society and are well represented in the business and
professional sectors, as well as in the judiciary and in
government. There does not appear to be a significant wage gap
between men and women .
Domestic violence against women continued to be an issue of
intense concern in The Bahamas, with independent women's
support groups reporting that over 120 women per month seek
shelter at the Women's Crisis Center in Nassau. Women may have
their cases heard in a closed domestic court and may seek a
restraining order against an abusive spouse or male companion.
Women's rights groups speak freely on ways to improve the
condition of women and children, including safeguarding their
physical safety, and helped draft a bill which was passed into
law as the Sexual Offenses and Domestic Violence Act of 1991.
The Act strengthened measures against abuse by criminalizing
spousal rape, incest, and sexual harassment in the workplace.
Many Haitians in The Bahamas are illegal immigrants and face
economic and social deprivation and sometimes mistreatment by
police and members of the Defense Force. One of the major
topics of debate during 1991 within both government circles and
Bahamian society at large was how to contend with the growing
Haitian immigrant population. A substantial number of
Bahamians view the Haitians as unwelcome guests who are a drain
on the economy, contribute to the moral decline of the country,
and have no constitutional rights. The Government adopted a
hard-line approach during negotiations with the Government of
Haiti on renewing and/or revising a migrant repatriation
treaty, stating publicly that the number of illegal Haitian
migrants in the Bahamas had reached an "intolerable level."
The Bahamian Government further declared that it could no
longer allocate its scarce resources to care for Haitian
migrants, and that native Bahamians were demanding "immediate
action" to reduce the number of migrants significantly. The
situation during 1991 showed growing potential for increased
friction between the native Bahamian and Haitian migrant
communities .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution specifically grants labor unions the rights of
free assembly and association. Workers may form or join unions
without prior authorization except for members of the Police
Force, Defense Force, Fire Brigade, and prison guards, all of
whom are forbidden to unionize by the Constitution. This right
is exercised extensively, particularly in the hotel industry
where approximately 80 percent of the employees are unionized.
The two major labor organizations in the Bahamas, the
8,000-member Bahamas Hotel Catering and Allied Workers Union
and the 12, 000-member Trade Union Congress, are basically
politicized, although both function independently of actual
government or political party control.
All Bahamian labor unions are guaranteed the right to maintain
affiliations with international trade union organizations. The
right to strike is limited under the Industrial Relations Act,
which states that union members must vote to strike and the
motion must be passed by a simple majority before a strike can
commence. The Ministry of Labor oversees the vote.
493
THE BAHAMAS
There were no formal strikes during 1990, but there were
impromptu labor actions, which included slowdowns and
sick-outs, initiated by construction workers at the site of the
new airport terminal. The labor actions originated from the
workers' demands to form a union. An agreement was reached
whereby the workers dropped their demand to form a union in
exchange for increased compensation.
There were no human rights abuses directly related to unions or
workers in 1991.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers are free to organize, and collective bargaining is
extensive for the 30,000 workers (25 percent of the work force)
who are unionized. Collective bargaining is protected in law
and freely practiced, and the Department of Labor is
responsible for mediating disputes. Wages are set in free
negotiations between unions and employers without government
involvement .
Antiunion discrimination by employers is prohibited by both the
Industrial Relations Act and the Constitution. The Industrial
Relations Act mandates that employers recognize trade unions.
The Industrial Relations Board within the Department of Labor
mediates and conciliates disputes between individual employees
or unions and their employers. Two mechanisms exist to resolve
complaints: filing a trade dispute with the Department of
Labor, or bringing a civil suit against the employer in a court
of law. The Industrial Relations Act mandates the
reinstatement of workers fired for union activities.
Legislation pending before Parliament at year's end, the
employment protection bill, addresses unfair dismissal and
places greater burdens of proof for dismissal on the employer.
Labor laws and regulations are enforced uniformly throughout
The Bahamas. There are two small and not particularly active
free trade zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by the Constitution
and does not exist in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
While there are no laws prohibiting the employment of children
below a certain age, compulsory education for children up to
the age of 14 years effectively discourages child employment.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Fair Labor Standards Act limits the regular workweek to 48
hours and provides for at least one 24-hour rest period.
Overtime payment (time and a half) is required by law for hours
in excess of the standard. The Labor Department is responsible
for enforcing labor laws and has a team of several inspectors
who make on-site visits to enforce occupational health and
safety standards and investigate employee concerns and
complaints. These inspection visits are normally announced
ahead of time. Employers generally cooperate with inspections
in implementing safety standards. The National Insurance
Program provides for compensation for work-related injuries.
An employer is also required by law to find suitable
alternative employment for an employee who is injured on the
job but is still able to work. Laws on working conditions are
494
THE BAHAMAS
uniform throughout the country, including the export processing
zones. While the Fair Labor Standards Act has minimum wage
provisions, there are no legislated minimum wage levels.
495
BARBADOS
Barbados, a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, is a
constitutional democracy with a multiparty, parliamentary form
of government based on the Westminster model. Its House of
Assembly is the third oldest elected body in the Western
Hemisphere. Barbadians recognize the Queen of England as Head
of State; she is represented locally by an appointed Governor
General. The Prime Minister is the Head of Government and
governs with an appointed Cabinet. National elections, which
were held in January 1991, were contested by two major
political parties, one offshoot of the government party, and
several independent candidates. Prime Minister Sandiford of
the Democratic Labor Party was elected by an eight -member
majority to a maximum 5-year term.
The Royal Barbados Police Force is charged with maintaining
public order; it respects constitutional and legal guarantees
of human rights. The traditionally high public respect for the
Force dropped in 1991 due to a growing crime wave and the
emergence of youth gangs. Police morale suffered
correspondingly as police were called upon to work long shifts
for no additional pay. The small volunteer Barbados Defense
Force is responsible for national security but is used to
maintain public order in times of crisis, emergency, or other
specific need.
The country's economy, based on agriculture, tourism, light
manufacturing, eind services, is highly susceptible to external
economic developments. After years of positive growth, the
economy in 1990 took a serious downturn which reached crisis
proportions in 1991, leading to negotiations with the
International Monetery Fund (IMF). In an attempt to stave off
a devaluation, the Prime Minister instigated layoffs of public
sector employees, an 8-percent wage cut, stabilization and
consumption tax increases, an employment levy, and other taxes
to increase revenue and ease serious balance of payments
difficulties. The full impact of these measures was expected
to be felt in late 1991.
Barbados has a long record of generally respecting human
rights, and there was no significant change in that record
during 1991.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of such killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution specifically prohibits torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. A 1990 case of
a male prisoner who died in police custody as a result of
severe mistreatment by police officers became known during
1991. A commission of inquiry completed its study of the
496
BARBADOS
incident, but its findings had not been made public by year's
end. In addition, it is reported that a very high percentage
of convictions are based on confessions in Barbados. There
have been credible reports of the abusive treatment of
detainees by some law enforcement officers in order to elicit
confessions.
A decision by a judge in late 1990 to reintroduce flogging by
cat-o ' -nine-tails as punishment for heinous crimes caused
considerable public debate. Some groups described it as a
retrograde step, constituting cruel, inhuman, and degrading
punishment. Because the flogging law is still on the books,
judges have the power to use it in their sentencing decisions.
During 1991 one judge invoked it in 7 different cases, but none
of the sentences had been carried out by year's end.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and imprisonment
and requires detainees to be brought before a court of law
within 72 hours of arrest. These provisions are respected in
practice. Criminal defendants have the right to counsel, and
attorneys have ready access to their clients. Indigent
defendants are provided court-appointed counsel for indictable
offenses which are defined as serious crimes that are tried
before a judge and jury as opposed to a magistrate. Exile is
not used as a punishment or means of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides that persons charged with criminal
offenses be given a fair, public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial court. Defendants are
presumed innocent until proven guilty. The Government provides
free legal aid to the indigent. The judiciary acts
independently and is free of intervention from other branches
of government. There are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government does not interfere arbitrarily in the private
lives of its citizens. The Constitution prohibits arbitrary
entry, search, or seizure, and the law requires warrants to be
issued before privately owned property may be entered and
searched. There are credible reports that, in response to
increased drug-related crime, the police have resorted to
arbitrary searches of homes in certain neighborhoods in
Barbados. The Government neither censors mail nor restricts
the receipt of foreign correspondence or publications.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, and
these rights are respected in practice. There are five radio
stations, two of which are owned by the Government. Caribbean
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) television service (the only
television source, excluding direct satellite reception) is
government owned. Though CBC is a state enterprise, views
opposing government policies are regularly reported.
Opposition political figures occasionally claim their positions
are given little attention, and during economic debates in 1991
497
BARBADOS
appearances by opposition leaders were televised only on rare
occasions. There are two independent daily newspapers, both of
which present opposition political views. The Government
regularly comes under attack in the newspapers and on daily
call-in radio programs.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.
The Government observes the constitutional guarantees of
peaceful assembly and private association. Permits required
for public demonstrations continue to be routinely granted.
Political parties, trade associations, and private
organizations function and hold meetings and rallies without
government hindrance.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is full freedom of religion. The Anglican and Methodist
faiths have traditionally predominated, but there are numerous
other active religious denominations and organizations
throughout the country, including Rastaf arians . Foreign
missionaries of various faiths proselytize freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens and legal residents move freely within Barbados, and
leave and enter the country without restriction.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have this right in law and exercise it in practice.
Political parties freely compete in fair elections by secret
ballot at least every 5 years. There are no impediments to
participation in the political process, and all Barbadians over
age 18 may vote. The present Democratic Labor Party (DLP)
Government, in power since 1986, won the January 1991 election
with a reduced majority of 18 out of the 28 seats. The main
opposition party, the Barbados Labor Party (BLP), won 10
seats. A Cabinet of Ministers appointed by the Prime Minister
exercises executive power.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Local groups involved with human rights matters operate freely,
without government hindrance. There were no official reports
of human rights violations in Barbados during 1991, and neither
international nor local human rights groups have requested any
human rights investigations. A Caribbean-wide human rights
organization called Caribbean Rights has its headquarters and a
small staff in Barbados, and investigates and reports on
allegations of human rights violations throughout the region
when warranted.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for ec[ual treatment under the law
regardless of race, religion, sex, or national origin. These
498
BARBADOS
provisions are respected in practice. Women actively
participate in all aspects of national life and are well
represented in all except the uppermost levels of both the
public and private sectors. Women form a large percentage of
heads of household in Barbados and are not discriminated
against in public housing or other social welfare programs.
Although neither the Government nor women's rights groups have
singled out violence against women as a particular or acute
social problem, a domestic violence bill was put forward by the
Government shortly after its election in January 1991. The
bill, which specifies the appropriate police response to
domestic violence, aims to protect all members of the family,
including men and children, and applies to common-law
relationships as well as marriage. Hotly debated in March
1991, the bill was referred to a select committee of both
houses of Parliament for review. The bill had not been
reported out of committee by year's end. Criminal penalties
for violent crimes are the same, regardless of sex of offender
or victim. In cases of domestic violence, courts typically
issue restraining orders if requested by the victim, the breach
of which is punishable by a jail sentence. In 1991 local
courts heard a number of cases of domestic violence against
women involving assault or wounding, although women's rights
groups point out that there is still some reluctance on the
part of victims to report such incidents.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers in Barbados have the right to form and belong to trade
unions and to strike, and freely exercise these rights. There
are two major unions in Barbados and several smaller ones,
representing various sectors of labor. The largest union, the
Barbados Workers' Union (BWU), is historically closely
associated with the governing DLP (BWU officers hold elected
parliamentary seats, a Senate seat and the appointed post of
President of the Senate), but the BWU is not controlled by the
party or the Government. In September 1991, the three
non-cabinet unionists in Parliament made an unprecedented move
when one voted against, and then later the other two abstained
in the vote on the minibudget measure which included a wage cut
for public servants. One more vote against the measure might
have brought the Government down.
Trade unionists' personal and property rights are given full
protection under law. Strikes are prohibited only in the water
and electric utilities and in the security forces; all other
private and public sector employees are permitted to strike.
There was perhaps more worker unrest in 1991 than in any other
post independence year. On October 24, a large march and
widespread work absences occurred in protest of the
Government's austerity measures and public sector wage cuts and
layoffs. In November there was a 2-day general strike, with
most public and private offices closed and transport, school,
port authority, hotel, and telecommunications services
affected. The strike was called by the newly formed coalition
of trade unions to show displeasure with the Government's
management of the economy, its austerity measures, and the
projected program with the IMF. During the economic crisis, an
informal coalition of trade unions and associations was formed
to bargain collectively with the Government on issues affecting
them all. Barbadian trade unions are free to form federations
499
BARBADOS
and are in fact affiliated with a variety of regional and
international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The rights to organize and to bargain collectively are provided
by law and respected in practice. Over 25 percent of the
working population is organized, and wages and working
conditions are negotiated through the collective bargaining
process. Employers have no legal obligation to recognize
unions under the Trade Union Act of 1964, but most do when a
majority of their employees signify a desire to be represented
by a registered union. While there is no specific law
prohibiting antiunion discrimination, the regular courts
provide a method of redress for employees alleging unfair
dismissal. The courts commonly award monetary compensation but
rarely order reemployment. There are no manufacturing or
special areas where collective bargaining rights are legally or
administratively impaired. Barbados has no specially
designated export processing zones. The Government is studying
findings by the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association in
November 1990 that the Government's refusal to implement a
collective bargaining agreement reached by a state-subsidized
agency was not in full conformity with the principles of
freedom of association.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by the Constitution
and does not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum working age of 16 is generally observed.
Minimum age limitations are reinforced by compulsory primary
and secondary education policies. The Labor Department has a
small cadre of labor inspectors who conduct spot investigations
of enterprises, check records to verify compliance with the
law, and can take legal action against an employer who is found
to have underage workers.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wages for specified categories of workers are
administratively established and enforced by law. The minimum
wage for shop assistants (entry level commercial workers) is
marginally sufficient to meet minimum living standards; most
employees earn more.
The standard legal workweek is 40 hours in 5 days, and the law
requires overtime payment for hours worked in excess of that
number. Workers are guaranteed a minimum of 3 weeks of annual
leave. All workers are covered by unemployment benefits
legislation and by national insurance (social security). A
comprehensive government-sponsored health program offers
subsidized treatment and medication.
Under the Factories Act, there is effective enforcement for
safety and health violations and followup to ensure that
problems cited are corrected by management.
500
BELIZE
Belize is a parliamentary democracy organized under a
Constitution enacted in 1981 upon independence from the United
Kingdom. It is governed by a Prime Minister, a Cabinet of
Ministers, and a Legislative Assembly. A Governor General
represents Queen Elizabeth II in the largely ceremonial role of
Head of State. Both local and national elections are scheduled
on a regular, constitutionally prescribed basis, and the two
national political parties — the People's United Party (PUP) and
the United Democratic Party (UDP) — field competing slates of
candidates. The Government changed hands, for the second time
since independence, when the PUP won a majority of
parlicimentary seats on September 4, 1989.
The 750-member Belize National Police (BNP) is responsible for
law enforcement and maintenance of order. It is responsible to
and controlled by civilian authorities.
Belize is a developing nation with an economy dependent
primarily on agriculture. The Government favors free
enterprise and actively encourages increased investment, both
foreign and domestic. In 1990 the gross domestic product grew
by 9 percent, and the per capita gross domestic product was
$1,637.
Constitutional protections for the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the individual, including women and all ethnic
groups, are upheld by the judiciary. An active press
buttresses the people's civil and political rights. However,
during the year there continued to be credible reports of
mistreatment of workers by employers, especially in cases
involving undocvmiented aliens in agricultural areas.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated or other
extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment are expressly forbidden by the Constitution, and
this prohibition is generally respected in practice.
In December 1990 the Government announced the formation of a
Commission of Inquiry to investigate charges that the police
had tortured a Guatemalan, Luis Arevalo, before deporting him
in late October. The Commission concluded public and private
hearings on the case in May 1991. By year's end, the
Commission's findings had not yet been submitted to the Prime
Minister .
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BELIZE
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, and
these provisions are respected in practice. A detainee must be
informed of the cause of detention within 48 hours of arrest
and must be brought before a Court within 72 hours. In
practice, detainees are normally informed immediately of the
charges against 'them. Bail is granted in all but the most
serious cases. However, many detainees cannot make bail, and
backlogs in the judicial system often result in considerable
delays and postponements of hearings, resulting in overcrowded
prisons and prolonged incarceration without trial. Exile is
forbidden by the Constitution and does not occur.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Persons accused of civil or criminal offenses have
constitutional rights to presumption of innocence, protection
against self-incrimination, defense by counsel, public trial,
and appeal. Trial by jury is mandatory in criminal cases.
Those convicted by either a magistrate's court or the Supreme
Court of Belize may appeal to the Court of Appeal. In some
cases, including those resulting in a capital sentence, the
convicted party may make a final appeal to the Queen's Privy
Council in the United Kingdom.
These constitutional guarantees are respected in practice,
although the judiciary's independence from the executive branch
has been questioned by observers who note that judges must
negotiate their contracts with the Government. The Supreme
Court and magistrate courts suffer backlogs aggravated by the
inability to maintain a full complement of judges.
There are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Constitutional provisions for the protection of personal
property, privacy of home and person, and recognition of human
dignity are generally honored by the Government.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and the press are protected under the
Constitution and by local custom. In practice, all viewpoints
are publicly presented without government interference. Five
privately owned weekly newspapers, two of them fiercely
partisan, engage in lively debate of the issues. The
opposition press is a frequent critic of government officials
and policies. All newspapers are subject to the constraints of
libel laws.
With the introduction in 1990 of Radio KREM, Belize's first
privately owned commercial radio station, the government
monopoly of radio ended. The Belize Broadcasting Network was
removed from direct government control, restructured as an
autonomous corporation, and renamed the Broadcasting
Corporation of Belize (BCB) in September 1990. According to
informed observers, indirect government influence over the BCB
continues, however, and sometimes affects editorial decisions
regarding news and feature reporting.
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BELIZE
Fourteen privately owned television broadcasting stations,
including several cable networks, operate throughout Belize
under the authority and regulation of the Belize Broadcasting
Authority (BBA) . The BBA asserts its right to authorize
certain broadcasts, such as those with political content, and
to edit any defamatory or personally libelous material from the
political broadcasts of both parties before these are aired.
As far as is known, the BBA did not exercise this authority
during 1991.
Academic freedom is provided for by law and respected in
practice .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly is constitutionally assured and honored in
practice. Political parties and other groups with political
objectives freely hold rallies and mass meetings. The
organizers of public meetings must obtain a permit 36 hours in
advance of the meetings; such permits are not denied for
political reasons. Under the Constitution Belizeans are free
to form and join associations of their choice, both political
and nonpolitical .
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion in Belize. All groups may worship
as they choose, and all groups and churches may establish
places of worship, train clergy, and maintain contact with
coreligionists abroad. There is an active missionary
presence. In church publications and from the pulpit, church
leaders comment on government and political policies as these
affect the social welfare of the country. A broad-based
partnership of the Government and several different churches
active in education successfully operates and administers most
of Belize's primary and secondary schools.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on freedom of movement within the
country. Foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation are
unrestricted.
As many as 40,000 Central Americans from neighboring countries
have taken up residence in Belize since 1980, many of them
entering illegally and living in Belize without documentation.
The Government of Belize has been generous in conferring
refugee status on many of the new arrivals and providing them
with assistance. However, the sheer number of refugees and
other immigrants has strained government social services, while
the highly visible presence of recent immigrants in the labor
force and the marketplace has provoked widespread resentment
among native-born Belizeans.
The Government is taking steps to address these problems.
Working with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) , Belize has undertaken a variety of projects aimed at
defusing resentment of the refugees. In 1991 the Government
enacted legislation implementing the provisions of the United
Nations Convention on Refugees, which Belize ratified in 1990.
The new refugee law clarifies the distinction between refugees
and illegal immigrants and establishes an Office on Refugee
Affairs within the Foreign Ministry.
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BELIZE
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Belize is a functioning democracy governed by a Legislative
Assembly, with executive direction coming from a Cabinet of
Ministers headed by Prime Minister George Price. By
constitutional mandate, the Governor General instructs the
leader of the majority party of the Legislative Assembly to
form a Government following national elections, which must be
held at least once every 5 years. Municipal and town board
officials are elected in local contests at 3-year intervals.
All elections are by secret ballot, and suffrage is universal
for Belizean citizens 18 years and older. The UDP and PUP
dominate Belizean political life, and each party's membership
includes all segments of Belize's diverse ethnic groupings.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Local and international human rights groups operate freely, and
the Government cooperates with independent investigations of
human rights conditions in Belize.
The Human Rights Commission of Belize (HRCB), a nongovernmental
organization that opened offices in late 1987, cooperates with
Amnesty International and is affiliated with regional human
rights organizations. The HRCB was active in 1991 on a range
of issues, including refugee and agricultural workers' rights,
cases of alleged police abuse and cases of alleged illegal
deportations of Central American nationals.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Belize is a multiracial, multiethnic country, and the
Government actively promotes tolerance and cross-cultural
understanding. Discrimination on ethnic or religious grounds
is illegal and is not common, although ethnic tension,
particularly resentment of Central American immigrants, is
increasingly apparent.
Despite constitutional provisions of equality, Belizean women
face some social and economic prejudices. For example, women
can find it more difficult than men to obtain business and
agricultural financing and other resources. Most employed
women are concentrated in female-dominated occupations with
traditionally low status and wages. The Government worked to
ameliorate this problem by funding a Women's Bureau, charged
with developing programs to improve the status of women in
Belize. Founded in 1981, the Women's Bureau was upgraded in
1986 to a department within the Ministry of Labor and Social
Services. A number of officially registered women's groups
work closely with various government ministries in promoting
social awareness programs. Women have access to education and
are active in all spheres of national life. Both the Governor
General and the President of the Senate are women, and women
hold other important positions in both the public and private
sectors. Women generally receive the same wage as men for
similar work and are not impeded from owning or managing land
or other real property.
Domestic violence against women is a chronic problem. In 1985
a group of Belize City residents began the Belize Women Against
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BELIZE
Violence Movement (WAV) which now has branches elsewhere in the
country. The group runs a shelter for battered wives and a
hotline for rape victims and has obtained cooperation from the
Ministries of Home Affairs and Education. The Government's
commitment to increasing the safety of women is affirmed in its
Policy Statement on Women, the effective policy guidance for
the work of the Women's Bureau.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
By statute and in practice Belizean workers are free to
establish and join labor organizations. Thirteen independent
unions, with an estimated 10.3 percent of the labor force,
represent a cross-section of white-collar, blue-collar, and
professional workers, including most civil service employees.
The unions are recognized by the Ministry of Labor after they
file with the Office of Registry. Members are empowered to
draft the bylaws and constitutions of their unions, and they
are free to elect officers from among the membership at large.
Unions which choose not to hold elections can act as
representatives for their membership, but only unions which
hold free and annual elections of officers are permitted to
join the National Trade Union Congress of Belize (NTUC) . By
both law and precedent, unions are effectively protected
against dissolution or suspension by administrative authority.
Although no unions are officially affiliated with political
parties, several are clearly allied with one or the other of
the two main parties. Unions freely exercise the right to form
federations and confederations and affiliate with international
organizations. Unions are legally permitted to strike, but
unions representing essential services may strike only after
giving 21 days' notice to the Ministry concerned. Workers at
the Civic Textile plant in Belmopan struck in April to protest
the company's dismissal of 16 coworkers, including 6 members of
the newly formed Women Worker's Union (WWU) . A board of
inquiry commissioned by the Labor Minister found that the
workers' rights had been violated and ordered the dismissed
workers reinstated. The Government subsequently revoked Civic
Textile's development concession (which had exempted the
company from paying normal import duties). Shortly thereafter
the company closed down, and all its employees lost their
jobs. The board of inc[uiry further criticized the Labor
Ministry for failing to enforce labor laws and regulations and
for failing to advise employers about fair labor practices.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is protected in law and freely practiced
throughout the country. Wages are set in free negotiations
between employers and unions or, more commonly, simply offered
by employers. In practice, the Labor Commissioner acts as a
conciliator in deadlocked collective bargaining negotiations
between labor and management, offering nonbinding counsel to
both sides. Historically, the Commissioner's guidance has been
voluntarily accepted. However, should either union or
management choose not to accept the conciliator's decision,
both are entitled to a legal hearing of the case, provided that
it is linked to some valid provision of civil or criminal law.
The Constitution prohibits antiunion discrimination both before
and after the union is registered. Theoretically, unions may
freely organize. In practice, however, employers are not
legally required to recognize a union as a bargaining agent.
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BELIZE
and some employers have been known to block union organization
by terminating the employment of key union sympathizers,
usually on grounds purportedly unrelated to union activities.
Effective redress is extremely difficult in such situations.
Technically, a worker may file a complaint with the Labor
Department, but it has been virtually impossible to prove that
a termination was due to union activity.
Belize's sole export processing zone is not exempt from the
Labor Code. However, there are no unions in the export
processing zone.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is forbidden by the Constitution and does not
occur .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age of employment in Belize is 14 years, or 17
years for employment near hazardous machinery. Inspectors of
the Ministries of Labor and Education enforce this regulation,
although in recent years school truancy officers, who have
historically borne the brunt of the enforcement burden, have
been less active.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
No single minimum wage covers all workers, but some categories
of service employment, such as retail, restaurant, domestic,
and health care jobs, do have legal minimum hourly wage
standards. However, current legal minimum wage rates are
outdated, and real wages generally exceed the statutory rates.
Real wage rates provide a relatively decent standard of living
for a worker and his family. A minimum wage council appointed
in May by the Minister of Labor proposed an increase in the
minimum wage for all manual workers. By year's end, the
proposal had not yet been approved.
No worker is obliged to work more than 6 days or 45 hours per
week. Payment of overtime work is obligatory, as is an annual
paid vacation of 2 weeks. A patchwork of health and safety
regulations covers numerous industries, and these are enforced
to varying degrees by the Ministries of Labor and Public
Health. Enforcement is not universal countrywide, and in 1991
the limited inspection and investigative resources were
committed principally to urban and more accessible rural areas
where labor, health, and safety complaints had been registered.
There continued to be reports of employers who routinely fail
to pay workers. Undocumented foreign workers, especially in
the banana industry, are particularly vulnerable to this
practice. The working conditions of undocumented Central
American banana workers in Stann Creek District are a cause of
major concern to labor and human rights officials. Workers
have complained to the Human Rights Commission of Belize about
impure drinking water, lack of electricity, inadequate
schooling, and poor medical care, in addition to nonpayment of
wages .
506
BOLIVIA
Bolivia is a multiparty democracy with an elected president and
bicameral legislature. Because no presidential candidate
received an absolute majority of the popular vote in the
elections of May 7, 1989, the Congress, in a procedure mandated
by the Constitution, selected Jaime Paz Zamora to succeed
Victor Paz Estenssoro as President. Government and opposition
parties agreed in June 1991 to major reforms of the electoral
and judicial sectors, one result of which was the establishment
of an impartial electoral court.
Police security forces and the military are responsible to and
controlled by the civilian Government. Some members of the
security forces, however, were involved in human rights abuses.
Bolivia is rich in minerals, which account for the bulk of its
export earnings, but is the second poorest country in the
Western Hemisphere. Its economy only began to show consistent
growth in 1987-88 after years of severe contraction. The
Government has emphasized debt reduction, export development,
foreign investment, and a freer banking system to strengthen
Bolivia's economic base and accelerate development. There was
very modest economic growth in 1990 — an estimated 2.6 percent,
only slightly more than population growth.
Human rights are provided for by the Constitution and are
generally respected in practice. Human rights abuses in 1991
included instances of mistreatment of detainees and prisoners,
substandard prison conditions, an overburdened and sometimes
corrupt judicial system, prolonged incarceration of detainees,
societal discrimination and violence against women, and
discrimination against indigenous people.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no cases of political or other extrajudicial
killings in 1991 by government or terrorist groups.
Following the extrajudicial execution of alleged Peruvian
terrorist Evaristo Salazar ("Alejandro Escobar") on December 5,
1990, two members of the Bolivian National Police (BNP) were
charged with negligent homicide and coercion (the use of undue
force in interrogation), and were dismissed from the police.
The Government brought criminal charges against the policemen
and detained them. The judge entered a preliminary ruling of
guilty. The policemen had claimed that Salazar was shot while
trying to escape, but the coroner's finding of death by gunfire
at close range did not corroborate this. The policemen were
not subject to first-degree murder charges because their
lawyers made a convincing case that Salazar was a violent
terrorist who had threatened the policemen and their families.
The Permanent Assembly of Human Rights of Bolivia (APDHB),
argued that the policemen should have faced more serious
charges because Salazar was killed deliberately.
On October 11, a court convicted five members of the Armed
Forces of Liberation-Zarate Willka on charges of conspiracy for
the 1989 murder of two American Mormon missionaries. Three
others charged in this case remain at large. Juan Domingo
Peralta Espinosa, another terrorist connected to the murder.
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BOLIVIA
was killed after he fired at policemen during an attempted
arrest. The ensuing investigation detetrrlned that the police
responded to probable cause and reacted with appropriate force.
b. Disappearance
There were no known politically motivated disappearances during
1991.
Judicial proceedings in the case of General Garcia Meza, who is
being tried in absentia for involvement in disappearances
during 1981-82, have entered their fifth year. The trial is
expected to conclude in early 1992. The Association of
Relatives of Those Disappeared and Martyred for Democracy
(ASOFAMD) has 156 registered cases of persons who disappeared
for political reasons, dating back to the late 1960 's. There
are several legal proceedings involving cases from 1980 to
1981, but there were no verdicts in any of these cases as of
year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture. However, there have been
allegations of torture, credible charges of cruelty, and
degrading treatment of detainees and prisoners by police
officers and prison personnel. Security personnel are rarely
tried and punished for such acts. There were credible
allegations that several terrorists were tortured in late 1990
by members of army intelligence. However, the army rejected
the allegations, and no other government element sought to
investigate them.
Conditions in some Bolivian jails are very poor. Overcrowding,
corruption, malnutrition, unsanitary conditions, and drug and
alcohol abuse are common. In the San Pedro jail in La Paz,
which was constructed to hold no more than 200 inmates, there
is a population of more than 1,300. Overcrowding is so severe
that five persons may be confined to a small cell with the
result that the occupants sleep sitting up because there is not
enough space to lie down. Approximately 70 children of inmates
reside at San Pedro because they have no place else to go, but
they have not been charged with any crime. Some of these
children may be sexually abused. The new Chonchocoro prison
will open in 1992. However, the capacity is 300, so it will
offer little relief to overcrowding at San Pedro.
Evidence surfaced in 1989 of serious human rights abuses over a
period of years at the Espejos rehabilitation farm in Santa
Cruz Department. Los Espejos was one in a system of government
rehabilitation farms for minor offenders. However, it had
deteriorated into a forced labor camp run for the financial
gain of the police. In 1990 the Government closed Los
Espejos. The ensuing investigation implicated 13 persons. Two
are in San Pedro prison awaiting trial, and one is presumed to
have died. The others are at large. There is no indication
that the Espejos abuses are being repeated at other
rehabilitation facilities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution requires a court order for an arrest, and
detainees must be charged or released within 48 hours. In
practice, many detainees remain incarcerated in excess of this
period without being charged. The Constitution also provides
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BOLIVIA
for a judicial determination of the legality of detention, and
prisoners are usually released if a judge rules that they have
been detained illegally. After the initial detention,
prisoners may consult a lawyer of their choice. Provisions for
bail exist, except in certain narcotics cases, and bail is
generally granted.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The constitutional right of a fair public trial is adhered to
in most respects, but with one important exception, namely,
delays commonly result in trials lasting 3 to 4 years without
sentencing. As a result, about 80 percent of the prison
population is unsentenced. Investigations, trials, and appeals
procedures are so protracted that some prisoners eventually
serve more time than the maximum sentence for the crime for
which they are being charged.
Defendants have the right to an attorney, to confront
witnesses, to present evidence, and to appeal a judicial
decision. These rights generally are upheld in practice.
Although the law provides for a court-appointed defense
attorney at public expense, if necessary, one may not always be
provided because of a shortage of funds and qualified personnel,
Corruption and intimidation in the judicial system remain a
serious problem. Judges and prosecutors are paid very poorly,
making them susceptible to bribery. Narcotics traffickers
often bribe judicial and other officials to release suspected
traffickers and their aircraft, return captured drugs, and
purge incriminating files. The Government has taken some steps
to try to discipline Bolivia's judicial system, establishing,
for example, three-judge specialized narcotics courts.
However, the courts established so far continue to be
overburdened, with poorly qualified personnel and inadequate
facilities. In May the Government appointed a special
committee to prepare draft legislation to reform the judicial
system and the Public Ministry. It was scheduled to conclude
its findings toward the end of 1991.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The sanctity of the home and the privacy of citizens' lives are
protected by the Constitution and are usually respected in
practice. However, there have been incidents in which the
police entered a home or business without obtaining a search
warrant as required by the Constitution.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
There are no legal or institutional barriers to freedom of
speech and the press in Bolivia. Many journalists are paid by
politicians and other well-connected persons to increase or
suppress exposure. Also, some journalists who experienced
repression under former governments claim they still practice
self-censorship. Both state-owned and private radio and
television stations operate in Bolivia. All newspapers are
privately owned.
The Government has consistently respected academic freedom.
Public universities enjoy autonomous status by law, and that
status is respected.
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BOLIVIA
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The rights of peaceful assembly and association are provided
for by law and are respected in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion
Citizens are free to practice the religion of their choice.
Although an estimated 400 other religious groups, mostly
Protestant, are active, Roman Catholicism predominates in
Bolivia, and the Constitution recognizes it as the official
religion. Catholic bishops receive a nominal stipend from the
State. The Government has designated the Catholic Church as
the coordinator of all official public ceremonies. Missionary
groups — usually evangelical Christians — are required to
register with the Foreign Ministry as nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's). In 1991 all NGO ' s , including missionary
groups, were required to reregister. There is no indication
that missionary groups have been treated differently from other
NGO's, and no registrations have been disapproved.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on travel within Bolivia or abroad.
The Government does not impede emigration and guarantees
departing citizens the right to return. Citizenship is not
revoked for political reasons.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Bolivia is a multiparty democracy with an elected president and
a functioning, independent, bicameral legislature. Opposition
groups ranging from the far left to the right function freely.
In 1989 Bolivia held free and fair elections which resulted in
a peaceful, constitutional change of administration on
August 6, 1989. Equally successful municipal elections took
place on December 1, 1991.
In 1991 Congress began impeachment proceedings against several
members of the Supreme Court following a court ruling that a
law passed by Congress that increased the tax on fees had been
enacted incorrectly and, therefore, was unenforceable.
President Paz Zamora refused to accept the ruling, arguing that
the Court had usurped a legislative function. The Senate
eventually suspended its trial of the justices, and on May 16
the Congress voted to allow them to resume their places on the
Court .
Suffrage has been universal since the 1952 revolution. There
are no legal impediments to women voting, holding political
office, or rising to leadership in the government; a woman was
President in 1979-80. Nevertheless, the number of women who
have attained prominent positions in politics is still small.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government is sensitive to the opinions of both domestic
and international human rights organizations and is willing to
discuss human rights concerns with them. The Congress has
committees responsible for monitoring the observance of human
rights. The Catholic Church, APDHB, labor organizations, and
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BOLIVIA
the press have been aggressive monitors of human rights and
comment frequently on relevant issues and developments.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Although the law contains an advanced family code passed in the
1970 's, Bolivian women do not enjoy a social status equal to
that of men and are generally unaware of their rights under the
law. Cultural traditions, social conditions, and limited
political influence remain major obstacles to advancement for
women. In rural families, women contribute significantly to
economic activities and often control the family finances, but
nonetheless they are considered socially and politically
subordinate. In urban settings, women are slowly achieving a
greater role in business and professional life, as their
participation in cooperatives, community affairs, and education
increases. In both rural and urban settings, women are more
likely to be illiterate and employed in low-level or domestic
jobs.
There are no reliable or complete statistics indicating the
extent of violence against women in Bolivia. However, many
women and some women's rights groups have made credible charges
that this is a serious problem. Violence against women is a
criminal offense in Bolivia, and legal sanctions are regularly"
applied when cases come to the attention of the authorities.
However, women are reluctant to bring charges in cases of
domestic violence, and the incidence of such abuse as wife
beating is underreported. Legal counseling is available for
women on a limited basis through private organizations. An
organization called the Center for Investigation and
Development of Women (CIDEM) is working to change the penal
code to further protect women from violence.
Although prohibited by the Constitution, discrimination against
people of indigenous background continues, a fact all political
leaders acknowledge. The Aymara- and Quechua-speaking Indian
majority of the population remains at the lower end of the
country's socioeconomic scale and is disadvantaged in terms of
health, life expectancy, education, income, literacy, and
employment. The Government's programs to ease Bolivia's
economic crisis, including infrastructure projects sponsored by
the social investment fund such as schools, health clinics, and
water systems, directly benefit some of the disadvantaged.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Bolivian workers may establish and join organizations of their
own choosing despite the existing Labor Code which, if
enforced, would limit the right of association. The Labor Code
recjuires previous authorization of the establishment of a trade
union, restricts more than one union from establishing itself
at a given enterprise, and allows the Government to dissolve
trade unions by administrative act. However, the Government
does not enforce these provisions of the law and has used none
of these powers in recent history. The Labor Code also denies
civil servants the right to organize and prohibits strikes in
all public services, including banks and public markets.
Nevertheless, virtually all government workers are unionized.
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BOLIVIA
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts
(COE) repeated in 1991 its previoius criticism of provisions of
Bolivia's 50-year old Labor Code that would limit the right of
association if they were enforced.
Workers in the private sector possess and frequently exercise
the right to strike. The ILO's COE has criticized the
requirement in Xhe Labor Code that strike votes require the
approval of three-fourths of employees actually in service
instead of a simple majority. Solidarity strikes are illegal,
but the Government has never prosecuted those responsible for
solidarity strikes. On January 8, for example, the transport
workers called a 2-day strike to protest a government-decreed,
35-percent rise in fuel prices. The Government settled by the
end of the day, granting fare increases that compensated
transport workers for the fuel price increase. A solidarity
strike in support of the transport workers called by the
Bolivia Workers Central (COB) was not grounds for prosecution
by the Government .
Unions are not truly independent of the Government and
political parties. All unions are underfinanced and depend on
outside support from varying sources. The political parties
all have labor committees that attempt to influence union
activity, but they have been only partially successful in
recent years. The Government places no restrictions on a
union's right to join international labor organizations. The
COB became an affiliate of the Communist-dominated World
Federation of Trade Unions in 1988.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Bolivian workers have the right to organize and bargain
collectively. The law does not extend this right to government
workers, but the distinction is largely ignored in practice, as
virtually all government workers are organized. Consultations
between government representatives and labor leaders are common
but there are no collective bargaining agreements as the term
is normally used. In state industries, the union issues a list
of demands, and the Government concedes some points. Wage and
working condition adjustments in the private sector track what
happens in the civil service, public services, and state
industries. Private sector employers normally use public
sector settlements as guidelines for their own adjustments, and
some private sector employers even exceed what the government
grants. However, the Government, conscious of International
Monetary Fund guidelines, rarely grants wage increases that
exceed the rate of inflation. As in the public sector, there
is no real collective bargaining and no signed agreements.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against
union members and organizers. Complaints are referred to the
National Labor Court, which often takes a year or more to rule
on a question. Labor activists say that a problem is often
moot by the time the Court gives an answer.
There are no export processing zones in Bolivia.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and the law is
generally complied with and enforced. No cases of forced or
compulsory labor were reported during 1991.
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BOLIVIA
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law prohibits the employment of persons under 18 years of
age in dangerous, unhealthy, or immoral work. Bolivia's Labor
Code is ambiguous on the conditions of employment for minors
from 14 through 17 years of age. Responsibility for enforcing
child labor provisions lies with the National Office of Minors,
which is part of the Government's Social Action Group for the
Presidency. However, the existing legal provisions concerning
employment of children are not enforced. Young children can be
found on the streets hawking goods, shining shoes, and
assisting transport operators. They are not generally employed
in factories or businesses.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government, both by statute and presidential decree, has
established a minimum wage and a system of bonuses and fringe
benefits. A worker earning only the minimum wage would not be
able to sustain a decent standard of living for himself, let
alone support a family. However, most workers earn more than
the minimum wage. Though the minimum wage is well below the
prevailing wage in most occupations, the minimum wage — which
was doubled in February — is significant because certain fringe
benefits are pegged to it. Approximately 20 percent of the
urban work force — street vendors, shoe polishers, and lottery
ticket sellers, for example — are not covered by the minimum
wage .
In urban areas, only half the labor force enjoys an 8-hour
workday and a workweek of 5 or 5-1/2 days. Like many other
labor laws, the maximum legal workweek of 44 hours is not
enforced.
Responsibility for the protection of workers' health and safety
lies with the Labor Ministry's Bureau of Occupational Safety.
Labor laws that provide for the protection of workers' health
and safety are not adequately enforced. Although the
state-owned mine corporation COMIBOL has a special office
charged with mine safety, the mines, often old and operated
with anticpiated equipment, are particularly dangerous and
unhealthy.
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BRAZIL
Brazil is a constitutional federal republic with a directly
elected president, a bicameral legislature, and an independent
judiciary. The rights to free speech and to a free press are
broadly exercised.
Public security responsibility is shared by federal, state, and
local police, with the state police bearing the greatest
responsibility for law enforcement activity which most directly
affects most citizens. Under a new law passed in July,
authority to activate the military forces in domestic security
matters is firmly restricted to the President. Some local and
state police officers have been implicated in human rights
abuses, including extrajudicial killings and serious physical
abuse of detainees. A few delinquent police have been charged
and punished, but most act with impunity.
President Fernando Collor's economic and administrative reform
program continued to move Brazil toward a free market economy.
However, income distribution remains marked by wide
disparities. Although the Collor Administration called for
heavy investment in education and public health programs, such
new initiatives are severely restricted by limited fiscal
resources .
The principal human rights problems in Brazil are the high
number of extrajudicial killings and death threats against
rural activists by landowners and their agents, and of criminal
suspects and minors by vigilante groups in urban areas.
Reports of killings of peasants and union organizers involved
in land disputes continued, as did confrontations involving the
landless. Government efforts to effect agrarian reforms which
would alleviate rural tensions were obstructed by funding
shortages and legislative bottlenecks. Cases of human rights
violations generally were not investigated and prosecuted. The
Administration demarcated 9.4 million hectares of land as an
exclusive preserve for the Yanomami Indian tribe and initiated
a national program to combat violence against minors.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section l Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Extrajudicial killings are Brazil's most serious human rights
problem. Several hundred Brazilians died at the hands of
landowners, hired thugs, vigilante groups, and policemen in
urban gang wars and in land conflicts. Brazilian and
international human rights organizations made credible charges
that state and local policemen and hired gunmen kill persons
suspected of common crimes, including street youths and
children. They charge that federal, state, and local
authorities frequently fail to take legal action against those
responsible for such killings. They affirm that police often
fail to conduct complete investigations, sometimes because they
cooperated with the hired gunmen or their employers to carry
out the crimes.
Conflicts between rural landholders and the landless continued
in 1991, in part because of the failure of the Government to
settle conflicting land tenure claims. Approximately 40
persons died in rural conflicts during the year. This
represents a marked decline from the 80 such killings
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BRAZIL
registered in 1990. The victims included labor leaders and
other activists helping to organize agricultural unions, as
well as law enforcement officials and landowners. Death
threats against rural leaders, landowners, and rural laborers
also continued; a federal deputy estimated that 163 persons
were threatened in rural conflicts. Human rights groups and
legislators charge that killings and threats are carried out
with no fear of punishment. Out of more than 1,000 killings
related to land disputes during the 1980 's, only a handful of
persons had come to trial by the end of 1991.
About a dozen rural leaders were killed in 1991. The murder of
Rural Workers Union leader Expedito Ribeiro de Souza in
February attracted international attention. President of the
Rio Maria, Para, chapter of his union, de Souza was involved in
the same land issues which led to the murders of Paulo and Jose
Canute in 1990 and of their father, Joao, in 1985. Expedito 's
successor, Carlos Cabral Pereira, was wounded by gunfire 4
weeks after Expedito 's murder, in the midst of an ongoing
police investigation. In the case of Expedito's murder, police
arrested the gunman within a few days and named the person who
instigated the crime a few days later. However, as of year's
end the case had not come to trial. Father Ricardo Rezende, an
activist priest in Rio Maria, was threatened with death by
presumed agents of local landlords. Officials of the Church's
Pastoral Land Commission (CPT) in the state of Para charge that
police ignored evidence of an even wider conspiracy in the Rio
Maria area, including threats against the judge who would try
the case. Two other Rural Workers Union leaders were shot, and
one killed, in nearby areas on March 8. In August Darcy
Araujo, a rural union leader from Amazonas, was killed by a
shot to the head; he had previously been threatened by a local
rancher. No arrests have been made in these cases. Two more
rural unionists, Mauro Carneiro dos Santos and Francisco Nunez
de Souza, were killed in Para in October.
The widow of assassinated rubber-tapper leader Chico Mendes and
other rubber-tapper leaders, including Mendes' successor,
Osmarino Amancio, continued to receive death threats. On
September 17, agronomist Gumercindo Rodrigues, a colleague of
Chico Mendes, was shot and wounded in Rio Branco, Acre. Human
rights groups have also expressed concern over alleged judicial
harassment of rubber-tapper leader Antonio Macedo ' s organizing
activities in northern Acre. Members of the landless movement
concluded that austerity measures by the Federal Government led
to increased rural tensions. Government monitoring offices
suffered personnel cuts, while the unavailability of funds to
expropriate disputed properties deprived landholders who are
party to land conflicts of the prospect of compensation.
Vigilante actions to control rising urban crime continued to be
cited as a major human rights problem during the year.
Brazilian and international human rights organizations made
credible charges that policemen, often acting off-duty as
members of vigilante groups, kill persons suspected of common
crimes, including street youths. Vigilante groups engaged in
killings of alleged or suspected criminals in working-class
neighborhoods and shantytowns. In the Baixada Fluminense area
of Rio de Janeiro, 1,015 homicides were registered from January
to May; Rio state authorities assert that a significant portion
of these homicides are the work of vigilantes. The vice
governor and chief of civil police for Rio de Janeiro state
asserted that the police broke up 15 organized vigilante groups
in the first half of 1991. On August 13, Fausto Ribeiro da
Silva Filho, a lawyer for the urban squatters' movement, was
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killed by a gunman. Human rights groups suspect that he was
murdered by opponents of the squatters' movement. The
authorities frequently fail to take effective legal action
against those responsible for such killings, and some police
fail to conduct complete investigations because they either
cooperate or sympathize with vigilante actions.
Human rights groups detailed many cases in which street
children were killed by thugs, including off-duty policemen
hired by businessmen. Rio de Janeiro church groups estimate
that minors constitute 30 percent of those murdered in the
Baixada Fluminense. Deaths of street youths in Sao Paulo
reportedly increased from one every 3 days in 1989 to one every
2 days in the first half of 1991. Studies and spot surveys
suggest that most minors killed in large cities are between the
ages of 16 and 18 and are often suspected of criminal
activity. Most are black and poor. Volmer Nascimento, Rio de
Janeiro coordinator for the National Street Children's Movement
(MNMR) , has received death threats.
The Government initiated a national plan to combat violence
against minors in April. Under the plan, which recommends a
number of measures to implement the 1990 Statute of the Child
and the Adolescent, the Federal Government, through the
Brazilian Center for Children and Adolescents (CBIA) , funded
state efforts to coordinate action to reduce the killings of
minors. In late November, the governor of Ceara state ordered
the arrest of five military policemen believed to be involved
in the killing of minors in that state. Nevertheless, violence
against minors remained high in 1991.
The Government confronts several obstacles in its efforts to
prevent extrajudicial killings, including widespread public
apathy. According to local human rights sources, Brazilian
citizens are reluctant to report extrajudicial killings by
police because the police tend to protect their own during
internal investigations of such killings. The high crime rate,
the failure to apprehend most criminals, the slowness of the
judicial system, and the legal requirement to release criminals
pending trial contribute to public acquiescence in police
brutality and killings of criminal suspects. Investigations
into these incidents are hampered because witnesses hesitate to
cooperate with authorities for fear of retribution or because
they and the general public often sympathize with the actions
of vigilantes.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated abductions in
1991. There were, however, numerous reports of disappearances
of persons purportedly involved in common crimes, which
appeared to be the result of vigilante action
(see Section 1 . a. ) .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is prohibited by the Constitution, which contains
severe legal penalties for torture and acquiescence in
torture. However, there continued to be many credible reports
of widespread police beatings and torture of criminal suspects
and landless peasants to extract information, confessions, or
money, and sometimes to punish. Human rights groups estimate
that as little as 10 percent of police brutality cases are
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reported in some areas as the victims are generally poor,
afraid, and unaware of their legal rights.
Most prison facilities are severely overcrowded. Victims of
torture and beating by prison guards often have little
effective recourse. Eight prison guards have been charged in
the 1989 suffocation of 18 inmates in a Sao Paulo prison; their
cases had not been tried as of December 1991. Three guards at
Ary Franco prison in Rio de Janeiro were charged with starting
a fire that killed 26 prisoners following a thwarted escape
attempt on October 28. The prison, designed to hold 950,
contained 1,400 inmates at the time of the fire.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution limits arrests to those caught committing a
crime or those arrested by order of a judicial authority,
except in cases of soldiers charged with violating military
rules and regulations or with military crimes as defined by
law. The constitutional provision for judicial determination
of the legality of detention is respected although some
convicted inmates are kept after the expiration of their
sentences due to poor record keeping. The law permits
provisional detention for up to 5 days in certain circumstances
stipulated by law during a police investigation or during the
prosecution phase of a case. This period may be extended until
the case comes to trial or until a judge rules that reasons for
the detention no longer exist. Provisional detention is used
inf reqTjently .
In 1991 there were several cases of illegal and incommunicado
detention without a judicial order. Human rights groups charge
that police detained people, including street youths and
children, for questioning without probable cause, in some cases
based on arbitrary criteria such as vagrancy. In Belo
Horizonte, 520 minors were arrested and 200 detained on the
night of August 22, in response to complaints that youth gangs
were operating freely in the downtown area. In Manaus , a
program of mass arrests of street minors was ended in June at
the insistence of federal authorities.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is an independent branch of government. The
judicial system, with the Federal Supreme Court at its apex,
includes courts of first instance and appeals courts. The
states organize their own judicial systems but must adhere to
the basic principles in the Federal Constitution. Brazil also
has a system of specialized courts dealing with military,
labor, electoral, juvenile, family, and narcotics matters,
among others. Separate police courts manned by police
officials rule on charges of police brutality. Human rights
groups make credible charges that police courts are reluctant
to punish their colleagues for human rights abuses. Military
courts do not have jurisdiction over civilians.
The right to a fair public trial is provided for by law and is
generally respected in practice, although an international
human rights group charged in a 1991 report that state judges
are sometimes biased in favor of landowners in cases involving
rural activists. Defendants are entitled to counsel and must
be made fully aware of the charges against them. In cases in
which a defendant cannot afford an attorney, one must be
provided at public expense; private attorneys are appointed by
courts to represent poor defendants when public defenders are
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unavailable. Defendants and their attorneys have the right to
be informed of the evidence on which charges are based. Only
cases of willful crimes against life are tried by jury; all
others are tried by a judge.
The judicial system is inefficient and continues to have a
serious backlog; many cases are not tried for years. According
to several state judges in Sao Paulo, the judicial system is so
inefficient and outdated that it is incapable of playing an
effective role in controlling crime.
Lynchings of suspected criminals by irate citizens, arising out
of public rage against crime levels and a perceived failure of
the judicial system to mete out justice, is a significant
problem in Brazil. In February nationally televised video
footage of the November 1990 killing and burning of three men
apprehended in an act of burglary and hostage-taking in the
rural town of Matupa, Mato Grosso, raised a public outcry.
Local judges subsequently sought to disassociate themselves
from the trial of the accused vigilantes, and the prosecutor in
the case received death threats. In April two men believed to
have robbed and killed a taxi driver were killed by a group of
taxi drivers in Rondonia, and two suspected teenage criminals
were killed, mutilated, and burned in Belera in July. By
midyear, police sources in Bahia reported 64 such vigilante
killings .
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for freedom from arbitrary intrusion
into the home. There were no reports of illegal entry for
political reasons, but illegal entry into homes without a
warrant occurs in searches for criminal suspects. Wiretaps are
unconstitutional except for purposes of criminal investigation
and prosecution and then only when authorized by a judicial
authority in circumstances defined by law. The inviolability
of private correspondence is respected.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The right to free speech and to a free press is provided for in
the Constitution and is broadly exercised. The press and
broadcast media routinely discuss controversial social and
political issues, with opposition viewpoints aired freely.
Most radio and television stations are privately owned; the
Government, through Congress, controls licensing authority.
Newspapers are privately owned and vigorously report and
comment on government policies and performance. The 1988
Constitution abolished all forms of censorship. Foreign
publications are widely distributed in Brazil; prior review of
films, plays, and radio and television programming is practiced
only to determine a suitable viewing age.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the right to assemble peacefully,
and this right is respected in practice. Permits are not
required for outdoor political or labor meetings, and they
occur throughout Brazil with frequency.
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c. Freedom of Religion
There is no favored or state religion. Most Brazilians belong
to the Roman Catholic Church, but spiritism has many adherents,
and Protestantism has been expanding in recent years. All
faiths are free to establish places of worship, train clergy,
and proselytize, although the Government reserves the right to
control entry into Indian lands. The National Council of
Brazilian Bishops and various missionary groups continue to
complain that visas for missionaries and other foreign
religious personnel are systematically delayed by immigration
authorities. Church sources ascribe the delays to mistrust on
the part of some Brazilian authorities of the foreign
missionary presence.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on movement within Brazil, except for
the protected Indian areas, nor are there any restrictions on
emigration or return. Brazil admits few immigrants, does not
formally accept refugees for resettlement, and is selective in
granting asylum.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change
their government through free elections, a right that was
exercised in a 1989 presidential election and in elections for
the Federal Congress and state governors in 1990. Executive
and legislative offices throughout the country at local, state,
and national levels are filled through democratic direct
elections among candidates representing many political parties.
Voting is secret and mandatory for all literate Brazilian
citizens aged 18 to 70, except military conscripts who may not
vote. It is voluntary for minors aged 16 to 18, for the
illiterate, and for those aged 70 and over. Women have full
political rights under the Constitution, and they are
increasingly active in politics and government. Indians were
given the franchise under the 1988 Constitution.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Brazilian nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) actively
investigate allegations of human rights violations and often
initiate legal proceedings. Several international NGO's either
maintain offices in Brazil or visit periodically. Both
Brazilian and foreign human rights organizations report that
the Federal Government under the current Administration and
some state governments have been more responsive than previous
administrations to human rights problems.
The Foreign Ministry accepts international approaches on human
rights questions and transmits human rights inquiries to
relevant federal and local authorities.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, and
nationality is unconstitutional, and racial discrimination.
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illegal since 1951, is a crime excluded from bail. However,
poor, uneducated, and darker-skinned Brazilians encounter
substantial de facto discrimination. The black population is
disproportionately concentrated in the lowest economic strata.
For example, while 40 to 60 percent of Brazil's population is
of African or other non-European ancestry, few senior officials
in government and the armed forces are black. Similarly, there
are relatively few blacks in senior private sector management
positions. In 1990 blacks were elected governors of 3 of
Brazil's 27 states. Black consciousness organizations
challenge the view that Brazil is a racial democracy and
denounce discrimination in housing, education, the workplace,
and society at large. These organizations complain that blacks
are more likely to be stopped by police and deprived of their
civil rights and that they bear the brunt of police brutality.
Surveys of murders of minors in major cities show that the
victims are disproportionatley black; a Rio de Janeiro state
legislator estimated that 75 percent of minors killed in the
Baixada Fluminense slum neighborhood are black.
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex in •
employment or salaries and provides for 120 days of paid
maternity leave. However, the provision against wage
discrimination is rarely enforced, and, as a reaction against
the maternity leave law, some employers seek sterilization
certificates from prospective employees or try to fire or avoid
hiring women in their childbearing years.
There is a high incidence of physical abuse of women in
Brazil. Major cities annually report several thousand cases of
violence against women, usually domestic violence. Although
there is still a strong cultural bias against the filing of
complaints by victims of abuse or their families, officials
note that women are now more willing to make official
complaints. A special study by an international human rights
group on this issue concluded that over 70 percent of all
reported cases of violence against women take place in the
home. The study also concluded that rape is seldom
investigated and is rarely prosecuted. Special women's health
police precincts in more than 12 major cities provide shelter,
assist in bringing actions against offenders, and provide
general information on women's health. Women's organizations
have been active in promoting women's rights and lobbying the
Government in such areas as combating violence against women,
respecting the constitutional rights of women, and promoting
sensitivity to women's issues through courses and seminars,
including courses for local police.
There are approximately 250,000 Indians in Brazil. The
Constitution gives Indians the exclusive use of the riches in
the soil, rivers, and lakes located on their lands. The
Federal Government has the responsibility to demarcate and
protect Indian lands. The Federal Government also has the
authority to develop Indian lands, but the Indians must receive
a share of the proceeds from any such exploitation. Brazilian
Indians may bring suits in court to defend their rights and
interests, and in such suits they are to be assisted by a
public prosecutor. In February President Collor ordered a
restructuring of government administration of Indian affairs.
On April 19, the Day of the Indian, President Collor nullified
a 1985 decree demarcating Yanomami Indian territory into 19
"islands" and placed off-limits to outsiders a 9.4-million
hectare area which includes those lands. On July 1, the
president appointed a prominent Indian affairs specialist as
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president of the National Foundation for the Indian (FUNAI).
In July FUNAI management reactivated "Operation Free Jungle" to
clear illegal prospectors from the area and ordered the
formalization of the 9.4-million hectare area as a Yanomami
reserve. On November 15, President Collor officially
designated the area as the Yanomami Reserve. The announcement
followed the ratification in October of 71 Indian land
demarcations and the demarcations in August and September of 13
new indigenous areas by FUNAI. On November 28, the President
also announced the demarcation of a 4.9-million hectare reserve
for the Menkragnotire Indians of Para state.
Land disputes between Indians and non-Indian neighbors
continued to lead to killings of Indians in 1991. Indian
rights groups state that seven Guajajara Indians were killed in
land conficts in Maranhao state between July and October. On
October 16 and 17, a group of Roraima farmers entered two
Makuxi villages, beating residents, burning down houses, and
destroying livestock pens. They were assisted by local police,
according to human rights sources. Random violence against
Indians, such as the murder on August 15 in Amazonas of an
Arapacu Indian for refusing to lend his tape recorder to the
murderer, also persists in Brazil.
Illegal prospecting continues on Indian lands. Prospectors
evicted from Yanomami lands by Operation Free Jungle have
reportedly migrated in large numbers to other indigenous areas
in Roraima. In one Indian area in Mato Grosso, the population
of prospectors reportedly grew from about 300 to as much as
2,000 between March and October. President Collor ordered the
closing of an illegal mining operation on Indian lands in Para
in December. Government efforts to control illegal prospecting
are hampered by a lack of resources to allow effective policing
of the extensive borders of indigenous areas and by powerful
local interest groups.
Effective health care for Indians, a federal government
responsibility, is also impeded by lack of funds. Private
donations support some health care costs in the Yanomami
territories, but many Indians still must travel long distances
to find health care facilities.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Brazil's Labor Code has long provided for union representation
of all Brazilian workers but imposed a hierarchical, unitary
system known as "unicidade," which prohibited multiple unions
of the same professional category in a given geographic area.
It also stipulated that no union's geographic base could be
smaller than a municipality. Workers in a union whose numbers
increased (as when an industry grew) could petition the state
to split a preexisting union into two or more unions.
The 1988 Constitution retains both "unicidade" and the
requirement that no union's geographic base may be smaller than
a municipality, but it frees workers to organize new unions out
of old ones without prior authorization from the Government.
The decision to retain unicidade drew opposition both from
elements of Brazil's labor movement and from the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). In practice,
however, unicidade has proven more formal than real, as
hundreds of new unions have sprung up across Brazil and
compete, in many cases, with unions and federations that had
already enjoyed official recognition. The sole bureaucratic
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requirement for new unions is to register with the Ministry of
Labor and Social Security which, by judicial decision, is bound
to receive and record their registration. The Government has
introduced legislation that would remove itself from dues
collection and would automatically recognize the existence of a
new union organization. However, the proposal in its most
recent form would also give the Government responsibility for
recognition of a union as bargaining agent for a specific group
of workers, thus retaining control of a key step in the process.
Several prominent rural labor leaders were killed in 1991
(see Section l .a. ) .
The Constitution provides for the right to strike. Enabling
legislation passed in June 1989 stipulates that essential
services remain in operation during a strike and that workers
notify employers at least 48 hours before beginning a walkout.
The Constitution prohibits government interference in labor
unions but provides that "abuse" of the right to strike (such
as not maintaining essential services or not giving advance
notice, denying workers not on strike access to their jobs, or
damaging property) will be punishable under the law.
During the year, there were strikes in the steel, oil, and
banking industries, and an attempted general strike. Courts
ruled the petrochemical workers' strike abusive because of its
disruption of fuel supplies in much of southern Brazil.
Formerly the ruling of abusiveness was virtually automatic;
more recently the courts have been applying the law with more
discretion. The Sao Paulo Regional Labor Court ruled on April
30 that the Sao Paulo metalworkers' strike was not abusive and
refused to issue a back-to-work order. According to union
officials, this was the first metalworkers' strike since 1964
that had not been ruled abusive.
Although Brazilian laws do not make any provision for a central
labor organization, three such groups have emerged — the General
Workers Central (CGT), the Sole Workers Central (CUT), and
Forca Sindical. The centrals do not have legal standing to
represent professional categories of workers and have been
created in Brazil as nonprofit civil associations. Unions and
union centrals are free to affiliate internationally. In
November the ICFTU accepted the CGT as a member. Forca
Sindical has a pending application with the ICFTU, and the CUT
remains unaffiliated.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize is provided for by the Constitution, and
trade unions are legally mandated to represent workers. The
Government has encouraged labor and management to resolve
differences through collective bargaining, which has become
commonplace. Nevertheless, a system of labor courts continues
to exercise normative powers with regard to the settlement of
labor disputes, thereby discouraging direct negotiation.
Existing law charges these same courts (as well as personnel
linked to the Federal Labor Ministry) with mediation
responsibility in the preliminary stages of dispute
settlement. Arbitration by neutral, professional third parties
is part of a labor reform proposal introduced by the Collor
Administration and awaiting congressional action.
International Labor Organization (ILO) bodies noted in 1991
that provisions of law restrict collective bargaining by
imposing wage parameters which may not be exceeded.
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The Constitution incorporates a provision from the Labor Code
that prohibits the dismissal of employees who are candidates
for or holders of union leadership positions. In one instance,
the president and a number of directors of the aeronautical
workers' union were fired by Varig and Vasp airlines after a
February 1988 strike. Some were subsequently rehired, but the
president and five directors remained without work, and their
cases were still pending at the end of 1991. In general,
enforcement of laws protecting union members from
discrimination lack effectiveness.
Labor law applies uniformly throughout Brazil, including the
free trade zones. However, the unions in the Manaus zone are
relatively weaker vis-a-vis industry as compared to unions in
the major industrial cities in the southeast.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
While the Constitution prohibits forced labor, there have been
repeated credible charges that it exists in Brazil, despite
federal government assertions that it is taking steps to halt
the practice and prosecute perpetrators. In 1991 the Pastoral
Land Commission (CPT) again denounced specific labor
contractors for maintaining "slave" work forces. The CPT
charged that these contractors deducted transportation and
other inflated expenses from the workers' meager salaries and
employed armed guards to prevent the "indebted" workers from
leaving. The CPT complained that state and federal authorities
have not promptly investigated reports of compulsory labor.
Several farms in the south of Para state were raided by federal
police in July and August; CPT sources charged that police
delayed mounting such operations and thereby failed to arrest
or punish a number of involved persons. In November formal
indictments for slave labor practices were entered against two
agents for employers of involuntary labor in the state of
Para. Other accusations of compulsory labor occurred in Acre,
Mate Grosso do Sul, Goias, Rio Grande do Sul, Sao Paulo state,
and in Rio de Janeiro state.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum working age under the Constitution is 14, except
for apprentices, and legal restrictions have been approved to
protect working minors under age 18. By law, the permission of
parents or guardians is required for minors to work, and
provision must be made for them to attend school through the
primary grades. All minors are barred from night work and from
work that constitutes a physical strain. Minors are also
prohibited from employment in unhealthful, dangerous, or
morally harmful conditions. Despite these legal restrictions,
however, approximately 34 percent of all children between the
ages of 10 and 14 are working. Many, perhaps most, of these
working minors are working in violation of the law, but
accurate statistics are not available. Economic conditions
often compel children to contribute income to their families
(or their own upkeep if they have left home) . Enforcement of
these laws is severely limited because the Ministry of Labor
and Social Security, the responsible agency, deploys too few
inspectors and accepts a widely held view that it is better for
these minors to work than to be involved in street crime.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The 1988 Constitution limits the workweek to 44 hours. It
expanded pay and fringe benefits and established new
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protections for agricultural and domestic workers. Several of
these provisions have proved unenforceable under current
economic conditions in Brazil. Worker purchasing power
declined in recent years, but in September Congress raised the
monthly minimum wage to roughly double its value during the
first 8 months of the year, and a new increase is scheduled for
January 1992. However, this is not sufficient to provide a
minimally decent standard of living for a worker and his
family. It is estimated that some 40 percent of economically
active individuals, including minors, earn no more than the
minimum wage.
Many Brazilian workers suffer from unsafe working environments.
Occupational health and safety standards are set by the Fundo
Centre, which is under the authority of the Minister of Labor
and Social Security. Enforcement of these standards is
inconsistent because the Ministry lacks sufficient resources
for adequate inspection and enforcement. In practice, if a
worker has a problem in the workplace and has trouble getting
relief directly from his employer, he can file a claim with the
regional labor court, although in practice this is a
cumbersome, protracted process. The most recent figures
gathered by the Government's social security system show that
in 1990 there were 745,555 total registered workplace
accidents, of which 5,355 were fatal and 18,878 caused
permanent disabilities. As these figures measure only those
incidents involving covered workers (some 23 million out of a
total work force which exceeds 50 million) they undoubtedly
understate the extent of the problem.
524
CHILE
After more than 16 years of military rule, democracy was
restored to Chile on March 11, 1990, with the inauguration of
President Patricio Aylwin. The new Congress is an active and
independent legislative body, comprising 120 Deputies and 38
Senators who were elected in December 1989. An additional nine
Senators were appointed during the previous military
government, depriving the elected Aylwin Government of a
majority in that body. There is a separate, independent
judicial branch which, however, is dominated by appointees of
the former military regime.
Civilian control of the military is increasing but not
complete; the armed forces remain largely autonomous
institutions. The Minister of Defense is a civilian appointed
by the President and responsible for oversight of the
military. General Augusto Pinochet, the only member of the
1973 junta still on active duty, remained as commander in chief
of the army after the transition to civilian government, a
position he may hold until 1997 under a constitutional
provision approved during the military regime. The national
police, or Carabineros, have primary responsibility for public
order and safety, crime control, and border security. The
Investigations Police are responsible for controlling and
investigating serious crime. Both police organizations,
although under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Defense, are
under the operational control of the Minister of Interior.
Chile's economy is based on free market principles and has a
dynamic and growing export sector. Copper is Chile's major
source of foreign exchange, followed by fresh fruits and fish
meal. This was the eighth consecutive year of real economic
growth. Despite weak rates of job creation, the rate of
unemployment remained relatively unchanged from 1990.
In 1991 the principal human rights problems included the need
to address past human rights violations committed during the
military regime, incidents of torture by police, terrorist
violence, and restrictive legislation inherited from nearly 17
years of military rule. President Aylwin in March released a
comprehensive report by the National Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation tnat implicated the security forces in over
2,000 cases of murder and disappearance during the 1973-90
military regime headed by General Pinochet. Based on the
Commission's recommendations, the Aylwin Government presented
the Congress with a compensation package for the families of
the victims mentioned in the report. Other legislation amended
vaguely defined and far-reaching state security laws and
transferred from military tribunals to civilian courts crimes
relating to state security.
The Chilean Government showed a strong commitment to bring to
justice those individuals indicted by a U.S. grand jury in
connection with the 1976 murders in Washington, D.C., of former
Chilean official Orlando Letelier and his American associate
Ronni Moffitt. The case passed from military to civilian court
jurisdiction; the Supreme Court reopened the investigation; and
a special investigating judge indicted the suspected authors of
the crime for murder and passport fraud. The Supreme Court
subsequently upheld the indictments, and the case at year's end
was headed for trial.
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CHILE
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Political and other extrajudicial killings were largely the
result of terrorist action. Two terrorist organizations, the
dissident wing of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR/D)
and elements of the Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL) , were
responsible for most of the political violence. The April 1
assassination of Independent Democratic Union (UDI) Senator
Jaime Guzman, a leading rightist political figure, was the
first terrorist assault directed against a democratically
elected legislator in recent Chilean history. A self-described
spokesman for the FPMR/D claimed responsibility for the
attack. A special investigating judge was assigned to the
case. Unidentified gunmen assassinated retired army physician
Carlos Perez Castro and his wife on March 3, the day before the
public release of the report of the Commission on Truth and
National Reconciliation; he had previously received numerous
FPMR/D telephone threats. Perez Castro, who allegedly advised
the National Intelligence Center (CNI) on the medical condition
of torture victims during the military dictatorship, was
sanctioned by Chile's national medical association for
unethical behavior in 1983. The MJL claimed responsibility for
the murder on March 15 of Investigations Police Chief Hector
Sarmiento Hidalgo in Concepcion. The Government continues to
investigate these cases and has requested the extradition of a
Chilean citizen in Spain who is suspected of having
participated in the Guzman assassination. The Government has
also been increasing the number of uniformed police to better
combat both crime and terrorism.
Eight police officers were killed during the year in
confrontations with Chilean terrorists; most were gunned down
by the MJL while patrolling the streets. Nine terrorists were
killed in 1991; a bomb killed two of them allegedly just before
they were to place it at the home of the Senate's Vice
President .
According to government records, leftwing terrorist groups in
1991 caused 46 personal injuries in attacks which included 173
bombings through November 30. A failed rocket attack on a U.S.
Marine van injured one U.S. serviceman in February; the FPMR/D
claimed responsibility. There were more than 30 bombings of
Mormon churches through November 30; most were conducted by
elements of the MJL. Several offices of the center-right
political parties National Renewal (RN) and the Independent
Democratic Union (UDI) were bombed, as was the residence of the
Supreme Court president.
In March President Aylwin released the findings and
recommendations of the Commission on Truth and National
Reconciliation, or Rettig Commission, which he appointed in
1990 to report on human rights abuses that took place during
the 1973-1990 military regime. The report held the security
forces responsible for more than 2,000 cases of murder and
disappearance that occurred during that time. According to the
report, many of the victims were poor young males, and nearly
half of the victims had no known political affiliation. The
report also concluded, among other things, that the judiciary
had been ineffective when faced with human rights violations,
that the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), the secret
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CHILE
police agency, had targeted political opponents of the military
regime for elimination and was responsible only to General
Pinochet, and that the regime's claim that it was fighting an
internal war in the years following the coup was not valid,
given that the regime had established effective control over
the country within days of the 1973 coup with very little armed
opposition.
The Commission recommended that the Government compensate the
families of the victims with financial payments and special
health care services, among other benefits. Though the
Government's proposed legislation on reparations was still
under consideration in Congress by year's end, the package was
expected to be approved without difficulty. The Commission
also emphasized the need to determine the fate of the missing
by establishing a national foundation that would assist in
locating them.
President Aylwin, while reaffirming the validity of the 1978
amnesty law, called upon the Supreme Court to reconsider its
decision not to investigate offenses falling under that law,
arguing that while the ultimate sentencing might be negated by
that law, the facts and guilt should be determined in
individual cases. The Court, however, chose not to do so,
interpreting the law as proscribing such investigations.
However, the Catholic Church's Vicariate of Sol-darity
succeeded in having some individual civilian judges reopen
certain investigations. In September, at the Santiago general
cemetery, authorities disinterred 125 bodies of victims who
were detained by security personnel and who then disappeared
during the months immediately following the military coup. For
the first time, a Santiago appeals court in November indicted
an active duty army officer in connection with the
disappearance of two Chilean youths in 1974, ruling that
kidnaping is not covered by the 1978 Amnesty Law. The Supreme
Court, however, suspended the detention order while it reviewed
whether the amnesty law is applicable.
At the request of the Aylwin government, the Supreme Court in
July appointed Supreme Court Judge Adolfo Banados to reopen the
investigation into the 1976 car bomb murders in Washington,
D.C., of former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier and
his assistant Ronni Moffitt, a U.S. citizen. In September
Judge Banados, the first appointment by President Aylwin to the
19-member Supreme Court, indicted retired General Manuel
Contreras and Colonel Pedro Espinoza in connection with the
crime. Contreras had served the military regime as director of
DINA, the precursor to CNI , and Espinoza had served as DINA's
chief of operations. The Supreme Court upheld the indictments
against the two men in November. In a related action in July,
both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate ratified an
agreement reached between the Governments of the United States
and Chile in June 1990 in which the Governments were to convene
a commission under provisions of the 1914 Bryan-Suarez treaty
to determine the amount of ex gratia compensation the Chilean
Government would pay the Letelier and Moffitt families.
Carmen Gloria Quintana, who was seriously burned in a
confrontation with a military patrol in 1986, and the family of
Rodrigo Rojas, who died of burns in the same confrontation,
filed an appeal to the Supreme Court in 1991, but no decision
had been rendered by year's end. A military appeals court in
1990 had overturned a serious injury finding by a military
tribunal in 1989. There was little advancement in other
outstanding cases against Carabinero officers.
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b. Disappearance
There were no confirmed cases of politically motivated
kidnaping in 1991. Unidentified assailants, however,
reportedly abducted a son of the owner of the El Mercuric
newspaper in September. In March the Rettig Commission
concluded that tlje security forces were responsible for 957
cases of disappearance following the 1973 coup and that there
was substantial evidence that the victims were dead (see
Section 1 . a. ) .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Credible reports of torture by some Carabinero and
Investigations Police units continued. The Chilean Human
Rights Commission (CHRC) reported 32 instances of torture as of
August 30. The most serious case was of six suspected MJL
members believed responsible for the murder of the
Investigations Police Chief in Concepcion. The detainees were
held incommunicado for several weeks and reportedly beaten by
Investigations Police during detention. Some allegedly were
subjected to electric shock. There were other credible
complaints of mistreatment and torture in 1991, including sleep
deprivation, beatings, and threats by the Carabineros ' s Third
Commissary in Santiago.
Judicial investigations of torture have seldom been concluded,
due in large part to the refusal of some state security
organizations to comply with court orders to make security
agents available to the courts for questioning. The
unwillingness of members of the judiciary, many of them
appointed by the military regime, to pursue human rights cases
has been responsible, at least in part, for the failure to
investigate and prosecute cases of torture and other
mistreatment by police.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under article 19 of the Constitution, civilian and military
courts may order detention for 5 days, and extend it up to 10
days, for suspected terrorist acts. Under 1991 legal reforms,
detainees are to be provided immediate and daily access to a
doctor to verify their physical condition. With few
exceptions, this practice appears to have been observed. In
politically motivated crimes or cases of suspected terrorists,
some judges have denied detainees their legally protected right
to access to a lawyer. Though most cases related to the
antiterror ist law were transferred to civilian courts in 1991,
ad hoc military prosecutors continue to hold open
investigations of two cases; the discovery of arms caches in
1986 and the 1986 assault on a bakery in which a Carabinero
official was killed.
Despite the Constitutional prohibitions, incidents of arbitrary
arrest increased in 1991. The CHRC reported 101 arbitrary
individual arrests and 77 arrests during demonstrations through
November 1991. Many of those detained were never charged and
were released after several days. In April, for example,
immediately after the assassination of Senator Guzman, police
detained approximately 500 people, but released them shortly
thereafter .
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There were no cases of forced exile in 1991, but some Chileans
convicted of politically motivated crimes during the military
regime opted to go abroad to secure their release from jail.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Jurisdiction for the prosecution of proscribed political
activities remains with the regular civilian courts, but under
the military government a broad interpretation of state
security laws had greatly expanded the jurisdiction of military
courts over these cases. The Government's 1991 package of
legal reforms, or "Cumplido Laws," limited the jurisdiction of
military courts and transferred many such cases to the civilian
courts. The Social Aid Foundation of the Christian Churches
(FASIC) reported that, as of early December, 63 persons charged
with violating state security laws before March 11, 1990,
remained in jail. In 1991 the antiterrorist law was revised to
better define security crimes, and some penalties were reduced
to reflect more appropriate punishments.
Trial is not by jury, reliance is on the written record rather
than oral testimony, and the judge renders a verdict after
directing the investigation. The investigation phase is
considered secret, with limited access for the accused or his
attorney to evidence or testimony which has been developed by
the judge. There is a we 11 -developed, multistage appeal
process leading ultimately to the Supreme Court.
The courts made little progress during 1991 in investigating
past human rights violations (see Section l.a.). Although the
broad jurisdiction of military tribunals over civilians was
reduced in 1991, military tribunals generally retain
jurisdiction over all cases where active duty military
personnel are charged with a crime, including instances of
crimes committed against civilians. Military personnel have
only rarely been convicted for human rights abuses; to prevent
further investigation, military tribunals often seek
jurisdiction in cases in which military officials are suspect.
When jurisdictional conflicts arise, the Supreme Court has
sided more often with military tribunals; these decisions have
produced considerable criticism and charges that Chile's
highest court collaborates with the military to impede justice
for victims of human rights abuses committed by the security
forces .
In a special joint session of Congress on March 23, article 9
of the Constitution was revised, giving the President temporary
authority to pardon those convicted of security or terrorist
crimes committed during the military regime. During 1991
President Aylwin granted pardons to more than 50 people who had
been convicted of politically motivated crimes. In November
the Congress also approved a law authorizing the appointment of
up to 30 temporary justices to clear a backlog of cases that
were transferred form military to civilian courts.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Searches of the home and interception of private communications
are prohibited by the Constitution, unless search warrants are
issued by either a civilian or military court for specific
locations. The 1984 antiterrorist law provides for
surveillance of those suspected of terrorist crimes, and for
interception, opening, or recording of private communications
and documents in such cases. In response to increasing crime.
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CHILE
Congress passed a law in 1991 that allows the police to enter a
location without a warrant if they have good reason to believe
perpetrators of a flagrant crime are in hiding there.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution recognizes freedom of speech and press and
these rights are generally respected in practice. In 1991
legislation was enacted that reduced the penalties for libel,
which previously had consisted of lengthy jail sentences and
high fines. In addition, under article 6 of the State Security
Law, the legislation transferred from military to civilian
courts cases against journalists for "offenses against the
Armed Forces and Carabineros . " However, at the time of the
transfer of court jurisdiction, there were approximately 31
such cases, affecting approximately 19 journalists. Almost all
of these cases were dismissed, and a similar outcome is
expected in the rest. Few new cases of such offenses were
brought in 1991, although in September the Government filed a
summons against the leftist weekly Punto Final for a cover
image it deemed offensive to General Pinochet. In April
Congress passed a law stipulating that only universities could
award the professional journalism degree, a measure which is
interpreted as a first step toward restricting the exercise of
the profession to university journalism degree holders.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Citizens have the right to peaceful assembly and association.
Although official permission to hold rallies is not technically
required, authorities must be notified in writing of planned
public events. In September Carabineros used tear gas to
disperse a demonstration by university students and arrested
dozens of people for reportedly setting up road blocks. Human
rights groups charged that the police often used excessive
force, including tear gas and water cannon, particularly
against leftist protesters, to break up demonstrations.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion. Although
Chile is predominantly Roman Catholic, there are no
restrictions on religious practices and no official
discrimination against any religious group. The Mormon Church
continued to be a target of leftwing terrorist groups,
primarily the MJL, apparently for political rather than
religious reasons.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
By law Chileans are free to move within and to enter and leave
their country. In September 1990, the Congress passed a law
establishing the National Office of Returnees to facilitate the
reincorporation of returning exiles into Chilean society. The
office opened in November 1990 and is scheduled to close in
March 1994. In its first 6 months it assisted more than 9,500
Chileans who returned from exile.
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Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government through
periodic elections. There is universal suffrage for citizens
18 years of age or over, and over 95 percent of those eligible
are registered to vote. Women are active in Chilean political
life, especially at the grass roots political party level.
There are few women in leadership positions. The Senate and
the Chamber of Deputies passed legislation 1991 to amend the
Constitution to allow municipal elections by June 30, 1992.
The military regime designed certain provisions of the 1980
Constitution to protect its interests and maintain conservative
forces in power during the transition to civilian rule. For
example, critics charge that the Pinochet government designed a
system for Congressional elections to accord disproportionate
representation to the right. This "binominal" system is
considered undemocratic by many who prefer Chile's former
proportional representation system, and strong sentiment exists
in the Congress to introduce a traditional system of
proportional representation. According to a multiparty
political agreement, upcoming municipal elections will be based
on a proportional representation system. Under the terms of
the 1980 Constitution, as amended, nine Senators were appointed
by the outgoing government and the judiciary to take office
with the 38 elected Senators, which effectively deprived the
elected Aylwin Government of a majority in that body. One
appointed Senator died in December 1990, and the Government
decided not to fill his vacant seat.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Catholic Church's Vicariate of Solidarity took the lead in
defence of human rights during the Pinochet regime and
continues to provide legal counsel to those accused of
politically related crimes and to victims of human rights
abuses. The Government permits visits and investigations by
private international human rights groups. In 1990 the United
Nations Human Rights Commission terminated its mandate for a
special rapporteur, and, at its request, the Chilean Government
presented a report before a special session of the Commission
in February on its progress in the establishment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Although Chile seeks to integrate its indigenous population,
the only significant racial minority, the Mapuche Indians in
southern Chile, remains separated from the rest of society
because of historical, cultural, educational, and geographical
factors, rather than by official policy. In accord with the
International Labor Organization's resolutions on indigenous
peoples. President Aylwin has introduced constitutional changes
which would better protect the traditional life-styles and land
ownership of indigenous Chileans.
Legal distinctions between the sexes still exist, despite a law
passed in 1989 to reduce restrictions on women. Under the law,
for example, wives may now retain control over income earned
independently from their spouses, although assets held at the
time of marriage become community property controlled by the
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CHILE
husband; decisions on where to live are to be taken jointly,
whereas previously a woman was obliged to live where her
husband decided. Most importantly, a provision giving control
of a woman's person to her husband was rescinded.
The change in law has not been matched by a change in attitude
by society, police, or the courts. In many cases, violence,
such as wife beating and other abuse, continues to be tolerated
or ignored. The National Women's Service (SERNAM), whose
director in January became the first woman with cabinet rank,
estimates from polling data that approximately 30 percent of
women in the lower economic strata have experienced domestic
violence. No estimate is available for women from middle- or
high-income families. Besides providing legal and medical
information to abused women, SERNAM conducts courses on the
legal, medical, and psychological aspects of domestic violence
for Carabineros, most often the first public officials to
intervene in such incidents.
The legal retirement age for women is 5 years lower than that
for men. Inheritance laws provide strong protection for wives
and protect female offspring. According to government
statistics, as of 1988 women made up 30 percent of the work
force. The average salary for women is 87 percent of that for
men for the same job, and the unemployment rate for women is
higher, especially among those entering the work force for the
first time. As of 1988, women made up 50 percent of the
professional work force; 14 percent of working women were
professionals, compared to 6 percent of working men.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Private sector workers and employees of state-run enterprises
in Chile have the right to join trade unions, and approximately
12 percent of the work force is organized. The Labor Code does
not allow government employees to form trade unions, but their
"associations" have legal status, and they participate in labor
confederations. These associations do not engage in collective
bargaining. The police and military are not allowed to form
employee associations.
The Labor Code was amended in 1991 to allow for the formation
of nationwide labor "centrals," but the requirements are
onerous, and none of the existing de facto centrals have yet
obtained legal recognition. However, the Government discussed
Labor Code reforms with the Unified Workers Central (CUT) and
provided it with a headquarters building, implicitly
recognizing its existence. In October the CUT decided to begin
the legal steps required to obtain legal status. The
Government's failure to consult more closely with smaller
centrals, including the divided Democratic Workers Central and
the conservative Chilean Workers Central, was strongly
criticized by these groups and opposition political parties.
Unions are independent of the Government, but they maintain
ties with political parties. Only the Democratic Labor Central
sought political independence, but it has suffered a decline in
membership and power . Labor unions can and do maintain
relations with international labor bodies.
In 1991 Labor Code reforms removed some severe restrictions on
the right to strike, but a majority of bargaining employees
must reject an employer's final offer in the presence of a
Labor Inspector and vote by secret ballot for a strike.
50-726 - 92 - 18
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CHILE
Employers may no longer fire striking workers after 60 days
without paying severance benefits, and the benefits have
increased from a maximum of 5 to 11 months' salary. Even
before passing the labor reforms, the Government restored the
right to strike at copper mines and most other entities which
had previously been included on a list of strategic
enterprises. Employees of other vital services, such as bus
companies, are not allowed to strike but may take disputes to
neutral arbitration. In the private sector, unions have the
option of using an arbitrator when negotiations reach an
impasse, but most prefer to take legal steps toward a strike.
Organized labor continued to press during the year for a full
investigation of the 1982 murder of labor leader Tucapel
Jimenez, the most serious human rights abuse committed against
a labor leader in recent times. The case is in the hands of a
Supreme Court justice, but there was no visible progress in the
case during 1991.
In February 1988, Chile was formally suspended from trade
benefits under U.S. Generalized System of Preferences
legislation for its failure to take steps to afford
internationally recognized worker rights to Chilean workers.
After a thorough review, which included public hearings, the
U.S. Government restored these benefits in February 1991.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The climate for collective bargaining improved with the passage
of the new labor reforms, but the process is strictly
regulated, and employees in small firms face serious problems
of antiunion discrimination. The entire collective bargaining
procedure may be nullified if any of a series of legally
imposed deadlines are missed by either the union or
management. A decision not to negotiate a new contract upon
expiration of the former one results in automatically extending
the former agreement for a minimum 2-year period.
The Government unilaterally sets the wages of public employees
without formal bargaining. Reforms to the Labor Code allow
bargaining in the private sector and state enterprises, and it
may occur at other than the company level, but all parties must
agree to the alternate venue. Negotiations by "unions of
transient workers," defined as the merchant marine, port
workers, construction workers, and artists, "do not have the
legal status of a labor contract," according to the revised
Labor Code.
Although Chilean law guarantees the right of private sector
workers and employees of state-run enterprises to form unions,
in practice such laws are ineffective, especially in small work
places. Employers may no longer dismiss workers without cause,
but they use technicalities in the Labor Code to fire union
leaders even when they enjoy legal protections. Reforms to the
Labor Code provide that the employer must pay a 20-percent
penalty to the worker if courts rule that he was fired without
just cause, but they do not require that the worker be
rehired. Employers are allowed to negotiate with ad hoc worker
groups, which undermines the bargaining ability of the union.
There are no export processing zones or other special districts
where different labor laws apply.
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CHILE
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is implicitly prohibited in the
Constitution and Labor Code, and there have been no complaints
on this issue since the mid-1970s.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Child labor is regulated by law. Young people aged 14 and 15
may be employed only with the permission of their parents or
guardians and if they have completed their schooling, and then
only in restricted types of labor. Those aged 15 to 18 may be
employed in a larger variety of jobs and at expanded hours, but
again only with the permission of their parents or guardians.
Labor Inspectors enforce these regulations, and voluntary
compliance is good in the formal sector. Economic factors have
forced many children to seek employment in the informal economy
which, by definition, is more difficult to regulate.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and
health standards are regulated by law. The normal workweek is
48 hours. There is a minimum wage, and lower paid workers also
receive a family subsidy which is designed to raise their
earnings to an acceptable level . When the minimum wage was
increased in 1991, the Tripartite Committee — which is composed
of representatives from government, labor, and management —
agreed in principle that future wage increases would be tied to
increases in productivity. The Ministry of Labor has
inspectors to enforce laws covering wages, hours of work, and
occupational health and safety, but enforcement is poor,
especially in small industries.
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COLOMBIA
Colombia is a constitutional, multiparty democracy in which the
Liberals and Conservatives have long dominated the political
scene. A coalition led by M-19, the former guerrilla movement
that signed a peace accord with the Government and became a
legal political party in 1990, has gained some support as an
alternative to the traditional parties.
Internal security is the primary responsibility of the Ministry
of Defense, which includes the National Police. The Department
of Administrative Security (DAS), which is responsible for
national security intelligence, reports directly to the
President. Security forces are responsible for significant
human rights abuses.
Colombia has a mixed economy, with private enterprise having a
dominant role. The coffee industry, which accounts for 20 to
25 percent of legal export earnings, is mainly in the private
sector, as are most entities engaged in manufacturing,
agriculture, and the service sector. State enterprises control
participation in the oil and coal industries and play an
important role in the electrical and telecommunication
utilities. Privatization of certain public industries is
continuing.
In Colombia, strong democratic traditions and civilian
governments have withstood extraordinary levels of violence for
more than 40 years. The main sources of human rights
violations are powerful narcotics terrorists, leftist guerrilla
movements, and rightwing paramilitary groups that sometimes
operate with the support or acquiescence of regional or local
military and police officials. There are also significant
abuses by members of the police and military themselves,
usually in the context of efforts to quell narcotics-related or
political violence.
Narcotics traffickers control enormous illicit enterprises and
use terrorism in an attempt to intimidate the Government and
the judiciary, although narcoterror ism declined during 1991.
Narcotraf f ickers sometimes propagated disinformation regarding
official human rights abuses, hoping to undermine both domestic
and international support for the Government. The guerrilla
groups, which were responsible for increased political and
economic violence at the outset of 1991, frequently murdered or
kidnaped local government officials and civilians as part of
their continuing effort to overthrow the Government and to
finance their operations. In some areas, the guerrillas
cooperate with narcotraf f ickers; in others they are in violent
conflict .
Members and units of the army and the police participated in a
number of human rights violations. Particularly in areas of
guerrilla violence and little civilian government presence,
members of the armed forces committed various abuses, including
massacres, disappearances, and torture. The army is reluctant
to distinguish between guerrillas and noncombatants during
counter insurgency operations, although its record in this
respect appears to be improving. Targets of serious abuse by
members of the security forces include leftist politicians,
labor organizers, human rights workers, and peasants. Some
persons and units have assisted or participated in rightwing
paramilitary activity, which targets guerrillas and those
believed to have leftist or guerrilla sympathies, among
others. Some of these paramilitary groups have been linked to
narcotraf f ickers . Paramilitary activity was lower in 1991 than
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COLOMBIA
in previous years, partly because of President Cesar Gaviria's
commitment to ending support by officials for these
organizations. In urban areas, the National Police committed
human rights violations that typically included disappearances,
arbitrary arrests, and threats of violence.
In 1991 President Gaviria led several notable efforts to
identify and address human rights problems in Colombia. In
September the PCocuraduria, an independent government watchdog
institution, presented its first official report on the human
rights situation in Colombia. It termed the situation
"alarming" and called for immediate corrective measures by all
organs of the State, particularly those that are part of the
problem. The report praised the adoption of a new Constitution,
in 1991, the first in over 100 years, and highlighted
provisions in it regarding political and judicial reform,
strengthened individual rights, and the establishment of a
public defender's office to protect and publicize those
rights. Peace negotiations between the Government and the two
remaining guerrilla groups began in June and continued at
year's end. The Procuraduria continued to conduct a number of
investigations into allegations of government human rights
abuses; by year's end, the Procuraduria had levied sanctions
against 349 members of the security forces from April 1990 to
March 1991 for a variety of human rights violations.
Nevertheless, sanctions for human rights abuses are rarely
carried out within the military and very few security forces'
personnel have been prosecuted for human rights abuses in a
court of law.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial killing
Colombia has one of the highest murder rates in the world. Due
to insufficient police and judicial resources and expertise to
investigate and prosecute most killings, it is difficult to
separate political and nonpolitical murders. Nevertheless, the
Center for Investigations and Popular Education (CINEP),
Bogota's Jesuit-affiliated human rights and social research
institution, gives a credible figure of 398 confirmed political
killings in Colombia through October 1991, an increase" from the
313 political killings recorded by CINEP in 1990. CINEP
labeled an additional 1,029 murders as presumably politically
motivated, compared to 1,694 during 1990. These numbers
exclude deaths in combat.
Narcoterrorism continued to decline during 1991, due in part to
the surrender provisions of the Gaviria Administration's
decrees providing immunity from extradition and, under certain
circumstances, significant reductions in the sentences for
persons who turned themselves in and confessed. There were,
however, still significant instances of narcoterrorism during
the year. In January killers employed by narcotics overlord
Pablo Escobar brutally murdered kidnap victim Marina Montoya de
Perez, the sister of former President Barco's chief of staff.
In February a car bomb, almost certainly planted by
narcotraf f ickers, exploded in the midst of a Medellin crowd
leaving the bull ring, killing 21 people, including 9 police
officers, and injuring some 150 persons. The murder on April
30 of former Minister of Justice Enrique Low Murtra was also
almost certainly ordered by traffickers. Low had been
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COLOMBIA
repeatedly threatened by narcotraf f ickers due to his
proextradition stance. In one of Colombia's worst massacres of
1991, 20 Paez Indians were murdered in an opium-growing area of
Cauca Department on December 16. An investigation of possible
ties between narcotraf f ickers and the murderers is going
forward. By the end of the year, no one had been detained for
any of these crimes.
During a January police raid on a house belonging to the
Escobar organization, Diana Turbay, a prominent journalist and
daughter of a former president, was killed months after she was
kidnaped by guerrillas and turned over to Pablo Escobar. A
subsequent investigation by the Procuraduria found evidence
that members of the police who participated in the raid had
extrajudicially executed one to three persons they believed to
have been connected with Turbay 's captors. The Procuraduria
filed formal administrative charges against three police
officers — a captain, a lieutenant, and a sublieutenant.
Rightwing paramilitary groups, sometimes with the cooperation
or acc[uiescence of local military and police officers,
continued to operate in rural areas. In 1991 there was a sharp
increase in the number of murders of members of the small
leftwing Patriotic Union (UP) Party. Ninety UP members were
killed for political or apparently political reasons during
this period. Many of these killings are generally thought to
have been carried out by paramilitary groups. Activists in
Colombia's two major political parties have also been
assassinated, although losses in those parties are in no way
proportional to UP losses. According to CINEP statistics
through October, 16 Liberal and 6 Social Conservative party
activists were killed for political or apparently political
reasons in 1991. Major abuses attributed to paramilitary
groups appear to have declined, however, partly because of
government pressure on the trafficking operations that financed
some paramilitary groups and continuing government efforts to
sever the connections between these groups and individual
military units and officers.
In December members of Colombia's most infamous paramilitary
group, the Magdalena Medio Peasant Self-Defense Movement, began
to surrender to Colombian authorities, taking advantage of the
same surrender decrees used by narcotraf f ickers Pablo Escobar
and the Ochoa brothers. Over 225 members of the paramilitary
group had surrendered to authorities by year's end. In August,
13 paramilitary group members were convicted in absentia by a
public order judge for the murder of 21 peasants in the Uraba
region. Among those found guilty were Fidel Castano and Henry
Perez, both sentenced to 20 years in prison. Shortly after the
verdict was handed down, Perez was killed by unknown assailants.
Members and units of the military carried out political
killings. In August, eight members of the Thirteenth Army
Brigade attacked the home of a Communist Party member in the
rural community of Fusagasuga near Bogota. The evidence in the
case clearly indicates that five members of the family were
roused from sleep in the early morning hours and murdered in
cold blood. Criminal charges have been filed against all eight
soldiers, and the Procuraduria has filed administrative charges
against the lieutenant and sergeant responsible for the
operation. On December 9, the Procuraduria announced that
there would be no charges filed against the general in command
of the Thirteenth Brigade.
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Members of the police, frustrated by the ineffectiveness of the
judicial system, participated in extrajudicial killings of
suspected drug traffickers and young residents in poor urban
neighborhoods. Members of the police, apparently hired by
narcotraf f ickers or local merchants, have probably been
responsible for increasing numbers of "cleanup" killings in
Medellin and elsewhere. During 1991 significant numbers of
such executions occurred in Medellin, Barranquilla, Cali,
Bogota, Pereira, and Manizales. In November, in response to
charges made in 1990 by the Archbishop of Pereira, a special
commission of the Procuraduria tied at least 50 policemen in
Pereira and Risaralda Department to "cleanup killings" and
mistreatment of indigents, prostitutes, street children, and
drug addicts. Most of the policemen involved were either
dismissed or confront criminal charges. "Popular militias,"
probably linked to the guerrillas, have become active in
Medellin. There, too, groups appear to be involved in
"cleanup" campaigns, which include multiple executions of
delinquents and other criminal elements (or rival criminal
elements) from neighborhoods where the militias are powerful.
Statistics from the human rights groups Justicia and Paz and
the Andean Commission of Jurists indicate that there were 289
"cleanup" killings through September 1991, compared to 267 for
all of 1990 and 364 for 1989.
Nationwide, policemen continue to be murdered by the
narcotraf f ickers , the guerrillas, and common criminals at the
alarming rate of more than one per day; according to official
statistics, 329 members of the National Police were killed in
the line of duty between January 1 and October 7.
Leftist guerrillas were responsible for numerous extrajudicial
killings, including of those who refused to submit to
extortion, those who they thought had helped the Government,
and those, including some UP leaders, whom they declared guilty
of "crimes against the people." They also executed some within
their own ranks who tried to leave or who questioned the
leadership's political line. Two police officers were found
assassinated in Palmira, Valle del Cauca Department, in early
February; they had been kidnaped the previous day by Colombian
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) guerrillas. In June a
vegetable merchant was killed while attending his market stall;
guerrillas of the Army of National Liberation (ELN) faction
were implicated in the crime. In April the army uncovered an
unmarked graveyard in territory long controlled by the FARC
guerrilla group. Some of the dead appeared to have been
executed. In the second worst blow to Colombia's judicial
system in recent years, seven judicial officials (including a
judge) and one policeman were killed November on 26 in Usme,
outside of Bogota, by FARC guerrillas.
A disproportionately high number of victims of violence are
peasants and workers. In his first official annual human
rights report, the Procurador pointed out that peasants are the
primary victims of human rights violations, followed by
independent workers and laborers in the informal sector. In
his annual report the Procurador noted that he had files on
more than 68 reported massacres by security forces. In July
Colombia's Supreme Military Tribunal overturned an October 1990
investigative judge's finding acquitting 3 noncommissioned
officers of the murder of 11 residents of rural Macaravita in
Santander . In early May, the Procuraduria filed charges
against two agents of DAS (the equivelent of the U.S. Federal
Bureau of Investigation) for the murder in Barranquilla of
Jesus Santrich Nunez, a local Communist youth leader, in
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November 1990. Fifty-two union activists and 278 peasants were
killed in the first 6 months of 1991, according to CINEP
figures. In the same period, 32 schoolteachers associated with
FECODE (the national teachers' association) were assassinated.
FECODE leaders have stated that teachers were targeted by both
political extremes. Between January and April, the president
and three other leaders of UNDUPALMA (cooking oil union), one
of Colombia's largest labor organizations, were assassinated
following mock trials in which the FARC's Simon Bolivar popular
militias accused them of treason for surrendering their arms to
the Government. In October a union leader of the banana
workers previously associated with the formerly
guerrilla-affiliated Esperanza, Paz y Libertad party (EPL) was
shot to death in Uruba after having been targeted by a
dissident EPL group that is opposed to the peace process.
Due in large part to an ineffective criminal justice system,
very few of those who commit extrajudicial killings are ever
brought to justice. During the 16 months covered by its
1990-91 report, the Procuraduria noted 560 reported murders by
the security forces, but indicated that only 43 security forces
personnel had been administratively disciplined thus far.
Under the new Constitution, a "Defender of the People" will,
unlike the Procuraduria, also concern himself with violations
by private parties and, in certain circumstances, can intervene
in judicial proceedings related to human rights violations.
b. Disappearance
Both disappearances and kidnapings increased in 1991. In its
report, the Procuraduria noted that disappearances caused by
the security forces are a disturbing and chronic problem in
Colombia. The report noted that, in the 465 reported
disappearances attributed to the security forces, only 5
policemen and 5 members of the military had been
administratively sanctioned by the Procuraduria thus far. Most
disappearances take place in areas of active guerrilla
insurgency with limited civilian governmental presence. They
may be attributed as follows: to the security forces; to forced
recruitment by the guerrillas and flight from such recruitment;
to extrajudicial killings, particularly by guerrillas or
rightwing paramilitary groups; or to kidnaping for political or
nonpolitical motives. The victims are usually workers,
students, union members and activists, and peasants. There is
credible evidence linking the police to the disappearance in
Bogota of Alvaro Moreno Moreno. Moreno, a former university
student suspected of ties to the guerrillas, was subsequently
found dead. The inability to resolve most of these cases
reflects the inadequacy of judicial processes and the lack of
cooperation with the Procuraduria shown by police and
military. Fear of retaliation on the part of witnesses,
investigators, and judges are further inhibiting factors.
Kidnapings carried out by guerrillas, common criminals, and
narcotraf f ickers appeared to increase in 1991. Kidnaping the
wealthy for ransom is an important source of revenue for the
guerrillas, who also kidnap for political reasons, sometimes
executing victims after mock trials (see Section l.a.). Three
United States citizens kidnaped by guerrillas in late 1990 were
released in November. Another U.S. citizen was kidnaped by
guerrillas in late December and remains in their hands.
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c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although torture is prohibited by law, the police and security
forces frequently beat and torture detainees, especially in the
period immediately following detention. In its report, the
Procuraduria noted that it had 272 cases on file involving 664
persons alleging" torture by members of the security forces; the
national police were implicated in nearly half of the cases.
About one-half of the victims were peasants, followed by
workers and prisoners. Thus far, according to the report,
administrative sanctions have been levied against just 12
policemen, 9 military personel, and 3 prison employees.
Rightwing paramilitary groups operating in the countryside
frequently torture victims before killing them. Torture is
also a common guerrilla practice. The body of Gabriela White,
a prominent local politician of the Department of Antioquia,
was found displaying signs of torture. She had been kidnaped 4
weeks before, most likely by leftwing guerrillas.
According to the Procuraduria, physical assault is the most
common human rights violation committed by the security forces;
941 persons filed such complaints, and the national police were
implicated in about 76 percent of the cases. Victims included
primarily workers, students, peasants, and the unemployed.
Thus far, the Procuraduria has levied administrative sanctions
against 155 of the perpetrators.
Early in the year the military followed the police lead and
agreed to grant representatives of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) unlimited access to all persons
detained on security charges. While the ICRC is able to see
some prisoners held by the army, more progress is needed.
There is no evidence of systematic abuse of prisoners in
long-term detention facilities, although some does occur, as
indicated in the Procuraduria ' s report. Prison conditions are
seriously affected by the lack of adequate resources and
overcrowding.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The new Constitution includes several mechanisms designed to
prevent illegal detentions. A detainee now must go before a
judge within 36 hours and has the right to seek, before any
judge, a petition of habeas corpus which must be acted upon
within 36 hours. Despite these new safeguards, numerous
instances of arbitrary arrest or detention continued in 1991.
The Procuraduria reported that it was investigating 611 files
involving 677 alleged victims of arbitrary arrest and
detention; the National Police were implicated in 71 percent of
these cases. The Procuraduria had levied administrative
sanctions against 87 members of the security forces by year's
end. Workers and peasants were the major victims of these
arrests, followed by union members, indigenous peoples, and UP
members .
Persons are not subject to exile.
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COLOMBIA
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to due process is specifically provided for in the
Constitution. The accused have the right to representation by
counsel, but in practice representation for indigents is
grossly inadequate. An overburdened judiciary and a
traditional reluctance to grant bail results in many detainees
never coming to trial; they simply serve the minimum sentence
applicable to the crimes which they are alleged to have
committed. According to one study, a majority of the prisoners
in Colombia have never been convicted of a crime.
The judiciary is independent of the executive and legislative
branches in both theory and practice but has long been subject
to intimidation when dealing with serious narcotraf f icking or
paramilitary group cases. Many magistrates, judges, and
attorneys have been suborned, threatened with death, killed, or
had family members killed because they were investigating or
trying such cases. Since January 1991, however, the Government
has taken some extraordinary steps to try to alleviate these
problems. The special system of "public order" courts, which
began functioning in January, was approved as permanent
legislation in October. These special courts are designed to
protect certain highly threatened judges involved in narcotics
and terrorism cases, to process such cases more rapidly, and to
improve the conviction rate, which has risen dramatically.
Trials in these courts are closed to the public, although
representatives of the Procuraduria must be present during most
proceedings. The legislation also strengthens the powers of
the security forces to conduct judicial investigations without
direct judicial supervision. Under the reformed system, the
Procuraduria is charged with closely monitoring police
investigations in order to prevent abuses. Defendants before
the public order courts enjoy all the procedural rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. Defense attorneys do have
several complaints about the faceless judge and anonymous
witness structure of the public order courts. The new
Constitution mandates that judges and witnesses be protected
from violence but does not outline the specific means to be
taken to protect them. Some defense attorneys intend to mount
a constitutional challenge to the public order system. Under
that system, a defense attorney may not impeach a witness due
to the witness's anonymity, nor may a defendant make copies of
some of the evidence to be used against him or her because that
evidence may only be viewed within the confines of a specific
room. Also, under the public order scheme, a defense attorney
will be unable to bring charges of malfeasance or incompetence
against the faceless judge. Some fear that the public order
system could be used against political activists or other
persons and do not believe that the Procuraduria ' s presence is
sufficient protection for the defendant.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
A judicial order is generally required for authorities to enter
a private home, except in cases of hot pursuit. There are
widespread violations of legal norms regarding searches in
remote regions, but in urban areas the sanctity of the home is
generally respected. Peasants frequently charge that they are
forced to leave their farms by military counter insurgency
operations, guerrilla conscription and confiscations, and by
rightwing paramilitary groups. The Procuraduria reported that
it is studying 321 cases of illegal searches, and that 25
agents of the State had been administratively sanctioned
64|
COLOMBIA
as of year's end. The National Police are implicated in half
of the cases; victims are usually peasants and workers.
Telephone taps and the interception of mail are normally
allowed only when authorized by a judge.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in .Internal Conflicts
Although there was a decline in reports that military aircraft
and helicopter gunships had bombed and strafed villages, some
local human rights groups continued to charge that civilians
were deliberately targeted. The military responded that
noncombatant civilians were not deliberately fired on and that
any resulting injuries or damage was incidental to combating
guerrillas and narcotraf f ickers . Relatively few casualties
were reported, although these incidents produced significant
numbers of temporarily displaced persons.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These constitutionally assured rights are respected. The press
often vigorously criticizes the Government and its leaders, and
the privately owned print media publish a wide spectrum of
political views.
Television frequencies and facilities are owned by the State,
which leases air time to private production companies. The
Government imposes some restrictions on the coverage of
terrorism, and during a crisis it reserves the right to
prohibit broadcast media from covering certain news events.
During 1991 journalists continued to be a special target of
violence. Julio Daniel Chaparro and Jorge Enrique Torres, a
reporter and a photographer working for the Bogota daily El
Espectador, were murdered on April 24 in the violence-plagued
municipality of Remedies, Antioquia Department, where the two
were working on a story. The crime remains unsolved. On
December 28, El Tiempo reporter Henry Rojas Monje was murdered
in front of his family in Arauca. Two soldiers were arrested
in early January 1992 and charged with the crime.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of peaceful assembly is respected. Public meetings and
demonstrations are normally held without interference.
Permission is rec[uired for demonstrations and is usually
granted, except when the Government concludes that there is
imminent danger to public order. Any organization is free to
associate with international bodies in its field.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for religious freedom, and there is
little religious discrimination in practice. The overwhelming
majority of Colombians are Roman Catholic, and the predominant
position of the Catholic Church is established by a treaty with
the Vatican. The Government permits proselytizing among
Indians as long as the Indians welcome it and are not induced
to adopt changes that endanger their survival on traditional
lands .
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COLOMBIA
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens are free to travel domestically and abroad. In areas
where military operations against guerrillas are under way,
civilians can be required to obtain safe conduct passes from
the military; guerrillas reportedly use similar means to limit
travel in areas under their control. Emigration is
unrestricted and expatriates may, by law, repatriate. The
Government uses accepted United Nations standards to determine
the status of refugees and asylum seekers.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have exercised this right for the past 30 years in
elections that have generally been conducted fairly and
openly. Persons are enfranchised at age 18. Public employees
are forbidden to participate in political campaigns but, except
for military personnel, may vote. There are no restrictions on
the participation of women or minorities in politics. All
parties operate freely without government interference.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government cooperates with investigations by local and
international human rights groups. CINEP is one of the most
respected domestic human rights organizations, and information
compiled by it has been used by private international human
rights organizations. Local human rights groups, universities,
and the Government itself regularly sponsor conferences to
analyze violence and human rights violations. One function of
the presidential Human Rights Adviser and of the newly created
Defender of the People is to assist human rights groups. These
and other government officials maintain close contact with
prominent local human rights groups. The members of these
groups are sometimes the target of violence by rightwing
paramilitary groups or members of the police or military forces.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Article 43 of the new Constitution declares that "men and women
have equal rights and opportunities. Women may not be
subjected to any form of discrimination." Article 40
specifically requires the authorities to "guarantee adequate
and effective participation by women at the decisionmaking
levels of public administration." Long before the
implementation of the new Constitution, however, Colombian
legiolation had guaranteed women extensive rights.
Despite these constitutional guarantees, discrimination against
women still exists. Women are entitled to remuneration equal
to that of men, but this law is more respected by the
Government than the private sector. Reliable statistics
indicate that women earn approximately 66 percent of what men
earn with comparable educational backgrounds. This evaluation
does not include data for women \living outside metropolitan
areas on whom there are no available statistics. Although no
official Labor Department statistics are available, estimates
indicate that while women comprise about 41 percent of the
country's economically active population, men still dominate
top positions in government and industry. Nevertheless,
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COLOMBIA
approximately 40 percent of the university population is
female, and, over the past several years, women have increased
their participation in a variety of professions, particularly
in government. There are active private associations working
for women's rights in the workplace and in public life.
Violence directed against women appears to be common, but a
lack of reliable statistics makes it difficult to gauge its
full extent. A "social welfare organization in Bogota estimates
that only 20 percent of sexual assaults are even reported by
women to authorities. According to Pro Mujer, an organization
that assists female victims, at least five rapes a day are
reported in Colombia. Victims of domestic violence are usually
reluctant to file reports or press charges. The Government,
through the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare, provides
education in domestic relations and personal behavior,
primarily to lower income families. However, domestic violence
is not usually treated as a serious crime in Colombia, and
rapists, even when convicted, generally receive suspended
sentences .
Several million blacks form a large racial minority in
Colombia. They enjoy all the legal rights of other citizens,
but they suffer some discrimination. Indians legally enjoy all
the rights and privileges of full citizenship but also
experience discrimination. Late in 1990 three leaders of the
Arauca tribe were kidnaped while on their way to Bogota to
present constitutional reform proposals to the Government. The
three were subsequently murdered. Two army officers and the
director of Indian affairs for Cesar Department were convicted
of the crime and are awaiting sentencing. Both blacks and
Indians are significantly underrepresented among government and
business leaders. Indians form 1 percent of Colombia's
population. The new Constitution mandates two seats for
Indians in the 102-seat Congress, and, in fact, a third Indian
was elected to an at-large seat in the Congress. Blacks,
although forming 4 percent of Colombia's population, at present
have no representatives in Congress.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of workers to organize unions and strike is
recognized by law. Labor Law 50, enacted in January, provides
for automatic legal recognition of unions that have obtained 25
signatures from a workplace and strengthens the penalties for
interfering with workers' freedom of association. The Labor
Code assures the independence of labor organizations in
determining their internal rules, electing their officials, and
administering their own activities. It also forbids the
dissolution or suppression of trade unions by administrative
fiat. Nearly three-fifths of the country's 880,000 organized
workers belong to the Unitary Workers Central (CUT) . Unions
are free to associate internationally and do so.
Article 56 of the new Constitution extends the right to strike
to nonessential public employees and authorizes the Congress to
enact implem.enting legislation. Before carrying out a legal
strike, unions must negotiate directly with management and
engage in conciliation procedures if no agreement results. By
law, public employees must go to binding arbitration if
conciliation talks fail: in practice, public service unions
decide by membership vote if they choose to arbitrate or not.
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COLOMBIA
Peasant leaders and labor union activists continue to fall
victim to serious human rights abuses. Dozens of teachers have
been assassinated, and former rebel leaders of some
CUT-af filiated unions have been slain by guerrillas opposed to
the peace process.
In its 1991 report, the International Labor Organization's
(ILO) Committee of Experts (COE) commended the improvements
made to the Labor Code in the area of freedom of association,
collective bargaining, and maternity leave. It objected to the
nationality requirement for election to union office and to
other provisions that constitute interference in the internal
administration of trade unions and interference with the right
of unions to further and defend the interest of workers,
including the continuing authority granted the President to
terminate strikes that are believed to harm the national
economy. At its November 1991 session, the ILO Committee of
Freedom of Association (CFA), while recognizing government
efforts to address the deadly violence in Colombia, expressed
deep concern over the Government's failure to protect trade
unionists in the country and to prosecute the perpetrators of
violence directed at trade union leaders. The CFA also
criticized the Government for declaring a national strike
illegal, suspending a union's legal status without due process,
and firing strikers from their jobs.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right of workers to organize and engage in collective
bargaining enjoys constitutional protection. Unions have been
successful in organizing the larger firms and public services,
which include less than 8 percent of Colombia's economically
active population. High unemployment and weak union
organization have limited the bargaining power of workers in
the private sector. Antiunion discrimination or the
obstruction of union association is illegal and enforced by
administrative labor inspections. The new Labor Code increases
the fines for restricting freedom of association. The use of
strikebreakers is legally prohibited.
The revised Labor Code eliminates mandatory mediation in
private labor-management disputes and extends the grace period
from 40 to 60 days before the Government may intervene in an
effort to resolve conflicts. Confederations and federations
are now empowered to assist their affiliates in collective
bargaining. Colombian labor law is applied in the export
processing zones (EPZ), of which there are seven in Colombia.
There is no restriction against union organization in the
EPZ's. Several public employee unions have collective
bargaining agreements in the duty free zones of Barranquilla,
Buenaventura, Cartagena, and Santa Marta. Some EPZ unions
include both government and contract workers. There are no
private unions because all EPZ firms are based on public
investment and, as such, are treated as "official" enterprises.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is legally prohibited, and this
prohibition is respected in practice. The 1991 Constitution
specifically forbids slavery or any treatment of human beings
resembling servitude.
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COLOMBIA
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Constitution makes education compulsory between the ages of
5 and 15, and the law prohibits the employment of children in
most jobs before the age of 14, particularly when such
employment might interfere with schooling. This provision is
respected in larger enterprises and major cities. However, the
extensive informal economy is effectively outside government
control. According to 1991 surveys by the National Statistics
Department, approximately 800,000 children under 15 years of
age work in the informal sector for low pay under poor
conditions with little protection from the Labor Code.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government annually sets a national minimum wage which
serves as an important benchmark for wage bargaining. In
December the National Labor Council, a tripartite advisory
board, failed to reach an agreement between government, labor,
and private sector representatives. The Government
subsequently raised the monthly minimum wage to a level which
fits anti-inflation policies but falls short of providing an
adequate standard of living for a worker and family. Labor
experts estimate that at least half of the work force is paid
the minimum wage or less. Lax enforcement is partly due to the
small number of Labor Ministry inspectors and to fear on the
part of unorganized workers of losing their jobs. The law
provides for a standard workday of 8 hours and a 48-hour
workweek. These standards are enforced by Ministry of Labor
inspectors and judicial labor courts.
Workers' occupational safety and health are extensively
regulated, but many such regulations are difficult to enforce
for workers in the informal sector who are not covered by
social insurance systems. Employees have the right to ask the
Ministry of Labor to intervene in cases of suspected
occupational hazards. Overall enforcement is lax, although the
Government is trying to improve regulatory enforcement and
expand public information programs to create greater awareness
and voluntary compliance with labor and occupational health
norms .
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COSTA RICA
Costa Rica is an established democracy with separate executive,
legislative, and judicial branches and a Supreme Electoral
Tribunal considered to be a fourth branch of government.
Elections for president, two vice-presidents, and 57 deputies
to a unicameral legislative assembly are held every 4 years;
they have been free and fair. Rafael Angel Calderon won the
February 1990 presidential elections, in which approximately 80
percent of eligible voters participated. The president is
constitutionally barred from reelection to the presidency for
life. Members of the Legislative Assembly may be reelected but
only after at least one term out of office.
The 1949 Constitution abolished Costa Rica's standing army.
Law enforcement and citizen protection are shared by the Civil
Guard, the Crime Prevention Unit, and the Antidrug Police in
the Ministry of Public Security; the Rural Guard and the
Directorate of Narcotics and Intelligence in the Ministry of
Government; the Directorate of Intelligence and Security in the
Ministry of the Presidency; and the Judicial Police in the
Supreme Court. The San Jose Metropolitan Police and the
Ministry of Public Works and Transportation's Transit Police
also have limited police functions. Public security forces
generally observe procedural safeguards established by law and
the Constitution and are under effective civilian control.
Export-oriented businesses, both agricultural and light
industrial, lead the Costa Rica economy. Economic growth
slowed during 1991 to a projected 1.5 percent. The right to
own private property is protected by the Constitution, although
there have been delays in recent years in compensating foreign
and Costa Rican owners for properties expropriated for
incorporation into nature protection or Indian reserves. In
the southern border area, squatters' clashes with property
owners, including some who are U.S. citizens, have sometimes
become violent; three houses were burned and one squatter was
killed in May.
Costa Ricans enjoy a wide range of individual rights and
freedoms. There were some reports of mistreatment by police
and many prisoners suffer excessive periods of pretrial
custody. The Costa Rican State, reflecting a society-wide
consensus, is committed to extending effective protection of
basic rights and freedoms to all Costa Ricans.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The Government does not practice, abet, or condone political
killing, and none was reported.
b. Disappearance
There were no known or reported incidents of politically
motivated abductions or secret arrests.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits cruel or degrading treatment and
holds invalid any statement obtained through violence. These
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COSTA RICA
prohibitions are usually respected in practice, but incidents
of police mistreatment are sometimes reported. Prisoners
generally receive humane treatment. Though there have been
occasional charges of mistreatment by prison guards in past
years, no such charges were made by inmates in 1991. These
charges can be taken up with the Special Defense Counsel for
Prison Inmates, which investigates any such accusations.
Serious cases are handled by the office of the Chief Prosecutor
(Ministerio Publico) . Public concern about crowded
penitentiaries and the availability of weapons in prisons is
growing. Occasional rioting is a problem in several large
prisons. The Government has earmarked nearly $1 million to
repair the more rundown prisons, some of which are over 100
years old. Improvements were made to a number of prisons in
1991 .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Judicial warrants are required for arrests, and an arraignment
before a representative of the court must take place within 24
hours of arrest. Article 48 of the Constitution entitles
detained persons to a judicial determination of the legality of
the detention. These rights are generally respected, although
persons charged with major offenses often remain in pretrial
custody for long periods. Approximately 40 percent of those
currently in prison have yet to be tried.
The right to bail is provided for in law and observed in
practice. Bail is sometimes denied to repeat offenders,
however, and is usually denied to foreigners and major drug
offenders on the assumption that they would leave the country
before coming to trial. Generally, detainees are not held
incommunicado. With judicial authorization, however, suspects
may be held for 48 hours after arrest or, under special
circumstances, for up to 10 days. The judiciary is generally
effective in ensuring that legal and constitutional safeguards
are observed.
The Constitution bars exile as punishment.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is independent and assures a fair public trial.
The Supreme Court supervises the work of the lower courts,
known as tribunals ( "tr ibunales" or "juzgados"). Its 24
magistrates are elected by the Legislative Assembly to 8-year
terms. Accused persons may select their own attorneys; access
to counsel is guaranteed and honored in practice. The State
provides legal counsel to those who cannot afford an attorney.
There are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were no reported instances during 1991 of extralegal
invasions of privacy conducted by, or with the knowledge of,
the Government. Judicial warrants are required to search
private homes, and police generally comply.
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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution specifically provides for freedom of speech
and press, which is generally respected in practice. There are
9 private newspapers, 6 private television stations, and 1
public and 79 private radio stations. The media freely
criticize the Government, and there is no evidence of
self-censorship or governmental intimidation.
In May a lower court ordered the seizure of all 2,500 copies of
the first edition of El Caso Chamisse, a book alleging that a
prospective presidential candidate was involved in a 1973
murder of a suspected drug dealer. The order was made
following a libel complaint by the candidate. This led to
accusations of prior censorship by the authors and by many
newspapers. As a result of public pressure, the lower court
reversed itself, and the book was allowed to be distributed a
week later. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court in
June ruled that the 89-year-old press law was
unconstitutional. The law had stipulated that the Supreme
Court was the court of first instance for all slander and libel
cases dealing with journalists, in effect eliminating any right
to appeal. The June decision allows such cases now to be tried
in penal courts (i.e., criminal tribunals).
In 1983 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a U.S.
journalist for violating a 1969 law requiring licensing by the
journalists' guild. A 1985 advisory opinion by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights declared the law
incompatible with the Inter-American Human Rights Convention.
The Arias government (1986-1990) publicly supported the law,
however, and there were two additional convictions, resulting
in suspended prison sentences and fines in 1989. In 1990
unlicensed foreign correspondents in Costa Rica were briefly
harassed by police. The current Calderon Administration has
publicly supported the licensing requirement on the grounds
that it ensures professionalism.
Films, plays, and television shows are regulated by an Office
of Censorship and a Censorship Tribunal, which reviews appeals
of the Office's actions. In 1989 the censor's office banned
the film. The Last Temptation of Christ. An association of law
students brought the case to the Ombudsman for Human Rights,
who overturned the ban in November 1989. The acting Attorney
General rescinded that decision in January 1990. As of the end
of 1991, the case was still pending before the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Court .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Constitutional provisions of freedom of assembly and
association are fully respected. Permits required for parades
or similar large-scale gatherings are granted routinely; they
are not required for other public meetings.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is protected by the Constitution and
generally observed in practice. Roman Catholicism, however, is
the official state religion. Foreign missionaries and clergy
of all denominations work and proselytize freely. Costa Ricans
affiliated with non-Catholic groups note, though, that
non-Catholic churches are required to comply with building
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codes from which Catholic churches are exempt. These groups
are seeking remedial legislation. A group of religion teachers
filed suit before the Supreme Court in July, asking that the
Law on Career Educators be overturned. It stipulates that all
teachers of religion must be approved by the Catholic Church's
episcopal conference.
d. Freedom, of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Though there are no restrictions on travel within the country,
all citizens and residents are required to obtain an exit visa
before traveling abroad. Emigration and right of return are
not restricted, however. Costa Rica supports multinational
refugee programs and has accepted many refugees from Central
and South America. Many Nicaraguan refugees have been
voluntarily repatriated following the April 1990 change of
government in Managua. The Constitution specifically prohibits
repatriation of anyone subject to political persecution.
Political asylum traditionally has been granted to exiled
dissidents of various political orientations.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Costa Ricans choose their government through free, open, and
competitive elections. The integrity of elections is ensured
by the independent Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and election
results are respected. The Legislative Assembly can and does
reject executive branch initiatives. Citizens can and do
petition their elected representatives for legislative redress
and assistance with government bureaucracies.
The ruling Social Christian Unity Party and the opposition
National Liberation Party control 29 and 25 seats,
respectively, in the 57-member Legislative Assembly. The
Communist Party holds one seat. Two independent provincial
parties hold one seat each.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
A 1984 executive order created the office of Ombudsman for
Human Rights, now housed in the Ministry of Justice, which
hears complaints from individuals about human right abuses. A
similar office considers complaints concerning the penitentiary
system.
Three nongovernmental groups monitor and report on human rights
in Costa Rica: the Costa Rican Commission for Human Rights,
the Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Central
America, and the Family and Friends of Political Prisoners of
Costa Rica. There are also numerous private groups dedicated
to assisting refugees.
Costa Rica has traditionally been a strong supporter of
international and private human rights organizations. The
Inter-American Institute of Human Rights maintains its
headquarters in San Jose. The Government has invited the
Inter-American Human Rights Commission to visit the country
whenever it wishes.
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Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Costa Rica's population includes some 24,000 indigenous
people. Most live in traditional communities on 21 reserves
which, in part because of their remote location, often lack
access to schools, health care, electricity, and potable water.
Indigenous people participate in the management of their own
affairs through the National Indian Commission (CONAI).
According to CONAI, about 20 percent of the indigenous people
are undocumented and so lack proof of citizenship. In the
2,000-member Guaymi group, the figure increases to 70 percent.
Lack of documentation prevents voting or running for office and
makes it difficult to obtain credit. The Guaymis publicly
protested their status in 1990. In April 1991, President
Calderon signed a law that will permit 7,000 indigenous people
to obtain identification papers within the next 3 years.
The role of women, although still primarily domestic, is
legally unrestricted. Women and men are generally paid equally
for equal work. A Women's Defense Counsel has been established
to work with various government agencies to protect women's
rights and offer women advice and information on how to fight
sexual discrimination. The press reports on a disturbing rate
of violent crime against women, raising the level of public
awareness of the problem. Physical abuse of women, including
domestic violence, is prosecuted and often results in stringent
penalties. Abuse of female minors is considered aggravated
assault . There are a number of groups that monitor abuse of
women and provide counseling.
Costa Rica's population of 30,000 blacks, who reside largely on
the Caribbean coast, enjoys full rights of citizenship,
including the protection of laws against racial discrimination.
The 1990-1994 Legislative Assembly includes one black member,
as did the last. The Government treats all matters of racial
discrimination as human rights issues; the Defense Counsel for
Human Rights deals with these and other such issues.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers are free to join unions of their choosing without prior
authorization. Approximately 15 percent of the work force is
organized. Unions are independent of government control and
are generally free to form federations and confederations,
exemplified by the merger of three social democratic labor
federations in 1991, and to affiliate internationally.
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) , the ICFTU, and other trade union
organizations, however, have contended that trade unionism's
right of association has been hurt by the "Solidar ismo"
movement in Costa Rica, an alternative to traditional trade
unionism which espouses cooperation between employers and
employees. Solidarista associations are financed in part by
employers and are allowed under Costa Rican law to offer a wide
range of services and engage in profit-making activities, which
unions are not permitted to do. A "permanent workers'
comjtiittee" from an association will often enter into "direct
agreements" with an employer. This sometimes bypasses attempts
by an established union to reach a collective bargaining
agreement. In June the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Committee of Freedom of Association (CFA) concluded that the
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interference of Solidarista associations in trade union
activities, including collective bargaining, is in conflict
with the principle of full independence for workers'
organizations in carrying out their activities. The CFA noted
the Goverrmient ' s agreement to enact legislation to ensure the
real separation of functions between unions and Solidarista
associations .
The law restricts the right of public sector workers to strike
and imposes penalties on those who do. Nevertheless, they
strike with some frequency, and fines imposed are often dropped
as part of a strike settlement. At year's end a bill was
pending before the Legislative Assembly to repeal these
articles. Strikes and labor unrest were at low levels in 1991.
The one major labor action was a 2-day work stoppage held in
June to protest the Government's economic policies. The
stoppage effectively closed down the public schools and all but
the most essential public services.
There are no restrictions per se on the rights of private
workers to organize and strike. The Labor Code contains
clauses, however, that allow employees to be fired for
nonspecific reasons. Some employers have used these provisions
as license to fire workers who seek to strike. Very few
private sectors employees are union members and there were no
private sector strikes of any consequence in 1991.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize is protected by the Constitution; much of
the 1943 Labor Code, however, is outdated. One clause permits
workers to be discharged "at the will of the employer,"
provided the worker is paid the required compensation. This
has often been used to fire labor organizers. Public sector
workers cannot engage in collective bargaining because the
Public Administration Act of 1978 makes labor law inapplicable
in relations between the Government and its employees. The
Government has promised the ILO that it will enact remedial
legislation to protect union organizers, and proposals to
modernize the Labor Code were under consideration in the
Legislative Assembly at year's end. Collective bargaining is
allowed in the private sector but, due to the dearth of unions,
this is more a de jure than de facto right.
Labor regulations in nine export processing zones do not differ
from those in the rest of the economy but often are not
enforced. Lack of resources is cited by the Labor Ministry as
the reason why labor regulations are often not enforced in the
zones .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and
there are no known instances of either.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Constitution provides special employment protection for
women and minors and establishes the minimum working age at 12
years, with special regulations in force for workers under 15.
A child welfare agency, in cooperation with the Labor Ministry,
is responsible for enforcement. Although data is lacking,
child labor appears to be an integral part of the large
informal economy. Enforcement in the formal sector is
reasonably effective.
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e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Constitution provides the right to a minimum wage. A
National Wage Board, composed of three members each from
government, management, and labor, sets wages and salaries for
all sectors. The wages set are minimums. Wages can and do
exceed the set amounts. The Board usually meets at the
beginning and middle of each year. While violations sometimes
occur, these wage and salary levels are generally respected.
The minimum wage rates, which are legally enforceable, were
last set in May and June for the private and public sectors.
Workers at the low end of the wage scales often find it
difficult to maintain a minimum standard of living. A 1990
Ministry of Planning study found that at minimum wage levels,
about 97 percent of a worker's pay was spent on food; this
worsened in 1991.
The Constitution sets the workday hours, remuneration of
overti.Tie, days of rest, and annual vacation rights. It
requires compensation for discharge without due cause. Maximum
work hours are set at 8 hours for daytime and 6 hours for
nighttime work, with weekly totals of 48 and 36 hours,
respectively. Ten-hour days are permitted for work not
considered unhealthful or dangerous, but weekly totals may not
exceed 48 hours. Nonagricultural workers receive an overtime
premium of 50 percent of regular wages for work in excess of
the daily work shift. Agricultural workers are not paid
overtime, however, if they work beyond their normal hours
voluntarily; there is little evidence that employers coerce
such overtime from employees.
A 1967 law governs health and safety at the workplace. This
law requires industrial, agricultural, and commercial firms
with 10 or more workers to establish a management-labor
committee. The law allows the Government to inspect workplaces
and to fine employers for violations. There are too few labor
inspectors, especially outside of San Jose, to ensure that
minimum conditions of safety and sanitation are maintained.
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CUBA
Cuba is a totalitarian state dominated by President Fidel
Castro, who is Chief of State, Head of Government, First
Secretary of the Communist Party, and Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces. President Castro seeks to control nearly all
aspects of Cuban life through a broad network of directorates
ultimately answe,rable to him through the Communist Party, as
well as through the government bureaucracy and the state
security apparatus. The Party is the only legal political
entity and is headed by an elite group whose membership is
ultimately determined by Fidel Castro. All government
positions, including judicial offices, are controlled by the
Party. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a
de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and
professional advancement in most areas.
The Ministry of Interior (MININT) is the principal organ of
state security and totalitarian control. It operates border
and police forces, orchestrates public demonstrations,
determines whether or not to recognize nongovernmental
associations, investigates evidence of nonconformity, regulates
migration, and maintains pervasive vigilance through a series
of mass organizations and informers. The Ministry is under the
de facto control of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) . The
mass organizations attempt to extend government and Communist
Party control over each citizen's daily activities at home,
work, and school. Through neighborhood Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution (CDR), citizens are exhorted to
ensure ideological conformity and to report deviation.
The Cuban economy is highly centralized and managed by
President Castro and a group of close advisers. The Government
controls the means of production and is virtually the country's
sole employer. In 1991 the economy continued to decline,
particularly as a result of the accelerating deterioration in
Cuba's economic relationship with the Soviet Union, its
principal trading partner. President Castro allowed discussion
of minor adjustments to the economy during the Fourth Party
Congress in October but ultimately resisted any significant
change. The Government continues to implement its program of
stringent austerity measures known as "the special period in
peacetime," which emphasizes economic self-sufficiency at the
expense of social programs.
Cuban authorities attempt to neutralize dissent through a
variety of often nonviolent tactics designed to keep activists
off-balance, divided, and discredited by labeling them mentally
disturbed, social misfits, or hostile agents of certain foreign
countries. The Government sharply restricts virtually all the
basic human rights, including freedom of expression,
association, assembly, and movement, as well as the right to
privacy, the right of citizens to change their government, and
worker rights. MININT has among its major functions the
suppression of dissent and opposition of any kind. Just prior
to the Pan-American Games in August and during the Party
Congress in October, Cuban state security engaged in acts of
intimidation against nearly all human rights activists. Twelve
activists were detained for periods of from several hours to
several days. Four were subsequently tried and sentenced to as
long as 3 years on such charges as "contempt," "illegal
association," and "clandestine printing."
In mid-November, Cuban authorities unleashed a wave of
repression that continued through the end of the year against
human rights activists, largely through the use of "acts of
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CUBA
repudiation" — attacks by officially organized mobs that are
portrayed as being spontaneous public rebukes of dissident
activity. Leaders of the opposition umbrella group, the Cuban
Democratic Convergence, were targeted by such attacks after
meeting with a visiting Spanish official. In one instance, a
mob dragged the leader of the dissident group Criterio
Alternative, Maria Elenz Cruz Varela, out of her residence (see
Section 2.b.). She and four other Criterio members were later
sentenced to up to 2 years in prison for "felonious
association" and slander. Detentions of other activists
continued through December 31, including Yndamiro Restano,
leader of the opposition group Harmony Movement (MAR), and
three of its members.
In response to the passage in March of U.N. Human Rights
Commission (UNHRC) Resolution 1991/68, mandating the
establishment of a special representative to report on human
rights violations in Cuba, the Cuban Government said it would
not respect "a single comma" of the resolution. Although Cuba
was reelected to the UNHRC in June, it continued to refuse to
cooperate with the mandate and ignored letters from the special
representative requesting a visit to Cuba.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
In 1991 there were at least six cases of probable extrajudicial
killings by the security forces. A 17-year-old youth, Yoel
Reyes Torres, was killed by a policeman in the town of San
Agustin following an argument. Arnaldo Gonzales was reportedly
shot and killed by Special Brigade Agent Reinaldo Milau in the
city of Holguin. Following an investigation, Milau was
arrested. Heribeito Vega Calzadillo was reportedly
pistol-whipped and then fatally shot in the stomach by MININT
employee Julio Cruz after an argument at a recreation center.
No further information about official investigations of these
cases was available at year's end.
On January 28, the Provincial Military Court of Havana tried
police officer Isaac Guilarte Rodriguez for the fatal shooting
on September 28, 1990, of human rights activist Angel Galvan
Vanegas . According to family members who attended the trial,
only police officers were called to testify, although other
witnesses to the shooting were present. Guilarte was acquitted.
b. Disappearance
There were no credible reports of politically motivated
disappearances in 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits abusive treatment of detainees and
prisoners. However, beatings, neglect, isolation, and other
abuse by prison officials are often directed at those prisoners
who have been convicted of political crimes (including human
rights advocates) or are unwilling to conform. The Government
claims that prisoners have guaranteed rights, such as family
visitation, adequate nutrition, pay for work, the right to
request parole, and the right to present a petition to the
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CUBA
prison administrator. However, these purported rights are
frequently and capriciously withdrawn, particularly in the
cases of political prisoners, according to human rights
activists. There was no indication that Cuban authorities
investigated reports of abuse or took disciplinary action
against security agents responsible for such abuse.
On January 1, 14 prisoners organized themselves at Combinado
del Este Prison, calling themselves "nuevos plantados." The
"nuevos plantados," like the original plantados, refused to
wear prison uniforms and demanded political democracy and
freedom of expression. The authorities initially suspended
medical treatment for the prisoners, then separated the group
by transferring the prisoners to various prisons throughout the
country. During a February 5 visit by his mother, Orlando
Dominquez de la Coba, who has one arm, was handcuffed to a rail
and showed marks of having been beaten. Another "nuevo
plantado," Orlando Azcue Rodriguez, was kicked and beaten with
fists and hoses before being transferred from Pinar del Rio to
a Camaguay prison. Arturo Montane Ruiz and Manuel Pozo Montero
were beaten in the Ceramica Rojo Prison in Camaguay while they
staged a hunger strike over their conditions and treatment.
Reports from the prisoners related through family members
indicated that the "nuevos plantados" were beaten each time
they refused to wear uniforms.
Human rights activists and political dissidents are
systematically harassed and abused in public and private. On
Sunday, June 16, four members of the activist group MAR were
attacked and beaten with fists by 25 plainclothes policemen
after attending a mass with 52 other MAR members at a Catholic
church in the Miramar district of western Havana. On June 25,
MAR leader Yndamiro Restano was accosted and beaten by three
state security officials in plain clothes after he was denied
permission to enter what was considered to be a public trial of
two Cuban doctors charged with plotting to kill Fidel Castro.
Maria Celina Rodriguez, an activist of the Brotherhood for
Christian Rights, reported that after visiting the U.S.
Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy on August 2, she was
followed and verbally abused by five men who were apparently
from state security. As she attempted to gain the attention of
persons in the American Broadcasting Company Television Sports
compound, which was set up for the Pan-American Games, the five
men assaulted her, ripped her clothing, forced her into a car,
and took her and her infant child into custody. She was
released about August 25. She was not charged with any
offense; however, her detention included confinement in a
psychiatric hospital.
Cuban authorities utilized "acts of repudiation" to intimidate
activists and as a pretext for their arrest. Activists were
roughed up, in some cases suffering serious injury, by mobs who
chanted slogans and threw trash and other refuse at their
homes. Several were arrested "for their own protection," then
later charged and sentenced to terms in prison (see Section
2.b.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Article 245 of the Cuban Law of Penal Procedures requires
police to file formal charges and either release a detainee or
place him at the disposition of a prosecutor within 96 hours of
arrest. Authorities are also legally required to provide
suspects with access to a lawyer within 10 days of arrest.
These procedures are routinely denied to those detained on
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state security grounds. Article 61 of the Constitution permits
denial of all constitutionally and legally recognized civil
liberties in the case of anyone actively opposing the "decision
of the Cuban people to build socialism." Cuban authorities
invoke this open-ended article and justify lengthy detentions
of dissidents on the grounds that they constitute
"counterrevolutionary elements. "
Reports of arbitrary arrests of human rights activists
continued unabated, but the incidence of prolonged detention
without trial decreased in 1991. In addition, the Governinent
stepped up efforts to pressure dissidents to disavow activism
or choose between exile or long prison terms. From November
1990 through December 1991, there were over 50 detentions of
activists, a number of them held without charge. Of these,
only about a dozen came to trial. On December 20 and 26, MAR
leader Yndamiro Restano and three of the group's members were
detained. On December 31, the leader of the Humanitarian
Feminine Movement, Bienvenida Cucalo, and three of the group's
members were detained. At year's end, all remained in
detention without being charged.
Cuban authorities often use prolonged detention to prepare
false charges or to preempt meaningful activity by human rights
activists. This occurred in the case of Professor Luis Pita
Santos, who was taken into detention on October 9 after he
called for a demonstration on October 25. The Government also
preempts dissident activity by arbitrarily prolonging prison
sentences by sentencing detainees on new charges for human
rights activities allegedly committed during imprisonment. The
new charges are sometimes not announced until near the end of
the original prison term or shortly after the term ends. For
example, David Moya Alfonso and Samuel Martinez Lara were
forced into exile under threat of having to complete prison
terms that had been prolonged on the basis of new charges
brought against them during previous imprisonment. After years
of international pressure, the Government released the last two
"plantados historicos," a group of prisoners arrested in the
1960 's who refused to wear their prison uniforms or submit to
political indoctrination. Ernesto Diaz Rodriguez was released
on March 23, after 22 years in prison, and was permitted to
emigrate to the United States in April. Mario Chanes de Armas
was released on July 16, after being imprisoned for 30 years,
but at year's end had still not been allowed to emigrate. Also
released during 1991 were political prisoners Hubert Jerez
Marino, head of the Marti Committee for Human Rights, after
serving 18 months in prison for "disseminating false news";
Samuel Martinez Lara, who was freed into conditional liberty
following his trial; Pedro J. Dorta Rodriguez, after serving 11
years of a 15-year sentence; Cecilio Rodriguez Campo, after
serving 8 of 15 years; Juan Martinez Perdono, after serving 4
of 10 years; members of the Democratic Integrationist Movement
(MID) Mario Fernandez Mora and Edgardo LLompart Martinez, after
serving 18 months of 6- and 3-year terms respectively for
"rebellion"; Elizardo Sanchez, head of the Cuban Committee for
Human Rights and National Reconciliation, released into limited
freedom for the remaining 3 months of a 2-year term for
"spreading false news"; and factory worker Orlando Azcue
Rodriguez, after serving 15 months of a 3-year term for
"spreading enemy propaganda," during which he was chained to
the bars of his cell and badly beaten for staging a hunger
strike.
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e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Cuban law and trial practices do not meet international
standards for fair and impartial public trials. Although the
Constitution provides for independent courts, it explicitly
subordinates them to the National Assembly and the Council of
State (Article 122) . Judges are elected by the rubberstamp
National Assembly- and its lower level counterparts. The
independence of the judiciary is compromised by the
subordination of the courts to the Communist Party. There is
no known case in which a Cuban court has successfully ruled
against the Government on any political or security matter.
Civil courts exist at three levels: municipal, provincial, and
the Supreme Court. All civil courts are presided over by
panels composed of a mixture of professionally qualified judges
and lay judges. There is also a system of military tribunals
which assume jurisdiction for certain "counterrevolutionary
activity" cases. Most trials are held in public; however,
closed trials are held when state security is involved.
Testimony from a member of a CDR may be introduced on behalf of
a defendant and may contribute to either a reduced or a longer
sentence. The law recognizes the right of appeal in municipal
courts. In provincial courts, some cases are appealable and
others are not. Cases involving maximum prison terms or the
death penalty are open to appeal. The Law of Penal Procedure
provides that an appeal must be presented within 5 days of the
verdict .
Criteria for evidence presented in Cuban courts, particularly
in the cases of human rights activists, are arbitrary and
discriminatory. The sole evidence provided in many cases,
particularly with regard to those with political significance,
is the defendant's confession. The confession is usually
obtained under duress and without legal advice or the knowledge
of the defense lawyer. Defense lawyers often are not allowed
to meet with the defendants until the day of the trial. This
practice is so common that when an exception was made in the
case of activist Elizardo Sanchez, the authorities flaunted the
fact and advised family members that they should be grateful
for the consideration. Several other activists who have served
prison terms stated that they were tried and sentenced without
defense counsel and were not permitted to speak on their own
behalf.
Cuban law provides an accused the right to a defense attorney,
but the latter 's impartiality and independence are compromised
by the absence of a private bar association and by ideological
controls exerted over members of the state-controlled lawyers'
collectives, especially in defending persons accused of crimes
against state security. Observers have noted a reluctance
among attorneys to defend persons charged with political
offenses. Lawyers are discouraged from taking political cases
because of the persecution suffered by those who have done so
in the past. Former political prisoners have alleged that
state security officials apply pressure on all persons involved
in the judicial process, and that those officials, not the
courts, really decide the fate of the detainee. Foreign
observers at trials of human rights activists report that the
behavior of defense lawyers and judges indicates that decisions
on guilt and sentencing are not made at the trials but
beforehand, though sentences can be changed in court, depending
on the defendant's cooperation during proceedings.
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CUBA
In 1991 the Government continued to use the judicial system to
discredit human rights activists by publicly associating them
with certain foreign governments or with violent activities.
At the trial of activist Samuel Martinez Lara, the Government
accused him of attempting the violent overthrow of the Cuban
Government and tried to link him with foreign diplomats who
were mentioned by name. Virtually every prosecution witness
was either an acknowledged employee of the state security
organization or a government informer. Trial observers
concluded that the testimony used to convict Martinez was
probably fabricated. In addition, the prosecutor verbally
abused and intimidated selected witnesses without restraint by
the presiding judge. Martinez was found guilty even though
there was no concrete information to substantiate the charge of
"rebellion" or plotting to overthrow the Government.
Foreign observers, including media representatives, were unable
to attend the November 25 trial and December 4 appeal of Maria
Elena Cruz Varela, leader of the dissident group Criterio
Alternative (CA), and other CA members who were charged with
"felonious association" and slander after she arranged a
meeting between dissidents and a visiting foreign dignitary.
Court officials said there was no room for such outsiders. The
courtroom was filled with construction workers and CDR members
who, during the proceedings, conducted "acts of repudiation"
against the defendants. Cruz was sentenced to 2 years; the
other four defendants received similar terms.
The Penal Code includes a concept of "dangerousness" (articles
72-89), defined as "the special proclivity of a person to
commit crimes, demonstrated by his conduct in manifest
contradiction of Socialist norms." In 1991 there were reliable
reports that authorities continued to intimidate activists and
dissidents by threatening them with prosecution under this
article. If the police decide that a person is exhibiting such
behavior, the offender may be brought before a court which may
call for therapy or political reeducation lasting from 1 to 4
years .
According to reliable human rights monitors, there were
approximately 200 political prisoners and detainees in Cuba at
year ' s end .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Official intrusion into private and family affairs remains one
of the most repressive and pervasive features of life in Cuba.
Government- or Communist Party-directed mass organizations
permeate Cuban society. The State has assumed a virtual right
of interference into the lives of its citizens, even those who
do not actively oppose the Government and its practices. These
intrusions are calculated to encourage ideological conformity
and aim ostensibly at "improvement" of the citizenry.
Government authorities possess a wide range of social
controls. The educational system teaches that the State's
interests have precedence over all other ties and commitments.
Teachers, selected in part for their ideological commitment,
emphasize Communist Party doctrine in the classroom and can
sanction students whose families question orthodox opinion.
Teachers also evaluate the political and ideological character
of their students, which is noted in records carried with each
student throughout his or her education. Failure to join a
party-controlled student group or otherwise not having an
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CUBA
acceptable record may result in denial of student or worker
access to higher education, a choice of career, or improved
employment prospects.
MININT employs an extensive security apparatus to determine the
legality of all private and public associations, utilizing an
intricate system of informers, block wardens, and block
committees (CDR) to monitor and control public opinion. The
guardians of social conformity, CDR's are neighborhood
surveillance/security committees tasked with closely monitoring
the daily lives of individual residents. Participation in
Cuba's 80,000 CDR's is described as voluntary; however, in
urban areas it is in fact involuntary. CDR's report suspicious
activities, such as contact with foreigners, reception of
foreign radio or television broadcasts in the home, conspicuous
consumption, unauthorized meetings, and attitudes toward the
Government and the Revolution.
In 1991, in response to growing dissatisfaction of Cubans over
the deteriorating economic situation in the country and the
Government's policies to deal with it, CDR activity intensified
as the Government heightened its campaign against
"counterrevolutionaries." In early summer, the Government
established so-called rapid reaction brigades, authorized to
act to thwart even impulsive signs of dissent that might occur
during the Pan American Games. Members are drawn from MININT
and CDR's. A large portion of the members are women and young
people trained in martial arts, who appear to be local citizens
responding against dissident activity. Members are
"voluntarily" bused from workplaces on an emergency basis to
deal with any popular discontent. These brigades were used
against activists during a demonstration attempted near the
Villa Marista Detention Center on September 6.
Cubans have no right to receive publications from abroad and
expect that all correspondence with foreign countries will be
read by state security officials. Overseas telephone calls are
monitored, and conversations to and from foreigners in
embassies and public places are reported. Well-known activists
report frequent physical surveillance by security agents, as do
foreign diplomats and journalists. In one case, state security
personnel took over a garage across the street from the
residence of one activist and installed video equipment to
monitor activities in and around his home. The authorities
regularly search activists' homes for little purpose other than
intimidation. On June 30, authorities searched the home of MAR
leader Yndamiro Restano, detained him without charge, then
freed him some 24 hours later. On July 25, an activist was
visited by state security police who showed him a doctored
photograph of him dressed in the uniform of a MININT official
and told him that they could cause him "family problems,"
presumably by using the doctored photograph to make family
members distrust him. Activists report that the use of tactics
to divide family members is a new stratagem by the authorities.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms are widely restricted. The Government does not .
allow direct criticism of the Revolution or its leaders; laws
are enforced against antigovernment propaganda, antigovernment
graffitti, and slander or insults against government
officials. Local CDR's inhibit freedom of speech by monitoring
and reporting on dissent or criticism (see Section l.f.).
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CUBA
The electronic and print media are owned by the State or
party-controlled organizations and operate according to party
guidelines. Cuban media faithfully reflect government views on
events and are used to indoctrinate the public. No public
forum exists for airing one's views apart from the
government-controlled media. Artistic and literary freedoms
are circumscribed by government control. Party and government
officials carefully scrutinize humor and irony in the arts.
Academic freedom is also severely limited. Education is the
exclusive prerogative of the State, and the school system
follows Marxist-Leninist precepts as interpreted by government
guidelines. Academics may write freely so long as their work
does not conflict with any government or Communist Party policy.
In June the Government responded to an appeal by 10
intellectuals for political reform by removing them from their
jobs and expelling them from the National Union of Writers and
Artists, which issued a statement that labeled them agents of a
foreign government. The Government also campaigned to
discredit the signatories and then moved to exercise greater
control over the Union. A new union leadership was installed,
with the new president subsequently named to the Politburo of
the Cuban Communist Party.
On October 7, a number of human rights activists held a joint
press conference in Havana to present suggestions for the
Fourth Party Congress that began on October 10. At least two
Spanish journalists and one Polish journalist — who, along with
more than 40 other journalists, attended the press
conference — were subsequently expelled from Cuba. On September
6, two journalists attempting to observe a demonstration by
activists were roughed up by "rapid action brigades" as the
journalists attempted to leave the area.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution does not provide for freedom of assembly or
association, and those freedoms are not permitted. Any
assembly of more than 3 persons, even in a private home, is
punishable by up to 3 months in prison and a fine. According
to article 240 of the Penal Code, organizers of "illicit or
unrecognized groups" may receive a sentence of up to 9 months.
There was no known instance in 1991 of authorities approving a
public meeting of a human rights group. Human rights groups
are not recognized by the Government.
Article 208 of the Penal Code forbids the existence of "illegal
or unrecognized groups." The Ministry of Justice, in
consultation with MININT, determines whether to recognize
organizations. Apart from "recognized" churches and one or two
carefully monitored groups such as the Masonic Order, small
human rights groups represent the only associations outside the
State and the Party. Authorities continued to ignore
applications for legal recognition by the Cuban Committee for
Human Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN) and the Cuban
Committee for Human Rights (CCPDH) . The charge of "illegal
association" is often used by Cuban authorities to harass,
intimidate, and jail activists. At least 16 dissidents have
been convicted on these charges; these charges remain pending
against 12 others, so that the authorities are able to jail
them at any time.
"Acts of repudiation," which are officially sponsored mob
gatherings outside the home of a suspected counterrevolutionary
to shout insults and paint condemnatory slogans, took place
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CUBA
against several political activists, including Osvaldo Paya
Sardinas, head of the ChristianOOOOement Liberation, which had
been gathering signatures in favor of a referendum to reform
the Cuban Constitution; Jose Luis Pujol, founder of the
Alternative Criteria movement; and Gonzalez Gonzalez of the
CCPDH. On November 19, Maria Elena Cruz Varela, the leader of
Alternative Criteria who had set up a meeting of dissidents
with a visiting foreign official, was forcibly removed from her
home by a government-organized crowd of 200. She was beaten
and dragged downstairs from her fourth floor apartment, which
was ransacked. The attackers stuffed CA treatises in her mouth
in an attempt to force her to eat them. Other "acts of
repudiation" took place at the homes of CA members Jose Luis
Pujol, Pastor Herrera Macuran, Gabriel Aguado Chavez, Elviro
Baro, Eliezer Aguilar, Hubert Matos Sanchez, Fernando Velazquez
and Jorge Pomar, who suffered a fractured nose and ribs and
whose wife was beaten. Several of these persons were later
tried and sentenced to terms of up to 2 years in prison for
"felonious association" and slander. On November 22, some 200
people hurled eggs, stones, and insults at the home of Elizardo
Sanchez, leader of the Cuban Democratic Convergence. The "act
of repudiation" started shortly after Sanchez and his brother
were detained by police and warned to desist from further
dissident activity. The two were released at night and forced
to return home through the crowd, which roughed them up as they
returned to their residence. In the same period, other "acts
of repudation" took place at the homes of Osvaldo Paya, leader
of the Christian movement Liberation, and Vladimir Garcia
Alderete, of the Association for Free Art.
Most meetings among activists are monitored closely, and when
the authorities interpret an agenda to include criticism of the
Government or the political leadership, they take preemptive
action to prevent the gathering, often invoking legal
prohibitions on peaceful assembly. This occurred twice in
June, the first time when human rights activists attempted to
form a coalition group, and then when a group of activists
attended a Sunday mass to publicize human rights issues.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution recognizes the rights of citizens to profess
and practice any religious belief. However, the Government has
placed severe restrictions on the practice of religion and
discriminated against believers. Religious adherents are
excluded from membership in the Communist Party and thus from
almost all executive and leadership positions, including posts
in the Government, the courts, and the teaching profession.
Those who publicly profess their religious beliefs are subject
to informal discrimination in the workplace and through social
pressures on their children at school. The Fourth Party
Congress debated and approved the admission of religious
adherents to the Communist Party. While this new policy
recommendation is likely to have a positive effect on the lives
of Protestant adherents, it will not necessarily affect the
current Catholic Church-State relationship. On December 1, the
Catholic Bishops Episcopal Conference issued a statement which
concluded that religious believers could not in good faith join
the Cuban Communist Party because it is an "atheist and
materialist" party.
The Government and the Communist Party continue to maintain
restrictions and controls on the activities of organized
churches. Churches and other religious groups still must
register with the Government and be officially "recognized."
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CUBA
Authorized religious organizations are customarily permitted to
hold religious activities only at specifically designated
places of worship. Many Catholic and Protestant churches have
closed, and new construction of church facilities has been
restricted since the Revolution.
All Jehovah's Witnesses suffer discrimination for failing to
participate actively in the Revolution. However, the level of
oppression exercised against Witnesses has varied from tacit
toleration to virtual suppression of the practice of the faith,
depending on the time and place. Many Witnesses have been
imprisoned or fined for religious activities. With few
exceptions, Jehovah's Witnesses find it impossible to attend
school beyond the ninth grade, and are given menial low-paying
jobs. Witnesses are constantly watched by CDR's and often
harassed. They are detained by police for questioning, and
their homes are subject to police raids, normally, but not
always, carried out with a search warrant.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no legal restrictions on domestic travel. All Cubans
require permission from the Government to depart and remain
abroad. During 1991 the general age limit for foreign travel
was lowered from 45 for men and 40 for women to 20 for both
sexes .
In 1991 the Government permitted several thousand persons,
including hundreds of former political prisoners, to leave the
country permanently. It also granted exit permits to several
emigrants who had been consistently refused in the past,
including Alexander Menendez and Lisette Vazquez, children of
Cuban sports figures who had defected. The Government
continued to delay or deny, without explanation, exit permits
to some persons or their immediate families who had been
accepted into immigration or refugee programs, or are dual
nationals, a status which Cuba does not recognize. These often
include relatives of asylees, such as Nydia Cartaya and her
four daughters, or professionals who are forbidden to work in
their fields because they tried to emigrate but are nonetheless
refused exit permission.
It is a crime for Cubans to depart the country without official
permission. Persons who attempt to leave by boat face fines or
prison sentences ranging from 6 months to 1 year. In 1991
discrimination against intending legal emigrants continued. A
number of complex regulations affecting the ability to work and
receive social benefits apply specifically to intending
emigrants. Once emigration formalities are completed, all
family posessions revert to the State unless relatives can
prove ownership to the authorities' satisfaction.
There is no right of repatriation. Exit permits for
unofficial, temporary travel specify that the person must
return to Cuba within 30 days, although extensions may be
obtained. Cuban emigrants must apply for permission to return
for temporary visits. Cubans who left the island prior to 1959
are usually permitted to return for temporary visits. There is
an annual limit of 10,000, however, on the number of Cuban
emigrants who, having left the island between 1960 and 1980,
are permitted to return for temporary visits. Cubans who left
the island after 1980 are generally not permitted to return to
visit .
563
CUBA
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Cuban citizens have no legal right to seek to change their
government or to advocate such change. The only political
organization allowed in Cuba is the Communist Party. Members
of the highest governing bodies, the Politburo and the Central
Committee, are selected by a small group of party leaders.
President Castro ignored calls for democratic reform and
labeled the human rights activists who proposed them "worms"
and traitors working to undermine the Cuban Revolution. Any
change judged not to be within the Revolution is rejected, as
are proposals by Cubans who seek nonviolent political change or
open debate about the Cuban political system. The Government
has retaliated against those who have sought to change the
Government or its policies. Activist Samuel Martinez Lara was
tried and charged with rebellion or attempting to change the
Government by force. Although Martinez Lara stressed the
nonviolent nature of his group's desire to see change, the
prosecutor refused to recognize the distinction between
peaceful and violent change.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Domestic human rights monitors are subject to varying degrees
and forms of intimidation. The Government continued to refuse,
in violation of its own statutes, to consider applications for
legal recognition submitted by several human rights groups in
1991. The three principal domestic human rights monitoring
groups are: the Cuban Human Rights Committee (CCPDH) , the
Cuban Pro-Human Rights Party (PPDHC), and the Cuban Commission
for Human Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN) . In
September two umbrella organizations, the Cuban Democratic
Convergence and the Cuban Democratic Coalition, were
formed — each by the fusion of a number of smaller human rights
groups .
The Government angrily rejects criticism of the human rights
situation in Cuba. The Cuban reaction to the passage in March
of a United Nations Human Rights Commission resolution
mandating the naming of a special representative to investigate
the human rights situation in Cuba was to state that Cuba would
not comply with "a single comma" of the resolution. In July,
when U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar named Rafael Rivas
Posada to be the special envoy, the Cuban representative to the
United Nations stated that Cuba did not recognize the UNHRC
mandate on Cuba and would not cooperate with the special
representative, despite the fact that Cuba is a UNHRC member.
At year's end, Cuba maintained its refusal to cooperate with
the mandate and had ignored requests by the special
representative for a visit to Cuba to meet with the Cuban
Government and people.
No domestic or international human rights groups are recognized
by the Government or permitted to function legally in the
country. Visits by the International Committee of the Red
Cross, suspended in June 1990, were not reinstated in 1991. In
1991, however, representatives of a few foreign nongovernmental
human rights organizations were able to make unofficial visits
to Cuba.
50-726 - 92 - 19
564
CUBA
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Cuba is a multiracial society with a majority population of
persons with black and mixed racial ancestry. The Constitution
expressly forbids discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or
national origin, but evidence suggests that some racial and
sexual discrimination does occur.
The Family Code of 1975 states that women and men have equal
rights and responsibilities regarding marriage, divorce,
raising children, maintaining the household, and pursuing a
career. The Maternity Law for Working Women of 1974 provides
18 weeks of paid maternity leave, and working women are granted
preferential access to goods and services. Approximately 39
percent of Cuban women work, and they are well represented in
the professions, although few are in positions of significant
policy responsiblity .
Cuban law establishes strict penalties, including the death
penalty, for rape. The Penal Code also provides sanctions for
sexual coercion of women by authorities or guardians. These
statutes appear to be generally enforced. Anecdotal
information from human rights groups and other sources
indicates that domestic violence and sexual assaults occur, but
lack of statistical data makes it difficult to gauge its
extent. Violent crime is rarely reported in the press. Due to
cultural traditions, victims of mistreatment are reluctant to
file reports or press charges, so instances are likely under
reported.
Information about specific incidents of racial discrimination
is not available. In general, blacks tend to be concentrated
in low-paying and low-status jobs; there are few in senior
government circles and in the top military ranks.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution gives priority to state or collective needs
over individual choices regarding matters involving free
association or provision of employment; the decisions and
choices of workers are subordinate to the "demands of the
economy and society" (article 44). Strikes are not permitted
under the law, nor are any industrial actions known to have
occurred in 1991 which were treated as strikes. However, there
were reports of work stoppages in April by dockworkers in
Cienfuegos who refused to load export foodstuffs which they
believed should be kept for domestic consumption. Established
Cuban labor organizations are not trade unions in any real
sense and do not act as a voice for worker rights, including
the right to strike. Labor is organized under the control of
the State and Party through one umbrella group, the
Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) . The CTC is affiliated
with the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions
and plays a leading role in its regional organization, the
Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Latin America. The
CTC serves primarily as an instrument of the State to enforce
political and labor discipline, to encourage productivity and
extended hours of "voluntary" labor, to hold down labor costs,
and to conserve raw materials. However, some CTC member labor
organizations have served as debating forums for the
consideration of a limited range of labor issuer, such as
worker safety and local working conditions.
565
CUBA
Independent unions are explicitly prohibited. Even discussion
of such a step has been subject to punishment. In July local
dockworkers in Havana elected a union representative who had
not been handpicked by the Party leadership. He was
immediately fired and expelled from the CTC. In October he and
several others announced the formation of an independent union,
the General Union of Cuban Workers. A municipal court ordered
the others fired -shortly thereafter. At year's end, the
Government had not responded to the fledgling union's petition
for formal recognition, but neither had it taken any other
action against the group.
In 1991 the ILO accepted for the first time a complaint
alleging multiple worker rights violations in Cuba.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Effective collective bargaining does not exist. The State
Committee for Work and Social Security sets wages and salaries
for the state sector. There are no known export processing
zones in Cuba. Because the CTC is a government instrument,
antiunion discrimination is only a relevant concept as it
applies to the Government's repression of attempts to form
independent union groups .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Neither the Constitution nor the Labor Code contains
prohibitions against forced labor. Workers do not have freedom
to change jobs without official approval. Every worker must
present a work identification card when seeking a new job.
This card contains information on performance of "voluntary"
work, protection of Socialist property, political
consciousness, failure to meet production goals, and
negligence. In practice, any job change remains under the
control of the authorities who grade and evaluate employee
records that form the basis of the work identity cards.
Special groups of workers, known as "microbrigades, " on loan
from other jobs, are employed on special construction projects
and have taken on increased importance in the Government's
efforts to complete tourist and other facilities that were
given priority attention, such as the Pan American Games
facilities. Some human rights monitors allege that workers
refusing to "volunteer" for such projects often find themselves
victims of discrimination or even at risk of losing their
jobs. Microbrigade workers, however, are reportedly rewarded
with priority listing for apartments, a very powerful incentive
for voluntary work.
Various International Labor Organization (ILO) bodies have
found for a number of years that governmental restrictions on
the freedom to choose or change employment are incompatible
with ILO conventions prohibiting forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum working age is 17; however, the Labor Code
provides for exceptions for those aged 15 and 16 to allow them
to obtain training or to fill labor shortages. There is no
evidence that authorities deviated from these rules in 1991.
However, all students above the age of 11 are expected to
devote 30 to 45 days of their summer vacations to agricultural
work up to a maximum of 8 hours per day. The "voluntary labor"
of student brigades continues to be utilized extensively in the
agricultural sector.
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CUBA
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Cuba's minimum wage is supplemented by social security
consisting of free medical care and education, along with
subsidized housing and food. However, even with these
subsidies, a worker needs to earn substantially more than the
minimum wage to support a family. Also, many common
commodities increasingly can only be obtained on the black
market economy or at prices substantially higher than the
official government-listed price. The value of social security
in improving living standards has been significantly eroded by
the chronic shortages and tight rationing that are standard
features of the Cuban economy. For example, most newly married
couples must live with relatives for several years before
obtaining housing.
The standard workweek is 44 hours, with shorter workdays for
unusually demanding jobs such as underground mining. The
Government has discontinued most routine work on alternate
Saturdays as an energy-saving measure. Provisions for worker
safety and control of pollution generally appear to be
inadequate. There is a lack of effective control and
enforcement mechanisms to ensure worker safety, and industrial
accidents are apparently frequent.
567
DOMINICA
Independent since 1978, Dominica is a parliamentary democracy
and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Prime Minister
Eugenia Charles' Dominica Freedom Party, in office since 1980,
was reelected in 1985 and again in 1990 in free and fair
elections .
The Defense Farce was disbanded in 1981 following two violent
coup attempts. Since then the police have been the only
security force. The Commissioner of Police supervises the
Special Services Unit (SSU), a sm.all, paramilitary unit which
was established in 1983 and which has been incorporated into
the Regional Security System of the Eastern Caribbean States,
and oversees a marine unit which functions as a coast guard.
The police are controlled by and responsive to the
democratically elected Government.
Dominica's primarily agrarian economy is surviving on high
earnings from banana exports to the United Kingdom under a
generous quota, a situation which may change after the European
Community's further integration in 1992. The Government is
attempting to diversify agricultural production and is
promoting exports of raw fruits, vegetables, and coconut
products both within and outside the region. In addition,
Dominica has begun to develop its tourist industry by
advertising its unique natural attractions, with limited
success to date. Dominica's mountainous terrain and periodic
devastation by hurricanes have caused it to remain one of the
least developed nations in the Eastern Caribbean. Several
small industrial plants are operating, but unemployment and
underemployment remain serious problems. Per capita gross
domestic product at current prices was estimated at $2,102 in
1990.
Human rights continued to be respected in 1991, although there
were credible allegations of prisoner mistreatment by police.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or other extrajudicial
killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances or politically
motivated abductions.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture or other forms of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, and there were
no reports of such practices. However, in recent years there
have been recurring credible allegations of harsh treatment by
law enforcement officials of prisoners during incarceration.
568
DOMINICA
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Dominican law requires that persons arrested or detained be
charged with a crime within 24 hours or be released from
custody, and this is normally honored in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Dominican law provides for public trial before an independent,
impartial court. Criminal defendants are presumed innocent
until proven guilty, are allowed legal counsel, and have the
right of appeal. Indigents are provided free legal counsel
only in capital cases.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary entry, search, and
seizure. Search warrants are required by law. There were no
reports in 1991 of arbitrary government intrusions into the
private lives of individuals.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The right of free expression is provided for by the
Constitution and adhered to in practice. The political
opposition openly criticizes the Government. Dominica's main
radio station is state owned, and the other two stations
confine their broadcasts to religious programming. However,
Dominicans enjoy good access to independent news sources
through cable television and radio reception from neighboring
islands. The sole newspaper was founded by the Catholic
Church. During 1990 the Church divested its interest in the
newpaper ending an 81-year involvement as the company's
principal shareholder. The editorial stance of the newspaper
remains progovernment , but opposition viewpoints are
prominently reported. Political parties publish their own
"journals," and the opposition United Workers' Party (UWP)
prints a weekly newsletter. In 1985 the Government
discontinued live radio broadcasts of parliamentary sessions on
its station and now tapes the debates for editing and later use
on a regular program. The opposition party refused to engage
in parliamentary debate for 18 months after live coverage
ended, but now actively participates again. The Dominica Labor
Party complains that the live broadcast ban, which continued in
1991, is a form of censorship.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government respects the constitutionally mandated freedoms
of association and assembly and does not hinder opposition
groups from holding political meetings or public
demonstrations. Such meetings and gatherings were held
frequently throughout the year.
c. Freedom of Religion
Roman Catholicism is the predominant faith in Dominica, and
there are various Protestant denominations. There are also
small Muslim and Rastafarian communities. One Rastafarian
spokesman complained in May that non-Dominican Rastafarians are
banned from entering the country, contrary to the passport and
immigration ordinance. In addition, the same spokesman charged
569
DOMINICA
that authorities in Dominica cut off the "dreadlocks"
(hairstyle) of Rastafarians sent to prison, decrying this as a
violation of religious rights. There have been no other
complaints of discrimination on the basis of religious faith or
practice, and outside religious groups are not restricted in
their activities in Dominica.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
These rights are provided for by law and respected in
practice. The Government can revoke passports if subversion is
suspected but has not done so in recent times.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Independent since 1978, Dominica has a much longer tradition of
democracy and home rule. Power is exercised by a Cabinet
appointed by the Prime Minister. Elections in 1980, 1985, and
1990 were free and fair. The 1990 elections were contested by
the incumbent Dominica Freedom Party, the opposition Dominica
Labor Party (DLP) , and the opposition United Workers Party
(UWP) . The Freedom Party won 11 of the 21 parliamentary seats,
the UWP 6 and the DLP 4. In December 1990, the opposition
tabled a vote of no confidence in Parliament, and in April 1991
Prime Minister Charles defeated it by a one-vote margin.
Elections are by secret ballot and are held every 5 years or
earlier, at the discretion of the Prime Minister.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no government restrictions on the formation of local
human rights organizations, although no such groups exist at
present. There were no requests for investigations of human
rights abuses from international human rights groups during
1991.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There are constitutional provisions, respected in practice,
against racial or sexual discrimination in Dominica. Religious
practice is not restricted, nor is it the basis for
discrimination. Labor laws specify equal pay for equal work.
According to officials of the Government's Ministry of
Community Development, general assault against women is not
widespread. While cases of rape and sexual assault do occur,
both the police and the courts prosecute violators. There are
no specific laws dealing with domestic violence, but the
Government is aware of the problem and is investigating its
effect on society. The Ministry of Community Development began
a series of seminars on domestic violence in 1990, and in 1991
the Government conducted a research project on the subject of
violence against women, but the results had not been made
public by year's end. Public awareness has been heightened
concerning violence against women and children. Under the law,
victims may report sexual and other violent abuse to the
Welfare Department or to the police. While there is no shelter
for battered women, the Welfare Department often provides
assistance to victims of wife beating and child abuse by
finding them temporary shelter, providing counseling to both
570
DOMINICA
parties, or recommending police action. The Welfare Department
reports all cases of abuse to the police. The police, however,
are often reluctant to interfere in domestic quarrels.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the legal right to organize, to choose their
representatives, and to strike. Only slightly over 10 percent
of the work force is organized. Although there were virtually
no strikes in 1991, there were occasional demonstrations by
police and other civil servants in connection with ongoing
salary negotiations and with the proposed Public Service Act of
1991, which became law in November. Among other provisions,
the bill sets a limit on the period for wage negotiations. In
the past civil servants have traditionally received large back
pay awards after marathon negotiations.
There is no restriction on forming a national labor federation,
and several of the major unions have joined together to form an
umbrella grouping, called the "Joint Unions Steering
Committee." All the unions are independent of the Government
and political parties and are affiliated with various
international trade union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions have legally defined rights to organize workers and to
bargain with employers. Collective bargaining is widespread in
the nonagricultural sectors of the economy, including the
government service, and there is also recourse to mediation and
arbitration by the Government.
Antiunion discrimination by employers is prohibited by law, and
union rights are enforced by judicial and police authority.
Enforcement mechanisms are the responsibility of the Department
of Labor, whose inspectors operate under the supervision of the
Labor Commissioner. However, the small Labor Inspection Office
lacks qualified personnel to carry out its duties under
existing labor legislation.
Labor regulations and practice governing Dominica's three
industrial estates (free trade zones) and its other export
firms located outside the estates do not differ markedly from
that prevailing in the rest of the economy. About half of the
country's export firms have been organized by trade unions.
However, it is not legally compulsory for employers to
recognize legally constituted unions as bargaining agents.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited and does not exist in
Dominica.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum legal age for employment is 15 years. In practice,
employers generally observe this law without government
enforcement .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wages for various categories of workers are set by
statute, and were last revised in November 1989. The minimum
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wage rate for most categories of workers is not sufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for a household. However,
most workers earn more than the legislated minimum wage. The
standard legal workweek is 40 hours in 5 days. The law
provides for a minimum of 2 weeks' paid vacation. The
Employment Safety Act, an occupational health and safety law,
is considered to be consistent with international standards.
The Advisory Committee on Safety and Health, which it
established, however, has never met. The enforcement mechanism
consists of inspections by the Department of Labor, which can
and does prescribe specific compliance measures, impose fines,
and prosecute offenders, but, in practice, inspections are
rarely made.
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The Dominican Republic is a constitutional democracy with a
popularly elected president and a bicameral congress. In
practice, the system heavily favors the executive branch. The
Supreme Court heads an independent judiciary whose members are
appointed by the Senate. Political parties representing the
ideological spectrum from left to right freely participate in
elections. President Joaquin Balaguer was inaugurated for a
new 4-year term in August 1990.
The National Police (PN), the National Department of
Investigation (DNI), and the military serve as the security
services. The PN has general investigative and principal
arrest authority. The military has investigative and general
arrest authority for armed forces personnel and may arrest
suspects apprehended by military patrols. The armed forces may
be used to back up the PN. The DNI is the principal national
investigative body for national security concerns and does not
have arrest authority. The National Drug Control Directorate
(DNCD), formed in 1988, coordinates domestic and international
narcotics programs and brings under a single authority elements
of the PN, military, and DNI. All security services are under
control of the Government and are generally responsive to
civilian authority, but some members of these organizations
were responsible for human rights abuses (see below).
Major sectors of the diverse Dominican economy include
agriculture, fishing, construction, housing, commerce, and
manufacturing. State-owned firms are heavily involved in the
economy, especially the State Sugar Council (CEA), the Dominican
Electricity Corporation (CDE) , and the Consortium of State
Enterprises (CORDE) . Tourism is the largest earner of foreign
exchange, and exports from the free trade zones exceed those of
the rest of the country. The volume of traditional exports,
such as sugar and ferronickel, remains significant but is not
expanding. Real gross domestic product was expected to fall 2
to 5 percent in 1991; the country has a $4.5-billion foreign
debt. The rate of inflation dropped from 101 percent in 1990
to a single digit figure in 1991.
Principal human rights problems in 1991 were incidents of
illegal detention and mistreatment of civilian suspects by
police, the poor treatment of Haitian migrant workers, the
sweeping repatriation of Haitian workers, an antiquated
promanagement Labor Code, and antiunion discrimination in free
trade zones, as well as police sweeps that sometimes targeted
labor activists to discourage general strikes.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There was one known case of political killing in 1991. In
mid-February, police shot political activist Pedro Rafael
Almanzar in the city of Salcedo, reportedly while he was
leading protests against inadequate utility services. He died
of the wounds on March 30, sparking 2 days of protest strikes
and disturbances. The police reported that the policeman
accused of shooting Almanzar escaped from custody on March 9,
further contributing to public anger. He was still claimed to
be missing at year's end.
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There were several incidents of nonpolitical extrajudical
killings by police or military personnel, including one
incident of a civilian killed by a drunken policeman and
another involving a soldier's attempt to extort money. In
September the military handed over to civilian authorities an
officer and four enlisted men involved in the August 27
shooting of a civilian who was breaking forestry protection
laws. In a sejiarate incident, three forestry personnel (a
civilian and two army enlisted men) were arrested in September
for allegedly killing a farmer in Duveaux. A police officer
and a member of the army attached to the DNCD were cashiered
and placed at the disposition of civilian courts for their part
in the March death of a drug suspect in Barahona. During the
July 9-11 general strike, a young man said to be suffering from
tuberculosis died apparently after his condition was aggravated
by exposure to police tear gas, and another youth was killed by
stray gunfire. Although the Governnient has responded by
arresting and dismissing some officials in these incidents, as
of year's end there had been no prosecutions.
b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of politically motivated
disappearances in 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Credible sources, including lawyers' associations, the Roman
Catholic Church, and human rights organizations, continue to
charge that detainees and prisoners are sometimes beaten by
police to provide information or confessions. On September 4,
a naturalized U.S. citizen alleged that he was beaten and
tortured on two separate occasions by the DNCD to the extent
that he required hospitalization. Since then, two other
American citizens have complained of physical abuse at the
hands of DNCD agents. At the end of the year, the only
government response to U.S. Embassy protests in all three
incidents has been a promise that the cases will be examined by
the proper authorities. The Chief of the National Police
reported that between January 1 and November 27, 2,218
policemen had been fired or retired for offenses ranging from
insubordination to murder. The National Police has also fired
a small number of commissioned officers who were believed to be
guilty of various offenses. The latter category includes a
major who was fired and turned over to the justice system for
his participation in the beating death of a suspected thief in
the northwest city of Mao in November. Although a significant
number of ex-members of the National Police have been turned
over to the criminal justice system, to date there have been no
reports of successful prosecutions for human rights abuses.
Prisons are overcrowded, and health and sanitary conditions are
substandard. Most prisoners find it necessary to rely on
relatives or their own finances in order to be fed adequately.
Medical care suffers from a lack of supplies. In some
instances, minors have been incarcerated with adults in the
general prison population.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution stipulates that suspects may be detained for a
maximum of 48 hours for investigation before arraignment, after
which they must be charged or released. In 1991 enforcement
officials continued to detain suspects routinely for
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"investigation" or "interrogation" beyond the prescribed
48-hour limit. In October the Dominican Human Rights Committee
sent to President Balaguer a list of 27 prisoners, including
Lizardo Cabrera, whose judicial orders for release had been
ignored by the National Police. Large numbers of people were
detained in police sweeps conducted mainly in poor
neighborhoods. These roundups were ostensibly aimed at
fighting crime, but some were also conducted against labor
activists and others shortly before general strikes to
discourage the strikes. The Attorney General, members of the
legislature, and the Archbishop strongly criticized the sweeps,
charging that the police were indiscriminate and abusive in
carrying them out. President Balaguer and the Chief of Police
repeatedly defended the sweeps as necessary to combat rising
crime rates.
There were no credible reports of exile of citizens for
expressing views contrary to or critical of the Government.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court system includes a Supreme Court, appellate court, and
courts of the first instance. Judges at all levels are
appointed by the Senate. They are nominally independent of the
executive branch and are subject to removal or transfer by a
majority vote in the Senate. Their terms of office correspond
roughly to those of the President and other elected officials.
A newly elected Senate can either designate their replacements
or reconfirm them. There continued to be credible charges that
a number of judges and prosecutors accepted bribes to
manipulate the outcome of cases. There is concern that the
judicial system is not adequately independent of the executive
branch and that underfunding the courts is a means of lessening
their autonomy. In November the Senate approved legislation to
raise salaries for judges.
The Constitution provides for public trial. Court-appointed
lawyers normally are provided at public expense to indigents in
felony criminal cases but rarely in criminal misdemeanor
cases. There are chronic delays in the judicial process.
Credible sources have said that of approximately 9,000 persons
detained in the penal system, only 11 percent have been
convicted. Although the right to judicial determination of the
legality of detention exists, detention of those awaiting trial
is legal and commonly employed, and many of those accused
remain in prison for lengthy periods awaiting trail. This
practice, coupled with a lack of administrative and financial
support for the system, has created a major backlog of cases.
Additionally, enforcement authorities frequently claim that the
judiciary is too lenient, and the DNCD, in particular, appears
to be able to intimidate some judges in drug cases so that the
cases are delayed or sentences are imposed that at times appear
to be inconsistent with the nature of the offense. In several
instances, the police have defied judicial orders of release.
There are no known political prisoners. There are no special
courts for political or national security cases, and civilians
may not be tried by a military court. Members of the armed
forces are tried by military courts, except under specific
circumstances and only after review by a military board.
In July, after a trial which lasted more than 2 years, former
President Salvador Jorge Blanco and his Secretary of the Armed
Forces were found guilty of corruption during Jorge's 1982-1986
term. The two men were heavily fined and sentenced to 20 years
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in prison. Both immediately appealed their sentences. Jorge
maintained throughout the trial that his prosecution was
politically motivated.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were no -credible reports of arbitrary governmental
interference with the private lives of persons or families.
Constitutional safeguards against invasion of the home are
observed. A residence may not be searched except in the
presence of a prosecutor or an assistant prosecutor, excluding
cases of "hot pursuit" or instances where there is probable
cause to believe that a crime is actually being committed.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These liberties are provided for by law and are respected in
practice. Dominicans of all political persuasions enjoy
freedom of speech and regularly exercise it. The numerous
privately owned radio and television stations air all political
points of view. Dominican newspapers are privately owned and
freely reflect independent and opposition points of view.
There is no government censorship on political grounds. Public
and private universities enjoy broad academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are provided for by the Constitution and are
generally respected in practice. Outdoor public marches and
meetings require government permits, which are routinely
granted. Professional organizations of lawyers, doctors,
teachers, and others function freely and can maintain relations
with counterpart international bodies of diverse political
philosophies. Many of these organizations take on roles
similar to those of labor unions, including protest activities,
strikes, and collective bargaining. During 1991 there
continued to be incidents in which the security forces
arbitrarily detained labor activists and suspected agitators
prior to a general strike.
c. Freedom of Religion
Discrimination on religious grounds is prohibited by the
Constitution. There are no religious requirements to hold
public office, no restrictions on the practice of religious
faiths, and no social discrimination based on religion. The
Dominican population is predominantly Roman Catholic; several
non-Catholic faiths have well established churches in the
country. There have been no credible reports of government
interference with the free practice of religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no unusual legal restrictions on travel within or
outside the country for Dominican citizens.
On June 13, President Balaguer issued a decree ordering the
repatriation of all foreigners (primarily Haitian) under the
age of 16 and older than 60 who were working in the Dominican
Republic's sugar industry. According to Dominican immigration
officials, about 6,000 Haitians were involuntarily repatriated
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before the program was suspended the day after the September
coup in Haiti. Some Dominican citizens or persons with some
other right to reside in the Dominican Republic were among
those expelled. At times during the repatriation process,
families were separated and deportees were forced to abandon
their personal property and were not allowed to collect back
pay, severance pay, and pensions. In addition to those
involuntarily repatriated, some 50,000 to 55,000 Haitians left,
mainly to avoid the possibility of losing their possessions.
There continued to be credible charges of forced recruitment
and detention of Haitians to work on sugar plantations in 1991
(see Section 6.c . ) .
The Dominican Republic has a tradition of granting asylum to
people who fear political persecution if returned to their
countries .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Dominican Republic is a constitutional democracy. The
President, all 150 members of the Senate and Chamber of
Deputies, and the mayors and city councilmen of over 100
municipalities are freely elected every 4 years by secret
ballot and universal suffrage (except for active duty military
and police, who may not vote). The governors of the 29
provinces are appointed by the President. The nation enjoys a
functioning multiparty system. Opposition groups of the left,
right, and center operate openly.
The President fully exercises his authority in directing the
Government's administration. Through use of the veto,
discretion to act by decree, and influence as the leader of his
party, he also takes a leading role in enacting laws and
regulations. The Congress traditionally has had limited powers
but provides an open forum for the free exchange of views and
debate. The governing party holds a majority in the Senate (16
of 30 seats) and is in the minority (42 of 120 seats) in the
Chamber of Deputies. There are no legal or practical
impediments to women and minority participation in politics.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Nongovernmental human rights organizations operate freely
without government interference. They include the Dominican
Human Rights Committee, the Dominican Union for the Defense of
Human Rights, the National Committee of Human and Labor Rights,
various church and labor groups, and others. The Dominican
Republic participates actively in international and regional
human rights bodies and supports efforts to promote human
rights in international forums.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination based on race and sex is prohibited by law. For
historical reasons and because of sharp cultural differences,
there is a prejudice against Haitians in Dominican society.
This often translates into discrimination against those with
darker skin (i.e., Haitian appearing). Dark skinned
Dominicans, including some of Haitian descent, have, however,
been successful in a variety of fields, including elected
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political office. There have been charges that children of
Haitian descent were unable to attend school due to their
inability to obtain needed documents; nevertheless, the school
system functioned in areas heavily populated with Haitians, and
there were no apparent government restrictions aimed
specifically at Haitian children. An October 1990 decree
required all Haitians to register with the Department of
Immigration. One human rights group charged that fear of
deportation often prevents Haitians from registering and thus
obtaining proper documentation for school-age children.
Women traditionally have not shared equal social and economic
status or opportunity with men, and men hold the overwhelming
majority of leadership positions in all sectors. Women have,
however, begun to make visible inroads in employment rolls and
to hold more high and public leadership positions. Nine of the
country's 29 governors are female. Divorce is easily
obtainable by either spouse, and women may hold property in
their own names apart from their husbands. In the past,
violence against women had not received much public attention,
but 1991 saw continued growing public awareness of and
sensitivity towards this issue, in part due to the efforts of
various women's groups. These efforts culminated in month-long
activities in November, highlighted by the observance on
November 25 of the National Day against Violence against
Women. On November 26, feminists picketed the Justice Palace
in solidarity with women who have been abused.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for the freedom to organize labor
unions and also for the rights of workers to strike and
management to lock out. All workers, except military personnel
and police, are free to organize, and agricultural and public
sector workers exercise this right. However, unions operate
under the handicap of an antiquated (1951) Labor Code that
gives them few rights vis-a-vis management and, in practice,
gives little effective protection to organizers or union
officials. In October, President Balaguer forwarded the
revised Labor Code draft to Congress. The new code, if passed
by the Congress in its 1992 session, would strengthen the right
of workers to organize.
The current Labor Code contains several restrictions on the
right to strike, including blanket prohibitions on sympathy and
political strikes. The Labor Code grants the right to strike
for the private sector but prohibits strikes in the public
sector (including government-owned enterprises such as the
sugar plantations) and general strikes. Nevertheless, there
were major strikes in 1991 by government doctors, nurses, and
teachers seeking higher wages, and labor and political groups
staged general strikes in June and July.
The Labor Code specifies in detail the steps required to
establish a legal union, federation, or confederation. In
general, this has not been a major impediment for unions to
obtain recognition, as evidenced by the number of functioning
labor organizations, but labor complained that the Government
could use a union's failure to comply with every detail of the
Code as a reason to withhold recognition and that this was
being done in the Export Processing Zones (EPZ's). In 1991 the
Government extended recognition to several unions in the
EPZ's. Unlike in previous years, no union applications were
denied, and the Government has been processing the applications
more rapidly than in the past, although it is still unable to
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comply with the legal requirement to rule on an application
within 10 days of submission. However, this development was
not sufficient to prevent continued antiunion discrimination in
the EPZ ' s (see Section 6.b.).
Organized labor represents about 12 percent of the work force
and is divided among three large confederations, three minor
confederations, and a number of independent unions. Labor
unions can and do freely affiliate regionally and
internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is permitted and usually takes place in
firms which have union representation. The Constitution gives
the Government legal authority to set minimum wage levels, and
the Labor Code assigns this task to the National Salary
Committee. Congress may also enact minimum wage legislation.
The Labor Code clearly stipulates that workers cannot be
dismissed because of their trade union membership or
activities. However, Article 69 of the Code essentially
permits an employer or employee unilaterally to end an open
work contract simply with a notice of termination, and there
are credible charges that companies use Article 69 to fire
labor organizers. For example, the American Institute for Free
Labor Development reported that a union at the Empresa
Manuf acturera Borinzuena received recognition on April 30 and,
on May 11, 14 union leaders and activists were fired. The
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations also noted that at Undergarment Fashions workers
elected an executive board in November 1990, and by February
1991 all members of the executive board had been fired. In
October Undergarment Fashions fired all the members of a
reconstituted union executive board as part of an annual layoff
of workers. Although many workers were rehired, none of the
workers with identifiable union connections or sympathies was.
In September the Secretary of Labor stated that some companies,
especially in the EPZ's, systematically violated workers'
rights to organize; he said that government recognition of
unions served no purpose if companies then dismissed labor
organizers, and stressed the importance of passing the revised
Labor Code into law to strengthen workers' protections against
arbitrary firings. However, the judge in a complaint filed
against Westinghouse ruled that companies have the right to
fire any employee at any time for any reason, with the
provision of severance pay. There are over 350 companies and
110,000 workers located in the country's 23 EPZ's, yet no EPZ
company has concluded a collectively bargained contract with a
union.
During a 1990 strike, the administrator of the state-owned
Dominican Electric Corporation (CDE) charged the CDE union
(SITRACODE) with sabotage, featherbedding, and corruption, and
began massive firings of SITRACODE leaders and activists. In
1991, the Dominican Government agreed to a settlement calling
for the pensioning of 75 percent of the fired workers and the
rehiring of 25 percent.
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c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law. There were
credible charges in the 1990-1991 sugar harvest that the
Government and CEA forcibly recruited Haitian seasonal
agricultural workers and then restricted them to work on
specific sugar plantations. In some cases, workers told of
holding facilities under military guard, having personal
effects confiscated, and being physically and psychologically
abused by CEA employees to restrict them to the plantations.
There were also charges that the Government used the military
and police to round up Haitians residing in the Dominican
Republic and compelled them to work in the cane fields. The
International Labor Organization (ILO) noted that "in order to
prevent an exodus of workers to other plantations, rural guards
have used coercive methods, such as keeping the belongings of
the workers (in most cases their clothes) or locking them in
when they sleep."
In August representatives of the Dominican and Haitian
Governments held an ILO-moderated meeting and discussed the
repatriation issue and ways to regularize the recruitment of
migrant workers. The coup in Haiti forestalled plans for
further meetings.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Code prohibits employment of youths under 14 years of
age and restricts the nighttime employment of youths aged 14 to
18. The Labor Code also provides that employees under age 18
work no more than 8 hours a day and specifies that those 18
years and younger may not be employed in dangerous or unhealthy
jobs .
The high level of unemployment, the erosion of real wages by
inflation, and the lack of a social safety net create pressures
on families to allow children to generate supplemental income.
Young people, including minors younger than 14 years of age and
some who are abandoned, engage in a variety of work which
technically violates labor regulations, including selling
newspapers, washing car windows, and shining shoes. In
practice, many of the child labor restrictions in the Labor
Code are ignored. During the last 2 years, the Secretariat of
Labor has investigated the employment of youths in Santo
Domingo and Santiago and has attempted to enforce the law in
cases where companies employed underage workers in violation of
the law. Some young workers obtained work permits and
continued their employment. Those who were unable to obtain
permits were dismissed. Some companies were subjected to small
fines for violating the law.
A January 1991 ILO Direct Contacts Mission found that "the lack
of labor to cut sugar cane has resulted in plantations
resorting to child labor for this activity." One human rights
group interviewed over 100 youths during the 1990-1991 sugar
cane harvest and found cases of children aged 14 and under
being employed on sugar plantations. The CEA has stated that
it found 70 Haitian children working on the plantations and
that it repatriated them. The CEA has also issued orders to
its employees prohibiting the hiring of children under pain of
dismissal. Nevertheless, sugar cane workers have reported that
children often accompany their parents into the fields.
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e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Code establishes that all workers are entitled to 24
hours of rest after 6 days of work; in practice, a typical
workweek is Monday through Friday plus a half day on Saturday,
but longer hours are not unusual. Safety and health conditions
at places of work do not always meet legal standards. The
existing social security system does not apply to all workers
and is underfunded. As a result, benefits are low, payments
often delayed, and medical care is limited and available only
in the major cities.
Conditions among agricultural workers are in general much
worse, with little rest and long hours during harvest and
planting seasons. Some observers allege that Haitian workers
on CEA plantations are not allowed to eat or rest during the
day at harvest time and are required to work significantly
longer than the legal 48-hour week. Since workers are paid by
the weight they cut (plus bonuses for extra production) , and
CEA employees often manipulate the figures, many cane cutters
work extra hours to increase their income. The ILO Committee
of Experts (COE) in 1991 stated that new rates of payment to
cane cutters improve their chances of earning the statutory
minimum wage. It added that while the increase was
significant, it was lower than the rise in the cost of living.
The COE also recommended adoption of more uniform and regular
working hours for cane cutters.
Problems found in many Haitian worker villages, such as disease
and a lack of schooling, medical facilities, running water, and
sewage systems, are also found in many parts of the country and
are not suffered uniquely by Haitians. CEA has undertaken
projects, some in connection with international organizations
such as the U.N. Population Fund, to improve living conditions
on the plantations.
The Secretariat of Labor has formed a team of 20 inspectors to
prevent abuses by CEA employees such as the fraudulent weighing
of cut cane. Twenty CEA employees were dismissed for cheating
workers, but the practice continues, and not all CEA employees
are disciplined for it. In the 1990-1991 harvest, CEA paid the
cane cutters in vouchers, which were often exchanged by
merchants at exorbitant discount rates to reduce the value of
the worker's income. CEA announced plans to modify that
procedure in the 1991-1992 harvest.
Health standards for workers are set by the Dominican Social
Security Institute. Nonhealth safety standards are covered by
the Labor Code. Both the Social Security Institute and the
Labor Secretariat have small corps of inspectors who are
charged with enforcing standards. However, these posts are
filled through political patronage and some inspectors have
earned a reputation for corruption. Laws on working conditions
and their enforcement in the EPZ ' s do not differ significantly
from those in the country at large. Some companies in private
EPZ ' s exhibit much higher worker safety and health standards.
Real wages, especially in the public sector, were seriously
eroded by an unprecedented consumer price inflation in 1990 of
101 percent, in part because consumption subsidies on sugar,
wheat flour, and petroleum products were eliminated and prices
for these products rose sharply. The Government increased the
minimum public sector wage by 30 percent in August 1990 and
raised all public sector wages by 20 percent in July 1991.
Following consultations with the private sector and various
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labor leaders, the national wage board raised wages of lower
paid private employees (the majority) by 60 percent effective
in September 1991. According to labor leaders and many private
sector businessmen, the vast majority of workers receive only
the minimum wage. The current minimum wage is not sufficient
to maintain a small family at a minimally acceptable standard
of living. As a result, many people hold more than one job.
582
ECUADOR
Ecuador is a constitutional republic with a president and a
72-member unicameral legislature chosen in free elections.
Members of the Supreme Court, chosen by Congress, preside over
a judiciary that is independent according to the Constitution
but which is susceptible to political pressure. Seventeen
registered political parties, a free press, and active human
rights groups and labor unions are the mainstays of an open and
lively political system. The Congress has important powers to
question and censure executive branch ministers, and such
censure results in automatic dismissal of the minister. While
this power enhances the democratically elected Congress' check
on the Presidency, many Ecuadorians believe it has increased
governmental instability as well.
The Ecuadorian military has significant autonomy, reinforced by
access to revenues from the nation's oil exports, civil
aviation, shipping, and other economic activities. It has
maintained a low profile in domestic politics since the return
to constitutional rule in 1979. The National Police are
responsible for domestic law enforcement and maintenance of
internal order. They also have primary responsibility for
carrying out antinarcotics efforts, although the military is
increasing its role in the war against drugs. The President
controls the police through the Minister of Government, and the
command structure of the National Police is completely separate
from the armed forces joint command. In response to numerous
instances of police mistreatment of criminal suspects,
including the use of physical force against detainees, there
were widespread demands for reform of the National Police to
improve its human rights performance.
The economy is based on private enterprise, although there is
heavy government involvement in such key sectors as petroleum,
utilities, and aviation. Inflation remained high at about 50
percent in 1991 and overall economic conditions remained
difficult for the vast majority of Ecuadorians. Rural poverty
is extensive, and little improvement was evident in 1991. The
combined unemployment and underemployment rate was over 60
percent .
Ecuadorians enjoy, both in law and in fact, a wide range of
freedoms and individual rights, but serious human rights
problems remain. Principal among these are torture and other
mistreatment of prisoners and detainees, impunity for human
rights abusers, violence by paramilitary groups in rural areas,
brutal prison conditions, lengthy detention without charge, a
politicized court system, and pervasive discrimination against
women, blacks, and Indians. In September 1991, an
international commission named by the President to investigate
the 1988 disappearance of the Restrepo brothers (see Section
l.b.) concluded that the two boys had disappeared "at the hands
of the police." As a result of the commission's report, the
former commanding general of the police and 12 other active
duty and retired police officials were detained; they remained
in detention as of year's end. No date had been set for their
trial. Although the Administration of President Rodrigo Borfa
abolished the National Police's Criminal Investigative Service
(SIC) in September in response to the Restrepo Commission's
findings, serious problems remain, including the failure to
investigate and prosecute many of those who commit abuses.
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RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Both the physical mistreatment of suspects by the police, which
has sometimes led to deaths of suspects, and the impunity with
which many of these crimes are carried out, were continuing
problems in Ecuador in 1991. According to a report in a
respected Quito newspaper, of 74 cases brought against police
in police courts for the deaths of suspects between 1986 and
1989, 60 were still "pending," and in 4 of the cases the
outcome was unknown; 10 officials had been absolved of criminal
charges .
In addition, indigenous groups charge that they are the target
of violent and lethal reprisals by paramilitary groups during
land invasions and other squatter demonstrations. The
paramilitary groups are armed civilian bands and security guard
forces hired by private landowners to protect their property.
These forces often use military-like uniforms and weapons; some
are reportedly operated or trained by former military or police
officials, but there is no evidence of complicity with
active-duty forces or personnel.
During 1991, at least one indigenous activist, Julio
Cabascango, was killed, possibly by paramilitary forces. The
1990 deaths of Oswaldo Cuvi and Cesar Morocho (both indigenous
activists) under suspicious circumstances were still unresolved
at the end of 1991. Human rights activists charge that Cuvi
was killed by Ecuadorian regular military forces on June 6,
1990, during a nationwide indigenous uprising.
There is credible evidence that public security forces, both
police and military, were responsible in 1991 for
nonpolitically motivated deaths of private citizens under
detention or during investigations. For example, in July,
Mayer Mina of the port town of San Lorenzo was apprehended by
seven marines and brought to the local naval base for allegedly
stealing a scale. Two days later, after the marines failed to
find the scale, Mina's body was returned to his family. He had
been severely beaten and died of cardiac arrest. During a
demonstration in San Lorenzo to protest Mina's death, one
protester was killed by gunfire, allegedly shot by marines
stationed at the naval base. No charges had been filed by
year's end. There are credible reports that other suspects
have died while in police custody. With the exception of the
Restrepo case, previous deaths which occurred at the hands of
the public forces (for example, the 1985 death of Consuelo
Benavides) have not been satisf actionly resolved, nor have any
alleged perpetrators been tried, convicted or sentenced.
b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of politically motivated
disapperances during 1991.
In September, an international commission named by President
Borja to investigate the 1988 disappearance of two teenaged
brothers, Santiago and Andreas Restrepo, concluded that the
boys had disappeared and later died "at the hands of the
police." Ecuadorian military forces assisted the investigation
by carrying out a well-publicized 1-month search for the bodies
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of the two teenagers at a lake south of Quito. The bodies were
never found. The Restrepo Coirunission accused senior police
officials, particularly those associated with the Criminal
Investigative Service (SIC), of engaging in a cover-up and of
obstructing the investigation. In mid-September, a Quito judge
ordered detained 13 police officials, including the
just-retired chief of police and a former head of the
counternarcotics division. The civilian courts will decide
whether sufficient evidence and legal authority exists to try
the officials on criminal charges in regular (nonpolice)
courts. The police officials claim immunity from criminal
charges and procedures for acts committed while on police duty,
which would allow them to be judged by internal police
disciplinary courts. The parents of the Restrepo brothers have
filed a civil suit against two former cabinet officials who
served as Ministers of Government and Police at the time of the
disappearance and during the subsequent cover-up.
In addition to the judicial branch's attempt to prosecute those
deemed responsible by the commission for the Restrepo brothers'
disappearance, and presumed death, in September the Borja
Administration announced the abolishment of the SIC. The SIC
had been accused by many credible human rights activists and
organizations of involvement in torture, mistreatment,
disappearances, and deaths of criminal suspects. Many members
of the SIC have been reassigned to other police units, although
most officers continue to work in the Office of Criminal
Investigation (OID) . With the exception of the Restrepo
brothers 1988 case, no earlier cases of disappearances were
resolved, nor were any of those allegedly responsible punished.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although torture and similar forms of intimidation and
punishment are prohibited by law, reports in 1991 of physical
mistreatment by police of suspects and prisoners continued to
be persistent, widespread, and credible. Beating a suspect to
obtain a confession is the most common tool used by police to
carry out criminal investigations. The resort to torture and
other physical mistreatment to extract information from
suspects is caused, in part, by police lack of knowledge and
technology to carry out modern, scientific investigations. The
fact that officials are almost never punished for such abuses
is also a significant factor. Nearly every month the
Ecuadorian Ecumenical Human Rights Commission (CEDHU) publishes
detailed reports on suspects claiming to have been tortured by
the police. CEDHU' s reports frequently name police officials
alleged to be responsible for specific torture cases and often
include photographs of the victims with their wounds. Police
immunity and resort to police courts is a major factor in
preventing accountability for abuses by police.
Prison conditions in Ecuador's 20 extremely crowded detention
centers are abysmal. Human rights activists charge that these
detention centers constitute a serious violation of individual
rights. There are no separate facilities for hard-core or
dangerous criminals. A major mutiny and breakout at Quito's
Garcia Moreno prison in September resulted in one death and
several wounded guards. The breakout, which was carried out by
suspected drug traffickers who bribed a number of guards to
assist them, pointed out the urgent need for reform in the
prison system. Prisoners with economic resources are usually
able to secure highly favorable treatment through payments to
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prison officials, while the indigent suffer severe deprivation
and generally inhuman conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution and Penal Code provide that no one may be
deprived of liberty without a written order from a competent
governmental authority, either a police chief or a judge of
instruction. Specific written orders must be signed within 24
hours of detention — even in cases in which a suspect is caught
in the act of committing a crime. The suspect must be charged
with a specific criminal offense within 48 hours of arrest.
All prisoners have the right to a review of the legality of
their detention within 48 hours of arrest, a review which is
supposed to be carried out by the senior elected official of
the locality in which the suspect is held. Incommunicado
detention is legally prohibited. In practice, these legal
protections against arbitrary arrest or detention are often
violated.
The process of arrest normally begins with an accusation of a
criminal act brought by one or more private citizens against
another. The police often detain suspects without the required
written order. Suspects are freqiaently detained longer than 24
hours before orders are signed, and few are charged within 48
hours of arrest. Preventive detention before sentencing is
legal under certain circumstances. Trial is supposed to begin
within 15 to 60 days of the initial arrest (60 days is the
maximum period a suspect charged with a specific crime is
required to wait before the trial commences). In practice, the
initiation of the trial phase may take several years. Suspects
are frequently held in detention longer than the maximum
sentence imposed for the crime for which they are ultimately
charged. To avoid this long, arduous, and arbitrary process,
families of detainees sometimes seek to secure the prisoner's
freedom through illegal means.
Exile is not generally used as a tool of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The vast majority of civilian defendants are tried by the
regular court system, although some indigenous groups try
members privately for violations of tribal rules. The Congress
elects a 16-member Supreme Court which chooses its president
from within its ranks . The Supreme Court names the
approximately 115 members of the Provincial Superior Courts
which serve as appeals courts for criminal, civil, tax, and
labor cases. The executive branch names the other "first
instance" judges. While the courts are supposed to be
independent by law, political party leaders exercise
significant influence over the selection of judges at all
levels .
Minimum due process rights are provided for by law but are
often not observed in practice. In theory, the accused is
presumed to be innocent until proven guilty; defendants have
the right to a public trial, defense attorneys, and appeal;
they may present evidence but have the privilege not to testify
against themselves; and defendants may confront and
cross-examine witnesses. In theory, there is a public defender
system. In practice, there are relatively few attorneys
available to defend the large number of indigent suspects.
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f . Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Police are rec[uired to have a warrant to enter a private home
or business, except in the case of hot pursuit. The police
generally respect the sanctity of private homes and
correspondence, although there were continuing cases of illegal
entry in 1991. Police surveillance is permitted, but
wiretapping is prohibited by the Constitution. The naval and
marine authorities who apprehended Mayer Mina in San Lorenzo
(see Section l.a.) entered his home in July without a warrant.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and the Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech, and this right
is generally respected in practice. However, the
Guayaquil-based radio station Radio Sucre, owned by an
opposition political party, was closed down in 1990 by the
Government for broadcasting unsubstantiated charges of
corruption by President Borja's brother, and it remained closed
as of the end of 1991. The principal owner, a Congressman from
the opposition Social Christian party, appealed the closure
decision in the judicial system but continued to be denied a
license to reopen. In late 1991, all Radio Sucre network
frequencies were assigned to Quito's Central University in a
well-publicized ceremony.
With the exception of two small government-owned radio
stations, all of the major media outlets — television,
newspapers, and radio — are in private hands. Using a law
promulgated by the last military regime that requires the media
to give the Government free space or air time, the Government
frequently requires television and radio to broadcast
government-produced programs featuring the President and other
top administration officials. It also requires newspapers to
carry a minimum amount of news prepared by the National
Secretariat of Social Communications. The media and opposition
political figures have criticized the Government's use of the
media for its own political ends.
The media represent a wide range of political views and
criticize the Government. However, some degree of
self-censorship in the print media occurs, particularly with
respect to stories about the military or corruption at high
levels of national, provincial, or municipal government.
Nevertheless, in 1991, the media gave wide coverage to the
Restrepo disappearance case in which high ranking police
officials were implicated (see Section l.b.). There are 2
major daily newspapers in the capital, Quito, 5 in the
principal commercial center, Guayaquil, and more than 20
additional papers published daily in other regions and cities.
There are 4 national television networks and about 300 radio
stations, as well as cable television programming from the
United States, Canada, Brazil, Spain, and Mexico, all free of
government censorship. Journalists working in the preparation
and reporting of news (as opposed to opinion) must be graduates
of an accredited Ecuadorian university journalism school.
Ecuador has a large university system comprising both
state-subsidized and private universities. The state
universities are active in politics, particularly on the left
of the political spectrum. The Government has scrupulously
avoided interference in issues involving academic freedom.
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b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the rights of free assembly and
association for peaceful purposes. These rights are generally
respected in practice. Public rallies require prior government
permits, which are generally granted. Numerous political
demonstrations took place in 1991, including a February 6
general strike, student protests against government economic
measures, as well as numerous demonstrations throughout the
country against the war in the Persian Gulf. Generally, the
security forces intervene in demonstrations only when there is
violence against persons or proJ)erty. However, Professor Felix
Preciado died during a demonstration in San Lorenzo protesting
the murder of Mayer Mina at the hands of navy personnel . In
addition, indigenous organizations protested the use of private
paramilitary groups to break up demonstrations and land
invasions. The Minister of Government and the police announced
strengthened controls over private guard forces and other armed
groups that are not properly registered. However, there have
not been any reported charges brought against such groups. In
general, police were restrained in the use of force during
demonstrations .
c. Freedom of Religion
Citizens are free to practice the religion of their choice.
There is no official state religion, although the population is
nominally over 90 percent Roman Catholic. There are active
Protestant and Jewish communities in the major cities and
evangelical movements continue to attract new adherents. The
Constitution prohibits discrimination for religious reasons,
although members of the clergy are barred by the Constitution
from election to the Congress, the Presidency, or Vice
Presidency. Numerous foreign-based religious orders and
missionary groups are active in Ecuador.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution assures the right of all citizens to travel
freely throughout the country, to choose their place of
residence, and to depart from and reenter Ecuador. These
rights are respected in practice. Ecuadorian citizens who
return to the country after residing abroad are not harassed or
discriminated against by the Government. No cases of forced
resettlement were reported in 1991.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Since the return to civilian rule in 1979, Ecuadorian citizens
have exercised their right to change their national and local
governments. Free elections for the Presidency and the
Congress have taken place regularly since 1979, and power has
been transferred peacefully to different parties. The June
1990 congressional election saw significant losses by
progovernment parties, leaving the Government without a
majority in Congress. In 1991 there were 17 legally registered
political parties, spanning the ideological spectrum. Eleven
of the 16 parties, including 4 of the leftist parties, are
represented in the Congress.
Voting is mandatory for literate citizens over the age of 18
and voluntary for illiterate citizens. There are no
restrictions on voting by women or by minority groups.
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Active-duty members of the military forces cannot vote although
there was periodic debate on this subject in 1991. All
citizens, regardless of sex, religion, socioeconomic status, or
ethnic origin, have the right to form and join political
parties and to run for local or national office. The
white/mestizo male-dominated elite tends to be
self-perpetuating, and blacks, Indians, and women continue to
be underrepresented in high positions in government.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Domestic human rights groups such as the Catholic
Church-affiliated Ecumenical Commission on Human Rights (CEDHU)
and the Latin American Human Rights Association (ALDHU) are
independent and actively monitor human rights issues in
Ecuador. These groups, particularly CEDHU, have been outspoken
in their criticism of the Government's record on specific
cases, and CEDHU has taken a particular interest in defending
the human rights of the poor. Following demonstrations and
protests by indigenous groups in 1990 and 1991, the Borja
Administration, besides opening a dialog with the groups,
generally cooperated with international environmental and human
rights groups. In July 1991, four foreigners, who were looking
into environmental and human rights conditions in the Amazon
basin region where significant petroleum development activity
takes place, were detained for a number of days by Ecuadorian
military forces and later detained by police in Quito who
questioned whether the activists had permission to be in the
area.
Foreign and international human rights groups had access to a
wide range of government officials in 1991 and were able to
investigate human rights conditions without government
hindrance.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race,
religion, sex, or social status. Nevertheless, discrimination
against women, blacks, and Indians is pervasive in Ecuadorian
society, particularly with respect to educational and economic
opportunity. The vast majority of the rural population of
approximately 5 million (slightly less than 50 percent of the
population) are peasants of Indian or Indian-mestizo ancestry.
The population of the rural, northern coastal area of Ecuador
includes large numbers of black citizens. Most peasants live
in varying degrees of poverty. Land is scarce, infant
mortality, malnutrition, and epidemic disease are common, and
potable water and electricity are often unavailable. The rural
education system is seriously deficient, even while the
Government continues to heavily subsidize the state
universities' largely white or white/mestizo students from the
middle and upper classes.
Efforts to improve living standards for Indian and black
peasants were hampered in 1991, as in previous years, by the
Government's reluctance to change traditional spending
patterns, especially those favoreing the cities. The
long-simmering frustration of Ecuador's largest minority group,
the Indians, over these socioeconomic issues exploded in
nationwide protest demonstrations in 1990, and sporadic
demonstrations continued in 1991. The Borja Administration
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pursued a dialog with indigenous groups to attempt to resolve
some of the key issues they raised, but the dialog was broken
off on a number of occasions by both sides during 1991.
There was little improvement in the status of women in 1991.
The Ecuadorian women's liberation movement believes that in
practice culture and tradition inhibit achievement of full
equality for women. While no current data on salaries or
occupation by sex are available, anecdotal evidence suggests
that the number of women in the professions or working as
skilled laborers is substantially fewer than men, and salary
discrimination is common. Although violence against women,
including within marriage, is prohibited by law, it is a common
practice. Many rapes go unreported because of the victims'
reluctance to confront the perpetrator. To date the Government
has not addressed this cjuestion as a serious public policy
issue.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Under the Constitution and Labor Code, most workers enjoy the
right to form trade unions. In November the Legislature passed
Labor Code reforms which seek to boost employment without
significantly limiting workers' rights. Workers not free to
form trade xinions include public security and military
officials, and public sector employees in nonrevenue earning
entities. The Labor Code reforms raised the number of workers
required for an establishment to be unionized from 14 to 30.
While employees of stated-owned organizations enjoy full rights
similar to that of the private sector, the majority of public
sector employees are prevented from joining unions and lack
collective bargaining rights. The International Labor
Organization Committee of Experts (COE) reiterated in 1991 that
the prohibition on establishment of trade unions by public
servants in nonrevenue earning entities is incompatible with
Ecuador's ratification of Convention 87 on freedom of
association.
Approximately 12 to 15 percent of the work force is organized.
There are four large labor centrals or confederations, three of
which maintain strong international affiliation. Ecuador also
has numerous unaffiliated labor federations, such as the
drivers union, the teachers' organization, the national
artisans and mechanics confederation, and numerous peasant
groups .
Workers by law have the right to strike. There are few
restrictions on this right, except for workers in some
state-owned enterprises involved in basic services or products
such as hospitals, petroleum, telephones, water, and
electricity. A 20-day cooling-off period is required before
declaring a strike. The new Labor Code limits solidarity
strikes or boycotts to 3 days, provided that they are approved
by the Labor Ministry. Many legal strikes occurred in 1991.
In addition to the large number declared legal, there were
numerous illegal strikes, such as those by medical workers,
doctors, teachers, and provincial workers. In a legal strike,
workers take possession of the factory or workplace, thus
ending production at the site, and receive police protection
during the takeover. All salaries and benefits continue to be
paid by the employer during a legal strike. There were no
reports of use of police to control strikes in 1991, although
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police were called out during the national strike of February
6, 1991.
A Maquila (in bond) Law passed in 1990 permits the hiring of
temporary workers for the maquila industries only. While there
is no express prohibition on association rights in the Maquila
Law, organizing temporary contract workers will be difficult in
practice, as many will be temporary employees with short term
contracts. The Government approved a law permitting the
creation of free trade zones, but none had been established by
year ' s end .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Ecuador has a highly segmented labor market with a minority of
workers in skilled, usually unionized, positions in state-run
enterprises or in protected import substitution industries.
The vast majority of the economically active population is
either unemployed or underemployed in the informal sector.
Most rural labor is not organized. The Labor Code requires
that all private employers with 30 or more workers belonging to
a union must negotiate collectively when the union so
requests. This broad right does not extend to most public
sector employees in nonrevenue earning ministries nor to
management in certain entities with social or public
objectives. The new Labor law has streamlined the bargaining
process in stated-owned enterprises by requiring workers to be
represented by only one labor union. The Labor Code prohibits
discrimination against unions and requires that employers
provide space for union activities upon the union's request.
The COE, however, reiterated in its 1991 report that the Labor
Code inadequately protects against antiunion activity at the
time of recruitment. The ILO Committee of Freedom of
Association's review of a specific complaint involving
antiunion discrimination was rendered moot when union strike
leaders accepted compensation in lieu of job reinstatement.
Despite the reforms promulgated in November 1991, the Labor
Code remains highly unfavorable to employers and is a
disincentive to the hiring of union members and to employment
in general. Employers often try to avoid hiring additional
workers and unionization by substituting machinery for workers
or "atomizing" their production processes to maintain plants
employing less than the number needed to form a union.
Employers are not permitted to dismiss a worker without the
express permission of the Ministry of Labor. Dismissals ruled
as unjustified require payment to the worker of large
indemnities or separation payments by employers, although the
reforms have set a cap on such payments. The Labor Code
provides for resolution of labor conflicts through an
arbitration and conciliation board comprised of one
representative of the Ministry of Labor, two from the union,
and two representatives of management. Participation in this
process is voluntary, and strikes and lockouts occur even while
arbitration is under way.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is prohibited by both the Constitution and the
Labor Code and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Persons less than 14 years old are prohibited by law from
working except in special circumstances such as
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apprenticeships. Those between the ages of 14 and 18 are
required to have the permission of their parent or guardian to
work. In practice, enforcement of child labor laws is
seriously inadequate. In rural areas most children leave
school at about 10 years of age to contribute to household
income as farm laborers. In the city many children under age
14 work in family-owned "businesses" in the informal sector,
shining shoes,- collecting and recycling garbage, or as street
peddlers .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The basic minimum wage is not adequate to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and his family. The vast
majority of organized workers in state industries and formal
sector private enterprises earn substantially more than the
minimum wage and also have significant other benefits.
However, the minimum wage is the operative wage in many
informal sector activities where the majority of the
economically active population is employed. The Ministry of
Labor has the principal role in enforcing labor laws and
carries this out with a corps of labor inspectors who are
active in all 21 provinces. The Labor Code provides for a
40-hour workweek, a 15-day annual vacation, a minimum wage, and
other variable employer-provided benefits such as uniforms and
training opportunities.
The Labor Code also provides for general protection of workers'
health and safety on the job. In the formal sector
occupational health and safety is not a major problem. The
Government enforces health and safety standards and regulations
through the Social Security Institute. There are no specific
regulations governing health and safety standards in the
agricultural sector and, in practice, there is no enforcement
of safety rules in small mines and remote locations.
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EL SALVADOR
El Salvador is a constitutional democracy with an executive
branch headed by a president, a unicameral Legislative Assembly
and a separate, but politically appointed, judiciary. Alfredo
Cristiani of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) was
inaugurated President for a 5-year term beginning on June 1,
1989. Six political parties or coalitions participated in the
March 1991 legislative and municipal elections in which ARENA
lost its absolute majority in the Assembly and all six parties
or coalitions won at least one seat.
The Armed Forces of El Salvador (ESAF) include the army, air
force, and navy as well as the public security forces (the
Treasury Police, the National Guard, and the National Police)
and the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) . The security forces share
law enforcement responsibilities and report to the Vice
Minister of Defense for Public Security. These military and
police forces have been responsible for significant human
rights abuses in previous years and in 1991. During peace
talks, the Government and the Farabundo Marti Front for
National Liberation (FMLN) agreed on September 25 that the
Treasury Police and the National Guard will be dissolved and
the National Police will be replaced by a new national civilian
police force.
In El Salvador's mixed economy, private property is generally
respected. Due mainly to the Government's free market reforms,
the economy grew by 3 . 4 percent in 1990, and exports increased
substantially. Although the FMLN continued to attack economic
targets until a truce began on November 16, war-related damage
declined significantly in 1991.
On December 31, the Government and the FMLN signed an agreement
ending 11 years of civil war and providing for the
reintegration of FMLN excombatants into the national life of El
Salvador. The Government and FMLN agreed to a series of
constitutional reforms; these human rights, judicial, and
electoral reforms were ratified by the Legislative Assembly.
The parties also agreed to establish a truth commission to
investigate serious human rights violations in the past decade
and to create an "ad hoc" commission to evaluate the human
rights record, professional competence, and commitment to
democracy of each ESAF officer. The U.N. Observer Mission in
El Salvador (ONUSAL) began in July 1991 its mission of
verifying the human rights accord signed in July 1990 by the
Government and the FMLN.
In his annual report, the U.N. Special Rapporteur stated, as he
did in 1990, that there were fewer hiiman rights violations in
1991 than in the previous year, but that serious human rights
violations persist. There were incidents of extrajudicial
killings, torture of detainees, arbitrary arrest and
incommunicado detention, forced recruitment, intimidation and
abuse of noncombatants and civilian organizations perceived to
be sympathetic to the FMLN, and some violations of worker
rights by the ESAF. There were also incidents of extrajudicial
killings, forced recruitment, attacks on civilian targets, and
threats against government officials carried out by the FMLN.
Both sides in the conflict put civilians at risk, although
civilian casualties continued to decline. Although there were
a few notable prosecutions for human rights violations in 1991,
military and police officials, people with influence, and FMLN
guerrillas continued to enjoy virtual immunity from such
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EL SALVADOR
prosecutions. Both the U.N. Special Rapporteur and ONUSAL
concluded that cursory investigations by the Government of
human rights abuses contribute to a continuing atmosphere of
insecurity.
With a few notable exceptions, the ESAF and the FMLN continued
to avoid or resist legal accountability for human rights
violations. The FMLN refused to turn suspects over for
prosecution after they shot down a U.S. helicopter and killed
two surviving U.S. military personnel on January 2. All 13 CDF
members charged in the Armenia well case were acquitted on
October 9 despite overwhelming evidence that they killed 30
peasants in 1981. However, three members of the FMLN were
convicted on May 2 of the 1985 Zona Rosa murders of four U.S.
Marine Embassy security guards and nine others. A jury found
active duty army Colonel Guillermo Benavides guilty of ordering
the murder of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her
daughter in November 1989 . Lieutenant Yusshi Rene Mendoza was
convicted of ordering the murder of the housekeeper's
daughter. Both received 30-year sentences. Three other
officers received 3-year sentences on lesser charges related to
the murders. Four lower ranking soldiers, who had admitted to
the shooting, were exonerated by the jury. The ESAF high
command offered only limited cooperation in the investigation
of the Jesuit ca^; the court transcripts reveal perjury and
contradictions by high-ranking ESAF officers. The ESAF as an
institution also tried to limit the judicial investigation to
the named suspects; speculation continues over the possible
involvement of, or coverup by, other high-ranking officers in
the case.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were several political and other extrajudicial killings
by the ESAF in 1991. Atlacatl battalion soldiers murdered a
wounded FMLN combatant on May 15. The National Police arrested
Carlos Arturo Aguilar of the Atlacatl battalion for throwing a
hand grenade at the Ahuachapan lottery building on February 9
that killed Luis Francisco Contreras; Efrain Mazariego, a
member of a local military patrol, confessed to the murder on
February 11 of Salvador Lopez (Mazariego, nevertheless, was
later found innocent and released by a civilian court); and in
March, a subsergeant in the Salvadoran navy, Saul Antonio
Bonilla, was charged with the murder in December 1990 of Jose
Carlos Hernandez, a Green Cross member. On September 7,
Rosalie Hernandez died apparently as a result of being beaten
by the guards at a new military hospital. Jose Maria Chacon
was shot and killed (and his wife and daughter wounded) on
September 21; a Fifth Brigade soldier was acrested. On
September 25, Jose Samuel Fuentes was taken from his home and
died after being tortured by three men; a national policeman
and a municipal policeman were arrested. Human rights abuses
by the ESAF-supervised CDF also persisted. On February 9, 15
CDF members in Zacamil Canton were arrested for the February
murder of 3 civilians; 7 were released within 72 hours, and 7
others were released on February 12.
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EL SALVADOR
On September 28, Colonel Guillermo Benavides was convicted of
the murders in November 1989 of six Jesuit priests, their
housekeeper, and her daughter; Lieutenant Yusshi Rene Mendoza
was convicted of the murder of the housekeeper's daughter,
Celina Ramos. Seven lower ranking soldiers, including four who
admitted doing the actual killing, were exonerated by the jury,
apparently on the grounds that the soldiers were following
orders. The enlisted men are still on active duty. The
military authorities offered only limited cooperation in the
investigation and trial of these murders. Evidence was
fabricated and destroyed, and some witnesses provided false
testimony. Speculation continues that other high-ranking
officers may have been the intellectual authors of the crime or
acted to cover it up. Despite overwhelming evidence, all 13
CDF defendants accused of killing more than 30 people in the
1981 Armenia Wells case were accjuitted on October 9; unit
commander Sergeant Bernardino Tula and several soldiers who had
confessed to the murders were among those freed. On April 30,
Air Force Lieutenant Victor Manuel Aguilar, Sergeant Jorge
Alberto Ramos and Private Vidal Antonio Pleytes were convicted
for the beating death in December 1986 of a mentally retarded
man, Marcelino Barrera. A judicial investigation continues
into the alleged ESAF massacre of several hundred people in and
around the town of Mozote in 1981.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur concluded in his 1991 report that
charges of death squad activity are plausible but difficult to
verify, and that some cases may be common crimes made to look
like death squad killings. In January, 15 members of the same
family were killed in El Zapote in what many observers now
believe was a family feud. Isaac Martinez, a former leftist
political candidate, was found hacked to death on May 14; his
wife and stepson later confessed to killing him in
self-defense. Martin Ayala, the nightwatchman at the Council
for Marginal Communities, was killed and his common-law wife
severely slashed on July 6. Despite claims of political
motivation for his murder, most evidence indicates that the
murder was part of a robbery attempt . In February unknown
assailants killed Herberto Aristides Robles of the leftist
Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN) party and his pregnant wife
in a drive-by shooting. Elmer Dagoberto Lopez was stabbed 13
times, his face rendered unrecognizable, and he was bound hand
and foot and dumped into a river. Gustavo Rosa Ramirez was
shot seven times in his home in La Libertad on May 19 by three
men in civilian clothes. Ramirez had been arrested and
allegedly tortured by the National Police 1 month prior to his
death. On September 24, Miguel Angel Martinez, a member of the
construction workers' union, was killed, and then dumped by the
side of the road at a busy San Salvador intersection.
Numerous death threats were reported in 1991. In June Nora
Garcia, the director of the Institute of Investigation,
Training, and Development of Women (IMU), received telephoned
death threats and was told to close the IMU training center by
the first of July; the calls stopped and nothing further
happened as the deadline passed. On July 6, unknown assailants
ransacked and robbed the "Little Community" religious center.
This incident, like the one on June 30, 1990, was preceded by
threatening telephone calls which stopped after the break-in.
A group calling itself the Salvadoran Anti-Communist Front
(FAS) appeared in 1991 and issued written threats to a variety
of groups beginning in May. A FAS communique demanded that
businesses halt service to members of the United Nations, the
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International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other
humanitarian organizations which it claimed violated Salvadoran
sovereignty. Later communiques were delivered to Lutheran
Bishop Medardo Gomez, Christian Committee for Displaced People
in El Salvador (CRIPDES) director Mirtala Lopez, two members of
the Legislative Assembly, and other religious, union, and
community organization leaders. Senior government officials
denounced the threats, but government investigations have
failed to determine who produced the communiques.
The FMLN committed several political and other extrajudicial
killings in 1991. On January 2, FMLN combatants shot down a
U.S. military helicopter. Chief Warrant Officer Daniel Scott
was killed in the crash, but Lieutenant Colonel David Pickett
and Airman Ernest Dawson survived the crash and, according to
eyewitness testimony, were brutally beaten and then murdered.
The FMLN has refused to cooperate with either government or
U.S. investigations. Other FMLN killings included the
detention and subsequent execution on April 8 of ESAF member
Guillermo Hernandez, the assassinations of two off-duty
officers (Captain Carlos Alfredo Lopez and Captain Nestor Ariel
Lam), the summary execution of Treasury Police member Serafino
Orlando Merino on July 31, and the killing of a wounded
soldier, Emerson Vigil, by stopping his military ambulance and
disconnecting his intravenous transfusion. Three members of
the FMLN were convicted on May 2 of the 1985 Zona Rosa murders
of 4 U.S. marines and 9 other persons, and sentenced to 25, 11,
and 4 years in prison, respectively. On June 15, suspected
FMLN member Adolf o Aguilar was ordered to trial for the 1989
murders of conservative politicians Edgar Chacon and Gabriel
Payes . On October 12, FMLN member Jorge Alberto Miranda was
found guilty of the murder of Herbert Ernesto Anaya, the
coordinator of the Non-Governmental Human Rights Commission
(CDHES). Although Miranda confessed, neither the CDHES nor
Anaya ' s widow believe he is guilty.
b. Disappearance
The Constitution forbids unacknowledged detention by the
security forces or the military. Nevertheless, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur cited a figure of 87 disappearances in
1991. ONUSAL stated that many claims of disappearance turned
out to be illegal detentions or military recruitment. Some of
those reported as disappeared in 1990 have been found murdered,
and in three cases ESAF or CDF personnel have been charged.
San Cayetano Cooperative members Julio Cesar Juarez and Juan
Antonio Juarez, reported as disappeared in 1990, were found
murdered, and four CDF personnel have been charged. There was
no further investigation in the 1990 disappearances and
subsequent murders of Angel Maria and Julia del Carmen Ponce of
the La Reforma Cooperative, nor of Nelson Chincilla.
Kidnapings by the FMLN increased. Rancher Gregorio Zelaya of
Usulutan was released after his family reportedly paid ransom,
and ARENA ex-mayoral candidate Miguel Angel Vasquez and Justice
of the Peace Manuel de Jesus Villegas were released on April
23. The FMLN abducted navy Lieutenant Pedro Antonio Hernandez
from a public bus and released him only after his family agreed
to pay a ransom. Guillermo "Billy" Sol, businessman and ARENA
treasurer, was kidnaped by unknown assailants on July 18.
Despite charges by ARENA politicians, there is no evidence that
he was taken by the FMLN.
50-726 - 92 - 20
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c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although prohibited by the Constitution, torture and other
abuse of detainees by the public security forces and the
military continued in 1991. Reliable human rights monitors
reported that detainees were threatened, deprived of food,
water, and sleep, subjected to prolonged interrogation while
blindfolded, forced to stand for long periods of time, and
beaten. There were also some credible charges of injection
with unidentified drugs, near drownings, and electric shock.
These abuses occur most often during the 72-hour period of
administrative detention prior to the presentation of a
prisoner before a judge. The U.N. Special Rapporteur noted
that mistreatment was more serious in the cases of detainees
belonging to organizations suspected of being sympathetic to
the FMLN. ESAF personnel have never been prosecuted for abuse
of detainees or prisoners.
During 1991 government forces frequently resorted to abusive
tactics to intimidate noncombatants perceived as FMLN
sympathizers. The U.N. Special Rapporteur again noted the use
of intimidation and threats by government forces against
humanitarian, labor, rural, and repatriate organizations. On
January 29, Patricia Garcia of the Committee of Mothers of
Political Prisoners, Disappeared, and Assassinated of El
Salvador (COMADRES) was arrested by the National Police. After
her release due to lack of evidence on February 7, she claimed
she had been raped, threatened with other physical torture,
forced to stand for long periods, and deprived of sleep.
Amnesty International and the CDHES report that in January
Ricardo Osmaro Escobar was arrested by the National Guard in
Cabasnas, beaten and given electric shocks, and that Valentin
Ramos was arrested by soldiers of the Third Military Detachment
in Morazan, beaten, and threatened with death. Both were
released after about a week. ONUSAL reports visiting five
young men in San Salvador, Santa Ana, and La Libertad
Departments in August and September who had been badly beaten
while in detention. On October 5, a 20-year-old woman was
arrested and claimed she was taken to a military brigade
barracks and raped repeatedly. Opposition leaders accused CDF
units of abuse and harassment of their campaign workers. Both
the U.N. Special Rapporteur and the Inter-American Human
Rights Commission (lAHRC) stated that the ESAF has frequently
committed abuses and created obstacles that make it difficult
for repatriate communities to function. An ESAF operation
against the FMLN in an area north of the Segundo Montes
repatriate community in August resulted in a miscarriage by a
female resident (see Section l.g.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Although prohibited by the Constitution, arbitrary arrest and
detention continued in 1991. According to the Supreme Court's
information office, 2,000 to 3,000 persons were arrested every
month from January to August by the security forces. Nearly
two-thirds of these detainees were not formally charged and
were released before seeing a judge. The ESAF frequently takes
advantage of the 72-hour administrative detention provision to
arrest and sometimes abuse persons perceived to be sympathetic
to the FMLN or otherwise opposed to the Government. Nearly 50
percent of those detained on suspicion of subversive offenses
were subsequently released and never formally charged.
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However, the number of persons detained on this charge declined
by more than 30 percent in 1991, with 766 detentions registered
in 1990 as compared to 535 detentions in 1991. On June 15, 27
people were arrested at Los Olivos farm in San Salvador
Department and charged with "subversive associations"; 6 days
later, a judge found no merit to the charges and ordered all 27
released immediately.
The Constitution requires that all persons detained by the
security forces be turned over to the courts within 72 hours of
arrest or be freed, but this requirement is frequently
ignored. Although it is a crime for the public security forces
or the military to hold a suspect longer than 72 hours,
violators are never prosecuted. The ESAF also routinely fails
to notify the courts that an arrest has been made. When a
detainee is delivered to the court, the judge may order
detention for an additional 72 hours to determine if the
evidence warrants holding the accused for further
investigation. This time limit is normally respected. The
judge is then allowed 120 days to investigate serious crimes,
or 45 days for lesser offenses, before bringing the accused to
trial or dismissing the case. In practice, however, these time
limits are only rarely observed. El Salvador does not allow
for pretrial release in serious cases, and a suspect may spend
years in jail before being tried. As a recourse against
illegal detention, any accused person may request a review by
an appeals court or the Supreme Court.
The Constitution provides for the right to legal counsel for
criminal suspects, but the ESAF seldom permits attorney access
during the initial 72-hour period of detention and
interrogation when the ESAF most often attempts to extract a
confession or abuses detainees (see Section I.e.). In an
attempt to improve respect for detainees' rights, the Supreme
Court opened a Detainee Information Office in 1990. The Office
is supposed to receive timely reports from the courts, the
military, and the public security forces on arrests and the
status of detainees. In practice, the courts routinely provide
timely information on detainees under their jurisdiction, but
according to the ONUSAL the Office receives no information from
the Army and very little from the police in conflictive zones.
There are no legal provisions for exile. As of year's end,
FMLN leaders outside the country were subject to arrest for
participation in guerrilla operations were they to return.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Legislative Assembly appoints the 14 magistrates of the
Supreme Court for 5-year terms, and the Supreme Court in turn
appoints all lower court judges. The court structure is
divided into four levels: justices of the peace, courts of
first instance, courts of second instance (appeals courts), and
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court hears appeals from
appellate courts, decides writs of habeas corpus and
constitutional cjuestions, and settles disputes between the
legislative and executive branches. Jury verdicts can be
neither overruled by a judge nor appealed to a higher court.
Sentences, however, may be appealed up to the Supreme Court.
In theory, defendants have the right to the presumption of
innocence; protection from self-incrimination; legal counsel;
freedom from coercion; to be present in court; the opportunity
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to confront witnesses; and compensation for damages due to
judicial error. In practice, almost all of these rights are
restricted.
Although nominally independent, the judiciary is severely
weakened by political pressures. Political affiliation and
family ties, rather than professional capabilities, are often
the criteria used for appointing judges. Reappointment is
based more on a judge's political loyalty than on integrity or
professional qualifications. War has added to the pressures on
judicial personnel, who have always been vulnerable to
political influence, bribes, and threats. Judges are often
unwilling to investigate or prosecute members of the armed
forces or the FMLN. Death threats are also common in cases
that involve organized crime.
Civilian judicial authority has never extended to the military
officer corps. Some low-ranking members of the military and
police have been discharged and turned over to the civilian
courts for trial on criminal charges, but ESAF officers have
traditionally committed human rights abuses with impunity.
Judges are frequently reluctant to bring charges against them,
and military colleagues fail to cooperate in investigations of
fellow officers. Although a colonel and a lieutenant were
convicted of murder in the Jesuit case, the ESAF offered only
limited cooperation with the judicial investigation; court
transcripts indicate that high-ranking ESAF officers perjured
themselves to sustain a coverup which may have been designed to
protect the identities of other ESAF officers possibly involved
in the crime.
In 1991 the Legislative Assembly approved reform measures
designed to depoliticize and strengthen the judiciary.
Constitutional reform of the judicial system ratified on
October 23 will extend the terms of Supreme Court magistrates
to 9 years. The Court president will be newly chosen every 3
years, to coincide with the term of the Assembly. The Assembly
will also be required to select magistrates from a list
developed by the National Judicial Council comprised of law
school deans. Supreme Court magistrates, and Assembly
appointees. The reforms will also establish a judicial career
law, mandate pay increases, and create a judicial training
institute. However, it is still far from certain what impact
these reforms will have on the judicial system. In September
government authorities reported there were 127 political
prisoners, of whom 125 are awaiting trial. As of September 6,
COMADRES put the number of political prisoners at 99.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
According to the Constitution, before entering a private
dwelling the security forces must have the resident's consent,
a warrant, or a reasonable belief that a crime is being or is
about to be committed. However, in practice, the ESAF often
uses forced entry without a warrant to carry out arrests and
investigations. The ESAF also frequently intercepts mail
deliveries in war zones, and wiretapping of telephone
communications by the Government, the FMLN, private persons,
and political parties, while illegal, is widespread. The
military draft is applied arbitrarily, and recruits are
forcibly taken off of streets and buses; the sons of the
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wealthy or the well-connected are almost never required to
serve in the military forces.
The guerrillas arbitrarily interfere with the lives of
inhabitants in war zones by, among other things, intercepting
mail and requiring villagers to attend indoctrination
sessions. They engage in forced recruitment to fill their
ranks or to obtain laborers and porters, often coercing young
children to accompany combatants, or even to engage in combat.
Committees tied to the FMLN exercise a high degree of
influence, often through intimidation, over the residents of
repatriate communities.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
As the battle for territory in the countryside intensified
during peace negotiations, human rights monitors condemned both
the ESAF and the FMLN for repeatedly endangering the safety of
civilians .
On April 8 in Jucuaran, Usulutan, an air force bomb landed in a
civilian area, killing Maria Dominga Coreas and her son, Jose
Nelson Coreas. The Air Force accepted responsibility for the
deaths and paid compensation to the family. On September 2, 9
month-old Mayra Norelvis Salazar was killed during a military
operation in the area of San Jose Las Flores, Chalatenango;
ONUSAL suggested the ESAF may have been responsible, although
it also noted the earlier presence of FMLN combatants in the
area. Dora Alicia Gonzalez was injured and suffered a
miscarriage when, according to ONUSAL, the ESAF used excessive
force in reacting to civilians carrying rocks and machetes in
or near the Segundo Montes repatriate community.
The FMLN continued to put civilians at risk during offensive
operations. One civilian was killed when the guerrillas
attacked the ESAF High Command in San Salvador on February 17.
On February 26, when the FMLN attacked the San Salvador suburb
of Escalon and fired on the President's residence, one civilian
was killed. On April 8, a 14-year-old boy, Edwin Alvarado, was
killed, 10 civilians were wounded, and 3 schools were damaged
when the FMLN attacked the National Police, the CDF, and the
telephone company in Quetzaltepeque. The FMLN also killed
civilians during an attack on May 22 on the First Brigade, an
attack on July 22 on the town of Guazapa, and an attack on
October 8 on Apastepec[ue . FMLN use of unmarked,
indiscriminately placed mines and booby traps also caused
deaths and maiming of civilians, but the use of these mines
appeared to be declining: 23 civilians were killed in the
first 5 months of 1990 and 4 in the first 5 months of 1991.
The ESAF has confiscated food and medical supplies from
humanitarian organizations intended for villages (including
repatriate communities) in areas of combat or heavy guerrilla
presence. The lAHRC reported that the ESAF subjects civilians
living in war zones to arbitrary searches, harassment, and
threats. A March report by the International Commission on
Medical Neutrality and a June report by the CDHES assert that
other humanitarian workers confront similar problems.
The FMLN often uses threats against officials in conflict zones
to weaken the Government's influence there. In May and June,
the FMLN threatened mayors and judges in Usulutan and city
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council members in Morazan. After FMLN threats to the city
council in Guatijagua in June, 10 members resigned. FMLN
threats kept eight Chalatenango mayors from moving their
offices from Chalatenango City back to their respective
localities. In August the FMLN kidnaped four government
employees in La Union and threatened to kill them if they
continued their development projects. FMLN death threats
against judicial and other governmental authorities in conflict
zones impeded human rights and other investigations.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
El Salvador has 5 daily newspapers, 6 television stations, over
50 radio stations and 2 cable television systems. The
Government operates one television station and one radio
station. Both the Catholic Church and the ESAF operate radio
stations; the FMLN broadcasts from two clandestine stations.
Print and broadcast journalists, from all points on the
political spectrum, regularly criticize the Government and
report opposition (including FMLN) views.
Freedom of expression is provided for by the Constitution, but
sometimes it is inhibited by violence and threats of violence.
Diario Latino, a leftist newspaper run by its workers, suffered
substantial damage during an arson-caused fire on February 9.
Although the perpetrators had not been located by year's end,
speculation regarding their identity ranged from the extreme
right to an inside plot.
Academic freedom is provided for by the Constitution and was
generally respected by the Government during 1991. University
autonomy prohibits law enforcement officials from entering
campuses. The Government continues to express its concern,
supported by credible reports, that the University of El
Salvador campus is used by the FMLN as a safe haven for urban
guerrilla operations.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Any association not formed for criminal purposes is legal and
permitted in El Salvador. Numerous political, professional,
religious, labor, and social organizations, including some
allied with the FMLN, operate without legal restriction.
However, in practice, members of certain labor, humanitarian,
and peasant organizations were harassed by security forces (see
Sections I.e. and l,g.).
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution and is
respected in practice. However, the political activity of some
religious groups has led to incidents of intimidation of
certain members of these groups. Roman Catholicism is El
Salvador's dominant and official religion, but a growing sector
of the population (estimated at over 20 percent) now practices
other faiths, mostly Protestant and Evangelical.
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d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution establishes the right of free movement.
Article 97 states that foreigners may not involve themselves in
the internal political affairs of the country, and the
Government occasionally denies entry or deports foreigners
believed to violate that section of the law. Local military
commanders require that foreigners (except accredited
journalists) apply for permission to enter war zones and often
restrict entry when military operations are under way. Travel
by Salvadorans within El Salvador is occasionally restricted
for similar reasons. While there are no other limits on
freedom of movement in the rest of the country, those without
proper identification documents are subject to arrest. By
September about 38,000 displaced persons in El Salvador still
required government assistance.
Since the first massive repatriation in late 1987,
approximately 26,900 Salvadorans have repatriated from
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Documentation is the most
pressing issue for all repatriate communities; despite efforts
by the Government and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) , 80 percent of repatriates remain undocumented.
The Government uses accepted U.N. standards to determine the
status of refugees and asylum seekers. The Government imposes
no controls on emigration and cooperates with international
organizations that arrange Salvadoran emigration to other
countries .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their Government through
secret ballot elections which occur every 3 years for
legislators and local officials and every 5 years for the
president and vice-president. In the March legislative and
municipal elections, the ruling ARENA party lost its absolute
majority in the Legislative Assembly by winning only 39 of 84
seats, and a coalition of leftist parties, after ending its
electoral boycott in 1989, won 8 seats and came in second in
total votes in the capital. The far-left Nationalist
Democratic Union joined the political process in 1991 and now
holds one seat in the Assembly. Leaders of the armed FMLN
insurgency have also announced their intention to dismantle
their military structure under U.N. supervision and field
candidates in 1994, when elections for all levels of office,
from president to town council, will coincide.
A Salvadoran 's desire to support a certain political party or
participate in political activity is not always respected (see
Section I.e.). Also in 1991, a grenade exploded in front of a
Democratic Convergence office (no injuries), a caravan of ARENA
activists fired upon UDN supporters (a UDN candidate lost an
eye), and residents of the Segundo Montes Repatriate community
violently prevented the moderate Authentic Christian Movement
from campaigning in norther Morazan.
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Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Domestic human rights organizations active in El Salvador
include the governmental Human Rights Commission (CDH), the
Catholic Church's Tutela Legal and the nongovernmental CDHES .
The CDH compiles information regarding detainees and the
condition of those released from custody. Human rights
constitutional reforms ratified unanimously on September 11
created the position of Human Rights Ombudsman. Although the
secondary laws that will define the exact role and powers of
the Ombudsman had not been formulated by year's end, the broad
mandate of this new office likely will transform or encompass
the CDH. Tutela Legal, the human rights office of the
Archdiocese of San Salvador, conducts its own investigations,
reporting its findings to government and church authorities.
The nongovernmental CDHES interviews victims and other
witnesses and conducts investigations; the CDHES focuses
primarily on abuses by the Government. The Lutheran Church,
many labor unions, universities, and other nongovernmental
organizations also have human rights offices. The CDH, the
Lutheran DDH, the ICRC, and Catholic clergy give regularly
scheduled courses on human rights for police, military, and
civil defense personnel.
ONUSAL inaugurated its principal office in San Salvador on July
26. ONUSAL is investigating human rights violations,
conducting an educational and public awareness campaign
promoting human rights, and will make recommendations to the
Government and the FMLN as well as report directly to the U.N.
Secretary General. The ICRC assists noncombatants in war
zones, visits prisoners and detainees accused of guerrilla
activity, and makes confidential reports to the Government on
human rights issues. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on human
rights in El Salvador made his 11th annual visit to the country
in September. High-ranking government officials and military
officers met regularly during 1991 with legislators from
different countries and with members of human rights
organizations, church and labor groups, and others with an
interest in human rights matters.
There were some threats against human rights monitors in 1991.
Threatening letters were sent by the FAS to Mirtala Lopez of
CRIPDES; there were also FAS threats against ONUSAL. The
nongovermental CDHES reported the following incidents: on the
night of September 4, ex-CDHES member Zuleyma Argueta was
arrested by men in civilian clothes, taken to a National Police
post, and questioned about CDHES activities; on September 5,
the house of CDHES education specialist Azucena Mejia was
illegally searched by uniformed National Police officers; on
December 19, while filming alleged violations during a land
seizure in Santa Ana, CDHES delegate Miguel Montenegro was
arrested and released within an hour.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Article 3 of the Constitution states that all people are equal
before the law and prohibits discrimination based on
nationality, race, sex, or religion. El Salvador is an
ethnically homogeneous country. The Government does not permit
or condone discrimination in housing, jobs, or education
against the country's small minority groups.
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Under the Constitution women enjoy the same legal rights as men
but still suffer discrimination. Salaries for women are
generally lower than those for men, and women are
disproportionally represented in low-pay and low-status jobs in
the informal sector. Wages paid to professional women remain
lower than those paid to men in the same profession, and women
with lower levels of education working in nonprofessional jobs
are paid considerably less than men. In fact, most are not
even paid the lefcfislated minimum wage. Training geared to
females tends to focus on areas where they are already
economically active and in generally low-income occupations:
teaching, nursing, home industries or micro-enterprises, home
economics, and gardening. Training in such traditionally
male-dominated areas as computer sciences, engineering,
agricultural economics, agricultural sciences, and business
administration still tends to be reserved for males. This
perception of traditional male/female roles discourages females
from moving into high-growth, higher paying occupations. In
addition, women do not have equal access to economic resources
such as credit and land.
Violence against women, including domestic violence, is
widespread, but the lack of reliable statistics countrywide
makes it impossible to gauge its true extent. Statistics in
San Miguel, the third largest city, show that there were 400
rape cases from January to July and that the majority of the
victims were minors. Rape and domestic violence cases are
rarely prosecuted as judges often dismiss the charges, blaming
the victim for provoking the crime. A judge in a September
rape case ruled that a woman cannot deny conjugal privileges to
her husband. Prosecution of rape cases is difficult because of
lack of support groups for victims, lack of forensic
capability, and cultural attitudes. However, some efforts were
undertaken to encourage rape victims to come forward and press
charges. Since August a public prosecutor has been on duty 24
hours a day at the San Salvador children's hospital to assist
rape victims and their families in taking legal action. The
National Secretariat of the Family, headed by the wife of the
President, Margarita Cristiani, has organized conferences on
the prevention of domestic violence and child abuse.
Women's rights groups are active in El Salvador. There are
nearly 100 women's organizations to assist low-income women.
Major concerns for women's rights groups are equal rights,
unemployment, access to credit and skills training, illiteracy,
health services, family planning, child care, and violence
against women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The 1983 Constitution prohibits the Government from using
nationality, sex, race, creed, or political philosophy to
prevent workers or employers from organizing themselves into
unions or associations. This provision was intended to provide
the legal framework for secondary legislation, including a
revised Labor Code. However, a confusing and sometimes
conflicting set of laws governing labor relations remains in
place. While existing statutes provide protections that are
enforceable under the Constitution, their inconsistencies often
result in cumbersome procedures and significant delays. The
National Union of Salvadoran Workers and Peasants (UNOC)
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charged in October that the Cristiani Government had not
granted legal recognition to a single union since it has been
in power. On August 16, the Intergremial, an umbrella group
which includes El Salvador's largest labor organizations,
presented a draft labor code to the Legislative Assembly, to
which eight labor leaders were elected in 1991, and also to the
political parties. The proposed legislation was prepared by
the UNOC, El Salvador's largest labor group, and both the
Government and the private sector are reportedly studying the
UNOC draft in order to negotiate final legislation.
Legally, only private sector nonagricultural workers have the
right to form unions and to strike, while employees of the nine
autonomous public institutions may form unions but not strike.
The existing Labor Code requires that disputes go through
direct bargaining, conciliation, and arbitration before a
strike may be called. In practice since both labor and
management often ignore the onerous and time-consuming legal
requirements, most strikes are technically illegal. The
absence of specific laws granting public employees the right to
strike has not deterred such strike activity. The most
important strikes in 1991 were organized by public employee
associations and by a coordinating group of government
employees called UNASTEMA. Work stoppages were called by
teachers and employees of the Education Ministry, municipal
workers in San Salvador and other cities, employees at the
Treasury and Public Works Ministries, and the state-owned
telephone company. All of these public employee strikes were
eventually resolved through negotiations between labor and the
Government .
There are approximately 150 currently active trade unions,
employee associations, and peasant organizations, with a
combined membership of just over 400,000, roughly 15 percent of
the work force. The UNOC, claiming some 200,000 members,
remains by far the country's largest labor organization. These
organizations freely elect their officers in accordance with
their constitutions and bylaws. Leaders of worker
organizations appear frequently on television, publish their
views in major newspapers, and conduct seminars without
government interference. There are no restrictions on
affiliation with international organizations, and unions freely
affiliate with such international labor organizations.
Incidents of harassment and violence against union and
cooperative members continued in 1991. According to the
ONUSAL, on September 24, construction union member Miguel Angel
Martinez was found murdered in San Salvador. The construction
union leaders had previously been threatened by the FAS. The
U.N. Special Rapporteur noted the repression of strikes and
demonstrations by the ESAF.
An International Labor Organization committee extensively
examined two freedom of association complaints against El
Salvador in 1991. Among other issues, it deplored the large
number of violent deaths and disappearances in the recent past,
failure to comply with legal prescriptions concerning arrests
and detentions, the use of force to break strikes and the
dismissal of unionists for participating in strikes, and
antiunion discrimination.
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EL SALVADOR
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right of collective bargaining is granted in both the
Constitution and the Labor Code. Under the Labor Code, only
private sector workers may exercise this right, but the
Constitution is interpreted broadly to provide all workers the
right to bargain collectively. Private sector unions use the
mechanism of collective bargaining extensively, and a similar
collective bargaining practice is also followed, although more
informally, between public employee associations and the
Government. However, collective bargaining agreements signed
by public employee associations are not enforceable under the
Labor Code.
The Director General's office of the Ministry of Labor is
responsible for overseeing the implementation of collective
bargaining agreements and acting as conciliator in
labor-related disputes in the private sector and autonomous
government institutions. The Ministry of Labor is also
frequently asked to conciliate labor disputes involving public
employee associations, although these associations are not
technically covered by the Labor Code. The Ministry
successfully conciliated 126 disputes in which workers alleged
violations of contracts or the Labor Code by management.
The relationship between the business community and the labor
movement remains strained, and business leaders continue to
take measures to prevent unions from being formed. Union
leaders have also complained about lengthy and complex
procedures required to register new unions. An outdated Labor
Code, inadequate enforcement authority, and corruption remain
obstacles to fully protecting the right to organize.
The Constitution provides that union officials at the time of
their election, throughout their term, and for 1 year following
their term shall not be fired, suspended for disciplinary
reasons, removed, or debased in their work conditions except
for legal cause. This provision is generally observed in
practice.
El Salvador has one export processing zone. There are no
differences between labor regulations in this zone and those
which prevail elsewhere. However, there are no labor unions
represented in any of the firms in the zone, and the firms
discourage labor organizing.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor except in
cases of public calamity and other instances specified by law.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The -Constitution prohibits the employment of children under the
age of 14. The Labor Code states that exceptions may be made
only in cases where it can be demonstrated that such employment
is absolutely indispensable to the sustenance of the minor and
his family. This is most often the case with children of
peasant families who traditionally work with their families
during planting and harvesting seasons. The Constitution also
prohibits the employment of persons under 18 years of age and
all women in occupations considered hazardous. Inspections by
the Ministry of Labor are insufficient to fully enforce the law.
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EL SALVADOR
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government's National Minimum Wage Council recommends
increases in the minimum wages for commercial, industrial,
service, and agroindustrial employees. For the most part,
minimum wages are inadequate to meet the Ministry of Economy's
standard of basic necessity, and an estimated 40 percent of the
population lives below the poverty level.
The law limits the workday to 6 hours for minors between 14 and
18 years of age and 8 hours for adults. Premium pay is
mandated for longer hours. The average workweek is 44 hours.
The Constitution and the Labor Code require employers,
including the Government, to take steps to ensure that
employees are not placed at risk in their workplaces. Despite
extremely limited budgetary resources, the Ministry of Labor
attempts to enforce the applicable regulations. According to
Ministry figures, its Office of the Inspector General conducted
approximately 58,000 worksite inspections between June 1990 and
July 1991. The Inspector General's corps cited employers for
numerous infractions and assessed fines. Salvadoran health and
safety regulations are outdated, however, and inadequate
enforcement remains a problem.
607
GRENADA
Grenada's parliamentary form of government, with a Governor
General as titular Head of State, was suspended in 1979 by the
Marxist People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) and then
restored in October 1983 following the joint U. S . -Car ibbean
intervention. The second postrevolutionary election was held
on March 13, 1990, following the death in December 1989 of
Prime Minister Herbert Blaize who had prorogued Parliament in
August 1989 rather than face a potential no confidence vote.
In a free and fair election in March no political party
received a clear majority. Following several days of
inconclusive negotiations among the parties, the Governor
General appointed as Prime Minister Nicholas Brathwaite, who
successfully formed a majority government around the National
Democratic Congress (NDC) parliamentarians.
National security in Grenada is the responsibility of the
600-member Royal Grenada Police Force (RGPF), which includes a
75-man paramilitary Special Services Unit (SSU) and a 30-man
coast guard unit. The RGPF and its elements are controlled by
and responsive to civilian government authorities.
Grenadians are free to pursue economic goals in a free market
environment. Major improvements in infrastructure have
accompanied economic growth, which has averaged 5 percent
annually in real terms over the past several years. Economic
development in agriculture, construction, tourism,
transportation, and communications has been aided by a return
of Grenadian capital and substantial economic assistance
following restoration of democratic government in 1983.
Grenadians enjoy a wide range of civil and political rights.
Human rights problems in 1991 included incidents of domestic
violence against women, and some allegations of mistreatment
and poor living conditions at the prison. On August 14 Prime
Minister Braithwaite granted clemency to all 14 defendants who
had been sentenced to death by the courts for the murders of
Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and several Cabinet members in
1983. The sentences were commuted to life imprisonment.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated or other
extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances
or abductions.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution specifically prohibits torture, and there were
no reported incidents of torture in Grenada in 1991.
Prisoners in the Richmond Hill Prison have complained of lack
of exercise opportunities and poor diet, and an American
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GRENADA
citizen held overnight in the downtown lockup complained in
general terms of poor conditions there. The only complaint
alleging actual mistreatment was made publicly by a former
Grenadian prisoner following release, but contained few
specifics. There is a citizen prison visitation committee,
established in 1990, which visits the prison periodically to
check on the condition of the prisoners. They did not report
having found unacceptable conditions at the prison during the
year .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
According to law, police have the right to detain persons on
suspicion without a warrant, but formal charges must be brought
within 48 hours. This time limit is adhered to in practice.
If the detainee is not charged within this time, he must be
released. In 1991 no one was detained for political reasons.
The law provides for a judicial determination of the legality
of detention within 15 days after arrest on a criminal charge.
Formal arraignment or release of the arrestee must be decided
within 60 days. These procedures were generally followed.
There is a functioning system of bail, although those charged
with capital offenses are not eligible. Persons charged with
treason may be accorded bail only upon recommendation of the
Governor General.
No Grenadian citizen was exiled in 1990.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to a fair public trial is provided for by law and is
observed in practice. Those arrested and charged are brought
before an independent judiciary and are allowed access to a
lawyer of their choice. For capital crimes, the courts will
appoint a lawyer for the accused if he cannot afford one of his
own choosing, or it will appoint the lawyer who represented the
accused at the preliminary stages of the prosecution if the
accused can no longer afford the lawyer's services. In other
cases which reach the appellate stage, the court will similarly
appoint a lawyer to represent the accused if he was not
previously represented, or reappoint the defendant's earlier
counsel if the appellant can no longer afford the lawyer's
services. Following a determination by a judicial hearing that
there is sufficient evidence to substantiate a criminal charge,
the defendant is remanded for trial. Due to the backlog of
cases caused by a shortage of judges and facilities, a
significant amount of time can pass before those charged are
brought to trial.
In the cases of the 17 former PRG and army officials convicted
of the murders of Maurice Bishop and others in October 1983,
the Government took particular care to afford a fair public
trial. This included appellate hearings lasting from May 1988
until September 1990, with the decision handed down on July 12,
1991. Neither defense attorneys nor the three-person panel of
Caribbean jurists who were on the Grenada Supreme Court which
heard the appeals, were from Grenada. The Grenada Supreme
Court upheld all the sent'"nces . A second appeal was made on
August 9, 1991, but it was dismissed. The Government chose to
exercise the prerogative of mercy, which is written into the
Constitution, and commuted all the death sentences to life
imprisonment .
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GRENADA
Grenada rejoined the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States'
(OECS) judicial system in August. By so doing, the Grenada
Supreme Court, which had been instituted by the PRG in 1979 as
the highest judicial authority to have jurisdiction over
Grenadians, ceased to exist for that function. The court is
now the Supreme Court of Grenada and the West Indies Associated
States. Under the OECS system, appeals may be taken up to the
Privy Council, in London.
There are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were no reports of these types of arbitrary
interference. Judicially issued warrants for searching homes
are normally recjuired by law except in cases of hot pursuit.
In practice, warrants are obtained in the majority of cases
before a search is conducted.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is provided for by the Constitution
and is freely exercised. There are five weekly newspapers and
several newspapers that are published irregularly. Most are
affiliated with political parties, but the three most widely
circulated newspapers are independent and are frequently
critical of the Government. Flyers are occasionally
distributed by the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (named
after the former leader of the New Jewel Movement whose violent
overthrow in October 1983 by another faction led to the
intervention by the United States and several Caribbean
states) .
Grenada has three radio stations. The government station,
broadcasting on AM, is the most powerful and covers the whole
three-island state and parts of the Eastern Caribbean. The
other two stations are FM by choice and cover only a portion of
Grenada. Grenada's television broadcasting system is
government controlled. Political parties were allowed to
purchase television time for political campaigning.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Grenadians enjoy the right to assemble for any peaceful
purpose. Supporters of political parties meet frequently and
hold public rallies; permits are not required for public
meetings, but are required for the use of a public address
system.
c. Freedom of Religion
All groups enjoy freedom of religion. The Roman Catholic,
Seventh Day Adventist, and Anglican faiths predominate. In
addition there are Presbyterian, Methodist, and other Christian
groups. There is a small Muslim community but no mosque;
prayers are held on the premises of a local business. There is
also a small Baha ' i group.
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GRENADA
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There is freedom of movement within Grenada, and all citizens
have the right to enter and leave the country except in special
circumstances as outlined and limited by the 1986 Act to
Restrict the Freedom of Movement of Certain Persons. This law
allows the Minister for National Security to restrict travel
out of Grenada of any person whose aims, tendencies, or
objectives include the overthrow of the democratic and
parliamentary system of government; it was not invoked in
1991. Anyone so restricted may appeal after 3 months to an
independent and impartial tribunal, presided over by an
accredited lawyer chosen by the Chief Justice.
No one was forcibly repatriated from Grenada in 1991. There
were no official applications to Grenadian authorities for
refugee status, although the Baha'i community includes Iranians
who left their homeland to escape persecution. Work permits
are granted to them, and they are allowed to practice their
religion freely. The Government has allowed students and
others to return to Grenada from Cuba and other (former)
Communist countries. Grenadians are allowed to travel to Cuba
and receive Cuban scholarships.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change
their government through free and fair elections to be held at
least every 5 years. The political system is not dominated by
any particular ethnic group, nor are there any restrictions
that limit participation of any elements of the Grenadian
population.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Amnesty International and the Institute for the Promotion of
Human Rights have access to Grenada. The Government cooperates
with visits from international human rights organizations and
is responsive to inquiries from local human rights groups.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no evidence of official discrimination in health care,
employment, or education. There continue to be some reported
incidents of unofficial job discrimination against Guyanese and
other foreign-born residents. Women frequently earn less than
men performing the same work; such wage differences are less
marked for the more highly paid jobs.
Knowledgeable women's rights activists report that violence
against women in Grenada is common and that most cases of
spouse abuse go unreported to police authorities. To address
this problem, one women's group instituted in December 1989 a
crisis telephone hot line so that victims of rape or spouse
abuse have a mechanism for requesting support and assistance.
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GRENADA
The police confirm that most cases of alleged abuse are not
reported and others are settled out of court. Grenadian law
stipulates a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment for a
conviction of rape. Sentences for assault against a spouse
vary according to the severity of the incident. The Government
has under consideration Caribbean Community-produced draft
legislation dealing with violence against women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers are free to organize independent labor unions. Labor
Ministry officials estimate the percentage of the work force
that is unionized to be between 20 and 25 percent. Membership
in unions that represent restaurant and hotel workers expanded
in 1991. With the largest per capita public sector work force
in the region, the public sector unions hope to limit numbers
laid off and at the same time obtain a wage increase
retroactive to 1990. Union leaders play a significant role in
the political process, and one labor leader serves in the
Senate at the nomination of the government party.
Workers in the public and private sectors may and do strike
legally if they give advance notification. There were several
strikes in 1991, often in statutory entities such as the
telecommunications company, but all were short lived and
settled with the intervention of the Ministry of Labor. In
1991 all unions were free of government control, and none was
given government financial support. All the major unions in
Grenada belong to the one umbrella labor federation, the
Grenada Trades Union Council (GTUC), which holds annual
conventions and dictates some policy to leaders of the member
unions. The GTUC and its unions freely affiliate with regional
and international trade union groups.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers are free to engage in organizing and to participate in
collective bargaining. Legislation compels employers to
recognize a union that represents the majority of workers in a
particular business. The law prohibits antiunion
discrimination by employers against union members and
organizers. If a complaint of discrimination arises,
mechanisms exist for attempting to resolve it. After all
avenues for resolving a complaint have been exhausted between
union representatives and employers, both sides may agree to
ask for the assistance of the Labor Commissioner. If the Labor
Commissioner is unable to find a resolution to the impasse, the
Minister of Labor may appoint an arbitration tribunal if both
parties agree to abide by its ruling. These procedures are
routinely and effectively used.
Unions may organize and bargain anywhere in the country,
including in the one export processing zone (EPZ), which is not
exempted from Grenada's labor legislation. However, no EPZ
firm is presently unionized; the one firm previously unionized
has since shut down its Grenada-based operations.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution specifically prohibits forced labor, and no
such instances were reported in 1991.
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GRENADA
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The statutory minimum age for employment of children, 16 years,
is enforced in the formal sector by periodic checks made by
inspectors from the Ministry of Labor. Enforcement efforts in
the informal sector are lax.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Legislated minimum daily wage rates, most recently revised in
1990, are set for the agricultural, industrial, and commercial
sectors. Most workers in Grenada receive other benefits from
their employers through collective bargaining, but even when
these benefits are added to wages from a full-time minimum wage
job, it is barely enough to provide a decent standard of living.
The law does not prescribe a set number of hours as the
standard workweek, except for the public sector which is
expected to work a 40-hour week Monday through Friday.
However, the normal workweek in all sectors seldom exceeds 40
hours, although in the commercial sector this includes Saturday
morning work.
Health and safety standards set by the Government are minimal
and not effectively enforced. Laws on working conditions and
their enforcement apply equally to the export processing zone.
613
GUATEMALA
The Constitution calls for election by universal suffrage of a
one-term president, a unicameral Congress, and municipal
officers; it mandates an independent judiciary and a Human
Rights Ombudsman, who reports to Congress. Jorge Serrano won
the 1991 presidential elections with 68 percent of the vote,
taking office on January 14. Several hundred foreign observers
and journalists, monitored the elections and found them to be
free and fair.
The armed forces operate with significant institutional and
legal autonomy, particularly in security and military matters.
The army, which has responsibility for national security, has
been fighting a leftist insurgency for 31 years; it includes a
Mobile Military Police (PMA) that guards key facilities and has
a limited anticrime role. The National Police and the Treasury
Police report to the Interior Minister, a civilian. About
500,000 men in Voluntary Civil Defense Committees (CVDC), more
commonly called Civil Self-Defense Patrols (PAC), perform
counter insurgency operations in rural areas. Despite a
constitutional prohibition, membership in the PAC's in conflict
zones is often involuntary. The security forces and the PAC's
committed numerous and serious human rights violations during
1991.
Agriculture and commerce dominate the largely private
enterprise economy, with coffee, cotton, sugar, and bananas
accounting for the bulk of export earnings. During its first
months, the Serrano Government took steps to combat inflation,
stabilize exchange rates, lower interest rates, and carry out
other economic and fiscal reforms. The economy grew at a real
rate of 3.2 percent.
In 1991 the military, civil patrols, and the police continued
to commit a majority of the major human rights abuses,
including extrajudicial killings, torture, and disappearances
of, among others, human rights activists, unionists, indigenous
people, and street children. The motive behind many of the
abuses appears to be the belief, whether factual or based on
spurious information, that the victims were in some way
supportive of or sympathetic to the guerrillas. Guerrillas
also committed human rights violations, including killings of
policemen and others, kidnapings, forced labor and recruitment,
wide use of mines and other explosives, and the use of children
in combat .
Many human rights cases in which the United States had
officially expressed interest remained unsolved, such as: the
1985 disappearances of U.S. citizens Blake and Davis, the 1989
kidnapings of several Rununel Junam Council of Ethnic
Communities (CERJ) members, the disappearance and murder of
university students, the kidnaping and abuse of American nun
Diana Ortiz, the knife attack on members of the Peace Brigades
(PHI), the murders of Hector Oqueli, Gilda Flores, Gonzalez
Gamarra, and Villanueva de Barrera in 1990, and the
disappearances of Maria Tiu Tojin and her daughter from a
relocation center in 1990. The Army High Command continued to
impede a thorough investigation into the murder by army
personnel of American citizen Michael Devine in 1990. Because
of a lack of sufficient progress on human rights in Guatemala,
the United States has not resumed its military aid program,
suspended since December 1990.
Despite continuing serious abuses and lack of progress on many
cases, the current Government has shown more political will
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GUATEMALA
than its predecessor in promoting respect for human rights and
in pursuing violators. President Serrano has demonstrated a
commitment to control the military and to end the impunity of
human rights violators. Two army personnel, including an
officer, were arrested for the 1990 Santiago Atitlan massacre
and were convicted and sentenced to prison, and a suspect tied
to the military staff of former President Cerezo was arrested
in the 1990 Myrna Mack murder case (see Section l.a.). A few
PAC members were arrested for the murders of some human rights
activists. In August the President announced the creation of a
cabinet-level Human Rights Commission to advise him and respond
to reports of violations. The military agreed to participate
in peace negotiations led by President Serrano with the
Guatemala National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) guerrilla
coalition. Overall, the human rights situation improved from
1990, with the greatest improvement seen in the willingness of
increasing numbers of Guatemalan organizations and individuals
to address publicly and openly sensitive human rights issues.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Media and other reports indicated the 1991 murder toll to be
higher than the official figures of 1,800 to 2,000. While
common crime caused the vast majority of violent deaths, the
number of politically motivated killings, though fewer than in
1990, was very high. Preliminary reporting from the Human
Rights Ombudsman listed 258 complaints of political killings
(compared to 304 for all of 1990). The Archbishop's Human
Rights Office reported 575 political executions for the same
period; a local human rights group, the Mutual Support Group
(GAM), reported 796 "political killings" but did not define the
term.
Most of these killings are credibly believed to have been
committed by the armed forces and persons associated with or
protected by the army, such as the civil defense patrols. Most
of them took place in areas of military-guerrilla conflict,
where the military often fails to distinguish between
guerrillas and noncombatants . The security forces were
probably involved in many vigilante killings of criminals or
criminal suspects. The criminal backgrounds of many of these
victims suggests that the killers had access to police, court,
and prison data.
The security forces are virtually never held accountable for
human rights violations. With few exceptions, the Government
failed properly to investigate, detain, and prosecute
perpetrators of extrajudicial and politically motivated
killings. Often the army fails to cooperate with police,
courts, and prosecutors to bring to justice army personnel
involved in abuses. This was particularly evident throughout
1991 in the stalled investigation of the murder of American
citizen Michael Devine in 1990. The Ombudsman, the Attorney
General, and human rights groups have also found unambiguous
eyewitness and physical evidence of killings by the PAC's;
several clandestine cemeteries were found containing summarily
executed victims, some showing signs of torture. PAC leaders
enjoy army backing and virtual de facto immunity from
prosecution, and they are feared in many rural communities.
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GUATEMALA
The armed forces and PAC's frequently threatened and sometimes
killed human rights activists. CERJ is a rural-based human
rights organization dedicated mainly to opposing involuntary
service in the civil patrols. Juan Perebal and one son,
members of CERJ, were shot dead near Chunima (Quiche
Department) on February 17. Another son survived the shooting
and identified the attackers as Manuel Perebal Ajtzalam and
Manuel Xon Lares, former PAC leaders. The victims had
previously implicated the two attackers in the 1990 kidnaping
of Sebastian Velasquez Mejia, another CERJ member who was later
found dead. The two ex-PAC leaders had more than 10
outstanding arrest warrants, and efforts by police to arrest
them failed when armed civil patrol members intervened.
However, due to the intervention of President Serrano, in July
both surrendered, and judicial proceedings were under way at
year's end. Other such killings included CERJ members Miguel
Tzoy Colel, who had received death threats for refusing to join
a PAC; Toman Ventura Xon; Celestino Vicente Julay; and Camilo
Ajqui Jimon who, according to one credible report, was attacked
with knives and nearly decapitated by three men who also
threatened his wife.
There were several notable extrajudicial killings of political
party members, an army general, and a police investigator. In
April, two men in Guatemala City killed Dinora Perez, a young
woman involved in forming a new leftist political party, the
United Guatemala Party (PGU) . In 1991 most PGU members,
including 1985 Social Democratic Party vice-presidential
candidate Luis Zurita, fled abroad. The killers clearly meant
to abort the PGU. In January gunmen killed Escuintla Mayor
Marco Tulio Collado, following a period during which he had
received threats. Relatives blamed "right-wing extremists." A
crime which might be linked to the 1990 murder case of Myrna
Mack was the murder in August of Police Homicides Investigation
Chief Jose Luis Merida, who handled — among other sensitive
tasks — the investigation into Mack's death. In May two men
killed active-duty general and former defense attache to the
United States Anacleto Maza. Reports indicate Maza was about
to reveal information concerning corruption in the army
commissary and corrupt acts by government officers involved
with the national airline.
In June armed men killed Oscar Oswaldo Luna, a member of the
San Carlos University (USAC) maintenance workers' union who had
taken part in a bitter strike in which USAC officials were held
hostage. Although President Serrano ordered that the killing
be thoroughly investigated, there were no results by year's
end. There continued to be credible reports that policemen and
private security guards tortured and killed street children,
although there were fewer such reports in 1991. A court in
March sentenced four policemen to long prison terms for the
beating death of "street child" Nahamon Carmona Lopez in 1990.
However, a higher court found errors in sentencing, and, as
1991 ended, the case was remanded to the lower court. The case
against two other policemen accused of involvement in the
deaths of four other street children in 1990 continued in court.
Guerrillas were also responsible for extrajudicial killings in
1991. In June, Genaro Cabrera Gomez, a guerrilla who accepted
amnesty, was tortured and killed; a note stated that guerrillas
killed him for "treason." Relatives of Lorenzo Perebal and
Andres Lopix, Solola military commissioners (civilian army
employees whose main job is to ensure compliance with the
draft), said guerrillas kidnaped and murdered both men in
October .
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GUATEMALA
In June police arrested five PAC members in Alta Verapaz for
the death that month of Domingo Xe. Noel Beteta Alvarez,
suspected of stabbing Myrna Mack, was arrested following
deportation from the United States. At the time of Mack's
death, Beteta was working for the presidential military staff
of the prior administration. In December a court found
sufficient prima facie evidence against Beteta to justify
judicial proceedings. These were under way as 1991 ended. The
discovery of eleven torture and murder victims in August led to
the quick arrest of seven navy personnel, including the
commander of the Pacific naval base. In March the Supreme
Court dismissed the Government's appeal of the 1990 dismissal
by an appeals court of the convictions of six Quetzaltenango
policemen for the kidnaping and murder of two students in 1986.
b. Disappearance
The Ombudsman's office's preliminary report for 1991 indicated
that he had received 182 complaints of disappearances (compared
to 233 for all 1990). The Archbishop's Human Rights Office
reported 144 disappearances for the period, while the GAM
reported 126 kidnapings. Most political disappearances were
credibly believed to have been committed by persons linked to
the armed forces; the Government did not identify and prosecute
these persons.
According to witnesses, a reported member of CERJ, Felipe Lopez
Mendoza, was abducted in June by two men near Santa Cruz del
Quiche; no record of his arrest or detention was ever found.
In June Yolanda Figueroa, a leader in the Custom Workers Union,
was the intended victim of a kidnaping. A Treasury Policeman
foiled the crime, wounding two assailants. In April CERJ
leader Amilcar Mendez reported a kidnaping attempt in Guatemala
City in which men tried to drag him from his car into another
vehicle, desisting only when a crowd gathered. In May CERJ
member Miguel Sucuqiji charged that he was the victim of an
aborted kidnaping attempt by a local PAC.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
As in past years, many bodies found throughout Guatemala bore
signs of torture or postmortem mutilation. Such treatment,
however, is not necessarily evidence of security force
involvement: gangs and other criminals, as well as guerrillas,
all use torture. There were, nevertheless, many credible
reports of torture and mistreatment by security forces. There
were also credible reports of the use of excessive force by
police at the time of arrest and of abusive treatment by army
personnel, civil defense patrols, military commissioners, and
police of persons in rural areas.
In April police in Chiquimula arrested the ex-secretary general
of the electric workers' union. Otto Ivan Rodriguez, claiming
that he belonged to a car theft ring. They beat him, nearly
blinding him in one eye. The abuse ended when a judge had
Rodriguez taken from the local jail to one in Guatemala City
where he received medical treatment. He was freed on April 25
and left the country. Another reported case of abuse in
official detention was that of Messrs. Resales, Trujillo, and
Castillo who were arrested in August. Representatives of the
Archbishop's Human Rights Office visited the three prisoners
and confirmed that they were abused by the National Police.
The Human Rights Ombudsman, reporting on the case, denounced
the police and demanded the resignation of the National Police
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GUATEMALA
Director, a retired Army Colonel. He was replaced by a
civilian, the first to head the police in many years. Judicial
proceedings were begun against the police officers thought to
be involved in the torture. Julio Chualcuben, who was kidnaped
on December 16, 1990, was found near death on a rural highway
10 days later and taken to a hospital, where he remained
semicomatose until June. After regaining consciousness, he did
not have the use of his voice, legs, and right arm, but he
described his ordeal by writing with his left hand. According
to his account, military commissioners accused him of being a
guerrilla and took him to Solola's army base, where he was
interrogated, tortured, and left for dead. During his ordeal,
base officers had ignored writs of habeas corpus presented on
his behalf. The case has not been investigated. In March the
Ombudsman charged abuse at an army base near Izabal where
victims and other people in the area said that the base
commander and military commissioners sought to push them off
land wanted by a local firm. The Ombudsman asked the Defense
Minister to investigate; the commander was put at the
"disposal" of a military judge. Nothing further was heard
about the incident by year's end.
The Government undertook efforts to end police abuse of street
children; the new police director on several occasions made
clear he would not tolerate abuse of street children, and
reports of such incidents declined in 1991. However, on
October 23 two police cadets stopped and beat 17-year old
Walter Federico Flores, leaving him in the street unconscious,
when Flores objected to turning over his identification
papers. The Minister of Interior promised to look into the
matter but, as of the end of the year, no results had been
announced. The Attorney General appointed a special prosecutor
and a special investigator to look into the case of Sister
Diana Ortiz, an American nun who reported being kidnaped,
raped, and tortured in November 1989.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
A court-issued arrest warrant is required unless a person is
caught committing a crime. Police may not keep a suspect for
over 6 hours without bringing him to a judge. The law provides
for bail, access to lawyers, and limits to 20 days the time
anyone may be held, after which he must be charged or freed.
Authorities must produce detainees on request.
Despite these safeguards, there are frequent credible reports
of arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention by security
forces. Those engaged in such detentions routinely ignore
writs of habeas corpus. A preliminary report by the Human
Rights Ombudsman indicated that his office was investigating 10
credible complaints of illegal arrest in the capital. There
was reliable evidence of detentions by guerrillas. Guerrillas
forced some rural residents to take part in patrols similar to
PAC patrols. Guerrillas operating near the capital were also
reported to have taken several civilian hostages in October.
Exile is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary
comprised of a Court of Constitutionality, a Supreme Court,
Appeals Courts, and several courts of special jurisdiction,
such as labor courts. Military courts have jurisdiction over
military personnel, including military commissioners but not
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members of the PAC, thereby limiting the ability of civilian
courts to prosecute military personnel in human rights abuse
cases. Civilian trials are public; defendants have the right
to be present and to legal representation. An appeals court
automatically reviews convictions.
The judicial system is virtually ineffective in human rights
cases. Most human rights violations are never investigated;
security forces are reluctant to investigate cases in which
their colleagues are implicated. Judges are susceptible to
intimidation and corruption, suffer low pay, bad working
conditions, and low morale. In October the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court denounced pressure on judges by army officers
in rural areas, and U.N. Human Rights Expert Christian
Tomuschat echoed those charges.
There are no known political prisoners.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of home,
correspondence, and private documents, provisions that are not
always respected. Army intelligence units monitor private
communications. In addition, officials enforcing the military
draft frec[uently entered homes and places of business without
the legally required court orders.
The Constitution requires that PAC service be voluntary.
However, army officers, military commissioners, and PAC leaders
often pressure men in conflict zones to become PAC members.
There are credible reports that those who refuse to serve have
suffered serious abuse, including death.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Despite the efforts of President Serrano, the internal armed
conflict entered its 31st year in 1991 and continued to be a
cause of major human rights violations. There continued to be
charges of indiscriminate army "carpet bombings" and artillery
barrages; given the small, tightly controlled aerial and
artillery assets of the army, these charges are not credible.
In October the press reported an aerial attack on a
guerrilla-controlled Popular Community in Resistance (CPR)
named Caba just prior to the scheduled visit of U.N. Human
Rights Expert Tomuschat. Subsequent information, however,
showed the firing was not aimed at Caba, but was in response to
guerrillas 3 kilometers away who had fired on an army
helicopter. Little information exists on the fate of many
captured guerrillas. Information from previous years, however,
leads to the conclusion that such persons often faced torture
and death at the hands of their military captors. There were
some documented cases, however, of guerrillas who applied for
and received amnesty and were well treated.
In October the army charged that guerrillas summarily executed
four wounded soldiers; the report was plausible but without
independent confirmation. Guerrillas used children as young as
12 years of age in combat and as young as 7 in such noncombat
roles as lookouts and couriers. They also made wide use of
landmines and other explosives, including "pamphlet bombs," one
of which injured a girl at the capital's zoo. In February the
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) in northern Quiche attacked a
13-man PAC, killing 10 and wounding 3. Witnesses said the EGP
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GUATEMALA
had caught the lightly armed PAC in a well-laid ambush and
summarily executed some of the wounded. The Human Rights
Ombudsman, who barely escaped injury when his helicopter took
guerrilla fire, found that the EGP violated international
humanitarian law. In March guerrillas ambushed a police car
escorting a bicycle race in Solola; two policemen died and the
car was set afire. Guerrillas killed two more policemen in
Nueva Vinas in J\ily. This incident led to a public outcry, and
in August guerrillas promised they would no longer target
policemen. Since then, no more attacks have taken place.
In March police dislodged squatters on a Pacific coast estate,
Finca Olga Maria. A woman was killed and several other
persons, including police, were hurt. Three foreigners of the
Peace Brigades were arrested and required to leave Guatemala.
The Ombudsman charged that the police used premeditated lethal
force and acted without a judicial order. A police official
was removed from his post by the Interior Minister, and murder
charges were filed against him.
An army lieutenant and a sergeant were arrested, convicted, and
sentenced to 4 years and 16 years respectively for the 1990
Santiago de Atitlan massacre in which 14 people were killed,
including two children, during a peaceful demonstration against
army abuses. Armed army personnel on patrol approached the
town of Santiago de Atitlan in mid-1991 but were confronted by
local residents and turned away.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of expression, and
critics of the Government, including guerrilla leaders, had
access to the media — nearly all of which, including television,
is privately owned. A range of organizations, many critical of
the Government, have their own publications, including the
Ombudsman, who began a monthly newsletter during the year.
However, a series of attempts of undetermined origin to
intimidate the media occurred in August and September. These
included anonymous telephone threats and the placing of a
powerful bomb (deactivated by security forces) in a large
office building where many foreign and domestic press agencies
are located. Two men entered the offices of the press agency
NOTIMEX, threatened the secretary, and rifled through files.
Two days later, the home of the NOTIMEX correspondent was
entered and ransacked. The local International Press Service
(IPS) correspondent had to leave Guatemala after receiving
threats, but the office remained open. The Government did
little to investigate these incidents.
There were numerous warnings to journalists not to publish
articles on the cases of Michael Devine, Myrna Mack, the
attempted murder of journalist Byron Barrera (his wife died in
the attack) in 1990, and on several U.S. narcotics-related
extradition requests. Many journalists complained that the
Serrano Administration showed little sympathy or concern for
threatened newsmen. Media representatives openly denounced
the threats and vowed to continue their work on human rights
cases and other sensitive topics. Nevertheless, there
continued to be self-censorship on certain topics, such as
investigative reporting into corruption in the military or into
illegal actions by powerful politicians.
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GUATEMALA
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution recognizes the rights of peaceful assembly and
association: parades, rallies, marches, forums, debates, and
seminars on various topics, including human rights, took place
openly and freely. Organizations require legal association
status, a cumbersome and expensive procedure which works
against organizations without good funding or legal counsel.
While legally organizations must have association status, not
having it did not stop groups, including some with foreign
ties, from operating openly. In October Guatemala played host
to an international indigenous peoples' gathering entitled
"500 Year Struggle Against Oppression" to mark the anniversary
of Christopher Columbus' arrival in America.
c. Freedom of Religion
No state religion exists. Religious freedom is
constitutionally guaranteed and is generally respected in
practice. Religious personnel are sometimes threatened,
abused, or killed for political reasons. About 70 percent of
Guatemala is nominally Catholic, but many other faiths openly
exist.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government did not restrict foreign travel, nor did it
revoke citizenship for political reasons. Movement inside
Guatemala was unrestricted except in some conflict areas. The
EGP continued to limit travel in areas under their control.
The army, military commissioners, and the PAC also limited
travel in some areas .
Repatriation of refugees continued; 1,200 to 1,300 returned
during 1991 and plans were under way for repatriation of many
of the 40,000 to 45,000 refugees in Mexico.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Guatemalans have the right to change their government by
peaceful and democratic means. Universal suffrage by secret
ballot exists for those 18 years of age or older; there are no
property or literacy requirements. Voting is not mandatory.
National elections were held on November 11, 1990, and,
following a run-off on January 6, Jorge Serrano took office as
President on January 14. International observers found the
elections to be free and fair. Eight parties or groupings from
center-left to far-right have seats in the Congress as do
several independents.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government did not hinder international human rights
groups. Local human rights groups and organizations are
permitted to operate in Guatemala, but members of some of these
groups continue to suffer threats and violence at the hands of
the security forces or the PAC ' s (see Section l.a.).
The office of the Human Rights Ombudsman expanded in size and
activity. It issued many reports and criticized both the
Government and guerrillas for abuses. The office remained the
621
GUATEMALA
most reliable source of objective information on human rights
practices. The Government's relations with the Human Rights
Ombudsman were often tense; officials often imputed political
motives to his criticisms. However, the Government responded
to some criticism by naming special prosecutors to handle
particularly notorious cases and creating a cabinet-level human
rights advisory committee. When CERJ leader Amilcar Mendez
reported threats, he quickly received a police escort.
However, Mr. Mendez reported that President Serrano made
statements that unfairly associated him with guerrilla
activities.
Senior officials met representatives of numerous foreign and
international nongovernmental human rights organizations,
several of which have local offices. The U.N. Human Rights
Expert visited Guatem.ala and received wide press coverage for
his often critical comments. Some foreign groups took part in
the location and exhumation of clandestine cemeteries. The
International Committee of the Red Cross operated openly and
visited villages controlled by the guerrillas.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Over one half of the population is culturally indigenous and
the rest culturally European. While having equal legal rights,
many indigenous people still remained outside the country's
predominant culture, language, and economy. Rural indigenous
men were more likely than urban counterparts to be drafted by
the army or forcibly recruited by guerrilla groups. Indigenous
people suffered most of the serious human rights abuses
(see Sections l.a. and I.b.). Although there are some
indigenous army officers, congressmen, and judges, there is
widespread and pervasive discrimination against indigenous
people, who have limited educational and employment
opportunities. Illiteracy among indigenous people is
prevalent. Over half of the population are not native Spanish
speakers and face myriad difficulties in interactions with
officials, few of whom speak indigenous languages, thereby
limiting access to a variety of public services, including the
judicial system.
Women are active in the labor force, especially in the textile
industry, agriculture, retail business, and in lower paying
public sector jobs. Several women hold prominent political
positions, including at the cabinet level. Despite legal
protection, women face job discrimination and receive lower pay
than men. There are no major organizations devoted to women's
issues. Violence against women, including domestic violence,
remains common but receives little attention. Criminal sexual
violence often goes unreported by victims, and relatively few
rape cases came to court. The Ombudsman named a woman as a
deputy with particular responsibility for violations of women's
rights.
Aside from private clubs that bar membership to persons of
certain religions, Guatemala is very tolerant of religious
diversity. Government and business has senior personnel from
many faiths.
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GUATEMALA
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to join or form unions. About 8 percent
of the work force is organized, including much of the public
sector. Due to their complexity, provisions of the Labor Code
serve to hinder both the ability to organize unions and to
obtain the necessary legal recognition. During 1991 the
Government used administrative powers to simplify rules for
union recognition. Unions must have at least 20 members, but
craft unions of skilled workers employed by several companies
are permitted. Some employers, however, seek to avoid
unionization by forming several entities of fewer than 20
workers each. A court ruling in 1990 opened the possibility
that unions could organize these separate entities into a
single union. Workers have the right to strike, but procedures
involved made legal strikes cumbersome; most occur without
permission. In practice, the Government made no effort to
determine their legality. The structural weakness of organized
labor and the lack of funds limit the duration of most strikes.
Union leaders may serve only one term in a union office, but by
rotating offices the same persons stay on unions' boards of
directors. The Constitution protects the right of political
participation for individuals and drops previous prohibitions
restricting participation by unions and their leaders. One
prominent union leader was elected to Congress in 1990; two
others are alternates. Unions may form federations and
confederations, and join international organizations.
A "solidarity" movement was active; critics charged it was
promoted by management to rival genuine unions. Unions
continued to operate in workplaces which have "solidarity"
associations. The Government made clear these associations
exist as civic organizations, and, as such, need not limit the
ability of legal trade unions to function.
A draft Labor Code, drawn up with help from the International
Labor Organization (ILO), remained under consideration by the
Labor Committee in Congress. The Committee gave a favorable
recommendation on July 10 in the first of three required
readings .
Local and international labor and human rights groups,
including the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions,
charged that unionists were "particular targets of death
squads." There have been threats and violence against
unionists by members of the security forces (see Sections l.a.
and I.e.). However, labor violence generally involved "thugs"
used on an ad hoc basis by employers opposed to unions.
Perpetrators of these criminal acts are seldom prosecuted.
At its May-June 1991 session, the ILO's Committee on Freedom of
Association (CFA) noted with deep regret that, other than
indicating the possibility of adopting a policy of guaranteeing
the protection, safety, and freedom of action of trade union
leaders enabling them to carry out their functions, the
Government failed to provide any specific information on
measures taken either in this regard or on the outcome of
judicial inquiries into the death and torture of a large number
of trade union leaders. The CFA again urged the Government to
set up independent judicial inquiries to ascertain the facts in
these cases. In a related development, the ICFTU called for a
full investigation of reports that former union leader Otto
623
GUATEMALA
Rodriguez was tortured following his arrest for alleged car
theft. The National Ombudsman for Human Rights met with trade
union leaders in early December to hear complaints related to
threats against them or other union activists. Following this
session, the Ombudsman committed his organization to establish
a special office, headed by a union leader, to handle
complaints related to trade union activities.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers have the legal right to organize and bargain
collectively but often face discriminatory antiunion actions by
employers. Labor Courts, responsible for enforcing laws
prohibiting such discrimination, are ineffective. The Labor
Ministry indicated its intention to concentrate on improving
the administration of labor laws.
Labor laws and regulations apply throughout Guatemala. The law
authorizing establishment of export processing zones specifies
that all Labor Code provisions be applied. However, in April
the Ministry of labor and Social Welfare, with the assistance
of the Human Rights Ombudsman, issued a report on the textile
plants in the export zone sector . The report documented worker
rights abuses in some plants, including mistreatment of
workers, low wages, long hours, and poor working conditions.
The report put forward proposals to protect workers, and the
Government created a commission to propose reforms to the 1989
export processing zone law.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution bars forced labor, and the practice generally
does not exist. However, some groups charge that forced
participation in the PAC violated prohibitions against forced
labor. There have been credible reports of isolated instances
of unpaid PAC members being used to provide free manual labor,
but no systematic pattern of such abuse was established.
d. Minimum Age for the Employment of Children
The Constitution bars employment of minors under the age of
14. In the industrial sector where the Labor Code is fairly
easy to enforce, child labor is uncommon but not, however, in
the informal and agricultural sectors. Children often help run
family businesses, work as domestic help, engage in begging,
and wash automobiles. A local organization, Casa Alianza,
which promotes the rights of street children, estimated that
over 5,000 children live in the capital city's streets; they
are often involved in prostitution and other crimes.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The workday is legally 8 hours and the workweek 44 hours, but a
tradition of much longer hours remains. As noted in the April
report on the export processing zone industry, most owners of
textile plants paid minimum wages for a 12-hour day, violating
both the Constitution and the Labor Code. Several complaints
of beatings and firings of textile workers accused of failing
to meet work requirements were made to the Labor Ministry.
Labor inspectors, who report to the Labor Courts, were accused
of a lack of diligence in enforcing the 8-hour day, in part
because the highly mobile third-country textile plants move
when they find conditions more attractive elsewhere.
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GUATEMALA
Little was done to educate workers and employers about the
potential harmful effects of certain chemicals and procedures.
Even simple precautions, such as the use of helmets and hearing
protection on construction sites, were rarely taken. In
November the Government issued a decree requiring all employers
to provide medical facilities on work sites, a decree to which
employers have objected. A similar reaction was noted to an
earlier decree that required payment of a bonus based on years
of service to all workers who retire or who are no longer
recjuired by employers. Insufficient time has passed to judge
if these decrees will be enforced.
Mimimum wages are set by law and are the de facto wages for
most rural and urban workers. A bilateral committee
representing labor and management is named each year from each
economic sector to review minimum wage levels and to make
recommendations for increases. In the event agreement is not
possible, the Government may decree such increases. In late
1991 the Government decreed increase in the minimum wage for
several industrial sectors. Rural workers had their minimum
wage increased in 1990 at a slightly lower monthly rate. The
Minister of Labor in late November publicly announced that many
rural and urban workers are not receiving the minimum wage
established for their sector. While some skilled workers
earned wages higher than the minimum, most are paid below the
legal minimum. Labor Ministry inspectors have been unable to
enforce the minimum wage law. These wages do not provide a
decent standard of living; over 75 per cent of the population
lives below the Guatemalan poverty line.
625
GUYANA
The Co-operative Republic of Guyana, a member of the
Commonwealth of Nations, is a small, multiracial developing
nation with a unicameral Parliament chosen by direct election
in a multiparty political system. The leader of the party
obtaining a plurality of seats in Parliament is elected as
Executive President. Under the 1980 Constitution,
parliamentary, regional, and municipal elections are held at
least every 5 years. National elections were to have been held
before May 1991; however, the government-cont rolled Parliament
introduced legislation allowing the elections to be postponed
to allow for the development of a new voters' list based on a
house-to-house enumeration. The People's National Congress
(PNC), currently led by Hugh Desmond Hoyte, has dominated
political life since the 1964 elections. In each subsequent
election, opposition leaders have charged the PNC with
electoral fraud.
Guyanese social and political life is influenced by the
polarization of the two main ethnic groups, the Afro-Guyanese
and the Indo-Guyanese. Urban Afro-Guyanese dominate the ruling
PNC, the Guyana Police Force (GPF), and the other security
forces; the Indo-Guyanese predominate in the agricultural and
business sectors and in the chief opposition political party,
the People's Progressive Party (PPP). The GPF has primary
responsibility for maintaining law and order throughout
Guyana. The police and security forces are responsible to the
civilian Government. Police were responsible for instances of
brutal treatment of detainees and prisoners.
As part of its Economic Recovery Program approved by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the
Government made major efforts to encourage private investment
in state-owned corporations. Discussions during 1991 were
focused on the Government's divestment program which included
its sugar and bauxite industries and state-owned rice mills,
three of Guyana's most important export earners. The recovery
program included the privatization of state-owned entities,
currency devaluations, and budgetary restraints. Despite these
efforts, the economy continued to be plagued by high external
debt, shortages of skilled labor, and a deteriorating
infrastructure. Devaluation severely reduced the real wages of
workers.
Human rights problems in Guyana continued to include police
abuse of detainees and prisoners, retaliation against union
organizers, societal violence against women, and continuing
credible charges of election manipulation in preparation for
the next election. During 1991 the Government made further
concessions on several electoral issues, but some opposition
groups remain skeptical about the implementation of these
reforms. The 1988 split between the government-linked unions
and the more independent unions remained unresolved, a
situation which continued to undermine labor's independence and
strength.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No politically motivated or governmental ly sanctioned
extrajudicial killings are known to have occurred. Summary
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GUYANA
executions do not take place.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances,
clandestine detentions, or abductions.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
While torture is prohibited by the Constitution, the Guyana
Human Rights Association (GHRA) noted continuing problems with
police brutality in 1991. The number of allegations of
brutality by policemen involved in criminal activity, including
extortion, intimidation, and assault, diminished during 1991,
but claims of brutality resulting from efforts to extract
confessions continued to be noted. Officers charged as a
result of complaints to the Police Complaints Authority are
routinely suspended for a few days and sometimes fined but are
rarely jailed for their alleged offenses. The case against
five police officers charged with the death of a criminal
suspect in December 1990 was dismissed for lack of evidence.
Prison conditions continued to deteriorate in 1991. The GHRA
called for the suspension of the mandatory prison sentence for
narcotics offenses, citing it as the primary cause of severe
prison overcrowding. Disease, including acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), and lack of adequate
nutrition were prevalent throughout the penal system.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution provides that no person may be deprived of
personal liberty except as authorized by law and also requires
judicial determination of the legality of detention, a mandate
that was generally respected in practice in 1991.
Arrest does not require a warrant issued by a court official,
only the presumption of guilt by the police officer. If a
person is arrested and held for more than 24 hours, the law
requires that he be brought before a court of law to be
charged. Parliament repealed the National Security Act in
1991, but the GHRA points out that many provisions were
modified and are now covered under antinarcotics legislation,
in effect limiting possible rights infringements for criminal
activities other than narcotics trafficking.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Under Guyana's British common law system, the Constitution
provides that anyone charged with a criminal offense has the
right to a hearing by a court of law, and this right is
respected in practice. Guyana has a functioning bail system.
Defendants are granted fair public trials, and appeal may be
made to higher courts.
There are no political prisoners or special courts for
political security cases. Several leaders of an alleged
aborted coup attempt in 1990 are awaiting trial on treason
charges. No judge has been selected to try the defendants, one
of whom returned to Guyana voluntarily from Canada and was
arrested at the airport on arrival.
In the past, some opposition figures have expressed concern
over court rulings in certain cases involving government
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GUYANA
interests, such as in libel suits brought by government
officials; there were no cases of this nature in 1991.
Opposition lawyers do complain that the judiciary is prone to
grant lengthy postponements in trials affecting the Government
or law enforcement officials; however, postponements are
routinely granted to both the defense and the prosecution.
Other delays in judicial proceedings are often caused by
shortages of trained court administrative personnel and
magistrates .
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government generally respects the right to privacy,
although some opposition politicians have alleged instances of
government surveillance, particularly at meetings and rallies.
Uniformed police officers routinely monitor such rallies. The
laws requiring judicially issued warrants for searches were
generally respected.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The constitutional provision for freedom of speech is generally
respected, and Guyanese freely criticize their Government and
its policies but sometimes suffer retaliation for such
criticism. Guyana has two private television broadcasting
stations. The two stations carry a variety of public affairs
and news programming with a broad range of views and opinions.
Government-owned Guyana Television (GTV) continued to produce a
10-minute daily news show which provided relatively evenhanded
reporting of local events. The government-owned Guyana
Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) generally takes a more
aggressive progovernment position, offering live coverage of
PNC political activities while ignoring many opposition events.
In past years, the Government exercised varying degrees of
control over the media through ownership of the country's only
daily newspaper (the Guyana Chronicle), the communications
agency, the radio station, and the issuance of import licenses
for newsprint and printing presses. This control, however,
continues to lessen. The independent Stabroek News expanded
its publication to six times a week in 1991. The PPP-owned
Mirror imported new presses and expanded its weekly newspaper
from 4 to 16 pages per issue.
The Government continued to take retaliatory action against
persons perceived to be in the political opposition. It was
quick to remove a well-known critic of its electoral policies
from a senior position in the government-owned bauxite industry
after the publication of a report suggesting reforms of the
electoral regulations. Members of the Government have
sometimes brought libel suits against publishers, which critics
claim were aimed at discouraging press criticism. A lawsuit
filed in 1988 by individual police officers against the GHRA
over its Brief of Police Violence was postponed indefinitely
due to the lack of interest on the part of the Government in
pursuing the issue at the time.
The Government's record on academic freedom was mixed in 1991.
On the one hand, the President promised a return to an
educational system that offered a choice of both public and
private schools. On the other, the President named a PNC
political adviser as vice-chancellor to the University of
50-726 - 92 - 21
628
GUYANA
Guyana in a move that many viewed as limiting the ability of
the University to operate independently.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Public Order Act requires police permits for mass political
meetings, but the police commissioner, at his discretion and
without explanation, may refuse permission for a public
meeting. During 1991 all political parties held regular public
meetings and rallies at locations throughout the country
without incident. However, the opposition continued to cite
instances of local police surveillance and harassment at a
number of rallies.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and members
of all faiths are allowed to worship freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement within Guyana is provided for in the
Constitution. Travel to certain Amerindian areas requires
government permission, a regulation dating from colonial times
designed to protect the indigenous peoples from exploitation.
The GHRA, opposition politicians and some clergy contend that
permits are sometimes denied to missionaries and non-PNC
politicians and that the regulations are being used to maintain
PNC influence among the Amerindians.
Guyanese are free to travel abroad, emigrate, and to return.
Guyana neither received nor generated refugees in 1991.
However, the Government has agreed in principle to accept a
small number of Haitian refugees under the auspices of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees for future repatriation or
placement in receiving countries. There are no forced
resettlements or displaced persons, and citizenship is not
denied on political grounds.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Guyanese are free to join or support political parties of their
choice, but it is unclear whether citizens have the ability to
change their Government. The ruling PNC has won every election
since 1964, but the results of every election since 1968 have
been tainted by opposition charges of electoral fraud.
However, opposition groups were able to keep pressure on the
Government to reform the electoral process in 1991. The
President agreed to a reorganization of the Elections
Commission, to the use of metal ballot boxes, and to granting
more authority to the Elections Commission. However, the
Commission has failed to produce an acceptable voter's list,
causing the President to declare a state of emergency and
postpone elections until 1992, reconvening Parliament to deal
with necessary changes to the Constitution and to electoral
regulations .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The GHRA, the most active local human rights group, functions
without government interference. The GHRA is a nongovernmental
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GUYANA
organization, formed in 1979 with support from trade unions,
professional organizations, and churches, that issues periodic
press releases and publishes an annual report on human rights
in Guyana. Some leaders of GHRA were instrumental in forming
the Guyanese Action for Reform and Democracy (GUARD) in 1990.
After a series of well-attended public rallies in 1990, GUARD
split from the GHRA to pursue a political agenda, planning to
nominate a list of candidates in the upcoming elections.
The Government usually regards outside criticism of its human
rights practices as interference in its internal affairs.
However, during 1991 the Government entertained follow-up
visits from the Commonwealth's election observer team and
missions from the U.S. -based Carter Center to monitor progress
towards upcoming elections. In September the Carter Center
opened a field office. A representative from the
Washington-based International Foundation for Electoral Systems
traveled to Guyana regularly to assist with the logistical
planning for elections.
Representatives from the National Democratic Institute, based
in Washington, met with a less-than-enthusiastic reception by
the Government but were not prohibited from meeting with a
broad spectrum of Guyanese.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides fundamental rights for all persons in
Guyana regardless of race, sex, religion, or national origin.
Guyanese society and political life continue to be influenced
by ethnic differences between Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese .
Guyana has a small ethnic Amerindian population, composed of
nine tribal groups, living in reservations scattered throughout
the country. Their standard of living is lower than that of
most Guyanese. The GHRA has charged that the Government
controls Amerindian leaders and land titles and places
limitations on access to their reservations by clergy and other
outsiders. The Government exerts influence over the selection
of their leaders, but all are free to criticize the Government
and many actively and openly oppose government policies. While
government restrictions exist on travel into Amerindian areas,
these are largely on paper and are ignored in practice by many
persons traveling into the interior of Guyana. The GHRA
charges that expanding mining operations by the private sector
has prevented the Government from fulfilling its legislatively
mandated land distribution to the Amerindians. However, the
President recently awarded titles to the villages which were
identified in the original legislation in 1976.
In principle, the Constitution prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex and establishes a commitment to ensure equal pay
for equal work. A 1988 government-sponsored constitutional
amendment rendered the equal pay provision unenforceable except
in cases in which equal pay for equal work is provided for by
specific statute. No such statutes have been passed. In 1990
the Parliament passed legislation granting equal rights to
women and legislation that protects women's property rights
under common law marriage, entitling a woman who separates or
divorces to one half of the couple's property if she had been
working and one third of the property if she had been a
housewife. Additionally, the legislation gave authority to the
court to overturn a man's will in the event it does not provide
for the wife. There are no organizations, other than those
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sponsored by political organizations, that focus primarily on
women's rights.
Violence against women, including domestic violence such as
wife beating, is considered a significant problem. Victims of
such abuse often are reluctant to report it to the authorities
or to press charges, and underreporting of incidents of such
violence makes it impossible to estimate its true extent.
While it provides victims access to the courts for redress, the
Government has not recommended additional legislation or other
remedial action.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of association is provided for in the Constitution,
which specifically enumerates a person's right to "form or
belong to trade unions." Approximately one quarter of Guyana's
total work force of about 250,000 are formally organized. Most
union members work in the public sector and in government-owned
corporations .
There is a tradition of close ties between Guyana's trade union
movement and political parties, particularly the PNC which has
controlled the Government (and thus public sector employment)
for 25 years. Many of the 24 unions in the Guyana Trades Union
Congress (TUC) are formally affiliated with the PNC. In
theory, unions are free to choose their own officials, but
political parties, including both the PNC and the opposition
parties, wield significant influence over the leadership of a
number of unions. Trade unionists often have dual roles as
officials in political parties. President Hoyte is the
honorary president of the Guyana Labor Union, a member of the
TUC. Opposition leader Cheddi Jagan holds the same position in
the Guyana Agricultural and General Workers Union (GAWU), which
represents 14,000 sugar workers.
Six unions belong to the Federation of Independent Trade Unions
of Guyana (FITUG), which was originally formed when these
unions walked out of the September 1988 TUC conference to
protest heavy-handed electioneering tactics by the PNC.
Leaders of the TUC and FITUG continued efforts to negotiate a
reconciliation during 1991, but efforts at formal reunification
of the two bodies continued to be blocked by unionists with
ties to political parties.
Workers have a generally recognized right to strike. Public
employees providing essential services are under normal
circumstances forbidden to strike, but a procedure exists for
the review of grievances by a tribunal appointed by the
Minister of Labor. A Public Utilities Undertakings Act was
introduced but not enacted by this year's Parliament after
widespread criticism by labor and civic leaders. The Act
threatened severe penalties for strikes by workers in essential
services such as health, electricity, and water. During the
year, nurses at the public hospitals and workers at the
municipal power plant staged strikes. It is unlikely that the
Public Utilities Act would have prevented these strikes. Labor
disputes are frequently settled through consultation and dialog
without resorting to strikes or other industrial action. A
bill that would have introduced standards for union
recognition, a longstanding demand of labor leaders, was not
passed in 1991 due to objections by the TUC.
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Unions freely maintain relations with recognized Caribbean and
international trade union and professional groups. All three
of the trade union internationals have affiliates in Guyana.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Public and private sector employees possess and utilize the
generally accepted right to organize and to bargain
collectively. The Labor Ministry must certify all collective
bargaining agreements but has never refused to do so. This
right is not codified, however, and employers are not legally
reqiaired to recognize unions. Increasingly, unions of public
sector corporations are bargaining directly with employers
rather than through TUC/government negotiations, but bargaining
for public servants remains highly centralized, and wage
negotiations take place between the TUC and the Ministry of
Finance .
The TUC's traditional ties (through individual unions) to the
PNC-cont rolled Government reduces the unions' ability to
negotiate effectively on behalf of workers with the result that
salaries are often set solely by the Government. After the
announcement of the 1991 budget in February, the FITUG and the
TUC formed a joint committee to negotiate with the Government
on behalf of workers. FITUG leaders continue to charge that
TUC officials are unwilling to make militant demands of the
Government, precluding the possibility of an effective wage
settlement .
The Chief Labor Officer and the staff of the Ministry of Labor
provide consultation, enforcement, and conciliation services.
In 1989, the latest year for which figures are available, 23
collective bargaining agreements were concluded and certified
by the Ministry of Labor. The Ministry has a backlog of cases,
and insufficient manpower and transportation severely limit the
Ministry's ability to comply with its mandate.
The Ministry of Labor reported no cases of antiunion
discrimination during 1991. However, union leaders make
credible charges that workers attempting to unionize workplaces
are harassed and intimidated and that the Ministry does not
expeditiously pursue complaints that employers are allowed to
dismiss workers when confronted with union recognition claims.
For example, public sector nurses involved in last year's
strike have still not been paid benefits promised them in the
agreement that ended the strike. Other unions have complained
of retaliation against union organizers at worksites, including
a dredging firm, a shipping company, and a textile mill.
Guyana has no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it
does not exist.
d. Minimum Age of Employment of Children
Minimum age laws are set out in the Factories Act and the
Employment of Women, Young Persons, and Children Act. Legally,
no person under 14 years of age may be employed in any
industrial undertaking, and no person under 16 may be employed
at night, except under regulated circumstances. The terms
"industry" and "factory" as used in the law have been
interpreted by the Ministry of Labor to encompass nearly all
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workplaces except offices and retail shops. According to the
law, children under age 14 may be employed only in enterprises
in which members of the same family are employed. The local
economic situation has forced more and more young children into
the work force, however, and it is common to see children under
14 selling candy, cigarettes, and other items along the roads
throughout the country. While cognizant of the situation, the
Ministry of Labor lacks sufficient inspectors to enforce
existing laws effectively.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government legislates a public sector minimum wage and
private employers generally pay a higher rate. The minimum
wage is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and his family. Hours of employment are set under
the Factories Act and vary by industry and sector. Work in
excess of an 8-hour day and a 40-hour week receives payment at
an overtime rate.
The Occupational Health and Safety Division of the Ministry of
Labor is charged with conducting factory inspections and
investigating charges of substandard workplaces and
conditions. As with its other responsibilities, inadequate
resources have prevented the Ministry from effectively carrying
out this function. Occupational health and safety standards
are also prescribed in the Factories Act.
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HAITI
Following Haiti's first free and democratic elections in
December 1990 and January 1991, Jean-Bertrand Aristide took the
oath of office as President on February 7. However, on
September 29, enlisted elements of the army revolted and forced
President Aristide to leave Haiti. With armed soldiers
occupying the interior of the Legislative Palace, a majority of
both houses of, the legislature on October 7 declared the
presidency vacant and the next day confirmed Supreme Court
Justice Joseph Nerette as provisional President. In the days
after the soldiers' rebellion, both the Organization of
American States (OAS) and the United Nations General Assembly
passed resolutions urging member states not to recognize the
Nerette presidency and to adopt economic sanctions and
political measures against Haiti in order to restore
constitutional order and President Aristide to his
constitutional office. OAS-sponsored negotiations for
President Aristide 's return were continuing at year's end.
The army is responsible for state security and enjoys
considerable legal and institutional autonomy, particularly in
military and security matters. The military's human rights
record improved under the Aristide Government, but that trend
was reversed following the September coup, when the army
committed numerous and serious human rights violations. In
both rural and urban areas, army units serve as police,
although the Constitution calls for a separation of the police
and army. Many rural section chiefs, responsible for many
human rights abuses in past years, were dismissed during the
first months of Aristide 's presidency. However, in their
stead, Aristide attempted to install "rural police agents,"
many of whom were suspected of being local activists of the
President's political movement, Lavalas. Following the
September coup, the military began to reinstall the rural
section chiefs.
Haiti is a densely populated and extremely poor country in
which the vast majority of the population suffers from
unemployment and economic inequalities. Economic opportunities
remain severely restricted for all but the wealthiest classes
of society. Notwithstanding significant fiscal and
administrative reforms during Aristide' s first 8 months in
office, Haiti's fragile economy made little progress prior to
the rebellion on September 29.
Haitians suffered frecjuent human rights abuses throughout 1991,
including extrajudicial killings by security forces and
partisan mobs, disappearances, torture and other mistreatment
of detainees and prisoners, arbitrary arrest and detention, and
executive interference with the judicial process. The Haitian
people's right to choose their own government was ultimately
denied them when the military overthrew the freely elected
Government of President Aristide in September.. Although there
were few institutional advances made to improve respect for
human rights during the Aristide Government, there were fewer
instances of abuse by soldiers, which resulted in a greater
sense of personal security. However, the Government proved to
be unwilling or unable to restrain popular justice through mob
violence and ensure the rule of law for all citizens
irrespective of partisan interests. Following the coup,
particularly in certain quarters, the army resorted to
brutality and massacre to control the population; credible
estimates placed the dead nationwide at between 300 and 500.
In the remaining weeks of 1991, the army employed violence on
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several occasions to intimidate opposition political
supporters, popular organizations, the urban poor, and the
media, and otherwise to discourage antiregime activity. The
army arbitrarily arrested numerous active supporters of the
President, raided and looted the homes of many of his ministers
after issuing arrest orders for them, and violently closed
almost all of the country's media for several weeks.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section l Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Hundreds were killed in political violence during 1991. At
least 75 persons were killed in incidents of "popular justice"
by mobs as well as shootings by Tonton Macoutes (henchmen of
the Duvalier dictatorship that ended in 1986) following the
failed coup attempt of Duvalierist strongman Roger Lafontant in
early January. Political killings included those of Sylvio
Claude, twice a presidential candidate and a prominent party
leader, who was murdered the evening of the September coup
after speaking out against Aristide; well-known Port-au-Prince
radio personality Jackie Gary Simeon, the host of a popular
radio call-in show and a strong supporter of President
Aristide; and Roger Lafontant, murdered on September 29 at the
National Prison where he was serving a life sentence for his
January 7 coup attempt .
The Aristide Administration, in its first months in office,
attempted to hold military personnel and law enforcement
officers accountable for some human rights excesses, especially
extrajudicial killings of civilians. Numerous abusive
personnel were transferred or removed from office, and a few
specific disciplinary actions were instituted. As a result of
a disturbance on March 9 in the town of Montroius which cost
the lives of a 14-year-old boy, two soldiers, and another
civilian, six members of the armed forces were arrested.
President Aristide, however, appeared less concerned about
prosecuting members of the military accused of human rights
abuses if they were supporters or appointees of his
Government. The police on July 26 tortured and murdered five
young men who were in police custody; following an
investigation, the Army recommended to President Aristide that
a lieutenant and the enlisted men under his command at the time
be brought to trial for the killings. The President attempted
publicly to exonerate the officer, believed to be a militant
Aristide supporter. President Aristide also failed to condemn
categorically all recourse to popular justice through mob
violence. The Aristide Government made no effort to identify
and bring to justice those responsible for the wholesale
killing, looting, and burning that occurred after the failed
Lafontant coup in January. The only response to three official
requests to the Aristide Government for information on the
status of the investigation into the death of an American
citizen, Richard Andre Emmanuel, who was killed by mob violence
in late February, was that the investigation "was still in
progress . "
Human rights abuses increased significantly immediately
following the September coup. At least 300 civilians were
killed during and after the military rebellion on September 29
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HAITI
against President Aristide. Immediately after the coup,
Haitian troops engaged in random shootings and selected
killings of residents in poor neighborhoods who were suspected
pro-Aristide organization leaders. In
Lamentin, troops avenged the murder of one or two soldiers by
indiscriminately shooting 30 to 40 people, and, on October 2,
soldiers killed several civilians in Cite Soleil, a poor
neighborhood iri Port-au-Prince. In the months following the
coup, the army resorted to violence on several occasions to
intimidate perceived opponents of the regime. On December 15,
a rural section chief shot and killed Astrel Charles, a Member
of Parliament, in his home in Pignon in what is believed to
have been a personal dispute. A clandestine radio station
threatened 98 known Aristide supporters with death on December
15.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported disappearances while the Aristide
Government was in power. There were many reports of persons,
including active Aristide supporters and other perceived
opponents, being out of contact with friends and family. At
year's end it was not possible to determine whether these
people went into hiding, fled the country, or had been
clandestinely abducted. There were two confirmed cases of
abduction. Felix Lamy, a journalist for Radio Galaxie, was
abducted on December 10 by armed soldiers; his whereabouts
remained unknown as of year's end. Dr. Dieudonne
Jean-Baptiste, a brother of the president of the Papaye Pessant
Movement, was reportedly abducted by members of the police in
Port-au-Prince; his whereabouts also remained unknown.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Beatings and other cruel treatment of detainees were
substantially less common under the Aristide presidency than in
previous years. However, there were several credible reports
of torture and other abuse of detainees and prisoners (see
Section l.a.) both during the initial Aristide tenure and since
the coup.
Following the September coup, the army resorted to torture and
violence on several occasions to intimidate and discourage
perceived opponents and antiregime activity. Scores of armed
soldiers arrested and badly beat the mayor of Port-au-Prince,
Evans Paul, on October 7. Other Aristide supporters, such as
popular musician Manno Charlemagne and prominent businessman
Antoine Izmery (both released), were arbitrarily arrested and
sometimes beaten. On October 12, the army arrested and in many
cases beat between 100 and 150 students who were holding a
pro-Aristide press conference at the State University of
Haiti. There was widespread intimidation of journalists: on
November 9, for example, Paul-Jean Mario, a radio reporter, was
arrested and remained imprisoned at year's end.
Prison conditions remained abysmal. Prisoners continued to
suffer from a lack of the most basic hygienic facilities, as
well as inadequate food and health care. Guards routinely
extorted money from prisoners for basic services and favors.
Health care in the National Prison was further complicated by
internal partisan quarrels within the Ministry of Health that
led to widescale dismissals in the summer, including doctors
assigned to periodic prison visits. The National Prison
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remained overcrowded throughout Aristide's tenure. Mass
escapes and the payment of bribes for release immediately after
the coup, as well as a general pardon of political prisoners
and the dismissal of several cases resulted by year's end in a
dramatic reduction in the prison population. The de facto
regime was less inclined to leave uncharged prisoners in
prison; the police under the de facto Government tended to
arrest and sometimes beat prisoners, then release them if a
judge so ordered.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arbitrary arrest and detention remain among the most persistent
human rights abuses in Haiti. By law, a person may be arrested
only if apprehended during the commission of a crime or if a
judicial warrant has been issued for the arrest. While some
effort was made in 1991 to ensure that persons were not
arrested without a warrant, freqxiently persons were detained
for weeks, sometimes months, without access to family, friends
or legal counsel, and with no judicial action being taken on
their cases. In at least one political case, persons continued
to be held in detention despite a court order for their
release. Persons detained were routinely interrogated without
the presence of legal counsel, in violation of the Constitution.
Cto June 29, Roland Alcindor and Wilfred Alexis, two members of
a political party headed by former presidential candidate
Hubert Deronceray, were arrested by members of the President's
security detail in the southern provincial city of Petit Goave
for demonstrating against Aristide. Ignoring a court order for
their release, agents of Aristide's personal security service
went to Petit Goave and transferred Alcindor and Alexis to the
National Prison where they were held incommunicado and denied
access to legal counsel . Despite repeated promises by the most
senior officers of the Government to review the case
personally, the prisoners were still in detention at the time
of the September coup. The Aristide Administration detained
former president Ertha Pascal Trouillot on April 4 on charges
of complicity with the Lafontant coup attempt. The former
president spent a night in the National Prison and was released
under house arrest the following day. The charges against
Trouillot subsequently were investigated and dropped in late
July. Prime Minister Rene Preval personally interrogated
prisoners at the National Prison in politically sensitive
cases; the detainees did not have access to legal counsel
during these interrogations. Local authorities in the coastal
city of Jacmel arbitrarily arrested several American seamen in
May and held them without charges for several days despite
repeated consular protests.
Following the September coup, there were numerous arbitrary
arrests of prominent supporters of President Aristide. In
October populist singer Manno Charlemagne and Aristi-de campaign
financier Antoine Izmery, both of whom had been arrested by the
current de facto authorities of the Nerette/Honorat regime,
were released from illegal detention, as was the wife of Prime
Minister Preval.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary and the
right to a fair public trial, and expressly denies police or
judicial authorities the right to interrogate persons charged
with a crime unless the suspect has legal counsel present or
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HAITI
waives this right. This right was, nonetheless, routinely
denied throughout 1991, especially in cases involving state
security (see Section l.d.).
The Aristide Government repeatedly attempted to interfere with
the judicial process or usurp it through "mob justice."
Shortly after assuming office, and without consultation with
the Senate, the Aristide Government attempted to appoint five
new justices to the Supreme Court. The executive maintained
that a constitutional provision and a law passed by both houses
of the legislature granting the executive special authority for
6 months to reform the judiciary and public administration
provided sufficient authority to name the disputed justices.
Legislators, however, insisted that the law in question could
not supersede specific constitutional requirements and that the
Constitution expressly grants only the legislature the right to
interpret the intent of legislation.
On July 29, Roger Lafontant was tried after he was charged with
attempting to overthrow the Government by force in January. In
public comments prior to the trial. President Aristide said
that he believed Lafontant should be condemned to life in
prison for his crime, although Haitian law calls for a maximum
sentence of 15 years. On the day of the trial, hundreds of
people demonstrated in front of the courthouse, carrying tires
and gasoline cans and threatening to kill the judge in the case
if Lafontant were not condemned to life in prison. After a
22-hour trial, the judge condemned Lafontant to life at hard
labor. Serge Beaulieu, a radio personality closely identified
with extreme Duvalierist views, was bound over for trial on
charges of inciting a riot. He had spent 6 months in prison
with only belated and limited access to his attorney and family
while awaiting completion of a judicial investigation in his
case. The only evidence cited by an appeals judge in September
to confirm the propriety of sending Beaulieu' s case to trial
was the presumption of his guilt based on the fact that a mob
had ransacked Beaulieu 's house following the failed Lafontant.
coup attempt.
Persons with controversial political reputations charged with
various crimes against state security experienced significant
difficulty engaging competent counsel. Lawyers and human
rights groups were afraid to take on such cases because of
Aristide 's continued ambiguity about mob violence. Some
attorneys who initially had agreed to accept politically
controversial cases later dropped them because they received
threats against themselves and their families. In the weeks
immediately preceding the September coup, there were at least
three known instances of lawyers who were either arrested or
narrowly escaped popular justice through mob violence because
of their association with politically suspect defendants.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
During and following the September coup, there were many
credible reports of soldiers and other armed persons entering
private homes for illegal purposes. The homes of a number of
Ministers of the Aristide Government were looted by uniformed
personnel, and family members were threatened.
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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech is provided for by the Constitution but was
often abridged by violence and intimidation, particularly
following the September coup. In addition to one
government-owned and -operated television and radio station and
a daily newspaper, there also are many private radio stations,
one private television station, and several private daily
newspapers .
During and after the rebellion against Aristide, several
pro-Aristide reporters and radio stations were attacked by
military personnel and forced off the air by soldiers (see
Section I.e.). Popular pro-Aristide radio commentator Jackie
Caraibe was murdered (see Section l.a.). Many journalists from
the state-owned radio, television, and newspaper went into
hiding or sought refuge in embassies. Pro-Aristide journalists
from private media operations also fled or took refuge. In
response to threats from both Aristide supporters and
opponents, most broadcast stations suspended news broadcasts.
There were credible reports of foreign journalists having their
materials confiscated by soldiers and being forced to leave
certain areas of Port-au-Prince at gunpoint. Some private
radio stations and newspapers resumed their activities in late
October; most exercised considerable self-censorship in their
reporting of events.
Following the failed Lafontant coup attempt in January, angry
pro-Aristide mobs attacked Duvalierist radio stations and
newspaper offices that had been strongly critical of President
Aristide. Throughout the subsequent months, many Haitian
journalists were fearful of mob action if they openly
criticized the Aristide presidency too harshly. These fears
were compounded by Aristide' s own public criticism and thinly
veiled threat in early February (for which he subsequently
apologized) against a reporter from Haiti Observateur, an
expatriate newspaper widely distributed in Haiti. In the weeks
just prior to the September rebellion, however, most
journalists were beginning to abandon their earlier caution and
had begun openly to criticize government personalities,
actions, and programs with much less reserve.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association, but these rights were severely restricted
following the September coup. There were credible reports from
all parts of Haiti indicating that the de facto Government was
engaged in a systematic effort to inhibit any type of
association. Soldiers would fire into the air to disperse
gatherings. Community organizers, even of nonpolitical
organizations, were arrested and sometimes beaten, harassed, or
intimidated into fleeing their own communities. Only
anti-Ar istide organizations were allowed to demonstrate. When
some students attempted to organize a press conference, police
units raided the university building in which they were
meeting. There were credible reports from several towns that
Haitians were inhibited from gathering to listen to radio
broadcasts from the Voice of America and other foreign
stations, and that church groups perceived to be pro-Aristide
were discouraged from meeting.
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On August 13, the Parliament, as well as the offices of a
number of the Aristide Government's critics — the labor union
Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers (CATH), and the political
organizations National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD)
and United Democratic Committee (KID) — were attacked by mobs
who many observers believe were inspired by those close to the
Administration. This move coincided with an attempt by the
Chamber of Deputies to debate a motion of no confidence in the
Government .
c. Freedom of Religion
Religion is an integral part of Haitian life and culture and is
practiced widely. Roman Catholicism is embraced in varying
degrees by about 75 percent of the population. Voodoo, a
mixture of African animism and Christianity, is also practiced
by a majority of Haitians. Various Protestant denominations
and foreign missionary groups openly proselytize in Haiti.
There are no government restrictions on missionary activities,
affiliations with overseas coreligionists, or religious
instruction or publishing.
However, there were serious incidents of politically motivated
violence directed against religious groups in 1991, especially
after the September coup and during the period following the
failed Lafontant coup attempt. In January the Archbishop of
Port-au-Prince — closely associated with the Duvalierist
regime — was forced to flee for his life because of his
denunciation of Aristide. The sacking of the Nunciature, the
mob attack on the Papal Nuncio, and the serious wounding of his
assistant, shocked many in Haiti. There were credible reports,
some from Lavalas supporters who were themselves horrified by
the attack, that radical partisans of the President both
organized and participated in the event. In addition to the
violence directed against the leadership of the Catholic Church
(with whom the President had longstanding differences), there
were reports in January and sporadically thereafter that
populist groups had threatened various Protestant missions in
certain areas of the country and caused several pastors to flee
their congregations.
After the September coup, there were credible reports of
arrests and threats of arrest of pro-Aristide clergy, of
military forces entering places of worship during services, and
that church groups perceived to be pro-Aristide were prevented
from congregating.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The most serious 1991 violations of freedom of travel occurred
shortly after President Aristide took office when hundreds of
former officials of previous governments were subjected to a
constitutionally questionable ban on foreign travel. Former
president Ertha Pascal Trouillot was subject to an official ban
on foreign travel from Aristide 's inauguration on February 7
until August 16 when the restriction was lifted after a
magistrate's finding that there were no grounds to prosecute
her on state security charges. The de facto Government which
took power after the September coup followed a similar pattern
of restricting travel within and without the country,
especially in cases involving Aristide' s ministers and closest
advisers, most of whom sought refuge in various foreign
embassies .
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Throughout 1991, Haitians continued to leave Haiti bound for
destinations throughout the Americas.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
This right was exercised early in 1991 when President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide took office in February following free
and fair elections. However, he was forced by rebellious
soldiers to flee the country in September after a military coup
that left hundreds dead. Most senior members of his
Administration either went into hiding, fled the country, or
took refuge in foreign embassies. At soldiers' gunpoint on
October 7, the legislature declared the presidency vacant and
the next day installed Supreme Court Justice Joseph Nerette as
provisional President. After nearly a week of maneuvering
among the country's various political party leaders, human
rights activist Jean-Jacques Honorat, who was appointed Prime
Minister in the Nerette regime, was finally able to form a
cabinet of mostly technocrats and little-known political
figures .
After his election victory. President Aristide and his
supporters often excluded or intimidated their political
opponents or those perceived as such. Partisan mobs attacked
political party headquarters, the media, and the Church
following the failed Lafontant coup attempt in January. In
early August, after the Chamber of Deputies began an
interpellation of Prime Minister Rene Preval, a mob of
thousands of angry demonstrators appeared at the Legislative
Palace to threaten legislators with death should they vote to
censure Preval. Several legislators were physically abused
trying to enter the legislative chambers, and police at the
scene made only limited efforts to keep the mob at a distance
from the parliament building. At the same time, another
violent mob attacked the headquarters of Aristide' s former
political party sponsor and the labor union offices of populist
labor organizer Jean-Auguste Mesyeux, who had been agitating
for weeks for Preval 's resignation. After the September coup,
pro-Aristide human rights groups were forced underground.
Although many of these groups attempted to report on
conditions, limitations on their ability to travel freely and
communicate openly inhibited their ability to monitor fully the
situation .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Several local human rights groups operated in Haiti in 1991.
They monitored human rights violations, and at least one such
organization, Chadel, published a monthly bulletin of human
rights violations. Other human rights organizations, such as
the Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church, also
published periodic reports. There were no reports of any
effort by the Aristide Government to interfere overtly with the
activities of domestic human rights organizations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Some 95 percent of Haitians are descendants of African slaves
who gained independence from France in 1804 . Most others are
mulatto or of European, Middle Eastern, North American, or
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HAITI
Latin American origin. Haitian law makes no distinctions based
on race. However, there are longstanding social and political
animosities among these various groups, many of which date back
before Haiti's revolutionary period. There are two official
languages in Haiti: Creole, which is spoken by virtually all,
and French, which is spoken by no more than 20 percent of the
population. Those unable to read, write, and speak French are
limited in their social and economic activities. Many argue
that the country's French-speaking elite have used language
requirements as a barrier to the advancement of the country's
disadvantaged.
Officially, there is no discrimination against women. Women
have occupied prominent positions in both the public and
private sectors in recent years. In some social strata,
however, women's roles have been limited by tradition. Peasant
women remain largely in the traditional occupations of farming,
marketing, and domestic tasks. Violence against women is known
to occur with some frequency, but there are no statistics to
document its extent. Because of societal traditions, domestic
violence often is not reported to police authorities.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution and the Labor Code guarantee the right of
association. Workers, including three in the public sector,
are specifically granted the right to form and join unions
without prior government authorization. However, a union,
which must have a minimum of 10 members, is required to
register with the Ministry of Social Affairs within 60 days of
its establishment.
There are five principal labor federations in Haiti: the
Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers; the National
Confederation of Haitian Teachers; the Federation of Unionized
Workers; the Confederation of Haitian Workers; and the
Independent General Organization of Haitian Workers. Each of
these organizations maintains some affiliation with various
international labor organizations.
Tripartite negotiations (labor, management, and government),
which began in 1986 to revise the Labor Code, made little
progress during 1991. The existing Code recognizes the right
to strike but restricts the duration of certain types of
strikes. There were repeated public and private sector strikes
in 1991. Most of the public sector strikes concerned political
demands by workers over government appointments to management
positions within various government ministries and public
enterprise firms. Private sector strikes also frequently
targeted employers with demands for dismissal of various middle
or senior level management officers.
During President Aristide's 8 months in office, there were
credible reports of efforts by Lavalas activists to encourage,
entice, or compel the formation of an umbrella organization of
the country's labor organizations. Labor activists expressed
their concerns that the Lavalas movement was seeking either to
compel their adhesion to a Lavalas organization or neutralize
the existing labor organizations by wooing away their rank and
file members through offers of access to government favors,
patronage, or resources controlled by Lavalas.
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HAITI
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Trade union organizing activities are protected by the Labor
Code, and those who interfere with this right may be fined.
Employers, however, still routinely attempt to prevent workers
from organizing labor unions, and government enforcement
remains mostly ineffective. Constant reorganization of the
Social Affairs Ministry under the Aristide Government rendered
government activity in this area even less effective than it
had been in recent years. Collective bargaining has never been
widespread in Haiti and was even less common in 1991. Most
wages are unilaterally determined by the employer.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Labor Code prohibits forced or compulsory labor, but
enforcement of these provisions is practically nonexistent.
The common practice of forced domestic labor by children in
Haiti, commonly called "restavek," continued unabated during
1991. Thousands of young children from rural families are
"adopted" and "educated" by more affluent city dwellers to
serve as mostly unpaid domestic labor. The children are
compelled to work long hours, receive poor nourishment and
little or no education, and are frequently beaten and sexually
abused.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for factory employment is 12 years. Fierce
adult competition for jobs ensures that child labor is not a
factor in the industrial sector. Children do work at odd jobs
in both rural and urban settings in Haiti to supplement family
income. Enforcement of the law, which is the responsibility of
the Ministry of Social Affairs, has been criticized by the
International Labor Organization as inadequate.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The minimum wage is set by law. Last set in 1984, Parliament
and President Aristide were close to agreement on a substantial
minimum wage increase when the President was deposed. The
current minimum wage, insofar as it is observed, would not
provide a worker and family with a decent living. Moreover,
the majority of Haitians, who work in the agricultural sector,
must survive on considerably less than the minimum wage.
The Labor Code governs individual employment contracts. The
Code sets the normal workday at 8 hours, and the workweek at 48
hours, with 24 hours of rest on Sunday; it establishes minimum
health and safety standards, particularly for hazardous
occupations. The Government has not systematically enforced
labor laws regarding wages and minimum health and safety
regulations. These laws and regulations are somewhat better
observed in the industrial sector, which is concentrated in the
Port-au-Prince area and is more accessible to outside scrutiny.
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HONDURAS
Honduras is a constitutional democracy with a President and
unicameral Congress elected every 4 years. In January 1990,
the National Party candidate, Rafael Leonardo Callejas, was
inaugurated as President. While the historically dominant
military now plays a less intrusive role in the country's
civilian Government, it still operates in practice with a great
deal of institutional and legal autonomy, particularly in the
realm of security and military affairs. Although the Callejas
Administration took some initiatives in 1991 to improve the
human rights situation, it has yet to ensure that human rights
violations are fully investigated and that perpetrators of
those violations, whether members of the military or civilians,
are prosecuted in a court of law.
The Armed Forces, including its police branch, the Public
Security Force (FUSEP), are responsible for domestic security.
Major FUSEP elements include the Transit Police, the Customs
Police, the Order and Security Police, the Cobra Paramilitary
Unit, and the National Department of Investigation (DNI). As
in previous years, members of the Armed Forces were involved in
human rights abuses in 1991, often for personal motives. The
military's judicial system makes it difficult to know how many
perpetrators are actually punished for these abuses; from the
limited information available, it appears that many act with
impunity.
The economy continued to stagnate, resulting in part from a
painful adjustment process initiated in March 1990 by the
incoming Callejas Government. In 1991 per capita income was
estimated to be approximately $500, combined unemployment and
underemployment ran as high as 40 percent, illiteracy was
approximately 33 percent, and inflation reached 35 percent.
High rates of criminal violence continued in 1991, due in part
to the country's poverty and lack of employment opportunities.
The principal human rights problems are extrajudicial killings,
arbitrary and incommunicado detentions, torture and abuse of
detainees, and the impunity of members of the Armed Forces who
commit such violations. As in past years, when members of the
Armed Forces committed acts of murder or torture, the military
often tried to cover up the violations. Another serious
problem is a weak and inefficient judiciary. The criminal
justice system is unable to protect systematically the rights
of ordinary citizens owing to the Government's failure to
exercise the political will to insist on accountability for
human rights violations, to ensure the independence of judges
and courts, to establish a transparent and just military
judicial system, and to set up a mechanism to resolve
jurisdictional issues between the civilian and military court
systems. Approximately 80 percent of those detained in
civilian penal centers are neither sentenced nor exonerated.
Leftwing terrorists claimed responsibility for several killings
and attempted killings during the year, including one of a
returned political exile.
During the year, the Callejas Administration made some efforts
to improve the country's human rights situation. An Office of
Professional Responsibility was created within FUSEP in
September to investigate allegations of police misconduct.
Preliminary results are promising, but its real effectiveness
remains to be proven. The President negotiated the return of a
number of leftist political exiles who had fled the country
primarily in the early 1980's. Work commenced with U.N.
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HONDURAS
assistance to set up a new governmental human rights commission
at the presidential level. Strong administration support led
to congressional passage of a "full and unconditional" amnesty
that resulted in the release of some 13 persons incarcerated
for crimes against the State and an unspecified number of
persons jailed on charges involving land invasion. There was
no evidence of retaliation by members of the military or the
police against these people or against the returned leftist
exiles. In cooperation with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Government agreed to
provide safe haven for 250 Haitians fleeing turmoil in their
homeland.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Although firm evidence was not available, past practice and a
persistent lack of investigatory followup suggests that
extrajudicial killings by police and security forces continued
in 1991. Members of the Armed Forces were responsible for
killing and injuring a number of other civilians in 1991,
apparently for personal motives. Armed Forces authorities, in
some cases responding to intense public pressure, arrested and
detained a few of the perpetrators. However, no one has yet
been sentenced for these crimes. No arrests or convictions
were made in the cases of possible political killings from
previous years.
Riccy Mabel Martinez, an 18-year-old student, was raped and
murdered on July 13 in Tegucigalpa. Family members and
classmates of the victim named Colonel Angel Castillo
Maradiaga, commander of the First Communications Battalion, and
Captain Ovidio Andino Coello, head of personnel for that
battalion, as primary suspects. A junior employee of the Armed
Forces General Staff, Santo Eusebio Ilovares Funez, confessing
guilt, surrendered on July 20 to a civilian court but recanted
a few days later stating that he had confessed only under
threat of torture by DNI agents. On July 23 the U.S.
Ambassador to Honduras publicly urged that the crime be
resolved promptly and fairly through an open judicial process.
Three days later a civilian court issued arrest warrants for
Colonel Castillo and Captain Andino, but FUSEP Commander
Colonel Guillermo Paredes Hernandez would not carry them out
before Armed Forces Commander General Discua Elvir and Armed
Forces Auditor General Efrain Gutierrez Ardon ruled on the
issue of jurisdiction. The military discharged the two
officers and relinquished jurisdiction to the civilian court.
This action precluded the Supreme Court from issuing an opinion
which might have clarified the jurisdictional question for
cases contested in the future. The two officers and Ilovares
Funez remained incarcerated in the Central Penitentiary while
criminal investigations continued.
Two members of FUSEP ' s Cobra Paramilitary Unit, Oscar Fidel
Almendarez and Rafael Villagra Galo, killed five persons and
wounded eight in a night club altercation on March 9. After
the two soldiers surrendered voluntarily to a civilian court,
high-level military authorities insisted that the two be placed
under the jurisdiction of a military court, asserting a
longstanding claim that the Armed Forces have the
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HONDURAS
constitutional right to try all such cases. In November
Almendarez escaped from a minors' detention center and remained
at large at year's end. Villagra remained in detention by
order of the military judge.
On May 3, a group of about 15 men, armed with assault weapons
and dressed mostly in military uniform, killed five unarmed
members of the .National Association of Honduran Peasants
(ANACH) and wounded eight others in rural Agua Caliente in a
dispute over land owned by Army Lieutenant Colonel Leonel
Galindo Knutsen. Survivors alleged that Galindo's foreman led
the assault at the behest of Galindo, with members of the army
carrying out the attack. A military court ordered Galindo's
arrest and charged him, inter alia, with murder. Four
suspected participants in the massacre were held under the
jurisdiction of a civilian court. According to credible
sources two of these suspects, 16- and 17-year-old minors, were
not involved in the crime. The press reported charges that the
two minors were tortured by DNI agents; neighbors and family
members stated that the two boys were at work when the massacre
occurred. Armed Forces authorities insisted that military
courts retain jurisdiction over Galindo. However, ANACH
members obtained legal counsel to pursue the matter through a
civilian court. That court petitioned the Supreme Court to
rule on jurisdiction in November. Other participants in the
massacre, including Galindo's foreman, remained at large at
year's end.
Deputy Director of the Armed Forces Military Command and Staff
School, Colonel Erick Sanchez Sandoval, shot civilian Gustavo
Funez on June 9 outside a restaurant in La Ceiba after a brief
argument. Funez, who was unarmed, was rendered quadraplegic .
Sanchez was removed on June 25 from his position at the school
after a military court issued an arrest warrant for him. When
Armed Forces authorities insisted that jurisdiction be retained
by the military tribunals, the nongovernmental Committee for
the Defense of Human Rights in Honduras (CODEH) filed charges
in a civilian court. The military court, citing Sanchez'
assertion of self-defense and the absence of contradictory
testimony, found Col. Sanchez not guilty on September 5. The
verdict was sent on September 5 to a civilian appeals court for
review as stipulated under Honduran law. That court confirmed
the military court's verdict in early January, 1992, thereby
releasing Colonel Sanchez from military detention.
Three men and two women, ranging in age from 17 to 29 years,
were killed on August 18 in the village of El Balsamo after
reportedly having attended a dance. A few days later the
police arrested six men who publicly claimed they were
innocent. Responding to local residents' speculations that two
FUSEP agents had actually carried out the killings, the local
DNI chief publicly stated that the two had taken the accused on
patrol with them on the night of the murder but had returned to
their duty stations before the murders were committed. When
newspapers carried photographs of five of the suspects' badly
bruised buttocks, a DNI spokesman claimed they had not been
tortured but "only beaten" by a DNI agent who was then
arrested, charged in a military court, and detained in a San
Pedro Sula jail. The six suspects, who claimed their
innocence, were provisionally released on September 11 for lack
of evidence. No other suspects had been arrested for the crime
by year ' s end .
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HONDURAS
On November 2 a group of approximately 10 men dressed in
military uniforms and carrying high caliber weapons kidnaped
Jose Agapito Paz Rivera, his son, brother, and an employee from
their homes in the village of El Plomo in the Department of
Olancho. The bullet-ridden bodies of the men were discovered
lying along a road the next day. Paz' widow initially accused
members of the Honduran Armed Forces of involvement in the
killings but retracted those claims a few weeks later. By the
end of November, FUSEP authorities had arrested a total of
eight suspects, four of whom were Paz' cousins. Investigations
in the case continued at year's end.
Three members of the Marxist-led National Central of Farm
Workers (CNTC) were killed during the year. Manuel de Jesus
Guerra, a prominent CNTC leader, was killed on December 11. At
the time of his death, Guerra was involved in organizing
demonstrations in support of striking electrical workers.
Although the CNTC blamed the Government for the crime, Guerra
could also have been targeted by landowners for his advocacy of
squatters' rights or killed as a result of internal CNTC power
struggles. CNTC member Moises Castillo Lopez died on February
19 when he was hit by a truck trailer while in the custody of
two FUSEP officers in Santa Barbara. A FUSEP commission named
to investigate the case concluded that Castillo had threatened,
while drunk, to kill two women. FUSEP officers arrested him,
and while they attempted to hail a ride to police headquarters,
he fell into the path of the trailer because of his drunken
state. Five days later, CNTC Press and Propaganda Secretary,
Marcos Mejia Reyes, died in El Progreso, Yoro. The CNTC
publicly speculated that the military was involved in his
death, but the police said their investigation showed that
Mejia was killed when an automobile struck the motorcycle he
was driving at an excessive speed while intoxicated.
Leftwing terrorist groups claimed responsibility for several
killings and attempted killings in 1991. A faction of the
Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement, which has refused to
renounce armed struggle, claimed responsibility for the May 26
shooting of Roger Eludin Gutierrez, one of four ex-Cinchonero
leaders who returned to Honduras from abroad under the auspices
of President Callejas' reconciliation program (see Section
2.d.). The shooting was in apparent retaliation for Gutierrez'
abandonment of armed struggle and statements he made during a
May 10 press conference at the Presidential Palace. Three days
after taking responsibility for the rocket attack on the
Tegucigalpa headquarters of the United Nations Organization for
Central America (ONUCA) , the Morazanist Patriotic Front (FPM)
claimed in a June 27 communique that one of its commando units
had executed Jose Bias Pena Paz, nephew of former Armed Forces
Commander and Head of State Policarpo Paz Garcia. Pena was
shot by two men in front of family members as he was leaving
his house on June 25. The Morazanist Patriotic Front initially
claimed responsibility for the October 4 killing of Raul Suazo
Madrid, a member of the rightwing United University Democratic
Front (FUUD), but subsequently denied that claim. It took
responsibility for the November 22 attempted murder of Arturo
Guillen, chief of personnel of the National Enterprise for
Electric Power (ENEE) .
Marco Tulio Lopez Hernandez, the 26-year-old son of the
president of the nongovernmental Committee of Relatives of the
Detained and Disappeared in Honduras (COFADEH), was shot and
killed on July 22 as he stepped off a bus in San Pedro Sula.
FUSEP agents arrested Julio Cesar Guardado almost immediately
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HONDURAS
when a passerby restrained him as he was fleeing through the
streets. Credible reports indicate that the murder was not
related to Lopez' human rights activities but that he was
killed by a member of a leftist organization. There is no
information suggesting armed forces involvement.
The Government has failed to pursue its investigation into the
1990 killings of labor leader Francisco Javier Bonilla Medina
and student leader Ramon Antonio Briceno. Two accused
triggermen, claiming they were tortured in 1990 into confessing
to killing Bonilla, were released in April 1991 for lack of
evidence. There is no indication that the investigation into
Bonilla 's murder has been reopened.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances
in 1991. Local human rights groups continued to press,
unsuccessfully, for an official accounting of the approximately
145 claimed disappearances which mainly occurred during the
early 1980 's under the tenure of former Armed Forces Commander
General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although the Constitution prohibits torture, and military
authorities reiterated throughout 1991 their assurances that
the practice had been stopped, credible charges of torture and
other abuse of detainees continued. Methods of torture
included beatings on various parts of the body, near-
suffocation, and psychological pressures such as death
threats. While FUSEP authorities have announced in past years
that individual cases of alleged torture would be investigated,
the results of such investigations have never been released.
There are no known instances of members of the Armed Forces
ever being convicted of torture.
In September FUSEP authorities opened an Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) to investigate allegations of police
misconduct. Preliminary reports indicated that some officers
and enlisted personnel have been punished, and national level
FUSEP directors stated that internal discipline has improved as
a result of the establishment of the OPR. The effectiveness of
this office, however, remains to be demonstrated.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Honduran law states that a person may be arrested only with a
court order, unless the arrest is made during the commission of
a crime, and that the person must be clearly informed of the
grounds of the arrest. A detainee must be brought within 24
hours before a judge who then must issue an initial temporary
holding order within 24 hours, release an initial decision
within 6 days, and conduct a preliminary investigation to
decide whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant a trial
within 30 days, or if necessary, to extend the 30-day period up
to 3 months. While bail is legally available and used, poor
defendants, seldom represented by an attorney, are very often
unable to take advantage of it. Under the 1984 Code of
Criminal Procedures, criminal proceedings may be initiated by a
judge, the police, public officials, or any citizen. Perhaps
as many as 80 percent of the cases reported to the police are
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HONDURAS
never referred to the criminal justice system but instead are
settled administratively by the police or municipal offices.
As in past years, police and other security force elements
continued in 1991 to practice arbitrary arrest and detention in
a substantial number of cases. Credible reports of
incommunicado detention and failure to comply with writs of
habeas corpus also continued. FUSEP and DNI agents were most
often responsible for violations of these laws and regulations.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Under Honduran law, an accused person has the right to a fair
trial, which includes the right to an initial hearing by a
judge, to bail, to an attorney provided by the State if
necessary, and to appeal. Defendants in military tribunals
have the same due process rights as those being tried in the
civilian system with the exception of bail. The military court
system does not have courts of appeal; appeals and
ratifications of military tribunal verdicts are referred to the
civilian judicial system.
Jurisdictional disputes between the civilian and military court
systems arose throughout 1991 in several cases in which a
member of the military was alleged to have committed a crime
against a civilian in circumstances unrelated to official
duties. In all of these cases, high-level Armed Forces
authorities insisted that the Constitution gives jurisdiction
to the military courts, while several prominent civilian
jurists publicly argued that civilian courts should have
jurisdiction. A congressional committee began to study
clarification of the per-tinent constitutional articles
governing the issue in August. The Supreme Court failed to
resolve the question despite several cases pending before it.
The civilian court system is weak and inefficient. The
Attorney General is directly subordinate to the Congress, which
is dominated by the political party in power. The nine
magistrates of the Supreme Court are elected directly by
Congress and confirmed by the President. The Supreme Court
appoints most of the judges in the lower civilian courts.
Whenever past elections resulted in a change of party, there
was always a large turnover of court personnel. However, with
enactment in March of the Career Judicial Law, judges,
prosecutors, and defenders may now only be legally removed for
cause, a step which may reduce the susceptibility of the
judiciary to outside influence.
The judicial system also suffers from inadequate funding. The
executive branch and the Congress were only willing to fund
about half of the 3 percent of the government budget that the
judiciary is authorized under the Constitution.
Detention without sentencing, averaging 14 months and sometimes
as long as 4 years, constitutes one of the most serious human
rights problems in Honduras. A significant number of
defendants in Honduras serve the maximum possible sentence for
the crime of which they are accused before their trials are
ever concluded or sometimes even begun. Approximately 80
percent of the prison population in 1991 had neither been
sentenced nor exonerated.
These judicial weaknesses, along with FUSEP 's poor
investigative skills and the lack of transparency in the
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HONDURAS
military court system, greatly undermine the right of Hondurans
to a fair public trial.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution specifies that a person's home is inviolable
and that entry by persons authorized by the State may only be
made with the owner's consent or with authorization by a
competent authority, and then only between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. or
at any time in the event of an emergency or to prevent the
commission of a crime. There were credible charges in 1991
that police and Armed Forces personnel failed at times to
obtain the needed authorization before entering a private
home.
Government monitoring of mail or telephones may be authorized
by judicial order for specific purposes, such as criminal
investigation or national security. There is no proven illegal
monitoring by government authorities of telephone
cotwaunications or written correspondence, although it is widely
believed that the Armed Forces takes advantage of its operation
of the national telephone company to illegally monitor selected
telephone lines.
Section 2 Respect For Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, and
these freedoms are largely respected in practice. The media's
active role in shaping public opinion was apparent in the Riccy
Martinez murder (see Section l.d.) when media discussion became
a key element in moving the Government and Armed Forces to
pursue justice in the case. The media, however, are also
subject to worrisome levels of corruption and politicization .
As in past years, there were allegations of intimidation by
authorities, instances of self-censorship, and payoffs to
journalists. In January some members of the National Congress
threatened to end duty-free privileges for newsprint and
related ecjuipment after the press severely criticized
congressmen for granting themselves the right to duty-free
import of three automobiles over a 4-year period. The
automobile import privileges were rescinded, and President of
Congress Irias Navas and President Callejas quickly assured the
press that its duty-free privileges would continue as provided
for by the Constitution. Two unidentified persons in a pickup
truck shot at but missed Allan McDonald, an award-winning
political cartoonist, as he was walking down a sidewalk in
Tegucigalpa on June 8. McDonald said he had received several
threatening telephone calls earlier about his cartoons. His
assailants were not identified.
The Government respects academic freedom and has not attempted
to curtail political expression on campus.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution gives Hondurans the right to peaceful assembly
for political, religious, or other purposes. The Government
does not generally require prior authorization or permits but
may ask for a permit to "guarantee public order."
Demonstrations to protest such matters as the Government's
economic programs routinely took place throughout the year
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without obstruction. Photographs of supposed plainclothes
FUSEP agents mingling with student demonstrators calling for
justice in the murder case of Riccy Mabel Martinez (see Section
l.d.) were printed in newspapers in early August. Following
those peaceful demonstrations. Armed Forces authorities ordered
tanks and personnel carriers into the streets of Tegucigalpa,
ostensibly to maintain law and order. Many Hondurans, however,
believed that the real purpose of the maneuvering was to
dissuade future demonstrations over the case. There are no
restrictions on the rights of association.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution protects all forms of religious expression,
and there is no state religion. While most Hondurans are Roman
Catholic, foreign missionaries of various Protestant sects work
and proselytize throughout the country. There were no publicly
reported incidents of harassment or intimidation of the clergy
by the military in 1991. President Callejas, responding to
pressure from the country's Catholic community led by Bishop
Luis Santos of Copan, in April canceled a major educational
reform project called "Schools for the Future. " The Bishop
alleged that the program, developed by a U.S. evangelical group
and funded by the Honduran Government, violated the concept of
separation between Church and State. In September the Catholic
Bishops ' Conference issued a communique condemning recent
violence, pervasive corruption in the administration of
justice, and the failures of the Government's national agrarian
reform program.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens enter and exit Honduras without arbitrary impediment,
and travel within the country's borders is freely permitted.
There have been no known instances in which citizenship has
been revoked for political reasons.
The Callejas Administration reached an agreement in early 1991
to promote the repatriation of political exiles who had left
the country primarily in the early 1980 's. On January 12
President Callejas personally welcomed home four prominent
leftist leaders. Under terms of the agreement, the four, as
well as all other returnees, have the right to pursue their
political objectives through legal means and to organize
political parties and union movements. A second group of
leftist repatriates, comprising 36 men, women, and children,
returned to Honduras on May 7. They were followed on May 10 by
four former leaders of the Cinchonero Popular Liberation
Movement and in November by 11 leftists who had been living in
Cuba. The "full and unconditional" amnesty passed by Congress
on July 10 applies to all returnees.
The few remaining Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan
refugees, who numbered as many as 80,000 during the 1980 's,
continued throughout the year to return to their countries of
origin. An official ceremony on February 28 to close the Los
Guasimos Camp for Nicaraguan refugees in Jacaleapa marked the
end of the UNHCR assistance program to Nicaraguans in
Honduras. Approximately 1,700 Salvadorans remained in the Mesa
Grande Camp at year's end.
At the request of the UNHCR, the Government agreed to provide
safe haven to 250 Haitians fleeing turmoil in their homeland.
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A camp was established near the city of Trujillo for the
Haitians, who arrived in Honduras on November 20. On December
17, 104 of the Haitians were voluntarily repatriated.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights; The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Hondurans continue to exercise the right to change their
government through democratic and peaceful means. National and
municipal governments are chosen by free, secret, direct, and
obligatory ballotting every 4 years. Suffrage is universal,
and any citizen born in Honduras or abroad of Honduran
parentage may hold office except for members of the clergy and
Armed Forces. A new political party may gain legal status by
obtaining 20,000 signatures and establishing party
organizations in 50 percent of the country's departments.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Government officials continued to meet and cooperate with
representatives of local and international human rights
organizations in 1991. The governmental Inter-Institutional
Commission on Human Rights (CIDH) , established in 1987 to
respond to domestic and international inquiries and to
investigate human rights violations, is comprised of members
drawn from the Supreme Court, Armed Forces, Foreign Ministry,
Ministry of Government and Justice, and National Congress. It
is charged with gathering evidence in human rights cases,
presenting that evidence to the courts, and asking the Supreme
Court to ensure that trial take place based on that evidence
when the lower courts fail to act. However, the Commission is
ineffective: it did not ask the Supreme Court to pursue any
human rights case in 1991, and it did not receive full
cooperation from military and civilian judicial authorities.
In late 1991 President Callejas began work to create a new
governmental human rights commission at the presidential level.
The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Honduras
(CODEH) and the Committee of the Relatives of the Detained and
Disappeared in Honduras (COFADEH) are the best known and most
active local nongovernmental human rights organizations. Since
the Government has failed to establish an effective human
rights monitor, CODEH, with its network of offices throughout
Honduras, is often the only recourse available to victims of
abuses, particularly those living in rural areas. The
nongovernmental Center for the Investigation and Promotion of
Human Rights (CIPRODEH) was established in April. The center
plans to offer basic human rights courses, hold monthly
seminars, carry out research studies on Honduran issues, and
serve as a source of information on human rights.
There were no serious incidents of harassment against members
of human rights organizations in 1991. Although the
26-year-old son of COFADEH President Liduvina Hernandez, Marco
Tulio Lopez Hernandez, was shot and killed on July 22 in San
Pedro Sula (see Section l.d.), credible reports indicated that
the murder was not related to Lopez' human rights activities
but that he was killed by a member of a leftist organization.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights reported in April to
the General Assembly of the Organization of American States
that the Government of Honduras has not yet fully complied with
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HONDURAS
the judgments of August 17, 1990, in the Velasquez Rodriguez
and Godinez Cruz cases. In those cases, the court found
Honduras liable for the involuntary disappearances of two labor
activists and awarded compensatory damages to the widows and
children. A subsequent interpretive ruling required that the
damage awards be protected against devaluation of the Honduran
currency. Honduras paid in late 1990 the original damages but
has not paid to date either the full economic value or
post judgment interest, as ordered by the court. The matter
remained under consideration by the Government at year's end.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution bans discrimination for reasons of race, sex,
and class. Women are represented in at least small numbers in
most of the professions, but cultural attitudes act to limit
their career opportunities. Women have equal access to
educational opportunities and are paid equal wages for equal
work, although their jobs are often classified as less
demanding as a justification for paying them lower salaries.
Physical abuse of women occurs in Honduras, but reliable
statistics on the extent of the problem are unavailable. There
are no shelters specifically maintained for battered women.
Although the law offers legal redress, few women take advantage
of the legal process. This reluctance stems from a lack of
education and the perception that judges would be unwilling to
apply the law vigorously.
Many organizations have begun to offer assistance to women,
principally targeting those living in the rural sectors and
marginal neighborhoods of cities. The Honduran Federation of
Women's Association, for example, provides home construction
and improvement loans, offers free legal assistance to women,
and lobbies the Government on women's causes.
Although discrimination on the basis of class is banned under
the Constitution, only Hondurans from the middle and lower
classes are forcibly recruited into the Armed Forces. The
Constitution provides for 2 years of compulsory military
service for male citizens between the ages of 18 and 30.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the legal right to form and join labor unions.
Although only about 20 percent of the work force is organized,
trade unions exert considerable economic and political
influence. They frequently participate in public rallies
against government policies without interference and also make
extensive use of the media to advance their views. There are
three large peasant associations directly affiliated with the
trade unions.
The right to strike, along with a wide range of other basic
labor rights, is provided for by the Constitution and honored
in practice. Although the Civil Service Code stipulates that
public workers do not have the right to strike, there were
strikes in the public sector in 1991. On November 27, the
Government declared illegal the strike of the Electrical
Workers' Union (STENEE) against the government -owned electric
company. STENEE union leader Gladys Lanza was subsequently
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HONDURAS
fired from her job when she did not obey the Government' order
to return to work.
A number of private firms have instituted "solidarity"
associations. (Solidarity is a labor/management concept which
provides an array of services through an association and a
joint employer/worker capital fund.) Organized labor,
including the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations and the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), strongly opposes these associations
on the grounds that they do not permit strikes and have
inadequate grievance procedures. The membership of such
associations in Honduras remained static during 1991.
On October 24, members of the 105th Army Brigade forcibly
attempted to open a road blocked by miners from the El Mochito
Mine. The miners were striking over management's attempts to
institute a "solidarity" association. A retired miner was
killed and over 20 were injured, including several members of
the Army. As part of the settlement of the bitter 37-day
strike, the Government agreed to introduce legislation banning
"solidarity" organizations, but a debate about the
constitutionality of this measure has ensued and it has not
been passed as yet .
"Land invasions" are still common and have sometimes resulted
in armed conflicts among groups of peasants or squatters and
landowners. During 1991, 12 peasants died as a result of land
disputes, but no one has been found guilty of any of these
killings. On May 3, five members of the National Association
of Honduran Campesinos (ANACH) were killed in a land dispute
with an army colonel (see Section l.a.). Two well-known
leaders of the Xicaque Indian tribe were killed on September 30
in yet another land dispute. An unpopular Anti-Terrorist Law
used to arrest squatters is still on the books, although the
Government has announced its intention to abrogate it.
A few union activists were killed in unclear circumstances in
1991. The Government failed to pursue its investigation into
the 1990 murder of labor leader Javier Bonilla (see Section
l.a.).
The 1991 Report of the International Labor Organization's (ILO)
Committee of Experts repeated earlier requests that provisions
of the Labor Code be revised to conform with ILO Convention 87
(freedom of association), including extending the right to
organize to agricultural workers, allowing more than one union
in a workplace, and removing restrictions on the right to
strike.
In May the New York Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and
Human Rights in El Salvador filed a petition with the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) requesting that Honduras'
Generalized System of Preferences benefits be withdrawn because
of alleged worker rights violations. In July the USTR
announced that the petition had been rejected due to
insufficient credible information.
Honduras' trade union movement maintains close ties with
various international trade union organizations.
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HONDURAS
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and to bargain collectively is protected
by law but not always observed in practice. Retribution by
employers for trade union activity is not uncommon, in spite of
its prohibition in the Labor Code. There are instances in
which companies have threatened to close down if unionized.
Some workers have been harassed and, in some cases, fired
because of their efforts to form a trade union. Relatively few
workers are actually dismissed for union activity; these cases,
however, have served to discourage other workers from
attempting to organize. Workers who are fired may apply to the
Ministry of Labor or the courts for redress.
Collective bargaining agreements are the norm for companies in
which the workers are organized. Workers in both unionized and
nonunionized companies are under the protection of the Labor
Code, which gives them the right to seek redress from the
Ministry of Labor. Wages in nonorganized companies are
determined by labor supply and demand, within the constraints
of the minimum wage law which was last adjusted by Congress in
July.
The free trade zones are governed by the same labor regulations
as the rest of private industry, and working conditions in
these export processing zones are generally considered superior
to those prevailing in the rest of the country. Unions are
active in the government-owned Puerto Cortes free trade zone,
but factory owners have resisted efforts to organize the
privately owned new industrial parks.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced or compulsory labor in Honduras; such
practices are prohibited by law and the Constitution.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Constitution and the Labor Code prohibit the employment of
children under the age of 16 years. Violations of the Labor
Code occur frequently in rural areas or in small companies.
High unemployment and underemployment have resulted in many
children supplementing the family income by working in small
family farms, as street vendors, or in small workshops. The
Ministry of Labor has the responsibility for enforcing child
employment laws, but it lacks the resources necessary to carry
out the task.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
In July President Callejas negotiated a tripartite agreement
among labor. Congress, and the private sector which granted an
average 27.8 percent minimum wage increase. The Constitution
and the Labor Code require that all labor be fairly paid.
Minimum wages, working hours, vacations, and occupational
safety are all regulated, but the Ministry of Labor lacks the
staff and other resources for effective enforcement. The
minimum wage, which varies by occupation, is considered
insufficient to provide a decent standard of living,
particularly in light of spiraling inflation. Many households
need to pool family members' salaries to survive.
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HONDURAS
The law prescribes an 8-hour day and a 44-hour workweek. The
Labor Code provides for a paid vacation of 10 workdays after 1
year and 20 workdays after 4 years. The regulations are
frequently ignored in practice as a result of the high level of
unemployment and underemployment .
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing national
health and safety laws. Due to a lack of resources, the laws
are not well enforced. Reliable reports indicate that as many
as 50 deaths per yejr result from serious health and safety
hazards facing M^skito Indian scuba divers employed in lobster
and conch harvesting off the Caribbean coast of Honduras. Some
complaints have also arisen about the failure of foreign
factory managers to comply with the Labor Code in factories
located in free zones and industrial parks.
656
JAMAICA
Jamaica is a constitutional parliamentary democracy and a
member of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Governor General,
appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Prime Minister,
represents the Queen as Head of State. The elected Prime
Minister, the leader of the majority party in Parliament, is
the country's chief executive. The Parliament is composed of
an elected House of Representatives and a Senate appointed by
the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister and
the Leader of the Opposition. Two major political parties have
alternated in power since the first elections under universal
suffrage in 1944. In the last general election, held in
February 1989, Michael Manley's People's National Party (PNP)
won 45 of the 60 seats in the House of Representatives. The
opposition Jamaica Labor Party (JLP), which formed the
government from 1980 to 1989, holds the remaining 15 seats.
The security forces, which consist of the Jamaica Constabulary
Force (JCF — police) and the Island Special Constabulary Force
(ISCF — auxiliary police), are responsible to the Ministry of
National Security. The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF — army, air
wing, and coast guard) is responsible to the Prime Minister in
his capacity as Defense Minister. Since 1974, however, the JDF
has been authorized to conduct joint operations with the JCF to
maintain peace and order under the Suppression of Crime Act,
and when operating under the provisions of that Act is also
responsible to the Ministry of National Security. The police
continued to be responsible for incidents of human right abuse.
Jamaica's economy emphasizes the private sector and is based on
primary products (bauxite/alumina, sugar, bananas), service
industries (tourism, banking), and light manufacturing
(primarily garment assembly). The Manley Government has
promoted private investment to stimulate economic growth and
modernization, most dramatically by eliminating foreign
exchange controls on September 25.
Extrajudicial killings and other abuses by police and prison
guards, frequently committed with impunity, remain Jamaica's
principal human rights problem. Conditions in Jamaican jails
and prisons remain appalling, with serious overcrowding, poor
sanitary conditions, and inadecjuate diet the norm. An
overburdened and inefficient judiciary is responsible for
lengthy delays in trials and in other sectors of the justice
system.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated killings by
government security forces in 1991, but there continue to be
credible reports that the JCF engages in the summary execution
of suspects under the guise of "shootouts . " Police statistics
show that fatal shootings by police increased from 89 during
the first 9 months of 1990 to 116 during the same period of
1991. Nonfatal shootings totaled 81 in 1991, 59 in 1990. By
comparison, 8 policemen were shot and killed and 16 wounded in
the line of duty through September 1991; 9 were killed and 23
wounded in 1990. Figures compiled by the Jamaica Council on
Human Rights (JCHR), taken from local media reports, are
somewhat at odds with police statistics: they show a much
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JAMAICA
higher rate of police shootings, averaging over 210 per year
since 1979. The JCHR, however, also notes a significant
decrease in such incidents during the first part of 1991.
A dramatic incident involving unjustifiable use of lethal force
by JCF members occurred in front of more than 30,000 Jamaicans
during the July visit of South African leader Nelson Mandela.
A JCF corporal fired his M-16 into the crowd, killing one man
and seriously wounding a woman. He and another policeman who
opened fire were charged in September with murder and wounding
with intent to kill and released on bail. Their trial,
scheduled to begin on December 13, was postponed to 1992.
Major public statements against police violence were made
during the year by Prime Minister Manley, National Security
Minister K.D. Knight, Police Commissioner Roy Thompson, and
Director of Public Prosecutions Glenn Andrade.
Long-anticipated legislation to set up a police Public
Complaints Authority was submitted to Parliament in early
December; approval was expected in early 1992. Despite these
actions, the JCF claims that 20 policemen were arrested for
murder in 1991. None was convicted. Police are infrequently
punished for extrajudicial killing. In many cases,
investigations undertaken immediately following a fatal
shooting drag on for years.
Vigilantism, involving spontaneous mob executions, is a coirenon
phenomenon in Jamaica. Charges are rarely brought against
vigilantes, and in the few cases that do go to court,
acquittals are common. Violence during elections, perpetrated
largely by armed gangs of political partisans, has decreased
greatly since the 1988 signing of a "political code of conduct"
between Jamaica's political parties. The September 1991
parliamentary by-election for North East St. Elizabeth took
place without incident.
b. Disappearance
There was no evidence of abduction, hostage-taking, or
disappearances perpetrated by the security forces in 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other abuse of prisoners and detainees are
prohibited by law. Nonetheless, there were numerous credible
complaints of police beatings, some fatal, of detainees at
station houses and of inmates held in jails and prisons. While
government efforts to reduce the problem through police
training continue, JCF statistics show that only two officers
were charged with "mistreatment of prisoners" in 1991; neither
case had been tried by the end of the year.
As in past years, some persons brought suit successfully
against the police for unlawful actions. Total damages paid by
the Government have averaged $265,000 annually over the past
few years. According to police statistics, 207 complaints were
filed against police between January and August 1991, including
124 alleging assault by JCF officers. The JCHR in its July
1990-June 1991 annual report highlighted the problem of abusive
officers in the JCF. Reports made to the JCHR named 113
policemen (out of a force of 6,110) as perpetrators in cases of
unlawful physical abuse. Only five officers were named for
more than one offense, and only one of those was named more
than twice. The JCHR also cites eyewitness accounts of
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JAMAICA
off-duty policemen attempting to intervene in public beatings
who have themselves been beaten by their own colleagues.
Conditions in prisons, particularly the penitentiaries and
maximum security facilities, remain abysmal. Sanitary
conditions are appalling, food inadequate at best, and
overcrowding the rule rather than the exception. At
St. Catherine's district prison, scene of four major riots
involving fatalities since May 1990, as many as 6 men are held
in each 5- by 8-foot cell. A June 1991 disturbance at
St. Catherine's is indicative of several underlying problems.
Five men were killed during a prison riot; four inmates were
later arrested and charged with murder. Subsequently, in
September, the media reported that prison warders were under
investigation for the June deaths, noting that the men killed
were witnesses to an earlier incident in which Gun Court
warders allegedly facilitated the escape of two notorious
murderers. One newspaper alleged that the June 30 "riot" was
in fact a cover for the murder of the five witnesses. Another
longstanding problem is the failure to provide timely and
adequate medical attention to prisoners and detainees. For
example, several women prisoners have suffered miscarriages,
either through lack of prompt medical treatment or from being
beaten or otherwise physically abused.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Suppression of Crime Act (SOCA), adopted in 1974 and still
in force in Kingston and two nearby parishes, allows police to
make arrests and conduct warrantless searches of persons
"reasonably" suspected of having committed a crime. The SOCA
was revoked islandwide in May 1990 but, following what police
termed an extraordinary crime wave over the next 2 months, the
Manley Government reinstituted it in Kingston, St. Andrew, and
St. Catherine parishes. Police claim the SOCA is useful,
primarily for its deterrent effect on prospective criminals,
and that the authority for warrantless searches and detentions
already exists under the Dangerous Drugs and Firearms Act.
Detention of suspects without a warrant occurs regularly,
particularly those from poor neighborhoods. According to the
JCHR, many detainees are held for several weeks without being
brought before a judge or magistrate. For Jamaican suspects
charged with a crime, there is a functioning bail system.
Foreign detainees, however, are regularly denied bail. Persons
unable to post bail while waiting for a judicial hearing are
often detained for long periods.
For the period from July 1990 through June 1991, the JCHR
reported 103 habeas corpus violations brought to their
attention; of these, 57 writs were prepared, and only 14
persons were eventually charged by the Government (in two
cases, after the habeas corpus writs were served).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Persons who have been charged with criminal offenses have
access to legal representation, and legal counsel is provided
to indigents in criminal cases. The Court of Appeal and the
Parliament may refer cases to the Judicial Committee of the
Queen's Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
A special Gun Court, established in 1974, considers all cases
involving the illegal use or possession of firearms and
ammunition. Public attendance is restricted, and rules of
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JAMAICA
evidence are less rigorous. In capital cases, hearings before
the Gun Court serve as preliminaries to jury trials under the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The judicial system, although independent, is overburdened and
operates with inadequate resources. Budgetary shortfalls have
resulted in a steady attrition of trained personnel, causing
further delays. Some cases take years to come to trial, and
others have had to be dismissed because case files could not be
located. Prisoners have been held for more than 4 years
awaiting trial or decisions on their appeals. The Government
has in recent years taken some steps to reverse the
deterioration of the legal system. These include raising
judicial salaries, increasing training for justice personnel,
and upgrading courthouse facilities.
According to the JCHR, the intimidation — even the murder — of
witnesses is a chronic problem hampering criminal prosecutions,
and jurors are sometimes threatened by associates of criminal
defendants. The Government in 1989 announced the development
of a protective custody program for threatened witnesses and in
1990 provided additional funding for a witness protection
program. Nevertheless, the problem of witness intimidation
remained serious throughout 1991.
There are no political prisoners in Jamaica.
f . Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary intrusion by the State
into the private life of the individual. Under the SOCA,
however, homes or businesses believed to be occupied by persons
"reasonably" suspected by the police of having committed a
crime may be searched without a warrant. This authority is
sometimes abused.
The use of telephone taps without court order has been
practiced for some 30 years. Prime Minister Manley has
proposed legislation to codify rules for wiretaps and has
promised to limit future taps to cases involving the drug
trade, terrorism, and subversion of the Government.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press are provided for in the
Constitution and are observed in practice within the broad
limits of libel laws and the Official Secrets Act. In 1990,
however, there were several incidents in which reporters were
detained briefly by security forces; there were no such
incidents in 1991.
The government-owned Jamaica Broadcasting Company (JBC)
operates two radio stations and the island's only television
channel. After recent changes in the procedures for naming
members to the JBC Board of Directors and the General Manager
of JBC Operations, the Government's influence over JBC program
content has been diminished significantly. Three JBC regional
radio facilities have been sold to groups of private
investors. A private group was granted a license to begin
operating a second television channel, but the station had not
yet gone on the air by year's end. The Government's Broadcast
Commission has the right to regulate programming during
50-726 - 92 - 22
660
JAMAICA
emergencies. There are now more than 21,000 satellite antennas
on the island, permitting many Jamaicans to watch foreign
television broadcasts without any government restriction.
Jamaica's three largest newspapers, all privately owned,
regularly report on alleged human rights abuses, particularly
those involving the JCF. Foreign publications are widely
available. There is no censorship or interference in academic
institutions.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association. Large numbers and varieties of professional,
business, service, social, and cultural associations function
freely. Public rallies are staged by all political parties.
Such events require a police permit; they are not denied
arbitrarily.
c. Freedom of religion
Freedom of religion is provided for by the Constitution and is
well established in Jamaica. More than 80 percent of the
population belongs to various Christian denominations, and
religious groups of all kinds operate freely. Evangelical
Christian movements have gained a significant following, and
foreign evangelists visit regularly.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides Jamaican citizens freedom of movement
and immunity from expulsion from the country. There are no
restrictions on foreign travel or emigration. Citizenship is
not revoked for political reasons.
Those who apply for refugee status are handled on a
case-by-case basis. Jamaica is a party to the 1951 U.N.
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Jamaicans have, and freely exercise, the right to change their
government. All citizens age 18 and over have the right to
vote by secret ballot. In some urban electorates, however,
partisan political gangs are known to intimidate voters and
reportedly interfere with the electoral process. The
Constitution requires that the Prime Minister call national
elections within 5 years and 3 months of the first sitting of
Parliament; he is free to do so at any time within that period.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no restrictions on human rights organizations in
Jamaica. The JCHR, the country's only human rights
organization, has vigorously protested abuses by the police and
has called for corrective reforms. Their work has been
hampered, however, by a lack of adequate resources. The
Government has cooperated with foreign nongovernmental human
rights group that have visited Jamaica several times in recent
661
JAMAICA
years and those that have issued reports on Jamaican human
rights problems.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Jamaican women are accorded full equality under the
Constitution, and -the 1975 Employment Act requires equal pay
for equal work. However, in practice, because of cultural and
social traditions, women often suffer economic discrimination,
which is frequently evidenced in hiring practices.
Violence against women occurs with some frequency in Jamaica,
although useful statistical data are not available. The Bureau
of Women's Affairs within the Ministry of Labor, Welfare, and
Sports, along with several nongovernmental organizations, helps
victims cope with the effects of domestic violence. According
to officials at a crisis center, police are frequently
unwilling to assist battered women in taking legal steps
against their assailants. The JCF, responding in early 1991 to
complaints about its handling of rape victims, established a
rape center staffed by women officers to take reports from
victims and initiate investigations. Women remain reluctant to
bring assault charges against their domestic partners when jail
is seen as the likely result. However, the Government is
preparing to introduce noncustodial sentencing soon for
nonweapon offenses.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution specifically provides for the right to form or
join a trade union and obligates the Government to protect the
person and property of trade unionists. Labor unions function
freely. The Labor Relations and Industrial Disputes Act
(LRIDA) codifies worker rights.
The Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) and National
Workers Union (NWU) are both closely associated with, but
independent from, the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and People's
National Party (PNP), respectively. The University and Allied
Workers' Union (UAWU) is closely affiliated with the Workers'
Party of Jamaica (WPJ) through mutual officers; the WPJ is
moribund, however, while the UAWU is thriving.
Jamaican law neither authorizes nor prohibits the right to
strike, but unions and workers do go on strike. Striking
workers can interrupt work without criminal liability but
cannot be assured of keeping their jobs. However, strikes are
prohibited by workers in 10 broad categories of "essential
services," including health and communications workers. In
1991 the International Labor Organization (ILO) again
criticized the broad definition of essential services in
Jamaican law as being overly restrictive of the right of
association as defined in ILO Convention 87. In 1991 there
were several work slowdowns and a number of strikes of short
duration.
Trade lonions are free to affiliate internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Constitution provides for the right to organize and belong
to labor unions, and LRIDA provisions include guidelines for
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JAMAICA
labor, management, and government on issues such as organizing
work sites, negotiating agreements, and conflict resolution.
The Government rarely interferes with union organization
efforts, and judicial and police authorities effectively
enforce the LRIDA and other labor regulations.
Labor, management, and the Government remain firmly committed
by law and in practice to collective bargaining in contract
negotiations and conflict resolution, even in some nonunion
settings. When labor and management fail to reach an
agreement, cases may be referred to an independent Industrial
Disputes Tribunal (IDT), which forms the first appeal level
above the Ministry of Labor. Any cases not resolved by the IDT
pass to the civil courts. Employees may not be fired solely
because they are union officers. On the other hand, union
affiliation is not a prerecjuisite for employment.
Domestic labor laws apply in the export processing zones;
however, union representation in the zones is minimal. Union
organizers attribute this to resistance by foreign owners to
organizing efforts.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Jamaica is a party to both ILO Conventions which prohibit
compulsory labor, and there have been no allegations that this
practice exists in Jamaica.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Juvenile Act provides that children under the age of 12
shall not be employed except by parents or guardians, and that
such employment may be only in domestic, agricultural, or
horticultural work. Children under 12 years of age may not be
employed at night or at industrial sites, but enforcement is
erratic, and children under 12 can be seen peddling goods or
services on city streets. There is no evidence of widespread
illegal employment of children in other sectors of the
economy. However, reports of illegal working conditions for
"exercise boys" at a large thoroughbred racing farm surfaced in
September; although prompt action was promised by the Ministry
of Labor to prevent further abuses, no charges were brought as
a result of the allegations. The Educational Act stipulates
that all children aged 6 to 11 must attend elementary school.
Industrial safety, police, and truant officers are charged with
enforcement .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The legal minimum wage is widely considered inadequate for
rural families with one wage earner, and completely inadequate
for urban dwellers. Most salaried workers are paid more than
the legal minimum wage.
The LRIDA establishes basic conditions of work, including a
40-hour workweek, and the Factory Act stipulates that all
factories be registered and approved by the Labor Ministry
before they can begin operating. The Ministry's Industrial
Safety Division is reqiiired to make annual inspections of all
factories, but budget constraints reduce the number of
inspections actually made. If a private sector work site does
not meet the definition of a "factory," the Ministry does not
have the authority to inspect it.
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JAMAICA
The Labor Ministry's Industrial Safety Division is charged with
setting and enforcing industrial health and safety standards,
which outside experts consider adequate. Industrial accident
rates are relatively low. The Ministry maintains records on
industrial accident victims, and they are compensated under the
National Insurance Scheme. The Ministries of Labor, Finance,
the Public Service, and National Security are charged with
enforcing labor laws and regulations. Working conditions in
the export processing zones are generally comparable to outside
conditions .
664
MEXICO
-Mexico is a federal republic which has been dominated by the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) since its founding in
1929. Recent political reforms have expanded the opposition's
role and stake in the political system. A diverse political
opposition currently holds a significant number of seats in
congress, two major governorships, and numerous mayoralties.
Nevertheless, the PRI has maintained its predominant political
control by a combination of voting strength, organizational
power, access to governmental resources not enjoyed by other
political parties, and, the principal opposition parties and
other credible observers charge, electoral irregularities.
In the summer of 1991, midterm elections were held for all
seats in the Chamber of Deputies, for one-half the Senate, and
for 7 governorships. In much of Mexico, the PRI gained
significantly more votes than in 1988, winning nationally with
a wide margin over its nearest competitor. Many political
analysts attributed the PRI ' s improved showing to popular
support for the reform programs, particularly economic
modernization, advocated by President Salinas. However,
opposition leaders and many respected nonpartisan observers,
both domestic and international, cited a variety of actions by
election authorities and PRI supporters that they charged had
distorted the outcome of races in several states. In the cases
of the races for governor in Guanajuato and San Luis Potosi,
the Government responded to charges of egregious fraud by
forcing the PRI candidates who had been declared victorious by
state electoral commissions to withdraw, replacing them with
interim governors pending new elections.
Mexican security forces include federal and state judicial
police, specialized forces such as Mexico City's traffic
police, the federal highway police, and the military. Members
of the Federal Judicial Police (MFJP), especially antinarcotics
personnel, continue to be responsible for most human rights
abuses, including torture, unlawful arrest, and abuse of
authority. Some analysts charge that police brutality is
widespread in Mexico, but according to the National Commission
on Human Rights (CNDH), as well as some state and local human
rights advocates, allegations of such abuse declined in 1991.
Analysts attribute this decline primarily to significant legal
reforms that took effect in February and to the Government's
efforts to begin prosecuting some officials as offenders.
Mexico has a mixed economy that combines domestic market
capitalism with increasingly reduced state ownership of major
industries. The Government's economic reform progam has been
very successful in reducing inflation, promoting growth, and
restoring economic confidence. Negotiations continue for a
Free Trade Agreement with Canada and the United States.
Increased confidence in Mexico abroad has led to record levels
of foreign investment.
A wide range of individual freedoms is provided for by the
Constitution and honored in practice, but there continue to be
human rights abuses. These include the use of torture and
other abuse by elements of the police, instances of
extrajudicial killing, and credible charges by opposition
parties, civic groups, and outside observers of election
irregularities in some races. Throughout the year, however,
the Salinas Administration continued its serious efforts to
promote human rights. As of December, 139 police and other
public employees had been disciplined as a result of 158
recommendations by the CNDH, and criminal charges were pending
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against 64 of them. Nevertheless, many human rights abuses
still go unpunished. Both President Salinas and the CNDH
acknowledge that much remains to be done to improve respect for
human rights and to eliminate the culture of impunity that has
traditionally surrounded human rights violators.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section l Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Several killings of political and human rights activists
occurred in 1991. As in previous years, the identities and
motives of the perpetrators often could not be shown
conclusively for lack of evidence, but a number of the killings
may have been politically motivated. Most public attention in
1991 was focused on the murder in July of Victor Manuel
Oropeza, a doctor and columnist in Juarez who often denounced
human rights abuses committed by government officials (see
Section 2.a.). Two suspects who were arrested and confessed to
the crime later recanted, claiming they had been beaten and
tortured into confessing by federal and state police
officials. The suspects remained in detention, although a
judicial inquiry into the investigation of the case was pending
at year ' s end.
There appeared to be less electoral violence in the August
elections than in most previous Mexican elections.
Nonetheless, a Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRO) mayor
in Michoacan was shot dead several days after the election by
an inebriated assailant apparently driven by partisan feeling.
A PRI mayoral precandidate was slain before the election in
rural Veracruz, and the son of a National Action Party (PAN)
federal deputy was shot at on election day while working for
the party.
There continued to be incidents of extrajudicial killing by
MFJP agents. In December 1990, MFJP agents killed 8 people in
Angostura, Sinaloa, in an ambush intended to net drug smugglers
who eluded capture. In November 1991, the six policemen
involved were convicted of homicide and sentenced to terms of
from 16 to 18 years. The body of Francisco Quijano Garcia was
identified in March 1991. Quijano disappeared in June 1990
after he had pressed for an inquiry into the shooting deaths of
three of his sons at the hands of police in January 1990. The
CNDH ' s investigation into the sons' deaths implicated MFJP
agents, and the commission issued a recommendation that the
incident be investigated. After the Attorney General's first
investigation left unanswered questions, the CNDH sought
further information and said its own investigation would
continue. As of year's end, the CNDH was awaiting the results
of a study by independent forensic specialists before giving
its views on the case. In September 1991, the Government
announced the arrest of former MFJP Commander Mario Alberto
Gonzalez Trevino, who allegedly contracted for the 1990 murder
of lawyer and prominent human rights worker Norma Corona.
Trevino 's trial for murder was pending at year's end. Although
no suspects have been arrested, investigations continue into
the deaths of Hector Felix, a journalist and police critic who
was killed in 1988, and also into the 1988 slayings of two
senior aides to PRO leader Cuauhtemoc Cardenas.
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In Mexico's rural states, violent disputes over land sometimes
-result in extrajudicial killings. Paramilitary bands and local
police controlled by political bosses and land owners have
threatened and sometimes killed peasant activists. A violent
confrontation in November near Acapulco, Guerrero, reportedly
caused by developers trying to evict peasants from a tract of
land, resulted in several injuries and at least two deaths.
In 1991 there was an increase in the number of police officials
disciplined for human rights abuses, principally as a result of
CNDH investigations and recommendations. Cooperation with the
CNDH by the Attorney General's office, which has jurisdiction
over the MFJP, improved after Ignacio Morales Lechuga, the new
Attorney General, took office in May. The investigative power
of the CNDH was substantially strengthened in 1991 by a change
in the federal law that requires government employees to
respond to information requests by the CNDH in a timely and
truthful manner. Morales Lechuga later promulgated an internal
office rule ordering unrestricted access for CNDH investigators
and prompt, full replies to requests for information.
b. Disappearance
The CNDH investigated the 54 reports of disappearance it
received from January through December, 1991. In addition, on
its own initiative the CNDH investigated 154 other cases as
part of a joint program with the Attorney General's office to
investigate every case in Mexico listed by the U.N. Working
Group on Involuntary or Forced Disappearances. (The U.N. list
contains a total of more than 200 persons who reportedly
disappeared in Mexico over the last 22 years. Mexican
independant human rights groups continue to claim that
approximately 500 persons disappeared in Mexico over the same
period.) As of its December 1991 report on the program, the
CNDH had concluded 40 cases, 16 concerning claimed
disappearances from 1973-1989 and 24 from the period
1989-1991. Of the 40 concluded cases, 30 persons were found
alive and 6 dead (including 1 who drowned and 5 who were
apparently murdered. One murder suspect is in custody.)
Investigations of the other four concluded cases were closed at
the request of family members or for lack of evidence that the
person had disappeared. According to the Commission, of the 24
disappearances from 1989-1991 that it resolved, there was some
evidence of a political motive in l case, that of Jose Ramon
Garcia Gomez. The Commission has issued a recommendation in
his case and its investigation continues. Of the cases
concluded after the subject was found alive, many had been
imprisoned and charged with minor offenses, then released and
had not returned home, while others moved for personal reasons.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is prohibited by the Constitution. However, police
agents continue to employ psychological and physical torture,
and this form of abuse is a significant human rights concern in
Mexico. The most commonly used methods of torture include
threats, beatings, asphyxiation, and electric shock. In its
first 18 months of operation, the CNDH received 602 complaints
of torture out of 5,741 complaints of human rights violations.
According to the CNDH, however, complaints of torture declined
during the course of 1991 and during the second semester
represented 6.2 percent of complaints filed. Through
September, 60 U.S. citizens complained of police abuse, a
decline of 37 compared to the same period in 1990. In the
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majority of cases, where victims were able to identify those
involved, MFJP agents were implicated, although the share of
cases involving local and state authorities increased. By
year's end, the U.S. Government formally protested 27 cases of
torture or other mistreatment through diplomatic channels, down
from 43 such protests in 1990. According to the Attorney
General's reports, investigation of U.S. protests in 1991
resulted in 9 dismissals, 59 suspensions, and 20 reprimands of
officials found to have been involved. While criminal
investigations into the nine dismissed officials were
continuing, none had been prosecuted by year's end.
The Government continued efforts begun in 1990 to reduce the
incidence of torture and similar abuse by officials. Since
June 1991, the Government investigated, suspended, and/or fired
137 agents of municipal, state, and federal police forces, in
response to CNDH investigations, and 64 were prosecuted. The
charges against these 64 include 10 of homicide, 13 of torture,
16 of wounding, and 6 of unlawful detention. A total of 143
charges are pending against the 64.
In response to frequent criticism that confessions are coerced
in the period before defendants appear before a judge and are
assigned a lawyer, the federal rules of evidence were amended
in February. Confessions are now inadmissible unless given
before a judge or a Public Ministry official and in the
presence of defense counsel or a person in whom the accused has
confidence. Similar changes have been adopted in several state
codes and are being considered in the rest. The new rule is
credited by the CNDH and independent human rights activists as
partly responsible for the apparent decline in the incidence of
torture in 1991. But some human rights groups argue that
torture is still widespread and that the new rule does not go
far enough. They assert that only confessions before judges
should be accepted. Continued investigation of complaints
combined with vigorous prosecution and severe sentences are
needed to eliminate the practice of torture and other abuse of
detainees and prisoners.
Most prisons in Mexico are overcrowded and lack adequate
facilities for the prisoners. In addition, an entrenched
system of corruption has undermined prison authority and led to
abuses. In May a prison riot in Matamoros was sparked by a
conflict between prisoners involved in the drug trade. After
the riot, both prison officials and police officers were
dismissed and charged with collusion. The CNDH has advocated
legislation, before Congress at year's end, reducing the number
of crimes that carry mandatory prison sentences and giving
judges more discretion to sentence defendants to fines and
supervised release instead of prison terms.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution requires that arrestees be brought before a
judge within 24 hours of arrest, and that the judge take from
them a prelimiary declaration within the following 48 hours.
Within 72 hours after the arrestee first appears before him,
the judge must decide whether or not the detention shall
continue. Police and judges often fail to meet these
constitutional and procedural deadlines.
Incidents of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment occur
frequently: CNDH figures show that illegal deprivation of
liberty is the most common complaint among its human rights
cases. From June 1990 to December 1991, out of 5,741
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complaints received by the CNDH, 624 alleged arbitrary
detention. The most notorious arbitrary arrest case in 1991
involved Antonio Francisco Valencia Pontes, the lawyer of
Sergio Machi Ramirez who, according to the CNDH, may have been
abducted by MFJP agents in November 1989. After the CNDH
issued a recommendation calling for the release of Valencia
Pontes, the trial judge dismissed the case for lack of
evidence.
The law permits suspects caught in the act of committing a
crime (flagrancia) to be arrested with a warrant. It has been
frec[uent police practice to arrest a suspect without a warrant
even when there is no flagrancia and for judges to overlook the
irregularity. That practice has only recently begun to abate
with the dismissal of several cases based on arrests without
proof of flagrancia. In order for the protection against
arbitrary arrest to be given full effect, human rights
advocates assert that defense counsel must regularly raise the
issue and judges must be prepared to recognize it.
Credible reports continue to be made of human rights
violations, including forced expulsions and unlawful arrests,
in connection with land disputes in rural areas. These
incidents often involve indigenous people evicted by landowners
with local police and government support. In the spring
hundreds of people were expelled from their houses in Paso
Achiote, Chiapas, by local police and agents of the landowner.
Those evicted had returned by year's end, but several were
arbitrarily arrested and held for months before their release.
Local human rights activists credit their release to the
intervention of the Pederal Government, publicity, and
demonstrations of domestic and international support. In
another case, the alleged violent occupation of another lot in
Chiapas led to the imprisonment of a local priest who had
supported the Paso Achiote arrestees. The priest was held over
for trial by a judge who did not believe evidence that the
priest was not present, at the time of the incident. On
November 6, the priest was released following a national and
international outcry by religious and human rights groups, and
after an investigation by the CNDH.
Exile and extradition of Mexican citizens are not normally
practiced in Mexico.
e. Denial of Pair Public Trial
The judicial system is divided into federal and state court
systems, with the federal courts having jurisdiction over most
civil cases and those involving major felonies, including drug
trafficking. The political opposition charges that the
judiciary, with judges placed in office by renewable
appointments, is dependent on the executive branch. The
Government, in turn, denies that political beliefs have any
bearing on the impartial administration of justice. Pactors
such as low pay and high caseloads contribute to continued
corruption within the judicial system.
The Constitution recjuires that the court must hand down a
decision within 4 months of arrest for crimes that carry a
maximum sentence of 2 years or less, and within a year for
those with longer maximum sentences. The trial itself,
sentencing, and appeals can delay the imposition of a criminal
sentence for significant periods of time, sometimes adding a
year or more to the entire process. Trial is by a judge, not a
jury, in nearly all criminal cases. Defendants have a right to
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counsel, and public defenders are available. Other rights
include protection against self-incriminaton, the right to
confront one's accusers, the right to a translator if one's
native language is not Spanish, and the right to a public
trial. Protection of these rights is improving, but such
protections are not always observed in practice. The problem
of delayed sentencing is one of the major causes of
over-crowding in the prison system. The CNDH has begun to
address this problem by issuing several recommendations to
judges to render timely sentences.
The National Front Against Repression (FNCR) states that there
are currently 5 political prisoners in the country who were
imprisoned before President Salinas took office, down from the
33 reported in 1989. Historically the FNCR has claimed that
most political prisoners in Mexico were peasants and peasant
activists arrested in land disputes. The Government disputes
the appellation "political prisoner" altogether, charging that
most of those listed over the years by the FNCR have been
guilty of common crimes such as terrorism, criminal
association, and damage to property.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Privacy and freedom from intrusion by the Government into
homes, family, and correspondence are rights protected under
article 16 of the Constitution. Although search warrants are
required by law, human rights activists charge that unlawful
searches occur frec[uently in Mexico. Peasants and urban
squatters involved in conflicts over land titles have charged
that local landowners, accompanied by police, have entered
their homes without appropriate judicial orders and sometimes
resorted to violence, particularly in rural areas. Wiretaps
placed in violation of the law were found in the office of PAN
Governor Ernesto Ruffo Appel of Baja California and in the
offices of the CNDH. By year's end, investigations into the
perpetrators of both attempts had not been concluded.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and of the press are provided for by the
Constitution. Opposition leaders freely voice their criticism
of the Government and there are a large number of newspapers
and magazines with a wide range of editorial views. The
Government's control of a significant advertising budget and
its former role as the sole newsprint supplier have long fueled
charges that it used its leverage to pressure editors into
quashing unfavorable reports. Also, a number of journalists
depend upon receipt of "under-the-table" payments from the
often public entities they cover to supplement low wages.
Opposition political parties and independent observers charge
that Mexico's two principal television networks, one government
owned and the other privately owned, accord the PRI inordinate
news coverage, particularly at election time. The Federal
Electoral Code provides opposition parties during an electoral
campaign with 15 minutes per month of television time and
additional time in proportion to their electoral strength.
Violence and threats against journalists continued in 1991.
The death of physician and columnist Victor Manuel Oropeza
Contreras in July was the most controversial individual human
rights case during the year. Oropeza 's murder sparked outrage
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among those believing he was killed because he had recently
written articles critical of the MFJP. Then assistant to the
Attorney General and human rights activist Teresa Jardi and
others were critical of the subsequent police investigation
conducted by a special prosecutor appointed by the Attorney
General. A respected advocate for human rights whose presence
lent credibility to reform efforts, Jardi left the Attorney
General's office shortly thereafter. The alleged perpetrators
of the Oropeza murder were arrested, but the victim' s family
and others expressed strong doubts that those arrested were
guilty. At the request of the CNDH, Oropeza 's body was exhumed
for a second autopsy which confirmed the finding of the first
autopsy that death was caused by knife wounds and that there
was no evidence of torture. The case investigation was
continuing at year's end.
The Oropeza case was one of a series of attacks on journalists
that are the subject of a special CNDH study. In response to a
complaint by the Union of Democratic Journalists, the
Commission began an inquiry in 1990 into 55 cases of alleged
denial of the human rights of journalists. Of these, 17 were
passed to the regular complaint program or were not pursued
either because of a lack of information or because they did not
involve journalists. In December the CNDH updated its report
on the study. In 14 cases those responsible had already been
convicted; in 3 other cases (Hector Felix, Manuel Burgueno, and
Elvira Marcelo Esquivel) the killers had been convicted, but
complainants were pressing for further investigation and
prosecution of the intellectual authors; in 14 cases the CNDH
issued recommendations calling for the investigation and
punishment of officials involved in the attacks. One case was
dismissed after a finding of no wrongdoing, while another, that
of Manuel Buendia, remained pending because the alleged
intellectual author of his murder is imprisoned on another
charge. Of the remaining cases, three have been shelved
because of a lack of evidence or jurisdiction, and two
investigations remain pending.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution grants the right of peaceful assembly for any
lawful purpose. A government permit is generally required for
major demonstrations. The Government, with few exceptions,
permits demonstrations by a broad range of political groups.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution permits persons to practice the religion of
their choice. In December a constitutional amendment was
approved by both houses of Congress and several state
legislatures (with final ratification expected in January 1992)
that would transform the legal relationship between Church and
State in Mexico. Applicable to all faiths, it would grant
religious bodies legal standing, authorize them to own
property, run private schools, and permit clergy to vote and
wear religious garb in public. These are all rights that have
been denied de jure since the Mexican Revolution while
tolerated de facto. The clergy remain barred under the pending
change from holding public office and advocating partisan
political positions.
Mexico is predominantly Roman Catholic, though Protestant,
Mormon, Jewish, and other religious communities also exist
unfettered. Protestant evangelists and Mormons, principally
foreign-supported groups, are active and especially successful
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in certain rural and largely indigenous communities. A
significant rapprochement between the Catholic Church and the
State, begun by President de la Madrid and carried forward by
President Salinas, continued in 1991. Bishops even ventured
into political commentary during the midterm elections,
encouraging voting, criticizing fraud, and calling for honest
elections .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Movement within and outside the country is unrestricted. The
Government has customarily admitted persons recognized by the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Approximately 42,000
Guatemalan refugees reside in camps and resettlement areas in
three southern Mexican states. Since 1990 they have been
permitted to accept work outside their camps and may travel
freely in the five-state area of Chiapas, Campeche, Quintana
Roo, Tabasco, and Yucatan. The Government estimates that an
additional 500,000 Central Americans, most of them Guatemalans
and Salvadorans, are living illegally in Mexico, primarily in
the southern border areas and the Federal District.
Undocumented Central Americans lead a precarious existence
because they are subject to deportation if caught, and they are
often exploited by private Mexicans as a source of cheap
labor. The CNDH has drafted a law, similar to a U.S. amnesty
law, that would enable all those Central Americans to apply for
citizenship who could prove long-term residence in Mexico. It
has been held up while voluntary organizations complete a study
on the numbers of refugees to whom the law would apply. Once
their status as undocumented aliens is recognized, some of
these Central Americans will presumably be eligible for refugee
status under a new population law that was passed in 1990. The
Mexican Refugee Assistance Committee (COMAR) was processing the
recognition of 5,000 Guatemalans under this law at year's end.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Since 1929, Mexico's government has been controlled by the PRI ,
which has won every presidential race and every gubernatorial
race except the 1989 Baja California Norte election. To
maintain power, the PRI has relied on extensive public
patronage, the use of government and party organizational
resources, and, according to respected independent observers,
electoral irregularities.
The midterm federal elections were the first conducted under
the auspices of the new federal electoral law, COFIPE, approved
by the Congress in 1990. COFIPE introduced several changes
into the electoral process, including the complete renovation
of the official list of voters and distribution of over 36
million voting credentials to eligible voters. COFIPE also
strengthened opposition political party representation at the
Federal Electoral Institute, which supervises federal
elections, and created a Federal Electoral Tribunal (TFE), an
autonomous oversight commission that rules on electoral-related
disputes .
On August 18, the PRI tallied over 61 percent of the vote,
winning 290 of 300 directly elected federal deputies, 31 of 32
Senate races, and all 6 contests for Governor. In addition, it
had won the governorship of Nuevo Leon contested in July.
While hundreds of allegations of electoral wrongdoing were
filed, the consensus of observers and analysts was that an
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election devoid of fraud would not have significantly altered
the PRI ' s strong showing.
However, electoral fraud apparently did alter the results of
some state and local elections, especially in the states of
Guanajuato, San Luis Potosi, and Sonora. In San Luis Potosi,
an election monitoring effort led by the respected Mexican
Academy of Human Rights suggested that electoral fraud occurred
in over half the voting booths, bolstering opposition claims
that it was fraud that ensured victory by the PRI gubernatorial
candidate. In Guanajuato, in some voting booths several
hundred more people c&st ballots — almost all for the PRI — than
the number of people registered in that precinct. Such fraud
and the inability of electoral oversight organs to provide a
satisfactory remedy resulted in widespread public protests and
some election-related violence. After more than a week of
controversy, the announced election results were set aside. In
a compromise widely seen as having been imposed on the state
party cadre by a Federal Government intent on defusing the
opposition protests and removing the taint on the national
elections of the egregious fraud in those states, the declared
PRI winners resigned in both Guanajuato and San Luis Potosi and
were replaced by interim governors pending new elections. The
interim governor in San Luis Potosi was a PRI member but, in a
surprise move, a PAN mayor was chosen as interim governor in
Guanajuato. In December, municipal elections were held in both
states with the PAN winning a significant share of the vote.
New elections for governor are scheduled for April 1993 in San
Luis Potosi, while the date in Guanajuato was still pending at
year's end.
Despite improvements provided for in COFIPE, the electoral
process is still heavily weighted in favor of the PRI. While
admitting that President Salinas' popularity and Mexico's
economic resurgence contributed to the PRI ' s victory and that
fraud was less prevalent than in past elections, opposition
political parties claimed that sophisticated manipulation and
intimidation bolstered the PRI vote and denied opposition
victories in some races.
The opposition's strongest criticism concerned the official
voter list, which it charged was manipulated by inflating the
number of PRI voters, removing the names of opposition
supporters, or not delivering voting credentials to them.
Opposition allegations were bolstered by the Government's
failures in reporting election results on time and its
inability to deliver credentials to everyone who met the
registration recjuirements . The opposition also complained
about the use of government resources to support campaigns of
PRI candidates. COFIPE outlaws such support, and opposition
representatives filed criminal charges against some government
and PRI officials for violating this law. Independent
observers also critized the Government's frequent use of
patronage, particularly in the form of the Government's social
services and development program — the National Solidarity
Program (Pronasol) — for partisan political advantage.
Many in the opposition still do not have confidence that the
electoral oversight and review organs will act impartially.
Consequently, nongovernmental human rights organizations and
civic and academic groups have taken it upon themselves to
serve as independent electoral watchdogs. For example, during
the 1991 elections, the Council for Democracy, a loosely
aligned group of academics, journalists, and politicians,
organized a "quick count " of the vote results from Mexico City;
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its results mirrored the official results. The opposition is
also increasingly bringing cases of election-related human
rights violations before multilateral organizations. In 1990
the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (lAHRC) issued its
report to the Organization of American States (OAS) on a suit
filed in 1987 by the PAN. The report ruled in favor of the PAN
complaint, noting that "the Nuevo Leon electoral law does not
fully and effectively protect the exercise of political rights
and does not provide for simple, swift, and effective recourse
to independent and impartial tribunals .. .the Government of
Mexico must immediately adopt measures to see that the law is
corrected." The Government has not acted on the OAS ' s
recommendation, although the newly elected PRI governor in
Nuevo Leon has promised to reform the state electoral code.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government permits both domestic and international human
rights groups to operate in Mexico without restrictions or
harassment. Ranking Mexican officials routinely meet with
domestic and international human rights activists to discuss
human rights problems. In June 1990, President Salinas
established the semi autonomous National Commission on Human
Rights (CNDH) and appointed respected jurist Jorge Carpizo
Macgregor as its president. In December 1991, both houses of
Congress approved constitutional reforms that would make the
CNDH legally independent. Final ratification is expected in
January 1992. The Commission's advisory council is composed of
respected human rights leaders, and Dr. Carpizo has received
strong support from President Salinas for CNDH efforts.
During its first 18 months of operation, through December 1991,
the CNDH received 5,741 complaints. It had concluded 3,325
cases and the remainder were pending. Of those concluded,
1,123 were settled during investigation by counseling or
agreement. The Commission issued 158 recommendations in
connection with the remaining cases that resulted in 138
officials being punished for human rights violations — 64 were
awaiting trial for criminal offenses, 37 were dismissed from
their jobs, and 36 had been suspended. Sixty-three cases were
closed with a finding that no public official bore
responsibility for the alleged wrongdoing. The remaining cases
were either dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or were awaiting
additional information from complainants. Until now, however,
there have been few convictions of officials for extrajudicial
killings, torture, or similar serious offenses. The murder
convictions of the police involved in the Angostura killings
were the most noteworthy such convictions in 1991.
There are more than 7 5 nongovernmental human rights
organizations active in Mexico. One leading organization, the
Mexican Academy of Human Rights, is composed of respected
political and academic figures and serves primarily as an
information clearinghouse on human rights abuses. This year it
organized observers and issued a study of the August 18
election in San Luis Potosi that revealed a long list of
actions by the state PRI and local government officials ranging
from minor breaches of the electoral code to outright fraud
(see Section 3). The National Commission for the Promotion and
Defense of Human Rights was created in 1990 by experts formerly
associated with the Academy. This organization takes a direct
role advocating individual cases. It criticized the Government
for the impunity of officials who abuse human rights, arguing
that, despite CNDH efforts, few officials had been convicted of
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torture or more serious offenses. Twelve state governments
have created human rights commissions and, in Baja California,
the first Office of Attorney General for Human Rights was
created.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Mexico takes pride in its Spanish and indigenous origins and in
the success the country has achieved in fostering a climate of
racial harmony. Indigenous groups, many of which do not speak
Spanish, are encouraged to participate in political life, and
the Government is respectful of their desire to retain elements
of their traditional lifestyle. However, these groups remain
largely outside the country's political and economic
mainstream, a result not of overt governmental discrimination
but rather of longstanding patterns of economic and social
development. The Government's National Program for Development
of Indigenous Peoples acknowledged in a report that "a set of
relations of inequality for indigenous peoples .... still
exists." These groups are severely disadvantaged in access to
medical care and education. The continued existence of large
family estates results in a severe shortage of land for
indigenous people to feed a rapidly growing population.
Federal law was changed in 1991 to require that indigenous
peoples not fluent in Spanish have an interpreter at every
stage of a criminal proceeding.
Historically, women in Mexico have played a subordinate role,
economically, politically, and socially. However, women are
becoming increasingly active economically and politically. One
woman is a member of President Salinas' Cabinet, and others are
key congressional and union leaders. Legally, women are equal
to men. They have the right to file for separation and
divorce, and to own property in their own name. The
Constitution provides for equal pay for ec[ual work and for
maternity leave. Domestic assault is a crime, but in
practice — largely due to social tradition — women are often
reluctant to file reports of abuse or to press charges. Police
are reluctant to intervene in what is often considered a
domestic affair. After a successful effort to reform the law
on sexual crimes in 1990, specialized medical and social
assistance is now available for rape victims, at least in urban
areas, and there are penalties for sexual harassment. Violence
against women in prison continues to be reported, particularly
in overcrowded facilities where, contrary to law, women are
held in common areas with men. In rural areas there have been
reports of harassment and mistreatment of indigenous women in
the aftermath of land evictions. Four bodyguards of former
Attorney General antinarcotics chief Javier Coello Trejo, who
were originally charged with a series of rapes in Mexico City,
remain in jail with additional charges pending against them.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution and specific provisions of the current Federal
Labor Law (FLL) give workers the right to form and join trade
unions of their own choosing. Unions must register with the
Labor Secretariat and, although registration requirements are
not onerous, there have been charges that they have not been
uniformly applied. About 30 to 35 percent of the total Mexican
work force of 23 to 26 million (some 11 to 12 million in the
formal sector and 12 to 14 million in the informal sector) is
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organized in trade unions, most of which are members of several
large union confederations, also known as labor centrals.
Mexican unions may join together freely in labor centrals
without the Government's prior approval.
The principal Mexican trade union organization is the
Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), which is
organizationally a major sector of the PRI . All PRI-af filiated
federations and a number of the independents (a total of 36
organizations) belong to the Congress of Labor (CT), a trade
union coordinating body which represents approximately 85
percent of Mexico's organized workers. The significant
presence of union officers in the Government, especially in
elected positions, and the continued heavy union influence in
the nominating process for candidates at all levels of
government, perpetuates a symbiotic relationship which limits
the freedom of action of unions. For example, union officers
support government economic policies and PRI political
candidates in return for having a voice in policy formation.
The next largest category of trade unions is that of strictly
apolitical unions. Many, but not all, are company unions, with
widely varying degrees of independence from management
influence. The smallest category encompasses unions and labor
centrals that oppose the PRI. Spokespersons for the largest
unions in this category claimed in 1991 that in practice
federal and state government registrars have improperly
frustrated attempts to register new unions that oppose the PRI
politically.
Mexican law grants workers the right to strike. The FLL
requires as a first step that a 6- to 10-day strike notice be
filed, followed by a brief, government-sponsored mediation
effort. If a strike is ruled illegal, employees must return to
work within 24 hours or face dismissal for cause. On the other
hand, once a legally recognized strike occurs, by law the
company (or its subunit) that is the strike target must shut
down totally. The FLL also permits strikes by public sector
employees, although this rarely occurs. In the early months of
1991 a dissident group within the National Teachers Union
undertook wildcat work stoppages for better wages. The
Government granted all teachers a 25-percent wage hike,
recognizing that a real gap had developed between teachers' pay
and that of comparable employees.
There were no major, prolonged strikes in 1991. There was,
however, a well-publicized effort by union dissidents and
former workers of the Ford plant outside Mexico City to hold a
new union recognition election. This grew out of a
confrontation in 1990 between the incumbent CTM auto workers'
union and dissident workers linked with a competing labor
central. The dissidents eventually won their legal appeal, and
a union representation election was held on June 3 which the
CTM won by a close margin.
Following the closing of a major oil refinery in Mexico City,
there were a series of protests by workers who had been
dismissed without benefits. Angered that their protests were
not supported by their local of the Oil Workers Union, the
protesters criticized the local. Shortly afterward, according
to a credible report from a respected human rights advocate,
Braulio Aguilar Reyes, the younger brother of one protester,
was seized, beaten, and held incommunicado part of the time in
a police building by men whom he later identified as members of
the Federal Judicial Police. He was not charged with any
offense and was released after 36 hours, following pressure by
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the family and advocacy groups. The assailants were arrested
but, as of year's end, no proof of their alleged union link had
been established.
Mexico was again formally criticized by the International Labor
Organization (ILO) in 1991 for its legal requirement that
federal public sector employees can only belong to a single
union in each category of public employment. Such federal
employee unions, in turn, are grouped together in a single
public sector labor central, the FSTSE.
Unions and labor centrals are free to join or affiliate with
international labor organizations and do so actively.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The FLL strongly upholds the right to organize and to bargain
collectively. On the basis of only a small showing of interest
by employees, an employer must recognize the union concerned
and make arrangements either for a union recognition election
or proceed immediately to negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement, and such agreements are commonplace. FLL prounion
bias is so pronounced that it has led many employers to
encourage company unionism as an alternative to organization by
national or local unions affiliated with the dominant labor
centrals.
The public sector is almost totally organized. The degree of
private sector organization varies widely by states. While
most traditional industrial areas are heavily organized, states
with a small industrial base usually have few unions. Workers
are protected by law from antiunion discrimination, but this
law is unevenly enforced, especially in states with a low
degree of unionization.
The rate of unionization of in-bond export, or "maquiladora, "
industries varies, but the rate of unionization on average for
in-bond export industries is comparatively low. A 1990 study
by the U.S. Department of Labor suggested that antiunion bias
by employers played a contributing role. The report also cited
allegations, denied by the Mexican Government and labor
centrals, of a tacit agreement to refrain from organizing the
in-bond export plants. The Attorney General for Human Rights
of Baja California attributes the low rate of unionization of
"maquiladoras" in his state to the fact that the relatively
good wage and benefit packages of the large "maquiladoras" have
reduced the incentives to unionize.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced labor. There have been no
credible reports for many years of forced labor in Mexico.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The FLL sets 14 as the minimum age for employment by children.
Children from 14 to 15 may work a maximum of 6 hours, may not
work overtime or at night, and may not be employed in jobs
deemed hazardous. This means there is little incentive for a
responsible employer to hire children under the age of 16,
especially since in most instances more mature adults are
available at the same wage scale. In the formal sector,
enforcement is reasonably adequate for large- and medium-size
companies; it is less certain for small companies. As with
employee safety and health, the worst enforcement problem is
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with the many very small companies, especially those with five
or fewer employees. Child labor is largely found in the
informal economy. It is widely believed that the informal
economy includes significant numbers of underage street
vendors, employees in very small business, and workers in rural
areas .
In 1991 the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare (STPS) and
the U.S. Department of Labor undertook joint studies of both
the child labor problems and the nature of the informal
economies in Mexico and the United States as part of an effort
to consider better ways for both countries to prevent illegal
child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Constitution and the FLL provide for a minimum wage for
workers, which is set by the tripartite National Minimum Wage
Commission (government/labor/employers). In December 1987, the
major labor centrals and unions, along with employers, agreed
to a temporary tripartite accord to limit price and wage
increases. It has been renewed annually since then. Since
1987, annual minimum wage adjustments have been made to
compensate for inflation only. Generally, in the private
sector in the past few years, wages set by collective
bargaining agreements have kept pace with inflation even though
the minimum wage did not.
The FLL sets 48 hours as the legal workweek. The FLL provides
that workers who are asked to exceed 3 hours of overtime per
day or work any overtime in 3 consecutive days must be paid
triple the normal wage. For most industrial workers,
especially unionized ones, the real workweek has declined to
about 42 hours. Mexico's legislation and rules regarding
employee health and safety are relatively advanced. All
employers are bound by law to observe the "general regulations
on safety and health in the workplace" issued jointly by STPS
and Mexican Institute of Social Security. The focal point of
standard setting and enforcement in the workplace is in
FLL-mandated bipartite (management and labor) safety and health
committees in the plants and offices of every company. These
meet at least monthly to consider workplace safety and health
needs and file copies of their minutes with federal or state
labor inspectors.
Government labor inspectors schedule their own activities
largely in response to the findings of these workplace
committees.
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Nicaragua is a constitutional democracy, governed by President
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and a National Assembly elected in
a free and fair election in 1990. The President has given the
lead for the direction of the Government to her son-in-law,
Antonio Lacayo, the Minister of the Presidency. The National
Opposition Union (UNO), a 14-party coalition which supported
Chamorro 's presidential bid, holds a solid majority in the
National Assembly. The Sandinista Front for National
Liberation (FSLN), which was defeated in the 1990 elections,
retains minority representation in the legislature. Sandinista
justices outnumber Chamorro appointees five to four on the
nine-member Supreme Court, but neither group has the six-vote
majority necessary to decide cases. Few cases of human rights
violations were brought before the courts during the year.
The Ministry of Government and the President, acting as her own
Defense Minister, are the civilian authorities legally
responsible for overseeing the National Police and Sandinista
People's Army (EPS). In practice, however, Nicaragua's
security forces continued to be led by Sandinista appointees
who operated with substantial autonomy. Police and military
officials were repeatedly named in human rights violations
committed during the year. The Ministry of Government took
several positive steps in 1991 in response to these reports,
establishing the Civil Inspection Unit to investigate police
wrongdoing, the National Penitentiary Commission to review
prison conditions, and the Human Rights Directorate to respond
to outside inquiries about human rights. The army took no
similar steps in response to complaints of human rights abuse
in its area of jurisdiction.
Nicaragua continued efforts to rebuild its predominantly
agricultural economy in 1991. Per capita income was estimated
at less than $300 per year in a 1991 report of the
International Monetary Fund. In March the Government
implemented a structural adjustment program which cut inflation
to about 1 percent per month and ended the practice of weekly
currency devaluations.
Major human rights problems in 1991 included; continued
extrajudicial killings, mistreatment of detainees, and other
abuses by security forces; violence by paramilitary bands in
rural areas; the backlogged and often partisan judicial system;
and the Government's continuing failure to investigate and
prosecute those responsible for human rights abuses.
Nongovernmental human rights groups criticized the Government's
failure to investigate past abuses. In a report on Nicaragua
released in February 1991, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (lACHR) stated that "particular mention should be
made of the biased behavior of the security forces, which have
become a state within a state, acting in concert with one
particular political party and to the detriment of the civilian
authority of the democratically elected, constitutional
Government . "
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Politically motivated violence was commonplace in 1991. The
civil war, which formally concluded in June 1990 with the
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demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN), left
Nicaraguan society both politically polarized and heavily
armed. Prior to leaving office after their electoral defeat,
the Sandinistas distributed weapons to many of their
supporters; some members of the RN also cached supplies of arms
before demobilizing. In September 1991, Minister of Government
Carlos Hurtado named a bipartisan disarmament commission to
develop a strategy for collecting the 35,000 to 100,000 weapons
estimated to be in civilian hands.
There were numerous credible reports that demobilized RN
combatants were killed by the police, army, or Sandinista
militants during the year. In virtually all cases, there were
no investigations or prosecutions of the perpetrators of these
killings. According to the International Support and
Verification Commission (CIAV) of the Organization of American
States, 45 former RN combatants were killed during the first 10
months of the year; in 1990, 36 former combatants were killed
in the six months following their formal demobilization on June
27. CIAV records attributed 45 of these killings to FSLN
supporters and 21 to the police, army, or former state security
officers. CIAV provided details of the homicides and other
alleged human rights abuses to the Ministry of Government. As
of October 31, CIAV had received full or partial responses to
13 of the 73 homicide cases it reported.
Local human rights monitors charged that security forces
continued to be staffed by many former members of the General
Directorate of State Security (DGSE) , which was cited for
repeated human rights violations under the Sandinista
government. While most ex-DGSE officers assumed positions in
the military, some in rural areas became police officers. In
December the Ministry of Government confirmed that several
former DGSE officers had been removed from their positions.
Much of the rural violence in 1991 involved land disputes. In
one instance, documented by local and international human
rights monitors, some 200 unarmed peasants approached the
Sandinista cooperative Corinto Finca on February 28 to claim a
share of its land. Cooperative members opened fire, killing 5
and wounding 11. Five cooperative members were charged by
police as a result of the incident. According to the
independent Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights (ANPDH),
their cases were subsequently dismissed when a court determined
that some statements had been obtained improperly from the
accused. In another case, a band of armed men, identified in
press reports as demobilized RN combatants, attacked the Carlos
Fonseca Amador cooperative near the town of Cafen. The
attackers shot three youths and burned buildings at the
cooperative before withdrawing. In October the pro-Sandinista
Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH) reported that 56
FSLN militants had been killed since Chamorro took office and
attributed many of these deaths to demobilized RN combatants
who had rearmed.
In mid-1991, some demobilized RN combatants began to rearm in
small groups. These "recontras" conducted several armed
attacks to press demands that the Government comply with
promises made to the RN at the time of demobilization. In
making these demands, the recontras echoed calls by other
demobilized RN members for improved security guarantees in the
face of continued harassment by the police, military, and armed
Sandinista militants, and they also urged the Government to
keep its promise to provide farmland to former combatants. Two
of the most prominent recontra leaders, Jose Angel Moran (known
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as "El Indomable") and Encarnacion Valdivia ( "Tigrillo" ) ,
rearmed after their homes were attacked by Sandinista
militants. Moran's pregnant wife was killed in the attack on
his home.
On July 21, a band of recontras attacked and briefly occupied
the Centroamerica hydroelectric power facility in Matagalpa
Department, killing two and kidnaping two others. On July 25,
a band of recontras led by Moran attacked the police station in
the town of Quilali in Nueva Segovia and in the ensuing
violence two police officers and two recontras were killed.
Moran was also accused in the June 6 death of police Captain
Luis Meza and his secretary, who were ambushed on the road from
Jinotega to San Rafael del Norte. Based on the results of a
police investigation, a local judge ordered Moran's arrest;
Moran denied responsibility for the deaths and called for a
full investigation of the incident.
Sandinistas also formed armed bands known as "recompas,"
reportedly composed largely of retired members of the EPS. On
August 21, a mine exploded beneath a truck traveling on the
road from El Cua to Pita del Carmen in Jinotega Department,
killing 16, including 7 recontras. Although police initially
reported that the attack was the work of a rival band of
recontras, a CIAV team concluded that the mine was not the work
of recontras. An ANPDH investigation pointed to EPS
involvement in the mining, while other credible sources
ascribed the attack to the recompas. In a November 28
incident, demobilized ex-RN member Mario Vivas Maldonado was
kidnaped and murdered while accompanying a disabled comrade
being transported for medical treatment in a clearly marked
CIAV vehicle. Also kidnaped and robbed in the incident were
vivas' wife, the disabled ex-RN member, and the female driver
of the vehicle. While the victims' belongings were recovered
by the EPS, those responsible were not apprehended.
On February 16, former RN commander Enrique Bermudez was
assassinated in front of Managua's Intercontinental Hotel. A
police investigation had not identified any suspects in the
murder as of the end of the year. A special commission named
by President Chamorro to monitor the investigation criticized
police for: failing to cordon off the crime scene immediately
following the shooting and not listing all witnesses present;
reporting initially that no bullet had been found at the scene,
then later producing one; discrepancies in the forensic reports
with respect to the trajectory of the bullet through the body;
and failure to mention in the police report all evidence
photographed at the scene. In April the Government requested
assistance from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
in providing answers to four specific questions raised by
Nicaraguan investigators. The FBI responded to the specific
requests, providing information from its files and arranging
the exhumation and autopsy of Bermudez' remains in Miami. In
contrast to forensic medical examinations performed in Managua,
the FBI autopsy revealed that Bermudez was killed by two 7.62
millimeter bullets, rather than a single shot. In November the
special presidential commission announced its dissolution,
citing the lack of progress in the Nicaraguan police
investigation.
A police investigation widely thought to be lacking credibility
revealed no suspects in the October 28, 1990, murder of Jean
Paul Genie. Genie was killed by automatic weapons fire while
driving on Managua's Masaya highway; several witnesses placed
General Humberto Ortega's motorcade at the scene of the
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murder. A Managua district judge reinterviewed key witnesses
and examined physical evidence in the case, but by year's end
had not named any suspects. A special commission composed of
National Assembly deputies was formed to monitor the Genie
investigation. The Commission invited a team of Venezuelan
criminal investigators to review the Genie case in an effort to
identify likely suspects. The Venezuelan team issued a report
August 27 naming General Ortega's bodyguards as the prime
suspects .
Those responsible for major incidents of political and
extrajudicial killing dating from 1990 had not been brought to
justice by the end of 1991. Military courts acquitted members
of the security forces charged in connection with violent
incidents in Las Sabanas, August 13, 1990; Yolaina, October 29,
1990; Nueva Guinea, November 2, 1990; and Jalapa, December 16,
1990. Human rights monitors had charged the police and
military with excessive use of force in each of these cases.
b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of abduction by official forces
during the year. However, there were several cases in which
recontras kidnaped members of the police or army and later
killed them. Recontras kidnaped three former DGSE officers in
El Sarayal July 17; the three are still missing and believed to
be dead.
Local human rights groups estimated that as many as 1,000
persons remain unaccounted for since the end of the war. As in
1990, the continuing discovery of clandestine graves dating
from the Sandinista era (1979-90) provided information as to
the whereabouts of some of the disappeared. Among such
discoveries in 1991 were clandestine graves at Correntada Larga
in the South Atlantic Coast region and at two sites in Esteli
Department. At Correntada Larga, witnesses reported that over
a 2-week period in 1981 DGSE officers tortured 37 peasants in a
farmhouse before killing a total of 67 in the surrounding
area. In April family members found at least 35 sets of
remains, including some buried in prison uniforms or in garbage
bags, at a common grave located on a military base near
Bluefields in the South Atlantic Coast region. According to
credible reports, six of these victims were executed by
Sandinista troops in 1985 following a clash with RN
combatants. Although the diggers were continuing to uncover
additional sets of remains, officials of the military justice
system closed the site to further excavation.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were numerous credible reports during the year of
beatings and other physical mistreatment of persons detained by
the police, often to obtain confessions from detainees. The
Government generally failed to investigate and prosecute those
responsible for cases of mistreatment. For example, ANPDH
reported that police officers in a Managua substation beat one
detainee at the time of capture and threatened to detain his
wife and children unless he signed a confession.
During 1991 human rights groups visited most of the facilities
in the Nicaraguan penitentiary system. The physical abuse
common in police detention centers was rare in the prisons.
ANPDH reported isolated cases of beatings and occasional use of
solitary confinement as punishment. In general, however, human
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rights monitors indicated that mistreatment of prisoners
typically took the form of inadequate food and medical
attention.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Police Functions Law establishes procedures for the arrest
of criminal suspects. The law was criticized by local human
rights groups in 1991 for providing inadequate judicial
oversight of police arrests. The law requires police to obtain
a warrant prior to detaining a suspect, but it is issued by a
police official rather than a judge. After detaining a
suspect, police are required by the law to notify family
members of the detainee's whereabouts, but in practice this is
rarely done. Detainees do not have the right to an attorney
until they have been formally charged with a crime.
Arbitrary arrest and detention by the police were common
practices in 1991. Under the terms of the Police Functions
Law, a suspect may be detained for up to 9 days before he is
brought before a judge. If released before the 9-day deadline,
the police are not required to justify the detention. Human
rights monitors note that the nine-day period contravenes the
constitutional requirement that a detainee appear before a
competent judicial authority within 3 days of detention. The
National Assembly specified the 3-day deadline in the Reform
Law of Penal Procedures, passed on March 8. The Assembly did
not amend the Police Functions Law, however, and local human
rights groups reported that detainees continued routinely to be
held without charge for more than the three days allowed by the
Constitution. The Civil Inspection Unit of the Ministry of
Government, which is responsible for monitoring and correcting
police wrongdoing, uncovered more than 50 cases of illegal
detention in its first full quarter of operation (March through
June.) In some cases, the unit obtained the release of the
detainees after intervening with police.
Although the Constitution provides that detainees are to
receive access to legal counsel once they have been charged
with a crime, in practice police do not act to protect this
right. In visits to Managua police detention facilities in
April, CENIDH investigators found that only 32 percent of
detainees had been informed of their right to counsel. The
Reform Law of Penal Procedures, approved by the National
Assembly in March, provides for the release of accused
criminals on bail. Previously, detainees were permitted to
remain at liberty prior to trial only for compelling personal
reasons, such as ill health. CENIDH opposed the release of
prisoners on bail as favoring the rich at the expense of the
poor, but most human rights monitors applauded the reform.
Although passed by the National Assembly in March and
promulgated in July, the Reform Law had not been implemented at
year's end. After the judiciary claimed it lacked the
resources to enact the reforms, the National Assembly postponed
implementation of the new law until February 1992.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system comprises both military and civilian
courts. The military court is responsible for investigating,
prosecuting, and trying crimes committed by or against members
of the armed forces or police. Proceedings of the military
courts are secret but may be released to the public if the army
authorities so choose. Military courts often fail to
investigate or try cases against members of the military. Even
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when soldiers are convicted, they either receive light
sentences or the sentences are not enforced.
The accused has the right to legal coxinsel; if he cannot afford
his own attorney, he is represented by a public defender najned
by the presiding judge. Defendants are presumed innocent
unless proven guilty. Those convicted have the right of
appeal. The Constitution provides for the right to a speedy
trial but, in practice, many persons arrested and held without
bail spend months in jail before appearing in court. The
Permanent Commission for Human Rights (CPDH) estimates that one
third of all those incarcerated in the prison system have been
awaiting trial for between three months and two years.
The 1991 Reform Law of Penal Procedures, which had not been
implemented by year's end, modifies some court procedures. It
reestablishes trial by jury and allows individual citizens to
denounce criminal activities directly to a judge. Previously,
all accusations of criminal wrongdoing were processed first by
the police, who determined whether the case merited further
action. The Reform Law was approved unanimously by the
National Assembly and without opposition from the judiciary.
Subsequently, however, several members of the Supreme Court
criticized its provisions as too costly and administratively
unwieldy for the judiciary to implement at current funding
levels, and implementation was postponed until February 1992.
The judiciary in Nicaragua continues to be dominated by
Sandinista appointees. The Supreme Court, which is responsible
for naming lower court judges, reports that approximately
one-third of the Sandinista government's judicial appointees
have been removed or transferred. Critics in the Nicaraguan
Bar Association and human rights monitors argue that the
Sandinistas' partisan influence on the courts did not
appreciably diminish in 1991 since the dismissals were few and
the transfers allowed Sandinista judges to remain in the
judicial system, albeit in new jobs. Sandinista appointees to
the nine-member Supreme Court outnumber Chamorro appointees
five to four, but neither group alone has the six votes needed
to decide cases.
On December 22, President Chamorro declared an amnesty for "all
political and related common crimes" committed since May 10,
1990. This decree extended the amnesty granted in 1990 to
those responsible for prior political crimes. Some human
rights monitors criticized this decree as a setback to their
efforts to bring known human rights abusers to justice.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were numerous credible reports of police and army units
entering homes or businesses without judicial authorization.
Often this forced entry was conducted as part of a search for
contraband weapons. Political opponents of the Sandinistas
were the principal targets of forced entry onto their property,
as well as other intimidation tactics. On the night of June
18, following National Assembly action on a bill opposed by the
Sandinista deputies, the private homes of prominent UNO
officials in several cities were bombed in coordinated
attacks. During the year, ANPDH also received reports that
recontra combatants had forced their way into homes and small
stores to commandeer boots, food, and other supplies.
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Vocal opponents of the Sandinistas, including some independent
human rights groups, reported that their telephones were tapped
and that their mail often showed signs of tampering.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Diverse viewpoints were freely and openly discussed in public
discourse, in print and broadcast media, and in academic
circles. There are two television stations, one owned and
operated by the Government, and one operated by a private
company which leased the station from the State. The
government station broadcasts two news programs nightly, one
produced by its own news team and a second by the Sandinista
opposition, and also provides extensive coverage of National
Assembly debate. In 1990 licenses were granted to several
other television production companies. As of the end of 1991,
none had begun broadcasting, apparently for lack of financing
and programming.
Pro-Sandinista mobs attacked several pro-UNO radio stations
during the year. In late June, supporters of the
pro-Sandinista Front for Popular Struggle occupied the
facilities of Radio Corporacion in Managua, Radio Dario in
Leon, Radio San Cristobal in Chinandega, and La Voz de
Matagalpa in Matagalpa, forcing their broadcasts off the air.
Several other stations closed down under threats of attack.
All of the occupied stations were subseguently vacated
peacefully, and no arrests were made in connection with the
takeovers. During a 2-day rampage on November 9 and 10,
Sandinista mobs again damaged the studios of Radio Corporacion
and Radio Dario and the transmitter of Radio San Cristobal.
Although Sandinista appointees continued to predominate among
faculty and administrators in the Nicaraguan educational
system, alternative viewpoints were increasingly expressed in
the academic community.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Numerous marches and demonstrations were held throughout the
year by groups representing a range of political views.
Demonstrators must obtain permission for a march after
registering its planned size and location with police. This
permission is routinely granted. Opposition and independent
associations of all sorts coexisted in Nicaragua throughout
1991. Private associations of any kind may be formed without
restrictions but do not have legal status until they receive
this designation from the National Assembly. Such legal
recognition is routinely conferred.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion. Although
Nicaragua is at least 80 percent Roman Catholic, other
religious groups practice without hindrance. Protestant
denominations proselytize actively and now constitute as much
as 20 percent of the population. Missionaries and church
workers freely enter the country to engage in religious
activities as well as development assistance.
NICARAGUA
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no government restrictions on movement within or from
Nicaragua.
Nearly 200,000 former RN combatants, their families, and other
refugees have been repatriated to Nicaragua since
demobilization in June 1990. Their return to Nicaragua was
accomplished without incident under the supervision of CIAV and
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Their
reintegration into the Nicaraguan society and economy, however,
has been more problematic, with many repatriates still awaiting
land to farm and adequate protection of their physical security
(see Section 1 . a. ) .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government .
In the February 1990 election, Nicaraguans exercised the right
to change their government peacefully. The election, contested
by the 14-party UNO coalition, the FSLN, and several smaller
parties, was declared free and fair by international observers.
Violeta Chamorro won the Presidency, and UNO obtained a
majority of seats in the National Assembly. The next elections
for the Presidency, Assembly, and municipal councils are
scheduled for 1996.
The National Assembly was characterized by free-flowing and at
times acrimonious debate throughout the year. Fifty-two of the
92 Assembly seats are held by parties of the UNO coalition, and
39 by the Sandinistas. The Government continued the National
Dialog in 1991, encouraging the participation of progovernment
as well as opposition groups. Through this process, begun in
1990, the Government sought to forge a broad consensus on
social and economic policy.
On several occasions during the year, Sandinista-directed mobs
violently attacked elected representatives. One example of
such violence occurred on June 18, following Assembly action to
return to their former owners properties that had been
confiscated by the Sandinista government and distributed to its
partisans. Sandinista mobs forced their way into the offices
of elected mayors in cities throughout the country, including
Managua, Masaya, Granada, and Matagalpa. In Managua, the mobs
struck one councilman in the head with a pipe and threatened
other city employees with firearms. Small bombs exploded at
the homes or offices of prominent UNO politicians and the
presidents of the National Conservative Party and the
Independent Liberal Party. On November 9, following an
explosion at the tomb of FSLN founder Carlos Fonseca,
Sandinista mobs burned and looted the offices of the mayor of
Managua, among other violent acts. Police failed to intercede
to stop the violence.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government generally permitted local and international
human rights monitors to operate freely in Nicaragua in 1991.
There were three local human rights orginzations the Nicaraguan
Center for Human Rights (CENIDH), the Permanent Commission for
Human Rights (CPDH), and the Nicaraguan Association for Human
Rights (ANPDH) . CENIDH is a pro-Sandinista monitor, whose
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director is a member of the FSLN Assembly, the party's supreme
standing body. The CPDH and the ANPDH are not affiliated with
any party but are known for their active criticism of abuses
committed under the Sandinista government. The CPDH was
founded during the later Somoza years and was staunchly
critical of that regime. It continued to function after the
revolution despite Sandinista harassment. ANPDH was founded in
1986 to train the Nicaraguan Resistance in acceptable human
rights practices and to investigate reports of abuse. Both
groups have received funding from U.S. government sources or
private donors. In May the National Assembly voted to disband
the National Commission for the Protection and Promotion of
Human Rights (CNPPDH), a government-funded organization
established by the Sandinistas to defend their human rights
record.
The Ministry of Government, which is responsible for the police
and the prison system, took several steps in 1991 to identify
and correct human rights abuses. In January it named Ulises
Somarriba to head the Ministry's newly created Civil Inspection
Unit, charged with investigating complaints of human rights
violations or abuse of authority by Ministry employees.
Somarriba had regular contact with local human rights monitors
throughout 1991. The Ministry named local human rights
monitors and church representatives to the National
Penitentiary Commission and permitted access to police and
prison facilities (see Section I.e.). In July it named Juan
Manuel Siero to head a new Human Rights Directorate charged
with responding to nongovernmental organizations concerned with
human rights.
International human rights organizations also were active in
Nicaragua in 1991. The lAHRC reported in February on
conditions in Nicaragua. A Commission of Inquiry from the
International Labor Organization (ILO) issued a report in
response to complaints of worker rights abuses under the
Sandinista government. Human rights conditions of the
demobilized RN combatants were monitored by CIAV's Office of
Follow-up and Verification of Rights and Guarantees, and by the
verification network of Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo.
Witness for Peace, a U.S. -based ecumenical group founded to
document Resistance abuses during the war, maintained an office
in Managua. Americas Watch made frequent visits from its San
Salvador office and issued a July report on human rights
conditions in Nicaragua.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of
"birth, nationality, political belief, race, gender, language,
religion, opinion, national origin, economic position, or
social condition." Most Nicaraguans are of mixed mestizo
background, and skin color does not appear to be a barrier to
political or economic success. Women continued to suffer de
facto discrimination in the male-dominated culture prevalent in
some sectors although this did not prevent women from occupying
senior positions in government, the trade union movement, and
social organizations. Women are underrepresented in management
positions in the private sector and form the majority of
workers in the traditionally low-paid education, textile, and
health services sectors.
Violence against women, including rape and wife beating, occurs
in Nicaragua. Because victims often are reluctant to publicize
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their charges, it is likely that such abuse is significantly
under reported. Local human rights groups report that police
sometimes intervene to prevent injury in cases of domestic
violence, but that the perpetrators are rarely charged or tried
for their acts. The Ixchen Centers and the Luisa Amanda
Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women, a Sandinista mass
organization, provided medical and psychological counseling to
women, as well as" legal advice in divorce cases and to victims
of rape and other violence.
The Government has been criticized for its failure to expend
resources in support of the Atlantic Coast population, which is
composed largely of ethnic/racial and religious minorities.
Successive central governments in Managua have traditionally
neglected the minorities on the Atlantic coast, extracting
natural resources while expending a disproportionately small
amount of state funds in the region.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers, except the military and the police, are entitled
to form and join unions of their own choosing, and they
exercise this right extensively. New unions must register with
the Ministry of Labor and be granted legal status before they
may engage in collective bargaining with management. Some
labor groups report occasional delays in obtaining legal
status. Nearly half of Nicaragua's work force, including
agricultural workers, is unionized, according to labor leaders.
Workers also freely exercise their right to strike. Under the
terms of the Labor Code, workers may strike legally only after
they have exhausted other methods of dispute resolution,
including mediation by the Ministry of Labor. There were
numerous strikes in Nicaragua in 1991, mostly in the public
sector. Although most of the strikes did not follow Labor Code
requirements, the Government generally did not declare the
strikes illegal or punish workers who participated. One
exception was a strike at the Corona cooking oil factory in
July. The Ministry of Labor declared the strike illegal and
authorized Corona management to dismiss the strikers. The
Government also called in police to remove strikers from
customs facilities in March and from Managua's Convention
Center in April. The Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights
charged police with excessive use of force in these incidents.
During the first five months of 1991, Sandinista public sector
unions staged a series of strikes and lockouts in hospitals,
customs depots, banks, schools, and other government offices.
Sandinista workers typically did not have majority worker
support for the work stoppages but used intimidation and
threats of violence to prevent other employees from entering
the workplace. With these strikes, Sandinista-led workers
sought not only increased economic benefits but also to
challenge the Chamorro Government politically.
Broad strike actions were threatened by Sandinista unions
following introduction of the Government's economic structural
adjustment program on March 3, but this threat subsided when
the two sides concluded a "labor truce" on March 18. Under the
terms of this agreement, the Government increased salaries for
health and education workers and made a commitment to
compensate other workers for any loss of purchasing power as a
result of its adjustment program.
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On November 1, armed Sandinista workers occupying the German
Pomares sugar mill opened fire on non-Sandinista employees who
arrived to begin work on the first day of the sugar cane
harvest. One non-Sandinista worker, Obdulio Herrera, was
killed and another wounded. An independent union leader had
previously urged police protection for the independent workers,
but none was provided. Police arrested two Sandinista
unionists but later released them without charge. Facing
Sandinista death threats, independent union leaders were forced
to resign from the mill, and the independent union was broken.
Unions may freely form or join federations or confederations
and affiliate with international bodies.
In February a Commission of Inquiry of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) issued a report in response to a 1987
complaint that the then-Sandinista government had violated
various ILO conventions. The report concluded that although
worker rights violations had occurred previously, most had been
corrected by the time the Commission conducted its site visits
in 1990. The Commissioners concurred with complainants'
charges that during the Sandinista regime there was a failure
to respect basic civil liberties related to the exercise of
trade union rights. They concluded that labor laws in effect
under the Sandinistas were used to establish a system of trade
union monopoly at variance with ILO conventions. In its
recommendations to the Chamorro Government, the Commission
urged the Ministry of Labor to improve mechanisms for effective
tripartite consultations and to review reqiairements that
participants in collective bargaining first obtain legal
status. The ILO Governing Body accepted the Commission's
report and agreed to review Nicaragua's progress in
implementing the recommendations at its June 1992 meeting.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Constitution provides for the right to bargain
collectively. The Chamorro Government's labor negotiations in
1991 continued primarily to be ad hoc efforts to resolve
pressing labor conflicts, including these in the health and
education sectors. Collective bargaining is not common in the
private sector, due to unfavorable economic conditions and
continued unf amiliarity with the practice following 10 years of
central economic planning.
In mid-1991 the Government drafted a decree specifying
conditions for establishing export processing zones. One
export zone, containing fewer than five firms, was established
during the year. The firms receive tax concessions but operate
under the same labor laws in effect for other Nicaraguan
companies .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution provides that "all Nicaraguans have a right to
choose and exercise freely their profession or trade and choose
their place of work." No charges that the practice of forced
or compulsory labor exists in Nicaragua were made in 1991.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children under the age of 14 legally are not permitted to
work. The Constitution prohibits "child labor that can affect
normal childhood development or interference with the
obligatory school year." The child labor law is generally
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observed in the small modern sector of the economy, but the
Ministry of Labor rarely enforces it, and young street vendors
ply their trade in Managua and children frequently work on
family farms at an earlier age.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
In May the National Assembly passed legislation establishing a
tripartite commission responsible for setting a minimum wage at
regular intervals. In August, over the objections of worker
representatives, the government and employer delegates voted to
establish sectoral minimum wages; the levels of their minimum
wages were not sufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. The Ministry of Labor's
inspection department, which is responsible for enforcing the
law, had received few complaints of noncompliance as of year's
end.
The Constitution specifies an eight-hour workday in a workweek
of 48 hours with one day of rest. Health and safety standards
also are provided for by the Constitution. The Ministry of
Labor's Office of Hygiene and Occupational Security is
responsible for verifying compliance witl\ health and safety
standards. Due in part to the deployment of too few inspectors
and other resources, few on-site inspections occurred during
1991.
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Panama's Constitution establishes a representative democracy
with three branches of government — executive and legislative
branches elected by direct secret vote for 5-year terms and an
independent judiciary — plus an independent electoral tribunal.
The current Government, headed by President Guillermo Endara,
is a multiparty coalition that successfully opposed the
candidate of former dictator Manuel Noriega in the May 1989
general elections. Elected executive branch officials were
sworn into office on December 19, 1989, prior to the collapse
of the Noriega regime in the wake of U.S. military action
against his forces on December 20. Special elections were held
in January 1991 for nine legislative seats and various
municipal representatives for which winners could not be
determined from the 1989 elections. Five of the legislative
seats were won by opposition parties.
Panama has no military; constitutional amendments that, among
other things, prohibit the establishment of military forces
were approved by the Legislative Assembly in late 1991. (To go
into effect, the amendments must be approved by a second
consecutive Assembly session. The first 1992 session is
scheduled from March to June.) Law enforcement duties are the
responsibility of the Panamanian Public Force (PPF) . Criminal
investigations are performed by the Judicial Technical Police
(PTJ), which is not part of the PPF. The Minister of
Government and Justice is responsible for all law enforcement
organizations, although legislation approved in 1991 moves the
PTJ in January 1992 to the Public Ministry, headed by the
Attorney General. There were credible charges of serious
abuses committed by prison guards in 1991.
Panama has a free enterprise, service-based economy. Efforts
were under way in 1991 to reduce tariff and nontariff trade
restrictions and to open the economy to international
competition. The Government reached agreement on an economic
reform program with the major international financial
institutions, contingent on passage of social security, tax
reform, and privatization laws. Unemployment, estimated at
approximately 35 percent in early 1990, was reduced to
approximately 17 percent in 1991.
The Government continued in 1991 to stress respect for human
rights, to strengthen institutional protections, and to attempt
to rectify the abuses and civic and economic distortions
ensuing from 21 years of dictatorship. Principal human rights
concerns during 1991 were an inefficient and overloaded
criminal justice system (including prolonged preliminary
detention and pretrial detention), and credible reports of
abuse of detainees by prison security personnel. Limitations
on union activity in the public sector, banks, and export
processing zones have prompted complaints from labor and human
rights organizations. The Government approved legislation
reforming the judicial system and amended the Civil Code to
eliminate provisions discriminating against women.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No cases of political or other extrajudicial killings were
reported during 1991. The Government continued to investigate
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politically motivated murders that took place under the
military dictatorship. Former PDF member Olmedo Espinosa was
convicted for the 1989 murder of Dutch priest Nicolas Van
Kleff. Progress in other cases has been slow. Key cases
include the 1971 disappearance of Catholic Priest Hector
Gallegos; the 1985 murder of Dr. Hugo Spadafora, a former
Minister of Health and critic of Noriega; and the summary
executions of 11 PDF members after the October 1989 coup
attempt against Noriega. The Government continued to prepare
charges against those accused of the kidnaping and murder of
American citizen Raymond Dragseth, killed during the 1989 U.S.
military action, reportedly by agents of the Noriega regime.
The Government served legal notice on Manuel Noriega in July
for his alleged role in the murder of Dr. Spadafora; he is to
be tried in absentia in accordance with Panamanian law.
Investigations and judicial proceedings into other cases of
ex-government officials or members of the security forces
accused of participating in extrajudicial executions continued
at a slow pace. Various local and international human rights
organizations called for intensified investigation and
prosecution of alleged Noriega-era human rights abuses and
other crimes. The Attorney General introduced legislation to
permit the expedited judicial processing of criminal cases
involving Noriega regime figures. According to the Supreme
Court, 80 criminal cases were initiated against Noriega-era
defendants in 1991, 29 of which were set for trial. Former PDF
Captain Jose Maria Chaverri and former Revolutionary Democratic
Party (PRD) legislator Rigoberto Paredes were the first members
of the Noriega regime to be tried and convicted in Panama.
Chaverri was sentenced to 42 months' imprisonment for
extortion, and Paredes was sentenced to three years'
imprisonment for his involvement with pro-Noriega paramilitary
groups that fired on a crowd following the 1989 elections.
Three defendants were acquitted in cases stemming from
activities of the Noriega regime.
A report released in February by the Inter-American Human
Rights Commission (lAHRC) estimated that between 300 and 600
persons were killed during the clash between the U.S. military
and Noriega's forces in December 1989. The Commission
recommended a thorough investigation and compensation for
relatives of noncombatant victims. A report released by the
Panamanian Committee for Human Rights (CPDH) asserted there
were 403 casualties during December 1989. Lawyers on behalf of
various Panamanians continue to pursue claims before the lAHRC
for compensation for alleged damages.
b. Disappearance
No known or alleged cases of politically motivated
disappearance occurred during 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits measures that could damage the
physical, mental, or moral integrity of prisoners or
detainees. Panama acceded in June 1991 to the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. However, there were
cases of police brutality during 1991. Members of the National
Police and the Judicial Technical Police who were found guilty
of abuses were fired or suspended without pay. Criminal
investigations were initiated against the most serious
50-726 - 92 - 23
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abusers. The most egregious and notorious problem involved the
mistreatment of prisoners at the Coiba Island penal colony.
Some prisoners there were subjected to beatings and other forms
of abuse by guards and by other inmates . The CPDH reported
several unexplained or suspicious deaths on the island.
Conditions on Coiba generally were deplorable, including
primitive living conditions, undernourished inmates, no
electricity between 6 p.m. and 5 a.m., and contaminated water.
The Government appointed a new prison director and formed a
commission to investigate accusations of prisoner abuse.
Criminal charges were filed against seven prison officials as a
result of the investigation.
Prison conditions throughout Panama improved little in 1991;
overcrowded and unhealthful conditions remained common. The
physical plant of many prisons had seriously deteriorated,
medical care was lacking, escape attempts were frequent, guards
and correction personnel were poorly trained, and there were
credible reports of corruption. Government steps to improve
the penal system included appointment of a new National
Director of Corrections in February, a reduction in the number
of pretrial detainees (see Section l.d.), and action to
construct a new prison. The Panamanian National Police and
Judicial Technical Police each established offices of
professional responsibility to investigate claims of police
misconduct, including corruption of members of their respective
organizations. Sanctions included formal reprimand,
disciplinary transfer, and, in severe cases, dismissal or
prosecution. Through the end of November, the National Police
Office had investigated 320 cases; 17 officials were dismissed
for their actions, and 7 cases were forwarded for prosecution
in the courts. In the same period, the PTJ office investigated
175 cases; 14 PTJ officials were dismissed, and 14 cases were
awaiting legal action. Each organization, with the assistance
of the CPDH, established training programs for existing
personnel and incoming cadets on laws and procedures designed
to protect the human rights and legal guarantees of citizens.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
No known cases of arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile
occurred in 1991. The Constitution stipulates that arrests
must be carried out with a warrant issued by the relevant
judicial authorities, except when a person is apprehended
during the commission of a crime. The detainee is to be
informed immediately of the reasons for arrest or detention,
and the detainee has a right to immediate legal counsel, to be
provided by the State for the indigent. The Constitution
provides for judicial review of the legality of detention and
mandates the immediate release of any person found to have been
detained or arrested illegally. A suspect may not be detained
for more than 24 hours without being charged and brought before
a magistrate, after which a prosecutor has a fixed period
(which varies according to the crime) to complete the
investigative file for judicial review. The judge, in turn,
has an additional 20 to 30 days to render a decision as to
whether a trial is warranted. In practice, these time limits
are often ignored.
Extended preliminary and pretrial detention is common. As of
June 30, the 11 jails or detention centers of the penal system
had a combined population of approximately 3,610 inmates;
nearly 80 percent were in pretrial detention. Criminal
suspects have been held in pretrial detention for as long as 5
years, and some prisoners have been held without
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trial for longer than the maximum period established to punish
the crimes of which they were accused.
The Government took several steps to try to reduce the judicial
backlog. It established four new courts to assist with pending
cases in the two largest cities; legislation was passed to
permit alternatives to pretrial detention; and the Attorney
General ordered "prosecutors to review cases for the possible
use of such alternatives. Judges also sought to expedite cases
involving extended pretrial detention. As a result, the
proportion of prisoners held for pretrial detention fell from
92 percent in August 1990 to 79.4 percent in June 1991.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The nine Supreme Court magistrates are appointed to 10-year
terms by the executive branch and confirmed by the Legislative
Assembly. The magistrates appoint Superior Court judges, while
the latter appoint lower court judges of their respective
jurisdictions. The Supreme Court recently approved judicial
career regulations intended to promote professionalism and to
prevent the removal of judges for nonprofessional reasons.
At the local level, a system similar to that of justices of the
peace is in use. These officials (corregidores) are appointed
by municipal mayors and exercise jurisdiction over minor civil
and criminal cases in which they may impose sentences of up to
2 years. The system has been harshly criticized by the legal
community because these officials need not be (and normally are
not) attorneys, operate outside the jurisdictional control of
the courts, and some allegedly engage in corrupt practices.
Their actions are not regulated by the Code of Criminal
Procedure, nor are their decisions subject to appeal. Another
group, "night" or "police" judges, has jurisdiction over minor
cases arising at night. Like their counterparts in the
mvinicipal system, judges in the police courts are beyond the
jurisdiction of the regular courts, operate without reference
to the Code of Criminal Procedure, and.,.lack training as
attorneys .
The Constitution provides that persons charged with crimes have
the right to counsel and are presumed innocent until proven
guilty. The Government is constitutionally obliged to provide
public defenders for the indigent, but this guarantee was in
practice routinely ignored because of the shortage of public
defense attorneys. The Government in 1991 hired 15 new public
defenders, leaving the judicial system five short of the 36
required by law. Court proceedings during the investigative
phase are conducted with written presentations by the
prosecution and defense without the presence of the accused.
Trial proceedings are conducted orally with the accused
present. The Constitution provides for trial by jury to be
used in some circumstances; however, most trials do not use a
jury.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the home and
communications. Personal documents may not be examined or a
private residence entered and searched except by written order
of a competent authority for a specific purpose. There were no
known cases of violation of home or correspondence in 1991. In
March the press reported that the Council on Public Security
and National Defense (CSPDN), Panama's intelligence service,
had engaged in telephone tapping. Government spokesmen claimed
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such activity was done only with the recjuired approval of the
Attorney General for law enforcement purposes. One month
later, a public controversy broke out over a surveillance
operation by the Ministry of Goverrilwent and Justice; President
Endara ordered that operation stopped.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Panamanians generally enjoyed the freedom of speech and press
provided for by the Constitution. Seven national daily
newspapers were published. Foreign journalists worked and
traveled freely throughout Panama, and the population had
access to foreign media. Three commercial television
stations — two of which were national networks — operated in
Panama, as did an educational station located at the University
of Panama. Panama had 139 privately owned radio stations,
broadcasting a wide variety of political and other commentaries
and perspectives.
Legislation was introduced in late September to repeal
Noriega-era gag laws and related decrees which regulated the
practice of journalism (such as accreditation of journalists),
restricted the free flow of information, and made libel a
criminal offense subject to fine and jail. President Endara
filed a criminal libel complaint against a political cartoonist
in mid-1991 in response to a caricature questioning the
President's honesty. The matter became a major issue in the
press, and the President eventually withdrew his complaint.
Academic freedom was recognized at public as well as private
universities .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides the rights of peaceful assembly and
association, and the Government generally respected these
rights. No authorization is needed for outdoor assembly,
although prior notification for administrative purposes is
required. Panamanians have the right to form and organize
political parties, associations, and professional or civic
groups without government interference.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for religious freedom. During 1991
there were no governmental restrictions on the free exercise
and proselytization of religious beliefs. Although Roman
Catholicism is predominant, Panama has no state religion.
Clerics are constitutionally prohibited from holding public
office except as related to social assistance, education, or
scientific research.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution grants Panamanians the right to move freely
within the country and to emigrate and return. These rights
are respected in practice. No known cases of forcible
repatriation of refugees or asylees occurred in 1991. There
were unsubstantiated charges of forcible repatriation of
illegal immigrants from the People's Republic of China and Hong
Kong, most of whom reportedly had gained entry through the
illegal purchase of travel and residency documents from
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corrupt Panamanian officials. .The Government in 1991 granted
safe conduct for the departure of remaining former officials of
the Noriega regime and participants in the December 1990
seizure of police headquarters who had claimed asylum in
foreign embassies.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The ^ight of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for a representative democracy with
direct popular election of the President, Vice Presidents, and
legislators every 5 years. Technical arrangements for, and the
supervision of, elections are the responsibility of the
independent National Electoral Tribunal. Suffrage is a right
and duty for all citizens; there is, however, no penalty for
noncompliance. Voting is by secret ballot. Panamanians enjoy
the right to join any political party, to propagate their
views, and to vote for candidates of their choice without
government interference. These rights were respected by the
Government in 1991.
Special elections were held in January for nine legislative
seats and a number of municipal representatives for which
winners could not be determined on the basis of available tally
sheets from the May 1989 elections. Five legislative seats
were won by opposition parties. The Electoral Tribunal
withdrew official recognition from seven political parties as a
result of their failure to receive the minimum rec[uired 3
percent of votes during the May 1989 general elections and the
January 1991 elections. These parties must reregister to
contest the 1994 general elections. To obtain legal
recognition, a registering party must present 30,000 signatures
representing all of the country's provinces.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government was sensitive to allegations of human rights
abuses and endeavored to investigate charges. Several local
human rights organizations, including both church and secular
groups, operated without restrictions in Panama. These
organizations carried out a full range of activities, including
investigations and dissemination of findings. International
human rights groups were permitted to operate without
government restriction.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
illegitimacy, social class, sex, religion, or political views.
Owing to traditional bias and general economic conditions,
women generally do not enjoy the same economic opportunities as
men. Panamanian law does not recognize community property, and
divorced or deserted women are often left destitute. Although
the Constitution mandates equal pay for equal work, wages paid
to women are often lower than for equivalent work performed by
men and increase at a slower rate. Amendments to the Civil
Code in July removed prohibitions against divorced women using
their maiden names and remarrying without a mandatory waiting
period. Domestic violence against women continues to be a
serious problem, but few reliable statistics exist on the
subject. Private groups and government agencies operate
programs to assist victims of such abuse.
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Panama is a racially mixed country. People of African and
indigenous descent are politically active, but under represented
in senior positions in the Government and the private sector.
The law does not discriminate against any social, religious, or
cultural group. However, naturalized citizens may not hold
certain categories of elective office, and the Constitution
reserves retail trade to Panamanian citizens.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Panamanian workers, with the exception of certain sectors
(e.g., central government civil servants), have the right to
form and join unions of their choosing, subject to registration
by the Government. Public employees who are not permitted to
unionize had the right to form representative associations
subject to restrictions imposed by Law 25 of 1990. Several
public employee associations exist. Workers in state-owned
companies are permitted to organize, and these unions along
with teacher unions are among the strongest in Panama.
Approximately 11 percent of Panamanian workers are organized
into roughly 225 unions and associations, grouped under five
labor centrals and several independent federations. Organized
labor, which received various benefits from and was largely
coopted by the military regime, is no longer identified with,
or controlled by, the Government or political parties. Unions
may and do affiliate with international bodies.
Workers, except government workers and those employed by U.S.
forces and the Panama Canal Commission, have the right to
strike. (Employees of state-owned enterprises that were once
private, such as the electric and telecommunications companies,
have the right to strike when certain criteria are met).
Employees in banks and the Colon Free Zone technically have the
right to strike, though there are no unions in the banks or the
Zone. However, Law 13 of 1990 limits the right to strike by
requiring compulsory arbitration in all enterprises that
provide public services and in other enterprises when the
strike could create serious economic problems for that
enterprise. The private sector experienced only minor strikes
in 1991, other than a work stoppage in July led by the
transportation collective serving the Colon Free Zone which was
resolved through government mediation. In the public sector,
legal nationwide strikes by teacher unions were resolved by
government acceptance of most of the teachers ' demands .
Organized labor maintains that changes in labor law and
practice begun in 1990 (see also Section 6.b.) violate the
right of free association. The union movement charges that the
Ministry of Labor discourages freedom of association through
bureaucratic delays that prevent recognition of new unions.
The Government contends it cannot grant legal recognition to
unions whose applications do not comply with the current labor
registration regulations, which have been in effect since
1947. The Government granted legal recognition to 11 new
unions in 1990 and 1991.
Law 25 of 1990, which expired at the end of 1991, empowered the
executive branch of the Government to dismiss a public employee
calling for, organizing, or participating in action contrary to
democracy and the Constitution. The law was prompted by a
December 4-5, 1990, labor march and attempted general strike
coincident with an abortive police coup led by Colonel Herrera
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and supported by various former members of Noriega's Panamanian
Defense Force. Organized labor characterized the Government's
dismissal of several hundred workers under this law as a
violation of the right of association and complained that the
Government's use of the law violated other legally mandated
procedures. Several unions challenged the constitutionality of
Law 25. In May the Supreme Court upheld the law's
constitutionality but struck the paragraph that enabled the
executive branch to dismiss state workers unilaterally, noting
that determination of an activity's illegality was reserved to
the courts. This ruling had no retroactive effect, and those
fired generally were not reinstated.
In 1990 the Government dismissed a number of officials of the
previous regime because of their alleged involvement in
paramilitary organizations such as the Dignity Battalions.
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions complaints
filed in 1990 on behalf of FENASEP (a government employees'
association) charged the Government with violations of public .
employee rights through alleged massive dismissals, closure of
union offices, and a campaign to pressure FENASEP members to
resign their association membership. The Government has denied
the charges and the case continued under review by the
International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee on Freedom
of Association (CFA) in 1991. The CFA, in its interim
conclusions, reminded the Government that many of these actions
violated the principles of freedom of association. Another ILO
body criticized the Labor Code which provides for the automatic
removal from office of a trade union officer in the event of
dismissal and grants the Government wide powers to supervise
the records and accounts of trade unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The law affords most workers the right to organize and bargain
collectively, and the right is widely exercised. Despite legal
exclusions for public sector employees (including employees in
public enterprises), the Government allows civil servants to
form employee associations for the purpose of representing
public employees in employee-management relations, but they do
not have the right to strike. Also excluded are workers in the
Colon Free Zone and the banking sector.
The right of collective bargaining is restricted by two laws
enacted by the legislature in late 1990 in response to Panama's
economic crisis. The first. Law 13, extended existing
collective bargaining agreements for 1 to 2 years absent
agreement by owner-management and employees to negotiate a new
agreement; relieved new companies and companies without a
collective bargaining agreement of the obligation to bargain
for a period of 3 years; authorized the Government to suspend
agreements for up to 6 months "when special circumstances"
prevent continued employer operations; and authorized the
Government to order binding arbitration of disputes that "cause
serious economic difficulties." The second. Law 16, relieved
employers in any export processing zones that might be
established of the obligation to bargain for the first 4 years
of operation, imposed binding arbitration of certain disputes,
relaxed restrictions on layoffs, and expanded the grounds on
which workers may be fired. No export processing zones,
however, were established in Panama during 1991.
The 1991 ILO Conference Committee on the Application of
Standards (CACR) pointed to Laws 13 and 16 in citing Panama in
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PANAMA
a "special paragraph," its highest form of condemnation. The
Government initiated with ILO assistance a tripartite
government/labor/private sector dialog to reach agreement on
modifications to Laws 13 and 16 that would meet ILO and related
worker rights concerns while preserving the economic
competitiveness sought through these laws.
Panama's Labor Code prohibits antiunion discrimination by
employers. Disputes or complaints may be brought to a
conciliation board in the Ministry of Labor for resolution.
The Labor Code provides a general mechanism for arbitration
once conciliation procedures have been terminated. Several
complaints were filed with the ILO alleging harassment of
private sector union members intended to promote resignations
from or refusal to join unions, particularly in the Colon Free
Zone. A report released in February by the lAHRC noted that
the Commission had received complaints of antiunion harassment,
including obstruction of the work of union leaders and members,
and repression of government employees' union activity.
c. Prohibition Against Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Labor Code prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and during
1991 there were no reports of either practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Code prohibits the employment of children under the
age of 14, or under the age of 15 if the child has not
completed primary school. The Code prohibits the employment of
persons under the age of 18 in night work. Children between
the ages of 12 and 14 may perform farm or domestic labor as
long as the work is light and does not interfere with the
child's schooling. Enforcement of these provisions is
triggered by a complaint to the Ministry of Labor, which can
order the termination of illegal employment. Though not
engaged in organized and regulated employment, street children
sell flowers and other items at several intersections in Panama
City.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Code establishes minimum wage rates for most
categories of labor and requires substantial bonuses for
overtime work, but the minimum wage is not sufficient to
provide a basic standard of living for a worker and family.
The vast majority of Panamanian workers earn the minimum wage
or above. However, Panama has a substantial informal sector,
some of whose workers undoubtedly earn below the minimum wage
The Ministry of Labor is charged with enforcing the minimum
wage, although budget and personnel restrictions limit its
enforcement capacity. The Government initiated a review of the
minimum wage rate in 1991.
The Labor Code establishes a standard legal workweek of 48
hours and provides for at least one 24-hour rest period; this
is the standard workweek throughout Panama. The Labor Code
establishes numerous health and safety standards for all places
of employment. The Ministry of Labor, which is responsible for
insuring that employers comply with these regulations, does not
have enough inspectors and resources to enforce these laws
effectively.
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Paraguay, independent since 1811, has been ruled almost
continuously by authoritarian regimes. In early 1989, however,
a new Government committed itself to democracy and respect for
human rights and subsequently took important steps toward those
goals. While the military and the Colorado Party remain the
dominant forces- in the political system of the country,
elections for municipal authorities and constitutional
convention delegates were recognized as free and fair by
international observers.
The police forces, under the overall authority of the Ministry
of Interior, hold the primary responsibility for internal
security and maintaining public order. Credible charges of
police brutality persisted throughout 1991, although less
frequently than in previous years.
Paraguay has a free market economy predominantly oriented
towards the exportation of primary agricultural products. In
1991, the Government continued to advocate economic reforms,
including the privatization of some state-managed businesses.
Principal human rights problems included police torture and
other physical abuse of criminal suspects and prisoners,
violent evictions and arbitrary detentions of squatters, police
corruption, instances of violent assaults on journalists, the
weakness of the judiciary, and restrictions on worker rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were a few possible cases of politically motivated murder
in 1991. In February, in Caraguaty, three Colorado Party
members were killed while campaigning before crowds during
mayoral races. On April 26, radio journalist Santiago
Leguizamon was assassinated in the town of Pedro Juan Caballero.
Leguizamon was very vocal in attacking corruption and narcotics
trafficking, including activities linked to corrupt government
officials. According to press reports, hired assassins from
Brazil may have killed Leguizaman, but no arrests have been
made in the case.
Extrajudicial deaths of persons in police custody also were
reported. In January in San Lorenzo, a policeman shot and
killed Juan Desiderio Ortellado Cardozo, 14 years old, for
trespassing. In April the mother of Ruben Dario Isasi claimed
that witnesses saw police detain Isasi for the February rape
and murder of a teenaged girl. Isasi 's body was later pulled
from the Paraguay River. In July in Caapucu, Carlos Niseforo
Garcia was killed in a traffic accident, according to police.
An autopsy later concluded that Garcia had been beaten to
death. There were two cases of police conscripts who were
apparently beaten to death by authorities under unclear
circumstances. In July in the town of Ita Angu'a, Jorge Raul
Martinez died from multiple blows, according to an autopsy.
The local sheriff had claimed Martinez died from food
poisoning. Witnesses accused the sheriff of murdering the
conscript. In September, the deputy sheriff of San Pedro
Department claimed that Jose Librado Peralta threw himself from
a truck while in custody for an alleged robbery. An autopsy
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revealed that Peralta had been beaten to death. Peralta's
family claimed that he was killed by the deputy sheriff.
By mid-January 1992, Brazilian authorities had arrested three
suspects allegedly responsible for the murder of Leguizamon.
Paraguayan authorities were working with their Brazilian
counterparts to investigate what may have been a planned
assassination by narcotics traffickers, according to press
reports .
b. Disappearance
There were no reported cases of disappearance by security
forces .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
There were credible reports of police brutality, including
torture, in the treatment of criminal suspects in detention.
There were disturbing reports of mistreatment of women and
minors and attempts to force confessions out of detainees.
Torture and other abusive treatment continued to be the subject
of inquiries by the Justice Ministry, the Supreme Court, and
the Human Rights Committee of the House of Deputies,
demonstrating concern about the issue. Although the Government
consistently condemned the practice of torture and abuse, it
failed to investigate and prosecute the officials implicated in
cases of police brutality.
In January Lucila Alvarez accused police in the Asuncion
neighborhood of Trinidad of beating her in an attempt to force
her to confess to various crimes. A police spokesman denied
the charges and claimed that Alvarez's injuries were caused by
her male companion. Alvarez also charged that one officer
attempted to extort money in exchange for her release. In
March the United Workers Central (CUT) denounced the violent
detention of two union members by police. The complaint
accused the Vallemi police of beating Victor Recalde and
Felipe Jimenez to force their confessions for an alleged
robbery.
There were credible complaints of abuse of prisoners held in
jails throughout Paraguay, particularly in Tacumbu and Buen
Pastor Prisons. Clandestine detention centers were uncovered
in some sheriff's offices, where witnesses claimed that police
brutality was routine. In April Deputy Sheriff Jaime Roig was
removed from office in Horquesta by the government
representative there due to charges of torture. The press
exposed abuses at the jail in Ciudad del Este, the country's
second largest city. Some local authorities there were
subsequently replaced. Overall, however, executive or judicial
oversight of police and detention facilities was very
inadequate.
Throughout the year security forces dislodged peasant land
occupiers. Peasants detained on judicial orders to protect
private property were often held under nonspecific warrants,
often without prompt judicial processing. While most were
released from custody within a few hours, others were held for
longer periods. Reports also surfaced of landowners taking
justice into their own hands by arming their employees and
aggressively removing sc[uatters from their property without
court orders. Some of the evictions were violent, accompanied
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by shots fired into the air, but there were no reports of
fatalities. Some peasants are known to have suffered beatings
during these evictions. Police also have been known to use
tear gas against the squatters and to burn down their
dwellings. Investigations into abuses by landowners are slow.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.
The Constitution provides for a judicial determination of the
legality of detention. It stipulates that any person arrested
without a warrant must be presented formally before a judge
within 24 hours of his detention and have charges filed against
him within 48 hours. Authorities often violated these
provisions in 1991.
On January 30, security forces detained three members of the
pro-Stroessner faction of the Colorado Party. They attended a
political rally for a Colorado Party candidate for mayor of
Santani and were visiting the candidate in his home when they
were taken into custody. They were released on February 1, In
April three persons waiting for a bus were arrested arbitrarily
by police in Asuncion. They were freed eventually, but were
witnesses to other arbitrary detentions. Some cases of
arbitrary detention are not publicly revealed because of police
intimidation.
Mass arrests of peasant squatters occurred frequently without
the issuance of arrest warrants that specifically named those
to be detained. There were reports of cases of peasants held
indiscriminately who were only released after publicity and
lobbying by interested groups.
Forced exile is no longer used as a means of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Trials are conducted almost exclusively by presentation of
written documents to a judge, who then renders a decision.
Since there is no trial by jury, the judge alone determines
guilt or innocence and decides punishment. During the pretrial
phase, the judge receives and may request investigative
reports. In this phase, the judge is also likely to make a
personal inspection of the scene of the crime and of all
physical evidence available. The accused often appears before
the court only twice: to plead and to hear sentencing. All
judgments are automatically reviewed by an appellate judge, and
the law provides for appeals to the Supreme Court. Court
proceedings in some cases are held in secrecy and any
subsequent press reports are based only on the pubic comment of
the judge or the attorneys.
While nominally independent, the judiciary is subject to
influence by the Executive Branch through the appointment of
judges and control over the judiciary's budget. The Supreme
Court attempted to strengthen judicial independence in 1991 by
removing or suspending 12 judges for various transgressions.
The majority of lower court judges were appointed by the
Stroessner regime which governed the country from 1955 to
1989. There were allegations that some acted arbitrarily, due
to b^ribery or to political motives. Meanwhile, judicial
prosecutions of cases of torture and official corruption dating
from the Stroessner-era moved ahead only slowly if at all.
While a number of well connected figures accused of corruption,
mostly Stroessner-era senior officials, have been prosecuted
and sentenced, other suspected perpetrators of major corruption
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remain at large. The belief among some that police and
judicial institutions principally serve those with political,
military, or economic power acts to discourage citizens from
reporting abuses.
The judiciary's inadequate budget and the cumbersome written
trial process, combined with the lack of adequately trained
personnel at all levels, limit the right of an accused to a
fair and speedy trial. The local jails and prisons are filled
with persons awaiting sentencing. More than 90 percent of the
prison population has neither been tried nor sentenced. For
example, according to human rights lawyers, of 1,420 inmates in
Tacumbu prison, only 140 were serving court imposed sentences.
At Emboscada Juvenile Correctional Facility, only 3 inmates out
of 140 have actually received a prison sentence.
Paraguay has no political prisoners.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence
While the Government and the security forces generally do not
interfere in the private lives of citizens, there have been
exceptions. The Constitution protects private homes from
police entry except under the terms of a judicial warrant or to
prevent a crime, but this protection at times was ignored,
especially in the interior of the country.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
In 1991 the Paraguayan press continued to exercise many
freedoms acquired in 1989. However, several incidents occurred
the net impact of which tended to discourage investigative
reporting into certain sensitive areas. Virtually all of the
incidents were related to press efforts to investigate and
report on corruption, contraband, and ties to the former regime.
An assault by soldiers on reporters from the newspaper
ABC Color who were attempting to investigate a clandestine air
strip in Ciudad del Este outraged the media. The murder of
Santiago Leguizamon (see Section l.a.) further underscored
press vulnerabilities to intimidation. A member of the Palace
Guard fired shots at reporters who were photographing the
renovation of Stroessner's former presidential palace, and the
reporters were subsequently detained by military officials.
Calls by military and political figures for a law to regulate
the press were resoundingly rejected by most sectors. Many
journalists felt that calls for a press law were intended to
induce a less independent and energetic press. The sentencing
of radio reporter Victor Benitez to 4 months in prison for
broadcasting an allegedly slanderous and abusive political
comment showed that the scope of public comment was subject to
constraint in the courts. Benitez was, however, released 4
days after his incarceration, after the the complaint was
withdrawn.
There were no restrictions on academic freedom in 1991.
However, the universities were involved in consideration of
measures to reform university regulations dating from the
Stroessner-era .
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b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
In June 1990, Congress passed a law regulating demonstrations
in Asuncion. The law limits the areas where and the hours when
demonstrations may take place. It also requires notice to the
Asuncion police at least 24 hours before any rally in the
downtown area and gives the police the option of banning the
protest. Notification of police opposition to the rally has to
be given in writing to the organizers within 12 hours of
receipt of the organizers' recjuest . Under the law, a police
ban is permitted only if a third party already had given notice
of plans for a similar rally at the same place and time. In
addition, the bill prohibits public meetings or demonstrations
in front of the Presidential Palace and outside military or
police barracks.
In September students from the Hospital de Clinicas marched
peacefully, but without a permit, in downtown Asuncion to
protest increases in the military budget, among other issues.
When the students failed to obey a police order for the crowd
to disperse, the police used their batons to break up the
demonstration. Police prevented a protest by peasants in March
in the town of San Estanislao. Sixty peasants tried to protest
the low price set for cotton and demand comprehensive land
reform. Security forces surrounded the protesters, took their
identification cards, and detained them for several hours.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of conscience for all
persons. The Government continued to respect that freedom in
1991. Roman Catholicism is the predominant and official
religion of Paraguay. All religious denominations are free to
worship as they choose and adherence to a particular creed
confers no advantage or disadvantage. Foreign and local
missionaries proselytized freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Paraguayan citizens travel freely within the country with
virtually no restrictions. In 1991 Paraguay opened up travel
to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There are no
restrictions on travel abroad or on emigration except for those
a husband legally has over travel of his wife and children (see
Section 5) .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
In 1991 Paraguay made significant progress in the transition to
a democratic form of Government. The process is scheduled to
culminate in 1993 with the election of a new president.
Congress continued to assert itself, modifying legislative
proposals of the executive and seeking detailed reports from
executive branch ministries on their expenditures and execution
of policy. Congress successfully overrode two presidential
vetos in September, further demonstrating its growing
independence from the executive. In May Paraguay successfully
held the first free and independent municipal elections in its
history. While the Colorado Party maintained its political
majority, an independent, former union leader Carlos Filizzola,
won the crucial Asuncion mayoralty. On December 1, a
Constituent Assembly was elected in a free and fair election.
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The Assembly will draft a new democratic constitution for
Paraguay.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Four major human rights groups operate in Paraguay: the
Committee of Churches (an interdenominational group that
monitors human rights and lends legal assistance), the
Paraguayan Human Rights Commission (which publishes a periodic
newsletter), Prodemos (a group that includes Roman Catholic
Bishop Mario Melanio Medina among its leaders), and the local
chapter of the Association of Latin American Lawyers for the
Defense of Human Rights. Two of Paraguay's leading human
rights activists. Carmen Casco de Lara Castro of the Paraguayan
Human Rights Commission and Francisco Jose de Vargas of the
Committee of Churches, continued to serve as opposition members
of Congress .
In April the Government named its first Director General of
Human Rights, Eric Salum Pires, to supervise, coordinate, and
promote human rights. Located in the Ministry of Justice and
Labor, the Human Rights Office has access to congressional,
executive, and judicial authorities. At year's end, it was
still too early to judge what affect the Office will have in
curtailing human rights abuses.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Paraguay's Constitution and laws bar discrimination based on
race, sex, religion, language, or social status, except for a
restrictive civil code which still limits the rights of married
women. There are significant expatriate Korean and Chinese
communities which experience de facto social and economic
discrimination. Koreans and Chinese are sometimes denied
access to credit terms that are enjoyed by non-Asian
Paraguayans. They are often discriminated against in the
housing market and do not have ec[ual access to private
institutions and schools.
Participation by women in the social and political system is
limited in Paraguay's male-dominated society. There are
several nongovernmental women's organizations which focus
primarily on encouraging civic education and greater
participation in the democratic transition process. Paraguay
is a signatory to the U.N. Convention on the Political Rights
of Women and has instituted, with the United Nations, a human
development program specifically targeted to assist peasant
women. Minister of Public Health Dr. Cynthia Prieto is
Paraguay's first female cabinet minister. The four women
elected to the Asuncion city council and the few elected as
mayors in the interior opened a new era for women's involvement
in politics .
Paraguay's civil code, reformed in 1988 by the Stroessner
government, still discriminates against married women. For
example, the code requires a woman to secure her husband's
permission before she may be employed, gives a husband
ownership of a couple's property, and allows a husband control
over the ability of his wife and children to travel. Violence
against women, such as wife beating, continued to be widespread
in Paraguay. Such abuse is against the law, but the law has
not been well enforced. A Department of the Family within the
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PARAGUAY
Asuncion police force was established in 1991 but lacked the
necessary resources to be effective. Congress passed the
country's first divorce bill in September.
Paraguay has an unassimilated, and generally ignored and
neglected, Indian population estimated at between 75,000 and
100,000. The Government's National Indigenous Institute (INDI)
has the authority to purchase land on behalf of Indian
communities and to expropriate private property under certain
conditions to establish tribal homelands, but the entity is not
well-funded. The Government actively encourages church groups
to work with indigenous populations in health and welfare as
well as in religious matters. The problems of the indigenous
population, particularly those involving land claims, continued
to receive frequent media attention.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Private sector workers are free to form and join unions without
government interference. The existing Labor Code does not
permit public sector, temporary, or domestic workers to
organize. Public sector workers, with few exceptions, continue
to experience strong resistance by management to their union
activities. However, the Ministry of Justice and Labor,
consistent with International Labor Organization (ILO)
guidelines, has acted in favor of public employee unions.
Protections for them were incorporated into the Government's
proposed new labor code which was being considered by Congress
at year's end. Less than 5 percent of Paraguayan workers are
organized.
Government permission to exercise the right to strike is
limited by a complex legal process of fact-finding,
arbitration, and adjudication that can involve delays of
several years. In 1991 public sector strikes were prohibited.
However, the Union of Electric Utility Workers (SITRANDE)
achieved a landmark decision from the labor courts in favor of
unionization. This was the first judicial ruling in favor of
the unionization of public employees. Nevertheless, the
management of the Electric Utility Company (ANDE) refused to
abide by the court's decision. SITRANDE went on strike in
September seeking formal recognition from management. The
strike ended when, unable to force management to recognize the
union (see comment in Section 6.b.) and considering inevitable
a judicial ruling that a public sector strike was illegal,
SITRANDE obtained a promise from Congress that it would address
the problem.
The most serious challenge to union activity in 1991 was the
arrest of United Workers Central (CUT) President Victor Baez
Mosqueira for refusing to abide by a judge's order regarding
the timing of the CUT'S national congress. Gregorio Ojeda, of
the CUT'S affiliated Construction Workers Union (SINATRAC), had
previously obtained a court injunction prohibiting the CUT from
holding its national congress until the CUT Executive Committee
permitted Ojeda to serve with his particular delegation. Baez
Mosqueira put the matter before the CUT congressional delegates
who unequivocally rejected the judge's injunction. The judge
issued an arrest warrant against Baez Mosqueira and ordered him
held for 20 days for contempt. Baez Mosqueira was freed after
serving half of the sentence when an appeals court ruled that
the judge's arrest order was inappropriate. Frequent and
sporadic incidents of pressure, particularly against unions
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affiliated with the CUT and the National Workers' Coordination
(CNT), continued throughout 1991.
Unions fully exercise their freedom to associate with regional
and international labor organizations.
Although still nominally independent, the leadership of both
the CUT and the CPT made efforts to involve their unions more
directly in partisan politics. CUT was integral to the
formation of the "Asuncion for Everyone Movement" which won the
May 26 Asuncion municipal elections. With a goal of nominating
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, CUT worked to
create an independent political front. A sector of the CPT
also sought to become more involved with national politics. In
September a wing of the CPT led by Basilio Gonzalez Hermosillo
formed the Colorado Worker Movement "27th of August," an
organization directly associated with the Colorado Party.
Paraguay was reinstated in February to eligibility for trade
benefits under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) . Paraguay had been denied trade preferences since 1987
for noncompliance with the GSP program's international worker
rights provisions. Before the decision to reinstate was
reached, the CUT expressed strong reservations about
reinstating GSP privileges before the replacement of the
existing archaic and biased Labor Code.
In April Ramiro Barboza of the Catholic University, with the
support of the CUT and a few parliamentary sponsors, submitted
a draft of a new labor code to Congress. This draft would
substantially broaden protections for workers, including the
right of association and to strike by public employees. Soon
afterwards, the Government submitted a new version of the draft
labor code which it had originally presented to Congress the
previous November. It is a clear improvement over the existing
Code. At year's end, although the Chamber of Deputies had
passed the revised code in November, the Senate had not yet
voted on it. The right of association has significantly
improved in one aspect; the Justice and Labor Ministry is no
longer an obstacle for workers wanting to unionize.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to bargain collectively is recognized in the Labor
Code, but most employers refuse to enter into such bargaining
because no legal sanctions or government pressures exist which
oblige them either to recognize duly constituted unions or to
bargain with them.
The tactic of firing the leaders of nascent unions,
traditionally used by Paraguayan employers, declined somewhat
in 1991. However the firing and harassment of union organizers
by the private sector continued. The Stroessner era Labor Code
provides little protection to unions and union leaders. The
new labor code pending in the Senate at year's end would better
protect union organizers and impose sanctions against employers
who violate worker rights. Under present legislation, fired
union leaders can seek redress in the courts, but the labor
courts sometimes respond slowly to complaints. As in previous
years, in some cases where judges ordered fired workers
reinstated, the employers disregarded the court order. In the
case of the reinstatement of FETRABAN workers fired from the
Development Bank in early 1991, management made an effort to
humiliate reinstated workers by rerouting all work away from
them.
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Having received various complaints regarding interference in
the right to organize and to strike, failure to protect workers
from antiunion discrimination, and police violence against
agricultural workers, various ILO bodies in 1991 criticized
Paraguayan labor law and practice for not protecting freedom of
association, the right to organize, and collective bargaining,
Paraguay has no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law, and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Office of the Director General for the Protection of Minors
in the Ministry of Justice and Labor is responsible for
enforcing Paraguay's child labor laws. Minors between 15 and
18 years of age can be employed only with parental
authorization and cannot be employed in dangerous or unhealthy
conditions. Children between 12 and 15 years of age may be
employed only in family enterprises, apprenticeships, or in
agriculture. Furthermore, the Labor Code prohibits work by
children under 12 years of age. However, in practice more than
25,000 children, many younger than 12, work in the streets of
Asuncion and its suburban communities selling newspapers,
shining shoes, and cleaning car windows. In rural areas, it is
not unusual for children as young as 10 to work beside their
parents cutting sugar cane.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government has established a private sector minimum wage,
regionally adjusted according to cost-of-living indices,
sufficient to maintain a minimally adequate standard of
living. The minimum does not apply to all private sector
employees, domestic servants, for example. Furthermore, it is
estimated that 60 to 80 percent of Paraguayan workers earn less
than the decreed minimum.
According to the Labor Code, maximum weekly hours are 48 for
day work and 42 for night work, with 1 day of rest. The law
provides for an annual bonus of 1 month's salary. A married
women needs her husband's consent to enter into a labor
contract, although labor contracts cannot be denied to women
who worked prior to marriage.
The Labor Code also governs conditions of safety, hygiene, and
comfort. In general, the Government does not effectively
enforce the safety and hygiene provisions of the Labor Code,
partially due to a lack of inspectors.
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Peru has a freely elected democratic government, with an
executive branch, a bicameral legislature, and a judiciary.
Alberto Fujimori, leader of the reform party Cambio 90, was
inaugurated President in July 1990, succeeding Alan Garcia
Perez of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) .
Public security responsibilities are shared by the police and
the military. The Interior Ministry and its police services
have the primary counterterror ist role in the capital city of
Lima and in the 70 percent of the national territory not under
a state of emergency. The military leads the effort to combat
subversion in the emergency zones. At year's end, 48 provinces
and parts of 11 others were under a state of emergency. A
state of emergency designation places all executive branch
authority in the hands of the local military commander,
suspends restrictions on arbitrary detention and the
requirement for search warrants, and restricts the rights of
movement and assembly. The number of provinces declared in
emergency for at least part of the year decreased in 1991, the
first reduction since the insurgency began in 1980. An
estimated 45 percent of Peru's population of 22 million,
including those in the capital, Lima, lived under a state of
emergency during 1991. In Lima the police, not the military,
took the lead in combating the insurgency. The police and the
military in the emergency zones are under the authority of the
emergency zone commander, not civilian authorities.
Peru has a mixed economy that combines elements of domestic
market capitalism with state ownership of major industries.
Minerals extraction and processing account for the bulk of
foreign exchange earnings. President Fujimori's administration
has pursued a rigorous economic stabilization and structural
adjustment program with severe fiscal austerity and tight
monetary policy. It has also instituted a number of
market-oriented reforms and has begun to privatize state-owned
firm.s. Although the program has reduced inflation and is
expected to produce long-term benefits, the immediate cost was
an even deeper recession and social hardship.
The chief causes of human rights violations in Peru remain the
terrorist activities of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)
Maoist guerrillas and, secondarily, the Government's difficulty
in mounting a disciplined response. According to the Peruvian
Congress' Commission on Pacification, chaired by Senator
Enrique Bernales, 3,180 people, including combatants and
civilians, were killed in overall terrorist-related violence in
1991, an 8 percent decrease from 1990 ' s all-time high. In the
category of deaths outside of combat, Peruvian human rights
observers have noted that Sendero was responsible for the
majority of assassinations and executions of civilians
throughout the country in 1991. Sendero committed 85 percent,
the security forces 10 percent, and paramiltary groups 3
percent of the political and other extrajudicial killings in
which the perpetrators were identified. Sendero regularly
assassinates persons perceived to be opponents or merely
uncooperative, from government leaders and other officials to
religious workers and peasants. In 1991 Sendero and the
pro-Cuban terrorist group Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(MRTA) both consolidated their control over parts of Peru's
major coca-growing region, the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), and
Sendero increased its activity in the large slum areas
surrounding Lima and other major urban centers.
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There continued to be credible reports of summary executions,
disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture, and rape by the
military and police. Most of these abuses occurred in the
emergency zones. However, the country's leadership undertook a
concerted effort to improve respect for human rights in 1991.
Statistics from the National Coordinating Committee for Human
Rights (Coordinadora) and the Public Ministry (an autonomous
office of the attorney general) showed a significant decrease
in the number of unresolved disappearances beginning in
August/September. Late in 1991, the Fujimori administration
authorized the unlimited access of civilian prosecuting
attorneys to all military facilities throughout the country to
determine the presence and condition of persons reported to be
detained. Similarly, in September the Ministries of Interior
and Defense granted the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) access to all police facilities and to all
military installations of units which conduct counterterrorism
operations, including those in the emergency zones. The ICRC
also has regular access to lists of military detainees.
Military and police forces incorporated formal human rights
components into regularly scheduled and special training
courses; the ICRC and local human rights groups were invited to
participate in these courses. The military and the police
investigated and charged several of their members with murder
and other serious crimes in the Santa Barbara and Callao murder
cases (see section l.a.). However, though the security forces
claim that there were significant numbers of dismissals for
various types of abuses, the commencement of criminal
proceedings against human rights violators has been rare.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The Coordinadora estimated that Sendero was responsible for a
total of 749 political and other extrajudicial killings of
civilians in 1991; security forces for 91; the MRTA for 18; and
paramilitary forces for 23. There were an additional 34
killings by unidentified terrorists, and 158 other killings by
unknown perpetrators. For the first time in 5 years, political
and other extrajudicial killings decreased in 1991 by 14
percent. Due to the isolation of many rural areas where
Sendero is most active, the number of victims is underreported.
Sendero Luminoso continued its campaign of assassinating
teachers and clergy, engineers, development and human rights
workers, Indian peasants, and political candidates, as well as
Government, police, and political party officials. It also
continued to terrorize and indoctrinate rural peasants and
increased its activity in the large slvim areas surrounding Lima
and other urban centers. Sendero routinely employs gruesome
killing tactics, including the mutilation of victims' bodies,
brutal beatings, castration and other sexual abuse, murder of
children, and forcing family members to witness torture and
killings. For example, in April Sendero murdered eight members
of one family, including two minor children, and in September,
Sendero brutally beat, castrated and burned the bodies of seven
members of a civil defense group. In Yanaz, Cajamarca on
September 23, a Sendero column of approximately 30 convoked a
"popular assembly", accused the villagers of failure to
collaborate with Sendero and machine-gunned 11 peasants.
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Sendero often attacked regional, municipal, and local
authorities to disrupt and destroy civilian government presence
and influence. In May 1991, Sendero shot the mayor of
Pachacamac and then dynamited his body while forcing his wife
and children to watch. He was one of more than 35 local
elected or appointed officeholders assassinated during 1991.
Development workers and providers of food assistance were also
prime Sendero targets during the year. In May a Sendero column
killed four women and five children in Ayacucho; the women were
active in the free milk distribution program. Foreigners,
particularly foreign religious and development workers, were
also targeted by Sendero, including a Canadian citizen employed
by World Vision, a church-affiliated development organization;
an Australian nun. Sister Irene McCormick, and three local
community leaders; three Japanese development workers; two
Polish priests, and an Italian parish priest.
A second terrorist group, the MRTA, continued to expand beyond
its original base of operations in Lima into several rural
zones. Although the MRTA chiefly engages in the destruction of
property through selective bombing, MRTA attacks killed at
least 139 people in 1991.
While many rondas (peasant self-defense groups) actively worked
in a variety of legitimate fields, including community
development and self-defense, there were also credible reports
that some rondas, which are often organized and equipped by the
military, committed serious human rights abuses, including the
torture and extrajudicial killing of terrorist suspects or even
of ronda members of rival communities.
There were several notable cases of probable military killings
in 1991, and rondas participated in some of them. Witnesses
charge that a mixed army/ronda patrol was responsible for the
killing of 14 peasants including women and children, whose
bodies were found in an abandoned mine in Santa Barbara,
Huancavelica . The military subsequently investigated and
charged in military court five noncommissioned officers and a
commissioned officer variously with murder, torture and rape;
the case was pending at year's end.
Police personnel were implicated during 1991 in several
murders, including the killing while in police custody of a
medical student and two teenaged brothers. Five
noncommissioned officers were dismissed from the police force
and were in jail at year's end awaiting trial in civilian
courts. Detention orders against four superior officers and
one noncommissioned officer were vacated by order of a civilian
court, but the suspects remained under investigation. On
October 16, the Minister of Interior publicly dismissed 33
police officials for crimes including homicide, extortion, and
robbery. Nine of the dismissed officials, accused of the
torture and killing of an accused drug trafficker while in
police custody, were remanded to the civilian courts
(see Section I.e.).
In most other notable human rights abuse cases implicating the
security forces, however, no judicial action was taken to
investigate and charge the perpetrators. A March 15 letter
bomb attack on human rights lawyer Dr. Augusto Zuniga Paz
remained unresolved. The November 3 massacre of 17 persons in
the Barrios Altos neighborhood of Lima, by a group of
unidentified, armed men, remains under investigation. With few
exceptions, the security forces have been unable to investigate
thoroughly and credibly cases in which their own members may be
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implicated. The Peruvian Code of Military Justice contains no
language for dealing with cases of killing, kidnaping, or
torture — only "negligence" and "abuse of authority". However,
it does allow military courts to use relevant portions of the
civilian panal code to try crimes which are not covered under
the Code of Military Justice. Military officials assert that a
number of enlisted men and officers were held within the
military justice system on charges relating to human rights
violations. For the most part, such assertions were difficult
to confirm because the military courts sealed relevant
records. In July the Minister of Defense announced that 71
military personnel had been punished for abuse of authority,
including human rights violations. However, neither the
identities of these individuals, the nature of their offenses,
nor the exact sentences imposed have been made public.
The military in at least three cases in 1991 used its court
system to preempt investigations into cases of military abuses;
under the law, the accused in a military court cannot
subsequently be tried in civilian courts for the same offense.
The pending civilian court cases against army Sergeant Jhonny
Zapata Acuna ("Centurion") for the 1990 massacre of 17
civilians in Chilcahuaycco, Ayacucho remained at a standstill
while a military court processes the case slowly. The Supreme
Council of Military Justice found Lt . Col. Victor la Vera
Hernandez ("Javier Landa Dupont") and Capt . Amador Vidal
Sambento ("Ojos de Gato") not responsible for the November 1988
murder of journalist Hugo Bustios.
b. Disappearance
The Public Ministry reports that the majority of the formal
complaints of disappearances implicated the security forces.
In 1991 the Public Ministry reported 279 new disappearances.
The Coordinadora reported 300 new disappearances in 1991,
including 52 new 1991 cases reported in January 1992. However,
disappearances were down sharply during the last 5 months of
1991. According to Coordinadora and Public Ministry figures,
unresolved disappearances averaged 33 and 29 per month
respectively from January through July, but fell to an average
of 14 and 16 per month, respectively, from August through
December .
Most 1991 disappearance cases involved army detention of
persons suspected of terrorist links in the emergency zones;
the vast majority of disappearances were reported in the
violence-torn departments of San Martin, Junin, and Ayacucho.
Based on the testimony of survivors, it appears that most
victims are taken to military bases for interrogation. Some
are executed by the armed forces, while others are turned over
to the civilian court system to be released for lack of
incriminating evidence or imprisoned on terrorism charges. An
unknown number of "disappeared" persons are unaccounted for
because they joined the ranks of the MRTA or Sendero, either
voluntarily or involuntarily. It is believed that the number
of persons "disappeared" or forcibly recruited by Sendero is
underreported.
According to witnesses and family members, Manuel Pacotaype,
Mayor of Chuschi, Ayacucho, along with three other men, were
detained on March 14 by members of the National Police and
taken to the military barracks at Pampa Cangallo. They have
not been seen since.
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c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although the Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman or
humiliating treatment, charges of brutal treatment of detainees
are common. Human rights groups charge that suspected
subversives held by the government security forces were
routinely tortured at military detention centers; lawyers and
others familiar with the police and judicial system concur.
It does not appear that suspects are tortured at Peru's main
counterterrorism detention center, run by DIRCOTE, the Police
Counterterrorism Directorate, in Lima. In 1991 there were
reliable accounts from released detainees, however, of torture
or mistreatment by some other elements of the police and
military. There continued to be credible reports of rape by
elements of the security forces in the emergency zones.
When torture occurs, it often takes place in the period
immediately following detention. The 1987 terrorism law
requires that persons detained for terrorism be interrogated
only in the presence of a defense attorney and a Public
Ministry prosecutor. In these cases, a court indictment must
be sought within 15 days of arrest or the prisoner must be
released. Reliable reports of violations of these standards
occur frequently in the emergency zones.
Many victims of Sendero terrorism also show signs of having
been tortured before death. Torture of those victims often
follows a brief "popular trial," normally held in the presence
of rural villagers as a method of intimidation. Sendero uses
particularly brutal methods to torture victims to death,
including slitting throats, strangulation, stoning, and
burning. Mutilation of the body is common both before and
after death.
Peruvian prison conditions are appalling. Prisoners are
exposed to unsanitary facilities, poor nutrition and health
care, as well as harsh treatment by both prison staff and
fellow prisoners. In contrast with 1990, when more than 65
inmates in Lima's prisons died due to severe malnutrition, no
such deaths occurred in 1991. Corruption is rampant among
prison staff, who have been implicated in a multitude of
offenses, from sexual blackmail and the selling of narcotics
and weapons to inmates, to arranging prison escapes. Certain
prison cellblocks have fallen under Sendero or MRTA control and
guards refuse to venture into them. President Fujimori
continued his program of phased release of unconvicted prison
inmates awaiting trial, especially those who have already been
in custody for a time greater than the sentence of the crime
with which they have been charged.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution, the Penal Code, and antiterrorist legislation
clearly delineate the arrest and detention process. However,
most if not all of these protections are suspended in practice
in those areas under a state of emergency.
In areas not subject to a state of emergency, a warrant
approved by a judge typically is required for arrest, unless a
perpetrator is caught in the act. Persons arrested must be
arraigned within 24 hours, except in cases of drug trafficking,
terrorism, or espionage, for which the limit is 15 days.
Detainees have the right to choose their own attorney, or the
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Government must provide counsel at no cost. Arrested persons
are entitled to have an attorney present when they make
statements to the police. Under the 1987 terrorism law, police
must also notify the detainee's family and human rights groups
of an arrest, although in practice this is not consistently
done. Police detention centers do not maintain publicly
available registers detailing detentions, charges, transfers
and releases of detainees. The ICRC, however, has access to
local police detention records and to the national military
registry of detainees. It is expected that a national listing
of detainees held by both the military and police for terrorism
and other security crimes will be operational within the next
year. There is no functioning bail system; a form of
provisional liberty is available, more in theory than in
reality, for persons not accused of terrorism, espionage, or
narcotics offenses.
Arrest procedures are different in the emergency zones. The
armed forces do not need an arrest warrant, and detainees are
often denied access to an attorney during interrogation and to
family members during their imprisonment. All detainees,
including those in the emergency zones, have the right to seek
judicial determination of the legality of their detention, but
this right is often disregarded by military commanders in the
emergency zones. Of the detainees held by the military inside
the emergency zones, human rights groups know of very few who
were turned over to civilian authorities for prosecution.
Incommunicado detention of suspects was a common practice by
combatant forces — Government and terrorist alike — operating in
the emergency zones. Dozens of persons of whose detention the
government's security forces had denied knowledge nonetheless
later were found to have been held in military detention
centers.
In August the Government issued a legislative decree granting
civilian public prosecutors access to all military barracks and
detention centers, including those in the emergency zones. The
decree specifies that the prosecutor may privately interview a
detainee immediately upon his detention and examine him or her
for signs of physical abuse. Where applicable, the prosecutor
may order the prisoner remanded into the civilian court
system. If remanded to the courts, the prosecutor is to
accompany the prisoner and require a formal medical examination
upon delivering him into civilian judicial custody. A public
prosecutor must be present at the release of any prisoner from
military detention. By year's end, public prosecutors had
entered a number of military installations in the emergency
zones checking for detainees, but none were found. In
September ICRC personnel began unannounced visits to numerous
military and police places of detention following the
Government's decision to permit such access. In August the
Ministry of Defense instituted a national registry of detainees
held by the military forces.
The Constitution prohibits forced involuntary exile, and there
have been no known cases of it in the past 10 years.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The legal system is based generally on the Napoleonic Code.
Defendants have the right to be present at the trial, at which
verdicts are rendered by a judge or a panel of judges following
an investigation and the filing of charges. Sentences may be
appealed, and judges may send cases back to lower courts for
additional investigation. Supreme Court judges, 28 in all, are
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nominated by the President from slates supplied by an advisory
committee and must be approved by the Senate. Many judges on
the Superior and Supreme Courts are active in political
parties, and there are occasional claims that decisions have
been politically motivated.
Courts face severe backlogs, a product of inefficiency, archaic
case law and criminal procedural law, and the sharp increase in
terrorism cases. There are too few public defenders for the
large caseloads. There is an estimated backlog of between
250,000 and 300,000 criminal cases. Human rights groups have
documented hundreds of cases of persons who have been detained
without bail while awaiting trial for periods of up to 4
years — in a few cases more than twice that long. There were
also widespread charges of corruption and the suborning of
judges, police and witnesses at all stages of the judicial
process .
The vast majority of human rights complaints made to the Public
Prosecutor's office during the past 10 years have not been
investigated adequately due to lack of police and military
cooperation, resources and official support. Provincial
prosecutors attempting to investigate complaints in the
emergency zones have been threatened, obstructed, and refused
information by members of the armed forces. Following a
presidential decree in September, access and support for human
rights prosecutors has improved, but the security forces
cooperation with civilian prosecutor investigations is still
limited. The prosecutors themselves have sometimes not been
aggressive in pressing investigations.
Senders and MRTA threats and intimidation of judges handling
terrorism cases also account in part for the low conviction
rate of accused terrorists. Since 1981 only 492 people have
been tried and convicted for terrorism; according to the Public
Ministry, this represents a conviction rate of only 10
percent. The extremely low rate of conviction in terrorism
cases contributes to police/military frustration with the
judicial process and to public tolerance of abuses committed by
security forces operating against presumed terrorists. In
September President Fujimori announced a human rights policy
that mandated the establishment of special courts, personnel
and security measures for terrorist cases, but by year's end
there had been little implementation.
The Supreme Court decides whether military or police offenders
are tried in civilian courts or in a separate military court
system. The military generally asserts its jurisdiction in
cases involving its personnel, and the Supreme Court typically
rules in its favor. Under Peruvian law, those tried in
military courts may not be retried for the same offense in
civilian courts. Military courts have usually failed to
investigate and convict military personnel implicated in human
rights violations. Army Sergeant Jhonny Zapata Zcuna
("El Centurion") was charged in civilian court for the October
1990 massacre of 17 persons at Chilcahuaycco, Ayacucho.
However, the civilian court trial remained blocked as of year's
end while a parallel process proceeds in the military courts.
Army captain Amador Vidal Sambento and Comandante Victor la
Vera Hernandez were charged in civilian court for the November
1988 killing of journalist Hugo Bustios Saavedra, but military
courts asserted jurisdiction and found the accused not guilty.
In February the Supreme Court annulled a habeas corpus petition
in the Ernesto Castillo disappearance case (see Section l.b.);
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This was one of the few such petitions that had been upheld by
the lower courts since 1983.
There were two notable cases in 1991 in which the security
forces cooperated with proceedings to hold several of their
members accountable for serious human rights violations. Five
noncommissioned police officers were arrested and charged in
civilian courts "with the killing in July of three youths in
Callao. Detention orders against four superior officers and
one noncommissioned officer involved in the cases were vacated
by order of a civilian court judge, although the four remained
under investigation. Five noncommissioned officers and an
officer were charged in military court variously with murder,
torture and rape in the Santa Barbara case (see Section l.a.)
following a military investigation. Proceedings were still
pending at year's end. Military trials may be closed to the
public at the discretion of the ruling magistrate, and little
is known about specific cases. In January 1990 both military
and civilian courts closed the investigation into the 1988
Coyara massacre case of 28 villagers. In late 1991, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights agreed to take the case.
The Government has indicated that it will respect the Court's
ruling. A December 1990 government decree requiring that
security personnel charged with crimes in connection with their
service in the emergency zones be tried in military courts was
subsequently overturned by Congress.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution stipulates that the police need a judicial
warrant to enter a private dwelling, and this requirement is
generally respected. The requirement is suspended in the
emergency zones, however, and security forces in those areas
routinely conduct searches of private homes without warrants.
Credible reports of illegal telephone wiretaps remain common
and the subject politically controversial.
With army training and encouragement, a number of rural
communities organized rondas to protect themselves against
terrorist and bandit incursions. While in parts of the nation
rondas have existed for centuries as a form of social
organization and to protect residents from invaders and
rustlers, many of the newer rondas were actively organized, and
sometimes imposed, under the directions of the military
authorities. Many peasants joined rondas voluntarily to defend
against Sendero, and many leaders are locally elected.
However, in some areas there were credible reports of peasants
forced to join rondas. Sendero was also credibly accused of
regularly forcing peasants to join its military ranks, often
for extended periods, requiring their involvement in terrorist
attacks and executions.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Peru has signed the two protocols additional to the Geneva
Conventions relating to the protection of victims of
international and noninternational armed conflict in July
1989. In September 1991, the Government authorized access of
the ICRC to all military facilities engaged in antisubversive
operations. The authorization includes the right to interview
detainees privately. By year's end, the ICRC had made 114
visits to 75 police stations and 95 visits to 77 military
installations without hindrance.
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According to the Senate's Bernales Commission, 3,180 people,
including combatants and civilians, were killed in terrorist-
related violence in 1991. This is an 8 percent decrease in
terrorist-related violence from 1990 's all-time high. The
Beruales figure includes 334 police and military, 1,287
civilians, 1,522 terrorists, and 37 narcotics traffickers. Of
the 3,180 deaths, Sendero killed 1,314, the military 1,049, the
police 346, MRTA 139, urban and rural rondas 109,
narcotraf f ickers 31, antiterrorist paramilitary groups 9, and
unknown perpetrators 177.
Local human rights groups maintain that a significant but
unknown number of captured terrorists and innocent civilians
were summarily executed by the military in 1991. Sendero ' s
disregard for the rules of war and humanitarian law are also
well known (see Section l.a.) Sendero routinely tortures,
mutilates and murders its captives.
There were widespread abuses by both security and terrorist
forces of the rights of prisoners, able-bodied, wounded, and
sick alike. The military's violations of international norms
ranged from the routine blindfolding of prisoners, to the
frequent refusal to admit that certain persons were being
detained, to the less frequent summary execution of unarmed
prisoners. For its part, Sendero does not acknowledge holding
any government prisoners; it executes government prisoners as a
matter of policy.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press.
With 8 television stations, 1 cable television system, 72 radio
stations, and 18 daily newspapers in Lima alone, Peruvians have
access to a very broad range of opinion and information. The
Government owns one of the three national television networks,
a radio network, and two newspapers. Most major opposition
parties boast their own newspapers, and opposition figures also
have frequent access to the government media.
There were relatively few complaints during 1991 of government
pressure on the media or of restrictions on journalists. There
were, however, charges that a popular television newsmagazine
program was canceled due to military pressure after the program
revealed the draft of a military document authorizing summary
executions under certain circumstances. The Minister of
Defense publicly repudiated the draft proposal, and those
involved in its preparation were administratively punished.
The television station management stated that the program was
canceled due to economic considerations and not as a response
to military pressure.
In separate actions MRTA and Sendero forces occupied the
offices of several radio stations and wire services, forcing
the media outlets to transmit political propaganda messages.
Sendero also bombed several rural radio stations. Sendero used
threats to intimidate radio stations, journalists and
publications .
Journalists were sometimes the victims of violence and
threats. The College of Peruvian Journalists reported that as
many as 33 journalists have been killed in the 11 years of
Sendero violence. Radio journalist Luis Antonio Morales
Ortega, whom Sendero later acknowledged as one of their
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political cadre, was assassinated on July 13. Only days before
his death, he had received death threats from a group calling
itself the Anti-Terrorist Liberation Command, and earlier had
received similar threats from the Rodrigo Franco Command
(CRF) . Melissa Alfaro, the 23 year-old news editor of
MRTA-linked Cambio newspaper, was killed on October 10 when she
opened a letter bomb addressed to Cambio editor Carlos Arroyo
Reyes. Ayacucho journalist Cirilo Ore Enric[uez was
assassinated by Sendero on October 27. Ore had received death
threats and his name had appeared on Sendero black lists
circulated in Ayacucho in the weeks prior to his death.
Ayacucho journalist Magno Sosa Rojas received threats from the
Anti-Terrorist Liberation Command. He was arrested on August
23 and charged with terrorism, but a civil judge released him
one week later for insufficient evidence.
Academic freedom is generally respected, but professors and
students are sometimes the victims of threats and abuses.
Sendero and MRTA resort extensively to threats and abuse
against faculty, staff, and students in a number of
universities which they strive to control. Army units entered
San Marcos and La Cantuta Universities in May to paint out
Sendero propaganda and "restore university freedom" with a show
of military presence.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These rights are expressly provided for in the Constitution and
are normally respected in practice except in areas under a
state of emergency (where the right of assembly is suspended) .
Public meetings in plazas or streets require advance
permission, which may be denied only for reasons of public
safety or health. Municipal authorities usually approved
permits for demonstrations in lima and nonemergency zones.
Many unauthorized demonstrations also occurred, and, for the
most part, the Government dealt with them in a
nonconf rontational manner. On a number of occasions, however,
police on the scene resorted to clubs, tear gas, buckshot, and
truck-mounted water cannons to break up marches or to disperse
large crowds. These tactics were freqijently used against
striking public service workers, including nurses, school
teachers, and social security workers on various occasions
during 1991.
c. Freedom of Religion
Roman Catholicism predominates in Peru, and the Constitution
formally recognizes the Church "as an important element in the
historical, cultural, and moral development" of the nation.
The Constitution also establishes the separation of church and
state and ensures freedom of religion and conscience. These
rights are respected in practice.
Members of various religious organizations report having
received death threats from Sendero during 1991. Sendero is
becoming increasingly antagonistic to organized religion in
general and to foreign clergy in particular; several religious
workers were killed by Sendero (see Section l.a.). During
February and March MRTA bombed, or tried to bomb, 15 Mormon
churches .
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d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides for the right of free movement, and
there are no political or legal constraints on foreign travel
or emigration. Freedom of movement is legally suspended within
the emergency zones, and travelers may be detained by
authorities at any time. Other domestic and international
travel is not restricted by the government for political
reasons .
Sendero called for numerous "armed strikes" in various parts of
the country, during which civilians were obliged to stay at
home or risk violence if they traveled.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Peru is a democracy governed by a freely elected president and
congress. The political process is open and subject to
monitoring by an autonomous national elections board, and
elections are vigorously contested by parties ranging from
conservative to Marxist-Leninist. Elections are held every 5
years for a president and two vice presidents, as well as for
the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The President is barred
from running for consecutive terms of office. Suffrage is both
universal and mandatory for persons 18 to 70 years of age,
except for active duty police or military, who are barred from
voting or holding public office. Balloting is direct and
secret.
Sendero Luminoso persistently sought to deny citizens their
political rights — particularly in the more remote areas — by
killing candidates and elected officials and threatening voters
(see Section l.a.). Sendero applied these tactics in the
August 1991 supplemental elections. Due to Sendero intimidation
there were no candidates in 123 districts, which constituted 25
percent of those districts holding elections in August 1991.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
A number of local private human rights organizations constitute
the Independent National Coordinating Committee for Human
Rights. These include the Commission for Human Rights
(COMISEDH), the Institute for Legal Defense (IDL), the
Association for Human Rights (APRODEH), the Church's Episcopal
Commission for Social Action (CEAS), and the Center for Studies
and Action for Peace (CEAPAZ) . A number of other, smaller
groups work in the departmental capitals and other cities.
These groups are generally credible observers, investigating
and reporting on human rights abuses to the extent possible,
regardless of the perpetrator.
However, violence against human rights activists continued in
1991, including the letter bomb attack on Dr. Augusto Zuniga
Paz, legal counsel for the Commission for Human Rights
(see Section l.a.). Local human rights organizations complain
that they are limited by the military in their efforts to
investigate human rights abuses in the emergency zones and that
their requests to the Government for information are usually
ignored. Legitimate fears of attacks by Sendero also greatly
limit the ability of human rights monitors to investigate
reported cases of abuse. Porfirio Suni Quispe, the President
719
PERU
of a regional human rights commission, was assassinated by
Sendero on February 14, in Puno .
President Fujimori regularly spoke out demanding greater
respect for human rights. At an Army Day celebration in
September, the President told an audience of military officers
that Peru would continue to fight the armed insurgents with
discipline and respect for human rights. He added, however,
that some human rights groups had not been evenhanded, failing
to condemn equally the human rights offenses committed by the
terrorists, and had thus served the ends of terrorism. Local
human rights groups vigorously denied these allegations and
expressed concern that this remark could endanger the lives of
their members.
Several foreign nongovernmental human rights organizations sent
representatives to Peru during 1991 to investigate the human
rights situation. Various of these visitors met with such
officials as President Fujimori, the Minister of Defense, the
Attorney General and military authorities. Some visited sites
in the emergency zones. The Inter-American Human Rights
Commission visited Peru in October 1991 to investigate the
human rights situation. Representatives of the military joint
command met with representatives of human rights monitoring
groups. Several human rights groups were invited to
participate in seminars and to offer human rights instruction
at military and police academies. The ICRC has regular access
to prison and detention facilities and to a military registry
of detainees.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution grants women equality with men, and laws on
marriage, divorce, and property rights do not discriminate
against women. Nevertheless, tradition impedes the access of
women to leadership roles in major social and political
institutions .
Sexual violence, including spouse abuse, is a chronic problem.
A special police center, staffed by policewomen, operates in
Lima to provide legal, medical, and psychiatric assistance to
abused spouses and children. Police in Lima receive
approximately 100 formal complaints of rape daily. Police
estimate, however, that less than 10 percent of all rape cases
are reported. Of the 2,800 rape cases tried in Lima in 1991,
only 340 resulted in convictions. A number of women's
organizations and feminist groups are active in Peru.
Peru's large indigenous population and its small black
population are subject to pervasive social discrimination. The
former group, mostly speakers of Quechua, Aymara, and other
native languages, traditionally has lacked access to public
services. Peru is a classic case of differential development,
with public investment traditionally focused on the coast,
drawing migrants to the cities, especially Lima. Recognizing
this fact, the Government has attempted to redirect the flow of
resources and services to poor, largely Indian, rural areas.
Development efforts, however, have been impeded by the
difficulty and cost of providing services to remote areas and
by the continued, targeted disruption of these efforts by
Sendero. As a result of current problems, as well as historic
and continued prejudice, the economic and social needs of
Peruvians of European ancestry continued to be met to a far
720
PERU
greater extent than those of Peruvians of black, mixed, or
Indian heritage.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of association and,
except for the judiciary, police, military, and military
parastatals, the right to form labor unions without previous
authorization. However, there are some legal restrictions on
the right to form a union. There is, for example, a
requirement to register with the Ministry of Labor before the
union can become a legal entity capable of performing its
functions. Suspension or dissolution of labor unions is
forbidden by the Constitution except through the civil court
system at the request of the union itself or by Labor Ministry
cancelation of the union's registration. Unions may form
industrywide federations which may, in turn, form
confederations, all of which may affiliate with international
labor organizations and such affiliations are commonplace.
Private and public sector unions of workers performing the same
type of work may not join together as a confederation at any
level. In late December 1990, the Government issued a new
decree that allows the formation of new unions with a minimum
of 20 members and allows multiple unions within the same
workplace. The measure also attempts to limit the power of the
politically affiliated leadership of the existing labor
organizations by allowing any two unions to form a
confederation.
Only about 15 percent of the labor force is organized, although
some labor organization is found in industries responsible for
about 70 percent of Peru's gross national product. The
majority of unorganized workers are in the countryside and
involved in the vast underground "informal" sector which works
outside government regulations. Although a significant
percentage of organized labor belongs to independent unions and
federations, those unions with a political party affiliation
are routinely manipulated to serve partisan political interests.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike "according to
law." There is no strike law, however, even though Congress
has considered various implementing bills since the
Constitution was promulgated in 1979. By Supreme Executive
Decree (which defines some strike behavior in the absence of a
formal law), workers in the private sector must give 72-hour
notice to the employer and the Ministry of Labor before going
on strike. When direct negotiations between workers and
employers break down, the Government can intervene and
constitute a tripartite (government, management, labor) board
to review the situation. If no agreement is reached, the
Government weighs the overall economic implications of the
employer's and the workers' positions and makes a decision
(which may be appealed administratively) . A government
determination that a strike is illegal can lead to the
dismissal of workers or union leaders and permits employers to
hire strikebreakers legally. There are no norms regulating
strikes in the public sector and all such strikes, common
though they are, are open to legal challenge.
In spite of the constitutional right to strike, nearly all
strikes in Peru are declared illegal. However, the workers who
strike illegally are seldom penalized. Following a series of
disruptive public sector strikes in late 1990, the Government
721
PERU
issued a supreme decree restricting the right of government
workers in essential services to strike. Although the right to
strike remains, a minimum level of essential services must be
maintained. Essential services were broadly defined by the
decree, which generated a complaint to the International Labor
Organization (ILO). Despite these restrictions, several major
strikes in essential public services took place in 1991.
In 1991 the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association
considered three cases involving government failure to
prosecute military and other officials allegedly responsible
for the illegal detention, torture, disappearance, and murder
of workers, peasants, and union officials in 1989; and called
for an independent judicial inquiry. Other ILO bodies
acknowledged some improvement in the trade union law, for
example in terms of permitting greater pluralism, but called
for further lifting of restrictions dealing with public
employee rights, free choice of representatives, freedom to
participate in political activity and collective bargaining.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to bargain collectively is provided for by the
Constitution, but there are restrictions on what can be
negotiated. In the public sector, however, only working
conditions may be negotiated, and then only if the changes do
not involve expenses greater than the funds already budgeted.
In the private sector, collective bargaining can cover both
working conditions and pay.
By law, employers cannot discriminate against union members or
organizers. In practice, however, union activists are
sometimes harassed by employers who threaten to fire them.
Others are paid off to leave the enterprise. Workers may
appeal their cases through the Ministry of Labor or, if a
decision is not acceptable to both parties, through the civil
courts. In some cases, a worker is kept on the company's
payroll until a final legal ruling is obtained. In other
cases, a worker may be awarded back pay in a final settlement.
There were several reported incidents during the year of
serious harassment and intimidation of labor union activists.
Sendero threatened leaders of the Teachers Union in order to
protract a 5 month strike in the public education sector.
Labor laws and regulations are applied uniformly throughout the
country, including the free trade zone of Tacna, and an area of
the Amazon Basin, granted in a Peru/Colombia border agreement,
which is analogous to a free trade zone.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits compulsory labor, and this
prohibition is usually respected in practice. There have been
a few, unverified reports of compulsory labor on plantations in
remote areas of the country where law enforcement is all but
nonexistent. Sendero has also been accused of forcibly
recruiting peasants to either join its ranks or render support
services. There were also credible complaints that the
military used coercion to recruit peasants to join self-defense
militias (see Section l.f.).
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law prohibits the employment of children under 14 years of
age. In the formal sector of the economy, the law allows for
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PERU
the employment of older children in some jobs, for a limited
period of time, and for a curtailed workweek at full pay.
According to a 1987 Senate report, however, 1.1 Million
children 6 to 14 years of age work, mostly in the informal
sector. Unofficial sources estimate that about half a million
children work in the Lima area alone. A June 1989 survey of
133 working children by the Agrarian University in Lima showed
that 78 percent of them were between 10 and 12 years old. Some
40 percent sold assorted merchandise as street vendors, and 53
percent went to school only occasionally or not at all.
One-third worked 7 days a week, and 57 percent of the total
worked between 2 and 5 days a week. There were confirmed
reports of children working in conditions approaching slavery
in the placer-mining gold fields of Madre de Dios department.
In this remote area, where there is virtually no government
presence, the children were overworked and ill-fed. Graves of
children discovered in 1991 brought the issue to public notice.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The administratively set minimum wage was last increased by the
Government in January 1991. It continues to lag behind
inflation and is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. The Government implicitly
recognized the inadequacy of wages paid to government workers,
often below the minimum wage when it reduced the required work
week to 24 hours in order to allow government workers,
including police and military, to seek secondary employment to
supplement their incomes. However, many Peruvians are paid
more than the minimum wage, and many others supplement their
income through multiple jobs or subsistence farming, or both.
Nonetheless, according to a September 1990 World Bank report,
55 percent of all Peruvians live in extreme poverty.
The Labor Code provides for an 8-hour workday and an official
48-hour workweek for men, and a 4 5-hour workweek for women, but
its provisions concerning conditions of work are routinely
ignored by most employers. All workers are legally entitled to
30 days' paid annual vacation. Those in the private sector
have to work a minimum of 260 days (excluding 30 days' sick
leave) or forfeit their vacation. In an economy where
unemployment and underemployment total an estimated 80 percent,
however, vacation benefits and other conditions of work are
readily sacrificed in exchange for steady or even temporary
employment .
There are government standards for industrial health and
safety, but these are rarely enforced, either by employers or
by the Government (which has no inspectors). Accidents are
common, and there is usually no emphasis on prevention; once
accidents occur, employers normally make compensation
voluntarily, however minimal.
723
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
St. Kitts and Nevis, a member of the Commonwealth of Nations,
is a small two-island state with a democratic, parliamentary
form of government. The Constitution provides the smaller
island of Nevis considerable self-government, as well as the
right to secede from the federation if certain enumerated
procedures are- followed. The country is governed by a prime
minister, a cabinet, and a legislative assembly. The Governor
General, with largely ceremonial duties, is the titular Head of
State. The Constitution requires general elections at least
every 5 years. Elections were last held in 1989, retaining
Prime Minister Dr. Kennedy Simmonds and his People's Action
Movement in power .
Security forces consist of a small police force, which includes
a 50-person Special Service Unit that receives some light
infantry training, and a small coast guard.
St. Kitts and Nevis has a mixed economy based on sugar cane,
tourism, and light industry. Most commercial enterprises are
privately owned, but the sugar industry (the country's largest
economic enterprise) and 85 percent of all arable land are
owned by a state corporation. Economic growth continued to
slow in 1991, but the opening of a major tourist resort in
Nevis and the ground breaking for two new resorts on the
southeast peninsula have the potential for tourist-generated
economic growth.
Human rights continued to be respected during 1991, although
limited access to government-controlled media remained a
concern.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Law enforcement authorities abide by the constitutional
prohibitions against the use of torture or other forms of
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Family members,
attorneys, and clergy are permitted to visit detainees
regularly.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and
this provision is respected in practice. The law recjuires that
persons detained be brought before a court within 48 hours.
There were no reported cases of exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides that every person accused of a crime
must receive a fair, speedy, and public trial, and these
50-726 - 92 - 24
724
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
requirements are generally adhered to. The judiciary, a part
of the Eastern Caribbean legal system, is highly regarded and
independent. Final appeal may be made to the Queen's Privy
Council in the United Kingdom. There are no military or
political courts. Legal assistance is available for indigent
defendants .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Neither the Government nor the police interfere arbitrarily in
the private lives of individuals. Judicially issued warrants
are rec[uired to search private homes.
Section 2 Respect For Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the
press. The Government owns the only radio and television
station on St. Kitts. There is a religious television station
and a privately owned radio station on Nevis. The Government-
owned radio and television stations on St. Kitts generally do
not publicize adequately rallies and conventions held by the
opposition political party. It is difficult for opposition
party leaders to gain access to the government-owned electronic
media.
St. Kitts and Nevis does not have a daily newspaper, although
each of the major political parties publishes a weekly or
biweekly newspaper. The papers are free to criticize the
Governnient and do so regularly and vigorously. International
news publications are readily available.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the right of peaceful assembly.
Organized demonstrations, rallies, and public meetings
sponsored by political parties occur regularly, usually taking
place without government interference.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for the free exercise of religion,
and religious practices are not restricted. Most church
members belong to Protestant denominations. All groups are
free to maintain links with coreligionists in other countries.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Travel inside and outside of the country is unrestricted.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens are able to change their government by peaceful
means. A vigorous multiparty political system exists in which
political parties are free to conduct their activities.
Periodic elections are held in which all citizens 18 years of
age and older may register and vote by secret ballot.
The People's Action Movement (PAM) of Prime Minister Kennedy
Simmonds holds a majority of seats in the Parliament. PAM has
worked closely with the Nevis Reformation Party (NRP) of Nevis
725
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
Premier Simeon Daniel. Since the March 1989 national election,
the two parties have held 8 of 11 elected seats in the
Parliament .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
While there are no governmental restrictions, no local human
rights groups have been formed to date.
There were no requests for investigations or visits by
international human rights groups in 1991.
Section 5 Discrimination Besed on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There were no reports of systematic discrimination based on
race, sex, creed, language, or social status. The role of
women in society is not restricted by law. However, the role
of most women in the country is still circumscribed by culture
and tradition. The Government created the Ministry of Women's
Affairs to help redefine the role of women in society and to
ensure that women's rights are promoted. According to a
Ministry official, violence against women is a problem, but
gauging the extent of the problem is difficult because many
women are reluctant to file a complaint or pursue their
complaints in the courts. Despite this reluctance, there were
publicly reported cases of both domestic violence and rape in
1991 and a few convictions. According to the Women's Affairs
Ministry, a special police unit works closely with the Ministry
to investigate domestic violence and rape cases.
The Ministry of Women's Affairs, headed by Constance Mitchum, a
lawyer and St. Kitts ' only female Member of Parliament,
continues to be active in counseling abused women, as well as
in other aspects of women's rights. The Ministry in September
submitted to the Cabinet a new national policy statement for
women that included sections on job discrimination and domestic
violence.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for the right of all workers to form
and belong to trade unions. The major labor union, the St.
Kitts Trades and Labour Union, is affiliated with the
opposition St. Kitts Labour Party and is organized in all
sectors of the economy. Membership appears to be declining, as
the Government assumes some of the social welfare roles
formerly played by unions. There is also an independent
teachers' union, a union representing dockworkers in the
capital city, and a taxi-drivers association.
The right to strike, while not specified by law, is well
established and respected in practice. There were no major
strikes in 1991. Unions are free to form federations or
confederations, and to affiliate with international
organizations. The islands' unions maintain a variety of
international ties.
726
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Labor unions are free to organize and to negotiate for better
wages and benefits for union members. There is no legislation
governing the organization and representation of workers, and
employers are not legally bound to recognize a union, but in
practice employers do so if a majority of workers polled wish
to organize. The Labor Commission attempts to mediate disputes
between labor and management on an ad hoc basis. If neither
the Labor Commission nor the Minister of Labor can resolve the
dispute, legislation allows for a case to be brought before a
civil court. There are no areas, such as export processing
zones, where union organization or collective bargaining are
discouraged or impeded.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution forbids slavery and forced labor, and they do
not exist in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum legal working age is 14. The Labor Ministry relies
heavily on school truant officers and the Community Affairs
Division to monitor compliance, which they do effectively.
Local law mandates compulsory education up to the age of 16.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wage rates for domestic servants and retail store
employees were established by law in 1984 and updated in 1989.
These provide an adequate, though Spartan, living for a wage
earner and family; many workers supplement wages by keeping
small animals such as goats and chickens. Most people live in
extended families where there may be more than one wage
earner. The Labor Commission undertakes regular wage
inspections and special investigations when complaints are
received; employers found in violation are required to pay back
wages .
The standard workweek, although not legally mandated, is 40
hours in 5 days. Workers are guaranteed a minimum annual
vacation of 2 weeks. While there are no specific health and
safety regulations, the Factories Law provides general health
and safety guidance to Labor Ministry inspectors.
727
ST. LUCIA
St. Lucia is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a member
of the Commonwealth of Nations. For almost a decade, it has
been led by incumbent Prime Minister John Compton, who was
reelected in 1987. His United Workers Party currently holds a
small majority of seats in Parliament. Elections must be held
by July 1992 but can be called earlier by the Prime Minister.
The Royal St. Lucia Police, which is the only security force in
the country, includes a small Special Service Unit with some
paramilitary training and a coast guard unit. The police, who
have traditionally demonstrated a high degree of respect for
human rights, are controlled by and responsive to elected
government officials.
St. Lucia, after experiencing several years of sustained
economic growth, began to feel the effects of the world
recession during 1991. Its economy is largely based on the
export of bananas, which also represent the major source of
foreign exchange earnings. St. Lucia is gradually diversifying
into other types of agriculture, tourism, and, more recently,
into light manufacturing and construction. Economic
performance in all sectors was relatively strong during 1991.
Human rights continued to be respected during 1991.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no confirmed reports of political or other
extrajudicial killings. According to the regional human rights
organization Caribbean Rights, in 1991 there was a reduction of
outright police abuse, but there were occasional instances
where detainees' rights were not respected. One such case
which came to public attention during the year involved the
1990 incarceration of a first time offender with dangerous
criminals; the victim was killed by inmates in the Castries
prison. This case led to a public outcry concerning the old,
severely overcrowded prison and unsanitary conditions there.
The regional human rights organization stationed in Barbados,
Caribbean Rights, expressed its concern over conditions in the
Castries prison, but St. Lucian Community Development and
Social Affairs Minister denied that St. Lucia's prison problem
was unusually bad.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances or politically
motivated abductions.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution specifically prohibits torture, and no such
incidents were reported. However, there has been an increase
of convictions based on confessions in St. Lucia in recent
years. This reflects the efforts to force confessions in lieu
of other judicial and investigative mechanisms. There have
been occasional credible allegations of harsh treatment of
prisoners by law enforcement officials prior to and during
incarceration. Although no international or regional human
728
ST. LUCIA
rights organizations filed reports or requests for
investigations in 1991, a 1990 request by a regional human
rights organization to survey the prisons in St. Lucia was not
approved by the government, which claimed it was "not ready"
(see Section 1 . a. ) .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Government adheres to the constitutional provision
prohibiting arbitrary arrest or imprisonment and requiring a
court hearing within 72 hours after detention. There were no
reports of arbitrary arrest or other forms of extralegal
detention, or of forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution requires public trials before an independent
and impartial court, and the provision of legal counsel for
indigents. Both constitutional and statutory requirements for
fair public trials are followed. Criminal defendants are
entitled to select their own legal counsel, are presumed
innocent until proven guilty, and have the right of appeal.
The regional West Indies Court of Appeal, a circuit court long
noted for its impartiality, serves as St. Lucia's appeals court.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were no reports of arbitrary intrusion by the State into
the private lives of individual citizens. Authorities
consistently observe constitutional prohibitions against
arbitrary search, seizure, and entry.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Constitutional provisions for free speech and press are
respected in practice. The Government neither interferes with
the operations of the press nor censors the content of the
three privately owned major newspapers, which cover the
spectrum of political opinion and are often highly critical of
the Government. The one local television station, Helen
Television System, is also privately owned, and covers a wide
spectrum of views. Radio St. Lucia is government owned and
operated, but the programming staff has been allowed a large
measure of autonomy.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of association and of assembly are provided for by the
Constitution. Permits are usually granted for public meetings
and demonstrations. Refusal to issue a permit is rare and
generally stems from the failure of the organizers to request a
permit in a timely manner, normally defined as a 48-hour notice.
c. Freedom of Religion
The majority of the population is Roman Catholic. Other
denominations are free to maintain places of worship, train
clergy, establish religious schools, and engage in the full
range of activities normally associated with religious
organizations .
729
ST. LUCIA
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
These rights are provided for in the Constitution and honored
in practice.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to' Change Their Government
St. Lucia's parliamentary system provides for genuine choices
among parties, policies, and officials. Although currently
there are two main parties, several other political
organizations also participate in free elections, which are
held at least every 5 years and by secret ballot. The
opposition St. Lucia Labor Party plays a significant role in
the country's political life, and presently holds 7 of 17 seats
in the House of Assembly.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights.
There are no local human rights groups in St. Lucia. There are
no government restrictions which would impede the establishment
of human rights organizations.
International human rights organizations filed no reports or
requests for investigations in 1991.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status.
Government policy is basically nondiscriminatory in the areas
of housing, jobs, education, and advancement opportunities.
There are no legal restrictions on the role of women or
minorities .
Violence directed specifically against women, including
domestic violence such as wife beating, has recently become
more of a public policy issue in St. Lucia. Lack of
statistical data and possible reluctance on the part of some
victims to report cases or to press charges make it difficult
to gauge its true extent. Police and courts do enforce laws to
protect women against abuse, although police generally tend to
be reluctant to intervene in domestic disputes. In 1989 a
women's rights organization called the "Crisis Center" was
established to monitor existing abuses. The group held a
number of public meetings to publicize the plight of battered
women, and staged a large demonstration to protest the killing
of a woman who was beaten to death. Extreme cases of this sort
are not common, but the Government responded by establishing a
Women's Affairs Office in the Ministry of Community
Development. That office, together with the Crisis Center
(whose staff includes female Peace Corps volunteers) developed
a National Policy Statement on Women which was ratified,
signed, and adopted by Parliament in March 1991. The Women's
Office then commenced work on implementation of the policy,
which includes among its objectives protecting the rights of
women in domestic violence cases, ensuring no discrimination
against women according to international conventions, and
ensuring equal treatment in employment and overall equal status
with men.
730
ST. LUCIA
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution specifies the right of workers to form or
belong to trade unions under the broader rubric of the right of
association. Unions are independent of the Government and are
free to choose their own representatives. Union elections are
often vigorously contested. All unions are free to publicize
their views and choose policies to advance their members'
interests. There is no restriction on forming a national labor
federation, and several of the major unions in St. Lucia have
joined together to form an umbrella grouping, called the
Industrial Solidarity Pact. Unions are free to affiliate with
international organizations, and some have done so.
Strikes in both public and private sectors are legal if efforts
by the Government to resolve disputes fail. Strikes do occur
from time to time. In 1991 there were disputes among various
unions representing the Air and Sea Authority over collective
bargaining agreements. The Windward Islands Packaging Company,
which manufactures banana cartons for export, locked out
production workers after they staged a work slowndown in
February. A temporary settlement was reached in negotiations
which included the Ministry of Labor and the Employers'
Federation, and a final collective bargaining agreement was
signed in October. When an American garment factory, "Belle
Fashions," the largest employer in St. Lucia, gave notice in
August that it might close due to financial difficulties, the
union representing its workers called on the Government to
intervene. With the intervention of the Prime Minister the
company agreed to stay open for the time being, and a number of
employees were rehired.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions have the legal right to engage in collective bargaining
and fully exercise that right. The majority of wage and salary
earners belong to unions. During 1989 the Government
negotiated a 6-year wage agreement with 6 unions representing
public servants, resulting in unusually harmonious
government-labor relations. In the private sector, some
companies offer packages of benefits with terms of employment
better than, or comparable to, what a union can offer. This is
especially true in export processing or industrial free zones
(EPZ's). Antiunion discrimination by employers against union
members is prohibited by law, and there are effective
mechanisms for resolving complaints. Union organizing and
collective bargaining are neither legally nor administratively
discouraged in the EPZ's.
Although labor law is applicable in the EPZ's, in practice many
firms do not welcome union efforts to organize in the EPZ's.
Some of these firms are under foreign management and employ
young, female, labor forces with relatively low wages.
Occasionally a persistent union is successful in winning a poll
in an EPZ, in which case labor law applies to collective
bargaining agreements in that company.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is illegal and does not exist.
731
ST. LUCIA
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum legal working age is 14 years, as stipulated by the
Women and Young Persons Act. The law is enforced effectively
by Labor Ministry officials.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
St. Lucia has legislated minimum wage rates set by the Wages
Regulations (Clerks) Orders, effective since February 1985.
The wage rates are divided by employment category (e.g. clerks,
switchboard operators, cashiers, janitors, and messengers.)
The minimum wage rates are not sufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family, but almost all
categories of workers are paid much more than this legislative
minimum, which is used only as a guide.
There is no legislated maximum workweek, although common
practice is 40 hours in 5 days. Occupational health and safety
regulations are relatively well developed. The Labor Ministry
periodically inspects health and safety conditions at places of
employment under the Employees Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1985. The Act is enforced through threat of closure of
the business if violations are discovered and not corrected.
732
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
A member of the Commonwealth of Nations, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines is a parliamentary democracy with an established
tradition of respect for the rights of the individual. After
defeating the incumbent St. Vincent Labor Party in 1984
elections, James F. Mitchell and his New Democratic Party won
all 15 parliamentary seats in general elections held in May
1989. Although some concern was voiced about the absence of
any parliamentary opposition, the elections were judged to be
free and fair.
The Royal St. Vincent Police, the only security force in the
country, includes a coast guard and a small Special Service
Unit with some paramilitary training. The force is controlled
by and responsive to the civilian Government and traditionally
maintains standards of professionalism that place a high value
on respect for human rights. In 1991, however, there was a
public demand, led by the major opposition political party, for
the resignation of Police Commissioner Toussaint, who was
alleged to have been involved in various criminal activities.
An official, one-man commission of inquiry was assigned by the
Government to investigate allegations of corruption and other
misconduct, but did not find any evidence against the
Commissioner. On December 23, 1991, Prime Minister Mitchell
announced the reinstatement of Commisioner Toussaint, but the
issue remains controversial.
St. Vincent has a young population, a relatively high rate of
illiteracy, and serious unemployment, possibly as high as 35
percent. St. Vincent's major export product is bananas, which
also represents the major source of foreign exchange earnings.
St. Vincent has embarked on a path of nontraditional economic
diversification, with some success in new agricultural products
and in industrial sectors.
Citizens of St. Vincents have and exercised a wide range of
freedoms and rights in 1991 although the administration of
justice is weak, including the treatment of the prisoners by
law enforcement officials'.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Human rights groups and the Vincentian media called for a
further investigation into the June 27 shooting of a
21-year-old man by police in St. Vincent's capital city of
Kingstown. A coroner's inqiiest was held, but the jury ruled
that it was misadventure on the part of the policeman, and that
he was not guilty of criminal activity. This was not an
isolated incident, as several people were killed by police in
1991.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
733
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture and other forms of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, and there were
no reports of such practices in 1991.
However, a very high percentage of convictions (estimated at 95
percent by the regional group Caribbean Rights) are based on
confessions in St. Vincent. This has led to credible charges
that harsh treatment by law enforcement officials during
incarceration is used to extract confessions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
According to the Constitution, persons detained for criminal
offenses must be provided legal representation and have their
cases reviewed promptly. However, there is a serious delay in
hearing cases and a large backlog of cases pending, including
preliminary inquiries, coroner's inquests, and appeals. This
slow administration of justice is due to the presence of only
one judge, plus one appointed on a part-time basis.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for public trials before an
independent and impartial court. Criminal defendants are
entitled to select their own legal counsel; alternatively, if
the defendant is indigent, counsel may be provided by the
court. Defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty
and may appeal cases to a regional high court system and
ultimately to the Privy Council in London. There are no
separate security or military court systems.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary search and seizure or
other government intrusions into the private life of individual
citizens. In 1991 there were no reports of such abuses.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the
press. There are two major newspapers and numerous smaller,
partisan publications; all are privately owned, and most are
openly critical of the Government's policies. In general, the
Government does not censor or otherwise interfere with the
operation of the press. In 1990, however, the Government
withdrew its own advertisements and official notices from the
country's leading newspaper to protest the newspaper's critical
treatment of government officials. In 1988 the
government -owned radio station canceled a program that the
Government considered provocative; the station, with the
Government's approval, agreed late in 1989 to reinstate the
program, but, as of the end of 1991, the program had not been
reinstated. The Government heavily supervises the content of
the station's programming, a fact which is often noted by
opposition political parties.
734
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are provided for in the Constitution and are
respected in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion
All religions are free to practice and proselytize.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
These rights are provided for by law and honored in practice.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Notwithstanding the New Democratic Party's clean sweep of all
15 parliamentary seats in the May 1989 elections, St. Vincent
has a genuine multiparty political system, with four active
parties. In the previous election the opposition garnered over
30 per cent of the total vote, but failed to earn a majority of
votes in any single constituency, needed in order to win a
seat. Although Prime Minister Mitchell's commanding majority
and high visibility in society have obscured opposition
political activity, there is nothing in legislation or practice
to prevent a change in government to favor the opposition.
Constitutionally, elections must be held at least every 5
years, by secret ballot, with universal suffrage.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Opposition political groups and the Vincentian press often
comment on human rights matters of local concern. The St.
Vincent Human Rights Association closely monitors government
and police activities, especially in the area of treatment of
prisoners, publicizing any cases of abuse. In 1990 it
published a booklet on the administration of justice in St.
Vincent and the Grenadines which focused on the delay in the
court system and offered a number of recommendations. The
Government's response was to appoint an additional (part-time)
j udge .
The Government is generally responsive to public and private
inquiries about its human rights practices.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for ec[ual treatment under law
regardless of race, sex, or religion, and the Government
adheres to this provision. In 1989 the Government took a
significant step forward in terms of wage scales for women by
adopting a new minimum wage law calling for equal pay for equal
work. The law went into effect during 1990.
Violence against women occurs in St. Vincent, but there are no
studies indicating its extent. Penalties for violent crimes
against women are identical to those involving acts of assault
perpetrated against men. For rape, depending on the magnitude
of the offense and the age of the victim, the penalty is
generally 10 or more years in prison. However, the House of
Assembly in 1989 considered legislation specifically addressing
735
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
penalties for violent acts against women, and subsequently
agreed to the imposition of more severe penalties for acts of
domestic violence; while the legislation is still not
officially approved, many provisions are in fact in force.
Although some victims of domestic violence such as wife beating
are reluctant to press charges, women are increasingly willing
to report such incidents to the police and the National Council
of Women. The "Government ' s Ministry of Education, Youth, and
Women's Affairs has a Women's Desk which assists the National
Council of Women with seminars, training programs, and public
relations.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
By law, Vincentians have the right to form unions, organize
employees, and strike; these rights are generally respected in
practice. Unions are independent of the Government and of
political parties. Somewhat more than 10 percent of the labor
force is unionized. No new unions were formed in 1991. Unions
are free to form federations and confederations and to
affiliate with international labor bodies and do so.
The only major strike during the year began in July when the
National Workers' Movement (NWM) pressed for recognition at a
hotel and construction company on Palm Island in the southern
Grenadines. When faced with a lengthy strike by some 70
long-time workers over dismissal of two employees, the American
owner hired half the number to replace them, with written
contracts and higher wages. Prime Minister Mitchell intervened
in the dispute in October. The Labor Department mediated the
dispute and supervised disbursement of severance payments to
some workers. While the hotel management considers the case
resolved, the NWM plans to initiate legal proceedings against
the hotel for unfair dismissal.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There are no legal obstacles to organizing unions; however,
employers are not legally bound to recognize a particular union
as an exclusive bargaining agent. Some companies offer
packages of benefits with terms of employment better or
comparable to what a union can offer. The law prohibits
antiunion discrimination by employers against union members and
organizers. Generally effective mechanisms exist for resolving
complaints. There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is illegal and does not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law sets the minimum working age at 16, although a worker
must be 18 to receive a national insurance card. This
provision, monitored and enforced by the Ministry of Labor's
Labor Inspection Office, is generally respected in practice.
There are no known instances of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no legislation concerning the length of the workweek;
however, the general practice is to work 40 hours in 5 days.
Workers are guaranteed a minimum annual vacation of 2 weeks.
736
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
Minimum wages, which are set by law, vary by sector and type of
work. In many sectors the minimum wage is not sufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for workers and their
families, but most workers earn more than the minimum.
According to the Ministry of Labor, legislation concerning
occupational safety and health is outdated. The Factories Act
of 1955 has some regulations concerning only factories, but
enforcement of these is ineffective due to a lack of
inspectors .
737
SURINAME
Suriname's difficult democratization process, which suffered a
severe setback on December 24, 1990, when the country's
military carried out its second coup d'etat in slightly more
than a decade, resumed its uneven course in 1991 with the
holding of general elections on May 25 and the inauguration of
a new, democratically elected President on September 16.
During most of ~ the year, however, Suriname was governed by a
Cabinet, reportedly handpicked by military commander Desi
Bouterse, and a President and Vice President installed by the
National Assembly on December 29, 1990, under pressure from the
military. The interim regime successfully administered the May
election, which was generally judged to be free and fair, but
also used the powers of the State, including public expenditure
and manipulation of government-owned media, in the electoral
interests of the promilitary National Democratic Party (NDP).
Nevertheless, in the May 25 election the NDP was soundly
defeated by a coalition of prodemocracy parties known as the
New Front for Democracy and Development, which took 30 of the
Assembly's 51 seats. On September 6 a constitutionally
mandated body called the United People's Assembly elected by an
80-percent majority Ronald Venetiaan, the New Front's
candidate, as Suriname's new President.
It is estimated that real gross domestic product declined in
1990 and will do so again in 1991. The causes of this decline
are a severe foreign exchange shortage with a consequent
scarcity of essential imported inputs, a sagging world market
for the products of the key bauxite sector, accelerating
inflation, and a burgeoning black market in which over 80
percent of all goods are sold. This economic crisis was
greatly exacerbated in 1991 by vastly increased levels of
domestic and foreign public expenditure under the
military-backed interim government.
Human rights abuses declined in 1991. This was attributable in
large part to the de facto end of the Maroon insurgency in the
country's interior which began in 1986; although no formal
peace agreement was reached, the last hostilities occurred in
September 1990. In addition, the military was anxious to
counteract international condemnation of the December 1990 coup
and to regain much-needed foreign assistance that was suspended
following the coup. Finally, during the early part of 1991,
the promilitary interim government prepared for the May 25
election with international observers present, some of whom
remained in Suriname until the September inauguration of
President Venetiaan; their presence also helped to deter the
sort of violence and other human rights abuses which punctuated
1990.
Principal human rights abuses in 1991 included the continuing
impunity of military personnel in regard to human rights
abuses, widespread illegal arrests by the military police, the
harassment of critics of the military, manipulation and
intimidation of certain sectors of the media, and prison
overcrowding. The promilitary interim regime made no apparent
effort to investigate any of the serious human rights
violations which occurred in 1990, including the assassination
of Police Inspector Herman Gooding in August.
738
SURINAME
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Extrajudicial Killing
There were no politically motivated killings reported in 1991.
However, early in the year human rights activists reported that
the fatal shooting during the night of December 25-26, 1990, of
a village official, Jules Indiaan, at the Amerindian village of
Bigi Poika was probably politically motivated. The body of the
76-year-old Indiaan reportedly showed signs of torture.
Shortly before his death, Indiaan had been involved in a
dispute with members of the illegal armed group known as the
Tucajana Amazone over what he considered the undermining of his
position by the Tucajanas. Villagers informed human rights
workers that Indiaan frequently had been threatened with death
by the Tucajanas.
There was no progress in investigations or prosecutions of
suspects in past murders of opponents of the military during
the era of military rule (1980-87) and the 3-year period of
civilian government (1988-90) which followed. Neither the
promilitary interim regime nor the civilian Government which
succeeded it offered settlements to the victims of the families
in two cases under investigation by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. These cases, the December 1987
killings of seven Maroons near the village of Pokigron, and the
November 1988 death while in civilian custody of a Surinamese
citizen who had just returned from the Netherlands, were
scheduled for hearing December 2 by the Inter-American Human
Rights Court.
b. Disappearance
During 1991, further information came to light on a number of
Amerindian men who disappeared during a failed uprising against
the promilitary leadership of the Tucajana Amazone group in
January-February 1990. In June an Amerindian activist claimed
that two men, in addition to the 4 Amerindians reported
murdered in 1990, had been killed by an army firing squad near
the village of Matta during the night of February 6-7, 1990, on
the orders of a senior army officer. Human rights activists
have received unconfirmed reports that six other missing men
were also murdered in the vicinity of Matta at around the same
time. Amerindian women had protested the disappearances and
human rights organizations took up the case, insisting that the
interim government respond to the charges of the Amerindian
activist and release information as to the fate of the missing
men. As of year's end, despite assurances in January from
interim president Johan Kraag that his government would pursue
an investigation into the fate of the missing men, no such
action had been taken. In September, three relatives of the
missing men who had been involved in protesting the
disappearances applied for political asylum in French Guiana,
claiming that their lives had been threatened by the Tucajanas.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no charges of physical torture or mistreatment in
1991. The severe overcrowding of civilian police jail cells
continued to be the only reported serious problem. Social
workers reported that at some police stations, as many as 25
739
SURINAME
detainees regularly inhabited rooms built for 10, and at others
10 to 13 were housed in cells built to accommodate 4 persons.
In August a check of the Nieuwe Haven station in Paramaribo
revealed 270 inmates incarcerated in cells with a combined
capacity of 90.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
According to law, a person suspected of committing a crime for
which the sentence is longer than 4 years may be detained by
the police for investigation for up to 10 days before being
brought before a judge to be charged. The detention may be
extended only if the judge decides there is sufficient evidence
to support the charge. This law is respected in practice.
There is no provision for bail during this extended period.
A law enacted in May 1990 terminating the arrest and pursuit
powers of the military police in civilian cases and canceling
the function of the military police commander and his deputy as
"officers of justice" continued to be ignored in practice by
the military police, who routinely arrested civilian suspects
on a wide range of charges and turned them over, usually within
a matter of days, to the civilian police. The courts have not
chosen to enforce this 1990 law.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Although the Constitution provides for an independent judiciary
and the right to a fair public trial in which defendants have
the right to counsel, the effectiveness of both the civilian
and military courts is limited. Civilian defendants before the
military court do not receive public trials, and the military
is, for all practical purposes, above the law. Military
personnel are not subject to civilian criminal or civil law;
under Surinamese military law, any soldier who commits a crime
immediately comes under military jurisdiction. The military
police are charged with carrying out all investigations
involving military personnel. Although it is illegal for the
army command to interfere with investigations, such
interference often takes place. Judicial officials acknowledge
that obstruction often takes place on the civilian side of the
judicial system as well, at the investigative and prosecutorial
levels, in politically sensitive criminal cases.
Another factor that prevents criminal cases involving military
personnel or drug traffickers from reaching the courts is what
judicial officials have termed a pervasive climate of fear and
intimidation. A number of criminal investigations are
effectively blocked by military authorities who refuse to
cooperate or by witnesses who are afraid to come forward.
Cases of military abuses are unlikely to be solved unless the
causes of the atmosphere of fear are addressed.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for the right to privacy. However,
there were an increased number of credible reports following
the December 24, 1990, coup concerning the illegal monitoring
of telephone calls by security service personnel. There were
also continuing credible reports of surveillance of the
movements of human rights activists and critics of the
military, and threats by letter and telephone to government
officials, policemen, human rights workers, and journalists,
presumably made by the military and its allies. One member of
740
SURINAME
the National Assembly fled the country after receiving a series
of anonymous death threats which followed his participation in
a December 29, 1990, protest against the Assembly's
installation of the military's candidates for president and
vice president .
Guyanese citizens entering Suriname at its western border or
residing in the country either legally or illegally frequently
complained to the press and to human rights organizations of
arbitrary searches and harassment by military and civilian
police personnel. There were several complaints by Guyanese
that Surinamese military policemen had extorted considerable
amounts of money and goods from them as they entered the
country or traveled to Paramaribo.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Reports in 1991 of violations of humanitarian law in the
interior diminished significantly following the de facto end of
the Maroon insurgency in 1990, the withdrawal of the army from
interior and upper Suriname River areas, and an unofficial
alliance between the army and the Jungle Commando. Supplies of
medicine and foodstuffs moved freely to the interior for
virtually the first time since the Maroon insurgency began in
1986. However, much of the country's interior remained under
the control of four so-called illegal armed groups: the Maroon
Jungle Commando, the promilitary Tucajana Amazone, and two
smaller promilitary groups, Mandela and Angula, which continued
to practice banditry despite the winding down of the conflict.
Shortly following the May 25 election, the leader of the
Tucajana Amazone Amerindian group (in reality a military
"front" group) announced that the Tucajanas' "occupation" of
central and west Suriname would continue until the Government
met various Tucajana demands.
Violations of humanitarian law persisted in the ongoing
conflict in the interior. Prior to the May 25 election. Maroon
residents of the upper Suriname river area of the interior
pleaded with both the army and the Jungle Commando to leave the
area, declaring that they no longer saw any difference between
the soldiers and the Jungle Commando and wished to vote in an
atmosphere free of intimidation. However, months later,
elements of both the army and the Jungle Commando remained in
central, eastern, and southeastern Suriname. The Jungle
Commando reportedly extorted gold from miners in southeastern
Suriname, many of them Brazilian, and its members frequently
demanded tribute from villages they passed through. On June
21, armed members of the Mandela group kidnaped four Maroon
gold miners in the vicinity of the village of Kwakugron in
Brokopondo district and held them for ransom. Three days
later, after protests from leading Maroon figures and human
rights groups, the four men, one of whom had become seriously
ill while in captivity, were freed, but only after their
relatives paid the Mandela group ransom in gold.
Despite an October 1990 promise by Army Commander Bouterse that
soldiers responsible for the September 25, 1990, burning of
over 20 dwellings in the Maroon village of Botopasi would be
punished and the villagers compensated for their losses, no
such action was taken during 1991.
741
SURINAME
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and of the press are provided for by the
Constitution, but these rights were limited for various reasons
during 1991. During most of the year the military-backed
Government exercised firm control over the content of news
broadcasts on state-owned television and radio stations.
Furthermore, during the tenure of the interim regime, news
about government activities became more difficult for the media
to obtain, as regime Vice President Jules Wijdenbosch took the
decision to centralize the release of government information in
his office, which effectively muzzled the various ministries as
sources of news.
In February the news director of one of the country's two
television stations, both of which are government-owned, was
removed from her position and replaced by a relative and
supporter of the interim vice president following the news
director's airing of the arrival remarks of the new U.S.
Ambassador, which included criticism of the December military
coup. Manipulation by the interim Government of the
state-owned media in the interests of the promilitary NDP was
extensive during the political campaign that led up to the May
25 election. During all but the last few days of the campaign,
the television stations refused to run political advertisements
other than those of the NDP, which were run repeatedly.
The press and private radio stations, while occasionally
critical of the promilitary interim Government, generally
appeared to have practiced self-censorship. This was
attributable, at least in part, to intimidation. Journalists
disclosed that they were aware of many unfavorable developments
involving either the military or the interim regime it
supported, but believed they could not report them for fear of
reprisals. For example, one of the private radio stations
received a "friendly" telephone call from a military
spokesperson, warning about possible trouble due to the
station's broadcast of dispatches from a correspondent in the
Netherlands. The station thereafter dropped the
correspondent's reports. One human rights organization
reported that the newspaper De West refused to run an
advertisement submitted by a group protesting official
involvement in drug trafficking, although De West did print
other advertisements by the group which were critical of the
Government .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right to assemble peaceably and to form associations for
nonviolent purposes is protected constitutionally, and these
rights are respected in practice. Official registration is
required in many instances and is generally granted. Most
large public meetings require a permit, and these are routinely
granted. Electoral campaign rallies by all parties were
permitted and held without incident, with the exception of the
cancellation by organizers of several public meetings scheduled
to be held by parties other than the promilitary NDP in areas
of the country under the control of the Tucajana Amazone
Amerindian group, due to Tucajana intimidation and a lack of
security.
742
SURINAME
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is respected in Suriname. Foreign clergy
are allowed to minister to both local and expatriate
congregations, and missionaries enter the country freely to
proselytize. Religious groups maintain international contacts,
freely organize trips abroad, and publish periodicals.
Adherence to a particular faith is neither a bar to, nor
advantage in, political, economic, or social activity.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Surinamers may change their residence and workplace freely and
travel abroad as they wish. Political dissidents who emigrated
to the Netherlands and elsewhere during the years of military
rule were publicly invited by a political adviser of the Army
Commander to return to Suriname, and the names of a number of
prominent opponents of the military were stricken from the list
of those wanted by the authorities, but few exiles chose to
return. Citizenship is not revoked for political reasons.
There were no known instances in which refugees were forced to
return to countries in which they feared persecution.
Travel to the interior remains limited in practice due to the
precarious security situation, although many areas which had
been virtually inaccessible to travelers opened up as a result
of the interim regime's agreement with four so-called illegal
armed groups to allow access to anyone having election-related
business in the interior. Even during the election campaign,
however, access to areas controlled by the Tucajana Amazone
Amerindian group, chiefly in central and western Suriname,
remained extremely limited. Despite the Tucaj anas' formal
adherence to the agreement cited above, members of political
parties other than the NDP and some election observers,
including those from the Organization of American States, were
denied access to these areas during the election campaign.
Local government officials and civilian police were also barred
from entering Tucaj ana-control led territory; several of them,
including the District Commissioner of Para, filed official
reports detailing incidents of harassment and intimidation by
the Tucaj anas.
Despite the cessation of fighting in the interior, the removal
of several army checkpoints on major roads leading to interior
areas, and a public relations campaign by the military centered
around the theme of "national reconciliation," 8,000-10,000
Surinamese refugees, predominately Maroon, remained in French
Guiana along the Surinamese border throughout 1991; of these,
6,400 resided in official camps administered by the French
Government since 1986. Some refugees reportedly decided to
remain in the camps for fear of losing the opportunity to apply
for permanent resident status in French Guiana. Others remain
fearful of what they believe to be the unstable security
situation in eastern Suriname and of possible retaliation by
the military for suspected connections with the insurgency.
An agreement between the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and a Dutch Roman Catholic charitable
organization to implement a pilot project of support for
repatriates was signed in March. Destruction during the
internal conflict of the small amount of infrastructure that
once existed in eastern Suriname is a major disincentive to
repatriation, and the UNHCR has recognized the reconstruction
of basic facilities in the area as a priority need.
743
SURINAME
In November, the French Government announced a refugee
resettlement incentive of approximately $800 for adults and
$400 for children choosing to return to their homeland.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Constitution stipulates that power and authority rest with
the people and provides for the right to change the government
peacefully through the direct election by secret ballot of a
National Assembly of 51 members every 5 years. This right was
suspended by the military by its December 24, 1990, coup
d'etat. Although the army agreed with civilian leaders to
permit a new election in May, the fact remains that the
Government democratically elected to a 5-year term of office by
a popular vote in November 1987 was arbitrarily terminated by
the military.
The May 25 general election was widely praised by international
observers as generally free and fair. However, due to a
lengthy and complex process of verifying the result and failure
by the new National Assembly on two occasions to elect a
President by the required two-thirds vote, the election of the
President by the United People's Assembly did not occur until
September 6, with the inauguration of the President taking
place 10 days later. This delay meant that the country was
ruled by a nonelected, interim government for the first 8 1/2
months of the year .
The interim government used the powers of office to promote the
electoral campaign of the ruling, promilitary NDP by dispensing
government largess to influence voters and manipulating the
state-owned media. Some observers believe this was, in fact,
the strategy behind the coup: to use the time the interim
government had in office to launch a populist program which
would make the previous democratically elected government
appear ineffectual by comparison. The regime carried out major
public works projects, granted a generous wage increase to
civil servants, attempted to enforce price controls and
restrain the black market, and increased imports of popular
foodstuffs at subsidized prices. This free-spending approach
proved popular with many voters, particularly in poorer areas,
and resulted in NDP electoral gains, but left the new
democratic Government with a large budget deficit and an
exhausted foreign exchange reserve.
The Constitution provides for the existence of political
parties, and 16 parties of widely differing ideologies and
programs competed for votes on the May 25 ballot. There are no
special conditions or restrictions on nationality or
citizenship that limit participation in the political system.
In practice, however, the less educated Maroons and Amerindians
of the interior are largely outside the legal political process.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Several local private human rights groups carried on their work
in Suriname during 1990. Two groups were especially active and
vocal in their criticism of the military coup and the policies
of the promilitary regime — Moiwana '86 headed by Suriname 's
leading human rights activist, Stanley Rensch, and the
Organization for Justice and Peace. The official National
Institute for Human Rights was not very active during the
744
SURINAME
year. Representatives of the International Committee of the
Red Cross visited Paramaribo and areas of the interior in 1991,
as did a team from Americas Watch and Caribbean Rights, which
published a lengthy and highly critical report based on its
findings .
Although the authorities have repeatedly expressed a
willingness to cooperate with international and domestic human
rights groups, there has been little if any progress toward
implementing these groups' recommendations to investigate past
atrocities and disappearances, owing primarily to the
unwillingness of the army to permit any serious inquiry. Human
rights groups renewed these recommendations following the
return to democratic government in September. Since the
Government had reached no settlement with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights to compensate victims of past
abuses, the Inter-American Human Rights Court was expected to
hear two cases dating from 1987 and 1988 on December 2 (see
Section 1 . a. ) .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination is prohibited by the Constitution and is rare in
Suriname's multiracial society. Ethnic consciousness remains
strong among all groups, however. There is no evidence that
Maroons and Amerindians confront overt de facto
discrimination. However, because of inadequate basic
educational, medical, and other inf rastructural facilities in
the interior of the country, residents such as Maroons and
Amerindians are likely to be disadvantaged from an early age in
terms of integrating into Suriname's urban society.
As noted in Section l.f., Guyanese citizens frequently
complained of discrimination, particularly by law enforcement
officials but also in the areas of housing and employment.
Guyanese asserted that they are often singled out for
harassment by officials due to their language (English) and
immigration and social status.
Women have a legal right to equal access to education,
employment, and property. However, social pressures and
customs inhibit the full exercise of these rights, particularly
in the areas of marriage and inheritance. Surinamese law does
not differentiate between domestic violence and general assault
cases, and the Government has not taken steps to address the
problem of violence against women in Surinamese society. The
privately funded Foundation Home for Women in Crisis Situations
in Paramaribo has rooms for battered and abused women and their
children, who are brought to the home by private and religious
organizations. The home's rooms are continually filled with
women from all the major ethnic groups, an indication that
violence against women is prevalent. Plans to expand the
facility are in abeyance due to lack of funds, and the
Government has declined requests to support the Foundation.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Suriname's Constitution protects the right of workers to
associate and to choose their representatives democratically.
This right is exercised energetically, and about one half of
the work force is organized. Unions are independent of the
Government and play an active role in politics. Though not
745
SURINAME
legally protected, strikes and other labor actions by civil
servants are permitted in practice. The right of nongovernment
employees to strike is protected by the Constitution, and
during 1991 labor officials reported no instances of
interference with the exercise of this right. Notable strikes
during the year included those by employees of the stated-owned
shipping company SMS (in May), the National Aviation Service
(May), the Jarikaba Banana Company (June), and the state-owned
lumber company Bruynzeel (July) . Surinamese trade unions are
permitted to maintain contacts with regional and international
labor associations.
The labor movement is a powerful political force. The umbrella
labor organization Ravaksur (Council of Trade Union Federations
of Suriname) issued a statement strongly condemning the
December 24, 1990, military coup. The Suriname Labor Party, a
relatively small political party which is independent of the
union movement but includes the chairmen of two of the most
influential labor federations (C-47 and the Public Service
Unions) in its leadership, contested the May general election
as part of a coalition with the three traditional, ethnic-based
parties known as the New Front for Democracy and Development.
Following the New Front's electoral victory, three members of
the Suriname Labor Party were named to the Cabinet.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is explicitly
recognized by the Constitution and was respected in practice in
1991. Collective bargaining agreements cover approximately 50
percent of the labor force. Surinamese law prohibits antiunion
discrimination by employers, and there are effective mechanisms
for resolving complaints of such discrimination. There are no
special economic zones in Suriname.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by the Constitution,
and there were no known instances of this practice in 1991.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal age for employment of children is 15 years. The
Ministry of Labor and the police are responsible for enforcing
this law. There were few complaints of violations in 1991.
Persons under age 15 are occasionally employed as street
vendors, newspaper sellers, and shop assistants. Most such
employment generally occurs after school hours. Education is
compulsory until the age of 12.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Suriname has no legislated private sector minimum wage rate.
However, the Government sets a minimum wage for janitorial
personnel and other unskilled labor, which does not provide a
decent living for a worker and family. Work in excess of 9
hours per day or 45 hours per week on a regular basis requires
special government permission, which is routinely granted.
Such overtime work is payable at a premium. Occupational
safety and health regulations are set by law and sporadically
enforced by a small inspectorate of the Occupational Health and
Safety Division of the Ministry of Labor. Statistics on
accident rates in local industry are not current, but the level
is not considered to be high. Occupational safety in the key
bauxite sector, for example, is considered outstanding.
746
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Trinidad and Tobago, a member of the Commonwealth of Nations,
is a parliamentary democracy in which political and civil
rights are provided for by the Constitution and generally
respected in practice. Free and fair general elections have
been held at regular intervals since independence from the
United Kingdom in 1962. The country is governed by a bicameral
Parliament and a Prime Minister from the lower house.
The Police Force and the Defence Force are under the control of
and generally responsive to civilian authority. However,
credible allegations of police brutality and corruption
continued in 1991. The legal system provides measures for
redress for the complainants in such cases.
The country's mixed economy is based primarily on the
hydrocarbon sector, but efforts continue to diversify the
economy into agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism. Many
major industries are either wholly or partially owned by the
Government. There is a strong parallel tradition of private
enterprise and ownership of property, however, and the
Government is committed to partial divestiture of most state
enterprises .
Trinidad and Tobago citizens have and exercise a wide range of
freedoms and individual rights, but there continued to be
incidents of the use of excessive force and other abuses by the
police.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports during 1991 of killings for political
motives by the Government or other political organizations.
However, there were credible allegations of abuses of
authority. In the first 11 months of 1991 there were at least
15 police shootings, 10 of which resulted in deaths. In one
case, charges were filed against a police officer in the
shooting death of David Agard, an off-duty security guard, in
January. In November a witness for the prosecution reported
receiving death threats through the mail prior to his scheduled
appearance in court. Relatives of Agard filed a civil suit for
damages against the Attorney General and the accused officer.
A second suit for damages was filed against the Attorney
General by relatives of a man (Deo Ramlogan) who was shot dead
by police on October 2.
The law requires a public coroner's inquest in a case of death
by unnatural causes only when a coroner finds the circumstances
warrant it; otherwise it is not mandatory. In practice,
inc[uests are seldom pursued. There is an internal
investigations unit within the police service. However, there
are no mandatory internal police investigations of police
shootings or killings.
Njisane Omowale, the 19-year-old stepson of Yasin Abu Bakr
(leader of the Jamaat al Muslimeen, who launched the failed
coup in July 1990) died from gunshot wounds in his
grandmother's house the day the coup collapsed (see the 1990
Country Reports). The house was stormed by a police inspector
and eight armed officers, and Omowale was shot in the leg and
747
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
died on the scene from loss of blood. Police claimed they had
opened fire in response to shots from within; however, no
weapons or ammunition were found on the premises. A newspaper
subsequently reported that witnesses in neighboring houses had
been threatened by police and offered passports by men in
uniform so that they could leave the country and thus not
testify at a preliminary inquest. After several days of
testimony, the magistrate at the 1990 preliminary inquest
dismissed the case, stating "there are no grounds for
suspecting anyone is guilty" (of Omowale's death). An appeal
to reopen the inquest was filed, and a judicial review was
granted. A determination of whether to pursue the inquest is
not expected until late January.
b. Disappearance
There was a possible disappearance case reported by the media
in 1991. Doodnath Dwarika, a 24-year-old man, was alleged to
have been detained by police in November 1990; although no
charges were filed, records show he was taken to several area
police stations for questioning and that he was treated in the
casualty department of the local hospital after an apparent
beating. His current whereabouts are not known, and police
have declined to provide further information regarding the
case.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution forbids such treatment, and, under law, any
evidence obtained by such means is inadmissible in court.
However, during 1991 there continued to be credible allegations
and charges in the courts that some police officers had
physically abused detainees. The law permits victims of such
treatment to sue for civil damages and to file criminal charges
against the individual police officer involved, and such suits
are occasionally initiated. The courts sometimes find in favor
of the complainant, in which case damages can be collected;
police officers found guilty of misconduct are subject to
disciplinary action. In one suit filed in 1991, Edmund
Phillips alleged that while he was in police custody he was
kicked and beaten about the head, neck, wrist, abdomen, and
testicles and was suspended in the air with his hands tied. In
February Phillips filed a suit against two police officers and
the Attorney General. For undisclosed reasons, the summons has
not been served on the Attorney General, and the case remained
at a standstill at year's end.
Trinidad and Tobago courts sentence convicted felons to
corporal punishment as well as prison sentences in
approximately 50 cases a year. Men convicted of rape, assault
with a deadly weapon, or aggravated robbery are subject to
flogging administered in private by prison officials. The
naked prisoner is secured facedown to a bench and whipped
across the buttocks with a freshly cut rod of tamarind wood.
Floggings consist of 10-20 strokes, and a prison doctor is
present throughout the proceedings. Severe prison overcrowding
exists in the Carrera prison, with seven prisoners to a cell
designed for two in many cases. Construction of a new
maximum-security prison was under way at year's end, and
programs for community service in lieu of incarceration for
minor offenses were under study.
748
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution specifies that a suspect has the right to be
"informed promptly" of the reason for arrest or detention,
which in practice has normally meant within 48 hours. Court
orders may be obtained by the police to hold a person longer
than normal to gather more evidence. However, there are
recurring credible reports that persons have been detained
incommunicado for up to 6 days or longer prior to the filing of
any charges, without the police having obtained a court order.
Arrests without a warrant are permitted when a person is
apprehended committing an offense or when reasonable suspicion
exists that an offense has been or is about to be committed. A
court ruling in 1991 held that police must allow a person in
police custody to contact an attorney "as early as possible,
and in any event before any interrogation takes place."
Detainees generally are allowed access to a lawyer, if one is
requested, and to family members, but police sometimes deny
access if they believe it would impede an investigation. There
continue to be recurring charges in the courts and press that
the police have violated one or more of these procedures in
several cases. Persons arrested have the right to a judicial
determination of the legality of the detention, and courts have
found for the complainant in some cases of illegal detention.
In July Elaine Theodora Bailey, mother-in-law of Yasin Abu Bakr
and grandmother of Njisane Omowale (see Section l.a.), sued the
Attorney General and the Police Commissioner for damages for
personal injuries, wrongful arrest, false imprisonment,
detention of goods, and damage to property caused by wrongful
entry into her home relative to an incident in April 1990 in
which she was taken into custody by police and interrogated
over a period of 44 hours prior to being released without
charge. She filed a second suit for damages relative to the
incident in which her grandson was killed.
Preventive detention may be authorized by the Minister of
Justice and National Security in order to prevent actions
prejudicial to public safety, public order, or the defense of
Trinidad and Tobago. The Minister must state the grounds for
the detention. A detainee under this provision has access to
counsel and may have his detention reviewed by a three-member
tribunal established by the Chief Justice and chaired by an
attorney. The Minister must provide to the tribunal the
grounds for the detention within 7 days of the detainee's
request for review, which shall be held "as soon as reasonably
practicable" following receipt of the grounds. The Minister
may at his discretion revoke detention orders on the basis of
the tribunal's recommendations.
There were no instances of preventive detention in 1991;
however, in the case of the Jamaat al-Muslimeen, the group
which launched the July 1990 coup attempt, 114 members filed a
suit claiming that their detention was illegal and the criminal
charges filed against them were unconstitutional because they
were granted an amnesty prior to their surrender. The case was
argued before the Privy Council in London in November; the
Privy Council determined that the matter of the amnesty must be
heard prior to proceeding with the civil and criminal cases
against the Jamaat al-Muslimeen.
The practice of exile is illegal and does not exist.
749
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution specifies that accused persons receive a fair
and public trial. The judiciary is independent and not subject
to outside interference. Appeals may be made to the Court of
Appeals and eventually to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in London. Under common law practice, defendants enjoy
a presumption of innocence and the right to confront witnesses
and present evidence. These rights are generally respected in
practice.
All accused persons have the right to an attorney. Legal
assistance is available from attorneys registered with the
Legal Aid and Advisory Authority (LAAA) of the Ministry of
Social Development and Family Services for persons who
demonstrate that they cannot afford representation. Judges may
also appoint attorneys in the courtroom to represent defendants
without counsel. The attorneys may then file claims for their
services with the LAAA. The LAAA provides aid and advice in
criminal as well as civil matters to both adult and juvenile
defendants .
An accused person may be freed on bail pending trial, unless
charged with murder or treason or detained under State of
Emergency regulations. The presiding magistrate may suspend
bail after consultation with the prosecution and defense.
Despite continuing attention by government officials, the
judiciary, and the bar association to the large backlog of
cases awaiting trial or appeal, there remain significant delays
in bringing cases to trial and in processing appeals.
There are no political prisoners in Trinidad and Tobago.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution prohibits such interference, a prohibition
generally respected in practice. By law, judicially issued
warrants are required for searches, except under State of
Emergency regulations; in practice, this procedure is not
strictly adhered to.
The state-owned telephone company has the ability to monitor
telephone calls, and informed observers believe that the police
use this facility for domestic intelligence purposes. There
are no laws authorizing such taps, however, so evidence
obtained in this manner may not be used in court. Legislation
is being considered which would make it permissible to monitor
telephone conversations under certain circumstances.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of expression, and this
right is protected in practice by the country's independent
judiciary, a democratic and pluralistic political system, and
independent and privately owned media. Academic freedom is
respected and is protected by law.
The import or circulation of publications may be prohibited
under the Sedition Act if they are deemed to have a seditious
intention, but the law has rarely been invoked in recent
years. A Board of Film Censors is authorized to ban films it
considers to be against public order and decency, or
750
- TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
contrary to the public interest. This includes films which may
be controversial in matters of religion, seditious propaganda,
or race.
Trinidad and Tobago Television (TTT) is government owned. Its
coverage is generally unbiased, although the opposition has
claimed in the past that programming on government-sponsored
activities, identified as NAR (the ruling National Alliance for
Reconstruction) initiatives, gives the NAR an unfair political
advantage. An award-winning 1989 documentary, which included
allegations of corruption within the previous PNM
administration, was broadcast on June 17, prompting opposition
charges of political motivation. CCN, a privately owned
television station, commenced broadcasting on September 15, and
another station was scheduled to begin operation by year's end.
Only one of Trinidad and Tobago's four radio stations is
government owned. Eleven new licenses were granted in 1990,
including radio, television, and cable television; one cable
franchise plans to carry 30 channels. Two new radio stations
are scheduled to commence broadcasting by year's end.
Some journalists have complained privately that the
interlocking directorates of local corporations results in
self-censorship by publishers. The two major daily newspapers
are sometimes critical of the Government in their editorials.
Their news coverage appears to report accurately criticism by
opposition parties and trade unions. The widely read tabloids
are extremely critical of the Government. In 1990 the High
Court ruled that the Government infringed on a newspaper
publisher's right to freedom of the press through its refusal
to grant foreign exchange for the purchase of sufficient
newsprint. The newspaper in question is generally critical of
the Government. The Government is appealing that decision.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are protected by law and respected in practice.
Registration of private organizations is not required. Permits
are required in advance for street marches, demonstrations, or
other public outdoor meetings, and are routinely granted.
c. Freedom of Religion
The right to practice one's religion is provided for by the
Constitution and is respected in practice. There is no state
religion and no religious test for public office. There are
large groups of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in the
population, and these and other religious groups are allowed to
maintain association with organizations and persons in other
countries and to perform religious travel. Religious groups
are generally free to establish places of worship and to engage
in religious training, education, and publishing. A perceived
favoritism in the appropriation of funding for Christian
(primarily Catholic ) schools to the neglect of Hindu schools
was addressed by the Government during the year.
Missionaries are permitted to enter the country and
proselytize. Conversion from one religion to another is not
hindered. Licensing of religious organizations is not required.
751
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no arbitrary restrictions on emigration or travel
either within or outside the country, nor on the changing of
residence or workplace.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The citizens of Trinidad and Tobago choose their government by
secret ballot in free and fair multiparty, multicandidate
elections held, as required by the Constitution, at intervals
not to exceed 5 years. Elections for the 12-member Tobago
House of Assembly are held every 4 years. The Constitution
allows citizens, as well as legal residents with citizenship in
other Commonwealth countries, who are at least 18 years of age,
to vote; there are no restrictions on the participation of
women in political activities. The Government is formed by the
party holding the majority of seats in the lower house of
Parliament. The Parliament consists of two houses: an elected
House of Representatives whose 36 members represent individual
voting constituencies, and a 31-member Senate appointed by the
President, 16 on the advice of the Prime Minister, 6 on the
advice of the leader of the opposition, and 9 at the
President's discretion. The Prime Minister is the Head of
Government; the President, elected by Parliament, is the Head
of State.
Prior to December 1986, each election had been won by the
People's National Movement (PNM). The election of the National
Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) Government on December 15,
1986 marked the first change in political power in 24 years of
independence. In elections held December 16, 1991, the PNM
(traditionally identified with Af ro-Trinidadians) won 21 of the
36 parliamentary seats, thus returning to power after a 5-year
hiatus. The United National Congress (traditionally, the
Indo-Trinidadian Party) won 13 seats, and the NAR carried only
Tobago's two seats.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Besides the judiciary, which acts on legal cases involving
charges of human rights violations, there is an Ombudsman, an
officer of Parliament, who is empowered to investigate
complaints of violations of law or policy and to report the
findings to Parliament. There is also a nongovernmental Bureau
of Human Rights, which was established by a local attorney and
focuses on areas of interest and concern to him. Founded in
1990, Caribbean Elections Watch promotes free and fair
elections in the Caribbean. The Caribbean Institute for the
Promotion of Human Rights is headquartered in Port of Spain.
This regional organization is composed of human rights
activists who seek to collect information from throughout the
region and report on Caribbean human rights matters.
International human rights organizations are free to visit and
discuss human rights with governmental and nongovernmental
representatives .
752
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no evidence of systematic official discrimination
based on race, sex, language, or social status in Trinidad and
Tobago. All persons are fully protected under provisions of
the Constitution. Trinidad and Tobago includes various ethnic
and religious groups that live together peacefully, generally
respecting each other's beliefs and practices.
There is occasional racial tension between Af ro-Tr inidadians
and Indo-Tr inidadians, who each comprise over 40 percent of the
population. The private sector is dominated by Indo-
Trinidadians and people of European descent. Indo-Trinidadians
also predominate in agriculture. Af ro-Trinidadians are
employed in disproportionate numbers in the civil service,
police, and military. Until the NAR came to power in 1986,
government cabinets had been predominantly composed of
Af ro-Tr inidadians . Since Indo-Trinidadians are the majority in
rural areas and Af ro-Trinidadians are the majority in urban
areas, competition between town and country for public goods
and services takes on racial overtones. Some Indo-Trinidadian
opposition politicians have complained that Af ro-Tr inidadians
receive a disproportionate share of government benefits.
Discrimination on the basis of sex is illegal. Many women hold
positions in the government, civil service, political party
leadership, business, and the professions. Women's groups
speak out publicly on all aspects of public life. Women make
up approximately 36 percent of the paid labor force, and
collective bargaining agreements cannot be registered with the
Industrial Court if they exhibit wage disparities between men
and women .
Although there are no reliable statistics, physical abuse of
women by family members appears to be extensive, as does child
abuse. Parliament passed a domestic violence bill in August
1991 to address these issues; among other things, the bill
provides for the filing of restraining orders on abusive family
members, a court hearing within 7 days of filing, and criminal
penalties for violation of restraining orders. There are
several privately operated shelters for battered women which
receive a minimal amount of governmental assistance.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of association is respected in law and practice. An
estimated 24 percent of the work force is organized into 45
labor unions. The unions are independent of government or
political party control, and they freely represent their
members' interests. Union members are free to choose their own
representatives, and unions are free to publicize their views
and determine their own programs and policies. The majority of
the unions are grouped into two labor confederations, the
larger of which is the Trinidad and Tobago Labor Congress
(TTLC) . In June the TTLC joined with the Council of
Progressive Trade Unions (CPTU), which is affiliated with the
Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions, to form
the National Trade Union Center (NATUC) . Both the TTLC and
CPTU have committed themselves to dissolve by June 1992, but
have not yet resolved the question of international affiliation.
753
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Workers are permitted, upon expiration of a conciliation
period, to strike, and employers are permitted to lock workers
out. After a strike or lockout has gone on for 3 months,
either of the parties involved may request the Minister of
Labor to refer the question to the Industrial Court, which is
part of the independent judiciary, for a binding decision.
Strikes and lockouts are not permitted in essential public
services, and the Minister of Labor may apply for an injunction
to halt any labor action he finds contrary to the national
interest; in practice, this has never happened. Workers in
essential services with labor grievances may call on the
conciliation services of the Ministry of Labor or may take
their cases directly to the Industrial Court. However, such
cases are not generally processed any more quickly than those
in the private sector. Workers in essential services may also
file civil suits against the Government.
During the year there were numerous strike actions and
threatened actions by various unions in the public and private
sectors, some of which included brief episodes of violence.
Public sector employees pressed for reinstatement of cost of
living allowances and payment of arrears, in some cases dating
as far back as 1983; employees in the private sector sought to
block the proposed partial divestment of state-owned
enterprises, particularly in the hydrocarbon sector. While
some disputes were settled through arbitration by year's end,
resolution of other outstanding issues was held in abeyance
pending the outcome of the December 16 national elections.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The constitutional right of workers to organize and bargain
collectively is well established and freely practiced. In
fact, collective bargaining is the predominant method by which
wage levels are established in most industries. Antiunion
discrimination is prohibited by law, and trade union property,
as other private property, is protected under law. The
Ministry of Labor acts as an impartial conciliator in
collective bargaining impasses. There are a few complaints
each year to the Minister of Labor about private antiunion
activities, usually involving the suspension or dismissal of an
employee who alleges the action was taken at least in part
because of union activity. The Ministry of Labor is generally
able to resolve those cases brought to it.
Legislation for the establishment of free trade zones, enacted
by Parliament in 1988, is currently being implemented. The
legislation primarily addresses issues such as exchange
control, customs procedures, duties payable, and exemption from
the Foreign Investments Act in free trade zones. All Trinidad
and Tobago laws, inclusive of those affecting working
conditions and the right of workers to organize and bargain
collectively, are applicable in free trade zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced labor in Trinidad and Tobago. Although
there is no domestic legislation on this matter, Trinidad and
Tobago is a party to the relevant International Labor
Organization conventions.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Legislation prohibits the employment of children under the age
of 12 years, and children aged 12 to 14 years are permitted to
754
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
work only in family businesses. Children may begin
apprenticeships at age 15 and regular employment at age 17.
The probation service within the Ministry of Social Development
and Family Services is the entity responsible for compliance.
Education is compulsory until the age of 12 years. Enforcement
of these restrictions appears lax. School-age children are
often seen vending on the streets. In practice, if parents do
not have the funds to buy books and uniforms, their children do
not attend school.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There are minimum wage rates for selected service sectors —
domestic employees, retail assistants, gasoline station
attendants, and hotel and restaurant employees. New
legislation is under consideration which would broaden the
slate of workers covered by minimum wage standards. Wage
levels in other sectors are covered under collective bargaining
agreements and provide a decent living for workers and their
families. The poorest paid workers usually have secondary
sources of support, often from their families. The standard
workweek in Trinidad and Tobago is 40 hours; the minimum wage
law defines a 40-hour week for workers who fall within its
jurisdiction, while collective bargaining agreements set the
standards in other industrial and service sectors. Additional
hours are considered overtime and remunerated at a negotiated
rate. Daily rest periods and paid annual leave form part of
most employment agreements. There are no legal restrictions on
overtime work.
Occupational health and safety is governed by the 1948
Factories Ordinance Bill, which sets requirements for health
and safety standards in certain industries and provides for
inspections to monitor and enforce compliance. The Government
enforces compliance with health and safety regulations,
although such enforcement is sporadic due to a shortage of
inspectors. Trade union representatives also monitor
compliance. Workers who file complaints with the Ministry of
Labor regarding illegal or hazardous working conditions are
protected under the Industrial Relations Act of 1972 to the
extent that, should it be determined upon inspection that
conditions exist in the workplace which present hazards to life
or limb, the worker is absolved in refusing to comply with an
order which would have placed him or her in harm's way. Beyond
that, it is the right of management "to manage and to manage
effectively." Government inspectors investigate complaints of
hazardous working conditions.
755
URUGUAY
Uruguay is a constitutional republic governed by an elected
president and a bicameral legislature with an independent
judicial branch. Its longstanding democratic tradition was
interrupted by 12 years of military rule from 1973 to 1985. On
March 1, 1990, following a free and fair election in November
1989, power was transferred from one elected civilian president
to another for the first time since the return to
constitutional government in 1985. Political parties, the
press, labor unions, private interest groups, and other
nongovernmental groups function freely, and political debate is
vigorous and unrestricted.
Uruguay's small military establishment consists of an army, air
force, and navy. It is under the supervision of the Ministry
of Defense. The military does not participate in domestic
security matters unless ordered to do so by the civilian
authorities. Domestic security and public safety matters are
under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry, which
administers all the country's police departments.
Uruguay is a middle income country with a per capita gross
domestic product of $2,751 in 1990. Its economy is heavily
dependent on agricultural exports and agroindustry . The
economy is a mixture of private enterprise and state entities.
Private property rights are respected. Following a short
period of rapid growth in the mid-1980s, the economy, which
subsequently experienced negligible growth for several years,
revived slightly and grew an estimated 2.5 percent in gross
national product in 1991. In an attempt to reverse long-term
economic stagnation, the Administration of President Luis
Alberto Lacalle is trying to implement sweeping reforms
designed to increase investment, reduce the fiscal deficit,
contain inflation, and privatize certain government-owned
companies .
Uruguayans continue to enjoy a broad range of individual rights
and liberties. Violence against women attracted increasing
public attention, while latent discrimination against the black
minority remained a largely unrecognized and unaddressed
problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No cases of politically motivated killing were reported, but
there was one instance of alleged extrajudicial killing
(see Section I.e.).
b. Disappearance
No known or reported incidents of politically motivated
abductions or disappearances occurred in 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits brutal treatment of prisoners.
However, there were recurrent but unsubstantiated reports of
physical abuse of detainees by police officers. In July a
detainee who had implicated three police officers as
50-726 - 92 - 25
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URUGUAY
accomplices in a series of robberies was found hanged in the
bathroom of the jail where the accused officers worked. An
administrative error had led to his return to jail after he had
testified against the officers; the judge investigating the
case had ordered that the detainee be transferred to another
jail. Following an internal affairs investigation and autopsy,
details of which were publicized, Uruguayan authorities
concluded that the death was a suicide. The dead man's family
and friends claimed that he was murdered. It remained unclear
whether they would pursue legal action. As a result of alleged
physical torture and mistreatment in connection with an arrest
occurring on November 1, police arrested and charged two agents
of the narcotics brigade, who remained under administrative and
judicial investigation at year's end. Authorities also
suspended the agents' immediate supervisor and ordered the
temporary removal of the chief of the narcotics brigade.
Generally poor conditions in the Uruguayan prison system have
given rise to charges of prisoner neglect and mistreatment.
Prisoners suffer from inadeguate professional supervision,
insufficient exercise and rehabilitation training, and lack of
medical attention. Although conditions in the maximum security
prison of Libertad improved after the appointment of a new
warden in December 1990, there were 2 suicides and at least 20
attempted suicides during the first 8 months of 1991 in the
juvenile detention system . In addition, deficiencies in the
state psychiatric hospital system have led to claims of patient
neglect. Uruguayan authorities recognize the problems in the
penal system and have made efforts to correct them, but
available resources have been insufficient to provide
significant improvement.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution reguires the police to have a written warrant
issued by a judge before they can make an arrest. The only
exception is when the accused is apprehended during the
commission of a crime. The Constitution also guarantees an
accused the right to a judicial determination of the legality
of detention and reguires that the detaining authority explain
and justify to the judiciary the legal grounds for the
detention. A detainee may be held incommunicado by the police
for a period of 24 hours before being presented to a judge, at
which time he or she has a right to counsel. If the detainee
cannot afford a lawyer, a public defender is appointed. The
judge must begin the judicial process within 48 hours of an
arrest. Failure to comply with this 48-hour rule has led to
the release of accused persons. If the crime carries a penalty
of at least 2 years in prison, the accused person is confined
during the judge's investigation unless the authorities agree
to release him or her on bail, or until the case is closed.
These constitutional provisions are generally respected in
practice .
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, headed
by a Supreme Court, which in turn supervises the work of the
lower courts. There is a parallel military court system under
the Military Justice Code, and the law provides for two
military justices on the Supreme Court who participate only in
cases involving the military. Military justice is applicable
to civilians only during a state of war or insurrection. The
independence of the judiciary is well respected in practice.
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URUGUAY
All trials must open with a public statement of the charge by
the prosecutor or the complainant. Trial proceedings are based
on written arguments, which are not normally made public, and
the defense attorney has access to all documents that form part
of the written record. Beginning in 1990 the Uruguayan legal
system began to introduce oral arguments into court
proceedings. .Under Uruguayan law, there is no provision
against self-incrimination, and the defendant may be compelled
to answer any questions posed by the judge. All sentences may
be appealed by the defense attorney or prosecutor to a higher
court which may acquit the person of the crime, let the
sentence stand, or reduce or increase the sentence.
Uruguay has no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution protects the right to privacy. It states that
the home, absolutely inviolable at night, may be entered and
searched only with a legal warrant during the day. Protection
for private papers and correspondence is equally strong, and a
warrant is required for confiscation. These rights and
safeguards are generally respected in practice.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press. All
elements of the political spectrum freely express their
viewpoints in both the print and broadcast media. Montevideo
has 5 daily newspapers and 10 important weeklies; there are
approximately 115 weekly newspapers in the interior of the
country. Montevideo has 3 commercial television stations and
about 30 radio stations, while Uruguay as a whole has
approximately 110 radio stations and 20 television stations.
The National University is autonomous, and academic freedom is
generally respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly and association are protected by law.
Formerly banned groups, such as the Tupamaros, freely organize
and express their opinions. Public marches and demonstrations
are allowed with permits from the Ministry of the Interior and
occur without official harassment or intimidation.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion, provided for by the Constitution, is
respected in practice. Most Uruguayans who practice a religion
are Roman Catholic. Members of other religious groups exercise
their faiths unhindered, and missionaries are free to
proselytize. Uruguayans who profess agnosticism or atheism
express their views freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Internal and foreign travel and emigration are unrestricted.
Uruguayans who left the country during the military regime and
wish to return are encouraged to do so. All of the prominent
political figures exiled by the military regime have returned.
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URUGUAY
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Uruguayan citizens have the right and ability peacefully to
change their government. Uruguay is a multiparty democracy
with mandatory universal suffrage for those 18 years of age or
older. Voting is not restricted by race, sex, religion, or
economic status. The Colorado Party, the National (Blanco)
Party, a coalition known as the Broad Front, and the New Space
Coalition are the four major political groupings. Each allows
ideological divisions within the party, and each such division
may field its own slate of candidates in general elections.
The electoral system combines a primary and a general election
in a double simultaneous vote. Each party fields different
lists of candidates; in essence, voters express a preference
for a list rather than an individual candidate as well as vote
for a party.
The winning list of the party that gets the most votes wins the
Presidency and a proportion of seats in the Senate and Chamber
of Deputies corresponding to the percentage of votes that the
party as a whole received. A party therefore may run multiple
presidential candidates, each with his or her own slate of
legislative candidates. National and provincial elections are
held simultaneously every 5 years.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Local human rights groups, some of which could not operate
openly under military rule, now function freely and without
restriction. A prominent local human rights group. Peace and
Justice Service (SERPAJ), was legalized in early 1985 after
operating underground for 2 years during the military regime.
SERPAJ investigates cases involving killing, torture, and
disappearances which occurred during the military regime and
has also become involved in investigating current prison
conditions in Uruguay.
The Government is open to inquiries from such organizations and
does not restrict the activities of human rights
investigators. The Government has also fully complied with
U.N. Human Rights Commission inquiries dating from the military
regime period and is a strong supporter of, and participant in,
human rights activities in international forums such as the
United Nations and Organization of American States.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination based on race, sex, religion, language, or
social status is prohibited by the Constitution and by law, and
there is no evidence of officially sanctioned discrimination.
Approximately 4 percent of Uruguay's population, or 120,000 to
130,000 people, belong to the country's black minority. Blacks
are underrepresented among elite groups and are almost
completely absent from the professional, bureaucratic,
political, and academic sectors of society. They lack the
educational opportunities and social and political connections
necessary for entry into these groups. The Government has not
addressed this issue because most Uruguayans do not believe
that racial discrimination is a problem in Uruguay.
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URUGUAY
Uruguayan women enjoy equality under the law but face a number
of forms of discrimination stemming from traditional attitudes
and practices. For example, in the labor force, service
sectors tend to be sexually segregated with only women working
as supermarket cashiers and only men employed as waiters or
taxi drivers. Women make up approximately one-third of the
work force. Some pursue professional careers. Women attend
the National University in large numbers. However, they are
underrepresented in traditionally male professions such as
engineering or architecture. Women are found at the highest
levels of the Uruguayan private or public sectors, but their
numbers are relatively limited. Conscious of this, the Lacalle
Administration initiated discussions with legislative
authorities on establishing a "National Institute for Women"
which could more effectively address these issues.
Uruguayan society is becoming sensitized to the question of
violence against women. A strong women's rights movement in
Uruguay is bringing increased attention to the problem, and a
statistical base is being developed. The issue of violence
against women is closely linked in the public eye with that of
child abuse, and the Government is expressing increasing
concern about both problems. A Women's Division in the police
force, concerned exclusively with crimes directed agianst
women, has been in existence for 3 years. In late 1991 the
Interior Minister announced plans to merge this division with a
counterpart activity established for cases involving minors in
order to create a more effective division responsible for
family matters within the police force. The penal code
mandates a sentence of from 3 months in jail to 3 years in
prison for the crime of "private violence." A government
agency, the Commission of Women, receives the complaints of
abused women, but many women are unable to make and sustain
such a complaint, especially those who continue to reside with
their partners.
Section 6 VJorker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution guarantees the right of workers to organize
freely and encourages the formation of trade unions. Civil
servants may join unions, as may employees of state-run
enterprises. All labor unions are independent of government
and political party control.
Uruguayan workers, including some civil servants, have the
right to strike and many unions did so during 1991. No
institutionalized mechanism for arbitration or mediation
exists, but the Ministry of Labor and Social Security does
assume the role of mediator on an ad hoc basis.
The Government may legally compel workers to work during a
strike if their work is considered an essential service. The
definition of an essential service is relatively limited,
although in some cases it may exceed International Labor
Organization (ILO) guidelines. In 1991 the "essential
services" provision was invoked to maintain services at
Montevideo's airport during a January general strike. The
essential services provision was invoked twice again during
December strikes at the ANCAP petroleum conglomerate and at the
Montevideo port. ANCAP workers suspended their strike
immediately after the decrees; at the port, workers remained on
strike for several days afterward, and replacement workers
resumed some, but not full, port operations.
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URUGUAY
There are no restrictions on a union's right to affiliate with
international trade union bodies. The largest trade union
confederation, the Inter-Union Workers Assembly-National
Workers Association (PIT-CNT), is by choice not officially
affiliated with any of the three world federations. Many
individual unions are affiliated with international trade
secretariats .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining ceased during military rule. Since the
return of civilian government, industrial contracts have been
negotiated on a sector-wide rather than pi ant -by-plant basis.
These negotiations take place under the auspices of a salary
council, a tripartite organization composed of representatives
from government, labor, and management. Each industrial sector
has its own council. The role played by the Government can
vary from council to council. In some councils, the government
representatives see themselves primarily as arbitrators or
mediators and participate in the negotiations only when there
is an impasse. In others, the government representative is an
active, equal participant in all phases of the negotiations.
The Government must approve labor contracts before they become
legally binding on the parties. Most employers like the
security gained from the council system; most unions like the
eqiaity of wages that result from sector-wide negotiations.
Although the Labor Ministry had stated publicly that the
Government would leave contract negotiations strictly to labor
and management beginning in January 1991, the Government
continued to participate in these discussions during the year.
While no institutionalized mechanism exists in Uruguay for
resolving complaints against employers, discrimination by
employers, including arbitrary dismissal for union activity,
generally is prohibited. If a proposed labor reform law now
under consideration is approved by Parliament, workers could
legally be dismissed for participating in an illegal strike.
Workers employed in the two special export zones are fully
covered by all labor legislation. There are no unions in
either zone, but there are as yet relatively few workers in
traditionally organizable occupations.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law, and there is
no evidence that would indicate its existence in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children are protected by a child labor code. Violations of
the Code are punishable by fines of up to $500. Children under
the age of 15 generally are not employed, but children as young
as 12 may be employed if they have a special government work
permit. Children under the age of 18 may not perform
dangerous, fatiguing, or night work, apart from domestic
employment. Salaries and hours for children are controlled
more strictly than for adults. Children over the age of 16 may
sue in court for payment of wages, and children have the legal
right to dispose of their own income. Children working in the
expanding informal sector as street vendors or others with no
fixed place of work, or in the agrarian sector, are generally
less strictly regulated and receive lower pay.
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URUGUAY
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
A legislated minimiam wage is in effect in both the public and
private sectors. The minimum wage appears to be effectively
enforced and adhered to. Currently, the minimum wage for the
public sector is adjusted every 4 months, while private sector
wages are adjusted on the basis of an inflation "trigger." The
Government is now considering abolishing the linking of wage
increases to the past rate of inflation and instead basing
calculations on an expected declining inflationary trend. A
family dependent on one minimum wage would be living below the
"poverty line" and would be in the poorest 20 percent of the
population.
The standard workweek is 48 hours for a 6-day week. Industrial
workers receive overtime compensation for work in excess of 48
hours. Workers are entitled to 20 days of paid vacation after
a year of employment. Workers are protected by legislation
regulating the health and safety of working conditions; it is
enforced by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security in a
generally effective manner. Some labor regulations cover
urban, industrial workers more adequately than rural and
agricultural workers.
762
VENEZUELA
Venezuela is a republic with an active multiparty democratic
system, a free press, strong labor unions, and a longstanding
commitment to democracy. For more than 30 years, power has
passed peacefully between the two major political parties
through open elections. In 1988 a third party emerged as a
significant political factor.
The security apparatus has civilian and military elements, both
of which are held accountable to popularly elected
authorities. Although the military services focus on
conventional war, one of its branches, the National Guard, has
arrest authority and supplies the top leadership for one of the
country's police forces. There were a few instances in 1991
when the National Guard was called upon to restore public order
following rioting. Both police and National Guard personnel
were responsible for human rights abuses during the year.
Venezuela's economy is dominated by the public sector. The
state-owned petroleum industry currently accounts for some 23
percent of the gross domestic product, more than any other
industry. The Government is in the process of a major economic
restructuring to reduce its dependence on oil exports, to
privatize many public sector firms, and to enable domestic
business to compete more effectively in the international
market. Human rights groups are concerned that the removal, in
the context of a wide-ranging government austerity program, of
most subsidies for basic foods, medicine, and transportation,
has aggravated poverty. The Government has attempted to
redirect its welfare programs toward the neediest segments of
the population.
Venezuelans have generally enjoyed a wide range of freedoms and
individual rights, including a free press, active unions, and
free elections. There are, however, serious human rights
abuses. In 1991 they included: arbitrary and excessively
lengthy detentions; frequent abuse of detainees; extrajudicial
killings by the police and military; the failure to punish
police and security officers accused of abuses; corruption and
gross inefficiency in the judicial and law enforcement systems;
deplorable prison conditions; and violence and discrimination
against women. Increased crime rates have led to demands for
greater police protection, and police have responded with the
tactic of periodic "sweeps" through poor, crime-ridden
neighborhoods. Incidents of extrajudicial killings and
arbitrary arrests appear to increase during these "sweeps."
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political killings in 1991. Instances
of extrajudicial killings, however, continue. The press
routinely reported cases of the police shooting and killing
criminal suspects apparently without appropriate justification,
of security forces killing civilians, and of arrested persons
dying while in police custody. Charges are rarely brought
against the perpetrators of such killings. If perpetrators are
prosecuted, the sentences issued are usually light, or, more
commonly, overturned in the appeals process.
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VENEZUELA
A case in point was the "suicide" in 1990 of a young man in a
police station. An autopsy performed in 1991 indicated that
the young man died from severe beatings to the chest, head, and
neck. Several similar cases were reported in the press during
1991. Some of those killed had been picked up during police
sweeps of high-crime neighborhoods; others were known
criminals. One murderer, reported by the police to have died
during a shoot-out, was found to have broken bones and a broken
back. His funeral attracted 4,000 people, most of whom
attended to protest police violence and abuse of human rights.
There have been credible reports of women who were picked up as
illegal aliens and who were then abused or even killed by
policemen. An example is the murder of Eldrys Josefina Brito,
a 22-year-old woman operating a small business in downtown
Caracas. According to witnesses who saw her last, she was
arrested by policemen. Her body was found burned beyond
recognition, and an autopsy revealed she had been raped and
repeatedly beaten. Preliminary police investigations indicated
that members of an urban security unit of the National Guard
arrested her. Further investigations showed that the young
woman was turned over to the Caracas Metropolitan Police, who
are alleged to have committed the murder. The case was still
being investigated at year's end.
In early 1991 a military court dismissed all charges against 19
security force members accused in the 1988 shooting deaths of
14 persons by Venezuelan security forces in the town of El
Amparo, near the Colombian border. Several of the victims and
their families are not Venezuelan citizens, and the military
court interpreted Article 177 of the Military Justice Code as
clearly stating that only Venezuelans could accuse military
personnel. The lawyers of the victims argued unsuccessfully
that international conventions signed by Venezuela prohibit
judicial discrimination based on national origin.
Nevertheless, 14 of the accused remain under detention while a
military procurator investigates the case.
Numerous cases of extrajudicial killings and other abuses by
security forces and the police during the riots of February-
March 1989 remained stalled during 1991 in both military and
civilian courts. Of approximately 300 cases involving charges
of extrajudicial killings, abuse of authority, indiscriminate
shooting, and similar violations, only 1 case has been
adjudicated: a police officer was found guilty of homicide and
sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment. The Committee of Family
Members of Victims of the riots (COFAVIC), formed in 1989 to
support riot victims' family members, continues to call for a
thorough investigation and prosecution of the cases.
b. Disappearance
There continue to be reports of persons disappearing without
explanation. Some persons reportedly have disappeared while in
police custody. Human rights groups cite, as an example, the
case of Fidel Jimenez, who disappeared in March 1990 and whose
remains were found in a lake in early October 1991. Jimenez
was detained by the police for possessing goods for which he
did not have sales slips. According to witnesses, he was
beaten and freed. Human rights groups charge that Jimenez was
rearrested and that the authorities are responsible for his
disappearance. The case remained unresolved at year's end. At
least 16 persons disappeared during the 1989 riots;
investigations of these cases have so far not resulted in any
clarifications. Witnesses, however, claimed that law
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VENEZUELA '
enforcement authorities were involved.
Progress in exhuming the bodies of 1989 riot victims buried in
a mass grave in Caracas was stopped officially by a judicial
order in November 1991. However, no examinations had taken
place since November 1990. Local human rights organizations
have initiated legal action to overturn the judge's negative
ruling. Before the judge's unexpected action, human rights
organizations attributed the delay to a lack of political will
and public interest in resolving the killings, poor
coordination between judges and experts overseeing the
exhumations, and the failure of forensic officials to expedite
the identification process. During an earlier judicial review
of the Caracas burial site, other cadavers were found buried on
top of those of the riot victims. Human rights groups charge
that these were also victims of disappearance and killing by
police forces.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is prohibited by law, but physical abuse of detainees
and prisoners is prevalent and includes cases of electric
shock, beatings, and rape. The Venezuelan Program for
Education and Action in Human Rights (PROVEA), a local human
rights group, reported 25 cases of torture in the first 7
months of 1991. The Government routinely fails to investigate
and prosecute the police officials responsible for these
abuses. Of 16 Judicial Technical Police (PTJ) officers
detained in late 1990 and accused of torture, 10 were released
in early 1991, and no trial had taken place as of year's end.
A young man accused members of DISIP (the Investigation and
Intelligence police) of torturing him to force him to confess
to the murder of a wealthy businessman. In reports to the
press following his release, the young man claimed he was
subjected to electrical shocks to the testicles, suffocation
with a plastic bag over his head filled with an unidentified
chemical substance that inhibited breathing, and beatings. He
was subsequently released when PTJ officers proved his
innocence. Two teachers accused members of the PTJ of
torturing them in prison, where they had been taken after being
stopped in a routine traffic check. One of the two teachers
was confined to a wheelchair for 4 months following the
beatings .
Prison conditions are appalling and are strongly condemned by
human rights groups and government officials. The Public
Prosecutor (Fiscal General), in his latest report to the
Congress, said that "the situation of prisons in Venezuela is
pathetic, and in fact became worse during 1990. There are two
vital problems for prisoners: their physical mistreatment and
the abominable mismanagement of funds for these centers."
Sporadic prison riots occurred during 1991, sparked by
persistent complaints of poor prison conditions — notably,
overcrowding, contaminated food, and physical abuse both by the
guards and among prisoners.
During the course of the year, the Ministry of Justice's office
of prisons submitted a report to Congress suggesting ways and
means to improve prison services. The report was reportedly
rejected by a congressional subcommittee for a number of
reasons, including lack of detail and a supposed failure to
deal adequately with the overall problems faced by prisoners.
Prison conditions remains the subject of active public debate.
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VENEZUELA
but concrete actions to improve conditions do not appear
imminent .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
While the right to judicial determination of the legality of
detention is provided by law, arrested persons or persons under
investigative "detention legally can be held up to 8 days
without a formal detention order, during which time they may be
held incommunicado. Arbitrary arrests and arrests with
improper warrants are common, and the time limits for holding
persons are frequently exceeded. Even if a person is detained
under a proper order, the time of detention pending trial often
exceeds the amount of time the person would have been required
to serve had he or she been found guilty.
During prison riots in mid-1991, prisoners vociferously
complained about being charged by prison officials for
transportation to judicial proceedings; detainees who lacked
the money to pay were unable to get to their judicial
hearings. Bail is permitted only for relatively minor crimes.
Venezuela's bail laws continued under review by the Congress;
the Government hopes that an increase in the applicability of
bail provisions will contribute to relieving overcrowded
prisons.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Although the right to a fair trial is provided by law and some
procedural safeguards exist, the burden of proof is on the
accused to prove his or her innocence. Because of corruption
and inefficiency, lengthy pretrial detention and case backlogs
are the norm.
The justice system is overburdened. The law provides public
defenders for those unable to afford competent defense;
however, the number of public defenders in the country is
insufficient to meet this obligation. The Judicial Council,
the governing body of the judicial branch, indicated during
1991 that there are some 150 public defense attorneys with an
average of 170 active cases each. Because of the unequal
distribution of cases, however, some defenders handle as many
as 250 cases .
Delays of 2 or 3 years in normal cases are not infrequent. The
judicial process is almost exclusively a written one, requiring
costly and time-consuming production of voluminous reports by
judges, attorneys, and witnesses at every stage. Some
Venezuelan leaders and legal experts also blame delays and
other irregularities on corruption and the use of personal
influence. The civilian judiciary is legally independent, but
connections to the two major political parties are important in
the judicial selection process.
Civilians charged with armed subversion are tried by military
courts as insurgents. There is neither a statute of
limitations nor a requirement of speedy trial for cases in
military courts, although persons convicted under the military
justice system have the same right to appeal to the Supreme
Court as those prosecuted under the civilian system. Military
judges are appointed by the Supreme Court. Besides the lack of
deadlines in the military system, the system's secrecy and
tendency to close ranks make it unlikely that defendants
undergo an impartial or timely prosecution and can result in
offenders being shielded from responsibility for human rights
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VENEZUELA
abuses. For example, although the case of 19 security agents
implicated in the October 1988 El Amparo incident has been sent
back and forth between the military court system and the
Supreme Court for more than 2 years and by the end of the year
no verdict had been issued. Attempts by human rights groups
and attorneys for the two survivors of the incident to shift
the proceedings to the civilian courts were unsuccessful.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Venezuela has constitutional safeguards protecting citizens
against arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, and
correspondence. In general, these safeguards are effective,
but there were several charges of wiretapping during 1991. A
former chief of DISIP stated publicly that wiretapping is only
possible through the collaboration of government security
agencies. A bill to further protect the right to private
communication has been under consideration by the Congress
since 1990.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of the press and free
speech. These liberties, along with academic freedom, are
almost universally honored. Venezuela has a free and lively
press, which frequently criticizes the Government and denounces
instances of government interference in the media. However,
serious questions about attitudes toward freedom of the press
were raised by a break-in apparently perpetrated by military
intelligence agents. In June the home of well-known journalist
Rafael Poleo was burglarized, and documents said to link
prominent political and military figures with current scandals
were stolen. The outspoken editor accused the former' director
of Military Intelligence (DIM) as the instigator of the
break-in. Three DIM agents were subsequently arrested,
although one of the three died in detention. His death is
officially registered as a suicide, but it is widely believed
that he was murdered in order to silence him. The press
reported the Poleo case extensively; no intimidation or
self-censorship was evident. In November, however, a judge
issued a warrant for Poleo 's arrest to face charges of illegal
possession of a submachinegun. Some politicians and
journalists criticized the action as politically motivated.
Venezuela has 4 nationwide television networks, 2 of which are
government -owned; 3 regional television stations; 168 radio
stations; and numerous newspapers and magazines, with 9 dailies
in Caracas alone. The Government is a significant source of
advertising revenue for the media, but there appear to be no
recent instances in which government advertising was channeled
for political ends.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of peaceful assembly and association is normally
respected in Venezuela. Public meetings, including those of
all political parties, are held without interference. Permits
are required for public marches but are not denied for
political reasons. Professional and academic associations
operate without interference. Public protests that turn
violent have sometimes been met with police force. In October
and November, during protests against increased bus fares and
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the Government's economic reform package, at least six students
were killed by the military and the police. For example, on
November 20 two students and an off-duty soldier were killed by
police officers, despite a government order banning security
forces from using live ammunition. Due to a prompt
investigation by the Attorney General, police authorities
within 24 hours identified five officers who apparently removed
the plastic antiriot bullets from their ammunition cartridges,
replaced them with marbles, and allegedly fired them at the
students and the off-duty soldier, causing their death. The
policemen were under arrest and the investigations were
proceeding at year's end.
c. Freedom of Religion
The population is predominantly Roman Catholic, although other
religious groups enjoy freedom of worship and proselytize
actively. Foreign missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant,
are active throughout the country.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens and legal residents generally have freedom to travel
within the country and to go abroad and return. Venezuela
traditionally has been a haven for refugees, exiles, and
displaced persons from many European, Caribbean, and Latin
American countries. Refugees are given normal residence status
and may be expelled only because of criminal activities.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Venezuela is a multiparty democracy, with a government freely
elected by secret ballot. Suffrage is mandatory for all those
18 years of age or older, and the political process is open to
all. Elections for the President, Congress, and state
legislative assemblies are held every 5 years. Governors and
mayors were elected for the first time in Venezuelan history in
1989, and voters also were able to choose individual candidates
by name, rather than selecting only from among party slates.
Political views are freely expressed, and persons from the
entire political spectrum contend for positions ranging from
municipal council seats to the presidency. The two largest
parties are centrist: the Social Democratic (Democratic
Action, AD) and the Social Christian (COPEI) parties. The
Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party, founded by disenchanted
members of the Venezuelan Communist party, has increased its
share of the total vote in recent elections.
Women and minorities participate fully in government and
politics, if in smaller percentages than their proportionate
representation in society. There are no de jure impediments to
their free participation, but traditional attitudes produce
some de facto impediments; women and minorities are promoted
into high-level positions at a slower rate than men.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
A considerable number of local human rights groups are active
and vigorously criticize perceived government inadequacies in
redressing grievances. Some of the groups complain of police
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harassment, including the disruption of legitimate protests,
unlawful entry into the homes of activists, and surveillance.
Two regional groups — the Latin American Foundation for Human
Rights and Social Development, and the Federation of Families
of Disappeared Persons — have offices in Caracas.. These human
rights organizations are able to operate free of government
restriction.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Venezuelan law prohibits discrimination based on ethnic
origin. However, the country's indigenous population,
comprised of an estimated 140,500 persons, frequently suffers
from inattention to, and violation of, its human rights.
Venezuela is home to seven major indigenous ethnic groups,
including the Yanomami , who live mainly in the state of
Amazonas bordering Brazil, and the Goajiros, settled in the
western state of Zulia along Venezuela's border with Colombia.
Many of the country's indigenous people live entirely isolated
from modern civilization and thus lack, for example, access to
health and educational facilities theoretically available to
all Venezuelans. However, even groups that are more integrated
into the social fabric complain of lack of access to medical
facilities and care. In May representatives of the Warao
communities stated that only 1 doctor was available for 30
indigenous communities and, as a result, 105 people had died in
the preceding 2 weeks from an outbreak of diarrhea and
vomiting. The Warao representatives also denounced actions by
a government development organization that had resulted in a
diversion of water from their area with a resultant destruction
of crops. The same group complained of frec[uent beatings by
personnel of the National Guard. The Attorney General's office
is conducting an investigation.
In response to frequent allegations from local and foreign
anthropologists and environmental groups alleging mistreatment
of Venezuela's approximately 14,000 Yanomami Indians, the
Government during the year inaugurated the upper Orinoco-
Casiquiane biospheric reserve. The 32, 038-sc[uare mile reserve
is designed to prevent development of and incursions into
Yanomani territory. No mining, farming, colonization, or
proselytizing will be permitted. The creation of this reserve
is widely seen as an important step toward preserving
indigenous culture and rights, affecting about one-tenth of
Venezuela's Indian peoples. Yet the Government must still
confront problems facing Venezuela's other indigenous groups,
which often suffer human rights abuses and de facto exclusion
from the social and economic benefits of citizenship.
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex.
According to women's groups, among the most serious problems
facing Venezuelan women are: rape and assault (including by
police officers — see Section l.a.); lack of access to education
and medical care; and culturally ingrained discrimination that
results in women's comparative exclusion from leadership
positions in the political structure, trade unions, and the
private sector. The first two problems especially, but not
exclusively, impinge on women from the lower economic strata.
The perpetrators of acts of aggression against women are rarely
punished.
During the Second Venezuelan Women's Conference, held in 1991
and attended by women from all major political parties.
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suggestions were made to revise sections of the Penal Code that
discriminate against women, as well as to provide greater
protection for women under the Labor Code. Although no changes
have been made in the Penal Code, labor laws were revised in
1990, and the changes became effective in 1991. The new Labor
Code specifies that women may not be discriminated against with
regard to remuneration or working conditions, may not be fired
during pregnancy and for a year after giving birth, are
entitled to unpaid leave (and compensation from the social
security agency) for 6 weeks before the birth of a child and 12
weeks after, and are due 10 weeks of unpaid leave if they
legally adopt children under 3 years of age.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Both constitutional and labor law recognize and encourage the
right of unions to exist. The comprehensive Labor Code enacted
in 1990 extends to all public sector and private sector
employees (except members of the armed forces) the right to
form and join unions of their choosing. There are no
restrictions on this right in practice and no special rules or
laws governing labor relations in export processing zones. The
1990 Code mandates registration of unions with the Ministry of
Labor but reduced the Ministry's discretion by specifying that
registration may not be denied if the proper documents (a
record of the founding meeting, the statutes, and the
membership list) are submitted. Only a judge may dissolve a
union, and then only for reasons listed in the law, such as the
dissolution of a firm or by agreement of two-thirds of the
membership. One major union confederation, the Venezuelan
Confederation of Workers (CTV), and three small ones, as well
as a number of independent unions, operate freely in
Venezuela. About 25 percent of the national labor force is
organized.
There are no restrictions on affiliation with international
labor organizations, and many union organizations play active
international roles. The CTV ' s top leadership includes members
of several political parties. The majority are affiliated with
the country's largest party, AD, and both reciprocally
influence each other. The CTV, however, has repeatedly
demonstrated its independence from both the Governinent, in
which AD holds the presidency and a plurality of the seats in
the Congress, and the parties, as evidenced by its frequent
criticism of the Government's economic policies.
The right of private sector and public sector employees to
strike is recognized legally and upheld in practice. The Labor
Code extended the right to strike to all government employees
(except members of the armed services), but stated that it may
only be exercised by public servants if it does not cause
"irremediable damage to the population or to institutions." It
also allowed the President to order public or private sector
strikers back to work and to submit their dispute to
arbitration if the strike "puts in immediate danger the lives
or security of all or part of the population." . In recent
years, Venezuelan workers seldom have resorted to strikes, but
a decline in living standards has increased the willingness of
workers to use them. During 1991 most strikes occurred among
government employees.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee on Freedom
of Association in March asked the Government to assure that
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internal union disputes are settled by a vote of the members,
and that settlement of strikes by compulsory arbitration only
occur when essential services are involved.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is protected and encouraged by the Labor
Code and is freely practiced throughout Venezuela. According
to the Code, employers "must negotiate" a collective contract
with the union that represents the majority of their workers.
It contains a provision stating that wages may be raised by
administrative decree provided that the Congress approves the
decree, and this procedure was followed in June to grant
increases of 17-21 percent to persons not covered by collective
contracts. (Employees with collective contracts did not receive
the increase but were authorized to reopen contracts to
negotiate similar pay levels.) In April the Vice Minister of
Labor stated that "only 25 or 26 percent" of all employed
workers are covered by collective contracts.
The law prohibits employers from interfering with the formation
of unions or with their activities and from stipulating as a
condition of employment that new workers must abstain from
union activity or must join a specified union. Complaints
regarding violations of these articles of the law are heard by
Ministry of Labor inspectors, who may impose a maximum fine of
twice the monthly minimum wage, or about $200, for a first
infraction.
Union officials have special protection against dismissal under
the Code. If a judge determines that any worker was fired for
union activity, the worker is entitled to back pay plus either
reinstatement or payment of a substantial sum of money, which
varies according to years of seniority. The ILO's Committee of
Experts in 1991 questioned the adequacy of the sanctions
provided for violations of the antiunion discrimination
provisions .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced or compulsory labor in Venezuela. The Labor
Code states that no one may "obligate others to work against
their will . "
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Code allows children between the ages of 12 and 14 to
work if given special permission by the National Institute for
Minors or the Labor Ministry. Children between the ages of 14
and 16 may work if given permission by their legal guardians.
Minors may not work in mines, smelters, or in occupations "that
risk life or health", in occupations that could damage
intellectual or moral development, or in "public spectacles."
For those under age 16 the workday may not exceed 6 hours or
the workweek 30 hours. Minors under 18 may work only during
the hours between 6 a.m. and 7 p.m. The law is enforced
effectively by the Ministry of Labor and the National Institute
for Minors in the formal sector of the economy, but much less
so in the informal sector, which by the end of 1990 accounted
for an estimated 41 percent of total employment.
Although education is technically compulsory until age 15, many
students drop out of school before they reach that age. Some
children work as street vendors; there is no other occupation
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in which employment of children is believed to be substantial.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Venezuela has a national urban minimum wage rate and a national
rural minimum wage rate. To this minimum wage provision should
be added mandatory fringe benefits that vary with the workers'
individual circumstances but in general would increase wages by
about one-third. Only domestic workers and concierges are
legally excluded from coverage under the minimum wage decrees.
Under the Labor Code, the rates are set by administrative
decree, but the decree is then sent to Congress, which may
suspend or ratify it but may not modify the decree. Minimum
wages are enforced effectively in the formal sector of the
economy by the Ministry of Labor. There is no reliable
information regarding compliance in the informal sector. No
current, widely accepted statistics on poverty are available,
but the World Bank, using 1989 data provided by the Government,
calculated that 54 percent of households lived in poverty at
that time. The percentage is generally believed to have
increased since then. Concern about rising poverty prompted
the Government in May to increase the urban minimum wage rate
by 50 percent and the rural minimum wage rate by 80 percent.
The 1990 Labor Code reduced the standard workweek to a maximum
of 44 hours. Some unions, such as the petroleum workers, have
negotiated a 40-hour week. Overtime may not exceed 2 hours
daily, 10 hours weekly, or 100 hours annually, and may not be
paid at a rate less than time and a half. These standards are
effectively enforced by the Ministry of Labor in the formal
sector .
A health and safety law was passed in 1986, but its enforcement
awaits implementing regulations. The delays are largely due to
concern over the fact that the law provides penal sanctions
against management when violations of health and safety occur
and ambiguity in the law over what constitutes a violation.
The 1990 Labor Code states that employers are obligated to pay
specified amounts (up to a maximum of 25 times the minimum
salary) to workers for accidents or occupational sicknesses
regardless of who is responsible for negligence. It also
requires that workplaces must maintain "sufficient protection
for health and life against sicknesses and accidents," and it
imposes fines of from one-quarter to two times the minimum
salary for first infractions. Labor Ministry inspectors
enforce the law and appear to be generally effective.
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Australia has a federal system of government and a long history
as a multiparty parliamentary democracy. National elections
were held on March 24, 1990 and must take place again by July
10, 1993.
Federal, state, and local police carry out their functions in
accordance with civil law, which respects and safeguards
individual human rights. The law is observed in practice.
Australia has a developed economy, largely based on mining and
agriculture but with growing manufacturing and service sectors,
which provides most Australians with a high per capita income.
A wide range of government programs offers assistance for the
minority of relatively disadvantaged citizens, but fiscal
constraints are affecting the amount of that assistance.
Persons are free to hold private property, pursue their
economic and personal interests, associate with others, and
organize trade unions.
Basic human rights are assured by law and respected in practice
in Australia, except in some external territories. The
colonial legacy in some of the external territories has
resulted in outdated and indecipherable laws which do not
protect some basic human rights. This is particularly true of
Christmas Island and the Cocos Islands, which have a combined
population of about 3,600. Government efforts are under way to
reform these laws to bring them in line with the rest of
Australian law by July 1, 1992. The Government is firmly
committed, both domestically and internationally, to the
promotion of, and respect for, human rights.
While Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) peoples
remained the most economically and socially disadvantaged
minorities, they now have the possibility of managing their own
affairs through a nationwide framework of elected councillors
and commissioners. The final report of the Royal Commission
into Aboriginal deaths in custody, released in April 1991,
found that while ATSI deaths could not be considered genocide,
the callous indifference and negligence of officials in charge
of the prisoners contributed to the deaths. ATSI deaths in
custody have decreased significantly as a result of increased
public scrutiny and the adoption of some legislative and
procedural measures suggested by the Commission's 1988 interim
report. The imprisonment rate of ATSI peoples, however, is
extraordinarily high — 29 times that of the general community in
Australia. The Australian federal and state governments have
been either unable or unwilling to implement the necessary
steps to curb this rate, which continues to grow in some states.
Federal and state officials in August announced a plan for
increasing cooperation and streamlining ATSI affairs programs
to provide more efficient service. During 1991 several
Aboriginal groups gained expanded land ownership and legal
rights from state and local governments.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Killing for political motives by the Government or by political
organizations does not occur.
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The Royal Commission investigating ATSI deaths in custody found
that although the deaths were not deliberately caused, police
and prison officials showed callous indifference and remarkable
insensitivity, which contributed significantly to the deaths.
The Commission found that although ATSI peoples died at
approximately the same rate as non-ATSI peoples in prison, ATSI
peoples were arrested at a rate 29 times that of whites.
b. Disappearance
There have been no instances of political disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Australian law prohibits all these practices, and this
prohibition is generally respected. There is, however,
credible evidence that Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders
in custody are frequently mistreated. According to human
rights investigators, ATSI peoples in prison have been subject
to solitary confinement, beatings, use of leg irons, and
deprivation of light. Federal and state authorities continued
efforts to address the problem of deaths and mistreatment of
Aboriginals in custody. The Royal Commission report on
Aboriginal deaths in custody recommended several steps to
reduce the number of arrests and improve the treatment of ATSI
prisoners to avoid further deaths.
A March 1991 report by the House of Representatives Standing
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs found that in
Australia's external territories of Christmas Island and Cocos
Islands, whipping is still a sentencing option, which the
report held to be violation of basic human rights. The report
also stated that these territories lack an appropriate range of
sentencing options and continue to apply a mandatory life
imprisonment sentence for murder. The Federal Government
announced in September 1991 plans to reform such laws in the
external territories by July 1, 1992.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Australian law prohibits arbitrary arrest and imprisonment.
This prohibition is respected in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Although Australia in law and practice gives defendants rights
to due process, including a presumption of innocence, a right
to confront witnesses, and a right to appeal, the State is not
required to pay for an indigent defendant's lawyer.
In practice, all states except New South Wales oblige people
involved in criminal cases to meet a merit test before
qualifying for legal aid. The purpose of the merit test is to
save the government from "wasting funds on unwinnable cases."
The local Legal Aid Commission evaluates a case and determines
whether the case is worth pursuing. The Commission also weighs
the chances of winning a case against the gravity of the likely
penalty.
Most, but not all, serious criminal cases merit legal counsel.
If the case is deemed futile, the defendant is denied counsel
at public expense. An unfavorable decision may be appealed to
a panel of independent lawyers and social workers appointed by
the Legal Aid Commission. Defendants appearing before a
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Defense Force Magistrate are exempt from the merit test. Also,
ATSI peoples, who comprise about 1.5 percent of Australia's
population, are able to receive legal aid without a merit test
from special legal counsel offices set up specifically for them.
Negative economic conditions are affecting the states' ability
to provide legal aid. In the State of Victoria, the Legal Aid
Commission announced in May that it would not grant aid in
criminal cases likely to cost the state government more than
$157,356 unless it received extra funding for such cases.
Despite these problems, the Australian High Court is expected
to decide in 1992 whether a legal right to counsel has been
created under international law.
According to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Affairs' report on the legal regimes
of Australia's external territories, the laws of Australia's
external territory of the Cocos Islands do not provide for a
right to trial by jury. Christmas Island recently changed its
laws to allow trial by jury and held its first such trial in
October .
The report also stated that, as no formal arrangement for legal
aid exists in either the Cocos Islands or Christmas Island,
residents of these islands are denied equality before the
courts and equal protection of the law. The Government issued
a response to the report in September and pledged to reform
these laws by July 1, 1992.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under Australian law and in practice, no search may be
conducted without a judicially issued warrant. The Government
does not interfere with the privacy of family, home, or
correspondence .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The democratic political system, an effective judiciary, and
diverse, vigorous, and independent news media combine to ensure
freedom of speech and press and full academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Australia does not have a bill of rights, but it is a party to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
provides for freedom of assembly and expression. These
freedoms are respected in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion
Australians have complete freedom of religion. A provision in
the Constitution precludes the adoption of an official state
religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Australia imposes no restrictions on movement within or outside
of the country. The rights of emigration and repatriation are
also protected. The legal status of some 350 Cambodian boat
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people who applied for refugee status remained unresolved. At
least 28 have appealed the Immigration Department's initial
decision in May to deny their asylum applications. If their
appeals fail, they will be subject to deportation as illegal
immigrants. In the meantime, all boat people remain in
detention at various centers around the country.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Australians elect representatives to a two-chamber Federal
Parliament as well as to numerous state and local bodies
through free and open elections.
Candidates are drawn from three major parties and a nvmiber of
minor parties. Voting, by secret ballot, is compulsory in
general elections for Australians 18 years of age and older;
persons may abstain or invalidate their ballots, but eligible
voters who do not at least collect ballots may be fined.
Elections are held at varying intervals as prescribed by
federal, state, and local laws.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
A wide range of local nongovernmental organizations concerned
with human rights operate freely and the Government permits
unimpeded access to all international groups investigating
alleged human rights violations. As a matter of policy, the
Government responds to any communication from the United
Nations alleging violations of human rights in Australia.
Australia actively promotes human rights on the international
level as a reelected member of the United Nations Human Rights
Commission and as a member of the United Nations Working Group
on Indigenous Populations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
By law Australians have ecjual access to government services
without reference to race, sex, religion, language, or social
status. Basic food, shelter, health care, education, and
social security benefits are guaranteed for all. The Racial
Discrimination Act of 1975 prohibits discrimination on grounds
of race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin.
However, Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders, who comprise
about 1.5 percent of the nation's population, continue to
suffer widespread discrimination.
Acknowledging that the Aboriginal population is the most
disadvantaged group in terms of education, housing, health, and
employment, the federal and state governments provide services,
in addition to the broad range of programs available to all
Australians, specifically aimed at improving Aboriginal
socioeconomic conditions. Thus far, however, these services
have not been able to reverse the deteriorating social
conditions of ATSI peoples.
The Federal Government's Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC), established by Parliament in late 1989,
replaced the department of Aboriginal Affairs and the
Aboriginal Development Commission in March 1990. ATSIC was
designed to give ATSI peoples greater control over many
government programs intended for their benefit. In late 1990,
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a special nationwide election filled 800 all-Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islanders positions on the 60 ATSIC regional
councils. The newly elected councillors selected 17 national
commissioners in March 1991 and the Federal Minister for
Aboriginal Affairs appointed the chairman and two other
commissioners .
In 1990, the Federal Government and the federal opposition both
expressed interest in a more formal delineation of Aboriginal
rights. The Government continued to include funds in its
1991-1992 budget to pursue an as yet undefined instrument of
reconciliation with Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders
with an informal deadline of the centennial of federation in
2001. Toward this end, the Government passed legislation at
midyear to establish a Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation.
The Council is to coordinate a 10-year multimillion dollar
program, which aims to promote better understanding between
ATSI peoples and other Australians.
On land rights issues. Aboriginal land councils gained control
of four national parks in the state of New South Wales in April
under state legislation calling for more "sympathetic
management of ancient rock art sites." In addition.
Aboriginals won a claim to 2,300 square kilometers in the
Northern Territory in May. However, they lost a 13-year legal
battle for the Cox Peninsula in the Northern Territory —
mainly because many of the traditional owners died while
waiting for the claim to be settled. In April Aboriginals made
their first official claim for land rights in the state of
Queensland. They have asked for freehold title to Aboriginal
reserves, crown land, and national parks; limited access to
pastoral lease; and veto power over licensing mining, tourism,
and commercial fishing.
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Deaths in Custody issued its
final 11-volume report after spending 3 years investigating 99
deaths. Although the Commission found that ATSI peoples died
in custody at the same rate as non-ATSI peoples, ATSI peoples
were incarcerated at a rate 29 times higher than that of
non-ATSI peoples. The Commission found that the most
significant factor in the higher incarceration rate was the
disadvantaged and unec[ual position ATSI peoples hold in
Australian society.
The report's 339 recommendations fall into two categories —
first, the relationship between ATSI people and the criminal
justice system, and second, the underlying factors which lead
to a higher rate of ATSI peoples in police custody. The first
category recommends that states pass laws to ensure that prison
is used only as a last resort, especially for public
intoxication; that police take all possible steps to eliminate
violent or rough treatment and use of racist language with ATSI
peoples; that police review their use of paramilitary forces to
avoid their unnecessary use in Aboriginal communities; and that
a coroner investigate not only the cause and the circumstances
of a death in custody but also the care, treatment, and
supervision of the deceased before death.
The second category's recommendations include: establishment
of a national task force on alcohol abuse; a review of liqijor
licensing legislation to reduce the availability of alcohol
while still meeting ATSI communities' needs; the promotion by
all political leaders and parties of the process of
reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
communities; a national survey of the Aboriginal population and
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infrastructure; and a requirement that governments and agencies
devise strategies to reduce the number of Aboriginal juveniles
involved in the welfare and criminal justice systems. The
Federal Government called on all of its departments to issue
plans in late 1991 for the implementation of many of the
recommendations. Because of the structure of Australian
federal and state, politics, however, only the states can change
many of the most crucial laws, particularly those which would
reduce the high imprisonment rates of ATSI peoples.
Overall domestic violence, mainly against females, may involve
as many as one in three Australian families. The problem
continues to attract government and public concern. The
National Domestic Violence Education Program, which, according
to government research and women's rights organizations,
successfully raised overall awareness about the problem in
1989, continued its emphasis in 1991 on changing attitudes in
particular socioeconomic groups (e.g.. Aboriginals, who have a
higher incidence of domestic violence) . Improving training for
law enforcement and community workers and expanding crisis
support services were also emphasized.
The Sex Discrimination Act of 1984 prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sex, marital status, or pregnancy. In 1986 the
Government passed affirmative action legislation obliging
employers to provide equal employment and promotion
opportunities for female employees. Women's rights and welfare
are promoted by a number of women's rights groups and the
Federal Government's Office of the Status of Women.
A March 1991 report of the House of Representatives Standing
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs concerning the
legal regimes of Australia's external territories found family
law in the Cocos Islands and Christmas Island is "outdated and
discriminatory in many respects." The report recommended that
the 1975 Australian Family Law Act be extended to these
islands. In doing so, however, the report recommended that
proper recognition be given to local customs and institutions
insofar as they do not violate human rights.
In 1991 the Federal Government continued its commitment to
promote intercultural understanding and t^ better address the
needs of ethnic groups through a national multicultural agenda.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Australian law and practice provide workers, including public
servants, full freedom to establish and join trade unions, to
choose their union representatives, to formulate union
programs, to associate directly with their counterparts in
other nations and to participate in international labor
organizations. The Australian Council of Trade Unions, the
principal labor organization in Australia, is affiliated with
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. A few
individual unions are also affiliated with the Communist-
dominated World Federation of Trade Unions.
Unions represent about 40.5 percent of the work force and are
extremely active and influential. Union representatives
constitute 60 percent of the delegates at national conferences
of the governing Australian Labor Party (ALP). However, unions
remain independent of both government and ALP control.
778
AUSTRALIA
Australian workers enjoy the right to strike, which is well
established in practice. However, a 1989 ruling of the
Victoria State Supreme Court, which declared the airline pilots
union liable for damages arising from the pilots' dispute with
the airlines, underscored that the right to strike is not
protected under domestic law. In its review of this case, the
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) of the International
Labor Organization (ILO) expressed its concern "about the scope
of the common law liabilities which appear to attach to
industrial action in Australia."
Strikes are frequent although generally of short duration. In
general, industrial disputes are resolved either through direct
employer-union negotiations or under the auspices of the
various state and federal industrial relations commissions
whose mandate includes resolution of disputes through
conciliation and arbitration.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Australian workers are granted the right, by law and in
practice, to organize and bargain collectively, and to be
represented in negotiating the prevention and settlement of
disputes with employers. Workers are also protected by law and
in practice from antiunion discrimination. A pattern of
centralized wage negotiations with quasi-judicial arbitration
and settlement, supplemented by industry-wide or company-
by-company collective bargaining, has generally prevailed since
the establishment of the Commonwealth Conciliation and
Arbitration Commission in 1904. The Industrial Relations Act
of 1988 made important technical changes in the basic system,
creating a new Industrial Relations Commission with expanded
scope for performing essentially the same tasks as its
predecessor .
According to an Australian Bureau of Immigration research
report released in May, Chinese contract workers in the
Northern Territory's Trade Development Zone (TDZ) were
"extremely underpaid. ' Moreover, their right to join a trade
union was restricted by their employers as a condition of
employment. As a result, the Special Immigration Agreement for
the zone was canceled. Except for these Chinese workers, there
were no restrictions on freedom of association in the TDZ.
Minimum wages in the zone are determined by the same system of
federal awards described in Section 6.e. below. However,
employers and unions are fre-^ to negotiate "over-award" wages,
where market conditions warrant.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Australia has ratified and fully respects ILO Convention 105
concerning forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Although no federally mandated minimum age for employment
exists, state-imposed compulsory education requirements,
monitored and enforced by state educational authorities,
prevent most children from joining the work force until they
are 15 to 16 years old. In addition. Federal and State
Ministries of Labor monitor and enforce a complicated network
of legislation (which often varies from state to state)
governing such interactive factors as minimum school-leaving
779
AUSTRALIA
age, minimum age to claim unemployment benefits, and minimum
age to engage in specified occupations.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Australia has long had a tradition that workers should be
guaranteed a decent standard of living. Although a formal
minimum wage exists, it is not used. Instead, most workers are
covered by differing minimum wage rates for individual trades
and professions which are embodied in a comprehensive system of
"awards," determined by the various quasi-judicial state and
federal industrial relations commissions after submissions by
union, employer, and government representatives. In many cases
involving individual business enterprises, the commissions
approve wage rates previously negotiated and agreed upon by
employer and union representatives. Where market conditions
warrant, higher wages than those provided for in industrywide
awards ("over-award payments") are common. The lowest current
federal award of $314 per 38-hour week is for clothing
workers. Combined with other regularly provided benefits and
government entitlements for low-income families, this wage
provides a decent standard of living.
A complex body of federal and state regulatory and commission
decisions prescribes a 40 hour (or less) workweek, paid
vacations, sick leave, and health and safety standards in the
workplace, as well as other benefits for the overwhelming
majority of Australian workers. Compliance with these and
other regulations is actively monitored and enforced by federal
and state Ministries of Labor. A tripartite body called
"Worksafe Australia" conducts periodic assessments of these
issues. The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1991 gives
employees the legal right to cease work if they believe there
is an immediate threat to their health or safety.
780
BRUNEI
Brunei is a small, wealthy monarchy located on the north coast
of Borneo. Although the population of roughly 250,000 is
predominantly Malay, there are substantial Chinese and other
minorities. Brunei is a hereditary and traditional sultanate
that has been ruled by the same family for over 500 years. It
became a British Protectorate in 1888 and achieved internal
self-government in 1959. It became independent in 1984.
The 1959 Constitution provided for the first delegation of
political power by the Sultan to a Legislative Council and a
Council of Ministers, but it permitted the Sultan to override
the decisions of legislative and executive bodies in most
instances. In 1962 tensions over policy differences with the
Sultan led to an armed uprising that was put down by British
troops. After suspending some provisions of the Constitution
and repealing others authorizing the election of members of the
Legislative Council, the Sultan invoked an article of the
Constitution that allowed him to assume emergency powers for 2
years. These have been renewed 14 times and remain in force.
Although not all of the articles of the Constitution are
suspended, the state of emergency places few limits on the
Sultan's power. He also serves as Prime Minister.
The police force, which has responsibility for internal
security, reports to the Prime Minister's office and is firmly
under the control of civil authorities.
Brunei produces about 150,000 barrels of oil per day and
slightly over 5 million tons of liquefied natural gas per
year. This combination gives Bruneians one of the world's
highest per capita gross national products.
Bruneians do not engage in activities to exercise the freedoms
of speech press and association contained in the Constitution.
The right of citizens to change their government does not
exist. Mandatory flogging of prisoners for a host of offenses,
discrimination against women, and repression of religious
freedom are additional problems. The Government increased its
efforts in 1991 to strengthen observance of traditional
Bruneian and Muslim values by emphasizing a sociopolitical
ordering of society known as "Malay Muslim Monarchy." The
resulting increased Islamization of Bruneian society placed
significant constraints on the religious freedom of non-Muslims
provided for in the 1959 Constitution.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from;
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
In 1988 whipping became mandatory punishment for 42 criminal,
and drug-related crimes and vandalism. Since then, sentences
of whipping occasionally have been handed down and carried out
781
BRUNEI
in the presence of a doctor who monitors the condition of the
prisoner and has the authority to interrupt and postpone the
punishment for medical reasons. Hong Kong provides judges for
Brunei's High Court and Court of Appeal under a Treaty of
Friendship between Brunei and the United Kingdom. A small
group of Hong Kong judges requested that they not be considered
for duty on the Brunei High Court and Court of Appeal because
the mandatory natUre of whipping as punishment for some
offenses denied them discretion in cases in which they might
believe extenuating circumstances existed.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution has no provision for habeas corpus. While
legislative provisions granting the right of habeas corpus
exist, those provisions, like the Constitution itself, can be
superseded, either partially or wholly, through invocation of
the emergency powers, which remain in effect. Under normal
circumstances, a magistrate must "endorse" a warrant for
arrest. On rare occasions, warrants are issued without this
endorsement .
The Internal Security Act (ISA) permits the Government to
detain suspects without trial for renewable 2-year periods.
Since the abortive rebellion in 1962, the Government has
occasionally used the ISA to detain persons suspected of
antigovernment activity.
While political detentions were not uncommon in previous years,
the last detainees were released in 1990. At the end of the
year, there were no known political detainees remaining. None
of the detainees was ever charged with, any crime.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Bruneian judicial system consists of five levels of courts:
magistrate, intermediate, high, and appellate, with final
recourse available through the Privy Council in London.
Although there is no trial by jury, procedural safeguards,
including the right to defense counsel, the right to an
interpreter, the right to a speedy trial, and the right to
confront accusers, are available. Because Brunei has no senior
judiciary of its own, the Chief Justice of the Brunei High
Court is a judge seconded from Hong Kong. There were no known
instances of interference with the judiciary by the Government
in 1991 and no trials of political opponents.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Although the Government is empowered by law to intrude into the
privacy of individual persons, families, or homes, it has not
been known to do so, except in drug cases.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are not restricted
by law, but there is no organized political opposition in
Brunei. The independently owned newspaper avoids controversial
issues; and the only television station is governmentowned (the
broadcasts of two Malaysian television stations can also be
received) . Because of the almost total absence of criticism or
opposing views, the Government's tolerance of political
782
BRUNEI
criticism has not been effectively tested recently. In the
past it has not hesitated to arrest those who attempted to
espouse unwelcome political views.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom to assemble for political purposes also has not been
seriously tested in recent years. In 1985 the Government
allowed establishment of the Brunei National Democratic Party
(BNDP), the first political party to be formed since party
activity was prohibited in 1967. Just before its first public
meeting, the Government announced that government employees
could not attend party meetings, become members of political
parties, or otherwise engage in organized political debate.
Since the Government employs over half the labor force, these
restrictions severely inhibit the recruiting efforts of any
political partyy. In February 1988, the Government dissolved
the BNDP and detained two of its leaders, charging that the
party's contacts with the International Democratic Union were
in violation of the Societies Act. While one of the two BNDP
leaders released from detention in March 1990 died shortly
thereafter (from natural causes), the other remains banned.
In 1986 the Government approved the establishment of a second
political party, the Brunei National Solidarity Party (BNSP),
which continues to function, albeit at a very limited level
with only a few dozen active members. The Government requires
the registration of private economic, recreational, religious
or other organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion
Islam is the state religion of Brunei, and the Sultan serves as
the country's chief religious leader. Section III of the 1959
Constitution provides for freedom of religion for Muslims and
non-Muslims alike.
In 1991 the Government began to emphasize the legitimacy of the
hereditary monarchy and the observance of traditional Bruneian
and Muslim values by developing and promulgating a
sociopolitical ordering of society described as "Malay Muslim
Monarchy." The resulting Islamization of Bruneian society has
increasingly infringed upon the constitutional rights of
non-Muslims to worship freely.
Both Anglican and Roman Catholic communities have experienced
great difficulty in obtaining government permission to retain
or replace expatriate clergy, despite repeated requests.
Currently, only one Roman Catholic priest is available to
minister to three Catholic congregations totaling some 15,000
persons. Members of the Anglican community have experienced
similar difficulties and for a period of almost 1 year were
without an ordained priest. In addition, despite a
constitutional right of freedom of worship, non-Muslims are
prohibited from proselytizing, except in their own homes and
among non-Muslims.
During 1991 the Government closed most Buddhist temples and
shrines in the country on the grounds that they were not
registered as such with the Government. Buddhist leaders
respond that the reason for the many nonregistered temples and
shrines is the Government's refusal to acknowledge applications
for building permits for new temples and shrines.
783
BRUNEI
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
While the movement of certain released former political
prisoners is restricted, there are no restrictions on freedom
of movement in the country for most citizens, permanent
residents, and expatriates. The Government places some
contractual restrictions on foreign travel for certain of its
expatriate employees. Travel to Communist nations is
restricted, and travel to China by Brunei's ethnic Chinese
citizens and ethnic Chinese residents is tightly controlled.
Brunei has not been willing to accept asylum seekers, has not
agreed to the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) adopted by the
1989 International Conference on Indochinese Refugees, and in
1989 pushed off at least one boatload of Vietnamese after
refueling and reprovisioning the boat. According to Bruneian
immigration officials, there were no pushoffs in 1991.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Bruneian citizens are unable to change their government through
established democratic processes. Under the continuing state
of emergency, there are no representative bodies at the
national or local level and, since the dissolution of the BNDP
in 1988, only the BNSP continues to function in spite of
government- imposed impediments. Citizens may seek to influence
the Government by working through appointed village headmen and
district officers, who meet regularly with their constituents.
They may also attempt to effect change by petitioning the
Sultan directly.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no government or private organizations in Brunei that
deal specifically with the protection of human rights. Amnesty
International (AI) reports that on several occasions it
appealed to the Sultan for the release of a number of political
prisoners, who at the time were being held by the Government,
some for many years without trial, but received no reply. In
1988 the Government appeared before the U.N. Human Rights
Commission to answer AI allegations of human rights violations
relating to ISA detentions. The Government acknowledged the
detentions but defended them on the grounds of national
security. As noted in Section l.d., the Government released
all known detainees in 1990.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Women are denied equal status with men in a number of important
areas such as divorce, inheritance, and custody of children.
Men are eligible for permanent positions in government service
whether or not they hold university degrees; women are eligible
to hold government positions only on an impermanent,
month-to-month basis unless they are university graduates.
Women in month-to-month positions do not qualify for government
pensions, receive fewer allowances, and get less annual leave
than their male counterparts in permanent positions. While
there are no separate pay scales for women and men, women in
the work force traditionally have been concentrated in lower
paying clerical and secretarial jobs and have been less likely
to find positions offering rapid advancement. In recent
784
BRUNEI
years, however, employment opportunities for women have greatly
improved, largely due to a chronic labor shortage. A growing
number of women hold senior-level professional positions, and
the number of female university graduates is also increasing.
Religious authorities strongly encourage Brunei Muslim women to
wear the tudong, a traditional head covering, and a growing
number do so. There is no pressure on non-Muslim women to wear
the tudong, and few, if any, choose to wear it.
The incidence of domestic violence against women is extremely
low. Rape cases are similarly rare. Because of the close-knit
nature of Bruneian society, such behavior would be difficult if
not impossible to conceal and would not be tolerated. The
criminal penalty for a minor domestic assault is 1 to 2 weeks
in jail and a fine. An assault resulting in serious injury,
such as broken bones, would be punished by whipping and a
longer jail sentence.
Few of the substantial Chinese minority are citizens; those
having no claims to other nationalities were "British-protected
persons" prior to independence and are now either stateless
permanent or temporary residents. Even permanent residents may
not own land, but they are permitted to hold property through
7-year leases, the maximum term for lease agreements in
Brunei. The process of obtaining citizenship in Brunei is long
and difficult. Many aspirants complain that the Malay language
test, which one must pass to obtain citizenship, is
administered so rigorously that it is virtually impossible for
a non native speaker to pass. In general, however, the Chinese
community has prospered in Brunei, and much of the country's
commercial activity is conducted by Chinese. While the Chinese
have done well economically, many are now reevaluating their
position in Brunei, especially the prospects of their children
in a society in which ethnic Malay citizens are favored in such
areas as government employment. Some Chinese are emigrating.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Trade unions are legal in Brunei but must be registered with
the Government. Signatures of seven members are required for
registration. There are four registered trade unions, all of
them in the oil sector, with a total membership amounting to
less than 5 percent of the work force. All workers, including
civil servants other than those serving in the military and
police, are able to form or join trade unions. Unions are
independent of the Government. The Trade Unions Act of 1962
permits the formation of trade union federations in Brunei but
forbids affiliation of Brunei trade unions with labor
organizations outside Brunei. An individual contract is
required between an employer and each employee, but legal trade
union activities cannot be deemed to violate employee
contracts. Local legal experts interpret this provision as
conferring the right to strike, but there have been none.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Government has not prevented the legal registration of
trade unions, nor has it dissolved any. There is no government
interference with lawful union activity. It is illegal to
refuse employment or discriminate against an employee on the
basis of membership or nonmembership in a trade union. While
unions are legal and easy to register, conditions in Brunei are
not conducive to the development of trade unions; there is
785
BRUNEI
little interest on the part of workers in forming trade unions;
and existing unions are inactive. Brunei law is silent on
collective bargaining, which occurs in only a few industries.
Wage and benefit packages far exceed those of neighboring
nations; there is a lack of those kinds of industries in which
unions have traditionally developed; and there is a long
cultural tradition favoring consensus over confrontation. Wage
and benefit packages are arrived at through direct negotiations
between employer and employee, usually based on a standard
contract in use by the employer .
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited and not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Employment of children below the age of 16 is prohibited and
below the age of 18 requires parental consent and approval by
the Labor Commission. Women under 18 may not work at night or
on offshore oil platforms. Laws on the employment of children
are effectively enforced by the Labor Department, which is a
part of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Labor is in short supply, and market forces enable most
citizens of Brunei to command high wages. Brunei has a
government-established minimum wage which is more than adequate
to provide a worker and his family with a decent standard of
living. Overtime is paid for work in excess of 48 hours, and
double time is paid for work performed on legal holidays.
Occupational health and safety standards are established by
government regulation. Working conditions are subject to
inspection on a routine basis and in response to complaints by
Department of Labour (DOL) officials, working under the
supervision of the Commissioner of Labor (who heads the DOL) .
Labor regulations are generally effectively enforced by the
DOL, however, at the lower range of the labor sector
enforcement is lax, especially for foreign laborers. The Labor
Department is empowered to close any workplace where health,
safety, or working conditions are unsatisfactory.
786
BURMA
Burma is a military dictatorship ruled by the 19-member State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which seized power
in September 1988 after suppressing massive, countrywide,
prodemocracy demonstrations. These demonstrations had led to
the resignation of long-time military ruler Ne Win, whose
policies had isolated Burma from the international community
and engendered economic decline. The military imposed martial
law and established the SLORC, headed by the armed forces
commander-in-chief, as Burma's governing body. Members of this
council are all senior military leaders. Although the military
held a relatively free election in May 1990, it did not
transfer power to the victorious party, which was headed by the
leaders of the 1988 demonstrations. Moreover, it took further
steps in 1991 to prolong its rule until a constitution and
civilian leadership acceptable to the military can be
produced. Such preconditions could well take years to fulfill.
The military Government enforces martial law by posting troops
in major urban centers and by a pervasive security apparatus
composed of the military's Directorate of Defense Services
Intelligence (DDSI) as well as several police intelligence
agencies under the Ministry of Home and Religious Affairs. An
11 p.m. to 4 a.m. curfew; surveillance of government employees
and private citizens; restrictions on contact with foreigners;
arrests, harassment, and torture of political activists; and
repeated denunciations of agitators and foreign interference
buttress the military's control.
The military Government justifies its security apparatus as
necessary to maintain law and order and to combat numerous
ethnic insurgencies, though in recent years these have posed no
threat to the country's major population centers. Insurgent
groups engage in small-scale fighting, mostly in remote areas,
in hopes of lessening domination by the ethnic Burman majority.
Apart from the Karen National Union (KNU), these groups are
financed mostly through trafficking in and/or producing
narcotics .
After Ne Win's 26-year rule reduced what was once Southeast
Asia's richest land to a U.N. -designated "least developed
country", the new military Government formally abandoned his
"Burmese Way to Socialism," opening up the economy to permit
modest expansion of the private sector and attract foreign
investment as well as badly needed foreign exchange. It has
failed, however, to address fundamental problems: highly
centralized decisionmaking; significant restrictions on private
commercial activity; an overvalued currency; rapid monetary
expansion; a timid, bloated bureaucracy; and disproportionate
funding for military purposes.
Politically motivated arrests decreased in 1991, perhaps due to
reduced activity by opposition groups that had been previously
devastated by arrests of their members. Burma's deplorable
human rights situation did not otherwise measurably improve.
Politically motivated arrests continued throughout the year,
particularly after the award of the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize to
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Torture, arbitrary
detentions, and compulsory labor persisted. The military
Government's program for ralocating many urban poor continues
to wreak hardship, though some experts believe it also may
serve legitimate long-term objectives. Freedom of speech, the
press, assembly, and association remain practically nonexistent.
The military continued to negate the right of the people to
change their government by failing to implement the results of
787
BURMA
the 1990 elections, in which the opposition National League for
Democracy (NLD) won over 80 percent of the seats in a new
National Assembly. The new Assembly has never been allowed to
meet, 70 of its 485 members have been arrested on political
charges, nearly 20 have fled the country, at least 6 have
resigned, and a,t least 1 has died in custody.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no verifiable reports of government-directed
political or extrajudicial killings in 1991. There were
sufficient credible reports, however, to suggest that a few
civilian deaths resulted from brutality in prison, including
denial of medical treatment. Several political prisoners,
including elected National Assembly member U Tin Maung Win and
writer Ba Thaw (also known as Maung Thawka) , died under
circumstances aggravated by poor treatment in custody. There
were also credible reports that over 100 political prisoners
and common criminals died while performing forced labor under
inhumane conditions.
While there was no clear evidence that any summary executions
were carried out against civilians in 1991, some knowledgeable
observers believe that secret extrajudicial killings
occasionally occur. A number of death sentences were publicly
announced after trials which fell far short of international
standards. However, well-placed observers believe that none
was actually carried out.
b. Disappearance
The number of people who disappeared during 1991 seems to be
far smaller than in 1988 and 1989, but accurate estimates are
again impossible. Family and friends assume that those who
have disappeared are under detention or have died in jail.
Some who disappeared were later reported as arrested. Others
may have dropped out of sight or quietly attempted to leave the
country for fear of arrest. A handful of youths continued to
join student insurgent groups fighting the regime, while others
were impressed as army porters.
Authorities seldom responded to inquiries from embassies or
from families concerning the whereabouts and welfare of
disappeared or jailed people. The few replies routinely
consisted of only general statements that such people were
arrested for violations of existing laws.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Substantial evidence documents that torture, beatings and
mistreatment of political detainees continued to take place in
Burmese prisons and detention centers operated by the DDSI .
Maltreatment includes sleep and food deprivation; beatings of
prisoners severe enough to cause permanent injury; suffocation;
cigarette burns; electrical shocks to the genitals and
elsewhere; and forcing prisoners to squat or assume unnatural
positions for lengthy periods. Techniques designed to
intimidate and disorient prisoners prior to interrogation are
also routinely practiced. Prisoners assigned to forced labor.
50-726 - 92 - 26
788
BURMA
such as sugarcane harvesting and road construction in remote
areas, were reportedly given inadequate food, water, medical
care, and protection from the elements.
Guards and prison physicians also have deprived political
prisoners of needed medical treatment. Imprisoned antiregime
activists have received beatings after requesting medical
attention, according to several well-sourced reports. Despite
repeated expressions of concern by foreign governments and
international hiiman rights organizations, the regime made no
apparent effort to investigate charges of torture or to punish
members of the security forces involved. The military
Government routinely denied that it engaged in torture or
condoned the practice.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The regime arbitrarily detained or arrested hundreds of people
during 1991, though exact figures are not available. Most were
held only a short time and released after interrogation, but
significant numbers were subsequently rearrested. Detainees
were commonly accused of violating criminal statutes, although
some were simply held without trial. Detention and
interrogation of political party officials occurred regularly,
either as harassment or reprisals for antigovernment statements
or actions. In connection with the insurgent activity in the
Irrawaddy Delta and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Aung
San Suu Kyi, for example, the military Government arrested 9
Members of Parliament, over a dozen leaders of small political
parties, and well over 200 rank and file members of opposition
groups. While most detainees were members of political parties
or people involved in distributing antigovernment literature,
businessmen and other private citizens were also subject to
arbitrary detention.
In July the military, without public announcement, extended by
6 months the house arrest of National League for Democracy
General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi, who in October was awarded
the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize. The decision was taken under the
provisions of the "Law to Safeguard the State From the Dangers
of Subversive Elements" — also the basis for her initial year of
house arrest which began in 1989. In August the military
Government amended this law to authorize further 1-year
extensions of arbitrary detention without charge or trial for
up to 5 years. Aung San Suu Kyi has never been formally
charged. Similarly, former Prime Minister U Nu has been held
under house arrest since December 1989.
Even before the establishment of martial law, there was no
provision in Burmese law for judicial determination of the
legality of detention. Under martial law people have no
pretrial rights. There is also no bail for defendants in
martial law proceedings, though bail may be granted by civilian
courts.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Burma remained under martial law throughout 1991. Official
spokesmen on numerous occasions emphasized that the military
Government rules according to martial law and is not bound by
any constitutional restrictions. Military tribunals continue
to exercise jurisdiction over all cases involving defiance of
orders issued by the SLORC or local military commanders.
Tribunals can mete out the death penalty, a life sentence, or a
789
BURMA
minimum of 3 years' imprisonment with labor irrespective of
existing legal provisions.
The tribunals are free to svmunon or reject witnesses, and to
consider or ignore evidence. The accused is not presumed
innocent and has no right to a defense attorney. When allowed
to participate,, a defense attorney's role is severely limited.
Lawyers have been warned that an overly aggressive defense
could jeopardize both attorney and client. Subject to certain
conditions, appeal is possible. Sentences of 3 years'
imprisonment may be appealed to the regional commander within
30 days. In cases involving the death sentence, life
imprisonment, or sentences of over 3 years, appeals may be
lodged within 30 days with the army commander-in-chief.
Significantly, among dozens of cases known to be tried by
military tribunals, there have been no reports of acquittals or
of any convictions being overturned on appeal.
In 1991 the military courts continued to hand out heavy
sentences to political prisoners, ranging up to 25 years'
imprisonment for peaceful opposition activity. Also in 1991,
some political sentences were arbitrarily extended. For
example, opposition leaders Chit Khine and Kyi Maung had been
sentenced in 1990 to 7 and 10 years' imprisonment, respectively,
but in 1991 their prison terms were each extended by an
additional 10 years.
The number of political prisoners in Burma remains impossible
to estimate, but credible sources suggest that as many as 2,000
may be in jail. Rangoon's Insein Prison as well as prisons in
Mandalay, Tharrawaddy, Kalemyo, and at least three other
locations reportedly hold political prisoners. The military
Government denies holding any political prisoners and maintains
that all those jailed are common lawbreakers and insurgent
"terrorists." However, the military Government's own
propaganda makes clear that it considers such acts as
possession of opposition literature and tape recordings to be
tantamount to "terrorism." Despite martial law, civil suits
and common crimes of no interest to the State are left to
civilian courts. Though corruption remains widespread and
judges are vulnerable to pressure from military authorities,
some informed sources report that these civilian courts have
become somewhat more professional and fair in handling
nonpolitical cases since 1988. Most political cases are
handled by military courts. Some basic due process rights,
including the right to a public trial and to be represented by
a defense attorney, are generally respected by civilian judges.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The State continued to intrude extensively into the lives of
private citizens during 1991. Forced entry and warrantless,
unannounced searches of private homes were often conducted.
The military Government strictly monitored the travel,
whereabouts, and activities of many Burmese, including
political leaders elected in 1990. A ubiquitous system of
neighborhood informers reported on dissidents and critics of
the military Government. Civil servants and political party
officials were also ordered to report whether any of their
relatives had fled the country or contacted insurgent
organizations. Security personnel selectively monitored
private correspondence and telephone calls. Contacts or
communications involving foreigners were subject to especially
intense scrutiny, and government employees were generally
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required to obtain advance permission from higher authorities
before meeting with foreigners.
The military Government continued a program of forced
resettlement, involving an estimated half-million people
throughout the country since 1989. While the military
Government described all those forced to move as "squatters,"
some people had been living on these properties for many years
and had constructed permanent houses. Persons who protested
resettlement were subject to arrest, and there were credible
reports that the authorities continued to use intimidation and
threats of force against reluctant neighborhoods. Unconfirmed
reports also allege official involvement in land speculation in
areas vacated through the resettlement program. The military
Government has resettled people, almost totally at their own
expense, to "new towns" which are far from their previous
residences. Occupants cjuite often live on abandoned rice paddy
land, subject to flooding in the rainy season, without adequate
transportation, medical facilities, or sanitation. However,
conditions at some resettlement sites were generally improving
in 1991, and some outside experts accept the military
Government's explanation that the resettlement program serves
legitimate long-term urban planning objectives. They do not,
however, endorse the forceful methods often used to move people.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
There were no confirmed reports in 1991 of deaths from the use
of excessive government force to put down peaceful opposition
demonstrations. There was, however, one credible report that
at least two people suffocated to death in an overcrowded
police van immediately after wholesale arrests on suspicion of
insurgent activity.
The Burmese Army has battled diverse insurgencies for- more than
four decades. These conflicts have resulted in numerous human
rights violations on both sides, including mistreatment and
killing of prisoners, neglect of sick and wounded, impressment
of civilians for porter duty, and indiscriminate attacks on
civilians .
In 1991 there were some reliable reports of deaths of impressed
Burmese army porters. The Burmese military continues to use
civilian corvee labor and prison labor in combat areas. There
were reliable reports, for example, that several hundred
prisoners were sent from Rangoon's Insein prison to work as
porters in the military's Irrawaddy Delta campaign. Credible
reports from multiple sources indicate that porters carry
ammunition, supplies, and wounded under the harshest
conditions. Other well-placed sources also note that they are
subject to hostile fire as well as maltreatment at the hands of
Burmese soldiers. They are placed at the head of columns to
detonate mines and booby traps and to spring ambushes. When
porters are wounded, fall ill, or become unable to continue
their work, they are left unattended to die. At the end of
their service, survivors often must find their own means to
return home.
Government-controlled media routinely cited numerous examples
of insurgent violence causing civilian and military deaths,
including several reports that the KNU and other insurgent
organizations killed civilians during attacks on villages and
ambushes along transportation routes. There were also credible
reports that the KNU executed two people accused of spying for
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the military Governraent after a "trial" by the opposition
Democratic Alliance of Burma.
As in past years, Burmese authorities denied impartial
observers permission to travel to areas of heavy insurgent
activity ostensibly for security reasons. Information about
human rights abuses by either side in those areas is therefore
all but impossible to verify.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Severe restrictions on freedom of speech persisted throughout
1991. Though the degree of enforcement varied, the military
Government did not tolerate opposing views and criticism.
Private citizens remained reluctant to express opinions for
fear of government informers. The military Government
continued to ban publications which criticized its programs and
policies .
Government propaganda repeatedly denounced various foreign news
organizations for interference in Burma's affairs. Censors
occasionally banned issues of newsmagazines with articles
criticizing regime practices or reporting activities of
opposition figures or groups. While the military Government
continued to discourage listening to foreign radio broadcasts,
these remained a major source of information for the Burmese
people and even the military.
The military Government continues to operate the mass media,
including television, radio, and the only newspapers, the
Working People's Daily and Rangoon's City News. Military
officials appoint newspaper editors and approve editorials in
advance. Especially for domestic news, journalists must
observe strict publishing and broadcast guidelines. The
military Government receives the product of several wire
services, but selects and edits international news before
publication or broadcast. All forms of communication — domestic
and imported books and periodicals, stage plays, motion
pictures, and musical recordings — are officially controlled and
censored. Criticism of the military Government, its officials,
or sectors of the economy it controls or partially controls is
not permitted.
In 1991 the official media spearheaded the military
Government's determined propaganda campaign against "decadent"
Western culture. Burmese were discouraged from adopting
Western styles of music, dance, and dress. Nevertheless,
foreign audio and video recordings, as well as modern Western
clothing, remained widely available and extremely popular in
Burma .
University teachers and professors are subject to the same
restrictions on freedom of speech, political activities, and
publications as other government employees. These include
freguent warnings against criticism of the military Government;
repeated instructions not to discuss politics while at work;
and strictures against joining or supporting political parties,
engaging in political activity, and meeting foreign officials.
The military Government began a purge of civil servants and
teachers in September, accusing them of lack of political
loyalty and "deceptive practices." At least several hundred,
and perhaps thousands, were fired from their jobs.
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Virtually the entire Burmese university system was closed from
the time of the 1988 disturbances until May 1991. Prior to the
opening of the new academic year in October 1991, all educators
were required to complete questionnaires concerning their
loyalty to the military Government and their personal political
views. In actions separate from the purge described above,
several dozen teachers and administrators were reportedly
dismissed because the authorities deemed their answers
insufficiently supportive of official policy. Similar
mandatory questionnaires were distributed during 1991 to other
civil servants and political party officials, who were then
faced with a choice between renouncing their political views or
likely arrest. Students were allowed to return to viniversity
only after they and their parents signed promises not to engage
in any ant i government activity. When Rangoon and Mandalay
students nevertheless staged prodemocracy demonstrations on
December 10 and 11, the military Government once again
announced the indefinite closure of all universities, colleges,
and technical schools.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The military Government does not respect the right to freedom
of peaceful assembly. A martial law edict prohibiting outdoor
assemblies of more than five people was again unevenly
enforced, but political demonstrations were strictly banned.
Political parties were required to request permission from
military authorities even to hold internal meetings of their
own membership. The military's intimidation generally served
to discourage public expressions of antigovernment sentiments.
However, on December 10 and 11, hundreds of university students
demonstrated peacefully in Rangoon and Mandalay in support of
detained Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi and for
democracy. The military Government responded by sending in
large numbers of heavily armed troops, arresting well over 100
people, and closing all of the country's higher education
institutions for an indefinite period. In a few other reported
instances of opposition political activity, security forces
intervened swiftly to arrest participants in unauthorized
meetings and to halt distribution of antigovernment leaflets.
The right of association exists only for those organizations
permitted by law and duly registered with the military
Government. Moreover, the military Government severely
restricts the activities of even these organizations.
Seventy-five political parties remained formally legal at the
end of 1991, but they were effectively paralyzed through
arrests, intimidation, and constant surveillance. Under
intense government pressure, the leading opposition National
League for Democracy (NLD) dropped several detained leaders
from its Central Executive Committee and expelled General
Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi from the party.
Trade associations and professional bodies, like other
organizations, are permitted only if sanctioned by the military
Government, which strictly monitors their activities. Members
are not free to discuss politics or criticize the regime. The
military Government took steps during 1991 to establish tight
control over the hitherto independent Burmese Chamber of
Commerce. The old chamber was dissolved and replaced by an
association packed with government officials.
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BUEMA
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in law and widely observed
in practice. The great majority of Burmese are Buddhist, and
the military Government frequently proclaims its commitment to
Buddhism in seeking to establish its own legitimacy. Sizable
numbers of Christians, Muslims, and animists exist among
various minority ethnic groups. While generally allowing these
groups to practice freely, security services monitor the
activities of some religious communities. The military
Government recpaires all religious organizations to register,
and subjects religious publications to the same control and
censorship imposed on secular ones. In 1991 there were
numerous, but often unsubstantiated, reports that government
troops committed abuses against Muslim populations in Arakan
State, including destroying of mosques and Muslim cemeteries
and carrying out several hundred arrests and beatings, and
dozens of rapes. While the area is inaccessible to independent
observers and many of the accusations appear exaggerated,
credible sources report that upwards of 20,000 Muslim refugees
fled from Arakan State to Bangladesh. The military Government
has denied allegations of abuse while acknowledging that a
relatively small number of arrests were made, largely for
illegal currency transactions and smuggling. Some refugees have
claimed that the Burmese Army forcibly uprooted civilian
populations, an apparent response to actions of at least two
insurgent groups in Arakan State that seek to achieve autonomy
through armed struggle.
In the fall of 1990, the authorities arrested upwards of 100
politically active Buddhist clerics, outlawed several groups of
opposition monks, and took other repressive measures in
reaction to organized passive opposition by monks in Mandalay
and elsewhere. While only a handful of monks were reportedly
arrested in 1991, little information emerged on the whereabouts
or fate of those monks previously detained. Restrictions on
unauthorized religious groups remained in force, and military
authorities continued to monitor activities in and around
Buddhist monasteries and pagodas.
Religious groups can and do establish links with coreligionists
in other countries, although such links are reportedly
monitored by the military Government. The Catholic Church, for
example, maintains ties to the Vatican. Foreign religious
representatives are usually allowed only tourist visas and are
not permitted to preach, proselytize, or remain to carry out
missionary activities. Permanent missionary establishments
have not been permitted since the 1960 's.
As part of its large-scale "urban development" program in
recent years, the military Government has taken control of
several Christian and Muslim properties throughout Burma. In
1991 credible sources report that more than 10 Muslim mosques
were seized by the military Government nationwide. Muslim
cemeteries were reportedly destroyed in Mandalay, Moulmein, and
Pegu.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Although Burmese citizens have the legal right to live anywhere
in the country, an estimated 500,000 poor urban residents have
been -forcibly relocated to rural areas since 1989. Except for
limitations in areas of insurgent activity, Burmese citizens
may travel freely within the country but must inform local
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BURMA
authorities of their temporary place of residence. People who
fail to report either guests or intentions to stay overnight to
the authorities are subject to a jail term, and arrests are
occasionally made. Throughout the year, the military
Government imposed an 11 p.m. to 4 a.m. curfew on the entire
country. In most cases, the curfew was strictly enforced.
Burmese authorities do not recognize the right of everyone to
leave his or her own country. Passport applicants must justify
the reason for each trip abroad, generally supported by an
employment offer or similar document. Legal requirements,
bureaucratic procedures, and corruption cause long delays in
obtaining passports. Emigrants must reimburse the military
Government for "educational expenses" before receiving exit
permission and are severely limited in what they may take with
them. Those who leave the country illegally may return but
must go through judicial proceedings.
Burmese citizens who leave the country legally are generally
allowed to return to visit relatives. However, the law does
not recognize dual citizenship, and acquiring citizenship in
another country results in loss of Burmese nationality. While
those who take citizenship in another country are legally
banned from returning, the military Government has shown
flexibility within the last 2 years in permitting some former
Burmese to visit for brief periods. Emigrants wishing to
return permanently are required to reapply for Burmese
citizenship, and approval is not guaranteed. Noncitizen
residents, including ethnic Indians and Chinese born in Burma
who hold foreigners' registration cards, must obtain prior
permission to travel.
Foreign refugees or displaced people may not resettle or seek
safe haven within Burma. The military Government treats people
claiming to be refugees as illegal immigrants and expels or
imprisons them.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Burma is governed solely by the military, and the Burmese
people do not have the right or the ability peacefully to
change their government. In the past 3 years, active duty
military officers replaced civilians in important positions
throughout the bureaucracy. The military occupied every
cabinet-level position except that of foreign minister,
numerous director general and subordinate posts, and key
positions previously held by technocrats in the economic
ministries .
On May 27, 1990, the military Government held Burma's first
national election involving multiple parties in 30 years.
While the election campaign was severely restricted and several
leading opposition figures were barred from participation,
election day procedures were free and fair.
In the election, the National League for Democracy (NLD)
received nearly 60 percent of valid votes cast and over 80
percent of the parliamentary seats. By the end of 1991,
however, the military Government still had not transferred
power. Meanwhile, it arrested most of the leadership of the
NLD. In late 1991, the military Government exerted pressure
against NLD leaders at the national, state, division, and
township levels by querying them about whom they considered to
be the leader of their party. The leaders were given to
understand that neither the name of jailed NLD Chairman Tin Oo
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nor that of detained General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi would
be appropriate answers. By the end of 1991, a total of over 90
elected opposition parliamentarians were either in custody, in
exile, or dead. Dozens of politically active people, including
parliamentarians and leaders of minor opposition parties, were
detained and pressured to denounce the Nobel Prize. In July
the military Government also retroactively amended the election
law to provide for disqualification of elected parliamentarians
on a wide range of grounds, including conviction for vaguely
defined crimes involving "moral turpitude." The authorities
now insist that transfer of power to a civilian government can
occur only after completion of a protracted constitution-
drafting process under its control. The conditions it has
imposed effectively negate the election results and ensure
indefinite military rule.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No internal human rights organizations are allowed to exist. A
group called Amnesty International of Burma, established during
the 1988 prodemocracy demonstrations, was subsequently denied
registration as a legal organization. The military Government
resents outside scrutiny of its human rights record. It is
only selectively willing to discuss human rights problems with
foreign governments or nongovernmental organizations and
routinely denies visas to foreign officials other than U.N.
experts concerned with human rights. The military consistently
denies charges of abuses and criticizes other governments and
independent organizations for interfering in its affairs.
Many nongovernmental organizations and governments have
repeatedly and publicly expressed concern over various human
rights abuses in Burma. The February 1990 meeting of the
United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) appointed an
"independent expert" who visited Burma to examine Burma's human
rights situation and who subsequently presented a confidential
report to the UNHRC ' s 1991 session. The UNHRC decided to keep
the case of human rights in Burma under review for another
year, and a new independent expert visited Burma in October.
While the expert met with senior Burmese officials and visited
Insein prison, the government-arranged and supervised program
provided little scope for interaction with the Burmese people.
In November the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution
urging Burma's government to establish a democratic state and
to allow all citizens to participate freely in the democratic
process. The resolution, which Burma's U.N. representative
rejected as "interference" in Burma's internal affairs, also
expressed concern about Burma's "grave" human rights situation
and recalled an appeal by the U.N. Secretary General for the
release of detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Burma's numerous ethnic minorities have been underrepresented
in the military Government and largely excluded from the
military leadership. These minorities have their own distinct
cultures and languages. Despite recently increased government
attention to the problem, economic development among minorities
continued to lag and many still live at the subsistence level.
This is due in part to geographic factors which impede economic
development in the rugged, isolated, border areas populated by
minorities. People of nonethnic Burmese ancestry, primarily
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Indians and Chinese, are denied full citizenship and excluded
from government positions. In addition, some have been denied
national identity cards, especially in Arakan State. Indian
and Chinese minorities continue to play an important role in
the economy — a situation resented by many Burmans . Social
prejudice against the country's Muslim community has in the
past erupted into violence and prompted official actions
infringing on the practice of Islam. Multiple, reliable
sources indicate that the military occasionally requires
minority populations to provide without compensation vehicles,
equipment, and lodging for soldiers.
Women in Burma have traditionally enjoyed a relatively high
status. They exercise the same basic rights as men and have an
active role in business. They keep their own names after
marriage and often control family finances. Female
participation is low in the minuscule industrial sector and in
the bureaucracy. There are no women's rights organizations in
Burma .
There is no violence directed specifically against women and
authorities appeared generally to treat detained women better
than men. Although Burmese culturally view rape with great
abhorrence, there were nonetheless widespread unconfirmed
reports of rapes committed in 1991 by Burmese soldiers against
Muslim women in Arakan State, as well as some allegations of
such incidents elsewhere in the country.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
After seizing power in 1988, the military banned the workers'
and peasants' organizations established by the previous
Government. Several political parties established workers'
organizations or committees to consider labor issues, but there
continue to be no trade unions and no independent labor
movement in Burma. Workers are not free to form or join trade
unions of their own choosing, and leaders of unofficial labor
associations are subject to arrest. Workers do not have the
right to strike and none did so in 1991.
In April 1989, the United States suspended Burma's eligibility
for trade concessions under the Generalized System of
Preferences program (GSP) pending steps to afford its labor
force internationally recognized worker rights. In 1990 a
United States interagency government committee declined a
formal request to reconsider the suspension.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers have no right to organize and bargain collectively.
Military authorities are the sole arbiter of workers' issues.
The regime abolished labor arbitration boards which, while
government controlled, at least theoretically provided means
for airing labor disputes. No special export processing
economic zones exist.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Burma's legal code does not prohibit forced labor. The
military Government routinely employs corvee labor on its
myriad building projects and, according to credible reports,
officials at times accept bribes to excuse people from work.
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BURMA
The Burmese army has for decades conscripted civilian males to
serve as porters. According to numerous eyewitness reports
this past year, the army continued to take youths off the
streets in various cities in minority areas. Women are now
also being impressed as cooks and launderers for soldiers in
front-line areas, according to one report. Military
authorities commonly permit conscripted persons and their
families to pay money in lieu of serving as porters.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children aged 13 to 15 may work 4 hours a day. The penalty for
employers who disregard this regulation, 2 years in prison,
generally is not enforced. In cities, working children are
highly visible. Many spend their nights on the street,
according to numerous reliable sources. They are hired at
lower rates than adults for the same kind of work, and economic
pressure forces them to work not only for their survival but
also to support their families.
Burmese law requires children to attend school through the
fourth standard, usually reached between the ages of 12 and
15. The Department of Basic Education estimates, however, that
38 percent of children aged 5 to 9 never enroll in school. Of
those who do, less than 30 percent complete the fourth grade.
Two-thirds of Burma's primary school children, primarily in
rural areas, leave school for economic reasons. In the higher
grades, the drop-out rate for girls is double that of boys.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is a legally prescribed 5-day, 35-hour workweek for
employees in the public sector and a 6-day, 44-hour workweek
for private and parastatal sector employees, with overtime paid
for additional work. Workers have 21 paid holidays a year.
While there is a government mandated minimum wage, it is
insufficient to provide a decent standard of living. The
actual average wage rate for casual laborers in Rangoon is
about twice the official minimum. Wages continue to lag far
behind inflation. There are numerous provisions to protect
health and safety at workplaces, pertaining to room size,
ventilation, fire hazards, and the availability of latrines and
drinking water. In practice, these are seldom enforced,
particularly in the private sector.
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The year 1991 was marked by major political changes in
Cambodia. The four warring factions finally signed a
Comprehensive Settlement Agreement in Paris in October calling
on the United Nations to supervise the cease-fire, cantonment,
and demobilization of forces, and to prepare for and conduct
free and fair elections in Cambodia. In November the U.N.
Advance Mission was deployed, and Prince Sihanouk returned to
set up the Supreme National Council in Phnom Penh. Meanwhile,
the Phnom Penh regime endorsed multiparty and free market
policies in an Extraordinary Party Congress called in advance
of the Paris Conference. Before the year ended, Cambodians had
begun speaking out and expressing some of their frustrations in
a number of anti-Khmer Rouge and anticorruption demonstrations.
This report thus attempts to describe human rights conditions
in Cambodia as they have changed over the course of the year.
The regime in Phnom Penh has called itself the State of
Cambodia (SOC) since 1989, but it is still freqiaently referred
to by its former name, the People's Republic of Kampuchea
(PRK). Headed by Party Chairman and National Assembly
President Chea Sim, Council of Ministers Chairman Hun Sen, and
Honorary Party Chairman and Council of State Chairman Heng
Samrin, the regime was installed by the Vietnamese army which
drove the Communist Khmer Rouge from Phnom Penh in 1979.
Although Vietnam withdrew most of its forces from Cambodia in
1989, Hanoi continues to exert some influence over the Phnom
Penh regime's policies.
Between 1975 and 1979, when the Khmer Rouge held power in
Cambodia, it compiled one of the worst records of human rights
violations in history as a result of a thorough and brutal
attempt at restructuring Cambodian society. More than 1
million people, out of a total population of 7 million, were
killed or died under the Khmer Rouge's murderous reign.
The current Phnom Penh regime, although controlling most of the
territory of Cambodia, is not recognized by the majority of the
international community. In fact, with the postsettlement
establishment in Phnom Penh of the Cambodian Supreme National
Council (SNC) under Prince Sihanouk, those governments which
had recognized the Hun Sen regime have generally switched their
accreditation to the SNC. Under the 1989 Phnom Penh regime's
Constitution, power is wielded by the Communist Kampuchean
People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) as the "sole leader of the
entire Cambodian society." The KPRP held an Extraordinary
National Congress in October to prepare for participation in
the postsettlement elections. It changed its name to the
Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and endorsed a free market and
multiparty system.
Prior to the signing of the Comprehensive Settlement Agreement
on October 23, the KPRP ' s control over Cambodia was challenged
by the National Government of Cambodia (NGC) , formerly known as
the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) . This
resistance coalition was composed of the Communist Khmer Rouge
and two factions making up the non-Communist resistance (NCR) .
The first NCR faction is the National United Front for an
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia
(FUNCINPEC), whose leader is now Prince Ranariddh, son of
Prince Sihanouk. FUNCINPEC s military force is the National
Army of Independent Cambodia (ANKI). The second is the Khmer
People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by former Prime
Minister Son Sann. The KPNLF armed forces are commanded by
General Sak Sutsakhan and operate independently of the KPNLF
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political leadership. The forces of the three resistance
groups had each been waging war against the Phnom Penh regime
from enclaves in western and northern Cambodia and areas along
the Thai-Cambodian border. A voluntary cease-fire has been in
place since May, however, and the coalition has effectively
been dissolved since the settlement in October.
As part of international efforts to negotiate a settlement
ending the conflict, the four Cambodian factions — including the
Phnom Penh regime — established the SNC, which is to represent
Cambodia during the transitional period before the formation of
a new and legitimate government. According to the settlement,
the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) is to
organize, conduct, and supervise free and fair elections which
are now expected in the spring of 1993. UNTAC will also
monitor and supervise the cease-fire, withdrawal of foreign
forces, and cantonment and demobilization of factional forces.
Prince Sihanouk returned on November 14 to set up the SNC in
Phnom Penh, and the U.N. Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)
is now in Cambodia preparing for the deployment of UNTAC. U.S.
diplomats opened the U.S. Mission in Phnom Penh on November 11.
In light of Cambodia's tragic recent history, the settlement
agreement noted the need for special measures to assure
protection of human rights, charged UNTAC with guaranteeing
oversight of human rights, and proposed that the U.N. Human
Rights Commission [UNHRC] closely monitor human rights in
Cambodia .
Cambodia's economic system continued its transition to a market
economy in 1991. Despite continued growth of the private
sector, which led to a marginal increase in the living
standards of Cambodians, the country again experienced severe
shortages of goods. Agricultural production was below normal
due to severe flooding and lack of farm equipment and draft
animals. Widespread corruption by officials of the Phnom Penh
regime continued to exacerbate economic problems, as did the
elimination of assistance from Eastern European countries and
the Soviet Union.
As in previous years, accurate information on the Phnom Penh
regime's human rights record is scarce. Travelers to Cambodia
and Cambodians who have left the country indicate that human
rights violations — including the absence of due process; the
continued imprisonment of large numbers of political prisoners;
restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly and
association, and religion; and an almost complete lack of
worker rights — continued to occur in sections of the country
under the control of the Phnom Penh regime, despite recent
evidence of substantial improvements. As in previous years, it
has been easier to obtain information on the NCR's human rights
practices than on either the Phnom Penh regime or the Khmer
Rouge .
Serious human rights violations by the Khmer Rouge, including
attacks on civilians and communications, disappearances, and
curbs on freedom of religion and other personal freedoms,
continued to be reported during 1991, although there were fewer
reports of egregious abuses. There were reports of Khmer Rouge
distributions of food, clothing and other forms of assistance
within Cambodia in an attempt to win the loyalty of the rural
population in particular. The Khmer Rouge top leadership from
1975-79 remains in place however, (albeit behind the scenes),
and there continue to be reliable reports that these leaders
retain their ultimate goal of regaining power in Cambodia.
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There were credible reports of human rights abuses by members
of both non-Communist groups during 1991. As in previous
years, lack of discipline in the KPNLF ranks resulted in acts
of banditry against some Thai villagers and Cambodians in the
border area and inside Cambodia. Some ANKI and KPNLF troops
were responsible for acts of violence against civilians living
in the non-Communist displaced persons camps in Thailand at
Site B and Site 2. An increase in the seriousness and violence
of such incidents on the part of NCR troops idled since the
cease-fire was reported in 1991. Respect for human rights by
residents of displaced persons camps of all three resistance
factions continued to improve, however, due largely to U.N.
training of Khmer police, the presence of U.N. security liaison
officers, and the expansion of the justice and court systems,
programs begun under U.N. auspices in 1989. The camp
administration opened a prison under the supervision of the
United Nations at Site 2.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
While there have been reports of political killing by the Phnom
Penh regime in recent years, there were no such reports in
either 1990 or 1991.
Although there were no reports of political killings by the
Khmer Rouge during 1991, a credible report in May stated that
the Khmer Rouge executed 30 persons in July 1990 for advocating
greater personal, economic, religious, and travel freedoms.
Despite the Khmer Rouge effort to improve its image and obtain
popular support in advance of the elections, civilians
continued to be killed during attacks by the Khmer Rouge on
towns, trains, and lines of communication during the first few
months of the year prior to the commencement of an informal
cease-fire in May.
The non-Communist factions were not directly accused of
extrajudicial killings during 1991. However, in June the
bodies of nine persons were discovered north of Site 2. The
media reported that the persons were executed as part of a
factional struggle within the KPNLF. Other sources have
indicated that those executed were bandits. There have been
other unconfirmed reports that the KPNLF and ANKI have
summarily executed alleged bandits.
b. Disappearance
Reports of disappearances in Cambodia continued during 1991.
As in previous years, many of these cases involved conscription
into the Phnom Penh armed forces. Khmer Rouge defectors
reported that Khmer Rouge soldiers, rather than killing Phnom
Penh regime and village officials, often abducted them for
"reeducation." Defectors from the Khmer-controlled Pailin area
also reported that the Khmer Rouge sometimes abducted gem
miners, forcing them to serve as porters for Khmer Rouge
units. The Khmer Rouge abducted three persons from the O'Trau
refugee camp in Thailand in 1991. They later were seen by U.N.
border relief workers imprisoned in another Khmer Rouge camp.
Residents of the camp reported that the three were accused of
selling guns and artifacts.
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c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Article 35 of the 1989 Phnom Penh Constitution specifically
prohibits the use of coercion or physical abuse against
prisoners. In past years, physical torture by regime
authorities had been reported both in rural areas and in Phnom
Penh at facilities under the control of both the Ministry of
Interior (and its subordinate civil police forces) and the
armed forces. Beginning in 1989, however, a few prisoners who
escaped or were released from regime prisons reported that the
regime had reduced its use of torture. Reports of torture
persisted in 1990, but there were no such incidents reported in
1991.
There were unconfirmed reports of KPNLF mistreatment of
Vietnamese prisoners held inside Cambodia. Most former Phnom
Penh regime prisoners, whether political or criminal, report
being beaten at some stage during their confinement. In
previous years, some detainees reported being held
incommunicado in small and completely dark solitary confinement
cells that were poorly ventilated and unsanitary. They were
constantly immobilized by shackles on both legs and were
sometimes handcuffed. Former prisoners reported that prison
officials often withheld food, water, and medical attention
from detainees during their interrogations. While there were
no specific reports in 1991, there is no evidence that this
practice has changed. There are no known cases of any
officials being prosecuted by the Phnom Penh regime for torture
or other mistreatment of prisoners. Reports of conditions
inside regime prisons are sparse. The Interior Ministry
refused Asia Watch's request to visit two prisons in Phnom Penh
to speak confidentially to prisoners about conditions. Despite
a request dating from 1981 for access to the regime's prisons,
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has not yet
been permitted access. The U.S. Mission in Phnom Penh
reported, however, that senior regime officials have recently
promised the ICRC access to prisons.
There were significant improvements in the conditions of jails
run by the United Nations in the displaced persons camps in
Thailand. This was due primarily to training and monitoring of
prison wardens by the United Nations as part of the institution
of a legal justice system and the construction of a prison at
Site 2. There were reliable reports, however, that at
locations outside these camps soldiers from the ANKI and KPNLF
continue to beat people suspected of spying for Phnom Penh.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Phnom Penh Constitution forbids unlawful "accusation,
arrest, detention, or imprisonment." However, the virtual
absence of legal process under the Phnom Penh regime remains.
There are reliable reports that the regime is trying to
establish at least the structure of a legal system, but a
severe lack of trained personnel has crippled the attempt.
Regime authorities often detain, interrogate, and jail common
criminals and resistance sympathizers for extended periods
without formal charges. This seems to be the rule rather than
the exception. In September Phnom Penh regime Foreign Minister
Hor Namhong announced that political prisoners will be released
once a settlement agreement is signed, and the regime
subsequently announced that 442 political prisoners were
released in October. It has been corroborated that at least
some regime officials arrested in 1990 for espousing democratic
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ideas were indeed released. In December members of Amnesty
International were received by Prince Sihanouk in Phnom Penh
and permitted to visit prison offices in the country.
A major obstacle to reducing the arbitrariness of the Phnom
Penh legal system is the role of the Interior Ministry.
According to one reliable report, the Interior Ministry remains
a law unto itself without check by other branches of the
regime. Among its other extrajudicial powers, the Interior
Ministry has authority to overturn all court rulings and
controls the regime's prison system.
In each displaced persons camp in Thailand, the United Nations
has worked closely with Khmer administrators to implement a
judicial system, incorporating both traditional Khmer and
Western legal procedures and codes. Under this system, a
judicial committee presides over trials open to the public, and
the accused has the right to address the court and the right to
legal counsel. In late 1991 the United Nations initiated a
program to inform the Khmer camp populations of their basic
human rights.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The 1989 Phnom Penh Constitution recognizes the presumption of
innocence and provides for a lawyer at every trial, if the
defendant requests one. It also provides for open trials but
permits secret trials if provided for by law.
In past years, political prisoners held by the Phnom Penh
regime were regularly denied fair trials. The situation does
not appear to have changed. Former prisoners reported in 1990
that the role of the regime's court system appeared to be
limited to determining a suspect's sentence, not deciding
whether the suspect was innocent or guilty. The regime has
used trials for propaganda and public intimidation. There are
few procedural rights for defendants. Defendants have been
required to memorize carefully and rehearse in advance all the
questions and answers to be presented in court, even in cases
where the interrogators have already decided to release them;
if these defendants satisfactorily recited their testimony as
rehearsed, they were released. Other reports indicated that
prisoners who had been arrested by regime authorities for
alleged cooperation with the resistance were incarcerated, not
as a result of judicial proceedings, but rather because they
confessed to their crimes under interrogation.
Recently released political prisoners estimate that there are
between 1,000 and 2,000 political prisoners held by the regime,
none of whom received fair trials. (Note: This was before the
announcement of the release of 442 political prisoners in
October.) Regulations of the regime provide for the arrest and
"reeducation" of "any person carrying out propaganda campaigns
to sabotage internal unity and Kampuchea-Laos-Vietnam
solidarity." Such "reeducation" means indefinite detention to
force a change in political values. Cambodians who left the
country in 1991 reported that the regime still operates
reeducation centers for political prisoners in various parts of
the country. Imprisonment as a form of extortion is also
reportedly practiced.
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f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Phnom Penh regime authorities search whenever and wherever they
wish and maintain extensive surveillance operations.
Cambodians who departed the country in 1991 reported that the
regime continues to maintain networks of informers who report
to the secret police. Visitors to Cambodia reported that
regime militia and soldiers regularly extort money from
travelers along the roads. The Phnom Penh regime also opens
and censors mail. In addition, since July 1990, the regime has
required that Cambodians wishing to marry foreigners or
overseas Khmer must obtain permission from the regime's Council
of Ministers.
The Khmer Rouge continued to regulate strictly the social
activity of those under its control. Khmer Rouge defectors
reported that the Khmer Rouge still strongly discourages its
members and civilians under its control from marrying freely.
Those who do not obtain permission before marriage can be
punished. Many Khmer Rouge defectors, however, reported a
relaxation of some restrictions in 1991. For example, Khmer
Rouge civilians who moved into Cambodia in 1991 reported that
obtaining permission to seek medical treatment in a
U.N. -assisted camp in Thailand is relatively easy. Although
the Khmer Rouge became more relaxed about contacts between its
populations and foreigners, visitors to Site K note that camp
leaders there still seem reluctant to allow foreigners private
access to camp residents.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Until the cease-fire took effect in May, troops from all
factions, but especially those from the Phnom Penh forces,
shelled targets indiscriminately, causing civilian casualties.
There were frequent incidents of banditry along the border by
NCR troops against Thai and Cambodian residents, some of whom
died in these attacks. In an August attack on Site 2, between
60 and 70 bandits killed 9 persons. In September Thai troops
reacting to a bandit attack on Site 2 fired a mortar round into
the camp, killing 1 person and wounding 10. In addition, all
factions have indiscriminately laid millions of mines
throughout Cambodia.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is severely restricted. The press
and radio in Cambodia are wholly controlled by the Phnom Penh
regime. The regime reserves the right to deny publication of
material that does not "express reality properly." Criticism
of the regime is not generally tolerated, though some persons
have reported seeing in Phnom Penh underground leaflets
critical of the regime. In May 1990, dozens of regime
officials were reportedly arrested for attempting to publish a
manifesto of a nascent opposition party. Some of these have
since reportedly been released (see Section l.d.). The editor
of the leading newspaper was removed from his position,
apparently for his association with this group. Possession of
foreign books and periodicals can result in arrest, but it is
doubtful that such regulations are strictly enforced.
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In some parts of the country, people who repeatedly listen to
foreign radio broadcasts after being warned not to do so are
detained without charge for a day or two. In other areas,
however, people may listen to the radio freely. The Phnom Penh
regime attempts to control what types of movies the population
sees, but widespread smuggling of video tapes has made movie
censorship virtually impossible. During 1990 the regime denied
visas to several foreign reporters and asked another to leave
the country, apparently because they had written articles
critical of the regime. Similarly, in 1991 a foreign
journalist was expelled, reportedly also for writing articles
critical of the regime.
Freedom of speech in camps and areas controlled by the
resistance varies considerably. In Site 2, residents often
speak their minds freely. However, credible sources report
that residents of Sok Sann (KPNLF) and Site B (FUNCINPEC) have
little freedom to criticize their leaders. Residents of
U.N. -assisted camps, including those run by the Khmer Rouge,
have access to a wide range of foreign publications. They also
may listen to the radio or watch television freely. Unlike in
past years, Khmer Rouge defectors reported in 1991 that
residents of most of these camps may now listen to foreign
radio and Thai television broadcasts.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The only associations permitted by the Phnom Penh regime are
those created to support the regime, such as those for farmers,
women, and youth. These are usually headed by ranking party or
regime officials. Since the settlement, however, there were
public demonstrations in Phnom Penh against corruption which
have in fact resulted in the dismissal of certain high-level
officials .
c. Freedom of Religion
Article 6 of the 1989 Phnom Penh Constitution makes Buddhism
the state religion of Cambodia. The regime also announced in
May 1989 that all men were free to enter the monkhood, provided
the ordination was approved by the regime and carried out by
designated senior monks. However, the Buddhist hierarchy is
controlled by the Phnom Penh authorities, and the curriculum of
temple schools is set by the Ministry of Education, which also
provides the teachers. Cambodians who left the country in 1991
indicate that, in most parts of the country, there has been a
pronounced relaxation of the regime's restrictions on religious
activity and there is now considerable freedom to practice
Buddhism and enter the monkhood. The regime authorities still
attempt to use the Buddhist hierarchy as one of a number of
organizations for "mass mobilization" to implement party
policies. Increasingly in 1991, the regime media widely
publicized the appearances by senior Phnom Penh leaders at
Buddhist ceremonies, which they often used to make political
speeches. The Phnom Penh regime allows Protestant and Roman
-Catholic communities in Phnom Penh to meet and hold services.
In January a Catholic church opened in Phnom Penh, reportedly
staffed by three foreign priests. Four Cambodian nuns have
also returned to Cambodia. Muslims continue to be able to
practice their religion. The October National Congress, while
recognizing Buddhism as the state religion, provided for
guarantees of religious freedom.
When in power in Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge actively sought to
exterminate religion. However, as part of its "united front"
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campaign, the Khmer Rouge now permits the construction of
temples in its camps and permits men to become monks.
Christianity and Islam were ruthlessly suppressed by the Khmer
Rouge when they controlled Cambodia and are not known to have
been revived in Khmer Rouge-controlled areas. Residents of all
camps affiliated with the non-Communist factions are free to
practice any religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Phnom Penh regime has eased controls on travel within
Cambodia, and travel has become easier despite regime attempts
to maintain systems of neighborhood surveillance, family
registration, and identification documents. The Interior
Ministry has issued identity cards which permit Cambodians
holding them to travel within the country without a travel
pass. Recent arrivals in Thailand from Cambodia report that
traders and other Cambodians can, either through bribing
officials at checkpoints or avoiding the checkpoints entirely,
move around the country freely.
Permission is required to travel abroad. Those traveling on
official business, including training programs abroad, have
little difficulty obtaining exit visas. However, those without
official reasons for travel have difficulty obtaining
permission and often must pay bribes, reportedly between $500
and $2,000 per person. Other Khmer seeking to leave the
country flee to the Thai border either to escape the conflict
or in the hope they can enter U.N. -supported refugee camps in
Thailand. Mines and bandits are endemic dangers in the border
areas and, increasingly, within Cambodia. Regime and
resistance soldiers often extort money from those fleeing
Cambodia before permitting them to cross into Thailand.
Most of the several hundred thousand Cambodian refugees who
fled to Thailand before 1980 have been approved for
resettlement and have departed for Western countries. However,
13,000 Cambodians accorded refugee status but rejected for
resettlement by third countries — generally because of close
contacts with the Khmer Rouge regime before 1979 — remain at the
Khao-I-Dang holding center in Thailand.
An additional 350,000 Cambodians — generally those who have fled
since 1980 — are in other camps on the Thai -Cambodian border.
They have not been accorded legal refugee status and are
considered "displaced persons" who will eventually return home
when security conditions permit. They are generally not
eligible for resettlement in third countries. The Phnom Penh
regime has agreed in principle to accept returning displaced
persons from camps in Thailand. It is also obliged under the
settlement agreement to honor the freedom of these displaced
persons to settle anywhere and to move about freely in
Cambodia. During 1991, 16 displaced persons were voluntarily
repatriated from Thailand.
In past years, some villages close to the Thai -Cambodian
border, especially those near known infiltration points, were
relocated by the Phnom Penh regime. During 1990 the regime
also relocated several thousand persons living far from the
border in Kompong Speu, moving them away from areas under the
influence of the Khmer Rouge. Recent reports indicate that
these villagers were moved to protect them from the fighting.
These persons remained displaced during 1991, although there
were no reports of additional displacement of villagers in
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1991. As many as 174,000 people within Cambodia had been moved
by the regime to relocation camps or had fled there because of
increased military activity. Cambodian refugees reported that
conditions in relocation camps were often primitive, without
clean water or sanitation.
Residents of the KPNLF ' s Site 2 and Sok Sann camps often
crossed the border to and from Cambodia during 1991. Residents
of the three U.N. -assisted Khmer Rouge camps were able to
depart their camps to farm (Site 8 and Au Trao) or to mine for
gems (Site K) . Many former Khmer Rouge camp residents now in
Cambodia frequently visit relatives in U.N. -assisted camps in
Thailand, but they report that not all people under Khmer Rouge
control are permitted to do so.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Cambodian people do not enjoy the right to change their
government through democratic means. The Kampuchean People's
Revolutionary Party (KPRP), now the Cambodian People's Party,
controls political life in the areas of the country governed by
the Vietnamese-installed Phnom Penh regime and allows no
competitors .
The only national election in the area controlled by the Phnom
Penh regime in 1981 did not allow genuine political
participation, but rather was staged by the regime to attempt
to demonstrate legitimacy. The regime's party was the only one
allowed to field candidates. Although National Assembly
members were supposed to serve terms of 4 years, no election
has been held since the original election. The regime
announced in 1989 that an election would take place before the
end of the year, but none was held. The October National
Congress endorsed liberal democracy and a multiparty system, as
well as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
An integral part of the Cambodian settlement agreement is the
staging of "free and fair elections." With the signing of a
comprehensive settlement agreement on Cambodia, the way was
opened for the first genuinely free elections since the
1950 's. If held as planned, they will permit Cambodians to
choose their own representatives and lead to a freer, more
democratic society. On October 31, however, officials
prevented a Cambodian-American from announcing plans to create
a new political party in Phnom Penh.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Independent local human rights groups do not exist.
Human rights violations in Cambodia have been the subject of
intense international attention since 1978, when the UNHRC and
its Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities began investigating the Khmer Rouge
record of atrocities.
In previous years the Phnom Penh regime refused to allow
investigations of alleged human rights abuses, though the
regime did permit a brief visit to Cambodia in August 1989 by
the Cambodia Documentation Commission. In 1990 the regime
allowed Asia Watch to study some aspects of the human rights
situation in Cambodia, although the regime refused its requests
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to visit prisoners. The ICRC has been unable to visit
political prisoners, despite an agreement in principle, because
of the Phnom Penh regime's insistence on limiting visits to
only a few of the regime's prisons. Phnom Penh informed U.S.
diplomats in December, however, that they are about to permit
ICRC prison visits. The regime has local Red Cross
organizations, but neither they nor any other groups within
regime-controlled areas have a role in the protection of human
rights .
The monitoring of human rights conditions required by the
comprehensive settlement should substantially improve the
ability of international human rights organizations to
investigate the human rights situation and may lead to
conditions in which local human rights groups might function.
All U.N. -assisted camps affiliated with the resistance allow
education in human rights issues as well as investigations of
human rights complaints. The Khmer Rouge do not permit
investigations of human rights issues in areas under their
control, except in U.N. -assisted camps.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Directives issued by the Phnom Penh regime in 1982 seemed to
accord a privileged status to Vietnamese immigrants as compared
with Cambodian residents, and there were many reports over the
years of Vietnamese taking advantage of their privileged status
to force Cambodians from desirable jobs or land. However, with
the announced departure of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in
1989, some Vietnamese merchants and settlers left Cambodia for
Vietnam. Travelers returning from Cambodia see little
indication that those Vietnamese who stayed have maintained
their privileged status. With the virtually complete
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, there have so far been no
reports of Cambodian reprisals against Vietnamese civilians.
The resistance repeatedly claimed in 1990 that there are more
than 1 million Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia, but there is no
independent, verified information on the number of Vietnamese
settlers in Cambodia. The resistance has dropped its demand
that all Vietnamese settlers must depart the country before a
peace settlement can be reached.
There is no specific information available on discrimination of
other types, including violence against women, although
international relief workers in the border camps have noted
that there appears to be significant physical abuse against
women and children in some of the camps.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers in Cambodia do not enjoy the right of association.
Organized labor is totally under the Phnom Penh regime's
control, and industries have organized branches of the
"Kampuchean Federation of Trade Unions" (KFTU), which is an
official mass organization headed by a member of the CPP ' s
standing committee. As far as can be determined, there is no
right to strike.
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b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no right to collective bargaining in Cambodia. Wage
scales for the few industrial and regime workers are set by
Phnom Penh. The KFTU claims to have successfully demanded pay
increases and subsidies on nine basic commodities in 1983 from
the Phnom Penh regime. The regime has not established any
economic incentive zones, although the October National
Congress called for a free market economy and free trade.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Although Cambodia has ratified International Labor Organization
Convention 29 on the abolition of forced labor, such practice
by the Phnom Penh regime is common, although not primarily as a
sanction or means of racial, social, or other discrimination.
Although the use of forced labor has appeared to decrease in
recent years, the regime still conscripted thousands of
laborers to clear brush, cut timber, and build roads.
The decrease in the number of forced laborers since early 1989
was partly the result of the institution of a nationwide
military draft, which led to the forcible seizure of young men
from their farms, schools, and movie and video halls and their
transfer directly to the front, with minimal or no training.
This mass conscription policy resulted in many of those drafted
fleeing to Thailand.
The Khmer Rouge also reejuires labor from all persons under its
control, including women, children, and the handicapped.
Defectors continued to report in 1991 that Khmer Rouge leaders
forced some people to carry supplies and ammunition into the
interior of Cambodia in support of military operations, though
these defectors insisted that most porters worked voluntarily.
However, the increasing use of trucks for transport and the
lessened logistics demand since the cease-fire commenced in May
reduced the Khmer Rouge's need for porters in 1991. There were
no reports during 1991 that the ANKI or KPNLF used forced labor
to carry supplies for their troops.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Phnom Penh regime has no known minimum age for the
employment of children. Children are regularly employed as
soon as they are physically able to perform the tasks required,
either in agriculture or industry. In past years, the
resistance forces have been reported to employ children as
porters .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
No attention appears to have been given by Phnom Penh
authorities to ensuring acceptable conditions of work, and
there is little information on this subject. The wage scales
set by the regime are universally regarded as insufficient,
forcing employees to supplement their wages through part-time
jobs or other means.
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CHINA
The People's Republic of China (PRO is a one-party state
adhering to Marxist-Leninist principles, in which the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), backed by the military and security
forces, monopolizes decisionmaking authority. A closed inner
circle of a few senior leaders holds the right of ultimate
power. Some of these party elders hold positions within the
Politburo, the Central Military Commission, and other organs.
Others hold no formal positions of authority but still wield
decisive influence by virtue of their seniority in the
Communist movement.
The party maintains control through its widespread apparatus
and traditional societal pressure as well as through a
nationwide security network which includes the People's
Liberation Army; the Ministry of State Security; the Ministry
of Public Security; the People's Armed Police; and the state
judicial, procuratorial , and penal systems. The security
forces have been responsible for human rights abuses including
torture and arbitrary arrest and detention.
More than a decade of impressive economic growth and the spread
of market forces have resulted in a reduction of the center's
span of economic control. Although China's per capita
income — estimated at roughly $300 — is one of the world's
lowest, wide disparities exist, with the living standards of
some coastal residents approaching those found in more
developed countries. China's leaders, with their overwhelming
emphasis on stability, continued to be concerned about
excessive growth rates and inflationary pressures but also
continued to be willing to move toward greater reliance on
markets to determine prices and allocation of resources.
China's human rights practices remained repressive, falling far
short of internationally accepted norms. After some loosening
of repression during the first half of 1991, heightened alarm
following the failed Soviet coup attempt in August resulted in
another effort by Beijing to strengthen central control,
reinforce ideological propaganda, and repress dissent, coupled
with efforts to bolster political stability by intensifying
economic reform. Serious human rights abuses persisted. The
early 1991 trials of several dozen persons detained in the 1989
crackdown were characterized by hasty verdicts, the defendants'
inadequate access to legal counsel, and the Government's
refusal to allow independent observers to attend the trials.
Several were sentenced to lengthy terms merely for expressing
views critical of the ruling regime. Despite statements that
these proceedings were "basically completed," the Government
acknowledged in mid-1991 that 21 democracy movement cases had
still not been brought to trial. Some of these persons were
being tried as the year ended, but no verdicts had been
announced .
Other serious human rights abuses continued, including
persistent abuses in Tibet, documented cases of torture and
mistreatment of those accused of crimes, and the repression of
Catholics and Protestants who refused to affiliate with
officially sponsored religious organizations and were charged
with conducting "illegal" religious services, proselytizing, or
maintaining illegal liaison with foreign groups. Although
Chinese media emphasized implementation of a new law allowing
citizens to sue officials for abuse of authority or
malfeasance, enforcement remained problematic and there was
little progress on political and legal reforms offering real
protection for individual rights. Severe restrictions on
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CHINA
freedom of assembly, expression, and the press were
maintained. Independent reports generated international
concern about Chinese prison labor practices.
On the more positive side, the Government released some
detainees and in late 1990 began a limited dialog on human
rights with its foreign critics which led to a number of
serious exchanges with government and parliamentary
delegations. The Chinese were exposed to a greater range of
views on human rights practices, and modest progress was made
in resolving a small number of human rights cases. Beijing
issued a comprehensive white paper in November which laid out
in considerable detail its self-congratulatory views on Chinese
human rights. Beijing nevertheless continued to reject the
applicability under "special Chinese conditions" of many widely
accepted international human rights concepts, arguing that
economic development should be the main measure of China's
human rights progress.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a.' Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no documented instances of extrajudicial killings in
the PRC in 1991 .
b. Disappearance
There were no reported cases of disappearance in 1991. There
has not yet been an overall public accounting by the Government
of the fate of those detained during and after the suppression
of the 1989 demonstrations (See Section l.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Despite legal safeguards, the use of torture and degrading
treatment of persons detained and imprisoned has persisted.
There were credible reports in 1991 of police having illegally
detained and tortured suspects, particularly those held outside
formal detention centers in "shelter and investigation
centers." The Government has not yet made public its 1991
statistics regarding investigation of such abuses, but in April
the Chief Procurator indicated that in 1990, 472 cases of
confession by torture were filed for investigation and
prosecution. These figures cannot be confirmed. Punishment of
abusers has rarely been reported, although severe punishments
have been imposed in at least a few cases.
The August hunger strikes of Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming
focussed international attention on the poor prison conditions
and medical care endured by many prisoners. After the
international community expressed strong concern about these
cases, government officials confirmed that Wang and Chen had
been held in solitary confinement in cells originally designed
to punish prisoners who had violated prison regulations, and
admitted that both prisoners had health problems. Wang was
eventually hospitalized and Chen removed from solitary
confinement, but the Government refused to allow impartial
observers to visit the prisoners. Released prisoners and
detainees, however, have reported abuses. Democracy activist
brothers Li Lin and Li Zhi (see Section 2.d.) told of having
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CHINA
been tortured during their imprisonment in Hunan province.
Other former prisoners and detainees have indicated that
ordinary workers and unemployed youths suffer even worse
treatment than well-known prisoners like Wang, Chen, and the Li
brothers, with more frequent instances of torture and degrading
treatment. Workers are also more likely to be sentenced to
prison, reeducation through labor, or execution than are
students and intellectuals. According to one credible report,
six political prisoners in Liaoning Province, including student
leaders Liu Gang and Zhang Ming, attempted to launch hunger
strikes during Secretary Baker's November visit to China to
protest the harsh prison conditions they faced. According to
the report, Liu's arm was broken by prison officials trying to
force-feed him. This report could not be independently
confirmed.
Conditions in all types of Chinese penal institutions are harsh
and frec[uently degrading. The emphasis on obtaining
confessions leads to widespread abuses, particularly in
detention centers. Former detainees have reported the use of
cattle prods, electrodes, prolonged periods of solitary
confinement and incommunicado detention, beatings, shackles,
and other forms of abuse against detained women and men. Both
before and after trial, prisoners are subject to severe
pressure to confess their "errors. " Despite official media and
other reports that indicate that coerced confessions have led
to erroneous convictions, the fact that a confession was
coerced does not in itself prevent or invalidate a conviction.
According to judicial officials, however, confessions without
corroborating evidence are an insufficient basis for conviction.
There have been frequent credible reports from Tibetan refugees
of torture and mistreatment in penal institutions in Tibet. In
February officials confirmed that Lhakpa Tsering, a young
Tibetan who had been imprisoned in Lhasa (Drapchi) prison, had
died on December 15, 1990. The Government denied reports that
his death resulted from torture, asserting that he died from a
ruptured appendix. Chinese officials have not, however,
responded to outside requests that they release autopsy
findings. Tibetan authorities have reportedly returned Sonam
Wangdu to Drapchi prison in spite of his continued, serious
health problems. His family has been denied permission to
visit and assist him. Sonam is serving a life sentence for his
involvement in a 1988 riot which led to the death of a
policeman .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
China's Criminal Procedure Law proscribes arbitrary arrest or
detention and limits the amount of time a person can be held in
custody without being charged. According to the law,
interrogation should take place within 24 hours of detention,
and the detainee's family and work unit should be informed of
the circumstances of the detention within 48 hours. Articles
43 and 50 of the Criminal Procedure Law, however, permit the
police to delay notifying the family and work unit "in
circumstances where notification would hinder the
investigation. "
A formal arrest under the Criminal Procedure Law of a suspect
detained by the Public Security Bureau should be approved by
the procuratorate within 10 days of the original detention.
Public security authorities, however, often detain people for
long periods of time under various informal mechanisms not
covered by the criminal procedure law. These include
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regulations, some unpublished, on "taking in for shelter and
investigation" and "supervised residence" as well as other
methods not requiring procurator ial approval. These
administrative forms of detention were purportedly abolished by
a 1980 State Council document, but are still used. In April
the Government indicated that 3,509 cases of unlawful detention
were filed for investigation and prosecution in 1990. These
figures cannot be confirmed. The Government has not indicated
if or how those responsible for such cases have been punished.
A we 11 -documented estimate of the total number of arbitrary
arrests and detentions in 1991 is not possible. There are
credible estimates, however, that hundreds of thousands of
people, such as vagrants, the unemployed, and migrants, have
been arbitrarily detained. In addition, dozens of persons
involved in small demonstrations throughout the year have been
detained. For example, according to credible reports,
authorities in Beijing in late December detained several
persons overnight after they tried to organize a peaceful
memorial ceremony commemorating the death of 1989 democracy
activist Wen Jie. In March the Government provided new
information on detentions in Tibet in 1989, confirming that 400
people were detained by Tibetan public security and judicial
organs between March and November of that year. More than 300
were later released and about 60 were brought to trial,
according to these figures, which cannot be independently
confirmed.
Several hundred persons detained for activities related to the
1989 demonstrations were held in "detention during
investigation" or "administrative detention" status. These
persons were not formally arrested or charged with any crime,
although authorities began in late 1990 and 1991 to press
charges against at least some of these detainees. Chinese
authorities have begun to respond to international inquiries
about those detained since June 1989, although the responses
have not yet provided complete information. During the
November visit of U.S. Secretary of State Baker, the Chinese
provided a response by individual name to a list of political
prisoners that the United States had earlier given them and
agreed to continue a dialog on human rights with the United
States .
Repeated requests for information on Zhu Mei (or Sha Zhumei),
reported to have been arrested in 1987 and sentenced to 5
years' imprisonment on "counterrevolutionary" charges for
religious activities, have been met by denials from Shanghai
municipal authorities that such a person is imprisoned in that
city. Officials have also declined to provide information on
many Tibetans detained since 1989 or on many members of
unofficial Catholic and Protestant churches who have been
detained for months before being charged or released, according
to credible reports.
"Crimes of counterrevolution" are dealt with under articles
90-104 of the Criminal Law. Counterrevolutionary offenses,
which range from treason and espionage to spreading
counterrevolutionary propaganda, are defined by the Government
in light of its four basic principles: upholding
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought, the people's democratic
dictatorship, the Socialist system, and the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party.
These principles are interpreted by the Government as
circumscribing the various rights provided for in the
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Constitution. As a result, despite constitutional guarantees
of free expression, people who have tried to exercise this
right have in some cases been charged with counterrevolution
under Articles 90-104 of the Criminal Law. These articles have
also been used to punish persons who organized demonstrations,
disrupted traffic, disclosed official information to
foreigners, or formed associations outside state control.
Those detained for committing "crimes of counterrevolution" are
in theory treated the same as those detained for other crimes,
and their cases are supposed to be handled in accordance with
the criminal procedure law. In practice, the law's provisions
limiting length of detention and requiring family notification
are often ignored in "counterrevolutionary" cases.
Sentences imposed by criminal courts may be served in prisons
or in reform through labor camps. Many labor reform camps are
in remote areas such as Xinjiang or Qinghai. Some former
inmates have been denied permission to return to their homes.
(See Section 6 .c . )
The Government provided in 1991 a more complete accounting of
the number of persons detained in Beijing in connection with
the 1989 democracy movement. According to these figures, 1,804
were originally detained, of whom 970 have been released, 715
convicted on nonpolitical charges, and 72 convicted on
political charges through the end of 1990. At year's end some
21 cases remained in pretrial detention. These figures seem
generally credible but cannot be independently verified. They
apparently exclude those detained in other parts of China,
those held only briefly for questioning in 1989, and at least
1,000 participants in the 1989 demonstrations assigned without
trial to reeducation through labor camps. Additional
statistics released by the Justice Ministry in July indicated
that at least 37 people detained for taking part in the 1989
democracy movement had been tried, served their sentences, and
released. This figure cannot be confirmed.
The 1990 report mentioned Bao Tong, Gao Shan, Li Minqi, Liu
Gang, Peng Rong, Wang Zhixin, Xiong Yan, Yang Wei, Zhai Weimin,
and Zhang Weiguo as among the prominent political detainees not
formally arrested or charged by the end of 1990. In 1991 Xiong
Yan, Yang Wei, Wang Zhixin, and Zhang Weiguo were released.
(Section 2. a. discusses Zhang's subsequent detention.) Liu
Gang was sentenced to 6 years in prison. Li Minqi, as well as
journalist Wu Xuecan, was brought to trial in December, but at
year's end the outcome of these trials was not known. The
cases of Peng Rong and Zhai Weimin were described by the
Government in November as "under investigation." The status of
Bao Tong and Gao Shan remained unclear. Labor activist Han
Dongfang was given medical parole from prison. Following
Secretary Baker's visit in November, charges against him were
dropped. Hong Kong resident Luo Haixing, imprisoned in March
for attempting to aid fleeing democracy movement activists, was
given medical parole and allowed to return to Hong Kong.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Officials insist that China's judiciary is independent but
acknowledge that it is subject to the policy guidance of the
CCP. In addition, there are credible reports that party and
government leaders predetermine verdicts and sentences in some
sensitive cases.
According to the Constitution, the court system is equal in
authority to the State Council and the Central Military
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Conunission, the two most important government institutions.
All three organs are nominally under the supervision of the
National People's Congress. The Supreme People's Court stands
at the apex of the court system, followed in descending order
by the Higher People's Court (province), the Intermediate
People's Court (prefecture), and the Basic People's Court
(county). Separate and special military, maritime, and railway
courts function directly under the Supreme People's Court. The
judiciary, however, falls under the policy control of the
party's Political and Legal Commission, headed by Politburo
Standing Committee member Qiao Shi.
During the 1980 's the Government moved haltingly toward the
establishment of a more autonomous and less arbitrary legal
system. There were efforts to clarify which offenses are
criminally indictable by defining more precisely or even
eliminating broad, general laws, including the legal provisions
for "crimes of counterrevolution." Programs were set up to
provide professional training for judges through overseas
training courses to acquaint them with foreign legal
procedures. As a result of the 1989 crackdown, however, the
tightening of political and ideological controls seriously
undermined these reforms, closed off debate on the relative
merits of "rule by man" and "rule by law," and set back China's
modest efforts to build a modern and more autonomous judicial
system. Official directives to the courts to produce quick
judgments during the anticrime campaign begun in 1990 further
undermined the integrity of the court system. A Justice
Ministry official acknowledged in September to a European
Parliament delegation that trials in China were conducted too
rapidly. He blamed a shortage of lawyers, of which there are
an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 in China. An Australian human
rights delegation that visited Shanghai in July found that of
the 16,000 criminal cases filed in that city in 1990 fewer than
half of the accused had a defense lawyer and only 30 were
acquitted. Defense lawyers, like other Chinese, generally
depend on their work units for employment, housing, and many
other aspects of their lives. As a result, they are often
reluctant to be seen as overzealous in defending individuals
accused of political offenses.
Due process rights are stipulated under the Constitution but
often ignored in practice. The Criminal Procedure Law requires
that all trials be held "in public," except those involving
state secrets, juveniles, and "personal secrets," but details
of cases involving "counterrevolutionary" charges have
frequently been kept secret, even from relatives of the
defendants, under this provision. Even when trials are
nominally open, in many cases the only "public" allowed to
attend are officially selected "representatives of the people"
and immediate relatives of the accused. Numerous requests by
independent foreign observers to attend 1991 trials of
democracy activists were all turned aside. The Government
asserted that foreign observers were not permitted to attend
trials unless the alleged crime directly involved a foreigner
or a Chinese related to a foreigner.
The law states that a defendant may be held in custody for a
maximum of 2 months during investigation, although a 1-month
extension may be requested from the next higher procuratorate.
The procuratorate then has up to 1-1/2 months to decide whether
or not to prosecute the case. An additional month is permitted
if "supplementary investigation" is needed. Any delay beyond
5-1/2 months theoretically requires approval of the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress, but amendments to
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the Criminal Procedure Law in 1984 allowed for further
-extensions of these periods without higher level approval,
including possible indefinite extensions while a suspect is
under "mental" examination. In politically sensitive cases,
the period of pretrial detention has often been much longer
than 5-1/2 months; many of the democracy activists tried in
early 1991 had bQen detained over 18 months, and some, who
still await trial, have been detained for 30 months. The
procuratorate sends to trial those persons it determines are
guilty on the basis of the police investigations, supplemented
if necessary by its own inquiries. The pretrial process,
during which the question of guilt or innocence is essentially
decided, does not give the defense adequate time and
opportunity to prepare its case. Defense lawyers may be
retained only 7 days before the trial. In some cases even this
period has been shortened under regulations issued in 1983 to
accelerate the adjudication of certain serious criminal cases.
Persons appearing before the court are not presumed innocent;
trials are generally, in effect, sentencing hearings.
Conviction rates average over 99 percent. Defense lawyers may
be retained privately, but most are appointed by the court.
They virtually never contest their clients' guilt; rather,
their function is generally confined to requesting clemency.
There is an appeal process, but initial decisions are rarely
overturned. Defendants are expected to "show the right
attitude" by confessing their crimes, and those who fail to
confess are typically sentenced more harshly.
Three sets of trials involving the 1989 democracy movement took
place in early 1991. The first set of trials, which began on
January 5, resulted in the sentencing of seven dissidents from
2 to 4 years' imprisonment and the release of two dissidents.
The second set of trials, which began on January 26, decided 71
cases. Among those sentenced to prison were student leaders
Wang Youcai (sentenced to 4 years but since released), Wang Dan
(4 years), and Guo Haifeng (4 years), activist Ren Wanding (7
years), and intellectual Bao Zunxin (5 years). Intellectual
Liu Xiaobo and 65 others were released. The third set of
trials began on February 12 and involved four cases. Law
professor Chen Xiaoping was released. Student leader Liu Gang
was sentenced to 6 years. Intellectuals Chen Ziming and Wang
Juntao were given 13 years each for allegedly masterminding the
demonstrations. In April the President of the Supreme People's
Court announced that the trials of cases related to the June
1989 demonstrations had been "basically completed." In
November, however, the Government released the names of 21
persons involved in the 1989 demonstrations who remained in
pretrial detention. At year's end, another series of trials
began, though no verdicts have been announced.
The Government characterized the trials as public and fair,
resulting in lenient sentences. It has steadfastly defended
its right to try and sentence any who transgress Chinese law,
rejecting the contention that "counterrevolutionary crime" is
an inappropriate, vaguely defined article which allows
punishment for peaceful dissent. Moreover, the speed of the
verdicts, the limited opportunity afforded defendants to
prepare a defense, and the inability of independent observers
to attend the trials raise serious concerns as to justice,
fairness, and due process.
In addition, a number of political prisoners jailed in previous
cycles of repression, notably 1979 Democracy Wall activist Wei
Jingsheng, remain in prison. Press reports claimed that Wei's
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health had deteriorated during prolonged solitary confinement,
but authorities asserted Wei was in good health and received
family visits. A July press report quoted Vice Minister of
Justice Jin Jian as having said that Wei remained in solitary
confinement but had been transferred from Qinghai province to
Hebei province. These reports on Wei's status cannot be
independently confirmed.
In the northeast, five workers from Changchun (Jilin) received
sentences ranging from 2 to 20 years in prison for their
participation in June 1989 demonstrations. All were convicted
under Articles 98 and/or 102 of the Chinese Criminal Code. The
verdict was reached in a lower court in November 1990, but the
result of a superior court review was not released until April
1991. In Tibet authorities continued to impose harsh sentences
for political activities. Hotel bookkeeper Tseten Norgye was
sentenced in February to about 4 years (exact sentence unknown)
in prison for counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement
and distributing leaflets on Tibetan independence, according to
credible reports. Officials in Tibet said in July that since
1987 there had been 50 convictions for counterrevolutionary
activity in Tibet and that all of those convicted were still in
prison.
In 1990 China, citing a sharp increase in the crime rate
(though one still low by Western standards), launched an
anticrime campaign that continued into 1991. The CCP
leadership ordered public security, procuratorate, and court
officials to speed the process of investigation, trial, and
sentencing, raising serious due process concerns. Chinese
officials refuse to provide comprehensive statistics on death
sentences or executions, but according to figures compiled from
press reports, from January to July 1991 at least 449 people
were executed, with an additional 176 sentenced to death. The
actual numbers may be much higher. One Western source with
access to Chinese criminologists estimated the total number of
executions in China in 1991 might have been as high as 5,000 or
6,000. This report could not be independently confirmed. All
death sentences are reviewed by a higher court, but such
reviews are often very rapid, with some completed within a few
days after initial sentencing.
Under a set of regulations governing reeducation through labor
originally issued in 1957 and revised in 1979, government
authorities can assign persons accused of minor public order
offenses (e.g., disturbing the peace, fabricating rumors,
hindering government officials from performing their official
duties) to reeducation through labor camps without judicial
review. This allows security authorities to deal with
political and other offenders without need for recourse to even
the nominal procedures and protections offered by the formal
criminal process. Reeducation through labor sanctions were
used to circumvent the formal criminal process in the cases of
some 1979 Democracy Wall activists and appear to have been used
in the same way to deal with some persons involved in the
spring 1989 demonstrations.
In 1990 Chinese officials stated that 869,934 Chinese citizens
had been assigned to these camps since 1980, with about 80,000
assigned each year and 160,000 undergoing reeducation through
labor at that time. Justice Ministry officials reiterated the
160,000 figure in July 1991. It is not possible to verify
these official statistics; other estimates of the number of
inmates are considerably higher. Terms of assignment run from
a normal minimum of 1 year to a maximum of 3, although the
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labor reeducation committee may subsequently extend an inmate's
sentence for a maximum of 1 year if his "reform attitude" is
not good.
The number of persons in Chinese penal institutions who would
be considered political prisoners by international standards is
impossible to estimate accurately. While Government officials
deny that the PRC has any "political" prisoners, they have
stated that there are just over 1.1 million inmates in Chinese
prisons and reform camps, and that 0.5 percent of these were
convicted of "counterrevolutionary crimes," for a total of
roughly 5,500 "counterrevolutionary" convicts. This figure
includes a substantial number convicted of crimes such as
"espionage" that are internationally recognized criminal
offenses; the secrecy surrounding espionage cases prevents
foreign observers from determining the validity of such
charges. On the other hand, the figure excludes the remaining
1989 detainees, at least 1,000 in labor reeducation camps, and
an undetermined number sentenced nominally for various criminal
offenses including religious activities (such as receiving
funds from abroad without authorization or changing such funds
on the black market). Estimates by some foreign researchers of
the number of political prisoners are much higher but cannot be
confirmed.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence .
Personal and family life in China is extensively monitored and
regulated by the authorities. Most persons depend on their
work unit for employment, housing, ration coupons, permission
to marry or have a child, and other aspects of ordinary life.
The work unit, along with the neighborhood watch committee,
monitors activities and attitudes. Since the 1989
demonstrations, Chinese authorities have strengthened the
surveillance functions of neighborhood watch committees,
requiring them to work more closely with the police. Search
warrants are required by law before security forces may search
premises, but this provision is often ignored. Daily life is
monitored in a variety of ways. Some telephone conversations
are recorded, and mail is frequently opened and censored, in
spite of the provision in the 1982 Constitution that "freedom
and privacy of correspondence of citizens ... are protected by
law." One purpose of this Government surveillance is to
regulate and limit contact between PRC citizens and foreigners,
who are generally required to live in segregated and monitored
compounds or dormitories.
The compounds in which foreign diplomats, journalists, and
business people live are under close physical surveillance,
have conspicuously placed television cameras in elevators, and
are presumed to be universally electronically monitored.
Chinese wishing to visit foreigners are deterred by this
pervasive system of monitoring. Since the 1989 crackdown, the
Government has intensified its efforts to restrict contact
between Chinese citizens and foreigners.
China's population has roughly doubled in the past 40 years,
seriously complicating the country's economic development. In
the early 1980 's the Government set a goal of limiting the
population to 1.2 billion by the year 2000. To meet this
target, it adopted a comprehensive and highly intrusive family
policy for Han Chinese in urban areas. Numerous exceptions are
allowed for Han in rural areas. Ethnic minorities are either
exempted or subject to less stringent population controls. In
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September 1991, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said the
population of China had reached 1.15 billion; the State Family
Planning Commission indicated in October that China's revised
target for the year 2000 is now 1.294 billion. Individual and
family decisions about bearing children are regulated by the
State, with economic rewards for those who cooperate with it,
and sanctions against those who deviate from official
guidelines. The Government sets an annual nationwide goal for
the number of authorized births, apportioned down to the local
level and, ultimately, to each work unit. Fujian province, for
example, has implemented the national family planning policy
through a system of contracts setting population growth targets
which extend from the provincial Governor through provincial
leaders and work units to individual workers. Work units
exercise pressure to control births, and fines may be imposed
to penalize those who violate the terms of the contract. Birth
statistics reflected the widespread ineffectiveness of these
measures in limiting couples to only one child. In 1990, 21
percent of all births were at least a family's third child, 32
percent were second children, and 47 percent of births in
Fujian were first children. In urban areas, couples are
encouraged to delay marriage until well after the legal minimum
age of 22 for men and 20 for women, and to defer childbirth
until at least their mid-20 's. For most urban couples,
obtaining permission to have a second child is very difficult,
although the policy is sometimes evaded.
China's population control policy relies on education,
propaganda, and economic incentives, as well as more coercive
measures including psychological pressure and severe economic
penalties. Rewards for couples who adhere to the policy
include monthly stipends and preferential medical, food, and
educational benefits. Disciplinary measures against those who
violate the policy include stiff fines, withholding of social
services, demotion, and other administrative punishments.
Local family planning officials are also subject to penalties
for "excess births" in their units. In Shanghai, in addition
to 145 publicized cases of couples being fined for having an
unauthorized child, there were 3 publicized cases in 1991 in
which the offenders (2 women and a couple) were not only fined
but also fired from their jobs.
Chinese family planning officials have become increasingly
concerned about the ability of itinerant workers, whose numbers
are estimated to range from 70-100 million persons, to
circumvent family planning regulations. More than 50 percent
of these persons are in their prime child-bearing years.
Accordingly, in November the State Council passed new
regulations aimed at bringing this population more directly
into family planning programs.
Although the Government officially opposes physical compulsion
to submit to abortion or sterilization, the practice has
continued to occur as officials strive to meet population
targets. Chinese officials acknowledge privately that there
are still instances of forced abortions and sterilizations in
remote, rural areas, although the number of such cases is well
below levels of the early 1980 's. While recognizing that
abuses occur, officials maintain that China does not condone
forced abortion or sterilization and that abuses by local
officials are punished. They admit, however, that punishment
is rare and have yet to provide documentation of any
punishments. In part, they explain, there is a bureaucratic
disinclination to punish those doing the difficult, socially
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unpopular, but economically necessary task of enforcing
national population policy.
According to officials in East China, local family planning
workers are penalized not only for "excess births," but also
for "excess abo-rtions." Family planning workers receive
negative performance evaluations for "excessively high"
abortion rates. Officials have not publicly defined the term
"excessively high."
Enforcement of the family planning policy is inconsistent,
varying widely from place to place and year to year. The 1990
census data indicate that the average number of children per
family (2.3) and the population growth rate (1.5 percent)
remain significantly higher than would be produced by
comprehensive national enforcement of official policy. In many
areas, couples apparently are able to have several children
without incurring any penalty, while in other areas enforcement
has been more stringent. Local officials have great discretion
in how, and how strictly, the policy is implemented. Because
penalties for "excess births" can be levied against local
officials and the mothers' work units, many people are
personally affected, providing an additional potential source
of pressure.
Female infanticide has persisted in some impoverished rural
areas. Insistence that local units meet population goals has
contributed to the persistence of this traditional practice,
generally by parents who hope to have more sons without
incurring official punishment. The Government strongly opposes
infanticide and has prosecuted offenders; it has been able to
reduce but not eradicate the practice. In order to discourage
the abortion of female fetuses, the Government has issued
regulations prohibiting medical personnel from using ultrasound
equipment to determine the sex of a fetus or from disclosing
the sex of a fetus as determined by testing conducted for
medical reasons, according to information Chinese officials
provided in July to an Australian human rights delegation. In
recent years, regulations with eugenics provisions have been
implemented in at least five provinces, beginning with Gansu.
These regulations seek to prevent people with severe mental
handicaps from having children and include provisions for
mandatory sterilization before permission to marry is granted
and compulsory abortion in the event of pregnancy. National
family planning officials reportedly have discouraged the
enactment and enforcement of such eugenics laws, though the
central Government has not overridden these provincial laws.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and self-expression are severely restricted.
Limited tolerance of some criticism of government policies and
officials had generally increased through the 1980 's, but after
June 1989 this trend was abruptly reversed. The party has
reasserted complete control over the press; the media's role of
transmitting the views of the people to the leadership has been
limited and carefully regulated. Citizens are not permitted to
criticize senior leaders or to express opinions contrary to the
"four cardinal principles," which provide for a Socialist state
under the Communist Party's exclusive control. Persons who
violate these guidelines are punished.
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Television and radio broadcasting has remained under strict
party and government control and been used to propagate an
orthodox ideological line. Programming has been heavily laced
with party propaganda. As part of its control of citizens'
access to information, the Government has continued to jam many
Chinese language broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA) and
British Broadcasting Corporation. The leadership has attacked
VOA, claiming it is part of a Western conspiracy to subvert
China. Despite the effort to jam VOA, the effectiveness of the
jamming varies considerably by region, with audible signals
reaching most parts of China. Cable News Network satellite
transmissions to international hotels were banned in Beijing
during the 1991 anniversary of the Tiananmen repression. Many
foreign journalists have reported episodes of surveillance and
harassment .
The party has ordered the domestic press to support the party
line and not question the "four cardinal principles." A
Communist Party Central Committee document called for renewed
prepublication censorship of all major state-run media,
according to credible reports. A number of Chinese journalists
have been detained and the ranks and leadership of many
newspapers and journals purged. Tightened distribution has
enabled authorities to control foreign language material more
effectively. The September 23 issue of Newsweek, which
contained investigative reports on prison labor, was not
distributed to the few newsstands (mostly located in
international hotels) that sell foreign magazines and
newspapers .
The Government has attempted to curb publications advocating
"bourgeois liberalization" (Western social, political, and
cultural ideas). Numerous publications have been closed,
heavy-handed ideological controls reimposed, and ideologically
suspect journalists replaced. The Government has banned
publications by authors considered politically unacceptable
such as Liu Binyan, Su Xiaokang, Su Shaozhi, Bao Tong, Liu
Xiaobo, Yan Jiaqi, and Fang Lizhi and his wife Li Shuxian.
The party has continued to impose tight controls on colleges,
universities, and research institutes. The entering freshmen
classes at Beijing University and Shanghai's Fudan University
were again sent to military camps for a year of training and
ideological indoctrination. Numerous textbooks and scholarly
works have been either censored or prohibited by the State
Education Commission. At all levels, the quantity of political
study has increased.
The heavy ideological control of academic institutions and the
censorship of the media have forced many Chinese journalists
and scholars to exercise great caution. Some researchers
engaged in work regarded as sensitive were prohibited from
accepting graduate students. Many scholars, including some of
China's most prominent, have declined opportunities to publish
or present papers on subjects that could be construed as
sensitive. More vigorous public debate on some subjects, such
as economic policy, has been tolerated.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of peaceful assembly and association is severely
restricted in practice. The Constitution has provisions for
the right "of assembly, of association, of procession, and of
demonstration," but such activities may not infringe "upon the
interests of the state." A "law governing assemblies, parades.
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and demonstrations" was implemented in 1990. Like the
Constitution, it provides for the right to assemble and
demonstrate but stipulates that parades and demonstrations may
not "infringe on the interests of the state, society, and
collectives or the legitimate freedoms and rights of other
citizens." This provision would proscribe any protests against
Communist Party rule, socialism, or the leadership and can be
used to ban protests that disrupt traffic, interfere with
business, occupy public places, or that could be interpreted as
"infringing" on the freedoms of other citizens.
Procedures for obtaining a parade permit discourage and
effectively prevent the exercise of the right of assembly
insofar as that right might challenge the perceived interests
of the State. The Government said that some demonstrations had
been authorized, claiming that 13 applications for
demonstrations in 1990 were approved in Sichuan Province
alone. Officials provided no additional details on these
demonstrations, which attracted minimal press attention. At
any rate, such demonstrations must by law have been perceived
by the State as consistent with its interests. The law does
not apply to "traditional cultural, recreational, or sports
activities" and "normal religious activities," but local
authorities retain the power to determine what are legitimate
"traditional" or "normal" religious activities.
Professional and other mass associations are for the most part
organized and controlled by the Communist Party. Regulations
issued in 1990 require all organizations to be officially
registered and approved. Ostensibly aimed at secret societies
and criminal gangs, the regulations also prevent the formation
of unauthorized political, religious, or labor organizations,
such as the student and worker groups that emerged briefly
before and during the 1989 democracy movement. They have also
been used to disband groups, such as unregistered "house
churches" (religious congregations which gather in private
residences), deemed potentially subversive. Security forces
maintain a close watch on groups formed outside the party
establishment, particularly unauthorized religious groups.
Associations recognized by the State are permitted to maintain
relations with recognized international bodies, but these
contacts are carefully monitored and limited.
The Government monitors and discourages contacts between
dissidents and foreigners. In Shanghai, after dissidents Wang
Ruowang and Zhang Weiguo were released from detention, they
were subsequently accused of unauthorized contact with
foreigners (particularly the foreign media), detained, and
questioned several times for brief periods. During a visit in
November by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, two prominent
dissidents, Dai Qing and Hou Xiaotian, were detained to prevent
any contact with the Secretary's party. Dai Qing was forcibly
removed from a hotel, sent out of Beijing, and held until after
the Secretary's visit was over. Hou Xiaotian was briefly
detained near Beijing. No charges were filed against either
Dai or Hou, and Chinese authorities denied that they had been
arrested. Dai was later allowed to leave the country.
c. Freedom of Religion
Religious freedom in China is subject to restrictions of
varying severity. While the Constitution affirms toleration of
religious beliefs, the Government places restrictions on
religious practice outside officially recognized and
government-controlled religious organizations. Religious
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proselytizing is restricted to officially registered and
sanctioned places of worship, although some discreet
proselytizing and distributing of religious texts seems to be
tolerated. The management and control of religion is the
responsibility of religious affairs bureaus across China,
staffed primarily by party members. Buddhists are by far the
largest body of religious believers in China. The Government
estimates that there are 100 million Chinese Buddhists, most of
whom belong to the dominant Han ethnic group. Other Buddhists
belong to Tibetan, Mongolian, and other ethnic groups. Han
Buddhist leaders generally cooperate with the Government and
have experienced few reported difficulties. In Tibet, however,
where Buddhism and Tibetan nationalism are closely intertwined,
relations between Buddhists and secular authorities have been
tense. Daoism, widely practiced in southern coastal provinces,
is officially respected as an important part of traditional
Chinese culture, but some of its practices conflicting with
Government strictures against superstition and waste of arable
land have been sharply criticized.
China permits Moslem citizens to make the hajj to Mecca, but
limited state financing effectively constrains the number of
hajj is. Nongovernment sources indicated that about 1,500
Chinese made the hajj in 1991, roughly the same number as in
1990. Officially sanctioned religious organizations are
permitted to maintain international contacts as long as these
do not entail foreign control, but proselytizing by foreign
groups is forbidden. The Three-Self Patriotic Movement, the
official Protestant church, and its Buddhist and Moslem
counterparts have established extensive networks of
international support. While the Catholic Patriotic
Association has no official ties to the Roman Catholic Church,
its leaders frequently visit Catholic and other religious
leaders abroad. The Association ordains its own bishops and
priests, generally follows pre-Vatican II practices, and
rejects papal authority. Sources in Rome publicly indicated,
however, that 20 to 30 of the more than 60 Catholic Patriotic
Association bishops had been recognized by the Vatican.
The Government, after forcefully suppressing all religious
observances during the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, began in
the late 1970 s to restore or replace confiscated churches,
temples, mosques, and monasteries. The official religious
organizations administer more than a dozen Catholic and
Protestant seminaries, nine institutes to train imams and
Islamic scholars, and institutes to train Buddhist monks.
Students who attend these institutes must demonstrate
"political reliability," and all graduates must pass an
examination of theological and political knowledge to qualify
for the clergy. The Government supervises the publication of
religious material for distribution to ensure religious and
political conformity.
Only those Christian churches affiliated with either the
Catholic Patriotic Association or the Three-Self Patriotic
Movement may operate openly, but active unofficial religious
movements pose an alternative to the state-regulated churches
and temples. The unofficial Catholic Church claims a
membership far larger than the 3.6 million registered with the
official church, though actual figures are unknown. It has its
own bishops and priests and conducts its own services. A large
number of Protestants worship privately in "house churches"
that are independent of government control. There is a dynamic
house church movement in many cities and, like their unofficial
Catholic counterparts, house churches often attract more
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followers than the official Three-Self Patriotic Movement
churches .
The Government generally tolerates the existence of unofficial
Catholic and Protestant churches as long as they remain small
and discreet. -In some parts of south and east China, official
and underground churches seem to coexist and even cooperate.
In other parts of the country, however, authorities have
sporadically continued efforts to rein in activities of the
unapproved Catholic and Protestant movements, raiding and
closing a number of unregistered churches. The Government
suspects many leaders of unofficial churches of harboring
criminal or dissident intentions and has imprisoned scores of
them in recent years. There have been numerous credible
reports in recent years of raids on house churches and
detentions of members, particularly in southern and coastal
provinces and in Inner Mongolia, Hebei, and Henan provinces.
While China remains a nominally secular society, the active
expression of religious belief has continued to grow.
Growth in expression of belief has been accompanied by
continued Government pressure on believers. In February the
Communist Party reportedly issued a secret document reflecting
heightened official suspicion of religious activities and
urging greater vigilance by the party in controlling such
activity. Shanghai Catholic Bishop Fan Zhongliang was arrested
in mid-June in Zhejiang Province, where he had reportedly
attempted to contact underground Chinese Catholic leaders. He
was returned to Shanghai where he remained in detention until
mid-August, when he was released pending further
investigation. According to Catholic sources, many other
bishops, priests and lay people remained in detention or
reeducation. Bishop Joseph Fan Xueyan, with the exception of a
period from 1979 through 1981, has been imprisoned or under
house arrest since 1958. The Government said in November that
Bishop Fan had been released. According to credible reports at
least 23 Catholics were detained in Hebei in December 1990,
including Bishops Simon An Shi 'en, Peter Chen Jianzhang, Cosmas
Shi Enxiang and Song Weill. One bishop from the group, Paul
Shi Chunjie, reportedly died in November. Another, John Han
Dingxian, was described by the Government in November as "under
investigation." A third bishop from the group, Paul Liu Shuhe,
was reportedly sent for reeducation through labor. Bishop
Casimir Wang Milu continued to serve a 10-year reform through
labor sentence. Cangzhou Bishop Paul Li Zhenrong and several
other people reportedly were arrested on December 11 in Tianjin.
Protestants faced the same sort of pressure. Members of the
Guangzhou house church of Pastor Samuel Lamb (Lin Xiangao)
continued to be harassed by local authorities, but the church
remained open. According to Protestant sources, many
Protestants remained in detention or reeducation for their
religious activities. These included Reverend Sun Ludian,
Reverend Song Yude, and Reverend Xu Guoxing. Many Tibetan
Buddhists and Xinjiang Moslems have continued to oppose Chinese
rule, and Chinese authorities have taken a harsh attitude
toward both. The Government tightly controls and monitors
Tibetan Buddhism and does not tolerate religious manifestations
that advocate Tibetan independence. It has recognized the
Dalai Lama as a major religious figure but condemns his
political activities and his leadership of a "government in
exile." A 1990 law sharply limits religious freedom for
Tibetan Buddhists. It provides for government regulation of
many religious activities, from burning incense to holding
ceremonies .
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The practice of religion in Tibet is also hampered by the
limits the Government imposes on religious education and by the
small size of the religious community compared to traditional
norms. Access to religious sites, however, does not appear to
be a major problem, and large amounts of money are being
devoted to reconstruction of the main sacred sites including
the Potala Palace in Lhasa. In areas with large Moslem
populations, particularly Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Ningxia, there
continues to be concern regarding the sharp restrictions on the
building of mosques and the religious education of youths under
age 18 mandated by the 1988 religion law. Following the 1990
unrest in Xinjiang, the authorities issued additional
regulations further restricting religious activities and
teaching.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government uses an identification card system to control
and restrict residence patterns within the country. Citizens
are required to carry their cards at all times when out of
doors (many apparently ignore this rule) and to present them to
authorities on demand. Individuals are registered as residents
of a particular jurisdiction and assigned to a specific work
unit. Change of residence or workplace is very difficult and,
in most cases, is possible only with government permission and
agreement by the work unit. The Government has placed travel
restrictions on several released detainees and religious
figures.
Authorities try to limit unauthorized migration to urban areas,
but they estimate there are at least a million unregistered
persons each in Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Beijing.
Authoritative Chinese estimates of the itinerant population for
the entire country range from 70 to 100 million. Official
tolerance of this itinerant population has varied with the
economic need for a supplemental work force in the big cities.
Foreign travel is controlled, although Chinese citizens have,
and many exercise, the right to emigrate upon the Government's
review of their circumstances. Tiananmen hunger striker Gao
Xin was released and allowed to leave China for the United
States in March. Former University of Arizona student Yang
Wei, several other dissidents, and the families of some
dissidents residing in the United States were also allowed to
leave China in 1991. Secretary of State Baker was assured in
November in Beijing that any person against whom no criminal
proceedings were pending would be allowed to leave China after
completing the usual formalities. At year's end, intellectuals
Dai Qing and Li Zehou had received their passports; Dai left
China for the United States in mid-December, and Li was
planning to leave in early January. Other dissidents and
religious figures, however, were still encountering problems in
acc[uiring PRC travel documentation.
The State Education Commission has stated on a number of
occasions that a proper political attitude is a major criterion
in selecting people to go abroad for government-sponsored
study. The State Education Commission has also made efforts to
restrict administratively the number of privately sponsored
students going abroad. Regulations implemented in 1990 require
those college and university graduates who received free
postsecondary education to repay the cost of their education to
the state by working for 5 years or more before being eligible
for passports to go abroad to study. For those who have
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overseas Chinese relatives or have not yet graduated, the
regulations provide a sliding scale of tuition reimbursement
exempting them from the work requirement. Students who must
pay the full amount are reportedly charged about $500 for each
year of study. Implementation of these regulations has varied
from place to place, and many students still managed to obtain
passports. Persons subject to the regulations on study abroad
appear to have had little trouble obtaining passports to visit
Chinese relatives overseas.
The Government has relaxed some restrictions on internal travel
by foreigners. Tibet and Xinjiang have allowed tourists and
some diplomats to visit, although with significant
restrictions. Senior officials have stated that students and
scholars returning from overseas have not been and will not be
punished for participation in prodemocracy activities while
abroad. It is not clear whether this guarantee applies to
leaders of student dissident organizations. Officials have
indicated that if such persons wanted to return to China they
would have to express "repentance," disassociate themselves
from "reactionary" organizations, and refrain from "subversive"
activities once they returned.
The Government indicated in September that since 1989 between
6,000 and 7,000 students had returned to China from the United
States on holiday. Another several thousand had returned to
work. None had been punished or refused permission to go
abroad again. None of the approximately 150 students
interviewed by the U.S. American Consulate General in Shanghai
reported experiencing any difficulties with the Chinese
Government when they returned on holiday from the United States
to China in 1991 .
Although no instance of government harassment has been reported
with regard to returning students, nonstudent democracy
activist brothers Li Lin and Li Zhi were arrested, tortured,
and held for 5 months when they returned in February to their
native Hunan province. They had fled to Hong Kong after
participating in the June 1989 democracy movement but returned
to China after the central Government announced that it was
safe for dissidents who had broken their ties to counter-
revolutionary organizations to come home. Upon return, they
were arrested by local authorities, but following appeals by
former President Jimmy Carter and Hong Kong-based American
businessman John Kamm, a compromise between central and local
authorities was apparently struck whereby they were convicted
merely of illegally crossing the Chinese border, then released
and allowed to return to Hong Kong.
The Li brothers' case is the only known instance of activists
having been arrested after returning to China from abroad.
There have, however, been reports since 1989 of harassment of
Chinese students overseas, although the number of such reports
dropped off in 1991. Chinese officials indicated in September
that they intended to "be helpful" with regard to overseas
students' passport problems. Privately funded students could
have their passports extended as long as they had an academic
reason to remain overseas. Publicly funded students could
change their passport status to private by making a financial
settlem.ent with the work unit that had financed their studies.
It is too early to assess the implementation of this policy.
The Government accepts repatriation of citizens who have
departed China without authorization, in most cases apparently
without punishing them. For example, some 3,000 Fujianese
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"boat people" who left China without authorization and entered
Japan illegally were repatriated in 1990 and 1991. Although
China accepted more than 280,000 refugees, mostly ethnic Han
Chinese, from Vietnam and Laos between 1978 and 1982, in recent
years it has adopted a stricter policy of no new admissions.
China has cooperated with Hong Kong to reduce the flow of
Vietnamese refugees into the colony. Although China has signed
the Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated at the
International Conference on Indochinese Refugees held in Geneva
in June 1989, it is unclear whether China considers itself a
participating state. Credible reports suggest the PRC has
repatriated persons of other nationalities seeking refugee
status .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens cannot peacefully and legally change their
government. Chinese citizens can neither freely choose nor
change the laws and officials that govern them. China is ruled
by the Communist Party, the paramount source of political
authority, on Marxist-Leninist principles. Within the party, a
closed inner circle of a few senior leaders exercises ultimate
power over the nation. Some hold key positions within the
six-member Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Central
Military Commission, or other organs. Others are nominally
retired but continue to exercise great political influence
despite holding no formal positions in party or government.
Although at age 87 he is less actively engaged in day-to-day
issues, Deng Xiaoping remains first among equals in this latter
group. These senior party leaders broadly determine policy,
which is then implemented by the Government.
According to the 1982 Constitution, the National People's
Congress (NPC) is the highest organ of state power. It
nominally selects the President and Vice President, decides on
the choice of the Premier, and elects the Chairman of the
Central Military Commission. During the 1980 's, the NPC had
begun to exercise increasing independence and influence.
Debates had become much more open, and several important
Government proposals were sent back for revisions. After 1989,
however, the NPC reverted to its more traditional role of
docilely ratifying decisions already made by the senior
leadership. There is no longer any real debate in the NPC
public sessions, though debate in closed-door committee
sessions on certain issues is still reportedly fairly vigorous.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no organizations within China which monitor or
comment on human rights conditions. The Government has made it
clear that it will not tolerate the existence of such groups.
In Shanghai, Fu Shenqi, Gu Bin, and Yang Zhou were detained in
the spring for "violating Chinese law" and held by public
security authorities pending investigation of their alleged
involvement in the establishment of a human rights society and
newsletter .
Despite the Chinese Government's adherence to the United
Nations Charter, which mandates respect for and promotion of
human rights, Chinese officials do not accept the principle
that human rights are universal. The State Council Information
Office's unprecedented November "white paper" on human rights
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argued that each nation has its own concept of human rights,
grounded in its political, economic, and social system and its
historical, religious, and cultural background. Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen said in his September address to the U.N.
General Assembly that the human rights forums of the United
Nations had been used by certain countries to wage "cold war."
Although officials no longer dismiss all discussion of human
rights as interference in the country's internal affairs, they
remain reluctant to accept criticism of China's human rights
situation by other nations or international organizations.
They reject reports by Amnesty International, Asia Watch, and
other international human rights monitoring groups on torture
and other human rights violations. The Chinese Foreign
Ministry publicly criticized the Department of State's 1990
report on human rights practices in China, charging that the
report had "cited false rumors to distort and attack China" and
was therefore "entirely unacceptable." Chinese officials have
stepped up their criticism of human rights problems in other
countries while arguing, paradoxically, that foreigners had no
right to criticize human rights abuses in China.
In 1991 Chinese officials initiated efforts to promote academic
study and discussion of Chinese concepts of human rights.
Articles in the official press argued that "Marxist human
rights" emphasizing collective economic entitlements were
superior to "capitalist human rights" stressing individual
civil and political liberties. The Law Institute of the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) held a symposium in
June on theories of human rights. A CASS delegation visited
North America in September and October to study international
concepts of human rights. In November the Government
published, and publicized widely, a report on human rights in
China which acknowledged the need for improvements, but
otherwise presented a one-sided and highly complimentary view
of individual rights in China, attempting to establish a
dichotomy between economic development and personal and
political liberties. The publication of the report and other
human rights activities appear to have originated in a desire
to improve China's image abroad and strengthen the Government's
ability to respond to criticism of its human rights record.
Whatever the motivation, this process of study and dialog has
exposed more Chinese to alternate concepts of human rights.
Chinese authorities continued to broaden their dialog with the
United States and other governments on certain human rights
issues, including judicial and penal systems, amnesties,
accounting for prisoners, emigration policy, and family
planning. Beijing also received several U.S. Congressional
delegations with a particular concern for Chinese human rights
problems. An Australian human rights delegation visited China
in July. A European Parliament delegation with an emphasis on
human rights made a September visit. Both the Australian and
European delegations visited Tibet. Other prominent visitors,
including a high-level U.S. delegation led by the Secretary of
State, also focused on human rights issues with Chinese
leaders. All of these delegations found restrictions imposed
by the Government which severely limited their contacts and
travel .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
While laws exist to protect minorities and women, in practice
discrimination based on ethnicity, sex, and religion persists
in housing, jobs, education, and other aspects of life.
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The economic progress of minorities is viewed by the Government
as one of its significant achievements. Minorities benefit
from a policy of "privileged treatment" in marriage, family
planning, university admission, and employment, as well as
disproportionate infrastructure investment in some minority
areas. In practice, however, discrimination based on ethnic
origin persists. The concept of a largely homogeneous Chinese
people pervades the general thinking of the Han ethnic
majority. The 55 designated ethnic minorities constitute just
over 8 percent of the PRC ' s population. Most minority groups
reside in areas they have traditionally inhabited, with
standards of living often well below the national average.
Government economic development policies have had some success
in raising living standards but have at the same time disrupted
traditional patterns of living.
The Communist Party's avowed policy of increasing minority
representation in the Government and the CCP has resulted in
members of minority groups accounting for 15 percent of the
deputies in the NPC. Among the 19 chairmen and vice chairmen
of the NPC Standing Committee, 6, or 32 percent, are of
minority nationality. Such statistics, however, obscure the
reality that ethnic minorities are effectively shut out of all
but a few positions of real political and decisionmaking
power. Some minorities resent Han officials holding key
positions in minority autonomous regions. Ethnic minorities in
Tibet, Xinjiang, and elsewhere have demonstrated against Han
Chinese authority, and the underlying causes of unrest continue
to fester. While martial law in Lhasa, Tibet's capital, was
lifted in 1990, foreign visitors to Tibet in 1991 observed that
there was still a pervasive armed police and military presence
there. Reports reaching the West in 1991 suggested the
existence of smoldering ethnic tension in Inner Mongolia.
Central authorities have made it clear that they will not
tolerate opposition to Beijing's rule in minority regions.
The Government has tried in some instances to adopt policies
responsive to minority sensitivities, but in doing so has
encountered the dilemma of how to respect minority cultures
without damaging minority interests. In Tibet and Xinjiang,
for example, there are two-track school systems using standard
Chinese and minority languages. Students can choose which
system to attend. One side effect of this policy to protect
and maintain minority cultures has been a reinforcement of a
highly segregated society. Under this separate education
system, those graduating from minority schools are at a
disadvantage in competing for jobs in government and business,
which require good spoken Chinese. These graduates must take
remedial language instruction before attending universities and
colleges .
The 1982 Constitution states tha.t "women in the People's
Republic of China enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of
life," and promises, among other things, equal pay for equal
work. In fact, women experience many inecjualities . Most women
employed in industry work in lower skilled and lower paid jobs,
women hold relatively few positions of - significant influence
within the party or government structure, and there was no
notable improvement in women's rights or working conditions in
1991. Women have often been the unintended victims of reforms
designed to streamline enterprises and give workers greater job
mobility. Many employers prefer to hire men to avoid the
expense of maternity leave and child care. Reports by women of
discrimination, unfair dismissal, demotion, or wage cuts when
they needed maternity leave have continued.
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The gap in the education levels of men and women has narrowed;
women now maKe up over one-third of both high school and
university students. Men continue, however, to constitute the
majority of the educated, particularly the highly educated, and
a disproportionate number of government-funded scholarships for
overseas study go to men.
The Government strongly condemns and is working hard to curb
traditional abhorrent practices against women such as the
abduction and selling of women for wives or prostitution, abuse
of female children, violence against women, and female
infanticide. In September the NPC's Standing Committee, in an
effort to curb such practices, adopted laws on protection of
minors, curbing of prostitution, and punishment of abductors of
women and children. Many discriminatory practices are rooted
in traditional rural attitudes and values. Rural parents tend
to view girls as liabilities because they are less productive
income earners and leave home without providing assistance for
their parents' retirement; boys are more highly valued as
prospective income earners and as future caretakers for elderly
parents. A number of provinces have sought to reduce the
perceived higher economic value of boys in providing old age
support by establishing more retirement homes and improving the
quality of those homes already in existence.
Finally, there is discrimination in China on the basis of
religion. Communist Party officials state that party
membership and religious belief are incompatible. This places
a serious limitation on religious believers, since party
membership is required for almost all high positions in
government and commerce. While there are some religious
believers in the party, especially in minority autonomous
regions, few hold important leadership positions. Most
government officials responsible for religious affairs work are
not religious believers.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The PRC's 1982 Constitution provides for "freedom of
association," but the guarantee is heavily qualified by
references to the interest of the State and the leadership of
the CCP. Though trade union officials recognize that workers'
interests may not always coincide with those of the party, they
claim their role encompasses both passing CCP demands and
propaganda down to the workers and channeling workers' demands
upward to the enterprises, the party, and the Government.
While union membership is voluntary for individual employees,
enterprises are generally required to have a union. Workers in
Chinese-foreign joint ventures are guaranteed the right to form
unions, which then must affiliate with the All-China Federation
of Trade Unions (ACFTU), and joint venture managers report
significant union activity and the need to bargain with these
unions over wages and benefits. Union officials indicate that
about 20 percent of joint ventures have unions, and attribute
the lack of unions in other joint ventures to the newness of
the firms. However, officials report that union membership is
much larger among large joint ventures, which include the
majority of U.S. company participation. They state that they
are actively organizing unions in those joint ventures that do
not have them, and report little opposition from foreign owners.
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The right to strike, which had been included in China's 1975
and 1978 Constitutions, was removed from the 1982
Constitution. In 1983, however, the Chairman of the ACFTU
stated that, if a trade union and its labor protection safety
officers found that a workplace was too dangerous, the union
should organize the workers to leave the hazardous areas.
Thus, Chinese authorities usually view strikes as justified
only when they respond to problems such as a sudden
deterioration in safety conditions. While Ministry of Labor
officials deny that there have been any recent strikes, there
were scattered press reports of strikes and other labor unrest
in 1991. Many of these continue to relate to the issue of
benefits for laid-off workers.
The ACFTU, nominally an independent organization, is in fact
closely controlled by the Communist Party. There have been
credible reports of Communist Party harassment through union
channels of workers with close working relationships with
foreigners. Virtually all state sector workers and nearly 90
percent of all urban workers belong to ACFTU chapters.
Unemployed workers are not considered union members.
The Government does not allow independent trade unions, and
none operates openly. In 1983 the ACFTU added a new clause to
its Constitution requiring that any attempt to set up or
dissolve a union be endorsed by its membership and approved by
higher bodies in the national trade union structure. While
this clause appears to allow for the existence of nonunion
worker groups, no such groups appear to be legally tolerated.
The Workers Autonomous Federations that were formed briefly in
the Spring of 1989 were all eliminated by arrests of their
leaders. Worker leader Han Dongfang was released and all
charges dropped in 1991, and the Government told the
International Labor Organization (ILO) that Liu Qiang had also
been released, but a number of other worker leaders who
attempted to form independent unions remain in detention.
Reports from several sources, however, indicated that
underground worker organizations exist in China. The Hong Kong
press has reported that these organizations were subject to
official harassment.
ACFTU international activities are subject to policy guidance
from the CCP. The ACFTU currently claims to have contacts with
trade unions in over 120 countries, without regard to whether
the foreign union is affiliated with the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the Communist-dominated
World Federation of Trade Unions, or other organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Under the labor contract system that now covers approximately
10 percent of China's work force, individual workers may
negotiate with management over contract terms. In practice,
only the very few workers with highly technical skills are able
to negotiate effectively on salary and fringe benefits issues.
The Government does not permit collective bargaining. Without
legal status as a collective bargaining body, the ACFTU' s role
has been restricted to a consultative one in the decisionmaking
process over wages and regulations affecting labor. Most of
the terms and conditions of employment continue to be
determined unilaterally by management in most cases. In joint
ventures and some small collectives, workers have greater
influence. The ACFTU has shown itself increasingly concerned
about protecting workers' basic living standards and.
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occasionally, protesting unsafe working conditions; it has
organized petitions and even sit-ins demanding that laid-off
workers' living wages be protected. Other than in cases where
it believes workers' basic welfare is severely threatened (such
as inadequate unemployment benefits), the ACFTU generally acts
simply as a channel for workers' complaints to the management
of individual enterprises and municipal labor bureaus, or as a
channel for passing CCP demands and propaganda to workers.
A 1988 law states that trade unions in private enterprises have
the right to represent employees and to sign collective
bargaining agreements with the enterprises. The significance
of this is muted by the fact that the work force of private
enterprises now accounts for less than 1 percent of Chinese
urban workers. Moreover, there have been no reports of
instances in which unions in private enterprises have
undertaken collective bargaining over wage, contract or safety
issues. Worker congresses, organized in most Chinese
enterprises, technically have the authority to remove
incompetent managers and approve major decisions affecting the
enterprise (notably wage and bonus distribution systems).
Worker congresses generally meet only once a year, however, and
appear to act primarily as rubber stamps on agreements worked
out among factory managers, party secretaries, and union
representatives .
In addition, a dispute settlement procedure has been in effect
since 1987. According to the procedure, workers who wish to
contest a dismissal or other unfair practice must first appeal
to an arbitration committee within the factory. If they are
not satisfied with the committee's decision they can appeal to
a local arbitration committee, chaired by a local labor bureau
official with representatives from the union and the
enterprise. If not satisfied with this committee's decision,
the worker can bring the matter to court, though in practice,
this has rarely, if ever, been done.
Laws governing working conditions in China's Special Economic
Zones are not significantly different from those in the country
at large. While the Government has regulations limiting wages
for joint venture employees to 120 percent of state enterprise
employees' wages (or 150 percent in highly profitable
ventures), these regulations are not uniformly enforced.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
While China has generally abandoned its traditional use of
massive corvee labor for construction of infrastructure
projects and public facilities, workers are still "mobilized"
for public works projects and to augment public security
forces. Imprisonment in China, except for those in detention
centers, generally entails compulsory labor. Almost all those
sentenced by the courts to prison or labor reform camps,
including political prisoners, are required to work, usually
for little compensation. In addition, China maintains a
network of reeducation through labor camps (see Section I.e.)
with an officially reported inmate population of 160,000, not
sentenced by a court, who also must work.
Under the "staying at prison employment" system, some prisoners
are denied permission to return to their homes after release
and instead are forced to remain and work in the vicinity of
the prison. For those assigned to camps far from their
residences, this constitutes a form of internal exile. While
the Ministry of Justice claims that only 200 to 300 former
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prisoners are currently held under this system, most outside
observers contend that the true number is far higher, although
numbers are impossible to verify. Chinese penal policy
emphasizes "reform first, production second," but labor is an
integral part of the system both for rehabilitation and in
order to help support the facilities. Prisoners in both labor
reform and labor reeducation reportedly spend a maximum of 6
hours per day working and 3 hours per day studying. Most
reports indicate that work conditions in the export-oriented
light manufacturing factories are similar to those in ordinary
factories, but conditions on labor farms and in coal mines are
exceedingly harsh gnd in the mines possibly more dangerous than
in ordinary mines. Various Chinese newspapers have reported
that Chinese prison labor is used for many types of production
(examples in parenthesis): infrastructure (roads), heavy
industry (coal, steel), light manufacturing (clothing, shoes,
small machine tools) and agriculture (grain, tea, sugar cane).
The U.S. Customs Service has issued orders barring a number of
products which were reported to be made by prisoners from
entering the United States and has detained several shipments
of such goods. On October 10, 1991, the Chinese Government
published a reiteration of its regulations barring the export
of prison-made goods. It also reported to the U.S. Embassy on
the results of several investigations, including one where a
factory manager was relieved of his administrative duties. At
year's end, the U.S. Government was actively negotiating a
memorandum of understanding with the Chinese Government on
obtaining the necessary information to enforce U.S. law and
halt these exports.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Regulations promulgated in 1987 prohibit the employment of
school-age minors who have not completed the compulsory 9 years
of education. Statistics on school attendance indicate that
approximately 20 percent of school-age children in the cities
and villages do not attend school, and therefore are likely to
be working. The number may well be higher in poorer and
isolated areas, where child labor in agriculture is assumed to
be widespread. In connection with a crackdown on vices, there
were reports in the press and by public security officials of
female minors being sold into prostitution or to factories as
laborers .
In September 1988, the Ministry of Labor issued a circular
designed to curb child labor problems; it reiterated those
policies this year. It calls for severe fines, withdrawal of
business licenses, or jail for employers who hire child
laborers under 16 years old. Enforcement appears to have been
haphazard. Provincial officials in Guangdong, where the
problem of child labor is particularly serious, were unable to
say how many enterprises have been prosecuted for child labor
violations .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
China does not have a labor code. A draft is apparently
circulating, but it remains unclear whether it will be
published or made into law.
There is no minimum wage in China.
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CHINA
The legal maximum workweek excluding overtime is 48 hours, of
which 3 to 12 hours are generally spent in political study or
"education" on current social issues.
At factories and construction sites, occupational health and
safety are constant themes of posters and campaigns. Every
work unit must- designate a health and safety officer; the
International Labor Organization has established a training
program for these officials. Despite this, general health and
safety conditions in the workplace are poor. Both workers and
managers often disregard safety procedures. State procurators
deal annually with thousands of negligence and accident cases
involving criminal or civil liability. The absence of a
national labor code makes enforcement of safety regulations by
labor bureaus extremely difficult. Most of the cases mentioned
above involve physical injuries caused by machinery or
transport of materials. Chinese epidemiological officials have
only recently become aware of the threat to workers from
chemicals and are currently only beginning to monitor such
threats .
834
TAIWAN
Taiwan's transition from a legacy of authoritarian rule by the
Nationalist Party (KMT) toward democracy advanced significantly
in 1991, as the authorities completed the first stage of a two-
stage constitutional reform plan. In April the old National
Assembly (NA) — Taiwan's electoral college and constitution-
amending body — composed largely of KMT elders ostensibly
representing Chinese mainland districts, enacted the legal basis
for President Lee's May 1 end to the "Period of Mobilization"
and abolition of the "temporary provisions" to the Constitution
in effect since 1948. Presidential emergency powers were
continued, however, with a sunset provision. The election of
new members from Taiwan constituencies in December created a
new NA basically representative of the island's population.
As with the NA, senior mainland members of the Legislative Yuan
(LY) — Taiwan's lawmaking body — were retired at the end of 1991.
With LY elections scheduled for late 1992, the NA and LY will
no longer be constituted under a representational formula
ensuring KMT dominance. The LY's role in politics became more
pronounced through opposition and KMT legislators'
interpellations .
The transition to majority rule inevitably has eroded the
disproportionate role of Chinese mainlanders who have dominated
politics and government on the island since 1949, and who still
hold a majority of important government and military positions.
The military's role in politics and civil administration has
diminished considerably since the lifting of martial law on
Taiwan in 1987. However, the Taiwan Garrison General
Headquarters (TGGH) — the principal enforcement mechanism for
martial law rule until 1987 — continued to play a role in law
enforcement. Its handling of reformatory education centers for
"hoodlums" came under scrutiny in 1991 following reports of a
fatal beating and hunger strikes.
Taiwan has basically a free market economy, but major sectors —
including finance, transportation, utilities, shipbuilding,
steel, petrochemicals, and telecommunications — remain dominated
by state-run enterprises. Taiwan's economy continued to shift
toward the service sector and capital/technology-intensive
industries. Shortages of unskilled labor resulted in the exodus
abroad of many labor-intensive manufacturers, as well as new
pressures to admit foreign workers.
In addition to advances in political reform, progress on human
rights in 1991 included: a new Law for the Maintenance of
Social Order, which replaced the Police Offense Punishment Law
declared unconstitutional over a decade ago; abolition of the
Sedition Punishment Law (although other sedition statutes
remain); abolition of the Statute for Eradication of Communist
Bandit Spies; and the end of review of junior judges' decisions.
Although human rights continued to expand in Taiwan's more open
political environment, significant restrictions remain —
including restrictions on freedom of speech, the electronic
press, movement and association, as well as on worker and
women's rights. Other problems included politically motivated
prosecutions, selective enforcement of the laws, and unfair
political practices, including restrictions on access to the
electronic media.
While the authorities' responses to increasingly visible Taiwan
independence activities have been more moderate than in the
past, they are still restrictive. Several independence
835
TAIWAN
activists were prosecuted for allegedly seditious actions,
although mere individual advocacy of independence was no longer
deemed sufficient basis for prosecution. Sedition statutes, a
border-entry "blacklist," and other methods continue to be used
against independence activists, particularly those who organize
outside Taiwan and those who advocate or use violence.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political killings but an inmate of a
reformatory died after being beaten (see Section I.e.).
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of persons being abducted or secretly
arrested by the authorities.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although Taiwan law expressly prohibits the use of torture,
there continued to be credible reports of physical abuse of
persons in police custody. Ministry of Justice officials claim
that all interrogations are recorded and that an attorney may
be present. They add that all allegations of mistreatment are
investigated. However, one of the attorneys for alleged
seditionist Lin Ying-fu, arrested in connection with the
"Independent Taiwan Association" case, claimed the authorities
interrogated Lin for 20 hours in a 24 hour period; an attorney
was not present much of this time (See Section 2.a.). Criminal
lawyers and legal scholars note that abuses most often occur in
local police stations where interrogations are not recorded and
that most persons do not have attorneys present at the
interrogation stage.
The handling of alleged "hoodlums" in a reformatory education
camp under the jurisdiction of the Eastern Taiwan Garrison
Command came under scrutiny after the death in June of an inmate
at the reformatory education institute at Yenwan, Taitung
County. According to press reports, an autopsy disclosed that
the inmate, Chen Ching-chi, had been beaten severely before he
died. The Ministries of National Defense and Interior have
announced plans to transfer most of the TGGH ' s law enforcement
function to the civilian police.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Police may legally arrest without a warrant anyone they suspect
of committing a crime for which the punishment would be 5 years
or more in prison and may call in persons for questioning
without a formal summons. The authorities must, within 24
hours after detention, give notice in writing to the detained
person, or a designated relative or friend, stating the reason
for the arrest or questioning. The Code of Criminal Procedure
specifies that the authorities may detain an accused person for
up to 2 months during the investigation phase prior to filing a
formal indictment, and for up to 3 months during the trial.
The prosecuting officer may apply once to the court to extend
the investigative detention for 2 months, and twice while in
detention during trial. The authorities generally have followed
836
TAIWAN
these procedures in extending periods of detention, although
trials usually take place within 3 months of indictment.
Persons indicted for relatively minor criminal offenses can be
released on bail at the judge's discretion. The right to have
a lawyer present during the investigation phase is generally
respected, but defense lawyers complain that persons often are
not advised of their right to have legal representation during
police interrogation, and there is no legal requirement that
indigent persons be provided with counsel during police
interrogation.
In July 1985, the Legislative Yuan passed the "antihoodlvini"
law, which accords law enforcement authorities broad powers,
including the power to determine whether a person should be
designated as a "hoodlum." The courts approve or deny requests
for reformatory education of designated hoodlums. Human rights
organizations and defense attorneys criticize the law as an
extreme departure from appropriate standards of due process.
Attorneys for persons charged under the law have no right to
examine documents or to cross-examine witnesses. While a
decision to commit a designated hoodlum to reformatory
education can, in principle, be appealed to the High Court,
critics say that courts simply rubberstamp police decisions.
Reformatory education for "hoodlums" remains under the
jurisdiction of the TGGH . The law does not authorize the
courts to determine the length of reformatory education; police
and prison authorities decide. The usual term is 3 to 6 months
for a first offense. Repeat offenders are detained for longer
periods, and detention may be extended up to 3 years, depending
on behavior in custody.
Until the June 1991 passage of the Law for the Maintenance of
Social Order, many minor crimes on Taiwan were handled under the
Police Offenses Law, which had empowered the police not only to
arrest but also to prosecute, convict, and punish offenders with
incarceration for up to 2 weeks. The Council of Grand Justices
in 1980 declared this statute unconstitutional, and in 1990
upheld this ruling and imposed a 1-year deadline for abolishing
this law. To assure that suspects would not be detained without
charge for over 24 hours, the new law establishes a series of
"simple courts" which operate 24 hours a day. These courts —
not the police — now determine penalties (up to 3 days'
imprisonment) for suspects arrested for minor offenses. The new
law also gives civilian police jurisdiction in cases involving
military personnel.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right of fair public trial is provided by law and generally
respected in practice. Taiwan's legal system does not provide
for trial by jury. In a typical court case, parties and
witnesses are interrogated by a single judge but not directly by
a defense attorney or prosecutor. The judge may decline to hear
witnesses or to consider evidence a party wishes to submit. All
judges are appointed by, and responsible to, the Judicial Yuan.
Informed observers have characterized the judiciary as not
fully independent and as susceptible to political and personal
pressure. Since the lifting of martial law on July 15,
1987, civilians may no longer be tried in military courts.
Although trials are public, attendance at trials involving
juveniles or politically sensitive issues may require
permission from the court. Defendants have a right to an
837
TAIWAN
attorney; if the defendant is suspected of committing a crime
for which the penalty is 3 or more years' imprisonment, or if
the defendant is handicapped or elderly, the judge may assign an
attorney. Criminal law specifically provides the defendant with
protection from self-incrimination. Court cases generally are
heard in several brief court sessions, often separated by weeks
or months . Persons convicted in cases in which the sentence
exceeds 3 years have a right to appeal to a High Court and the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court limits its review to the
legal aspects of the case and to specific procedural aspects.
The authorities on April 1, 1991, abolished the practice of
review of decisions of junior judges by senior judges. While
intended to correct errors of law and terminology, some critics
said the practice had increased the possibility of outside
interference with the judicial process.
The Legislative Yuan in May abolished the 42-year old Sedition
Punishment Law and the 41-year old Statute for the Elimination
of Communist Bandit Spies, after unrest over the arrest of 4
alleged members of the Tokyo-based Dutaihui (Independent Taiwan
Organization) on May 9 (also see Section 2.b.).
Antisedition provisions still exist in both the National
Security Law and the Criminal Code. The opposition has called
for abolition of Article 100 of the Criminal Code, which allows
for punishment of individuals who prepare for or conspire to
commit sedition. The KMT has agreed to revise this section to
eliminate penalties for "preparation for sedition" but has
refused to accede to opposition demands to abolish this law
altogether. Critics say the law is vague and inconsistent with
Taiwan's constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech. It
was involved in a number of sedition trials in 1991 of persons
advocating Taiwan's independence.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Warrantless searches, common before the lifting of martial law,
are unusual now. A warrant must be obtained before a search,
except when the search is incidental to arrest. The exception
is car searches, which are routinely conducted at roadblocks.
Although the right to privacy is generally respected, members
of opposition political parties and other political dissidents
allege that their correspondence and telephone calls are
routinely intercepted and that they are subject to surveillance.
The Ministry of Justice is drafting a telecommunications
monitoring law to provide a new legal basis for the Ministry of
Justice, Ministry of National Defense, and the intelligence
authorities to monitor telephone calls and correspondence.
In June an agent of the Ministry of Justice Investigation
Bureau (MJIB) was observed collecting information on campus
activists while posing as a Chiaotung University student.
After students protested to the MJIB, the Bureau announced that
the agent's actions were in violation of regulations and that
the evidence would not be used. Also in June, opposition
legislators caught an undercover MJIB agent — posing as a
volunteer legislative assistant — attempting to obtain from the
Legislative Yuan a list of members of an organization
investigating human rights abuses in the military.
838
TAIWAN
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
While the Constitution provides for freedom of speech and
press, these rights continue to be circumscribed by sedition
laws. Security agencies continue to monitor political
expression, both in Taiwan and overseas, and the authorities
continued selectively to prosecute opposition activists on
charges ranging from "sedition" to "harming public order."
"Sedition" is defined to include expressing sympathy with
Communists, espousing views contrary to the authorities' claim
to represent all of China, and supporting an independent legal
status for Taiwan. Nevertheless, the authorities have
demonstrated increasing tolerance for open debate, even on
sensitive issues.
None of the sedition cases initiated in 1991 was based on mere
individual advocacy of Taiwan independence, although the
authorities continued to draw the line at actions that went
beyond mere speech, such as joining or establishing
organizations deemed subversive because of such advocacy. The
authorities in some cases have investigated alleged seditious
actions but later declined to prosecute. Critics say such
investigations were intended to harass and intimidate the
opposition. The Taiwan High Court prosecutor's office in
August and October' began investigations to determine whether an
opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) "Draft
Constitution of the Republic of Taiwan" and its call for a
plebiscite on "Taiwan independence" justified criminal
prosecution for sedition. In addition, the authorities
referred the plebiscite plank case to the Executive Yuan ' s
Political Party Screening Committee for possible sanctions,
which range from issuance of a warning to ordering the DPP to
disband. Decisions were held in abeyance until after the
December 21 National Assembly election, and no decisions had
been made by year's end.
Various sedition prosecutions were initiated by the authorities
in 1991. In one case, 5 members of the Dutaihui (Independent
Taiwan Association) were tried; 4 were found guilty and 1 was
acquitted. Several persons were arrested from August through
December on various sedition charges as members of the World
United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) — an organization
banned by the Taiwan authorities. Some of them were also
charged with violation of the National Security Law (passport
fraud) in evading the "blacklist" to enter Taiwan. They were
denied bail on grounds that they might flee prosecution and
their cases remain in the courts. Several other cases
initiated in 1990 and earlier also remain in the courts.
The authorities can censor publications through provisions of
the Publications Law which empower the police to seize or ban
printed material that commits or instigates others to commit
sedition, treason, sacrilege, offenses of interference with the
lawful exercise of public functions, or offenses against public
order or morals. Cases of censorship, however, are rare today,
although critics say the existence of this statute continues to
be a source of indirect control over the press. Reporter Chang
Yu-hua and publisher Hsu Ting-hsin of the Economics political
magazine were indicted in March 1991 by the Taipei district
prosecutor's office for "jeopardizing military secrets" in
connection with an article in an October 1990 issue on military
deployments in Quemoy (Kinmen) . Chang was sentenced to 19
months' imprisonment, but the sentence was later suspended.
839
TAIWAN
Hsu was acquitted. Chang has appealed his sentence to the High
Court .
In contrast with the relatively unrestrained and highly
competitive environment in which the print media now operate,
television and radio remain tightly controlled. The authorities
are major stockholders in all three television stations.
Television coverage of sensitive political subjects, such as
opposition demonstrations, is restricted and slanted. Moreover,
while authorities claim only 12 of 33 radio stations are owned
by military or civil authorities, they count am9ng ostensibly
"private" radio stations the KMT-controlled Broadcasting
Corporation of China, which operates a number of stations
throughout Taiwan. Moreover, no requests to open new radio and
television stations have been approved since 1969, although
illegal cable television networks are pervasive.
In August the opposition DPP issued a statement protesting the
authorities' crackdown on unlicensed cable television stations,
charging that the ban was intended to disconnect its "democratic
cable-television network" during the National Assembly campaign.
Authorities said the crackdown was motivated by intellectual
property and safety concerns. Owners of competing movie
theaters and video rental stores, however, protested that the
crackdown was not thorough enough.
The authorities for the first time agreed to allow television
campaigning during the December National Assembly elections.
Any political party fielding more than 10 candidates in a
national election was entitled to access to television
campaigning. The party had to pay a deposit, which would not be
returned if less than one-tenth of its candidates were elected.
Legislators from both the KMT and the opposition DPP have
criticized a recjuirement that all campaign materials be approved
by a censor prior to broadcast. Other critics say the
regulations discriminate against smaller political parties.
Restrictions on academic freedom have diminished in recent
years, and the trend has been to allow greater expression of
dissenting political views. Student demonstrations occur and
are tolerated, at least within university campuses. Colleges
and universities have "education officers," who are military
officers seconded to the Ministry of Education for the purpose
of teaching the "Thought of Sun Yat-sen," but who also monitor
student attitudes and behavior. Teachers are sometimes
pressured to discourage students from taking part in
demonstrations and risk being disciplined and harming their
careers if they express unorthodox views themselves. There is
no system of tenure to protect teachers who express such views.
However, the overall trend has been to remove political loyalty
from professional consideration. The effect has been to enhance
the independence of the faculty from KMT political control.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly is provided for in the Constitution but is
restricted in practice. In 1987 the LY passed the Parade and
Assembly Law, which allows peaceful demonstrations if they are
approved by the authorities and do not violate the Constitution,
advocate Communism or advocate Taiwan's separation from China.
The DPP and other opposition groups have organized and carried
out numerous demonstrations under the Law. The Parade and
Assembly Law provides, however, that demonstration organizers
may be held responsible for the behavior of participants.
Oppositionists have been prosecuted for alleged harm to public
840
TAIWAN
order and interference with public functions (usually the
police) resulting from demonstrations they organized, as well as
for holding "illegal demonstrations" without a permit.
Prosecutors deny that politics plays a part in decisions to
bring charges under the Parade and Assembly Law, but the
authorities did not assert that those being prosecuted
personally either advocated or engaged in violence.
c. Freedom of Religion
The constitutional provision for freedom to practice religion is
generally observed in practice. Most Taiwan inhabitants adhere
to Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, animism, or a combination of
these beliefs. Other religions include Christianity and Islam.
There is no established or favored religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Except for military and other restricted areas, there is general
freedom of internal travel. An exit permit is required for
travel abroad and may be refused for a number of reasons,
including failure to complete compulsory military service. Such
refusals are now rare. There are now no countries to which
civilian residents of Taiwan may not travel. Entry permits for
overseas-resident Taiwan passport holders, as well as visas for
foreigners, also may be refused for a variety of reasons,
including political activities outside Taiwan. Under the
National Security Law, however, reasons for entry and exit
permit refusals must be given, and appeals may be made to a
special board. The authorities claim to recognize the right of
Chinese who hold Taiwan passports, and who normally reside in
Taiwan, to return from abroad. Nonresident Taiwan citizens,
however, are usually issued "overseas Chinese" passports and
require entry permits to travel to Taiwan. The authorities will
not authorize the entry of Chinese residents outside Taiwan
between the ages of 16 and 70, even those who have long held
Taiwan passports, if they have lived in Communist-controlled
areas within the preceding 5 years. Exceptions are made,
including for persons deemed to be of outstanding merit and for
mainland residents coming because of the serious illness or
death of close relatives. There is no longer a requirement for
these persons to renounce prior membership in the Chinese
Communist Party. In September the Bureau of Entry and Exit
announced plans to liberalize entry rules to allow
mainland-Chinese spouses of Taiwan citizens to enjoy permanent
resident status, provided that they have been legally married
for 2 years.
Increasing numbers of Taiwan-citizen dissidents previously
denied entry permits are now being permitted to return to
Taiwan; however, a number of overseas dissidents still
considered "undesirable" by the authorities have been denied
entry into Taiwan under the 1984 Law. The authorities' refusal
to allow the return of overseas-based Taiwan-citizen dissidents
has become the subject of political debate and interpellations
in the Legislative Yuan. The Premier stated April 2 in the LY
that, in order to protect the security of Taiwan residents, the
authorities will not permit the return to Taiwan of citizens
advocating "Taiwan independence."
The Taiwan authorities have indicated that they will reduce the
number of persons on this so-called blacklist of persons denied
admission because of their activities abroad. Entry and Exit
841
TAIWAN
Services Bureau statistics indicate that 296 persons of one
proscribed organization alone, the World United Formosans for
Independence (WUFI), were restricted from entering Taiwan in
1991. Opposition estimates put the total number of blacklisted
people at around 500. Entry and Exit Services Bureau
statistics indicate that the National Security Law was used as
the basis for the denial of 179 applications for entry and 490
applications for exit between January and October (including
criminal suspects and persons who visited the Chinese mainland
without approval).
The Taiwan authorities also continue to monitor and, in some
cases, interfere with the activities of political dissidents
abroad. In March five Taiwan independence activists were
initially denied entry into the Philippines for a meeting of
Taiwan independence activists there. The Taiwan authorities
provided a list of names to Philippine immigration officials,
and oppositionists charge that a security agent from Taiwan
assisted Philippine immigration officials in screening inbound
Taiwan tourists.
A 1984 law allows the authorities to detain persons or revoke
their passports, for behavior that harms the interests of
Taiwan, or endangers security, public order, tradition, or
Taiwan's economic interests. Critics of the law claim that it
gives the authorities the power to revoke the passport of any
Taiwan citizen who makes remarks overseas that are deemed
inimical to the political interests of the authorities, and
that this violates the right of all citizens to return to their
homeland. This law is not used frequently.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Taiwan has taken significant steps away from its authoritarian
political system to a more pluralistic one. The KMT, which
established itself in Taiwan after the surrender of the Japanese
in 1945 and has exercised political power since then, achieved
a decisive victory in open and democratic elections in
December. Reflecting their constitutional claim to be the
government of all of China, the authorities maintain not only a
provincial and local government system but also an array of
central-level political bodies identical to those found on the
mainland prior to 1949. In the past, centers of power on Taiwan
have been the Presidency, the Executive Yuan, the military and
security apparatus, and the KMT Central Standing Committee.
Both the President and Vice-President are elected by the
National Assembly, although changes in the mode of election are
under consideration. The Premier is appointed by the President
with the approval of the Legislative Yuan (LY) . A lively
debate is taking place in ruling party and opposition circles
over the merits of direct versus indirect presidential
elections. Power also is increasingly being shared with the
LY, which itself is increasingly representative. The Control
Yuan, the highest government supervisory organ, continues to be
elected indirectly under a voting system that guarantees KMT
domination.
Major changes are occurring in the two most important elective
bodies at the central level — the LY and the National Assembly
(NA) . Senior representatives elected on the mainland over four
decades ago retired at the end of 1991. New elections for the
NA — which under the present Constitution has jurisdiction over
constitutional revisions and meets every 6 years to elect the
842
TAIWAN
President and Vice-President — took place in December 1991. The
new NA has 403 members, 225 elected in 1991 from Taiwan
constituencies, 100 elected from party slates in proportion to
the 1991 Taiwan constituency election results (80 "national"
seats and 20 overseas Chinese seats), and 78 incumbents elected
in Taiwan in supplemental elections in 1986.
The KMT won 71 percent of the popular vote and 78 percent of
the seats in the new NA, giving the KMT the three-fourths
majority needed to control constitutional changes. The KMT
holds 318 seats in the new NA, while the DPP holds 75, the other
10 seats being held by third parties. LY elections will take
place in late 1992. There had been no general elections to
these two bodies since 1948. Universal suffrage exists for
citizens 20 years of age and over. Voting is voluntary and by
secret ballot.
The KMT continues to be the dominant political party in Taiwan,
as has been the case since 1945. Originally composed
overwhelmingly of mainlanders, its membership of over 2 million
is now more than 70 percent Taiwanese. (Native Taiwanese of
southern Fujian and Hakka origin comprise an estimated 85
percent of Taiwan's population, with Chinese mainlanders
arriving since 1949 and their offspring comprising most of the
remainder.) The KMT's structure and control mechanisms are
based on Leninist models; however, the party's operations are
considerably more flexible. In 1988 the KMT began to remove
formal party organs from the military and the school systems
and to democratize its party structure.
The passage of the Civic Organizations Law in January 1989
legalized the organization of additional political parties. At
present, there are 68 registered parties. The major opposition
party, the DPP, was formed in 1986 in defiance of martial law;
it registered as a political party in April 1989. The DPP
claims a membership of 25,000. The other opposition parties are
much smaller. The role of the opposition, however, is greater
than its small numbers might indicate. Opposition members are
very vocal, sometimes even violent, in elective bodies and
frequently use interpellation sessions to raise controversial
or sensitive issues. Their activities have spurred some KMT
legislators to criticize the authorities' policies as too
lenient toward critics. The opposition parties still face
several disadvantages, principally the authorities' virtual
monopoly of television and, to a lesser extent, radio. (For a
discussion of opposition access to mass media, see Section 2. a.)
Oppositionists also charge that the election code passed by the
Legislative Yuan in July 1991 increases the KMT's overwhelming
organizational advantages over smaller parties. The statute
bars defeated candidates from being appointed to at-large
proportional representation seats in the bodies, and adopts a
one-vote system under which voters cast a single vote for both
candidate and party. With the exception of those whose rights
were restored by presidential amnesty, persons convicted of
sedition under martial law were often given additional,
time-limited sentences depriving them of civil rights such as
voting and holding public office. (Further, restrictions on
practicing certain professions such as the law, medicine,
pharmacy, accountancy, and company management are not limited
by time but may be curtailed by an amnesty.) The benefits that
the KMT enjoys in terms of access to public and private funds
and assistance from administrative and security agencies also
give it a significant advantage.
843
TAIWAN
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Taiwan has two principal human rights organizations: the
Chinese Association of Human Rights (CAHR) and the Taiwan
Association for Human Rights (TAHR) . CAHR, staffed mostly by
retired officials, is regarded as the establishment-oriented
human rights organ. TAHR is aligned with the opposition.
Coordination between the two bodies is limited; they generally
have contact only when representatives of international human
rights organizations visit Taiwan.
The Taiwan authorities permit representatives of most
international human rights organizations, including Amnesty
International and Asia Watch, to visit Taiwan and meet citizens
freely. However, the staff of the publication Taiwan
Communique, published by the International Committee for Human
Rights in Taiwan, is denied entry.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Taiwan's only non-Chinese minority group, slightly more than 1
percent of Taiwan's total population, consists of the aboriginal
descendants of Malayo-Polynesians already established in Taiwan
when the first Chinese settlers arrived. They face no official
discrimination but encounter significant cultural and economic
barriers. Specially designated seats in both central and
provincial legislatures are reserved for representatives of
these aboriginal people, and the authorities have instituted a
number of social programs to help them assimilate into the
dominant Chinese society. The aboriginal people complain that
they are prevented from owning ancestral lands in mountain areas
under the control of the authorities. Furthermore, they are not
allowed to use non-Chinese personal names on legal documents.
The sale of aboriginal children into prostitution is a serious
social problem. Although aborigines constitute under 2 percent
of Taiwan's population, nearly 20 percent of the child
prostitute population consists of aborigines, according to
reliable statistics.
In June aborigine rights activists clashed with police and
occupied the offices of the Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs
Commission, demanding that a similar agency be established for
them. They claimed the authorities placed undue emphasis on
Tibetan and Mongolian affairs, despite the fact that only a
handful of Tibetans and Mongolians reside on Taiwan, while only
a small section within the Interior Ministry handles the affairs
of over 340,000 aborigines on Taiwan.
The law prohibits sex discrimination, but it exists both in fact
and in law. There are still some laws that discriminate against
women, relating mostly to divorce and child custody issues, but
a revised civil code passed by the LY in March 1985 provides for
more equal treatment of women in the areas of marriage and
divorce. The law, for example, provides for joint ownership of
property acquired after marriage. Previously, property obtained
after marriage would go to the husband upon divorce. A January
1989 revision of the juvenile welfare law now allows a public
prosecutor to appeal on behalf of the mother or a third party in
child custody cases. This revised law, however, applies only to
children between 12 and 18 years of age, and custody of children
under 12 generally is given to the father upon divorce. Women
have complained of being forced to quit jobs because of age or
844
TAIWAN
childbearing restrictions, and restrictive quotas exist within
certain ministries to control the number of female government
employees. A women's rights movement is active and growing.
Although official data on violence against women are not
available, women active in politics, human rights, and women's
organizations single out intrafamily violence as a serious
problem, especially wife beating. Strong social pressure is
sometimes exerted on abused wives to conceal their treatment to
avoid "disgracing" their families. The critics of this violence
believe that greater mobility, education, and job opportunities
are making women less inclined to tolerate such abuse and more
willing to complain of mistreatment, but it is not known if the
number of actual complaints filed increased in 1991. A somewhat
similar situation exists with regard to rape, since the victims
are still socially stigmatized. Under Taiwan law, the
authorities may not undertake a prosecution for rape; only the
victim may make a complaint. Because rape trials are public,
women are reluctant to prosecute their attackers. However,
feminist and human rights organizations have assisted rape
victims, and victims are now more willing to come forward and
press charges .
The problem of child prostitutes continues to receive
considerable public attention in Taiwan. Reliable estimates say
there are currently around 100,000 women under age 18 employed
as prostitutes. Preliminary police statistics for 1991 indicate
police located 1,152 child prostitutes; of these, 204 were under
14 years old, 880 were between the ages of 14 and 16, and 224
were aborigines. Police in recent years have established
antichild prostitution task forces in response to public
pressure. Women's rights activists have also hailed the January
1989 passage of a juvenile welfare law, which enables juvenile
welfare bodies, prosecutors, and victims to apply to courts for
termination of guardianship of parents and the appointment of
qualified guardians in cases where parents have forced their
children into prostitution. In cases where children are engaged
in prostitution of their own free will and the parents are
incapable of taking safe custody, the courts may order competent
authorities to provide counseling education for not less than 6
months and not more than 2 years. However, legal loopholes and
cultural barriers remain as obstacles to prosecution. For
example, in cases where both parents have sold a child into
prostitution, the current law requires the victim to lodge a
complaint before prosecution is undertaken. In many cases, the
child is reluctant — or afraid — to do so. According to some
reports, violence, drug addiction, and other forms of coercion
are used by brothel owners to prevent girls from escaping.
Although the Taiwanese dialect is the mother tongue of most
inhabitants of Taiwan, dialect television and radio programming
is limited. Taiwan currently has television broadcasts in
Mandarin, Taiwanese, and Hakka, as well as radio broadcasts in
Mandarin, Taiwanese, Hakka, and aboriginal dialects. The
authorities say that the percentage of non-Mandarin dialect
programming is now determined entirely by the marketplace.
However, the current broadcasting and television law still
mandates that "Stations shall mainly use Mandarin in domestic
broadcasts and shall decrease gradually the use of dialects.
The proportion between Mandarin and dialect broadcasts shall be
determined by the Government Information Office according to
actual requirements." In July, 21 KMT and DPP legislators
proposed removing dialect use restrictions from regulations
governing radio and television broadcasts.
845
TAIWAN
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Labor's right of association is seriously limited by a number
of laws and regulations. The Civic Organizations Law, revised
in January 1989,- requires all civic organizations, including
labor unions, to register with the authorities. Labor unions
may draw up their own rules and constitutions, but these must
be submitted to the authorities for review. Unions may be
dissolved by the authorities if they do not meet legal
reqijirements for certification, or if their activities disturb
public order. According to official sources, no unions have
been dissolved, although certification has been denied if there
were competing unions. In the latter cases, the unions were
asked to reconcile their differences and file as a single union.
Civil servants, teachers, defense industry workers, and
administrators acting on behalf of employers are prohibited
from organizing labor unions. The Labor Union Law reqiiires
that union leaders be elected regularly by their respective
membership by secret ballot, and in recent years workers have
sometimes rejected KMT or management-endorsed union slates.
Revisions of the law governing labor disputes, effective June
1988, recognize labor's right to strike but impose serious
restrictions that make legal strikes very difficult. Both labor
and management are forbidden from disrupting the "working order "
when either mediation or arbitration is in progress. Before a
strike can be called, it must be approved by a majority vote of
the full membership of the union. The authorities have
required official approval before such a meeting can be
called. Applications for arbitration may be made to the local
government. Stiff penalties may be levied should no-strike/
no-retaliation clauses be violated, but critics say that
employers have ignored the law and dismissed or locked out
workers without any legal action being taken against them.
However, the number of such incidents is believed to be minimal.
Observers also cite prosecution of labor activists as a factor
in inhibiting Taiwan's labor movement. In August 1991, nine
labor activists, including Workers Party Chairman Lo Mei-wen,
received sentences ranging from 5 months' imprisonment to 20
days for holding a strike at the Far Eastern Textile Company
without a proper permit. Their sentences were later reduced.
Prosecutors sought sentences under an obscure 1938 statute
governing agricultural, mining, industrial, and commercial
sectors during the emergency period; the law prohibited
instigating strikes among workers of enterprises producing
"designated products," including cotton, fiber, and wool.
Even well-established unions have adopted a cautious stance
towards confrontation with employers and authorities. During a
dispute over bonus payments involving the petroleum workers'
union in January, the Executive Yuan warned employees of the
Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC) not to carry out a
threatened stoppage of overtime work during the Chinese Lunar
New Year (February 13) holiday and ordered the concerned
authorities to arrest workers if they participated in the
protest. The union later called off the threatened stoppage
after the company increased its bonus offer.
Unions may form confederations but no administrative district,
including cities, counties, and provinces, can have competing
labor confederations, which effectively means there can only be
one Taiwan-wide labor federation. The Chinese Federation of
846
TAIWAN
Labor is closely associated with the KMT and also is affiliated
with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Some
workers have established independent unions and federations
under other names, such as "friendship organizations" and
"brotherhood alliances." These groups remain technically
illegal under present regulations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
As of September 1991, 2.895 million workers, or approximately
33.5 percent of Taiwan's work force, belonged to 3,622
officially registered labor unions. Under the Labor Union Law,
employers may not refuse employment to, dismiss, or otherwise
unfairly treat workers because they are union members. Labor
laws governing union activities apply equally within export
processing zones. The drive for independent labor unions lost
momentum in recent years due to tougher tactics on the part of
employers and the slowing of Taiwan's economy.
Collective bargaining is provided for under the Collective
Agreements law but is not mandatory. Only 295 formal collective
agreements were in force as of September 1991, down from 329 the
previous year . Since such agreements are made only in
large-scale enterprises, and less than 5 percent of Taiwan's
enterprises fall into this category, the proportion of workers
covered by them is small. Legal restrictions on the right to
strike and provisions for involuntary mediation or arbitration
seriously weaken collective bargaining. Most collective actions
by workers consist of such technically illegal actions as work
stoppages and mass leave-taking.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Under the Labor Standards Law, forced or compulsory labor is
prohibited. Violation is punishable by a maximum jail sentence
of 5 years. Except for allegations concerning prostitution (see
Section 5), there were no reports of violations of the section
of the Labor Standards Law prohibiting forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Standards Law stipulates that the minimum age for
employment is 15 (i.e., after compulsory education ends), and
interaction between this law and a compulsory education law
effectively keeps child labor at a very low level.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Taiwan Labor Standards Law was enacted in 1984 to provide
minimum labor standards. According to Taiwan's labor ministry,
the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA), it currently covers some
3.3 million of Taiwan's 5.6 million paid workers. The Law has
enjoyed only limited success in several areas, and there is a
growing sentiment that it and other labor laws should be
strengthened and extended to cover additional workers. By law,
the workweek is limited to 48 hours (8 hours per day, 6 days
per week) with certain provisions for overtime.
There is general agreement that the legally established minimum
wage is less than that needed to assure a decent standard of
living; however, the average manufacturing wage is more than
double the legal minimum wage. In addition, most large firms
provide their employees with allowances for transportation,
meals, housing, and other benefits which can amount to another
60 to 80 percent of base salary.
847
TAIWAN
While there is a new Occupational Safety and Health Law which
enlarges coverage of the old law to include workers in
agriculture, fishing, and forestry industries and strengthens
penalties for safety violations, it still provides only minimum
standards for working conditions and health and safety
precautions. Rising labor consciousness and continuing labor
shortages have resulted in improvements in working conditions.
Despite the establishment of the CLA, many workplace laws and
regulations are not effectively enforced because of a shortage
of inspectors. As of December 1991, there were 267 inspectors
for approximately 90,000 enterprises covered by the Labor
Standards Law. In 1990, 7.8 percent of all enterprises were
inspected. Since most enterprises are small, family owned
operations employing relatives who will not report violations,
actual adherence to the hours, wage, and safety sections of
various labor laws is hard to document but is thought to be
minimal. Taiwan's occupational injury rate, however, has
declined steadily from 1980 to 1990 by over 50 percent.
Given Taiwan's acute labor shortage, there has been an influx
of illegal foreign workers into Taiwan in recent years. Earlier
estimates of the number of illegal workers on Taiwan ranged from
40,000 to over 200,000. Authorities launched a crackdown on
illegal workers after a 58-day special amnesty ending on
February 28, 1991. The amnesty allowed illegal workers to
depart Taiwan voluntarily without penalty. By June nearly
30,000 illegal workers had left Taiwan voluntarily or were
deported. Authorities say illegal workers are entitled to the
same protection as native workers so far as work conditions are
concerned. In many cases, however, illegal foreign workers are
given board and lodging but have no medical coverage, accident
insurance, or other benefits enjoyed by local workers.
Conditions in many small- and medium-sized factories which
employ illegal labor are poor, with old and poorly maintained
equipment resulting in a high rate of industrial accidents.
Press reports suggest these illegal workers are vulnerable to
exploitation, including confiscation of passports, imposition
of involuntary deductions from wages, and extension of working
hours without overtime pay.
848
FIJI
Fiji's system of parliamentary democracy, inherited when the
country gained independence from Great Britain in 1970, ended
in October 1987 with the installation of a military regime
following two bloodless coups. An interim government,
initially formed in December 1987, remains in office and is
headed by Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, who held that
position for 17 years prior to the April 1987 elections. In
July 1991, Maj . Gen. Sitiveni Rabuka, who had become Fiji
Military Forces (FMF) commander, resigned from the military and
accepted a dual appointment in the Cabinet as co-deputy Prime
Minister and Minister for Home Affairs. A month earlier,
however, fears of a third coup were widespread when Rabuka
publicly called on the interim regime to resign, charging the
Cabinet with having lost touch with the people. Rabuka
resigned from the Cabinet on December 1, 1991 following his
election as President of the new Fijian Political Party (FPP) .
He is an FPP candidate for the general election planned for
1992 and is considered one of the front-runners to succeed
Prime Minister Ratu Mara.
Fiji's multiracial society is about evenly divided between
indigenous Fijians and ethnic Indians. Indians dominate the
economy and professions and are well represented in the lower
and mid-levels of the public service. Ethnic Fijians make up
the bulk of the nation's military services and control the
political structures.
The small but professional FMF include a naval division and an
air wing. Fiji also has a separate police force. The military
report to and are under the control of the Minister for Home
Affairs and, ultimately, the President. Control over the
police currently rests with the Prime Minister. In 1990 the
Government also established a new Fiji intelligence service,
with wide-ranging powers to search people and property, tap
telephones, and open mail.
Sugar and tourism constitute the mainstays of the economy,
accounting for almost half of the nation's foreign exchange
earnings. The economy has recovered from the effects of a
severe decline following the 1987 coups, despite a series of
strikes and other industrial actions which often reflect
political motives. The Government is promoting light
manufacturing for export to diversify the economy and lessen
its dependence on sugar and tourism.
The Government took two important steps to restore Fiji to
elected government: completion of the work on defining the new
electoral boundaries by the Electoral Boundaries Commission and
the undertaking of voter registration by the Electoral
Commission, which is expected to lead to a general election by
mid-1992. Principal human rights problems in 1991 included the
new Constitution's unecjual representation features; several
incidents of discrimination against ethnic Indians and women;
inhibitions on freedom of speech and press; continued delays in
bringing cases to trial; and the Government's footdragging in
choosing a president for the Court of Appeal. In December the
Government finally appointed an Australian judge to head the
Court of Appeal .
849
FIJI
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political killings by the Government
or any political group.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances in 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Police sometimes physically abuse detainees; the offending
officers have been punished in some instances. In September
the new Police Commissioner announced the creation of a new
internal affairs unit to expedite the investigation of such
cases. In November 1990, five members of the military pleaded
guilty to the abduction and beating of a University of the
South Pacific (USP) professor (see Section l.b.). Corporal
punishment is permitted by law; strokes of the cane are
administered lander medical supervision.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
In Fiji, the law of arrest and detention broadly follows the
British model. Generally, a person may be arrested only if
there is a reasonable belief that a breach of the criminal law
has been or is about to be committed. Arrested persons must be
brought before a court without "undue delay." This is taken to
mean within 24 hours, with 48 hours as the exception (such as
when an arrest is made over the weekend) . Rules governing
detention are designed to insure fair questioning of suspects.
The writ of habeas corpus obtains in Fiji. In urgent cases,
application may be made ex-parte to a judge at any time,
whether he is sitting or not. Incommunicado and arbitrary
detention are illegal according to Fijian law, and there have
been no known cases in Fiji since the events of 1987 and the
subsecjuent lifting of the Internal Security Decree.
In 1990 police arrested three journalists in connection with an
article stating that the USP staff and students would stage a
repeat burning of the Constitution to protest the abduction and
beating of a USP professor. The three were charged with the
"malicious act" of publishing a fabricated story under the
Public Order Act (POA). Released on bail, they were scheduled
to appear for trial in January 1991. Several other staffers
were taken in for questioning and released. However, the
Department of Public Prosecutions dropped the charges against
the journalists in August. The case of seven others, including
five USP lecturers, arrested and charged with sedition and
unlawful assembly for participating in the constitution-burning
demonstration in 1990 is still pending. In December the High
Court turned down an appeal by the seven defendants to have
their cases heard by that court rather than a lower court,
which would normally handle such a case. Unlike the High
Court, cases in the lower courts are decided by a magistrate
without benefit of a jury.
Exile is not practiced formally. The authorities reportedly
have a short list of Fiji citizens who are denied the right to
850
FIJI
return to Fiji, but this remains unconfirmed. No Fiji citizens
were denied reentry in 1991.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial structure has been slightly reorganized under the
1990 Constitution but remains similar to the British system.
The principal courts in Fiji are the High Court, the Court of
Appeal, and the Supreme Court, which now becomes the court of
final appeal because Fiji is no longer a member of the
Commonwealth of Nations. Hence, appeals to the Privy Council
in London are no longer available. However, the Court of
Appeal faces an enormous backlog of cases because it has been
unable to convene due to the Government's failure to decide on
the appointment of the president to this court, created under
the 1990 Constitution. This problem was resolved on December
19 when the Government announced that an Australian judge will
head the Court of Appeal from January 2, 1992.
There are no special courts; military courts try only men±>ers
of the armed forces. Magistrates' courts continue to try the
large majority of cases. In addition to its jurisdiction in
serious civil and criminal cases, the High Court is granted
special interest jurisdiction on behalf of the public and is
empowered to review alleged violations of individual rights
guaranteed under the Constitution.
The judiciary remains independent under the new Constitution.
Rights of due process are similar to those found under English
common law. The right to public trial is guaranteed and
defendants have the right to counsel. In lesser litigation,
there is a public legal advisor who is concerned mainly with
assistance to indigents in the domestic or family law court.
The right of appeal exists despite increasing delays. In 1991
both the Chief Justice, Sir Timoci Tuivaga, and High Court
Justice Michael Scott voiced concern, pointing out that justice
delayed is justice denied. Normal bail procedures mean that
most defendants do not experience any pretrial detention.
There are no political prisoners.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In general, privacy of the home is respected. However, the new
Fiji Intelligence Service has wide-ranging powers to search
people and property, open mail, and tap telephones. It is not
yet clear to what extent these powers will be used.
Surveillance of persons believed to represent a security threat
is carried out to some degree. Many political dissidents
believe their telephones and mail are monitored, but concrete
evidence is lacking. In 1991 the President promulgated an
antiterrorism decree giving, inter alia, airport and other
police special authority to cope with potential threats
connected with the Gulf War.
Section 2 Respect For Civil Liberties, Including;
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech has largely been restored. Political figures
and private citizens can and do speak out against the
Government. No arrests for making any kind of public statement
were reported in 1991. As noted above, several people who
participated in a constitution-burning protest were arrested in
1990. At year's end, the police were investigating a 1991
851
FIJI
repeat burning of the Constitution by some 100 university
students that took place on November 5, the anniversary of the
original protest and an Indian holiday. There have been no
arrests to date, and allegations that police illegally searched
students' rooms on campus have been refuted by the
Vice-chancellor .,
Although there are no legal restrictions on press freedom, the
Government has broad discretionary powers to impose
restrictions, and it has sometimes done so. Legislation
pertaining to the press is contained in the Newspaper
Registration Act (NRA) and the Press Correction Act (PCA) .
Under the NRA, all newspapers which are sold and published in
Fiji must be registered with the Government before they can
begin publishing. The Press Corrections Act gives the Minister
of Information sole discretionary power to order a newspaper to
publish a "correcting statement" if, in his opinion, a false or
distorted article has been published. Should the newspaper
refuse to publish the Minister's correction, it can be taken to
court and, if found guilty, fined $700 (individual persons
convicted under the act may be fined $150 and/or imprisoned for
6 months). The PCA allows the Government to arrest anyone who
publishes "malicious" material. This includes any false news
which could create or foster public alarm or result in the
"detriment of the public. "
Privately owned broadcast and print media operate without prior
censorship but with considerable self-censorship. Newspapers
usually refrain from printing editorials severely critical of
the Government and do little investigative reporting.
Statements about the political situation by opposition figures
and foreign governments are reported, however. Journals such
as the Fiji Labor Sentinel are often highly critical of the
Government. In March 1991, the opposition coalition publicly
launched the publication of a critique of the 1990 Constitution
entitled "A Fraud on the Nation" to which two overseas
academics. Dr. Yash Ghai and Sir Y. K. Pao, contributed. This
report was freely available in local bookstores. The coalition
has also promised publication of an alternative constitution.
The letters column of the two dailies also frequently carry
political statements from members of the deposed government and
other persons and from groups which are highly critical of the
Government, its programs, and the Constitution.
In August 1991, the Minister for Information revived talk of
requiring registration and licensing of the press, a plan which
was supposedly dropped in 1990. This possibility continues to
have some dampening effect on the press .
The Government dropped all charges against the three
journalists detained and charged in October 1990 for an article
about a planned protest rally at the university. Several
foreign journalists were denied visas in 1991, and the Fiji
office of the Pacific Islands News Service, closed in 1990
ostensibly for contractual violations, remained closed.
Prior to the 1987 coups and immediately thereafter, the
University of the South Pacific (USP) was a center of
opposition political activity. The Government has made it
clear that it objects to the mixing of university employment
and participation in Fijian domestic politics. In 1991 the USP
Council issued new rules governing staff involvement in
politics. Under the rules, staff members must take leave if
they run for public office and must resign from their
university posts if elected; senior staff cannot hold office in
852
FIJI
political parties; also, ser^iar staff must refrain from public
involvement in politics. A'"* leading academic and opposition
politician. Dr. Tupeni Baba, has chosen to relinquish his
position as head of the Humanities Department in favor of his
previous position as a Reader in the Education Department.
This has allowed him to be active in the Fijian Labor Party
(FLP) and left him free to address public rallies and give
media interviews. However, he is prevented from holding a
full-time executive position in the party.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Assembly for political purposes is allowed but subject to
restriction in the interest of public order. Public gatherings
require permission from the Government's district officers,
which may obtain prior assessment and advice from the police on
the anticipated crowd size and the ability of the police to
ensure public safety. Permits for large outdoor political
meetings or demonstrations are not always granted. In December
1991, the Fiji Mine Workers' Union, whose members have been on
strike since February, were refused permission to march in
Suva. The union secretary alleged political bias against the
union as the reason.
In 1990 the Government invoked the POA to prevent any rally
from taking place on the USP campus. However, permits were
issued during 1991 for several rallies organized by political
parties, religious groups, and groups opposed to the
Government. Several new parties were created in 1991. Party
headquarters, including those of the deposed coalition parties,
remain open. Political organizations are allowed to operate
and issue public statements. They have done so repeatedly and
openly throughout 1991.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution and
honored in practice. The Preamble to the Constitution declares
the importance of Christianity to the Fijian people but
guarantees protection for all religions. After the 1987 coups,
most commercial and social activities on Sundays were banned.
The Sunday bans were relaxed substantially in mid-1989 to allow
public transportation and restaurants to operate and to allow
agricultural activities to continue. All forms of unorganized
sporting activity are permitted on Sundays. Religious pressure
for restoration of sweeping Sunday bans has dissipated
somewhat. No significant restrictions affect foreign clergy,
missionary activity, charitable work, religious publishing and
education, or other typical nonpolitical activities of
religious organizations. In July news that a Muslim secondary
school had invited its non-Muslim students to view a film
entitled "Crucifixion or Crucif iction" led to major religious
protests by religious groups. The Fiji Muslim League issued an
apology, and the Government banned the film from being shown in
schools .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the "Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on freedom of movement within the
country or abroad. Occasional detentions at the airport occur,
but the courts do not hesitate to order redress where this is
warranted. Fiji citizens are free to emigrate. According to
the best available estimates, about 30,000 have done so since
May 1987. Most of the emigrants are Indians, many of them
853
FIJI
professionals, but Fijians and others also have left. Several
thousand have claimed refugee status, especially when applying
for admission to Canada, but neither the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) nor any Government has recognized those
claims. The increased emigration rate of Indians since the
1987 coups, coupled with a recent upsurge in the birthrate of
ethnic Fijians, has reversed the precoup racial composition
rankings. Fijians once again make up the single, largest
ethnic group with 48.9 percent of the population compared to
46.2 percent for Indo-Fi jians .
Increasingly, Fiji is receiving applications from Chinese
immigrants. Reportedly the Government is encouraging this
trend to compensate for the departure of skilled Indo-Fi j ians .
There are no refugees in Fiji, and no forced resettlement
programs. In 1991 a diplomat from the Peoples Republic of
China Embassy recjuested and was granted temporary asylum in
Fiji until such time as the UNHCR can process his case.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The right of citizens to change their government is abridged by
the provision of the new Constitution ensuring political
dominance by ethnic Fijians. Moreover, the Constitution was
promulgated by an unelected interim government and was never
approved by a national referendum. In January 1990, the term
of the first interim government came to an end, and the
President announced a second interim government, with a reduced
17-member Cabinet, devoid of active duty military officers. In
July 1990, this Government implemented the first part of its
announced mandate with the promulgation of the new
Constitution. In 1991 the Constituency Boundaries Commission
completed its work of delimiting new boundaries. Voter
registration was also undertaken with an estimated 83 percent
of eligible voters registered. National elections are expected
to take place in the first half of 1992.
There are currently about a dozen political parties that have
declared themselves prepared to contest the elections. Several
of these are Indian-based. One, the National Federation Party
(NFP), has pledged to continue its opposition to the
Constitution in the Parliament, once elected to it. According
to the Government, the new Constitution is intended to ensure
political dominance by the indigenous Fijians, while
reinstating a form of parliamentary democracy and ensuring
protection for basic human rights and Indian communal
interests. The Constitution thus provides that indigenous
Fijians are to hold 37 of 70 seats in the elected lower house
of Parliament with the ethnic Indians accorded 27 seats,
Rotumans (culturally distinct Polynesians) 1, and other races
5. In the Senate, an appointed body with essentially review
powers and the right to veto legislation, indigenous Fijians
are to hold 24 of the 34 seats, Rotumans 1, and the other
groups 9. Other constitutional features designed to ensure
indigenous Fijian political dominance include procedures and
requirements governing the selection of the President and the
Prime Minister.
The Constitution also incorporates a Bill of Rights, providing
for freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and other rights and
freedoms. The section setting forth these rights provides that
they may not be altered by Parliament except with the approval
of two-thirds of the lower house. However, elsewhere in the
Constitution, Parliament is also given the authority to pass
854
FIJI
special acts to deal with certain specified emergency
situations, notwithstanding human rights guarantees found in
other sections of that document. The Attorney General's office
has taken the view that any legislation introduced under the
emergency powers provision would require two-thirds approval by
the lower house, but critics of the Constitution maintain that
only a simple majority would be needed. Critics thus claim
that indigenous Fijians in the lower house would be able,
solely on the strength of their own numbers, to abrogate
constitutional human rights protections. The Labor Party
faction of the opposition coalition continues to cite this
concern, along with the lack of proportional parliamentary
representation for all races, as major factors in its announced
decision to boycott any elections held under the new
Constitution.
The President is to be selected (as are the Fijian members of
the Senate) by the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC), a traditional
Fijian leadership body. The Prime Minister, who along with the
Cabinet will hold most executive authority, is to be chosen by
the President from among the Fijian members of the lower house
on the basis of his ability to command majority support within
that body.
Elections are to be held by secret ballot, with voting only by
communal constituencies. The complex system of cross-voting in
the 1970 constitution, allowing Indians a say in the selection
of some Fijians and vice versa, has been abolished. The
Constitution calls for elections every 5 years, but the
Government may call an election at any time. A significant
feature of the 1990 Constitution provides for a formal review
of its provisions before the end of 7 years and every 10 years
thereafter .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no local human rights groups as such in Fiji, but the
women's rights movement, the labor movement, and various
political groups are involved in promoting a number of human
rights causes. There are also several small foreign-based
organizations that purport to advance human rights causes in
Fiji, including the Coalition for Democracy in Fiji (with
offices in New Zealand and Australia) and two U.K. -based
groups, the International Fiji Movement and the Movement for
Democracy in Fiji.
While the Government holds a very strong view on external
interference in its domestic affairs and has invoked this
principle in the past to inhibit certain investigations of the
political and human rights situation by such organizations as
Amnesty International, it did allow representatives from
several such organizations to attend the sedition trial of six
Rotumans in 1991. The Rotumans won a reversal of their 1988
conviction .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The stated purpose of the 1987 military coups was to ensure the
political supremacy of the indigenous Fijian people and to
protect their traditional way of life and communal control of
land. To this end, a number of measures have been taken that
favor the Fijian community over the other ethnic groups. The
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FIJI
most obvious is the reapportionment of the new Parliament to
guarantee a preponderance of Fijians. The Government is also
committed to raising the proportion of Fijians and Rotumans in
the public service to 50 percent or more at all levels. Many
Fijians felt that the public service prior to the coup
discriminated in favor of Indians, who controlled most of
middle managem,ent because of their higher educational
achievements. Current promotion and hiring policies in the
public service favor ethnic Fijians. The new Constitution also
provides specific affirmative action provisions to improve the
conditions of those disadvantaged as a result of race, sex,
place of origin, political opinion, color, religion, or creed.
Control of land is a highly sensitive issue in Fiji. About 85
percent of the land is held communally by indigenous Fijians.
Most cash crop farmers are Indians, who lease their land from
the Fijian villages. Freehold land title is not an indigenous
concept; lands owned currently by the State (6 percent) and by
individuals (9 percent) were transferred from customary owners
during the colonial period. The present land ownership
arrangements were instituted by the British to protect the
interests of the indigenous Fijians. Many Indians,
particularly farmers, feel that the absence of secure land
tenure discriminates against them. The military coups were
prompted, in part, by Fijians' fears that Indians sought to
take away their land.
Indians are subject to occasional harassment and crime based on
race, which is compounded by inadequate police protection.
More rarely, similar acts of vandalism have been reported
against Chinese farmers in remote rural areas. There have been
no credible allegations of government involvement in such
incidents, and the police have investigated and, where
possible, arrested lawbreakers.
Women in both the Fijian and Indian communities have functioned
primarily in traditional roles, although some women rise to
high places in the public service, politics, and business.
Women can also attain high status in Fiji's traditional chiefly
system. The Prime Minister's wife is, in her own right, Fiji's
second highest ranking traditional chief. In general, women in
the Fijian community are more likely to rise to prominence in
their own right than are women in the Indian community. Women
have full rights of property ownership and inheritance, and a
number have become successful entrepreneurs. Women are
generally paid less than men, a discrepancy that is especially
notable in the garment industry. Garment workers, most of whom
are female, are subject to a special minimum wage considerably
lower than that in other sectors. In December 1991, the leader
of the women's wing of the local labor confederation charged
that women in the garment industry are being sexually harassed
at the workplace, especially when tasked by their superiors to
work overtime.
There is a small but active women's rights movement, which has
pressed for more serious treatment of rape in the courts. The
crime tends to draw prison sentences of only a few years.
Continued admonitions by the Chief Justice in 1991 resulted in
some increase in the average prison term of rape. The law
allows corporal punishment for rape, but this is generally used
only in cases of offenses against minors. Domestic violence is
also a problem in Fiji and is a second major focus of the
women's movement. This problem appears more commonplace within
Fiji's Indian community where, for instance, the use of the
"danda" (stick) is seldom questioned. The authorities are
856
FIJI
generally reluctant to intervene in cases of domestic violence
unless it is necessary to save the woman's life. Few cases
result in prosecution, as the victim generally does not press
charges. The Government has not been active in dealing with
domestic violence. Suva, the capital, has a privately funded
women's crisis center which offers counseling and assistance to
women in cases of rape, domestic violence, and other problems,
such as child support payments. There is, overall, a growing
awareness that women's issues are deserving of greater
attention, but the issue has been overshadowed by the political
events stemming from the 1987 coups.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers' rights to form and join unions, elect their own
representatives, publicize their views on labor matters, and
determine their own policies are protected by law. Strikes are
legal .
Vigorous strike action occurred throughout 1991, delaying the
sugar harvest once again and severely impairing operations at
the nation's gold mine. A national strike was narrowly averted
by Maj . Gen. Rabuka bringing labor union leaders and the
President together. This resulted in the suspension of two
draconian decrees promulgated to protect the sugar and other
key industries from strike action. The Government continued to
charge that union activism was driven by a political agenda.
All unions must register with, but are not controlled by, the
Government. The only central labor body, the Fiji Trade Union
Congress (FTUC) , is closely associated with the opposition FLP
and the deposed Bavadra Government. The labor movement is led
largely by ethnic Indians. Persons with close ties to the
Government have started rival unions primarily for ethnic
Fijians; these unions are more amenable to political
cooperation with the Government. During the national economic
summit in May, the Government publicly discussed plans to
reform the role of the labor unions. These plans included
strict definition of valid conditions for a strike,
establishment of separate machinery for settlement of labor
disputes and other guidelines to control union activity. On
November 1, the Government passed decrees 42, 43, and 44 which
effectively brought these measures into effect. The more
militant wing of the FTUC has called for international support
for a general strike. In response, the Australian
Confederation of Trade Unions has pledged a 1-day ban on trade
and transport. On December 10, FTUC National Secretary
Mahendra Chaudhry filed a writ challenging some of these
decrees on the ground that they contravene certain sections of
the 1990 Constitution. Other elements of the FTUC leadership
reportedly are disposed to negotiate with the Government over
the reforms. The FTUC is free to associate internationally.
The Committee on Freedom of Association of the International
Labor Organization (ILO), at its 1990 session, again asked the
Government to reconsider its ban on Sunday meetings, including
union meetings. The ban had been relaxed previously; however,
permits for such meetings are often not granted.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The law recognizes the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Employers are required to recognize a union if
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FIJI
more than half the employees in a workplace have joined it.
Recognition is determined by union membership numbers rather
than by an election. The Government has the power to order
recalcitrant employers to recognize unions, although union
leaders accused the Government of failing to apply the law
correctly in one recent case. Key sectors of the economy,
including sugar and tourism, are organized, and collective
bargaining is the norm. In 1991 the Government lifted wage
guidelines. These guidelines had been devised to replace a
mandatory wage cut and freeze put into effect after the 1987
coups. Fiji's practice for wage bargaining has been to set
national wage guidelines after consultations among the
Government, employers, and unions.
Wage negotiation on an industry-by-industry basis is not
practiced, and a government proposal to introduce such
negotiations has been resisted by employers and unions. Union
leaders fear that straight market-based wage bargaining would
open unacceptably large wage gaps between skilled and unskilled
workers. Until 1984 a tripartite forum of employers, unions,
and government oversaw labor negotiations. In that year,
however, labor withdrew from the forum and it was abolished.
The restoration of the body is now a key demand of the FTUC,
reiterated in 1990 at its 33rd Biennial Delegates Conference
and on several occasions in 1991. While the Government has
reportedly agreed to consider the request, it is believed to
favor the current format of an annual national economic summit
as the forum for dealing with labor matters.
The 1990 Constitution expressly protects the right of persons
"to form or belong to trade unions" but permits restrictions to
be applied on public officers; in the interests of defense,
public safety, public order, public morality, or public health,
or to protect the rights and freedoms of other persons. The
unions are generally successful in preventing discrimination
against workers for union activities. In 1990 FTUC Women's
Wing Secretary Ema Druavesi reported some progress in
organizing women in the garment industry despite what she said
were the fears of many women regarding victimization and
intimidation for union activity. Some 20 garment factories out
of the total 55 operating in Fiji are reportedly now
unionized. Fiji's export processing zones are subject to the
same laws as the rest of the country, and many of their firms
have unions which have negotiated collective bargaining
agreements .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor does not exist in Fiji. The 1990 Constitution
specifically prohibits such practices.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children under 12 may not be employed in any capacity.
Children (under age 15) and "young persons" (ages 15-17) may
not be employed in industry or work with machinery.
Enforcement by the Ministry of Employment and Industrial
Relations generally is effective, except in the case of family
members working on family farms or businesses.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
No national minimum wage has been established. Certain sectors
have minimum wages set by the Ministry for Employment and
Industrial Relations. The minimum wage, which is effectively
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FIJI
enforced, will generally support a barely adequate standard of
living in all sectors except the garment industry. In the
garment industry, the starting wage is based on the assumption
that workers are young people or married women living at home
and not expecting to support a household.
Fiji has no regulation specifying maximum hours of work for
adult males. Women are prohibited from night work in industry
and underground work in mines. Certain industries, notably
transportation and shipping, have problems with excessive hours
of work. A number of fatal bus accidents have been attributed
to excessive working hours for drivers. Indians, who generally
rec[uire a cash income to survive, are more vulnerable to
pressure to work long hours than Fijians. Many Fijians can and
will return to their villages rather than work what they
consider excessive hours.
Fiji has workplace safety regulations, a workmen's compensation
act, and an accident compensation plan. Awards for workers
injured on the job are set by a tribunal. Government
enforcement of safety standards under the direction of the
Employment Ministry suffers from a lack of trained enforcement
personnel, but the unions do a reasonable job of monitoring
safety standards in organized workplaces. A 1989 study of
working conditions in the garment industry resulted in the
Government ordering many employers to improve working
conditions. Union leaders complained that the Government's
action was too mild and that the employers should have been
subject to criminal prosecution.
859
INDONESIA
Indonesia is the fifth most populous country in the would and
the largest in Southeast Asia. Since independence, Indonesian
leaders have sought to create a national identity and to
accommodate ethnic, religious, linguistic, and geographical
diversities, while fostering cohesion, internal security, and
development. The Soeharto Government actively promotes
allegiance to "Pancasila," five broad, guiding principles of
national life: belief in one supreme God, a just and civilized
humanity, Indonesian national unity, democracy, and social
justice.
President Soeharto and the military wield predominant political
power; opposition groups exist but in fact have no real chance
to obtain power. Since the mid-1960 's, after an abortive coup
backed by the Communist Party, retired and active-duty military
officers and civilian technocrats have exercised centralized
executive authority under President Soeharto 's leadership. The
partly elected, partly appointed Parliament (DPR) considers but
does not initiate legislation, although it has the
constitutional right to do so. The people's consultative
assembly (MPR) — consisting of 500 appointed members and the 500
DPR members — meets every 5 years to approve guidelines for
government policy and to elect the President and Vice President.
The armed forces (ABRI) — which include the military services
and the police — number about 445,000. The army constitutes
about half of the armed forces and focuses mainly on internal
security. Under a "dual function" concept, many military
officers serve in the civilian bureaucracy at all levels and in
Parliament. The military continued operations against
separatist groups in East Timor and Irian Jaya, although at
reduced levels, and intensified operations in the special
district of Aceh. Security forces were responsible for
numerous human rights abuses, including killings and torture of
civilians .
Although Indonesia's mixed economy involves the state in nearly
all sectors, government policies are expanding the role and
freedom of the private sector. Ongoing deregulation efforts
helped the economy to continue its strong expansion in 1990,
when Indonesia's inflation-adjusted gross domestic product
(GDP) grew between 7.0 and 7.5 percent. Nonoil export growth
slowed due to softening prices for Indonesia's major nonoil
commodities, but exports of manufactured goods remained
strong. The economy's growth was expected to diminish in 1991,
but still to maintain a real GDP growth rate of between 5 and 6
percent. Despite substantial increases in real incomes and in
the standard of living of most Indonesians in the past 20
years, the country is poor, there is significant unemployment,
and wide disparities in wealth exist. Corruption and influence
peddling are endemic and distort growth and economic
opportunity.
Insurgent sentiment and activity in Aceh led to the deaths of
hundreds of civilians, dozens of subversion trials in which the
rights of the defendants were limited, and numerous credible
reports of torture at the hands of the police and military.
Abuses in Irian Jaya also continued, although at a reduced rate
from past years. In East Timor, security forces opened fire on
November 12 on a demonstration protesting Indonesian rule over
East Timor at the Santa Cruz cemetery in the capital of Dili.
The demonstration followed a memorial service for a Timorese
killed on October 28 during a clash between Timorese for and
against integration with Indonesia. Available evidence
860
INDONESIA
indicates the violence employed by secuci-ty^. forces on November
12 was clearly disproportionate to the Situation. Many believe
the death toll was far higher than the officially acknowledged
nximber of 19. A national investigatory commission was
appointed to examine the incident. The commission issued an
advance report on December 26 (see Section l.a.).
While the DPR held several well-publicized hearings on freedom
of the press and on the restricted civil rights of some of
Indonesia's prominent dissidents, the hearings failed to reduce
abuses in these areas. The DPR remained subordinate to the
executive and the right of citizens to change their government
remained significantly restricted. Official and informal
discrimination against ethnic Chinese persisted. Indonesian
workers were less hesitant about exercising their right to
strike, especially to demand compliance with minimum wage
standards. The Government continued its generous policy toward
Indochinese refugees, allowed foreign parliamentary groups to
visit East Timor, and released several long-time political
prisoners. It also granted the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) access to prisoners in Aceh and to imprisoned
Muslim extremists.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people have died in the special
district of Aceh since mid-1989 as a result of a struggle
between separatist rebels and government troops. The
casualties, whose numbers have so far been impossible to
establish with precision, have included police and army troops
as well as rebel forces. A significant number of those killed
in 1991, however, appear to have been civilians. During the
first 6 months of 1991, dozens of bodies were found along
roadsides, in market places, and in rivers. The military and
other government leaders have claimed that rebel forces, which
are called GPK (Security Disturbing Gangs) by the Government
and Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh) by their supporters, were
responsible for these deaths. However, the ability of the
rebel forces to inflict significant civilian casualties was
severely limited in 1991 since, by the military's own
assessment, most of the armed rebel elements had been
eliminated or rendered ineffective. In fact, there are
credible reports of a pattern of abuse against the civilian
population of Aceh by security forces. Human rights groups
have charged the security forces with serious violations of
human rights in their anti-insurgency campaign in Aceh,
especially during the first half of 1991. These include
summary executions of suspected Aceh Merdeka supporters — part
of an effort to intimidate or eliminate potential rebel
sympathizers — as well as the incitement of villagers to
summarily kill suspected guerrillas. Substantiation of
individual cases is often lacking, and rebel forces doubtless
have caused some civilian deaths, but government forces clearly
appear responsible for the majority of these civilian deaths.
While some military commanders have acknowledged privately that
excessive force was sometimes employed by their troops, the
Government has denied a pattern of abuse, and no charges have
been brought against members of the security forces in
connection with the civilian deaths.
861
INDONESIA
In East Timor, where a shift from security operations to civic
action projects by the armed forces had brought about a gradual
reduction in human rights abuses, the situation deteriorated
sharply beginning in October. On October 28, shortly after a
proposed visit by Portuguese parliamentarians was canceled, a
clash between youths for and against integration with Indonesia
resulted in tJtie deaths of two youths, one from each faction.
After a memorial service for the anti-integration youth on
November 12 in Dili, a procession formed to go to the cemetery
where he had been buried. Some demonstrators carried flags of
the Fretilin guerrilla group and chanted ant i- Indonesia
slogans. During the course of the march to the cemetery an
army major was stabbed. After the procession reached the
cemetery, security forces opened fire on the crowd, killing and
wounding scores of civilians. There is no evidence that the
use of such deadly force was justified. In addition, the
acknowledged 19 killed were buried in unmarked graves and, for
12 days after the incident, the army denied the ICRC access to
the military hospital to which the dead and wounded had been
taken.
Within a week. President Soeharto appointed senior government
officials to a national commission to investigate the incident,
the first such commission in Indonesian history. The
commission spent more than 2 weeks investigating in East
Timor. In a preliminary report presented on December 26, the
commission concluded that "about" 50 had been killed and
acknowledged some eyewitness reports that the total was over
100. The commission said that more than the previous official
figure of 91 were wounded. The report went on to state that
"the acts of a number of armed forces members exceeded the
bounds of appropriateness," and called for legal measures to be
taken against all those suspected of violating Indonesian law.
Two days after the issuance of the report. President Soeharto
ordered that the military commanders in East Timor and the
larger region which includes East Timor be relieved. He also
ordered the Army Chief of Staff to form an "honorary council"
to investigate how security forces handled the incident.
In Irian Jaya, a leader of the banned Free Papua Organization
(OPM), Malkianus Salosa, was found dead in the jungle 3 weeks
after allegedly escaping from a military prison. Salosa was
convicted in March of involvement in a 1988 attack on
transmigrants in Irian Jaya and sentenced to life in prison.
Salosa was buried on the spot by the military, allegedly with
his family's approval. There reportedly was no autopsy or
independent observation of the body.
b. Disappearance
Security forces periodically took persons for interrogation,
usually without notification to families, resulting in at least
their temporary disappearance. This was especially true in
Aceh, where people would sometimes disappear for months after
being taken into police custody.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The use of torture to extract information from criminal
suspects or witnesses is prohibited under the Indonesia
Criminal Procedures Code (KUHAP) . Nonetheless, credible
reports of torture and mistreatment, including rape, of
criminal suspects, detainees, and prisoners were frequent.
862
INDONESIA
This was especially true in Aceh, where there were numerous
credible reports of systematic torture of suspected rebel
syinphathizers while in military or police custody.
Police often resort to physical abuse, even in minor incidents,
and prison conditions in Indonesia tend to be harsh. Pretrial
maltreatment to obtain confessions is reportedly common. The
practice in Medan of "shooting to wound" criminal suspects
allegedly attempting to escape capture, and efforts by police
in Jakarta to cope with increasingly brutal crimes raised
concerns about excessive use of force against suspects. In
August, for example, credible press reports indicate that 17
suspects were shot by police in metropolitan Jakarta, 8 of whom
died from their wounds. Nine other criminal suspects were
reportedly killed by mobs who caught the suspects in the act of
committing a crime.
Officials have publicly acknowledged and condemned police
brutality and harsh prison conditions and occasionally
instigate disciplinary action, including transfer, dismissal,
trial, and sentencing to prison terms. However, there were no
known instances in 1991 of officials being punished for
mistreatment of political prisoners or detainees.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
While the KUHAP contains protections against arbitrary arrest
and detention and specifies the right of prisoners to legal
counsel and notification of family, these safeguards are often
disregarded in practice. Detainees in cases of alleged
subversion may be held up to a year without charges. Security
agencies detain and arrest persons, including students and
intellectuals, to intimidate them and inhibit activities judged
undesirable. Legal mechanisms for redress of such actions are
inadequate. The number of persons detained without trial is
unknown, but in the Special District of Aceh the Government
during the year released more than 600 people who had been held
without trial for periods of up to several months on suspicion
of subversive activity or knowledge thereof, and up to 100 more
were believed to still be in custody at year's end. People
were detained in East Timor for days or weeks and subseqiaently
released without charges. Application of a 1987 presidential
decree on remission of prison terms leaves uncertain the status
of some prisoners, including several reportedly still in jail
despite apparent expiration of their sentences. Two convicted
members of the banned Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) were
released in July, several years after their sentences were
supposed to have expired.
The Agency for Coordination of Assistance for the Consolidation
of National Security ( BAKORSTANAS ) operates outside the KUHAP
and has wide discretion to detain and interrogate persons
thought to threaten national security. Indonesian law does not
provide for the right to judicial review of such actions or for
the right to protection or legal aid for the detainees. Their
cases are rarely if ever publicized.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
A quadripartite judiciary of general, religious, military, and
administrative courts exists below the Supreme Court. The
right of appeal from District Court to High Court to Supreme
Court exists in all four systems of justice. The Supreme
Court, with a current backlog of some 17,000 cases, does not
consider factual aspects of a case, only the lower courts'
INDONESIA
application of law. Initial judgments are rarely reversed in
the appeals process, although sentences are sometimes increased
or reduced. A three-judge panel conducts most trials, poses
questions, hears evidence, decides guilt or innocence, and
assesses punishment. The judiciary is not independent. While
judges receive guidance from the Supreme Court on legal
matters, they are civil servants employed by the executive
branch. The Supreme Court cannot annul laws passed by
Parliament. Most court sessions are open to the public, and
most defendants have access to counsel although such access is
sometimes significantly delayed. Destitute defendants can
obtain private legal help, such as that provided by the Legal
Aid Institute (LBH) . Courts also can provide a limited amount
of aid for those unable to afford legal assistance, but in
practice such aid is limited to defendants facing charges
carrying sentences of 5 years or more. The State must ensure
legal assistance in capital cases.
Corruption permeates the Indonesian legal system. In civil and
criminal cases, the payment of bribes can influence decisions,
prosecution, conviction, and sentencing. The use in trials of
forced confessions and limitations on the presentation of
defense evidence are reportedly common. The Government has
occasionally taken action against flagrant offenders, but by
and large these abuses continue unchecked. The Government
supports programs to improve legal awareness, training, and
research. Conviction is virtually automatic in cases involving
Indonesia's broad 1963 antisubversion law. Advocacy or actions
in support of secession or creation of an Islamic state,
criticism of Pancasila, and smuggling are classified as
subversive offenses subject to a maximum penalty of death.
Although the Government does not provide data on the number of
persons serving subversion sentences, the best informed
estimates suggest a total of more than 500. This figure
includes persons sentenced for involvement in the 1965
Communist coup attempt, alleged Muslim extremists, and those
convicted of subversion in connection with separatist
activities in Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya, some of whom
advocated or employed violence. In August the Government
reduced the sentences of and released four persons convicted of
subversion, including three Muslims accused of delivering
inflammatory sermons in connection with the Tanjung Priok riots
of 1984.
More than 30 subversion trials were conducted in 1991, the
majority of them in Sumatra, where more than two dozen people
were tried in connection with separatist activities in Aceh.
All were found guilty and received sentences of up to 20 years
in prison. Although the fact that public trials were held
represented an improvement over an earlier situation in which
accused Aceh separatists were held without trial, the
proceedings were in many cases seriously flawed. There are
credible reports that many of the defendants had been tortured
to elicit confessions, were arrested without warrants, and were
not clearly told the crimes with which they were charged. Some
of the defendants were unable to select their defense counsel
freely, as guaranteed under KUHAP . The LBH, for example, had
received powers of attorney from the families of 13 of the
defendants asking for representation but was prevented by the
authorities from doing so in all but one case. When other
attorneys were found to represent them, they often met their
clients on the day of the trial, and therefore had inadequate
time to prepare a defense.
864
INDONESIA
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Judicial warrants for searches are required except for cases
involving suspected subversion, economic crimes, and
corruption. However, forced or surreptitious entry by security
agencies reportedly occurs regularly. Security agencies
intimidate by conducting surveillance of persons and
residences, and they are believed to monitor selectively local
and international telephone calls without legal restraint.
Correspondence generally is not monitored. Government security
officials monitor the movements and activities of former
members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its front
organizations, especially persons the Government believes were
involved in the abortive 1965 Communist-backed coup. The
Government stated in late 1990 that this latter group then
totaled 1,410,333 people. These persons and sometimes their
relatives are subject to surveillance, required check-ins, and
arbitrary actions by officials, including removal from
government employment and threats of removal from such
employment .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Significant restrictions on freedom of speech and press exist.
Government agencies exercise broad discretionary authority in
applying laws concerning the rights of persons, and effective
judicial review is lacking. Public statements or publications
which criticize the Government or are perceived as critical of
Pancasila, top leaders, their families, or particular religious
and ethnic groups are often harshly punished. For example, a
young Moslem intellectual, M.H. Ainun Nadjib, was banned by
authorities in central Java from holding lectures in the
province apparently because of comments he made during a public
discussion about the effectiveness of a government -run civics
course on Pancasila. Earlier in the year, two students were
detained and others questioned for their part in distributing a
"land for the people" calendar that contained caricatures of
President Soeharto, his wife, and other government officials.
The Government operates the nationwide television network.
Private television companies broadcasting in Jakarta and
Surabaya expanded to other areas, and a private educational
channel began operating nationally. Some 537 private radio
broadcasting companies exist in Indonesia in addition to the
Government's national radio network. Private television and
radio stations, which have considerable programming latitude,
are subject to official scrutiny and are required to use
government-provided news programs. Private radio stations
frequently supplement such news programs with their own
reports. Foreign television and radio broadcasts are
accessible to those who can afford the technology.
The print media are largely privately owned. Officials state
that the press is "free" but also "responsible." It is
expected to support national development and stability, be
educational, and uphold professional standards. The Government
limits the number of newspaper licenses, the amount of
advertising, and the number of pages, and exercises strong
control over the press through its control of publishing
permits, known by their Indonesian acronym, SIUPP. The power
of the Government to revoke a newspaper's SIUPP was the topic
of a parliamentary hearing in June. Editors who testified
865
INDONESIA
protested that the Minister of Information has revoked SIUPP's
in the past without giving the offending publications an
adequate chance to defend themselves. They also protested
punishing an entire organization for the alleged sins of one or
several individuals. The Minister later told Parliament he had
no intention of modifying his control over the SIUPP. A
newspaper edit,or whose newspaper lost its SIUPP in 1990 for
publishing a poll which was judged insulting to the Prophet
Muhammad was sentenced in April to 5 years in prison, later
reduced by 6 months, on criminal charges of insulting a
religion.
The Government occasionally censors publications and continues
the practices of telephoning editors to suppress stories and
censoring foreign periodicals. An article about East Timorese
workers in Java that was to appear in the prominent news weekly
TEMPO, for example, was censored in early September at the
insistence of military officers who came to the magazine's
offices .
The Government closely regulates access to Indonesia by
visiting and resident foreign correspondents and occasionally
reminds the latter of its prerogative to deny requests for visa
extensions. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation, for
example, was allowed to reopen a bureau in Jakarta after a
lengthy break caused by controversy over Australian media
coverage of Indonesia. The importation of foreign publications
and video tapes, which must be reviewed by government censors,
requires a permit. Importers usually avoid foreign materials
critical of the Government or dealing with topics considered
sensitive, such as human rights. Foreign periodicals and
newspapers, readily available in Indonesia, are subject to
censorship prior to distribution. The International Herald
Tribune was allowed to resume distribution in March after a
4-month hiatus caused by a 1990 article critical of the
business dealings of members of the President's family. When
the Government expressed outrage at the article, the
newspaper's Indonesian distributor ceased distribution.
The risk of official sanctions and informal government
instructions generally influence the media to avoid or exercise
great caution in disseminating views of government critics.
However, coverage of opposition views conveyed to the
Parliament in July during a meeting with the Petition of 50
dissident group was extensive. Lack of clear guidelines on
what is permissible has generated a significant degree of
self-censorship both in public speaking and in the press.
However, as in 1990, the limits of government tolerance were
regularly tested in 1991 in published editorials, opinion
pieces, cartoons, and public statements.
While academic freedom is provided for in law, constraints
exist on the activities of scholars. They sometimes refrain
from producing materials which they believe might provoke
government displeasure. Publishers are often unwilling to
accept manuscripts dealing with controversial issues, and those
that do sometimes find works banned long after they have been
published. For example, an Indonesian translation of a
Japanese scholar's work on Indonesia was banned in September, a
year after its publication, because the Government felt it
discredited President Soeharto. This was one of at least 15
books the Government banned in 1991.
866
INDONESIA
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
All organizations must have government permission to hold
regional and national meetings. Local jurisdictions often
require prior approval for smaller gatherings as well. While
obtaining such approvals is fairly automatic, authorities
occasionally withhold permission. The Indonesian Lawyers
Association, for example, was unable to get government
permission to hold its national meeting. Meetings of
nongovernmental organizations are sometimes subject to
substantial official efforts to produce specific outcomes.
Student gatherings have often been the target of disapprovals,
and ostensible political activity at universities remains
forbidden under the "Campus Life Normalization" (NKK) law of
1978. The Government also banned political campaigning from
university campuses in connection with the 1992 parliamentary
elections .
The 1985 Social Organizations (ORMAS) Law requires all
organizations, including recognized religions and associations,
to adhere to Pancasila. This provision, which limits political
activity, is widely understood as prohibiting groups which seek
to make Indonesia an Islamic state. The law empowers the
Government to disband any organization it believes to be acting
against Pancasila and requires prior government approval for
any organization's acceptance of funds from foreign donors.
Government attitudes towards human rights groups varied.
Jakarta police in August entered a private home without a
warrant and broke up a gathering of members of the dissident
group known as the Petition of 50. The meetings had been held
weekly in the same home for nearly 11 years without prior
incidents. At the same time, three new discussion groups
concerned with promoting democracy and human rights were formed
and operated without government interference.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution recognizes and provides for religious freedom
for Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism, and permits
practice of the mystical, animistic beliefs of "Aliran
Kepercayaan. " Although the population is overwhelmingly
Muslim, the practice and teachings of the other recognized
faiths are respected. The Catholic Church, for example,
operates widely in East Timor, but the activities of some of
its clergy are carefully monitored by security forces concerned
with their political sympathies. Various restrictions on
religious activity nonetheless exist. According to official
statistics, nearly 400 "misleading religious cults" are banned,
including some Islamic groups considered heretical. Existing
bans affect many thousands of adherents, and new bannings by
national or local authorities occur periodically. Ten of the
books banned by the Government in 1991 concerned religious
topics .
Although banned, several thousand Jehovah's Witnesses are
believed to practice in Jakarta alone. Adherents are
periodically detained and their religious materials
confiscated. A 1963 ban on the Baha ' i faith continues in
force. The private practice of banned religions is often
tolerated, although authorities periodically harass adherents
or pressure them to convert to the recognized faiths. Because
the first tenet of Pancasila is belief in a supreme being,
atheism is forbidden. The legal requirement to adhere to
Pancasila extends to all religious and secular organizations.
867
INDONESIA
The Government strongly opposes Muslim groups which advocate
establishing an Islamic state or acknowledging only Islamic
law, both of which are outlawed. Over 300 and possibly many
more alleged Muslim extremists are estimated to be serving
prison terms on subversion charges. Visiting Muslim
fundamentalist teachers have been particularly susceptible to
deportation.
There is no legal bar to conversion between faiths, and
conversions occur. However, proselytizing between the
recognized religions or in areas heavily dominated by one
recognized religion or another is considered potentially
disruptive and is discouraged. Foreign missionary activities
are relatively unimpeded. In recent years, however, some
foreign missionaries have had difficulty renewing visas or
residence permits — a few on unspecified "security grounds."
Laws and decrees from the 1970 's do not allow foreign
missionaries to spend more than 10 years in Indonesia, with
extensions to 15 in exceptional circumstances only. With rare
exceptions, enforcement of this policy does not discriminate by
sect or nationality. Exceptions to the 10-year rule have been
granted to foreign religious workers since late 1987 in the
remote areas of Irian Jaya and Kalimantan and, more recently,
in other parts of the country. The Government says it intends
over time to reduce the number of foreign missionaries in order
to encourage employment of Indonesians. Foreign missionary
work is subject to the funding stipulations of the ORMAS law
discussed above. Indonesians practicing the recognized
religions maintain active links with coreligionists inside and
outside Indonesia and travel abroad for religious gatherings.
The Government permits a set number of pilgrims to make the
hajj annually.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Restrictions on freedom of movement exist. Permits to seek
work in a new location are required in certain areas, primarily
to control further population movement to crowded cities.
Previously some ethnic Chinese encountered legal and
bureaucratic obstacles to obtaining citizenship, although the
Government's stated policy was to encourage them to apply. In
connection with the 1990 renewal of diplomatic ties between
Indonesia and China, officials announced that stateless
Chinese — currently estimated to number 300,000 — must adopt the
citizenship of one country or the other and that Indonesia's
procedures would be simplified and shortened. Restrictions on
travel to China were lifted by the Government in August.
Government officials acknowledged that some 17,000 Indonesians
are under an absolute foreign travel ban. Included in this
group are former political prisoners and government critics
such as some members of the Petition of 50. Officials also
acknowledged that a second list exists of persons whose
permission to travel is decided only when they apply for an
exit permit. Some critics, however, are free to travel abroad,
and a person prohibited at one time may be permitted to travel
subsequently. Students wishing and able to do so can generally
go abroad for study. Restrictions exist on movement by
Indonesian and foreign citizens to and within parts of Irian
Jaya. Security checks affecting transportation and travel in
Aceh occurred sporadically in early 1991, and permission was
required to visit certain districts considered sensitive for
security reasons. Curfews were sometimes in force in
connection with military operations in parts of East Timor and
868
INDONESIA
Aceh. Family visits back to East Timor by East Timorese now
living in Australia continued. Former political detainees,
including those associated with the abortive 1965 coup, must
notify authorities of their movements and may not change their
place of residence without official permission.
Indonesia continued its generous attitude regarding Indochinese
asylum seekers. It has granted first asylum to over 123,000
Indochinese asyliom seekers since 1975, and the population of
its Galang Island facility was about 20,000 through most of
1991. Galang 's Cambodian population was about 1,750.
Indonesia considers the Cambodians illegal entrants rather than
asylum seekers. Nevertheless, Cambodians have been allowed to
remain in Indonesia, pending an international decision on how
to resolve their situation. Indonesia also continued its
cooperation with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and the ICRC on the return of residents of Irian Jaya
who had fled to Papua New Guinea during separatist violence in
the eastern portion of the province.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Parliament, political organizations, and the general public
have only limited ability to influence government decisions,
and citizens cannot change the system of government or its
leadership. President Soeharto and a small group of active
duty and retired military officers and civilian officials
exercise governmental authority. The military has
responsibility under a "dual function" doctrine for national
defense and security plus sociopolitical affairs. The military
is predominant in the political and security fields. The
Constitution provides Parliament a mechanism to call the
President to account in extraordinary circumstances.
The Parliament considers bills presented to it by government
departments and agencies but does not draft laws on its own,
although it has the constitutional right to do so. The
Government seeks to resolve potential parliamentary concerns
before bills are officially presented. Parliament makes
technical and (occasionally) substantive alterations to bills
it reviews. Through consultations and hearings with ministers
and other executive branch officials, press statements, and
field trips. Parliament is contributing more actively to the
content and execution of government policy than previously.
This was especially true in 1991, when debates over "openness,"
press control, land tenure, travel restrictions, and the role
of Parliament itself were given wide publicity. Nonetheless,
Parliament remains clearly subordinate to the executive
branch.
Only three political organizations are allowed by law. GOLKAR,
a government-sponsored organization of diverse functional
groups, dominates. Two small political parties — the United
Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party
(PDI) — also operate. By law they embrace Pancasila. They are
not considered opposition parties and seldom espouse policies
much different from those of the Government. The leaders of
all these organizations are approved, if not chosen, by the
Government, and their activities are closely scrutinized and
often guided by government authorities. GOLKAR maintains close
institutional links with the armed forces and KORPRI , the
nonunion association to which all civil servants automatically
belong. Civil servants may join either of the political
parties with official permission, but most are members of
869
INDONESIA
GOLKAR. Former members of the PKI and some other banned
parties may not run for office or be active politically.
General elections for Parliament and for provincial and
district assemblies are held every 5 years. GOLKAR won 73
percent of the national vote in the 1987 elections. New
elections are scheduled to be held in June 1992. All adult
citizens are eligible to vote, except active-duty members of
the armed forces, convicted criminals serving prison sentences,
and 36,345 former PKI members. Voters may choose by secret
ballot between the three approved political organizations, who
field candidate lists in each electoral district. Those lists
must be screened by BAKORSTANAS (see Section l.d. above), which
determines whether candidates were involved in the abortive
1965 Communist coup or adhere to other banned ideologies.
Critics charge these screenings are unconstitutional, since
there is no way to appeal the results, and note that they can
be used to eliminate government critics from Parliament.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government generally ignores calls by domestic human rights
groups and activists for investigations of alleged human rights
incidents. While various domestic organizations and persons
interested in human rights operate energetically, the
Government discourages public human rights activities. Some
human rights activists have complained of government harassment.
The Government considers outside investigations of alleged
human rights violations to be interference in its internal
affairs. Amnesty International, for example, is banned from
Indonesia. Nonetheless, the Government granted the ICRC access
to political prisoners arrested in connection with the
insurgency in Aceh and to jailed Muslim extremists. Under a
1985 agreement, the ICRC is authorized by the Government to
visit persons held for security reasons in East Timor.
Nonetheless, the ICRC experienced significant delays in gaining
access to those wounded or imprisoned in the November 12 East
Timor incident, and in getting permission to revisit prisoners
in Aceh first seen in July. The ICRC annually visits and
interviews the prisoners convicted of participation in the
abortive. Communist-backed coup in 1965.
Various foreign parliamentary groups visited trouble spots such
as Aceh and East Timor, although a November visit by Portuguese
parliamentarians to East Timor was canceled at the last minute
because of a dispute over the inclusion of a foreign journalist
the Indonesian Government considered biased. The prospects for
a Portuguese visit were unclear at year's end. The U.N.
Special Rapporteur for Torture visited Jakarta and East Timor
in November, but a workshop on human rights jointly sponsored
by the Government and the United Nations was postponed at the
latter 's initiative in December.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Indonesians exhibit considerable tolerance for ethnic, racial,
and major religious differences, with the important exception
of official and informal discrimination against ethnic
Chinese. Since 1959 noncitizen ethnic Chinese have been denied
the right to run businesses in rural Indonesia. Regulations
prohibit the operation of all-Chinese schools for ethnic
870
INDONESIA
Chinese citizens, formation of exclusively Chinese cultural
groups or trade associations, and public display of Chinese
characters. Chinese-language publications, with the exception
of one officially sanctioned daily newspaper, can neither be
imported nor produced domestically. Private instruction in
Chinese is discouraged but takes place to a limited extent. No
laws prohibit speaking Chinese, but the Government lays heavy
stress on the learning and use of the national language, Bahasa
Indonesia .
Many people of Chinese ancestry have nonetheless been
successful in business and the professions, and the enforcement
of restrictions is often haphazard. Some ethnic Chinese have
enjoyed particular government favor. Social and religious
groups exist which are, in effect, all-Chinese and not
proscribed. Jakarta authorities have ended the practice of
marking local identification cards to indicate Chinese
ethnicity. However, 1991 saw a rise in anti-Chinese feeling in
many quarters of Indonesian society, particularly against the
affluent Chinese.
Under the law, and as President Soeharto and other officials
periodically affirm, women are equal to and have the same
rights, obligations, and opportunities as men. Some Indonesian
women enjoy a high degree of economic and social freedom and
occupy important mid-level positions in the civil service,
educational institutions, labor organizations, the military,
the professions, and private business. Although women
constitute one quarter of the civil service, they occupy only a
small fraction of the service's top posts. Women make up about
40 percent of the overall work force, with the majority in the
rural sector. Despite legal guarantees of equal treatment,
women seldom receive equal pay for equal work and
disproportionately experience illiteracy, poor health, and
nutrition. Traditional attitudes which limit women's
aspirations, activities, and status undercut state policy in
some areas. Several voluntary, private groups work actively to
advance women's legal, economic, social, and political rights
and acknowledge some success in gaining official cognizance of
their concerns.
Violence against women is an acknowledged though inadequately
documented problem. The Government has recognized domestic
violence as a problem in Indonesian society and provides some
counseling, as do several private organizations. However,
cultural, social, psychological, and other factors inhibit
reporting of such abuse and recourse by victims to counseling
and legal protection.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Private sector workers, including those in export-processing
zones, are free to form or join unions without previous
authorization, but in order to bargain on behalf of employees a
union must meet the requirements for legal recognition and
register with the Ministry of Manpower. The requirements for
legal recognition are representation in at least 20 of the 27
provinces, branch offices in at least 100 districts, and 1,000
local units at plant level. The unions draw up their own
constitutions and rules and elect their representatives while
under close government scrutiny and subject to government
approval prior to registration. Less than 6 percent of the
estimated 78-mi 11 ion-member work force is organized. The All
871
INDONESIA
Indonesia Workers Union (SPSI), which groups together private
sector workers, is the only recognized intersectoral trade
union body. In 1990 the SPSI reorganized into 13 autonomous
divisions, covering broad industrial sectors and specialized
institutes. It has about 10,000 local units at the plant level
and claims over 3 million members, although only about 900,000
actually pay dues •
In November 1990, a number of human rights campaigners created
the Setia Kawan (Solidarity) free trade union, alleging that
the SPSI had failed to defend worker interests adequately.
While the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security
Affairs initially stated that the Government would not approve
the new trade union when it sought to register because to do so
would violate the Government's single-trade union policy, he
later indicated that the Government would tolerate the new
organization if it did not do anything illegal. The Government
has made no formal move to ban Setia Kawan. However, the Setia
Kawan is not able to function as a labor union since it does
not meet the requirement for legal recognition referred to
above. Setia Kawan organizers have been harassed, and in June
Secretary General Saut Aritonang reported he was abducted by
armed men and detained for several days. Prior to this
incident, Aritonang had indicated he would be going to Geneva
to bring Setia Kawan s case before the International Labor
Organization (ILO) during the ILO's annual International Labor
Conference at which the Indonesian Minister of Manpower would
be president of the conference. The Indonesian Government has
denied responsibility for Aritonang' s disappearance, and
Aritonang has not publicly speculated on the identity of his
abductors .
Prior to the 1990 SPSI National Congress, the Joint Secretariat
of Industrial Unions carried out certain limited trade union
functions which excluded collective bargaining. At the 1990
Congress, however, a number of its principal leaders rejoined
the SPSI and, while the Joint Secretariat continues to exist in
name, it is not a functioning organization.
In 1990 the Teachers' Association (PGRI) was allowed to
register as a trade union with exclusive jurisdiction for this
sector. The PGRI, which consists of 1.3 million teachers,
including teachers in religious, private, and public schools,
has representation in all 27 provinces. It has not, however,
attempted to bargain over wages and working conditions,
preferring its traditional role of working with the Government
to pursue the interests of its members. Some PGRI officials
are employees of the Ministry of Education.
State enterprise employees and civil servants, including public
school teachers, must belong to KORPRI , a nonunion association
whose Central Development Council is chaired by the Minister of
Home Affairs. In 1990, for the first time, a KORPRI subunit
successfully negotiated four collective bargaining agreements
with the state-owned coal company.
The Government and employers have considerable influence over
SPSI affairs; a retired military lieutenant colonel and GOLKAR
district chairman with some prior union experience is chairman
of the largest provincial branch of the SPSI, primarily due to
government backing. The Minister of Manpower is a member of
the SPSI Consultative Council. SPSI officials are pressured to
join GOLKAR, and GOLKAR members dominate the SPSI leadership.
Several SPSI leaders are in the DPR and are members of the
GOLKAR faction.
872
INDONESIA
Under the ORMAS law (see Section 2.b.), government approval is
needed for meetings outside union headquarters. Permission is
routinely given. A union may be dissolved if the Government
believes it is acting against Pancasila. There are no laws or
regulations laying out the procedures for the dissolution of a
union, and there have been no cases of union dissolution. The
SPSI is free to maintain international contacts.
While Pancasila principles call for labor -management
differences to be settled by consensus, all organized workers,
with the exception of civil servants, have a legal right to
strike. However, before a strike can occur in the private
sector, the law requires intensive mediation by the Ministry of
Manpower and prior notice regarding the intent to strike. Most
disputes are settled through negotiation and consensus, due in
part at least to fear of police and employer retaliation. In
1991 there was a significant increase in the number of strikes,
especially on the part of workers demanding employer compliance
with the legal minimum wage. In a number of instances, the
military or police were called to the scene of the strike. The
nature of military and police involvement at work stoppage
sites has been varied. Most often the security forces have
limited themselves to protecting property and preventing
violence, although there have been reports of conscious
attempts to intimidate strikers. Their mere presence has no
doubt had a dampening effect on the willingness of workers to
pursue strike or other protest activity. However, there have
also been reports that military officers have attempted to
mediate at strike sites and worked to settle disputes to which
they were called.
The largest strike, involving approximately 12,000 workers
engaged in the manufacture of automobile tires in the
industrial area west of Jakarta, prompted the Minister of
Political Affairs and Security to charge that "would-be heroes"
and other unnamed parties were behind the recent strikes. On
several occasions the Minister of Manpower stated the strikes
were the result of workers' increasing awareness of their legal
rights. During the first 11 months of 1991, there were 112
officially recorded strikes compared to 45 for all of 1990.
Most of these strikes were wildcat and so technically illegal,
but there were no reports of strike leaders or workers being
prosecuted for conducting them. Many strikes occur suddenly
and without prior attempts to resolve problems and may not be
included in official statistics. There have been a few reports
of employer retaliation against strike leaders, but this seems
to be the exception and not the rule. Most strikes are settled
relatively quickly and all workers return to work.
Strike outcomes varied. In some cases employers have quickly
complied with worker demands that salaries be increased to the
legal minimum wage. Others have been less successful with
workers returning to work with only partial gains or none at
all.
In practice there are no clear, established procedures
regarding the settlement of disputes. If the parties cannot
settle the matter, it is usually submitted to the Ministry of
Manpower's Mediation and Conciliation Service. If the parties
do not accept the mediator's decision, the mediator or either
party may submit the matter to tripartite (government,
employers, employees) administrative tribunals or to
arbitration. The Minister of Manpower may nullify the
decisions of administrative tribunals on legal or national
interest grounds. Although technically the Minister's
873
INDONESIA
decisions may be appealed to the courts, in practice it is
rarely done.
Indonesia has for many years been the subject of complaints in
the ILO regarding the ban on organizing public sector unions,
insufficient protection against antiunion discrimination,
restrictions -on the registration of trade unions and collective
bargaining, and the exercise of the right to strike. The ILO
Conference in June again regretted that Indonesian law was
still not in conformity with the requirements of ILO Convention
98, which Indonesia has ratified.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is provided for by law, but only
registered trade unions can engage in it. The Ministry of
Manpower vigorously promotes collective bargaining as an
instrument of industrial relations in accordance with
Pancasila. The overwhelming majority of the SPSI's collective
bargaining agreements are negotiated and concluded bilaterally
with employers. Once notified that 25 employees have joined a
registered union, the employer is under an obligation to
bargain. As a transitional stage to encourage collective
bargaining, regulations rec[uire that every company which has 25
or more employees must issue company regulations defining the
terms and conditions of employment. Before a company can
register or renew its company regulations, it must demonstrate
that it has consulted with a committee consisting of employer
and employee representatives, in the absence of a union. Of
the approximately 10,000 SPSI units, only about half have
collective bargaining agreements. The degree to which these
agreements are freely negotiated between unions and management
without government interference varies. By regulation,
negotiations are to be concluded within 30 days. If not, the
matter is submitted to the Ministry of Manpower for mediation
and arbitration. In practice, most negotiations are concluded
within the 30-day period. Agreements are for 2 years and can
be extended for l more.
Labor law applies equally in export processing zones. While
some companies in these zones have SPSI units, none have
negotiated collective bargaining agreements. Regulations
expressly forbid employers prejudging or harassing employees
because of union membership, and employees are urged to report
harassment to the Government. The SPSI claims that some
employers discriminate against its members and those wishing to
form SPSI units.
Many strikes and protests take place in support of fired union
officials. Charges of antiunion discrimination are handled by
the administrative tribunals. Many union members believe that
the tribunals generally side with the employer. Because of
this perceived partiality, many workers reject or avoid the
process and present their disputes before the Parliament and
other agencies. Workers can organize without restriction in a
private enterprise, even if it is designated vital by the
Government, subject to the recognition procedures discussed
above. If the State has a partial interest, the enterprise is
considered to be in the public service domain, but this does
not legally limit organizing. There are a significant number
of government /private joint enterprises which have labor unions
and which bargain collectively.
874
INDONESIA
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law. However, in 1990 credible
reports asserted that military and civilian officials in Irian
Jaya cooperate with Jakarta-based timber companies to compel
Asmat tribespeople to cut down trees and transport them
downstream to waiting ships, and that the Government
resettlement program raises serious questions of informed
consent. There are also documented reports of labor
contractors in Jakarta selling girls as domestic servants or to
brothels near plantations, and of men sold as agricultural
workers. The Government responded that it was investigating
the allegations. The Government did not release the results of
this investigation, however, in 1990 or 1991.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Child labor continues to be a major problem. The Ministry of
Manpower acknowledges that there is a class of children under
age 14 who, for socioeconomic reasons, must work and notes that
the child labor laws, which provide detailed safeguards, have
not been fully enforced.
Employers are supposed to report in detail on every child
employed, and the Ministry of Manpower is supposed to carry out
periodic inspections. Employers not complying with the law and
regulations are legally subject to fines of $65 and/or up to 3
months in jail for each infraction, but the Government still
relies on persuasion and teaching employers rather than
penalizing them. The Ministry of Manpower continues to admit
that employer compliance with the regulations is inadequate
(less than 50 percent of companies employing children have
registered), and that it still lacks enough qualified
inspectors to carry out inspections. Observers claim that over
2 million children under the age of 14 are working half- to
full-time, mostly in family-run businesses in the informal
sector and at agricultural sites, where enforcement is
difficult. Efforts to control child labor focus primarily on
instituting educational programs for working children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The law establishes 7-hour workdays and 40-hour workweeks, with
one-half hour of rest for each 4 hours of work. It provides
for a 24-hour rest period each week. Regulations allow
employers to deviate from the normal work hours upon request to
the Minister of Manpower with the agreement of the employees.
In the absence of a national minimum wage, minimum wages are
established by regional wage councils working under the
supervision of the National Wage Council. This is a
c[uadr ipartite body consisting of representatives from labor,
management, government, and universities. It also establishes
a basic needs figure for each province — a monetary amount
considered sufficient to enable a single worker or family to
meet the basic needs of nutrition, clothing, and shelter. The
minimum wage rates constantly lag far behind the basic needs
figures and fall short of providing a decent standard of
living.
Observance of minimum wage and other laws regulating benefits
and labor standards varies from sector to sector and from
region to region. Employer violations of these guarantees are
considered- to be fairly common and often the subject of strikes
and employee protests. Government supervision and enforcement
have been weak or nonexistent. In May 1989, the Manpower
875
INDONESIA
Minister issued regulations giving ministry officials a legal
basis to carry out periodic inspections and providing for fines
or imprisonment for employers who do not comply. In March
1990, spurred on by an Asian-American Free Labor Institute/SPSI
minimum wage compliance project, which showed that 50 to 70
percent of employers in three targeted areas in Jakarta were
paying less than the minimum wages, the Manpower Minister began
to prosecute softie employers for violating minimum wage
regulations in order to set an example.
Both law and regulations provide for minimum standards of
industrial health and safety. In the more profitable and
largely Western-operated oil sector, safety and health programs
function reasonably well. However, safety and health programs
in the country's over 100,000 large, registered companies in
the nonoil sector are still hampered by the limited number of
qualified inspectors from the Ministry of Manpower (less than
1,300), the slowness wij;h which the firms establish the
required plant-safety committees, the need for more and better
training of government inspectors and plant-safety personnel,
and the lack of employee appreciation for sound health and
safety practices. A National Health and Safety Council, an
advisory body established under the Ministry of Manpower, was
created in 1990 to oversee the enforcement efforts of over
6,000 company safety committees. Workers are obligated to
report hazardous working conditions, and employers are
prevented by law from retaliating against those who do, but in
practice enforcement is weak.
876
JAPAN
Japan is a parliamentary democracy based on a constitution
adopted in 1947. Sovereignty is vested in the people, and the
Emperor is defined as the symbol of state. On the national
level, power is divided among executive, legislative, and
judicial branches. Executive power is vested in a cabinet,
composed of a prime minister and ministers of state responsible
to the Diet, Japan's two-house parliament. The Diet, elected
by universal suffrage and secret ballot, designates the prime
minister, who must be a member of that body. Nearly 70 percent
of the electorate usually votes in general elections, contested
by six political parties covering a broad ideological spectrum.
For the last 36 years the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
has held a parliamentary majority. The judicial system has
several layers of courts, with the Supreme Court as final
authority.
A well-organized and disciplined police force generally
respects the human rights of the populace. However, there
continued to be reports of harsh treatment of suspects in
custody. The police force is firmly under the control of the
civil authorities. The Civil Liberties Bureau in the Ministry
of Justice and the Human Rights and Refugee Division in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs monitor problems relating to human
rights practices in Japan.
Japan's free market economy has the world's second largest
gross national product. Increased consumer demand and capital
investment have maintained the economy's steady expansion over
the last 5 years.
The Constitution states: "All of the people are equal under the
law and there shall be no discrimination in political,
economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex,
social status, or family origin." The human rights assured by
the Constitution and Bill of Rights are secured by a just and
efficient legal system. However, the "Burakumin" (a group
traditionally treated as outcasts), the Ainu (Japan's
indigenous people), women, and alien residents experience
varying degrees of discrimination. Current laws against
discrimination contain virtually no penalties for offenders.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known cases of political or other extrajudicial
killing.
b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of abductions, secret arrests,
clandestine detention, or hostage holding by security forces or
any other organization.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment is provided for in the Constitution. According to
reports by several Japanese bar associations, police often use
physical violence, including kickings and beatings, to obtain
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JAPAN
confessions from suspects in custody. While such abuse remains
a problem, several courts have overturned convictions obtained
by forced confession. No such cases were reported in 1991.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Freedom from art^itrary arrest or imprisonment is provided for
in the Constitution and respected in practice. Japanese law
provides for judicial determination of the legality of
detention. Persons cannot be detained without charge, and
prosecuting authorities must be prepared to demonstrate before
trial that probable cause exists to detain the accused. Under
the Criminal Procedure Code, a suspect may be held
incommunicado in police custody for up to 72 hours without
representation by defense counsel. This period may be extended
by a judge for up to 25 days if necessary. If an indictment
follows, the suspect is transferred to a criminal detention
facility. This practice, referred to as the "substitute prison
system," was the subject of critical testimony by Japanese
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) before the U.N.
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities. The NGO's criticized in particular the fact that
the police may hold a person in custody for up to 28 days,
thus, they say, allowing the detention itself to be used as an
interrogation tool. Furthermore, since the system does not
allow appointment of a pro bono attorney until an indictment
has been filed, those who cannot afford legal counsel may be up
to 28 days without it .
The length of time before a suspect is brought to trial depends
on the nature of the crime but rarely exceeds 2 months; the
average is 1 to 2 months. By law there is no right to legal
representation during interrogation. However, the Ministry of
Justice has stipulated that a detained person should be able to
meet with counsel within 48 hours of the accused's request.
This time limit is sometimes ignored. Counsel is provided at
government expense when the arrested person cannot afford one.
Preventive detention does not exist.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for the right to a speedy and public
trial by an impartial tribunal in all criminal cases, and this
right is respected in practice. The defendant is informed of
charges upon arrest and assured a public trial by an
independent civilian court with defense counsel and the right
to cross-examination. The Constitution assures defendants the
right not to be compelled to testify against themselves as well
as free and private access to counsel, although the right to
such access is sometimes abridged in practice. Defendants are
also protected from the retroactive application of laws and
have the right of access to incriminating evidence after a
formal indictment has been made. Judges are appointed by the
Cabinet for a 10-year term which can be renewed until the age
of 65. Justices of the Supreme Court can serve until the age
of 70, but face periodic review through popular referendum. A
defendant who is dissatisfied with the decision of a trial
court of first instance may, within the period prescribed by
law, appeal to a higher court. There are several levels of
courts, with the Supreme Court serving as the highest judicial
authority. There is no trial by jury in Japan. There are no
political prisoners.
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JAPAN
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under the Constitution, each search or seizure must be made
upon separate warrant issued by a judicial officer. Standards
for issuing such warrants exist to guard against arbitrary
searches. There were no reports that the Government or any
other organization arbitrarily interfered with privacy, family,
home, or correspondence.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Rights, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution, an independent press and judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure
freedom of speech and press.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are provided for in the Constitution and
respected in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution and
respected in practice. While Buddhism and Shintoism remain the
two major religions, there are many others, including several
Christian denominations. Foreign missionaries are welcome and
gain admission to Japan through a specific visa category for
foreign religious workers. Some temples and shrines receive
public support as treasured national properties.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Japanese citizens have the right to travel freely, both within
Japan and abroad, to change their place of residence, to
emigrate, and to repatriate voluntarily. Japanese nationality
can be lost by naturalization in a foreign country or failure
to elect Japanese nationality at the proper age. Immigrants
reportedly face police harassment and widespread discrimination
in obtaining housing, jobs, and health care.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Japanese citizens have the right and ability peacefully to
change their government. A parliamentary democracy, Japan is
ruled by the political party or parties able to form a majority
in the lower house of its bicameral Diet. The Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) has been in power on the national
level — through control of the lower house — continuously since
its establishment in 1955. The political system is open,
however. The LDP owes its longevity primarily to pragmatic and
effective governance and to the fragmentation of the opposition
parties. Local and prefectural governments are often
controlled by coalitions. Elections on all levels are held
frequently, suffrage is universal, and ballots are secret.
Postwar population movements have left some parliamentary
electoral districts disproportionately large; some districts
have more than three times the population of others. The
Supreme Court has called for greater equality in the value of
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JAPAN
votes, but the lack of a nonpartisan mechanism to make such
changes has slowed the process of adjustment.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
A number of local human rights organizations exist. They do
not face any governmental restrictions or impediments to their
work. The Government does not obstruct or inhibit the
investigative activities of international nongovernmental
organizations .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The exclusive nature of Japanese society, reinforced by
cultural and ethnic homogeneity and a history of isolation from
other cultures, has impeded the integration of minority
groups. Despite improvements in Japan's legal system, Korean
permanent residents (most of whom were born, raised, and
educated in Japan) and the Burakumin (descendants of feudal-era
"outcasts" who practiced so-called unclean professions such as
butchering and undertaking) are frequently the victims of
entrenched social discrimination which has restricted the
access of both groups to private housing, employment, and
marriage opportunities. The Ainu, descendants of the original
inhabitants of Japan, are also subject to discrimination,
especially regarding employment opportunities.
Beginning in 1969, the Government introduced a number of
social, economic, and legal programs designed to improve
conditions for the Burakumin and hasten their assimilation into
the mainstream of Japanese society. While the Government has
approved funding for these programs through 1992, organizations
representing the interests of the Burakumin are lobbying for a
new law expanding programs and specific antidiscrimination
legislation. In 1991 the Government announced plans for a fund
for protecting the rights of the Ainu and improving their
status through education beginning in 1993.
The legal obligation to carry an alien registration card and to
be fingerprinted have been leading concerns among permanent
resident aliens residing in Japan, particularly second and
third generation Korean residents who constitute 82 percent of
all such aliens. In response to continued appeals from the
Republic of Korea, the Government announced in January a number
of steps to improve the status of Korean residents, including
ending fingerprinting within 2 years and easing the requirement
to carry the registration card at all times.
In addition, Korean permanent residents are subject to various
forms of entrenched social discrimination. In recent years,
the Government has enacted several laws and regulations
extending to permanent resident aliens equal access to public
housing and loans, social security pensions for those
qualified, and certain public employment rights. Employment
rights were recently extended to technical positions in local
government, but fell short of allowing resident aliens
employment as full-time teachers in public schools and in
administrative positions in public service. Private sector
employment and social discrimination are still common.
Antidiscrimination laws affecting Korean residents were
initiated as government guidance and are not backed up by
penalty provisions.
880
JAPAN
According to law, aliens with 5 years' continuous residence are
eligible for naturalization and the simultaneous acquisition of
citizenship rights, including the right to vote. In fact,
however, most eligible aliens do not apply for citizenship, in
part due to fears that their cultural identity would be erased
by that act .
Estimates of Japan's illegal foreign worker population range
from 100,000 to 200,000 persons. The majority of these workers
are from South and Southeast Asia and have come in search of
better paying manufacturing and construction jobs created by
Japan's labor shortages. Activist groups claim that, with
little or no knowledge of the Japanese language or their legal
rights, foreign workers can easily be discriminated against by
employers. Some illegal alien workers have suffered
exploitative treatment, but there is no evidence that it is
common. The total number of illegal aliens is unknown and
there are no statistical data on their experiences. Japanese
media have reported on the influx of foreign workers who are
doing the dirty, difficult, and dangerous work that Japanese
now disdain. The Government has tried to decrease the inflow
of illegal foreign workers by prosecuting employers under
recent revisions of the immigration law and assessing penalties
on employers of undocumented foreign workers. A June 1991
survey published by the Ministry of Justice reported record
levels of deportation of foreigners, totaling 13,934, an
increase of 34 percent since 1990. The Government continues to
study the foreign worker issue in a special committee. Several
citizens' groups are working with illegal foreign workers to
improve their access to information on worker rights.
Late in 1990, press stories criticized Japan's failure to
protect adequately Chinese dissidents in Japan by extending the
visas of those who fear persecution in China or by preventing
intimidation by Chinese Embassy officials. Since then, the
Japanese Government has agreed to regularize their status but
has not granted asylum or refugee status. In some cases, the
Government has extended their visas; in others, it has issued
special activities visas giving temporary residence status for
up to 3 years and renewable. The Japanese Government continues
to believe that only a tiny fraction of the thousands of
Chinese students in Japan have a well-founded fear of
punishment by the Chinese Government. There is no information
that any Chinese citizen with a credible claim of fear of
punishment for prodemocracy activities since June 4, 1989, has
been deported by the Japanese Government. In 1991, for the
first time, the Government deported a Chinese citizen who
claimed fear of persecution. The Japanese Government
considered her case through regular procedures, including
consultation with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, before returning her to China together with other
Chinese migrants. There were reports that Chinese students
seeking to extend their visas face numerous obstacles and
impediments, although such problems are common among other
foreign students as well. There continue to be credible
reports of Chinese officials in Japan engaging in harassment
and intimidation tactics against prodemocracy students.
The position of women in society and the home, although
significantly improved during the last few decades, continues
to reflect deep-seated traditional values which assign women a
subordinate role. In this environment, violence against women,
particularly domestic violence, often goes unreported due to
social and cultural concerns about shaming one's family or
endangering the reputation of one's spouse or offspring.
881
JAPAN
Typically, victimized women more often return to the home of
their parents rather than file reports with authorities.
Therefore, Ministry of Justice statistics on violence against
women undoubtedly understate the scope of the current
situation. Many local governments are responding positively to
a need for confidential assistance by establishing special
women's consultation departments in police and prefectural
offices.
Although discrimination by private employers against women is
prohibited by the Constitution, it persists. Women comprise 40
percent of the employed population. Legislation over the past
30 years has been adjusted to accord them the same legal status
as men. The Equal Employment Opportunity Law of 1986 was aimed
at eliminating sex discrimination in such areas as recruitment,
pay, and working hours. The law does not expressly forbid
discrimination; it merely states that "employers should
endeavor" to avoid it. Under this law and other regulations,
the Ministry of Labor attempts to encourage corporate
compliance with its objectives by positive inducements,
including subsidies; it does not enforce compliance through
fines or other punitive measures. Under these circumstances,
significant disparities in pay and access to managerial
positions persist. There were two 1990 court cases of
discrimination against women. In one landmark case, the court
found violations of Article 14 of the Constitution and the
Labor Standards Law, which resulted in national media coverage,
and awarded compensation to the victims. The other case is
still pending in a Fukuoka court. Public awareness of
discrimination against women and sexual harassment in the
workplace has increased. Some government entities have also
established hotlines and designated ombudsmen to handle
complaints of discrimination and sexual harassment.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of workers to organize, bargain, and act collectively
is assured by the Constitution. Approximately 25 percent of
the active work force belongs to unions. Unions are free of
government control and influence. The Japanese Trade Union
Confederation (Rengo), which represents 8 million Japanese
workers, was formed in 1989 through the merger of several
confederations and is Japan's largest labor organization.
There is no requirement for a single trade union structure, and
there are no restrictions on who may be a union official.
Members of the armed forces, police, and firefighters, however,
are not permitted to form unions or to organize. The
International Labor Organization's Committee of Experts in 1991
again criticized Japan's denial of the right of firefighters to
organize as unwarranted. Japanese law allows unions to lobby
and to make political campaign contributions, and most unions
are involved in political activity as well as labor relations.
Rengo and other labor groups are active in supporting political
parties and individual candidates, and promoting their
political and social agenda. Organized labor generally
supports the opposition political parties and provides key
funds and manpower. Unions are active in international bodies,
most notably the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions, and maintain extensive international contacts. The
right to strike is implicit in the Constitution, and it is
exercised. During 1990, 144,000 working days were lost to
strikes. In 1991, as in earlier years, a disproportionately
large number of strikes took place during the "spring wage
882
JAPAN
offensive." Public employees, however, do not have the right
to strike, although they do have recourse to mediation and
arbitration in order to resolve disputes. In exchange for a
ban on their right to strike, government employees' pay raises
are determined by the Government based on a recommendation by
the independent National Personnel Authority.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Constitution states that unions have the right to organize,
bargain, and act collectively, and these rights are exercised
in practice. Collective bargaining is widely practiced. The
annual "spring wage offensive," in which individual unions in
each industry conduct negotiations simultaneously with their
firms, attracts national attention. Japanese management
usually consults closely with unions on issues. However, trade
unions are independent of management and aggressively pursue
the interests of their workers. Antiunion discrimination is
prohibited by law and in practice does not take place. There
are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Labor Standards Law prohibits the use of forced labor, and
there are no known cases of forced or compulsory labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Under the revised Labor Standards Law of 1987, minors under 15
years of age may not be employed as workers, and those under
the age of 18 years may not be employed in dangerous or harmful
work. Child labor laws are rigorously enforced by the Labor
Inspection Division of the Ministry of Labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wages are administratively determined by the Minister
of Labor or the Director of the Prefectural Labor Standards
Office based usually on the recommendation of the tripartite
Minimum Wage Council. Minimum wage rates vary by industry and
region. These wage rates are sufficient to provide workers and
their families with a decent living. The Labor Standards Law
provides for the phased reduction of maximum working hours from
the present 44-hour 6-day workweek to 40 hours by early in the
1990 's. The Ministry of Labor effectively administers various
laws and regulations governing occupational health and safety,
principal among which is the Industrial Safety and Health Law
of 1972. Standards are set by the Ministry of Labor and issued
after consultation with the Standing Committee on Safety and
Health of the tripartite Labor Standards Commission. Labor
inspectors have the authority to suspend unsafe operations
immediately, and the law provides for workers to voice concerns
over occupational safety and to remove themselves from unsafe
working conditions without jeopardizing their continued
employment .
883
KIRIBATI
The nation of Kiribati comprises some 72,500 people occupying
33 small islands widely scattered across 3.5 million square
kilometers of the central Pacific. The nation's population is
primarily Micronesian, with a significant remainder of
Polynesian origin. Kiribati gained full independence from the
United Kingdom in 1979 and became a republic within the
Commonwealth of Nations. It has a nationally elected president
and legislative assembly, with 39 members elected by universal
suffrage and 2 ex-officio members. Local affairs are handled
in a manner similar to that followed in New England town
meetings .
The only security apparatus is a small police force,
responsible to and effectively controlled by civilian authority.
The economy is very small; most people are engaged in
subsistence agriculture and fishing. The islands' isolation
and meager resources, including poor soil and limited arable
land, severely limit prospects for economic development.
Kiribati society is egalitarian, democratic, and respectful of
human rights. There were no reports of specific human rights
abuses in 1991, but in the traditional culture women have
occupied a subordinate role, with limits on job opportunities.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no politically motivated killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no disappearances, and no evidence of people being
abducted, secretly arrested, or clandestinely detained.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or other such
treatment are forbidden by the Constitution, and there were no
reported instances of such practices.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Constitutional safeguards against arbitrary arrest and
detention are observed in practice. There is no exile,
internal or external.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to a fair public trial is assured by law and observed
in practice. The Constitution provides that an accused person
be informed of the nature of the offense for which charged and
be provided adecjuate time and facilities to prepare a defense.
The right to confront witnesses, present evidence, and appeal
convictions is enshrined in law. Procedural safeguards are
based on English common law and are generally similar to those
in Western democracies. The judiciary is independent and free
of governmental interference. Kiribati has no political
prisoners.
en Toc
884
KIRIBATI
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The privacy of the home is protected in law and respected by
the Government. There is no arbitrary intrusion by the State
or political organizations into the private life of the
individual. Membership in political organizations is entirely
voluntary.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is provided for in the Constitution
and observed in practice. Kiribati's radio station and only
newspaper are government owned, but offer a variety of views.
Churches publish newsletters and other periodicals. Academic
freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association, including the right to form or belong to
associations for the advancement or protection of the group's
interests. There are no significant restrictions in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion
Complete freedom of religion prevails in Kiribati. There is no
state or preferred religion. Missionaries are free to seek
converts and actively do so.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens are free to travel within the country and abroad.
There are no restrictions on repatriation. Kiribati has no
refugees or displaced persons.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Government is chosen by the people in free and open
elections. Executive authority is exercised by the President,
who is elected by the people. No less than three and no more
than four presidential candidates are nominated by the elected
House of Assembly from among its members. Under the
Constitution, the President is limited to three terms. Thus,
President Tabai, who had been in power since independence in
1979, was required to step down in 1991. He was succeeded by
his former vice president, Teatao Teannaki .
There is no tradition of formally organized parties in
Kiribati. However, elections do bring about coalitions of
various interest groups, around specific issues. For example,
the 1991 election campaign saw the emergence of several such
interest groups, referred to by the following names: the
Christian Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the National
Progressive Party, and the New Movement Party. These groups do
not seem to have any durable distinguishing characteristics and
they have, as yet, no party headquarters, formal platforms, or
party structures.
885
KIRIBATI
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There have been no reported allegations of human rights
violations by the Government and no known requests for
investigations. There are no restrictions on the formation of
local nongovernmental organizations that concern themselves
with human rights but to date none has been formed. The
Government has not taken an active interest in international
human rights matters. Kiribati is not a member of the United
Nations .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
creed, national origin, or sex. There were no reports of
discrimination in the provision of social services by the
Government. Kiribati has no significant discrimination based
on race, religion, language, or social status. Kiribati
society, being fundamentally egalitarian, does not have the
privileged chiefly class of some other Pacific island societies.
The traditional culture, in which males are dominant, has been
an impediment to women taking a more active role in the
economy. This is slowly changing, and more women are finding
work in unskilled and semiskilled occupations. Women have full
and ecjual access to education. Statistics on the participation
of women in the work force and comparative wages are
unavailable. Women have full rights of ownership and
inheritance of property. Violence against women does not
appear to be a major problem in this isolated, rural society.
Rape is a crime under the law and the law is enforced when
charges are brought to court. To the extent that it exists,
wife beating is dealt with informally and in a traditional way;
frequently communal pressure is brought to bear.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Freedom of association is provided for in the Constitution.
Workers are free to organize unions and choose their own
representatives. Over 90 percent of the work force is occupied
in fishing or subsistence farming, but in the small wage sector
Kiribati has a relatively strong and effective trade union
movement. The Government does not control or restrict unions.
In 1982 the seven trade unions registered in Kiribati merged to
form the Kiribati Trade Union Congress (KTUC) . It has
approximately 2,500 members, most of them drawn from the public
service. The KTUC is affiliated with the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
The right to strike is provided for by law. However, strikes
are rare, the last one having taken place in 1980. This is
probably due to the small size of the cash economy.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is provided for in legislation under the
Industrial Relations Code. Government wage setting is the rule
in the large public sector; however, in a few statutory bodies
and government-owned companies, employees may negotiate about
wages and other conditions. In the private sector, employees
886
KIRIBATI
may negotiate about wages with employers. Negotiations are
generally nonconf rontational in keeping with Kiribati
tradition. There have been no reports of antiunion
discrimination. Mechanisms exist, however, for resolving any
complaints of antiunion discrimination. Kiribati has no export
processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced or compulsory labor in Kiribati. Both are
prohibited under the Constitution.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Kiribati law prohibits the employment of children under age
14. Children aged 15 are prohibited from industrial employment
and employment aboard ships. Children are rarely employed
outside the traditional economy.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Although legislation authorizing the Government to set minimum
wages exists, it has not yet been implemented. There is no
legislatively prescribed workweek. Government is the major
employer in the cash economy.
Employment laws provide rudimentary health and safety standards
for the workplace. Employers, for example, must provide an
adequate supply of clean water for workers and must ensure the
existence of sanitary toilet facilities. Employers are liable
for the expenses of workers injured on the job. The
Government's ability to enforce employment laws is constrained
by a lack of qualified enforcement personnel, a lack it is
attempting to remedy by improvements in training of the
relevant personnel. Women may not work at night except under
specified circumstances (generally in service jobs such as
hotel clerks) .
887
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA*
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a
dictatorship under the absolute rule of the Korean Workers'
Party (KWP) . The party exercises power on behalf of its
leader. General Secretary Kim II Sung, who is also President of
the DPRK. Kim II Sung, in power for 44 years, has largely
turned over glsy-to-day control of the Government to his son,
Kim Jong II. The son has been gradually taking a higher public
profile and was recently named Supreme Commander of the Korean
People's Army. The younger Kim ranks second in the party and,
together with his father, is the subject of a personality
cult.
The North Korean regime subjects its people to rigid controls.
The regime establishes security ratings for each individual
which determine access to employment, schools, medical
facilities, and stores as well as admission to the KWP, but
this loyalty system appears to have been relaxed somewhat in
recent years. Individual rights remain subordinated, however,
to those of the State and the party.
The State directs all significant economic activity. The North
Korean economy has contracted significantly due to the
elimination of Soviet concessional trade and aid. According to
a Bank of Korea estimate, the North Korean gross national
product (GNP) experienced a 2.7 percent contraction in 1991.
Moreover, there have been continuing shortfalls in agricultural
production and bottlenecks throughout the economy caused by
chronic energy shortages. In response, the Government has
haltingly experimented with some Chinese-style economic reforms
— increased enterprise autonomy, a joint venture law, and
farmers' markets — and recently announced special economic zones
in the far Northeast. It has also exhorted the general
population to endure even more austerity, and especially to
make do with less food. Economic development continues to be
hindered by inadequate distribution facilities, nonproductive
allocation of resources, and a bad international credit rating
stemming from the DPRK ' s default on its foreign debt, as well
as by the diversion of as much as a quarter of GNP to military
expenditures .
North Korea continues to deny its citizens the most fundamental
human rights. However, the Government has allowed the entry of
a growing number of foreign visitors, especially overseas
Koreans, and up to 2,000 Korean-Americans have visited the DPRK
for family reunions in the past few years. Furthermore, the
Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Cooperation and
Exchange Between North and South Korea, signed in December,
1991 calls for increased family exchanges and will establish a
joint committee to discuss concrete measures.
The North Korean Penal Code is draconian, stipulating capital
punishment and confiscation of all assets for a wide variety of
*The United States does not have diplomatic relations with the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea. North Korea does not
allow representatives of foreign governments, journalists, or
other invited visitors the freedom of movement that would
enable them to assess human rights conditions there. Most of
this report, therefore, is based on information obtained over j
period of time extending from well before 1991. While limited
in detail, the information is nonetheless indicative of the
human rights situation in North Korea today.
888
DEMOCRAT re PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
"crimes against the revolution," including defection, slander
of the party or state, and having "reactionary" printed
matter. The regime permits no independent press or
associations, and little outside information reaches the
public, except that approved and disseminated by the Government.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The regime has in the past summarily executed some political
prisoners, political opponents of Kim II Sung and Kim Jong II,
and repatriated defectors. The South Korean press reported
that the parents of a North Korean judo team member who
defected in Spain were executed in 1991 as a warning to other
North Korean sports team members who might travel abroad, but
this has not been confirmed.
North Korea has intermittently directed terrorist attacks
against South Korea, including most recently the bombing of
Korean Air Flight 858 off the coast of Burma in November 1987.
There has been no indication of further North Korean
involvement in terrorist acts since then, but the Government
has not yet provided credible assurances that it forswears
terrorism.
b. Disappearance
There is no information available on disappearance within North
Korea. There are several reports that over the past 10 years
the DPRK has kidnaped South Koreans, Japanese, and other
foreign citizens outside of its borders. In August 1991,
Japan, in the course of normalization talks with the DPRK,
raised the issue of a Japanese woman kidnaped from Japan and
used by the North Koreans to teach Japanese language and
customs to the surviving terrorist implicated in the Korean Air
Line Flight 858 bombing. The DPRK vehemently denied the
kidnaping charge, but Japan has said it will continue to press
the case. The Japanese press has estimated that as many as 20
Japanese have been kidnaped and are being held against their
will in North Korea.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There is no information on recent practices, but credible
reports indicate that during the 1980 's prisoners were
routinely tortured or ill-treated and that many prisoners died
from torture, disease, starvation, or exposure.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Little information is available on specific criminal justice
procedures and practices in North Korea. North Korea has
refused to permit outside observation of its legal system and
practices .
North Korean law provides that prisoners may be held for
interrogation for a period not to exceed 2 months. This period
may be extended indefinitely, however, if the Interrogation
Department obtains the approval of the Chief Prosecutor. There
are reports of persons being detained for 12 months without
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DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
trial or charge. Other reports note that it is very difficult
for family members or other concerned persons to obtain
information regarding charges being leveled against a person
accused or even detained. Habeas corpus or its equivalent does
not exist in law or in practice.
North Korean defectors to South Korea in 1989 estimated that
the regime holds at least 105,000 political prisoners and their
family members in "concentration camps," where they are
prohibited from marrying and required to grow their own food.
Based on defector testimony and other sources, the Republic of
Korea estimates North Korea detains about 150,000 political
prisoners and family members in maximum security camps in
remote, isolated areas. North Korean officials deny the
existence of such gulags or prisons but admit the existence of
"education centers" for people who "commit crimes by mistake."
One credible report lists 12 such prison camps believed to
exist in the DPRK. It is believed that several former high
officials, including former prime ministers, are imprisoned in
the camps, and that most maximum security prisoners have been
confined without trial or formal charges. Visitors and any
form of communication with detainees, although once allowed,
are now said to be prohibited.
In a July newspaper interview, Cho Kap Chae, a North Korean
defector who had been a high-ranking official in the DPRK
Ministry of Public Security, said that there were two types of
closed areas for detention of prisoners. One, he said, is a
system of closed camps from which prisoners never emerge and- in
which conditions are extremely difficult. In the second system
of camps, prisoners could be "rehabilitated," and Cho reported
that a prisoner he knew was released after a 3-year detention.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution states that courts are independent and that
judicial proceedings are to be carried out in strict accordance
with the law, which contains elaborate procedural guarantees.
However, credible reports indicate that these safeguards are
not followed in practice, and it appears the party exercises
pervasive control over the criminal justice system. Article
138 of the Constitution states that "cases are heard in public,
and the accused is guaranteed the right to defense; hearings
may be closed to the public as stipulated by law." Numerous
reports exist, however, of the Public Security Ministry
dispensing with trials in political cases and referring cases
to the Ministry of State Security for imposition of punishment.
When trials are held, lawyers are apparently assigned by the
Government, and reports indicate that defense lawyers are not
considered representatives of the accused but rather
independent parties who are expected to help the court by
persuading the accused to confess guilt. Some reports note a
distinction between political and common criminals and state
that the Government affords trials only to the latter. North
Korea equates "political criminals" with those who criticize
the regime. Numerous other reports suggest that in the past
political offenses included such forms of lese majesty as
sitting on newspapers bearing Kim II Sung's picture.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The regime subjects the people to a pervasive program of
indoctrination designed to shape and control individual
890
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
consciousness. Preschool children are drilled in homage to Kim
II Sung and his family while school age children are subjected
daily to extensive indoctrination. Youths and adults are
required to participate in daily ideological training conducted
during school or at places of employment. Government-organized
neighborhood units also provide indoctrination for persons who
neither work nor go to school. The daily indoctrination
requires rote recitation of party maxims and policies and
strives for ideological purity. Multiple North Korean security
organizations enforce these controls.
Koreans with relatives who fled to the South at the time of the
Korean War appear to be still classified as part of the
"hostile class" in the DPRK ' s elaborate loyalty system.
Because approximately 10 million families were separated by the
end of the Korean War, this category encompasses a significant
percentage of the North Korean population The defector Cho Kap
Chae, previously cited, notes that the "impure" or hostile
class consists of 25 to 30 percent of the population. Members
of this class may still be subject to some discrimination,
although Cho claims that their treatment has improved greatly
in recent years. Although the Constitution states that
"citizens are guaranteed the inviolability of person and
residence and the privacy of correspondence," the practice is
otherwise. The Government has developed a pervasive system of
informers throughout the society and, according to several
sources, electronic surveillance of residences is also common.
In school, the authorities encourage children to discuss what
their parents have said at home. The Government conducts
monthly "sanitation" inspections to check on household
activities. Each house is required to display portraits of Kim
II Sung and Kim Jong II. Reports indicate that because of the
pervasive surveillance, fear is the hallmark of most social
relationships .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although the Constitution states that "citizens have the
freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, association, and
demonstration," the regime permits such activities only in
support of government objectives. Other articles of the
Constitution that require citizens to follow the "Socialist
norms of life" and to obey a "collective spirit" take
precedence over individual political or civil liberties.
Credible reports indicate that the Government strictly curtails
the rights of freedom of expression and association guaranteed
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
to which North Korea became a party in 1981. Persons
criticizing the President or his policies are believed liable
to punishment by imprisonment or "corrective labor." One
defector reported in 1986 that a scientist, whose home was
bugged through his radio set, was arrested and executed for
statements made at home critical of Kim II Sung.
The Government attempts to control all news that enters and
leaves the DPRK. The visits of Western journalists admitted
into the country are carefully managed. Soviet publications
that have written critically of North Korea have had access
restricted, and during 1991 several had their offices closed.
Domestic media censorship is strictly enforced, and no
deviation from the official government line is tolerated. The
regime prohibits listening to foreign media broadcasts except
by the political elite, and violators reportedly are subject to
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DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
severe punishment. Radio and television sets are built to
receive only domestic programming. The Government controls
artistic and academic works, and visitors report that the
primary function of plays, movies, operas, and books is to
contribute to the cult of personality surrounding "the Great
Leader," Kim II Sung, and "the Dear Leader," Kim Jong II.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Government authorization is required for public meetings.
There appear to be no organizations other than those created by
the Government. The State even prohibits apolitical groups
such as neighborhood or alumni organizations. Professional
associations exist solely as another means of government
control over the members of these organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion
Although the Constitution provides that "citizens have
religious liberty and the freedom of antireligious propaganda,"
the regime, in fact, has severely persecuted Christians and
Buddhists since the late 1940 's and appears to discriminate
against persons whose family or relatives once had a strong
religious involvement.
Despite its past record, the regime is making a major effort to
use government-sponsored religious organizations to advance its
foreign policy goals. The DPRK claims to have 10,000
Christians who worship in 500 home churches, and the Chondogyo
Young Friends Party, a front group based on a native Korean
religious movement, is still in existence. A few Buddhist
temples are in operation, and the country's first two Christian
churches — one Protestant and one Catholic — were built in late
1988. The churches are included in the fixed itinerary for
many foreign visitors to Pyongyang. Some visitors attest to
the authenticity of the church services and to the faith of the
several dozen worshipers observed; others say the church
activity appears staged.
Kim II Sung, his family, and his juche (self-reliance) ideology
are accorded reverence akin to worship, and the cult of the Kim
family is functionally akin to organized religion. No North
Korean religious official is ever known to have preached that
there is any moral authority higher than that of Kim II Sung,
and the regime seems to be trying to find a theological basis
for melding Kimilsungism (as it is called by North Korean
media) and Christianity.
In 1991 a North Korean Christian delegation (including the
pastor of one of the two chruches established in 1988, divinity
students. Christian lay persons), and government officials in
charge of religious affairs journeyed to the United States,
meeting Christian groups in several cities over a 3-week
period. Additionally, a number of Korean-American pastors
representing a number of different churches traveled to North
Korea in 1991, meeting Korean pastors as well as government
officials in charge of religious affairs. The impression of
many of these travelers has been that while the DPRK is trying
to accommodate the desires of the overseas Korean Christian
community for more extensive contact with coreligionists in
North Korea, it continues to keep an extremely tight grip, both
organizationally and ideologically, on the practice of
Christianity (or any other religion) in North Korea.
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DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The DPRK regime strictly controls internal travel, requiring a
travel pass for any movement outside one's home village; these
passes are granted only for rec[uired official or certain
personal travel. Personal travel is usually limited to
attending the wedding or funeral of a close relative. Long
delays in obtaining the necessary permit often result in denial
of the right to travel even for these limited purposes. State
control of internal travel is also ensured by a ration system
that distributes coupons valid only in the region issued.
Worsening economic conditions, particularly energy and fuel
shortages, have contributed further to the restriction on the
freedom of movement for North Korean citizens.
Reports, primarily from defectors, indicate that forced
resettlement, particularly for those deemed politically
unreliable, is common. Permission to reside in, or even enter
Pyongyang, the capital, is strictly controlled.
Foreign travel is limited to officials and trusted artists,
athletes, and academics. The regime does not allow emigration,
and only 1,000 or so defectors have succeeded in fleeing the
country since 1953. The regime retaliates against the
relatives of those few persons who manage to escape.
Involuntarily repatriated defectors have been jailed or, in
some cases, executed. In 1991, for the first time, an
unmarried North Korean citizen was allowed to travel to the
United States to visit relatives. He was accompanied by a
government official and returned after 2 weeks.
The regime does not allow students to study outside of
Communist or friendly Third World countries for any period. It
tightened controls over DPRK students studying abroad when six
defected from Eastern Europe in 1989, and in 1990 called back
its students from Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.
From 1959 to 1982, 93,000 Korean residents of Japan, including
6,637 Japanese wives, voluntarily repatriated to North Korea in
response to nationalistic appeals. Despite DPRK assurances
that the wives, 1,828 of whom still had Japanese citizenship,
would be allowed to go home to Japan every 2 or 3 years, none
is known to have returned to Japan, and most have never been
heard from again. Credible reports indicate that most of the
returnees and their families were categorized in the "wavering
class;" given poor food, clothing, and housing; subjected to
hard labor; and treated with contempt. When reports of their
harsh treatment became known overseas, voluntary repatriation
dried up. Recent reports suggest that the treatment of
Japanese spouses has improved, since they have access to
much-needed hard currency. With normalization talks with Japan
under way, the DPRK has indicated it is willing to respond to
incjuiries about individual Japanese spouses on a case by case
basis.
North Korea has permitted entry to several thousand overseas
Korean residents in Japan, China, North America, and elsewhere
to visit their relatives. Recently the regime has granted
entry to greater numbers of other visitors, including
journalists and tourists. Large groups were admitted around
the time of Kim II Sung's birthday in mid-April. In addition,
several thousand delegates and press representatives were
admitted in June 1991 for the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting
held in Pyongyang. Visitors are closely monitored and
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DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
itineraries are usually fixed, although some visitors reported
they were allowed to walk freely around the vicinity of their
hotels .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
There is no mechanism by which the citizenry can effect
transitions in leadership or changes in government. The
political system is completely dominated by Kim II Sung and
heir-designate Kim Jong II. The legislature, the Supreme
People's Assembly, which meets only a few days a year, serves
only to rubberstamp resolutions presented to it by the
leadership. In an effort to create an appearance of democracy,
the DPRK has created several "minority parties." They exist
only as rosters of officials who have token representation in
the People's Assembly and completely support the government
line.
Free elections do not exist in North Korea. Although elections
to the Supreme People's Assembly and to provincial, city, and
county assemblies are all regularly held, in all cases the
Government approved only one candidate in each electoral
district. According to the government-controlled media, over
99 percent of the voters turned out to elect 100 percent of the
approved candidates. Such "elections" are an exercise in which
people are forced to participate to mobilize support for the
regime. Despite the long and rigorous selection process for
membership in the KWP, most party members have no voice in
decisionmaking, serving only to carry out the decrees
promulgated by party leader Kim II Sung and other top officials.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No organizations are permitted to exist to report on or observe
human rights violations. North Korea does not belong to any
international or regional human rights organizations, but has
for some years sent observers to the U.N. Commission for Human
Rights.
The Government has not allowed Amnesty International, Asia
Watch, or any other international organization to visit North
Korea to monitor human rights practices and has fulminated
against reports by such groups as being "full of lies and
fabrications . "
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that "women hold equal social status
and rights with men." However, few women have reached high
levels of the party or the Government. Women are represented
proportionally in the labor force, with the exception of small
factories where the work force is predominantly female.
The regime discriminates against the physically handicapped.
Handicapped persons, other than war veterans, are reportedly
not allowed within the city limits of Pyongyang. According to
one credible report, authorities check for deformities in the
capital city every 2 or 3 years and remove the disabled, some
of the elderly, widows, and the sick to the countryside. The
dwarf community has been banished to a remote settlement.
894
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Nothing is known about the extent to which violence against
women is practiced or tolerated.
North Korea is a homogeneous country and, except for a small
Chinese community, is relatively devoid of minority groups.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Free labor unions do not exist in North Korea. Because the
party by definition purports to represent the interests of
labor, trade unions exist in form only. There is a single
labor front, called the General Federation of Trade Unions of
Korea, which is affiliated with the Communist-dominated World
Federation of Trade Unions. Operating under this umbrella,
unions function on the classical Soviet model, with
responsibility for mobilizing workers behind productivity goals
and state targets, and for providing health, education,
cultural, and welfare facilities. They do not have the right
to strike.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers have no right to organize or to bargain collectively.
Wages are set by government ministries. Workers have no input
into management decisions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no prohibition on the use of forced or compulsory
labor. The Government routinely uses military conscripts for
construction projects.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
No data are available on the minimum age for employment of
children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
No data are available on minimum wages or occupational safety
and health. The State assigns all jobs; ideological purity is
as important as professional competence in deciding who
receives a particular job. Absence from work without a
doctor's certificate results in a reduction in a worker's
rations. The Constitution stipulates a workday limited to 8
hours, but several sources report that during production
campaigns most laborers work 12 to 16 hours daily. The
regime's propaganda euphemistically refers to these extra hours
as "patriotic labor" done on a "voluntary" basis by the workers.
895
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
In 1991 the Republic of Korea (ROK) continued the transition
begun in 1987 from an authoritarian state to a democracy. The
ROK held two local elections in March and June, giving Koreans
the right to choose their local representatives for the first
time in over 30 years. Defeated by the ruling party in these
elections, tfie two opposition parties merged in September.
Despite the end of the Cold War and, although high-level talks
between South and North Korea produced landmark agreements in
December, North Korea remained a military threat. Although
progress towards democracy has been made, elements of the ROK ' s
authoritarian past survive.
The powerful security services in 1991 continued to collect
information on a wide variety of people, including opposition
politicians, student radicals, and labor activists, and to
detain people who held views the Government considered
dangerous, principally those who advocated approaches to North
Korea that were not sanctioned by the Government. The new
National Police Administration was established on August 1 as
an "independent" government agency no longer under the Interior
Ministry.
The ROK in the last 30 years has transformed itself into a
major industrial power and trading nation. Important exports
include textiles, footwear, motor vehicles, electronics,
petrochemicals, and industrial machinery. A lack of important
natural resources, especially oil, is compensated for by an
industrious and literate population. Although growth of the
gross national product was near 10 percent annually in both
1990 and 1991, Koreans worried about the declining
international competitiveness of their exports, brought about
in part by wage increases that in real terms virtually doubled
in the last 3 years, far outpacing productivity. Urban housing
shortages, continued high levels of rural migration to the
cities, labor shortages, and unbalanced regional development
continued to pose problems for the Korean economy.
Although Korea is a markedly more tolerant and open society
than in the mid-1980 's, some gaps remain between democratic
ideals and practices. The principal remaining areas of human
rights problems are continuing instances of police abuse of
detainees (in both political and nonpolitical cases) and the
use of broad security laws which, although designed to thwart
subversion by forces aligned with North Korea, are sometimes
used to punish the nonviolent expression of opinion or the
exercise of freedom of association. Student violence,
including firebomb attacks on police, continued, resulting in
three student deaths, and injuries to numerous riot police.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
For the first time since 1987, a student was killed during a
demonstration, dying after being beaten by riot police on
April 26. He had been participating in a violent demonstration
in which firebombs were thrown at police to protest the arrest
of the university's student president and proposed tuition
increases. In the appeals court, three policemen involved got
reduced sentences of 1 1/2 to 2 1/2 years, while two others
were released on suspended sentences. After the April 26
896
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
demonstration authorities issued orders to prevent similar
incidents and riot police appeared more restrained in their
crowd control tactics during student demonstrations.
Student demonstrations continued throughout the year and
frequently erupted into violence because demonstrators came
armed with firebombs. Korean police figures show that during
the first 8 months of 1991 students attacked police stations
115 times. Police used firearms 29 times against such attacks.
On May 6 the leader of the Hanjin Heavy Industries union. Park
Chang Soo, was found dead after plunging from the roof of a
10-story hospital where he was undergoing treatment. Arrested
in February for violating the prohibition on third-party
intervention in labor disputes, he had been hospitalized for a
cut on the head suffered in a prison soccer game. The
authorities' determination that the death was a suicide was
disputed by his family and human rights groups, who noted that
there was neither a suicide note nor any witnesses to the death.
b. Disappearance
There were no documented cases of disappearance during 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Credible allegations of cruel treatment continued in 1991.
Although political cases get the most publicity, mistreatment
of people detained or arrested for nonpolitical crimes is said
to be common. In both cases the mistreatment reportedly
includes acute sleep deprivation, being forced to stand during
long periods of questioning, verbal abuse, and beatings. On
July 31, a Seoul Appellate Court judge ruled that authorities
tortured two pickpocket suspects arrested in October 1990,
forcing the two to make false confessions. The judge
overturned the lower court's guilty verdict. In a number of
poltical cases, most involving members of groups which the
Government views as "antistate," there were allegations, some
credible, that authorities used physical and mental abuse
during the investigation phase of their detention. In June a
policeman was arrested in Yosu for beating a detainee who later
died. On December 30, two policemen beat to death a 19-year
old drunken student for refusing to obey their instructions.
Police began an investigation into the incident.
There appears to be widespread acceptance of the use of force
among policemen. A survey by a Korea Institute of Criminology
researcher of 617 investigators with the rank of sergeant of
below, showed that 60 percent believed that inflicting some
degree of pain on criminal suspects to obtain a confession is
justified. Only 4 percent said that torture should not be used
under any circumstances. After the Government declared a "war
on crime" in the fall of 1990, a number of criminal suspects
charged they were similarly mistreated by police. In an
important ruling on January 30, a Seoul court convicted four
policemen of torturing dissident Kim Kun Tae in 1985. The four
were sentenced to terms of between 2 and 5 years. They were
set free pending appeals.
Throughout the year students and police clashed frequently,
exchanging rocks, firebombs, and tear gas canisters. In
general, the Korean police have shown restraint and discipline,
often in the face of severe provocation. Nevertheless, there
were reports of beatings by combat police in demonstrations
897
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
outside Seoul. In May, 8 policemen were indicted for beating
Kwon Chong Soo, an unemployed worker, during a demonstration.
Kwon was hospitalized in critical condition and spent 3 months
in a hospital. In September a judge sentenced the eight
policemen to 2 1/2 to 3 1/2 years in jail but released them on
suspended sentences .
Conditions in Korean prisons have reportedly improved somewhat
in the last few years. Most accusations of mistreatment
involved persons detained for investigation or awaiting trial
in detention facilities, rather than those who were already
convicted and serving their sentences in prison. Authorities
stated that as of August 1, each correctional facility was
staffed by three to nine medical attendants; they denied that
prisoners have died due to insufficient medical attention.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Several restrictive laws permit the Government to detain
persons whose views it considers dangerous, particularly people
it considers involved in activities in support of North Korea.
These include the National Security Law (NSL), the Law on
Assemblies and Demonstrations, the Social Surveillance Law
(SSL), and labor laws. Article 7 of the NSL permits
imprisonment of persons who "praise, encourage, or cooperate
with antistate organizations or their members or persons who
received orders from them, or by other methods benefit
antistate organizations." North Korea has been defined as an
"antistate organization." (See also Sections 2.b. and 6. a.)
In May the National Assembly amended the NSL to provide that a
person may now be arrested only if his or her action was taken
with the knowledge that it was destructive to the "liberal
democratic system." The Assembly also shortened the list of
crimes for which the "tattletale" clause applies; it is no
longer a criminal offense, for example, to fail' to inform the
authorities if one has knowledge that someone has made an
illegal trip to North Korea.
In May, based on the amendments to the NSL, the Government
dropped NSL charges that opposition politicians Kim Dae Jung,
Kim Won Ki , and Lee Choi Yong knew about Assemblyman Suh Kyung
Wen's unauthorized trip to North Korea in 1989 and failed to
inform the authorities. The Government also announced clemency
for 258 people convicted or arrested for violations of the
NSL. The Government continued to arrest, indict, and bring to
trial supporters, mostly students, of North Korea's "juche"
ideology (the state ideology of North Korea), and also to bring
to trial members of the Advanced Masses Organization and the
Socialist Workers Alliance under the NSL. Prosecutors
requested the death penalty for Park Noh Hae, head of the
Socialist Workers Alliance on charges of forming an antistate
organization and instigating illegal demonstrations. A Seoul
district court judge on August l sentenced him to life in
prison for violating the NSL.
There are credible reports that in separate incidents
throughout the summer over 50 other activists were arrested
under provisions of the NSL, among them Moon Ik-Hwan and Prof.
Park Soon Kyung. In September the Prosecutor General's office
released a list of over 120 student activists, mostly
supporters of juche ideology and leaders of student groups,
wanted for violating the NSL and the Law on Assemblies and
Demonstrations.
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■ REPUBLIC OF KOREA
In January an appeals court reduced from 3 years to 2 the
sentence of prominent dissident Kim Keun Tae, who was
imprisoned under the NSL and the Law on Assemblies and
Demonstrations. One of the charges against Kim was of aiding
the enemy by reading his organization's charter at a rally.
The Government justifies its broad security laws and the
resulting restrictions by arguing that Korea is in a "special
situation" because the Korean War ended with the signing of an
armistice, not a peace treaty, and North Korea remains a
formidable threat. The Government asserts that unauthorized
attempts to contact North Korea threaten the Government's
efforts to ensure peaceful reunification on the basis of
democracy and respect for human rights.
Warrants are required by law in cases of arrest, detention,
seizure, or search, unless a criminal is apprehended while in
the act of committing a crime. The Constitution specifically
provides the right to representation by an attorney, but in
practice attorneys are not allowed to be present during
interrogation. During 1991, however, the courts made a number
of important rulings to protect a defendant's right to
counsel. In an important decision, the Supreme Court upheld on
March 28 a lower court ruling that it is illegal for the
National Security Planning Agency (NSP) to bar contact between
arrestees and their lawyers during the initial investigation.
There is a functioning system of bail in Korea. The right to a
judicial determination of the legality of a person's detention
was deleted from the Code of Criminal Conduct in 1973,
partially restored in 1980, and then fully restored in late
1987.
e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides defendants a number of rights in
criminal trials, including a presumption of innocence,
protection against self-incrimination, freedom from ex post
facto laws and double jeopardy, and the right to a speedy
trial. When a person is physically detained, his initial trial
must be completed within 6 months of arrest. These rights are
generally observed. Trials are open to the public, but
attendance is restricted when the judge believes the spectators
would seek to disrupt the proceedings.
The Chief Justice and the other justices of the Supreme Court
are appointed by the President with the consent of the National
Assembly for a term of 6 years. Lower court justices are
appointed by the Chief Justice with the consent of the other
justices. The justices of the Constitutional Court are
appointed by the President. Judges generally allow
considerable scope for examination of witnesses by both the
prosecution and defense counsel. The right to an attorney is
frequently ignored in political cases until the initial
investigation is completed. Political and criminal cases are
tried by the same courts; military courts do not try
civilians. Defendants have the right of appeal. Appeals may
result in reduced or lengthened sentences. Convictions are
rarely overturned. Death sentences are automatically appealed.
Although historically the executive branch has exercised great
influence on judicial decisions, there have been increasing
indications of judicial independence in recent years.
Nevertheless, the judiciary remains subject to executive
influence in politically sensitive cases. The role of the
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Constitutional Court, which began operations in 1988, continued
to grow in 1991 .
In February, May, and December the Government released 12
long-term "security" prisoners (22 were released in 1990), most
of them for humanitarian reasons and without "conversion
statements," which involve recantation of previous political
beliefs .
It is difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners,
i.e, those jailed for exercising their political rights
unaccompanied by violence, because many people are detained and
then released without charges, or are charged and then released
without being tried. It is extremely difficult to determine
whether particular persons were arrested for merely exercising
the right of free association or were detained for committing
violent acts during demonstrations or illegal wildcat strikes.
Nonetheless, by the end of 1991, it appeared that the number of
political prisoners and detainees as defined by international
human rights standards remained in the hundreds.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In general the Government honors the integrity of the home and
family. Nevertheless, many political and religious figures are
still subjected to varying degrees of government surveillance.
Security officials have admitted that thousands of former NSL
detainees remain under surveillance. In March newspapers
published copies of fax messages from the Defense Security
Command (DSC) to its branches ordering them to conduct
investigations of six student activists. The Government said
the investigations were necessary because they were soon to be
drafted. In April an NSP employee was caught spying on a think
tank run by opposition Assemblyman Lee Hae Chan. Authorities
required domestic and foreign credit card companies to turn
over their magnetic tapes recording cardholders' transactions
without those persons' authorization, reflecting the lack of
legal guarantees for a person's right to privacy.
Because of often violent student demonstrations, the security
presence in city centers, near university campuses, government
buildings, ruling party offices, and media outlets is heavy.
Citizens, particularly students and young people, are sometimes
stopped, questioned, and searched. Government informants are
known to be posted on and around university campuses.
Persons thought to have backgrounds as political or labor
activists are still denied some forms of employment and
advancement, particularly in government, the broadcast media,
and education. In September a 1987 blacklist on computer
diskette of over 8,000 dissidents and labor and student
activists was found in the Pusan-based Kumho Shoe Company. The
blacklist included opposition Assemblyman and party spokesman
Nho Moo-hyun. Nho in 1987 was a lawyer representing labor
unions. A source, known only as "Mr. Kim," provided reporters
another 1987 blacklist containing 1,925 names from Pusan's
"local personnel management committee of the footwear
industry." The source claimed that member firms and companies
with more than 500 employees received the lists, exchanging and
adding information from police and the Labor Ministry. He also
claimed Labor Ministry officials were present when the
diskettes were distributed.
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Most political discourse remains unrestricted; nonetheless,
restrictions on the expression of ideas that the Government
considers Communist or pro-North Korea remain severe. Direct
control over the print media has virtually disappeared.
However, the Government continued to apply the NSL against
publishers, printers, and distributors who produce or sell
"subversive" literature. The NSL remains the Government's main
weapon to suppress domestic dissent and to inhibit unauthorized
exchanges with North Korea. In May a Seoul court ordered the
registration of the monthly Labor Liberation Literature revoked
because the magazine's political contents were at variance with
the literary purposes listed by the publishers when they
registered the magazine. Listening to North Korean radio is
illegal if the authorities judge it is for the purpose of
"benefiting the antistate organization," i.e.. North Korea.
Reading or purveying books or other literature considered to be
subversive, pro-Communist, or pro-North Korean is also
illegal. In April police entered university campuses to
prevent- the showing of the student-made film "Mother, Your
Son," and arrested the filmmaker, who received a 2-year
suspended sentence.
Despite restrictions on the production or sale of "subversive"
literature, the Government has allowed, within its guidelines,
an increase in media coverage of North Korea. Both television
networks broadcast, on a weekly basis, edited versions of North
Korean television programs. Newspapers published interviews of
ruling and opposition National Assemblymen who attended the
International Parliamentary Union (IPU) in May. The Government
has also allowed somewhat wider public access to selected North
Korean publications. The December 13 agreement between South
and North Korea included provisions for exchanges and
cooperation in publishing, journalism, radio, and television,
which South Korea has long advocated.
Constraints under the NSL continued to limit academic freedom,
both directly and indirectly. In September the NSP arrested a
student who had studied juche ideology in Japan and met with
the pro-North Korean group for Korean residents in Japan
(Chosen Soren) . In June police and the DSC arrested six
researchers from the Seoul Social Science Research Institute
under the NSL for writing and publishing books which the
Government said advocated violent revolution to overthrow the
government and build a Socialist country. By the end of 1991,
four of the six researchers were indicted, two of whom received
suspended sentences. Two others, who were soldiers completing
their military service obligations when they were arrested,
received 8 months in prison and 1 year of suspended civil
liberties. There is also a threat to academic freedom from
radical leftist students who attack the person or property of
professors whose lectures or writings contradict the students'
ideology. For example, students physically hit and threw eggs
and flour at Prime Minister Chong Won-Sik when he visited
Hankuk University to deliver his final lecture. Following the
spring demonstrations, presidents of Korea's 148 4-year
colleges and universities moved to take measures to reduce
radical influence, such as restoring academic standards for
continued enrollment and removing access to student activity
funds from radical groups.
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Law on Assembly and Demonstrations prohibits assemblies
considered likely to "undermine" public order and requires that
demonstrations of all types, including political rallies, be
reported in advance to the police. The Government continued to
use these and oth6r restrictive laws to prosecute protest
organizers and to block many gatherings organized by dissidents
and particularly students, arguing that they might incite
"social unrest" and are therefore illegal. Police usually
tried to prevent student demonstrations from moving off
campuses into the streets, and confrontations frequently
ensued, often involving violence on both sides.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion. Full freedom prevails for
proselytizing, doctrinal teaching, and conversion. Korea both
sends and receives missionaries of various faiths, and many
religious groups in Korea maintain active links with members of
similar faiths in other countries. The Government and the
public do not discriminate against minority sects. Adherence
to a particular faith confers neither advantages nor
disadvantages in civil, military, or official life.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There is universal freedom of movement within the country.
Foreign travel is generally unrestricted, but travel to North
Korea is allowed only with government approval; one of the
conditions is that the trip must not be "political." In the
first civilian contacts at Panmunjom authorized by the
Government, South Korean students met their North Korean
counterparts in August and September. The Government, however,
revoked permission when they agreed to undertake trips to North
Korea that the Government viewed as political. Political
opponents are sometimes banned from overseas travel, even if
they are not being sought by the authorities for the commission
of a crime.
The Government continued to issue arrest warrants for those who
made contact with North Korea without government
authorization. As of September 30, however, 143 South Koreans,
mostly sports teams, had visited North Korea in 1991 with
government approval. On September 24 Rev. Kwak Sun-Hee became
the first South Korean citizen to visit Pyongyang with
government permission. In November North Korean women leaders
visited Seoul to attend, with their South Korean and Japanese
counterparts, a seminar at which reunification and other
political issues were discussed. In the December 13 agreement.
South and North Korea pledged to guarantee "free inter-Korean
travel and contacts," as well as "free correspondence,
reunions, and visits" between separated family members and
relatives .
Authorities blocked several U.S. citizens involved in
commercial disputes with Koreans from leaving Korea by imposing
"exit bans" authorized by the Exit and Entry Control Act. The
Act gives immigration authorities discretionary powers to block
the departure of both foreigners and Koreans from Korea.
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Korean people have the right to elect their own
government. In 1987 they chose their president in an open
election, and the next year they elected an opposition majority
in the National Assembly. For the first time in over 30 years,
local elections were held in March and June, and local
assemblies began functioning again. In September, a year a
half after the ruling party and two opposition parties merged,
two other opposition parties also agreed to join in a single
party, giving Korea a two-party political system.
The Constitution, as amended in 1987, provides for the direct
election of the President and for a mixed system of direct and
proportional election of legislators. The President serves a
single 5-year term and may not be reelected. The Assembly's
term is 4 years. There is universal suffrage for all citizens
aged 20 or above, and elections are held by secret ballot.
For reasons of culture and discrimination, women occupy few
positions in government and the professions. There are
currently 6 women in the 299-seat legislature, all of whom were
appointed to proportional representation seats based on their
party's showing in the 1988 elections. There are two women on
the executive committee of the newly merged opposition party.
The Second Minister for Political Affairs is the only woman in
the cabinet. Her portfolio is women's affairs.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The National Assembly and the major political parties all have
committees concerned with various aspects of human rights. In
addition, several nonaffiliated private organizations are
active in promoting human rights. These groups publish reports
on the human rights situation in Korea and make their views
known both inside and outside the country. Some human rights
activists have alleged government harassment and surveillance.
Government and ruling party officials have generally been
willing to meet with international human rights groups,
including groups from Asia Watch and Amnesty International.
The Government has regularly discussed human rights with
foreign diplomats.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Republic of Korea is a racially homogeneous country with no
ethnic minorities of significant size. Nonetheless, regional
rivalries exist. Persons from the southwestern region (North
and South Cholla provinces) have traditionally faced
discrimination. Many Koreans believe that successive
governments led by figures from the southeastern region (North
and South Kyongsang provinces) have deliberately neglected the
economic development of the Cholla provinces for political
reasons .
Korea's conservative Confucian tradition has left women
subordinate to men socially, economically, and legally. Some
progress has been made since the founding of the republic.
Women may and do vote, become government officials, hold
elected office, and enjoy full access to educational
903
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
opportunities. Nonetheless, the vestiges of Confucian
traditions remain in many areas. Most married women do not
work outside the home. In large companies, women are often
expected to resign upon marriage, or no later than the birth of
their first child.
The National Assembly enacted an Equal Employment Opportunity
(EEO) Law in 1988 and, in early 1991, the Government issued
"Guidelines to Eliminate Sexual Discrimination in Employment."
So far, however, the law and guidelines have had only limited
practical effect.
The traditional preference for male children continues in Korea
today. It is estimated that when today's children reach
marrying age there will be 400,000 "surplus bachelors."
Although Korean law bans sex testing and abortions except when
the woman's life is in danger, fetal sex testing and abortion
of female fetuses are still widely performed.
Korea's amended Family Law went into effect in January 1990.
New amendments permit women, as well as men, to head a
household, recognize a wife's right to a portion of the
couple's property, and allow a woman to maintain greater
contact with her offspring after a divorce. The effect of the
revised law on actual practice is still uncertain. For
instance, although discrimination in the distribution of
inherited property has been legally abolished, it continued to
be widespread in practice.
Although the revised Family Law contains no express provisions
regarding wife abuse, it provides legal protections for women
in terms of custody of their children and division of the
property if they decide to file for divorce. Before the
amended Family Law went into effect, a woman who filed for
divorce, even if it was based on charges of physical or mental
abuse, automatically lost custody of her children and had very
limited property rights. Although the revisions gave abused
women a more credible option, divorce still remains a social
taboo. Most Koreans remain unaware of the revised law, and
there is little government or private assistance for divorced
women. These factors, plus the fact that employment
opportunities for women are limited and that divorced women
have difficulty remarrying, leads some women to stay in abusive
situations. There are no reliable statistics on the incidence
of wife abuse, although some observers claim it is widespread.
Although other types of violent crimes are directed against
women, reliable data on their prevalence are not available.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution gives workers, with the exception of most
public service employees and teachers, the right to free
association. There are, however, unions in the public sectors
of railways, telecommunications, postal workers, and the
national medical center. The Trade Union Law specifies that
only one union is permitted at each place of work and all
unions are required to seek registration with the authorities.
The Government refuses to register unions if they are not
affiliated with one of the country's two legally recognized
labor groupings — the FKTU (Federation of Korean Trade Unions)
and the independent Korean Federation of Clerical and Financial
Workers. There is no minimum number of members required to
form a union. Companies have in the past taken advantage of
904
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
this provision of the law to form small, company-controlled
unions, which labor organizers have often found difficult to
replace with more representative unions.
Strikes are prohibited in government agencies, state-run
enterprises, and defense industries. By law, enterprises in
public interest sectors such as public transportation,
utilities, public health, banking, broadcasting, and
communications must submit to government -ordered arbitration in
lieu of striking. The Labor Dispute Adjustment Act requires
unions to notify the Ministry of Labor of their intention to
strike and mandates a 10-day "cooling-off period" before a
strike can legally begin. The cooling-off period is 15 days in
public interest sectors. The Government continued its
crackdown on "illegal labor practices" as part of a tougher
stand on labor disputes. Measures included the use of police
intervention and detention of leaders. In May a union leader
allegedly committed suicide while in custody undergoing medical
treatment (see Section l.a.).
The FKTU has approximately 1.7 million members. It is
affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions. Most of the FKTU's constituent unions maintain
affiliations with international trade secretariats. The
membership of Chonnohyop (National Association of Trade
Unions), a fledgling alternative labor center founded in 1990
but not legally registered, reportedly dropped from 166,000
workers in January 1990 to 90,000 in June. Chonnohyop unions
numbered 456 in January 1990 and 232 in 1991. Chonnohyop
supporters blame hard-line government policies for their
confederation's decline in membership. Critics say workers are
disenchanted with its focus on a leftist political agenda
rather than economic demands.
The Government continued its hard-line policy against
Chonnohyop and "the Solidarity Conference of Large Firms'
Unions" ( "Yondae Hwaywe"), which was formed in December 1990 by
16 large company-based unions representing 100,000 workers,
mostly from heavy industry. The Government describes
Chonnohyop and Yondae as "radical organizations." In February
authorities arrested seven Yondae leaders and charged them with
violating the prohibition against third-party intervention in
labor disputes. In August the Government arrested 13 labor
activists, including at least 1 Chonnohyop official, and
investigated 6 others under the NSL for their activities in a
reportedly Marxist-Leninist group called the Anti-imperialism,
Antifascism Group for People's Democracy. Authorities also
asked for a 1 1/2 year prison term for Choi Jae Ho, president
of the Korean Federation of Clerical and Financial Workers,
the only non-FKTU federation legally recognized by the
Government, for violating the local election law prohibiting
political participation by unions. According to Chonnohyop,
from March 1988 to July 1991, the authorities arrested 1,736
workers and union staffers for their involvement in the labor
movement .
Another group of unions outside the FKTU, Chonnohyop, and
Yondae are the emerging crafts unions, including journalists,
hospital workers, construction workers, and teachers. Some of
these craft federations have begun to move toward affiliation
with international trade secretariats. The officially
recognized Korean Federation of Teachers' Associations (KFTA)
claimed a new law gives it legal, but very limited, collective
bargaining rights. The Government has thwarted efforts to form
a teachers' union popularly called Chonkyojo. In July a
905
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
majority of Constitutional Court justices upheld the Private
Schools Law (Articles 55 and 58) barring private schoolteachers
from engaging in union activities. The ruling ended a 2-year
legal battle between the Government and the banned Chonkyojo,
and barred 1,500 teachers, fired for refusing to quit the
union, from being rehired. Some teachers who formed a
committee to promote reinstatement of the fired teachers have
themselves been punished with expulsions and transfers. The
authorities required teachers to remove their signatures from a
statement criticizing the Government. They also issued a
warrant for the arrest of Chonkyojo 's president for reportedly
leading a violent rally.
In addition to its tough policy against Chonnohyop, the
Government took a hard line against strikes conducted outside
the scope of the law. This year there were fewer wildcat
strikes at key industries and media outlets. Labor frequently
avoided government intervention by changing its tactics, using
protest measures short of full-blown strikes, such as holding
union meetings during working hours. In July police
interrupted a labor-management negotiation mediated by the
Labor Ministry to arrest eight union negotiators.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Constitution and the Trade Union Law guarantee the
autonomous right of workers to enjoy freedom of association,
collective bargaining, and collective action. Due to
ambiguities in the Trade Union Law, the Seoul district court
ruled in September that union members cannot reject collective
bargaining agreements signed by management and labor
negotiators. This situation has in the past led to repudiation
of contracts and wildcat strikes. Extensive collective
bargaining is practiced. Korea's labor laws do not extend the
right to bargain collectively to government employees,
including employees of state or public-run enterprises, and
defense industries. Companies operating in Korea's two export
processing zones (EPZ'S) have been considered public interest
enterprises whose employees' rights to organize and bargain
collectively face restrictions. In practice, however, unions
at EPZ companies have been formed and workers in the two EPZ ' s
exercise the right to organize and collectively bargain like
other private sector unions.
Korea has no independent system of labor courts. The central
and local labor committees form a semi autonomous agency of the
Ministry of Labor that adjudicates disputes in accordance with
the Labor Dispute Adjustment Law. Each labor committee is
composed of equal representation from labor, management, and
"the public interest." Local labor committees are empowered to
decide on remedial measures in cases involving unfair labor
practices and to mediate and arbitrate labor disputes. Rulings
by the various labor committees are sometimes inconsistent.
Many major employers are still strongly antiunion. In
September a dissident newspaper obtained documents showing that
Daewoo Shipbuilding planned to control and disrupt union
activities by infiltrating company agents to inform on the
union and influence elections of union officers. The February
arrests of Yondae leaders were linked to their involvement in
the labor dispute there.
In 1991 there were no known incidents of "save the company
squads" beating up union organizers, although there were press
reports of kidnaping and intimidation of workers. In 1991, as
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
in the past, there were cases of violence against property by
workers. Workers at the Daewoo automobile factory in Inchon
destroyed finished cars during a demonstration. There were
credible reports of union activists harassing and physically
intimidating management officials, including foreign
businessmen, during labor disputes.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution provides that no person shall be punished,
placed under preventive restrictions, or subjected to
involuntary labor, except as provided by law and through lawful
procedures. Forced or compulsory labor is not condoned by the
Government .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Standards Law prohibits the employment of persons
under the age of 13 without a special employment certificate
from the Ministry of Labor. Because there is compulsory
education until the age of 13, few special employment
certificates are issued for full-time employment. Some
children are allowed to do part-time jobs such as selling
newspapers. In order to gain employment, children under 18
must have written approval from their parents or guardians.
Employers may require minors to work only a reduced number of
overtime hours and are prohibited from employing them at night
without special permission from the Ministry of Labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Korea implemented a minimum wage law in 1988. The minimum wage
level is reviewed annually. Companies with fewer than 10
employees are exempt from this law, and some still pay
below-minimum wages. Due to Korea's tight labor market,
however, firms are increasingly paying wages in excess of the
minimum wage in order to attract and retain workers. The FKTU
continued to claim that the current minimum wage does not meet
the minimum requirements of urban workers.
The Government states that the money an average Korean
blue-collar worker takes home in overtime and bonuses
significantly raises the total compensation package. In the
last 3 years, wage increases in real terms (i.e., after
adjusting for inflation) have virtually doubled, far outpacing
productivity. Wage increases (including benefits) in the
manufacturing sector for 1991 averaged about 17 percent.
According to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 5.2
percent of the population lived below the poverty level in 1991.
The labor standards and industrial safety and health laws
provide for a maximum 60-hour workweek. Amendments to the
Labor Standards Law passed in March 1989 had brought the
maximum regular workweek, excluding overtime, down to 46 hours
in companies employing fewer than 300 employees, and 44 hours
in companies with more than 300. According to the Ministry of
Labor, the average Korean worker worked 47.8 hours per week,
including overtime, in 1991.
The Government sets health and safety standards, but the
Ministry of Labor employs few inspectors, and the standards are
not effectively enforced.
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LAOS
> The Lao People's Democratic Repiablic (LPDR) is a Communist,
one-party state. The Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP)
is the only party and the primary source of political authority
in the country; the party's leadership imposes broad controls
on Laos' 4 million people.
In August 1991, the National Assembly (formerly Supreme
People's Assembly), driven at least in part by the Government's
economic reform efforts, adopted a new Constitution. The
Constitution confers substantial powers on the Assembly and
provides for many basic freedoms, including free elections of
National Assembly members. It also provides the possibility
for instituting some political reforms. The Constitution is
silent on the question of allowing competing political parties,
and it remains to be seen to what extent the human rights and
political reforms it promises will be realized in practice.
Also, in keeping with its efforts at economic development and
legal reform, the Government has made a substantial effort to
develop a legal system with a codified body of laws dealing
with contracts, foreign investment, private property, labor,
family and a penal code. Elections for a new National Assembly
are expected in 1992.
The Ministry of the Interior (MOD remains the main instrument
of state control. The MOI police monitor Lao society and
expatriates who live in Laos, and the LPRP also has its own
system of informants in workplaces and residential
communities. However, the extent of this monitoring seems to
be lessening as political change continues.
In the first few years after the LPDR came to power in 1975, at
least 350,000 Lao fled the country to escape the Government's
harsh political and economic policies. Since 1985, the
Government has abandoned socialist economic policies and
instituted a series of sweeping economic reforms that have
changed the country from a centrally planned to a market-
oriented economy. These reforms have improved the economy,
which is now dominated by private enterprise.
There were continued, if limited, improvements in important
personal freedoms in 1991. Lao nationals enjoyed greater
freedom of religion and travel, and the expansion of economic
reforms and contacts with the international community created
an atmosphere more conducive to political discourse. Freedom
of speech and press, freedom of assembly, the right of privacy,
and the right of citizens to change their government are absent
in Laos. To be sure, the new Constitution, with its provisions
for freedom of worship, freedom of speech, and freedom of the
press, offers the possibility of moving away from arbitrary use
of power toward the rule of law. However, it has yet to be
tested, and the extent to which citizens will be able to
practice these freedoms remains to be seen.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The small-scale insurgency that has existed since 1975
continued in 1991, but at a much lower level than in previous
years. Improved relations between Laos and its neighbors,
especially Thailand, have eroded foreign support for the Lao
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LAOS
insurgency. Most of the insurgents are former Royal Lao Army
soldiers and Hmong tribesmen, who conduct small-scale military
operations in Laos, occasionally attacking military and
civilian vehicles. Insurgents have claimed repeatedly that the
Lao military employs chemical weapons against them, but
considerable investigative efforts in recent years have
revealed no evidence of chemical weapons use. Both sides have
reportedly used brutal tactics on occasion, with the insurgents
occasionally assassinating military and local officials and
ambushing civilian and military vehicles. In early 1991, the
Vice President of the Kasi coal mining operation in northern
Vientiane province was assassinated, allegedly by Hmong
insurgents. Later in the year, a group of eight loggers were
found brutally murdered north of Vientiane. Hmong insurgents
also were suspected in this murder. Official policy calls for
the execution of insurgent leaders, but no such actions were
taken in 1991.
b. Disappearance
No disappearances were reported in 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Lao Penal Code prohibits torture or mistreatment of
prisoners, and the police do not appear to use torture or abuse
during arrest and detention.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
In April the Government released from reeducation camps 24
detainees who had been held since 1975, and a 25th detainee was
released in November. The Government still holds at least
eight detainees — all former Royal Lao Government officials or
military officers — in Houaphanh Province. The Government
admits to still holding these eight former officials, but
maintains they committed crimes while in detention and are now
common criminals serving fixed terms. There is no evidence
that these eight prisoners were tried for crimes committed
while in detention, nor has the Government given specific
information on the purported crimes. The Government claims
that all former reeducation camps have been closed and that the
eight remaining detainees are free to travel in Houaphanh
Province but not to other provinces. Reportedly, they receive
mail and financial assistance from outside, and their families
are free to visit or to stay with them.
Those accused of hostility to the regime or of what the
Government calls "socially undesirable habits" such as
prostitution, drug abuse, and vagrancy are subject to arrest
and confinement in "rehabilitation" centers, usually without
public trial. Most of these people have been allowed to return
to their homes after periods ranging from a few months tc
several years of forced labor, political indoctrination, and
admission of guilt. The November 1989 Penal Code contains some
protection for those accused of crimes, such as a statute of
limitations and public trials provisions. The Government is
setting up a system of courts to a^inister justice publicly
for the first time since the change of government in 1975. A
number of foreign lawyers, including some from the United
States, are assisting the Government in this effort.
909
LAOS
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The National Assembly enacted a criminal code and laws
establishing a judiciary in November 1989, but these steps have
been implemented slowly and have not yet made a significant
difference in the administration of justice. Under the new
Constitution, judges and prosecutors are independent and their
decisions are not subject to outside scrutiny. The Government
provides legal representation to the accused, but almost all
the practicing lawyers in Laos work for the State.
People may be arrested on unsupported accusations and without
being informed of the charges or of the accusers' identities.
Although regulations call for judgment to be given in public,
this amounts to a public announcement of the sentence and not a
true public trial. There is some provision for appeal,
although there is reportedly no appeal in important political
cases tried by "people's courts". The Council of Ministers
must approve death sentences. There were no reports of capital
sentences in 1991.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
With the recent liberalization of the economy, the Government
has significantly relaxed most elements of state control,
including police monitoring of personal and business activities
and enforcement of the nighttime curfew. In addition, the new
Constitution prohibits arrests or searches in homes without
warrants or authorization, though search and seizure continue
to be authorized by the security bureaus themselves rather than
by judicial authority. Although there is probably still some
monitoring of international mail and telephone calls, it is
much less than in the past. In addition, the new penal code
outlaws listening to telephone calls without proper
authorization. The Government has lifted restrictions on the
sale of privately owned land and implemented a new law to
return property confiscated after 1975 to the original owners.
However, a November 1990 decree provides for the confiscation
of the property of some 30 officials of the former Government
who were convicted in absentia in 1975 and are not allowed to
return to Laos.
The Government and party continue to monitor some aspects of
family life through a system of neighborhood and workplace
committees. The neighborhood committees have responsibility
for maintaining public order in their neighborhood and
reporting "bad elements" to the police.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Despite the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly, the exercise of
these freedoms is broadly controlled by the Government. In the
past, the Government has reacted harshly to expressions of
political dissent. Three officials and former officials
arrested in October 1990 for reportedly advocating a multiparty
system for Laos remain under internal exile in Houaphanh
Province, with no date fixed for a trial and no public access
to them. The new penal code bars slandering the State,
including distorting party or state policies, and spreading
false rumors conducive to disorder. The penal code also bars
910
LAOS
disseminating books and other materials that are deemed
indecent or would infringe on the national culture.
Newspapers and the state radio and television are instruments
of the Government, reflecting its views. The constitutional
guarantee of freedom of the press leaves open the possibility
of nongovernment publications, and at least one privately owned
publication is now operating in Laos. There are presently
limitations on what foreign publications may be imported,
though some Thai and Western newspapers are sold. The
Government makes no effort to discourage reception of Thai
radio or television, which are widely watched and listened to
in the Mekong River valley. The Government is currently
negotiating with Thai broadcasters to install transmitting
equipment in the interior of Laos to expand the Lao audience
for Thai television. In March the Government disbanded all
videocassette stores for distributing tapes opposing the policy
of the State and required stores to have permits to distribute
videocassettes . This decree has had little effect in practice,
as the number of video stores has actually increased, and
distributors continue to carry a large selection of tapes.
Academic freedom is limited, but the new Constitution
guarantees scholars the right to conduct academic research and
to associate with academic institutions in other countries.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government controls most large public gatherings and,
except for religious, athletic, and communal events, organizes
them. The new penal code expressly prohibits demonstrations or
protest marches aimed at causing turmoil and social
instability, prescribing penalties of from 1 to 5 years'
imprisonment. Unspecified "destabilizing subversive
activities" are also banned, with penalties ranging from house
arrest to death. All associations are party controlled and
disseminate official policy. The Constitution specifies the
right of Lao citizens to organize and join associations,
although presently all professional groups are organized and
directed by the LPRP .
Contact between ordinary Lao and foreigners is increasing as
restrictions, such as the rec[uirement for government approval
of invitations to most foreigners' homes, are no longer
enforced and appear changed. The prohibition against
foreigners staying with Lao families has likewise been eased in
urban areas, and the Government allows Lao citizens to marry
foreigners .
c. Freedom of Religion
Nearly all lowland Lao are Buddhists; most highland Lao are
animists. In official statements, the Government has
recognized the right to freedom of religion as well as the
contributions religion can make to the development of the
nation. The Constitution contains provisions for religious
freedom.
The Government has openly supported Buddhist organizations in
the last few years. It no longer seeks to subvert religion,
and even high-level government officials now routinely attend
Buddhist functions. The Government now tolerates and
encourages the open practice of religion, and many temples are
being repaired and restored. The number of Buddhist monks is
growing, with about 30,000 presently practicing in Laos. Monks
remain the only social group still entitled to special
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LAOS
honorific terms of address, and these are used even by high
party and governinent officials. Buddhist clergy are
prominently featured at important state and party functions.
The Government permits religious festivals without hindrance.
Links with coreligionists and religious associations in other
countries require Government approval. The Government does not
formally ban missionaries from entering Laos to proselytize but
in practice almost always denies them permission to enter.
Many resident foreigners are active in Lao churches and provide
assistance setting up new churches. The Government welcomes
nongovernmental organizations with religious affiliations as
long as they contribute to national development and do not
openly proselytize.
Roman Catholics and Protestants are permitted to worship
openly, and new churches have opened since 1990. At least one
Catholic and two Protestant churches are active in Vientiane,
with dozens of other churches scattered throughout the country.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Although the Government retains the right to require citizens
to obtain official permission for internal travel, it has
relaxed this requirement considerably. Foreign residents in
Vientiane must obtain permission to travel outside the limits
of Vientiane Prefecture, though this requirement is not
strictly enforced. The Government routinely issues
authorization for foreigners to visit almost all regions of the
country, often without official escort, to conduct research and
to work.
Most Lao may easily obtain government permission and exit
permits to travel abroad. The function for issuing passports
and exit permits has been transferred from the Ministry of the
Interior to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, facilitating
issuance of travel documents. Border crossing permits for
Thailand are routinely available for those who can afford the
modest issuance fee. Travel to the United States and other
Western countries has risen dramatically in the past several
years .
In recent years, the number of Lao emigrating to live with
relatives abroad has increased sharply, and the Government
appears not to interfere with persons desiring to emigrate.
The stated government policy since 1977 has been to welcome
back the approximately 10 percent of the population who fled
after the change of governments in 1975. Since 1988, thousands
of Lao living abroad have returned to visit family and friends,
and the Government does not restrict the return of these
people. A number of Lao have returned to investigate business
possibilities, and several returned Lao have remained to
operate businesses. Under the new property code, many returned
Lao have successfully petitioned to regain their property.
Laos has also agreed , to take back its citizens who crossed into
Thailand, mostly to seek refugee status, but who now wish to
return home. The Government's policy is to return any
properties that were confiscated, but some who fled Laos are
excluded from this policy. Since May 1980, when the Government
reached agreement on a repatriation program with Thailand and
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
nearly 8,000 Lao have voluntarily returned to Laos under UNHCR
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LAOS
auspices. Lowland Lao have made up the majority of returnees,
though many of the 62,000 hilltribe Lao living in refugee camps
in Thailand have expressed an interest in returning.
In July 1991, Laos, Thailand, and the UNHCR came to agreement
on a phased return of the hilltribe Lao remaining in Thailand
who wish to return to Laos. This agreement includes provisions
for the careful monitoring of returnees to insure they are
given the same rights and treatment as resident Lao. Those who
return are generally given several days of political
instruction and then sent on, usually to special resettlement
areas provided by the Government. The UNHCR provides basic
necessities and is given regular access to them to monitor
treatment of the returnees and living conditions. According to
the UNHCR, returnees have not been the subject of
discrimination, official or otherwise, and are allowed back
with all the belongings they accumulated while outside of Laos.
In addition to those repatriated under the UNHCR program, an
estimated 30,000 people have repatriated themselves without
official involvement.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Despite constitutional provisions for secret ballots and
universal suffrage in the public election of National Assembly
members, in practice citizens do not have the ability to change
their government. Under the new Constitution, citizens elect
members of the Assembly, which in turn elects the President.
Because the LPRP continues to dominate government and politics,
however, there is no structured way in which citizens could
remove the LPRP from power .
The National Assembly, which ratified the Constitution this
year, was elected by secret ballot in 1989. It included a
number of legislators who were not members of the LPRP, though
all candidates had to be approved by the party. Some 121
candidates ran for a total of 79 seats. No other parties were
permitted to organize, and voting was mandatory. The
Government has said it will hold National Assembly elections
again in 1992.
The new Constitution provides for basic human rights, including
freedom of religion, freedom of the press and of speech,
freedom of assembly, freedom to work, the right to petition the
Government, and the right to own property. It also provides
for elections by secret ballot of many important officials.
The Constitution stipulates the primacy of the LPRP but does
not specifically prohibit other parties. It remains to be seen
how these provisions will be applied in practice.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no domestic human rights groups. Any organization
wishing to investigate and publicly criticize the Government's
human rights policies would face serious obstacles, if it were
permitted to operate at all. Laos generally does not cooperate
with international human rights organizations. The Government
characterized the "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 1990" as "the most blatant act of interference in internal
affairs." It has, however, permitted visits by officials of
913
LAOS
international humanitarian organizations and has communicated
with them by letter .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Approximately one-half of the population is ethnic Lao, also
called "lowland Lao," and the other half a mosaic of upland
hilltribes. The Government is attempting to integrate these
groups through voluntary programs and to overcome traditional
antagonisms between lowland Lao and minority groups. The new
Constitution specifically provides for equal rights for all
minorities, and there is no legal discrimination against them.
The party and the Government continue to be dominated by
lowland Lao males, though efforts have been made to include
minorities in the political and governmental elites. Four
women and four members of minorities were elected to the
55-person Central Committee of the LPRP in April. Ethnic
minorities occupy many important government positions,
including that of Minister of Interior.
The Hmong, the largest highland hilltribe, are split along clan
lines. During the years of insurgency, many were strongly
ant i -Communist while others sided with the Lao Communists and
the Vietnamese. The Government has repressed many of those
groups who fought against it, especially those continuing to
resist its authority by force. The Hmong tried to defend some
of their tribal areas after 1975, and some continue to support
insurgent groups. Lao armed forces conduct operations against
armed insurgents, most of whom are Hmong. Many Hmong who
supported the Lao Communists before 1975 today occupy important
positions in the Government.
Traditionally, women in Lao society have been subservient to
men and often discouraged from obtaining an education. Today,
the active but government-controlled Lao Women's Federation has
as one of its stated goals the achievement of equal rights for
women, and equal rights for women are provided for in the new
Constitution. The Government claims a higher percentage of
women are in school now than before 1975 and that women are
being encouraged to assume a greater role in economic and
political activity. Women occupy responsible positions in
government and private business. The 1990 Labor Code offers
special protection for women and children in the workplace.
There is no pattern of widespread domestic or culturally
approved violence against women, but both lowland Lao and
hilltribes tend to hold women in lower esteem than men.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
An estimated 85 percent of Lao are subsistence farmers. Among
salaried workers, the majority are employed by the State,
though this is changing rapidly. In November 1990, the
Government adopted a Labor Code that permits labor unions to be
formed in the workplace but does not allow unions outside the
officially sanctioned single trade union system. The labor
unions that do exist have no right to strike and are controlled
by the Federation of Lao Trade Unions (FLTU) , which in turn is
controlled by the LPRP. The FLTU is affiliated with the
Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. The
extent to which the FLTU is free to affiliate internationally
with other organizations is unknown.
914
LAOS
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no right to organize and bargain collectively, but the
new Labor Code .stipulates that disputes must be resolved
through the formation of a committee in the workplace composed
of employees and representatives of the local labor union, as
well as representatives of the FLTU. Wages and salaries for
government employees are set by the Government, while wages and
salaries for private business employees are set by management.
Most salaried employees work for the State. There are no
export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced Compulsory Labor
The 1990 Labor Code prohibits forced labor except in time of
war or national disaster, when the State may conscript
laborers. Prisoners in prison camps are expected to do manual
labor, including growing their own food. In addition, there
are reports that some of these prisoners, when released, are
restricted to the general area of the camp and expected to work
there on state enterprises.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Under the 1990 Labor Code, children under 15 may not be
recruited for labor. Because many children younger than this
help their families on farms or in shops, the Labor Code allows
for younger children to work for their families, provided that
they are not engaged in dangerous or difficult work.
Employment of children in Laos' small but growing industrial
sector is not widespread, although it is common in urban
shops. The Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice are
responsible for enforcing these provisions, but enforcement is
problematical becaue of the country's lack of resources.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Laos is one of the world's poorest and least developed
countries. No minimum wage exists, but the 1990 Labor Code has
a provision for establishing one which is expected to be
implemented in 1992.
The Labor Code guarantees workers a broad range of
entitlements, including a workweek limited to 48 hours (36 in
dangerous activities) and safe working conditions. A worker
may not be fired without cause.
Workplace conditions are not systematically exploitative but
often fail to protect workers adequately against sickness or
accident. The Labor Code requires employers to provide a safe
work environment for employees, and offers special compensation
for workers engaged in dangerous work. An employer must
provide all expenses for a worker injured or killed while at
work. The Government has established health and safety
standards for workplaces but in practice has no mechanism to
insure compliance with these standards.
915
MALAYSIA
Malaysia is a federation of 13 states with a parliamentary
system of government based on periodic multiparty elections.
The ruling National Front has held power since 1957.
Opposition parties actively contested these elections and
currently control two state governments.
The Government justifies internal security laws allowing
preventive detention (and arrests under such laws) by citing a
Communist insurgency which raged between the 1940 's and 1960 's,
as well as longstanding racial tensions and endemic narcotics
trafficking problems. However, it applies these laws very
broadly and admits that it uses them to detain persons when
available evidence is insufficient to bring formal charges
under the criminal code. The Royal Malaysian Police is the
lead agency for internal security matters and reports
ultimately to the Minister of Home Affairs. Currently, Prime
Minister Mahathir also holds the Home Affairs portfolio.
Although in the past there have been credible reports of
mistreatment of prisoners and detainees by the police and
prison officials, there were no such reports in 1991.
A free market economy, abundant natural resources, and a
relatively small population have helped Malaysia become one of
the developing world's most prosperous countries. Strong
economic performance since 1988 has resulted in reduced
poverty, a rising standard of living, and more equal income
distribution, thus lessening political tensions between the
races .
Malaysia's human rights record was mixed during 1991, although
there were some positive developments, such as the registration
of a human rights society. Detention without trial,
limitations on judicial independence, and restrictions on
freedom of association and the press continued to be the
principal human rights problems in Malaysia. Detention of
three political critics under the Internal Security Act (ISA)
undercut an otherwise improved human rights record in 1991.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or other extrajudicial
killings by the Government or by any other political
organization.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance attributable to the
Government or to opposition forces.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
In the recent past, there have been allegations of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, but no new
allegations of such abuses were made in 1991. Malaysian
criminal law prescribes whipping as an additional punishment to
imprisonment for those convicted of narcotics possession.
Judges routinely include whipping in sentencing those convicted
of such crimes as kidnaping, rape, and robbery. The whipping.
916
MALAYSIA
which is normally carried out with a one-half inch thick wooden
cane, commonly causes welts and scarring.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Three laws permit the Government to detain suspects without
judicial review or filing formal charges: the 1960 Internal
Security Act (ISA), the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance
of 1969, and the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1985. Long-term
detentions without trial continue to be used by the Government
in cases alleged to involve national security, as well as in
narcotics trafficking and other cases.
According to the Government, the goal of the ISA is to control
internal subversion. This act empowers the police to hold any
person who may act "in a manner prejudicial to the security of
Malaysia" for up to 60 days. Security authorities sometimes
wait several days after a detention before informing the
detainee's family. The Minister of Home Affairs may authorize,
in writing, further detention for periods up to 2 years. Even
when there are no formal charges, the authorities must inform
detainees of the accusations against them and permit them to
appeal to an advisory board for review every 6 months.
Advisory board decisions and recommendations, however, are not
binding on the Home Minister, are not made public, and are
often not shown to the detainee. A number of ISA detainees
have refused to participate in the review process under these
circumstances .
The Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance was instituted after
intercommunal riots in 1969. Although Parliament regained its
legislative power in 1971, the state of emergency declared at
the time of the riots has never been lifted. According to the
police, 189 persons were in detention under the Emergency
Ordinance at the end of 1990; statistics for 1991 are not
available.
The 1990 total represented a decrease from previous years,
since drug suspects are now detained under the Dangerous Drugs
Act, which gives the Government specific power to detain
suspected drug traffickers. Many of these detainees are
suspected members of organized crime gangs or secret
societies. Suspects may be held without charge for successive
2-year intervals, with periodic review by an advisory board,
whose opinion is binding on the Home Minister. However, the
review process contains none of the due process rights that a
defendant would have in a court proceeding. Approximately
1,200 drug suspects were in detention under this statute at the
end of 1990.
There have been some cases of suspected narcotics traffickers
and firearms offenders being rearrested under the preventive
measures clauses of the Dangerous Drugs Act and Internal
Security Act after an acquittal in court on formal charges
under separate provisions of those acts.
The Government generally does not publish statistics or make
available authoritative information on the number of ISA
detainees. On January 23, however, the Deputy Home Affairs
Minister reported to Parliament that there were 142 detainees
at the end of 1990. While the Deputy Minister did not provide
details on these detentions, the figure represented an slight
decrease from the 155 detainees he acknowledged in a similar
parliamentary session in early December 1990. The Deputy
Minister categorized the detainees as follows: 117 alleged
917
MALAYSIA
former members of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM)
undergoing "rehabilitation;" 8 suspected forgers; 7 held for
espionage; 5 religious extremists; 4 detainees from the East
Malaysian State of Sabah; and 1 suspected arsonist. Assuming
these figures were accurate when announced, approximately 20
religious extremists would have been released in late 1990 or
early 1991, while an additional niomber of former Communists
were detained for "rehabilitation." The Government has issued
no general definition of what constitutes religious extremism,
but in this use it is generally accepted that the 5 are
persons, largely from the opposition Islamic Party, who were
detained in 1988 for suspicion of involvement in politically
motivated cases of arson. The 117 alleged former members of
the CPM, which led an insurgency active from the late 1940 's
until it ebbed into insignificance during the 1980 's, are
entitled to return to Malaysia under a 1989 peace agreement.
According to the Government, however, the agreement stipulates
that they satisfy certain conditions, including taking a
loyalty oath "to King and country" and renouncing the CPM in
writing. In 1990 and 1991, approximately 421 former CPM
members applied for return to Malaysia under the agreement. An
unknown number of these turned themselves over to Malaysian
security authorities for "rehabilitation." A credible report
indicates that this "rehabilitation" consists of detention
without trial under the ISA at the Kamunting Detention Center
in Perak State. The figures for ISA detentions provided by the
Government in January appear to support this conclusion. In
addition, at least 13 additional former CPM members, who
returned to Malaysia from Thailand under the accord during
August, were arrested by police in September under the ISA for
failing to make the loyalty pledge and written renunciation of
the CPM. The Government subsequently announced that all 13 had
met the recjuisite conditions and had been released. A CPM
spokesman in Thailand criticized the Government for insisting
on these conditions, arguing that the agreement neither
reqxiires former CPM members to sign such statements nor to
undergo rehabilitation. The Government did not respond to
these charges .
During 1991 three additional Malaysians from the east Malaysian
State of Sabah, including the brother of the Chief Minister,
were detained under the ISA. Two persons detained in January
were held under Section 73 (1) of the ISA, which permits police
to detain people for up to 60 days. One was released in March
upon expiration of the initial order; a 2-year detention order
under Section 8 of the Act (which requires the approval of the
Home Minister) was not sought in his case. The other person
remains in detention after a 2-year order was signed in March.
The Chief Minister's brother was detained in May for alleged
involvement in a "secessionist plot." A 2-year detention order
was signed in July, and he remains in detention.
In 1988 and 1989, Parliament amended the ISA, as well as the
other Acts authorizing preventive detention, to place severe
limitations on judicial review of detentions. The Government
argued that the amendments were necessary to prevent the courts
from usurping the authority of the Executive Branch in making
decisions on national security matters. Opposition leaders and
the Bar Council publicly protested these amendments as a
negation of recognized due process and accused the Government
of using the concept of "national security" too broadly.
918
MALAYSIA
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to a fair trial is restricted in criminal cases where
the Essential (Security Cases) Regulations of 1975 are invoked
by the Attorney General. These regulations governing trial
procedure normally apply only in firearms cases. In cases
tried under these regulations, the standards for accepting
self-incriminating statements by defendants as evidence are
less stringent than in normal criminal cases. Also, the
authorities may hold the accused for unspecified periods of
time before formal charges are made. The Attorney General also
has the authority to invoke these regulations in other criminal
cases if the Government determines the crime to involve
national security considerations, but such cases are rare.
Ordinary civil and criminal cases are tried under a fair and
open judicial system derived from the British model. The
accused must be brought before a judge within 24 hours of
arrest, and charges must be levied within 14 days. Defendants
have the right to counsel, bail is available, and strict rules
of evidence apply in court. Defendants may appeal court
decisions to higher courts and, in criminal cases, may also
appeal for clemency to the King or local state rulers as
appropriate. Criminal trials are heard by a single judge
without a jury, except in murder trials where juries are the
norm. The defense in both ordinary criminal cases and the
special security cases described above is not entitled to a
statement of evidence prior to the trial.
The public and the legal community has long regarded the
Malaysian judiciary as committed to the rule of law. The
judicial system traditionally exhibited a high degree of
independence, seldom hesitating to rule against the Government
in criminal, civil, or occasionally even politically sensitive
cases. For example, the High Court ruled in February 1988 that
the dominant party in the Government coalition was illegally
constituted. However, the Government's dismissal of the
Supreme Court Lord President and two other justices in 1988,
along with a constitutional amendment and legislation
restricting judicial review, resulted in less judicial
independence and stronger executive influence over the
judiciary. These developments create the possibility of a
chilling effect on the courts, the bar, and private citizens
who might otherwise seek legal remedies against government
actions. The 1988 changes have also resulted in less
willingness by the courts to challenge the Government's legal
interpretations in politically sensitive cases.
The Government announced late in the year that it was studying
proposals to give it greater control over the Malaysian Bar
Council, which has been critical of some Government policies.
The strong tone of government statements raised concerns among
local and international observers that the Bar Council's
freedom of expression and independence were being threatened.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
These rights are normally respected and protected by law, but
provisions in the security legislation described in Section
l.d. allow the police to enter and search without a warrant the
homes of persons suspected of threatening national security and
to confiscate evidence. Under these acts, police have searched
homes and offices, seized books and papers, monitored
conversations, and taken people into custody without a warrant.
919
MALAYSIA
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of speech and
press, some important limitations exist. For example, the
Constitution provides that freedom of speech may be restricted
by legislation "in the interest of security ... (or ) public
order." Thus, the Sedition Act Amendments of 1970 prohibit
public comment on issues defined as sensitive, such as
citizenship rights for non-Malays and the special position of
Malays in society. The Government has not charged anyone under
the Sedition Act since 1986, when a trial court acquitted a
former president of the Bar Council.
Press freedom is subject to important limitations under the
Printing Presses and Publications Act of 1984, under which
domestic and foreign publications must apply annually to the
Government for a permit. The Act was amended in 1987 to make
the publication of "malicious news" a punishable offense,
expand the Government's power to ban or restrict publications,
and prohibit court challenges to suspension or revocation of
publication permits.
In practice, press freedom is restricted by the fact that the
Government or companies controlled by the leading political
parties in the ruling coalition own all the major newspapers
and all radio and television stations. The Government- linked
mass media gives only limited and selective coverage to
opposition political views. A Commonwealth election observer
team reported that opposition parties were denied equal access
to the media during the 1990 general election campaign.
Despite government control of major publications, small-
circulation publications of opposition parties, social action
groups, unions and other private groups actively cover
opposition parties, and frequently print views critical of
government policies. The Government exerts significant
influence over these publications by requiring annual renewal
of publishing permits. At least two new independent newspapers
were given permission to begin publication during 1991, but
some established papers faced government limitations on their
publishing licenses. In November the Government warned two
newspapers published by opposition parties that the terms of
their licenses limited distribution to party members only. One
of the parties brought legal action to quash enforcement of the
license limitation. This plea was dismissed by the High Court
on December 31. In December Prime Minister Mahathir, acting in
his capacity as Home Minister, revoked the license of the
newsweekly Mingguan Waktu. This weekly had published articles
critical of Prime Minister Mahathir's governance.
In June 1990, Parliament enacted legislation making the
Malaysian News Agency (Bernama) the sole distributor of foreign
news in Malaysia, formalizing previous practice. The
Parliamentary opposition opposed the bill, arguing that it
would increase Government control over foreign news. Although
this law has not restricted foreign news coverage or
availability, under separate legislation the Government banned
editions of two prominent international weekly newsmagazines in
July and September, evidently for carrying articles and
photographic essays critical of Government policies. In both
cases, the Minister of Information did not explain the
rationale for the prohibition but simply cited his authority to
920
MALAYSIA
deny circulation under Section 9 of the Press and Publication
Act amendments .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the rights of freedom of peaceful
assembly and association, but there are significant
restrictions. These rights can be limited in the interest of
security and public order, and the 1967 Police Act requires
police permits for all public assemblies.
In the aftermath of the intercommunal riots in 1969, the
Government banned political rallies. While the formal ban has
not been rescinded, both government and opposition parties have
held large indoor political gatherings dubbed "discussion
sessions." Government and opposition candidates campaigned
actively during national elections in October 1990 as well as
in local and state elections during 1991. There are, however,
some restrictions on freedom of assembly during campaigns.
During the actual campaign period, political parties submit
lists of times and places for their "discussion groups;" no
police permit is reejuired. Outside of the campaign period, a
permit is required, with most applications routinely approved.
In past campaigns, however, some opposition discussion group
meetings have been canceled for lack of a police permit.
During the September election campaign in Sarawak, state
immigration officials barred Malay opposition politicians from
peninsular Malaysia from entering the state to campaign.
Government coalition members suffered no such exclusion.
Sarawak officials stated they took their action under
Provisions of the Immigration Act of 1959 but did not explain
the rationale behind the decision.
Other statutes limit the right of association, such as the
Societies Act of 1966, under which any association of seven or
more members must register with the Government as a society.
The Government may refuse to register a new society, and has
the power to revoke the registration of an existing society,
although this power is rarely employed. The threat of possible
deregistration under the Societies Act, however, may inhibit
political activism by public or special interest
organizations. Another law affecting freedom of association is
the Universities and University Colleges Act; it mandates
government approval for student associations and prohibits
student associations, as well as faculty members, from engaging
in political activity. Campus demonstrations must be approved
by a university vice-chancellor. Although spontaneous
demonstrations have occurred periodically in the past without
permission, no unapproved demonstrations occurred in 1991.
University authorities did approve a few demonstrations in
January by students protesting the Gulf War.
c. Freedom of Religion
Islam is the official religion. Ethnic Malays are legally
bound in some civil matters, such as family relations and diet,
by Islamic religious laws administered by state authorities
through Islamic courts. An Islamic religious establishment is
supported with government funds, and it is official policy to
"infuse Islamic values" into the administration of Malaysia.
At the same time, the Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government has refused to accede to pressures
for the imposition of Islamic religious law beyond the Muslim
community. Religious minorities, which include large Hindu,
921
MALAYSIA
Buddhist, Sikh, and Christian communities, are permitted to
worship freely.
The Government opposes what it consideres extremist or deviant
interpretations of Islam; in October it imposed restrictions on
the proselytizing activities of the Islamic sect Darul Argam.
These included enforcement of a prohibition on using government
facilities for religious activities.
There are persistent allegations that some state governments
are slow in approving building permits for non-Muslim places of
worship. The Government has limited the circulation of a
popular Ma lay- language translation of the Bible, and some
states restrict the use of Christian terms in the Malay
language. In 1991 a social action group reported the
demolition of a Christian church in a village populated by
aboriginal peoples. According to the report, officials argued
that the church building was erected several years ago without
a license. Government officials refused to permit the church
to be rebuilt.
Conversion to religions other than Islam is permitted but not
encouraged. Proselytizing of Muslims has long been proscribed
by law in some states and strongly discouraged in other parts
of the country.
In a March 1990 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the primacy
of the Constitution over inconsistent state laws by ruling that
parents have the right to determine the religion of their minor
children under the age of 18. The decision has eased fears of
the non-Muslim community over state laws which in religious
conversion cases set the age of majority at puberty based on
Islamic law.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign,
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Malaysians generally have the right to travel within the
country and live and work where they please, but the Government
restricts these rights in some circumstances. The states of
Sabah and Sarawak have the independent right to control
immigration into their territories; Malaysians from peninsular
west Malaysia are required to present passports for entry.
This power to regulate internal movement is sometimes exercised
arbitrarily for political purposes (see Section 2.b.).
The Government does not restrict emigration. Although in some
cases the Government has refused to issue passports on security
grounds, Malaysians generally are free to travel abroad, except
to Israel. Former restrictions on travel to South Africa and
to several Communist countries, including China, were
eliminated in 1990 and 1991.
Thousands of illegal workers from Indonesia arrive in Malaysia
each year to fill entry-level jobs in the plantation and
construction sectors of the economy. Although some ultimately
are able to regularize their immigration status, others depart
voluntarily after a few months, while some are formally
deported as illegal migrants. Between March and July, however,
separate groups of asylum seekers from the Indonesian province
of Aceh (totaling approximately 149) arrived in northwestern
Malaysia, allegedly fleeing violence stemming from a separatist
rebellion in Indonesia. These asylum seekers requested refugee
status. Despite expressions of concern by local and
international human rights organizations and foreign
922
MALAYSIA
governments, the Malaysian Government denied their requests,
ruling that at least the earliest arrivals were "illegal
immigrants" subject to deportation.
Intervention in court proceedings by local human rights lawyers
evidently halted — at least temporarily — a formal determination
of illegal immigrant status for a group of 40 Acehnese asylum
seekers who arrived in Malaysia in July. Some Acehnese have
returned home; others remain in official custody, but the
Government has taken no steps to deport them or repatriate them
against their will. In addition, the Foreign Minister said in
October that the Government would not force Acehnese
asylum-seekers to return against their will but would encourage
them to repatriate when they consider it safe to do so.
In accordance with the Compehensive Plan of Action (CPA) on
Indochinese refugees signed in 1989, Malaysia continued to
screen Vietnamese boat people in its first-asylum camps.
Malaysian military officers do the screening, with legal
consultants from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) present during each interview. The Malaysian screeners
and UNHCR consultants make every effort to develop the asylum-
seekers' claims to refugee status. The Government discusses
all disputed cases with the UNHCR before announcing a
decision. An administrative appeal is available to denied
cases .
Having provided first asylum to more than 250,000 Vietnamese
refugees since 1975, the Government began to deny first asylum
to some arriving Vietnamese in May 1989 in contravention of its
commitments under the CPA; 10,473 have been denied first asylum
since May 1989. Since June 1990, passengers on all but two
Vietnamese boats have been denied first asylum, and no
Vietnamese were granted first asylum in 1991. Credible reports
indicate that Malaysian authorities put back to sea about 110
Vietnamese asylum seekers from 4 vessels during 1991. There
were no reports of new landings after early May 1991.
Before arrivals ceased in May, Malaysian authorities allowed
Vietnamese boats to land, and normally held asylum-seekers in
temporary camps closed to observers. The Government provided
life jackets, boats, and essential supplies to asylum seekers
put back to sea. Government authorities have not responded
positively to concerns that this "redirection" of boat people
placed them in additional danger.
There have been some credible reports of abuses in the
temporary camps, as well as of instances in which Malaysian
authorities provided inadequate boats to asylum seekers put
back to sea. The only reported deaths resulting from the
denial of first asylum in recent years were four which occurred
in mid-1989. Interviews with asylum seekers indicate that the
Government takes positive steps to safeguard the lives and
welfare of those denied first asylum and disciplines personnel
involved in abusive behavior.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
By law' and in practice, Malaysians have the right to change
their government through periodic elections, although electoral
irregularities and campaign restrictions sometimes detract from
the overall fairness of the process. Malaysia has a
Westminster-style parliamentary system of government. National
elections, required at least every 5 years, have been held
923
MALAYSIA
regularly since independence in 1957. Through the United
Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malays dominate the ruling
National Front coalition of ethnic-based parties which has
controlled Parliament since independence. The Governnient
coalition currently controls 11 of 13 states. Non-Malays fill
a number of Cabinet posts, and at present ethnic Chinese
leaders of a member party of the government coalition hold
executive power in the State of Penang. In Sabah, the party in
power is controlled by Sabah 's ppedominant indigenous ethnic
group and headed by a Christian.
A new Malay political party called Semangat '46 (Spirit of '46)
was registered in July 1989. Led by former UMNO leaders who
unsuccessfully challenged Prime Minister Mahathir for the UMNO
leadership in 1987, the party joined the Parti Islam Semalaysia
(PAS) and two small Malay opposition parties in an umbrella
organization to contest general elections in 1990.
Subsequently, the Chinese-based opposition Democratic Action
Party and several small opposition parties formed a separate
electoral pact with Semangat 46, called the People's Front. As
a result, in the 1990 elections, the Government coalition faced
the unprecedented prospect of a multiethnic, multiparty
opposition linked into two groups which fielded single
opposition candidates for virtually every seat. In these
elections, the opposition won 53 seats and gained control of
two state governments.
Malaysian elections are procedurally free and fair, with votes
cast secretly and recorded accurately. General elections in
1990 were subject to intense scrutiny by both international and
domestic observers. Among the international observers was a
group dispatched by the Commonwealth of Nations, which reported
that the elections were "properly and impartially" carried
out. The Commonwealth observers criticized as campaign
"imperfections," however, unequal media access for the
opposition and irregularities in the electoral rolls. A local
election monitoring group called Election Watch reported that
the election was free, but criticized unequal opposition access
to the media, problems with the electoral rolls, and subtle
intimidation of voters by reference to the 1969 race riots.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In August 1989, a group of prominent Malaysians, including two
former prime ministers (both now deceased), formally applied to
the Registrar of Societies to establish a national human rights
society, the National Human Rights Association. The registrar
delayed ruling on the application because, according to some
observers, the Government objected to the prospect of having a
potentially powerful critic of certain official policies. The
application was approved in June 1991, however, and the society
has begun to operate freely. A number of other organizations,
including the Bar Council and public interest groups, devote
attention to human rights activities. The Government tolerates
their activities, but rarely responds to their inquiries or
occasional press statements. The Government has not acceded to
any of the major international covenants on human rights,
generally maintaining that such issues are internal matters.
The Government rejects criticism of its human rights record by
international human rights organizations and foreign
governments. The Foreign Minister argued in a speech before
the nonaligned movement in September that social and economic
924
MALAYSIA
rights are as important as civil and political rights, and that
Western nations must not be allowed to impose their values on
developing nations. Malaysian officials criticize local groups
for collaborating with international human rights
organizations. Representatives of international human rights
organizations have visited and traveled in Malaysia, but
frecjuently have no access to government officials.
Foreign government officials have discussed human rights with
their Malaysian counterparts, and private groups occasionally
have done so. For example, in 1990 representatives of the
American Bar Association (ABA) and the International Council of
Jurists attended the trial of the Bar Council Vice President
mentioned in Section I.e. The ABA representative met privately
with the Attorney General to discuss the case.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Government implements extensive programs designed to boost
the economic position of the ethnic Malay majority, which
remains poorer, on average, than other Malaysians despite its
political dominance. By favoring one segment of society, these
government programs and policies limit, in varying degrees,
opportunities for non-Malays in higher education, government
employment, business permits and licenses, and ownership of
newly developed agricultural lands.
There are no laws or regulations restricting the political and
economic rights of women. Government policy supports women's
full and ecjual participation in government, education, and the
work force. Women hold high-level political positions and
judgeships and are well represented in the professions.
Literacy rates for women are lower than for men, with a female
literacy rate of 55 percent compared to a rate of 76 percent
for the total adult population.
The cultural and religious traditions of Malaysia's major
ethnic groups heavily influence the condition of women in
Malaysian society. In family and religious matters, Muslim
women are subject to Islamic law. Polygyny is allowed and
practiced, and inheritance law favors male offspring and
relatives. The Islamic family law was revised in 1989 to
provide better protection for the property rights of married
Muslim women, and to make more equitable a Muslim woman's right
to divorce. Non-Muslim women are subject to civil law.
Changes in the civil Marriage and Divorce Act in the early
1980 's increased protection of married women's rights,
especially those married under customary rites. A national
women's policy was adopted by the Cabinet in late 1989 to
upgrade the status of the Government department responsible for
women's affairs and monitor the implementation of national
policies to insure that women's rights are protected.
While statistics on domestic violence, including wife beating,
are sketchy, both the Government and women's organizations
agree that the problem is growing. Currently there are no
specific laws on domestic violence; cases of wife beating or
child abuse normally are tried under provisions of the penal
code governing assault and battery, which carry penalties of 3
months to 1 year in prison and fines up to $750. During 1991
child abuse became a major focus of public attention, chiefly
through regular news media reports on the problem. A number of
social and political organizations have urged Parliament to
enact legislation addressing the problem of child abuse.
925
MALAYSIA
Women's groups continued to press government officials
responsible for women's affairs to issue recommendations on
legislation dealing with domestic violence. Problems center on
the definition of domestic violence and how Muslim women, whose
family and marital status is covered by Islamic law, should be
treated in -proposed civil legislation. Women's issues were
the subject of a number of seminars during 1991, and a Muslim
women's group. Sisters in Islam, published two widely
distributed pamphlets on the, rights of women in Islam.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
By law, workers, with certain limitations, have the right to
engage in trade union activity. Unions may organize
workplaces, bargain collectively with employers, form
federations, and join international organizations. The
Industrial Relations Act specifically prohibits interfering
with, restraining, or coercing a worker in the exercise of the
right to form trade unions or participate in lawful trade union
activities. The Trade Unions Act, administered by the Director
General of Trade Unions (DGTU), sets rules for organization of
unions, union recognition at the workplace, the content of
union constitutions, election of officers, and financial
reporting. However, the Act's definition of a trade union
restricts a union to representing workers in a "particular
establishment, trade, occupation, or industry or within any
similar trades, occupations, or industries," contrary to
International Labor Organization (ILO) guidelines.
The DGTU may refuse to register a trade union. In some
circumstances, he also has the power to withdraw registration
of a trade union. When registration has been refused,
withdrawn, or canceled, a trade union is considered an unlawful
association.
Dominated by American and Japanese firms, Malaysia's electronic
components industry has been the focus of unsuccessful union
registration efforts since the late 1970 's. The Government has
used its power to prevent electrical industry unions from
organizing electronics workers and permits only "in-house"
unions in the industry. Five such unions have been registered
in the electronics industry; three have been recognized by the
companies involved. All of the members of one of these unions
were dismissed in 1990 following reorganization of the
company's structure. The union charged the company with
union-busting and wrongful dismissal. The case was filed in
September 1990. Opening motions were heard in June 1991, and
the case is scheduled to be heard in February 1992. A
complaint about the case was also presented to the ILO. In
1991 the ILO examined complaints dealing with Japanese and
American electronics companies and again asked the Government
to amend the legislation to bring it into accord with the
principles of freedom of association. The Government has given
no indication of its intent to do so.
By law, federations of trade unions may cover only a single
trade or industry or similar trades or industries. Only three
national labor federations are currently registered: one for
public servants, one for teachers, and one consisting of
state-based textile and garment workers' unions.
The Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC), the main labor body
in the country, is registered as a society under the Societies
Act, rather than under the Trade Unions Act. The Malaysian
926
MALAYSIA
Labor Organization (MLO), recently set up as a rival labor
center to the MTUC, is also registered as a society. Previous
MTUC attempts to register as a trade union federation under the
Trade Unions Act were denied because its membership was deemed
too broad. In November 1988, Parliament approved legislation
which granted both societies of trade unions and societies of
employers the status and rights accorded trade unions, despite
their status as societies. This legislation was intended to
give the MTUC "standing" to represent union interests before
the High Court.
Unions maintain independence both from the Government and from
the political parties. Individual union members may belong to
political parties, while union officers are forbidden to hold
principal offices in political parties, individual trade union
leaders have served and currently serve in Parliament.
Malaysian trade unions are free to associate with international
labor bodies and have actively done so.
Although strikes are legal and a number of them occurred in
1991, the right to strike is severely restricted in practice.
Malaysian law contains a list of "essential services" in which
unions must give advance notice of any industrial action. The
list includes sectors that do not normally qualify as
"essential" under ILO definitions. The Industrial Relations
Act of 1967 requires the parties to notify the Ministry of
Human Resources that a dispute exists before any industrial
action (strike or lockout) may be taken. The Ministry's
Industrial Relations Department may then become actively
involved in conciliation efforts. If conciliation fails to
achieve a settlement, the Minister has the power to refer the
dispute to the Industrial Court. The result, in effect, is
compulsory arbitration. A strike or lockout is prohibited
while the dispute is before the Industrial Court.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Malaysian workers have the legal right to organize and bargain
collectively. Collective bargaining is widespread in those
sectors where labor is organized. Designed to curb disruptive
strikes, amendments in 1980 to Malaysia's Labor Law contain
provisions, however, which the MTUC believes erode the basic
rights of workers, restrict union activities, and result in
government and employer interference in the internal
administration of unions. Despite subsequent amendments, the
MTUC believes the labor law is still deficient by ILO
standards. Many union leaders also believe that the creation
of the Industrial Court further weakened their collective
bargaining rights.
Labor standards in free trade zones (EPZ's) are identical to
those in the rest of Malaysia. Workers at many companies
located in the EPZ's are unionized, especially in the textile
and electrical products sectors. Enterprises granted "pioneer
status" (regardless of location) are protected from union
demands for terms of employment exceeding those specified in
the Employment Act of 1955 during the period of their "pioneer
status" (normally 5 years) . The restriction does not apply to
wages or benefits covered by the Employment Act (see Section
6.e.). In 1991 the ILO asked the Government to remove legal
restrictions on the right to bargain in pioneer industries, in
the public sector, and on dismissals without notice. Despite
the existence of antiunion discrimination laws, there have been
a number of instances in which union activists have been
927=
MALAYSIA
dismissed, allegedly for engaging in union activities. The ILO
examined two such complaints in 1991 and is awaiting the
Government's response. Redress through the Industrial Court is
slow.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Malaysia laws allow the use of imprisonment with required
forced labor as a punishment for persons expressing views
opposed to the established order or participating in strikes.
The Government maintains that these laws have no force. There
is no indication that forced or compulsory labor is practiced
in Malaysia.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Children and Young Persons (Employment) Act of 1966
stipulates that no child under the age of 14 may be engaged in
any employment except light work in a family enterprise, in
public entertainment, in work performed for the Government in a
school or training institution, or in employment as an approved
apprentice. Children may not work more than 6 hours daily,
more than 6 days weekly, or at night. Periodic inspections by
the Ministry of Human Resources effectively provide enforcement
of this law.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Malaysia lacks a national minimum wage, although the Wage
Councils Act provides for a minimum wage in those sectors and
regions of the country where it is perceived to be most
needed. Under the law, workers in an industry who believe they
need the protection of a minimum wage may ask for the
establishment of a wage council. The Act assumes that workers
in industries where unionization is widespread can bargain for
wages directly with employers and do not need the protection of
a minimum wage. Approximately 140,000 workers in the over 7-
mi 11 ion-member labor force are covered by minimum wages set by
wage councils. Minimum wages set by the wage council have not
been revised for many years and do not, in general, provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and his family.
However, prevailing wages in Malaysia, even in the sectors
covered by wage councils, are higher than the minimum wages set
by the wage councils.
Contract workers, including numerous illegal immigrants from
Indonesia, increasingly perform plantation work. Working
conditions for these workers often are significantly below
those of direct hire plantation workers, many of whom belong to
the National Union of Plantation Workers. Additionally, many
immigrant workers, particularly illegal ones, may not have
access to Malaysia's system of labor adjudication. The
Government has investigated this problem and has taken a number
of steps to eliminate the abuse of contract labor. For
example, it has expanded its programs legalizing immigrant
plantation workers; it investigates complaints of abuses; it
endeavors to inform workers of their rights, encourages workers
to come forward with their complaints, and warns employers to
end abuses .
The Employment Act of 1955 sets working hours not to exceed 8
hours daily or 44 hours weekly (5 1/2 days). This Act sets
overtime rates, and mandates public holidays, annual leave,
sick leave, and maternity allowances. Minimum standards of
occupational health and safety are patterned after the British
928
MALAYSIA
Factory Act, and enforced by a unit of the Ministry of Human
Resources. All factories are supposed to be inspected at least
once every 15 months, but insufficient personnel precludes
strict enforcement.
929
MARSHALL ISLANDS
The Republic of the Marshall Islands is a nation of 31 small,
coral atolls scattered over a large area of the Central
Pacific, comprising a total land area of about 70 square
miles. The population, of Micronesian origin, is estimated at
48,000 and is concentrated primarily on Majuro and Kwajalein
atolls. The Marshall Islands constituted part of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, administered by the United
States from 1947 to 1986 pursuant to an agreement with the
United Nations. In October 1986, the Republic of the Marshall
Islands became a sovereign, self-governing nation under the
Compact of Free Association with the United States.
Political legitimacy in the Marshall Islands rests on the
popular will expressed by majority vote in accordance with a
constitution uniquely blending British and American precepts,
including a strong, American-style bill of rights. The
legislature consists of the Parliament, known as the Nitijela,
with 33 members and a Council of Chiefs (Iroij), the latter
serving largely a consultative function on matters dealing with
custom and traditional practice. The executive branch of the
Government consists of the President and his appointed Cabinet,
all of whom are elected members of the Nitijela. The President
is elected by majority vote from among the membership of the
Nitijela. The Constitution calls for an independent judiciary.
Under the Compact of Free Association the United States is
responsible for defense and national security. Consequently,
the Marshall Islands has no security forces of its own aside
from national and local police forces, which are firmly under
the control of the civil authorities.
The economy depends mainly on transfer payments from the United
States. Coconut oil and copra exports, a small amount of
tourism, and the fishing industry generate limited revenues.
No human rights abuses were reported in 1991.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of such killings.
b. Disappearance
No politically motivated disappearances or abductions were
reported.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment are expressly forbidden by the Constitution; the
prohibition is observed in practice.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution contains safeguards against arbitrary arrest
and detention, and no such incidents were reported.
930
' MARSHALL ISLANDS
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to a fair public trial is expressly provided for in
the Constitution and observed in practice. There were no
reported denials of fair public trial. In 1991 the Nitijela
pressured a high court judge to resign because of its
unhappiness with the way he was running a trial. Earlier in
1990, Nitijela interference with the workings of the
Independent Nuclear Claims Tribunal caused two of the judges to
resign. It is unclear at this point if the court's future
independence will be jeopardized by interference from the
Cabinet or Nitijela.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The privacy of the home is protected by law and respected by
the Government. There was no known instance of arbitrary
intrusion by the State into the private life of the individual.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, and
it is accorded in practice. There are two operating radio
stations, one government owned and one privately owned, and one
television station operated by the national museum.
The country's sole newspaper is privately owned and operated by
U.S. citizens long resident in the Marshall Islands.
At one point in 1991 the Government, displeased with editorial
criticism, put pressure on the privately owned newspaper by
canceling all government printing orders, which are a major
source of income for the company that puts out the newspaper .
After a few weeks, the order was rescinded. The newspaper
printed advertisements and letters to the editor from the
opposition party during the 1991 election campaign.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of peaceful assembly and association is provided for in
the Constitution and observed in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion
Free exercise of religion is provided for in the Constitution
and observed in practice. There is no state religion. The
majority of the population is Christian. Missionaries are free
to seek converts and freely do so.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens are free to travel within the country and abroad.
There are no restrictions on emigration or repatriation. There
are no displaced persons other than those from Bikini atoll who
left that atoll in 1946 because of scheduled nuclear testing on
their island. Pending further rehabilitation of the environment
of Bikini, contaminated in the tests, the Bikinians remain
resident elsewhere in the Marshall Islands and in the United
States.
931
MARSHALL ISLANDS
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Government of the Marshall Islands is chosen by secret
ballot in free and open elections every 4 years. Suffrage is
universal for men and women 18 years of age and older. Until
the Nitijela election of 1991, political parties, when they
existed, coalesced around a particular political issue and then
dissolved when the issue was resolved. However, in the 1991
Nitijela election, a new political party was formed, the Ralik
Ratak Democratic Party, which opposed the Government on a whole
range of issues. The party was able to contest the election
freely.
In 1988 a law was passed prohibiting political activity by
aliens. An offending alien is subject to deportation at the
discretion of the Cabinet. Although the law has never been
invoked, its invocation could result in deportation without due
process .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
While there are no official restrictions, no local
nongovernmental organizations that concern themselves with
human rights have been formed. There have been no reported
allegations of human rights violations by the Government or any
known requests for investigations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex,
race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, place of birth, family status, or
descent. No instances of such discrimination were reported.
Inheritance of property and traditional rank is matrilineal,
with women occupying positions of importance within the
traditional system. No instances of unequal pay for equal work
or sex-related job discrimination were reported.
Allegations of violence against women are rare and relate
mainly to domestic conflict. Assault is a criminal offense,
but in some cases women are reluctant to prosecute their
spouses. Women's groups have held infrequent meetings to
publicize women's issues and to create a greater awareness of
the rights of women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for the right of free association in
general. This freedom of association is interpreted by the
Attorney General of the Marshall Islands as allowing the
existence of labor unions, although none has been formed yet.
The Constitution is silent on the right to strike, and thus far
the Government has not addressed this issue.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no legislation concerning collective bargaining or
trade union organization. However, there are no bars to the
932
MARSHALL ISLANDS
organization of trade unions or to collective bargaining.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution specifically prohibits involuntary servitude,
and there is no evidence of its practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Marshallese law contains no prohibition on the employment of
children. Children are not typically employed in the wage
economy, but some assist their families with agriculture,
fishing, and other small-scale family enterprises.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is a government-specified minimum wage established by
law, and it is adequate to maintain a decent standard of living
by local standards. There is no legislation concerning maximum
hours or occupational safety and health.
933
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is composed of 607
small islands, mostly uninhabited, extending over 1 million
square miles of the Central Pacific. Comprise 4 states, Chuuk
(formerly Truk), Kosrae, Pohnpei, and Yap comprise the
federation. The population is estimated to exceed 100,000,
most of them of Micronesian origin. The four states were part
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, administered by
the United States from 1947 to 1986 pursuant to an agreement
with the United Nations.
Political legitimacy rests on the popular will expressed by a
majority vote in accordance with the Constitution, which is
based in large part on the U.S. model. There are three
branches of government: a president as chief executive and
head of state, a unicameral legislature elected from the four
constituent states, and a judicial system that applies criminal
and civil laws and procedures closely paralleling those of the
United States.
Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States is
responsible for defense and national security. The FSM has no
security forces of its own, aside from local police and other
law enforcement officers, all of whom are firmly under the
control of the civil authorities.
The economy depends heavily on transfer payments from the
United States, fishing, tourism, and subsistence agriculture.
No major human rights abuses were reported in 1991. However,
traditional customs sustain a value system which distinguishes
between people on the basis of social status and sex.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section l Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including -•■■
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No political killings occurred.
b. Disappearance
There were no disappearances or abductions. - - —
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
A single case of cruel and degrading treatment of a prisoner in
Pohnpei jail was reported in 1991. The case was brought to
trial and thoroughly discussed in open court. Guilty parties
and government offices were fined, with the avowed purpose of
improving general jail conditions and tightening official
responsibility for the civil rights of prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Legal procedures for the most part are patterned after U.S. law
in its provisions for due process. These provisions are
carefully observed. There is no exile.
934
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Public trial is provided for in the Bill of Rights, and trials
are conducted fairly. Juveniles may have closed hearings. The
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (currently a U.S. citizen)
is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of
the Congress .
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The law prohibits such arbitrary interference, and in practice
there is none.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These rights are constitutionally assured and faithfully
observed. Each of the four state governments controls a radio
station, broadcasting primarily in the local language. Yap
also controls a small television station. The Federal
Government and the Governors of Kosrae and Chuuk publish
newsletters. Several private and municipal newsletters in
Kosrae, Chuuk, and Pohnpei, however, do not hesitate to
challenge governmental policies. Religious groups operate
private radio stations in Pohnpei and Chuuk, and two commercial
television stations broadcast on Pohnpei.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Bill of Rights guarantees freedom of peaceful assembly and
association, and these rights are honored in practice. During
political campaigns, citizens often question candidates at
public meetings. Formal associations are uncommon in
Micronesia. Nevertheless, student organizations and at least
one lobbying group exist.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Federated States is extremely hospitable to diverse
religions, and missionaries of many faiths work within the
nation. The Bill of Rights forbids establishment of a state
religion and governmental restrictions on freedom of religion.
Most of the citizens are Christians.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions in any of these areas. The Compact
of Free Association permits citizens to travel to, reside in,
and work in the United States without having to obtain visas.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Congress is elected by popular vote from each state;
Congress then chooses the President and Vice President from its
ranks by majority vote. State governors, state legislators,
and municipal governments are all elected by direct popular
vote. Elections are conducted honestly, and political
campaigning is unrestricted. Although there are no
restrictions on the formation of political groups, to date
there have been no efforts to form political parties.
935
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No Human Rights violations have ever been alleged, nor are
there any known requests for investigations. While there are
no official restrictions, no local groups concern themselves
with human rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides explicit protection against
discrimination based on race, sex, language, or religion, but
the various traditional cultures establish hierarchies of
social status. These traditional rankings can influence access
to political office and education, even though such access is
in principle open to all. Traditional culture is greatly
respected by the peoples of the Federated States, and is
protected by Article V of the Constitution. Although the
traditional social orders are losing ground as Westernization
and a monetized economy take a greater hold upon young people,
male dominance remains a fact of life throughout Micronesia.
Women are still at the early stages of finding jobs beyond the
entry level in both the public and private sectors. Their
roles within the family as wife, mother, homemaker, and
child-rearer remain virtually unchanged from earlier times.
Allegations of violence against women are almost exclusively
concerned with domestic conflict between husband and wife, and
wife beating under certain circumstances still is condoned
among more traditional elements of the population. While
assault by a husband or other male relative on women and
children within the family is a criminal offense under law,
most women are reluctant to bring formal charges. The general
attitude is that such issues are best left to the extended
family unit to resolve. Local support groups are beginning to
hold meetings in some of the state capitals to publicize issues
of violence within the family and to highlight the effects of
widespread alcohol and drug abuse. These meetings serve to
create a greater awareness of social problems and help to
publicize the rights of all citizens under the law.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Citizens have the right to form or join associations, and
national government employees by law may form associations to
"present their views" to the Government. There are as yet,
however, no trade unions in this largely nonindustrial society.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no law dealing specifically with trade unions or with
the right to collective bargaining. There are no export
processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution specifically prohibits involuntary servitude,
and there is no evidence of its practice.
936
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
There is no law establishing a minimum age for employment of
children. In practice, there is no employment of children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The only government-established minimum wage is for government
workers. It and the wages customarily paid to unskilled
workers are sufficient to provide an acceptable standard of
living under local conditions. There are no laws regulating
hours of work or prescribing standards of occupational safety
and health, but a federal regulation requires that employers
provide a safe place of employment.
937
MONGOLIA
Mongolia, long a highly centralized Communist state, installed
its first freely elected government in 1990 as part of a
transition toward multiparty democracy. Responding to demands
of a growing opposition movement, the Mongolian People's
Revolutionary Party (MPRP — the Communist Party) amended the
Constitution to delete its leading role and created a
presidential system and an additional, more representative
legislative house. Political parties were legalized and an
electoral law was passed, leading to general elections in July.
Mongolia now has a president, a vice president, a prime
minister, and two legislative houses known as the People's
Great Hural (GPH) and the new Baga (small) Hural (BH) . The •
Vice President also serves as president of the smaller, more
influential legislative house.
Although the President serves as Chief of State with broad
emergency and veto powers, the actual division of
responsibilities between the President and Prime Minister
remains unclear. The GPH, which elects the President, is the
major legislative body, but the BH becomes the highest organ of
state power between infrec[uent GPH sessions.
President Ochirbat and Prime Minister Byambasuren of the MPRP
lead the new Government which includes a Vice President and
Deputy Prime Ministers from opposition parties. During 1991 a
commission of government officials, parliamentarians, and other
experts drafted a new, democratic constitution which has
provisions for a wide range of civil and political rights. At
year's end, it was being considered for adoption by the session
of the GPH which began meeting in November.
The role of the security apparatus has diminished; it is now a
department responsible to the Council of Ministers. Under
legislation enacted in August, police and security officers,
along with a wide range of other officials, may no longer be
members of political parties. As a result, all security and
police officials reportedly have resigned their party
affiliations. Substantial reductions in the military budget
and forces were announced.
Despite increasing industrialization and urbanization, a large
portion of the population is engaged in agriculture, with an
emphasis on livestock raising and associated light industry.
After decades of nearly total dependency on the Soviet Union,
Mongolia is attempting to increase its foreign trade with
non-Socialist countries and to make the difficult transition to
a market economy. However, this effort has been handicapped by
a severe foreign exchange shortage and a general economic
slowdown. The new draft constitution, if adopted, would
establish the right to private ownership of property.
Major improvement in most human rights categories continued in
1991, most dramatically in freedom of speech and press, freedom
of assembly, freedom of religion, and the right of citizens to
change their government.
938
MONGOLIA
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There has been no evidence of such killings in recent years.
The Government is investigating allegations of past instances
of such killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no known instances of unresolved abductions or
disappearances in recent years.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There have been no reports that torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment has been
practiced in the recent past.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, and Exile
There have been no confirmed reports of arbitrary arrest,
detention, or exile in the past few years. The Government is
investigating cases of such occurrences in the past and has
rehabilitated many victims.
Police may arrest those in the act of committing a crime and
hold them for up to 72 hours without a warrant. For
incarcerations of longer duration, or when the actual crime was
not witnessed, a warrant must be issued by a prosecutor who is
appointed by the State Prosecutor for a 5-year term and who
functions as part of the Ministry of Justice. The State
Prosecutor is appointed by the GPH for a 5-year term. Warrants
must also be issued by a prosecutor before persons or premises
may be searched. There is no statutory right for an accused in
detention to see an attorney, and defense attorneys are
routinely denied access to their clients prior to trial.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There are three levels of courts in Mongolia. The People's
Courts handle most routine criminal and civil cases such as
assault, petty larceny, traffic accidents, and liability
disputes. Provincial Courts hear serious cases such as murder,
rape, grand larceny, official corruption, and security cases.
The High Court serves as an appeals court for the People's and
Provincial Courts. To date the High Court has rarely
overturned the verdicts of the lower courts. High Court judges
are appointed by the GPH for a 4-year term. Lower court judges
are appointed by provincial Hurals, also for 4-year terms.
Current civil and criminal codes stipulate the right of the
accused to judicial process, a legal defense, and public trial
"except as stipulated by law." Closed proceedings are
permitted in the cases of crimes against the State, rape cases
involving minors, and particularly brutal murders. Witnesses
are usually required to appear at trials, but written testimony
is sometimes accepted instead. The accused must answer all
questions put to him by the prosecutor.
The courts have nominally been independent but in reality have
been closely controlled by the MPRP . Since the 1990
939
MONGOLIA
revolution, there has been a comprehensive review of the legal
code and the structure of the judiciary in order to establish a
legal system which will conform to international standards.
There are no political prisoners.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The right to privacy of person, home, and correspondence is
provided for in the Constitution. Despite political reforms
and cutbacks in the apparatus of government, the Government
still retains the authority to exercise control over individual
activity.
The Department of State Security (DSS), despite internal
reforms, still reserves the right to use special surveillance
measures (e.g., wiretaps) "when necessary." No information is
available on the extent of these practices, but the authority
of the DSS seems significantly below what it was before the
1990 democratic revolution.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is provided for in the Constitution
and is now widely respected in practice, although limits
remain. There continued to be lively debate covering a broad
range of political and social issues. Many newspapers jfreely
publish and circulate, although the Government controls the
allocation of newsprint, and opposition parties and other
publishers continued to allege that limitations on the
quantities of newsprint provided to opposition newspapers
effectively prevented them from publishing as frequently as the
MPRP newspaper. Although both the opposition and the
Government at times criticize the coverage, the only television
station, which is government owned, regularly broadcasts news
about the views of opposition parties as well as those of the
Government. Its news programs are generally considered to be
balanced.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of demonstration and
assembly. Demonstrations over various issues, including a
large (political) demonstration against the ruling MPRP
following the abortive Soviet coup, and protests against
government economic policies, were held throughout the year
without interference by the authorities. Although permits are
required for demonstrations, this requirement is not enforced.
c. Freedom of Religion
Mongolian law provides for freedom of religion; there is no
state religion. Since the 1990 revolution, freedom of religion
has been respected in practice. Throughout 1991, revival of
the Buddhist faith and its institutions continued. In
September, the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia on the invitation of
the Buddhist community. Commenting on his visit, which evoked
significant public interest, the Government emphasized that it
no longer interferes in the conduct of religious affairs.
The Government has given permission for a mosque to be built in
the western Kazakh province of Bayan Olgiy (the first since
1937) and for an Islamic center to be established in
940
MONGOLIA
Ulaanbaatar (the capital). The importation of Korans was
allowed to begin in 1990, and three Mongolians made the hajj to
Mecca in 1991. An association of Mongolian religious people
was formed in 1990 and has functioned freely. A small group of
foreign Baha'is is now residing in Ulaanbaatar. Christian
missionaries began to appear in late 1990, and the Government
does not interfere in their activities. The Government has
stated that proselytizing would be permitted.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Mongolians may travel freely inside the country and, under a
new emigration law passed in 1990, all Mongolians may leave the
country and return to it. Over 47,000 people had traveled
abroad in the first 10 months of 1991. Mongolia does not
receive many refugees, but a few who have come from China's
Province of Inner Mongolia have been accepted for resettlement.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights; The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens the right to change their
government through periodic, free elections with universal
suffrage. In July 1990, Mongolian citizens exercised that
right in the first multiparty elections for the GPH and local
offices and in expressing their party preferences for the Baga
Hural . The elections were generally judged by observers to be
free and open.
Although MPRP candidates captured over 80 percent of the 430
GPH seats, only 13 percent of GPH deputies were reelected,
bringing about wholesale changes within the MPRP. The
Mongolian Democratic Party, the Party of National Progress, the
Social Democratic Party, and some 39 independents won the
remaining GPH seats. The MPRP won 62 percent of the votes for
the Baga Hural, giving it 31 of 50 seats. The same three
opposition parties won the remaining seats.
In September 1990, the newly elected GPH elected P. Ochirbat of
the MPRP and R. Gonchigdorg of the Social Democratic Party as
President and Vice President, respectively. Prime Minister
Byambasuren (MPRP) and two opposition Deputy Prime Ministers
were also elected. The rest of the Council of Ministers is
composed of MPRP members, but Byambasuren has worked to include
all parties and ideologies in a collaborative effort to reform
Mongolia's political, economic, and legal systems.
In September, following months of intense national debate, the
BH approved a new draft constitution establishing the citizen's
right to form poltical parties and participate directly in
political affairs. In November the GPH began to consider its
adoption. Since the draft constitution would replace the
existing two legislative houses with a single, unicameral
legislature, its adoption might require new legislative
elections sooner than the 2-year period promised after the 1990
elections.
There are no legal impediments to the participation of women in
government and politics, and women constitute about 30 percent
of the MPRP membership. Nine women were elected to the GPH in
July.
941
MONGOLIA
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
A local human rights group, the Mongolian Human Rights
Committee, was formed in 1990. There are no known impediments
to its ability to monitor and report on human rights
developments. At the invitation of the Government, the
U.S. -based International Human Rights Law Group sent an
observer team to monitor the 1990 elections. The Government
has cooperated with other international nongovernmental human
rights organizations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There appears to be little discrimination in education on the
basis of race, sex, or religion.
According to government statistics, the percentage of women in
the work force was over 50 percent in 1991 and about half of
trade union membership. Women also hold high professional
positions in institutions such as schools, research centers,
and hospitals, but recent statistics indicate that unemployment
among women appears marginally higher. Little is known about
the extent to which violence against women, including domestic
violence, occurs. It has not been discussed as a matter of
public policy or in the media.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right to organize professional associations and trade
unions is provided for in the Constitution. The charter of the
Federation of Mongolian Trade Unions (FMTU) also provides for
the unionization of police and military personnel.
Approximately 75 percent of the total Mongolian work force,
including agricultural as well as industrial workers, is
unionized. Union officials are elected by secret ballot.
There are no arbitrary restrictions on who may be a union
official. Unions, other than civil servants and essential
services, have the right to strike. In November and December,
significant wildcat strikes occured in the transport and
medical services sectors. These strikes, settled by mutual
agreement between the striking unions and the Government acting
as employer, resulted in wage increases.
Most unions in Mongolia are currently affiliated with the FMTU,
which formerly was a part of the MPRP. The FMTU separated from
the party during the 1990 revolution, and its charter now
states that all unions have the right to leave it should they
so desire. The FMTU also maintains there is no requirement for
new unions to register with it or with any government body.
The FMTU is apparently no longer an instrxoment of government
control. During 1990, a new union movement called "The
Association of Free Trade Unions" (AFTU) emerged. This new
movement reportedly includes some 70 unions. In addition, a
variety of new professional associations, including those of
journalists and engineers, were created. Some of these
associations appear to be independent of both the larger union
groupings .
The Constitution places no restrictions on the political
activity of unions or union officials. Twenty members of the
942
MONGOLIA
GPH are labor union officials, three of whom are members of the
Central Council of the FMTU. In 1991 the FMTU, the AFTU, and
individual unions all frequently and publicly criticized
government economic policies and actions.
There is no statutory prohibition against unions forming
federations or joining international bodies. Mongolian unions,
formerly affiliated exclusively with Communist organizations
internationally, are broadening their contacts with Western
labor movements.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Labor Law prohibits antiunion discrimination. According to
the law, an employer must show work-related cause and must
obtain the union's approval to fire a union official who is an
employee. Should the union not approve, the employee may
judicially appeal any firing. The courts have the right to
order reinstatement. The FMTU says there were a few such cases
this year, most of which resulted in the workers regaining
their jobs. The right to bargain collectively is protected in
the Constitution. Because of changes in the labor law
introduced in July 1991, no collective bargaining agreements
were completed in 1991.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is specifically prohibited by law
and in practice, does not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law prohibits children under the age of 16, from working,
although those aged 14 and 15 may work if allowed to by the
local trade union committee and given permission by their
parents. Those under 18 are statutorily prohibited from
working at night, from doing arduous work, or from working in
dangerous areas such as mining or construction. The workday is
prescribed as 8 hours for adults, 7 hours for those aged 16 to
18, and 6 hours for those aged 14 and 15. These laws are
strictly enforced by civil authorities.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The government-established minimum wage applies to all workers,
even to those under 18 who work only 36 hours per week. While
it is difficult to determine what portion of the work force is
paid at the minimum wage, this wage, together with subsidies
provided workers, appears to provide an adequate standard of
living, although that is endangered by continuing inflation.
The Labor Law sets 46 hours as the standard workweek. For
those under 18 the standard workweek is 36 hours. Overtime is
forbidden by law except in case of national emergency or
natural disaster such as an earthquake or floods, and then only
with the concurrence of the local labor union.
The Labor Law, the Cooperatives Law, and the Enterprise Law
provide for occupational safety and health standards. These
standards are enforced by the Government and trade unions.
Violators may be fined and imprisoned. Nonetheless, according
to the FMTU, every fourth day a Mongolian worker dies from an
industrial accident.
943
NAURU
The Republic of Nauru, an 8.22-square mile Pacific island with
about 9,000 inhabitants, gained independence in 1968, at which
time it adopted a modified form of parliamentary democracy.
Prior to independence it had been administered by Australia.
Nauru has two levels of Government, the unicameral Parliament
and the Nauru Local Government Council (NLGC), both popularly
elected bodies. Parliamentary elections must be held at least
once every 3 years. The Parliament, consisting of 18 members
from 14 constituencies, is responsible for national and
international matters. The President, who is both head of
State and Head of Government, is elected by Parliament from
among its members. The NLGC acts as the local government and
is responsible for public services. The judiciary is
independent. Nauru has no armed forces, though it does
maintain an 87-man police force under civilian control.
The economy depends almost entirely on the country's rich
phosphate deposits, which are mined by the government-owned
Nauru Phosphate Corporation (NPC) . A large percentage of the
NPC's earnings are placed by the Government in long-term
investments meant to support the Nauruans after the phosphate
reserves have been exhausted. Using current extraction
techniques, Nauru's phosphate reserves will be exhausted —
probably by the year 2000.
Fundamental human rights are provided for in the Constitution
and generally respected in practice, although hard data and
systematic records are lacking. Discrimination and violence
against women remain the principal human rights problems.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no political disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits these practices, and this
prohibition is respected.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The constitutional prohibition against arbitrary arrest and
detention is honored. The police may hold a person for no more
than 24 hours without a hearing before a magistrate. Exile is
not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Nauru maintains an independent judiciary, and constitutional
provisions for both a fair hearing and a public trial are
respected. Defendants may have legal counsel, and a
representative will be appointed where required "in the
interest of justice." Nauru has only two trained lawyers, and
944
NAURU
many people are represented in court by "pleaders," trained
paralegals certified by the Government. There are no political
prisoners .
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution generally provides protection from these
abuses. Searches not sanctioned by court order are prohibited,
and there is no surveillance of individuals or of private
communications. However, Nauruan males must have permission
from the Government to marry a non-Nauruan; such permission has
not always been granted. Nauruan females are prohibited from
marrying foreigners. Birth control measures are not readily
available (see Section 5).
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of expression is provided for in the Constitution.
News and opinion circulate freely, rapidly, and widely by word
of mouth. Criticism of the Government, however, may not
receive media attention. The country has only one regular
publication, the Government Gazette, which contains only
official notices and announcements. The one radio station,
also owned and operated by the Government, broadcasts Radio
Australia and British Broadcasting Corporation news reports but
not local news. Satellite reception of pay television,
broadcast from New Zealand, became available in 1991. During
1991 there were reports that foreign journalists experienced
difficulty in obtaining access to information and interviews in
Nauru and that reporters who criticized the country were
discouraged from returning. It has not been possible to
confirm such reports. Foreign publications are available.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The constitutional right of peaceful assembly and association
is honored. No limitations exist on private associations, and
no permits need be obtained for public meetings.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is protected by the Constitution, and no
official religion is recognized by the Government. Several
different Christian denominations are established in Nauru.
Missionaries, foreign clergy, and religious publishing are all
permitted. Adherence to a particular faith results in no
advantage or disadvantage in any secular pursuit.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Nauruans are free to move and travel both domestically and
internationally. Domestic travel is particularly accessible,
since any place on the island is within a 3-hour walk. Foreign
workers must apply to their employers for permission to leave
during the period of their contracts. They may break the
contract and leave without permission but would lose their
positions and, often, a sizable bond as a result. In most
cases, foreign employees whose contracts are terminated by
their employers must leave Nauru within 60 days. Nauru does
not revoke citizenship for political reasons. Citizens who
have left the country have the right to return, and repatriates
945
NAURU
receive the same treatment as other citizens. No restrictions
on emigration exist.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have, and exercise, this right. Though Nauru has no
organized political parties, persons with diverse points of
view run for and are elected to Parliament and to the NLGC.
The President is elected by Parliament. Nauru has had seven
changes in presidential leadership since independence. Power
has always been transferred peacefully and in accordance with
the Constitution.
Voting by secret ballot is compulsory for all citizens over age
20 for parliamentary elections and for all over age 21 for NLGC
elections. All parliamentary seats have been contested during
recent elections. The 3,000 guest workers in Nauru have no
voice in political decisions.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no restrictions on the foundation of local groups
that concern themselves specifically with human rights, but to
date none has been formed. There have been no allegations by
outside organizations of human rights violations in Nauru, nor
any requests for investigations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution contains provisions assuring women the same
freedoms and protections as men. They are provided equal
opportunities by the Government in education and employment and
are free to own property and pursue private interests except,
as noted above, they are prohibited from marrying foreigners.
Nauru's population has been almost eliminated on several
occasions, first by disease and drought, then during World War
II as a result of massive removals by the Japanese. The
Government has gone to great lengths to encourage large
families. Contraceptives are available to women only after
they have five children, and then they are often difficult to
obtain. The island has no gynecological specialists. Nauruan
women complain that the emphasis on their reproductive role
limits their opportunities.
While no statistics exist to show its extent, physical abuse of
women in Nauru is a serious problem, with alcohol abuse
generally regarded as a major contributing factor. Previous
Nauruan governments have shown little interest in the problems
of women. The current Government gives high priority to
improved health care and education but it has not specifically
addressed the problem of physical abuse of women. In 1991 a
Nauruan was convicted of beating his wife to death.
Foreign laborers, mainly from Vanuatu and Kiribati, experience
some discrimination. While guest workers are provided free
housing, the shelters they are given are often poorly
maintained and severely overcrowded. Some foreigners allege
that Nauruan police rarely act on complaints they make against
Nauruan citizens.
946
NAURU
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for the right to assemble and
associate peaceably and to form and belong to trade unions or
other associations. Trade unions do not exist in Nauru,
however, and efforts to form them are officially discouraged.
The transient nature of the mostly foreign work force and the
relative prosperity of the Nauruans have tended to hamper
efforts to organize the labor force. No strikes took place in
1991.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Nauru lacks labor laws and legislation. The private sector in
Nauru employs only about 1 percent of Nauru's workers. For
government workers, salaries, working hours, vacation periods,
and other employment matters are determined by public service
regulations. There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is forbidden by the Constitution,
and there were no instances of either.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Nauruan law sets 17 as the minimum age of employment for
children. This is honored by the only two large employers, the
Government and the NPC. Some children under age 17 work in the
few small family-owned businesses.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wages paid on Nauru vary considerably between office
workers and manual laborers, but they suffice to provide an
adequate, if Spartan, standard of living. The minimum wage for
Nauruans is administratively set by the Government; wages for
foreign contract workers are determined by the employer and are
based on market conditions and the consumer price index.
Foreign workers and their families receive free housing,
utilities, medical treatment, and, often, a food allowance.
The workweek for office workers is 36 hours and for manual
laborers 40.
The Government sets health and safety standards. The NPC has
an active safety program that includes worker education and the
use of safety helmets, safety shoes, respirators for dusty
conditions, and other safety measures. In 1991 the NPC
established the position of safety officer, responsible for
improving safety standards throughout the company. During
1991, despite many workers' lax attitudes toward the use of
safety equipment, NPC had only two serious accidents.
947
NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand is a parliamentary democracy, with executive
authority vested in a 22-member cabinet led by a prime
minister. The 97 members of the unicameral legislature include
4 elected by those members of the native Maori minority who
wish to be included on a separate electoral roll.
Maori comprise approximately 12 percent of New Zealand's
population of 3,427,000, while other Pacific islanders total
about 3 percent. The rights of the native Maori minority have
been the subject of increasing public attention in recent
years. The Department of Maori Affairs is being phased out in
favor of the Iwi Transition Agency, charged with overseeing the
devolution of responsibility for Maori interests to Iwi
(tribal) authorities.
Niue and the Cook Islands are self-governing countries in free
association with New Zealand. The island group of Tokelau is
administered by New Zealand with limited but growing
self-government. Inhabitants of all three hold local and New
Zealand citizenship, and local law is compatible with New
Zealand and British common law.
The police and defense forces are responsible to and firmly
controlled by civilian officials.
New Zealand is one of the world's most efficient producers of
agricultural products. The mainstay of its economy is the
export of wool, meat, and dairy products. A small
manufacturing sector is engaged primarily in food processing,
metal fabrication, and wood and paper products. While real
annual economic growth has been low or negative in recent
years, the free enterprise economy affords most New Zealanders
a comfortable standard of living.
Human rights are respected and protected in New Zealand. New
Zealanders enjoy a wide range of freedoms and live under the
rule of law. There is respect for minority rights and concern
for the economically deprived.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Such killings do not occur.
b. Disappearance
There have been no instances of politically motivated
disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other forms of mistreatment are prohibited by law,
and these prohibitions are respected in practice.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
New Zealanders enjoy freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention,
and exile. The law provides for the writ of habeas corpus, and
persons arrested in New Zealand are promptly charged. Legal
948
NEW ZEALAND
aid is provided by the court to those who cannot afford to pay
for a private attorney. Preventive detention is prohibited.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
New Zealand law and an independent judiciary assure a prompt
and fair public trial. The rights of the accused are carefully
observed and subject to public scrutiny.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The right to privacy is protected by law. The Government does
not violate a person's privacy, the sanctity of the home, or
the integrity of correspondence.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press are provided for in law and
respected in practice. Several hundred newspapers and
magazines are published throughout the country, reflecting a
wide spectrum of political and social thought. The Government
makes no attempt to censor the press, and opposition viewpoints
are freely expressed.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Rights to peaceful assembly and association are recognized and
respected.
c. Freedom of Religion
New Zealand enjoys a long tradition of religious tolerance.
All faiths are given equal treatment under the law.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
New Zealanders are not subject to limitations on internal
movement or resettlement. Foreign travel is unrestricted and
the right to return is assured. To the extent of its
resources. New Zealand accepts and resettles refugees and
asylum seekers.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The people freely elect their government. Two major parties.
National and Labour, dominate the political scene and have
formed governments chosen in triennial elections for more than
50 years. There are no restrictions on the formation of
political parties, though smaller parties have historically
been of little conseqiaence in the national electoral process.
New Zealand law provides for universal suffrage at age 18. No
restrictions based upon sex, creed, or national origin limit
participation in the political process. Maori, other
minorities, and women regularly serve in Parliament and the
Cabinet. Voting rates are high, and participation in political
groups is common. Opposition groups freely voice their views
and can influence government policies.
In response to complaints that the current "f irst-past-the-post"
electoral system unfairly disadvantages third parties, the
949
NEW ZEALAND
Government has announced plans to hold a two-tiered referendum
in 1992-93 on whether to adopt some form of proportional
representation for the 1996 election. Both major political
parties have expressed support for holding the referendum,
although there is no clear consensus between them concerning
whether proportional representation or which form of it should
be adopted.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
New Zealand's commitment to human rights is demonstrated by the
efforts of both nongovernmental and official organizations to
protect human rights and prevent discrimination.
Nongovernmental organizations include: the New Zealand Council
for Civil Liberties, the Citizens Association for Racial
Equality, the New Zealand Chapter of the International
Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and the National
Council of Women. The ratification of the optional protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in
1989 allows individuals to request an independent U.N. Human
Rights Committee investigation of alleged abuses of rights.
The official but highly independent New Zealand Human Rights
Commission and the Office of the Race Relations Conciliator
work at the national and regional levels to adjudicate human
rights and discrimination complaints.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination based on the above factors is prohibited by
law. Despite the historical absence of overt discrimination
and the achievements and status of many successful Maori in
government and public life, some of the indigenous population
remain marginally educated and economically disadvantaged. A
relatively high percentage of Maori are unemployed and receive
state assistance. They figure disproportionately in crime
statistics and among the prison population.
The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, by which Maori chiefs ceded
sovereignty to the British crown, in recent years has become a
focal point for many Maori seeking a greater economic and
political voice. A special tribunal was established in 1975 to
hear claims to land and other rights under the Treaty. The
tribunal's role was strengthened by a 1989 court ruling that
its decisions would be regarded as binding in the case of land
held by state-owned enterprises.
The New Zealand Human Rights Commission hears complaints of
discrimination based on sex, marital status, national or ethnic
origin, and religious or ethical belief. The Government funds
shelters, provides assistance for victims of violence, and
prosecutes offenders.
Violence against women has received increased public and
governmental attention in recent years. The Crimes Amendment
Act of 1986 increased protection for the victim during trial by
allowing suppression of the victim's name and other details,
and eliminated the exemption for spousal rape. In 1987 the
police changed their policy on family violence, recpjiring that
arrests be made instead of attempting mediation at the scene.
Human rights organizations praise judges for supportively
issuing "nonmolestation" and "nonviolence" restraining orders
950
NEW ZEALAND
but complain that police continue to be reluctant to arrest
offenders even when the offender has a history of violence.
Women have become increasingly cognizant of their legal rights
as evidenced by the number of claims by sexual abuse victims to
the accident compensation corporation for "loss of the capacity
for enjoyment of life." Assistance organizations for such
victims have dramatically increased in numbers in recent years.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
New Zealand workers have unrestricted rights to establish and
join organizations of their own choosing and to affiliate those
organizations with other unions and international
organizations. Unions are protected from interference,
suspension, and dissolution by the Government and, in fact,
influence legislation and government policy. Unions have and
freely exercise the right to strike. Public sector unions,
however, are precluded from striking if work stoppages threaten
public safety, and new legislation prohibits (in both the
public and private sectors) strikes designed to enforce
national wage awards.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right of labor unions to organize and bargain collectively
is provided by law. Unions actively recruit members and engage
in collective bargaining.
Approximately half of all wage earners are represented by
unions, and the level is dropping. The Employment Contracts
Act, which became law May 15, ended compulsory membership in
labor unions. This legislation also scrapped the past system
of national awards, whereby one contract covered workers across
the country and across industrial lines. Under the new law,
employers may negotiate contracts with unions, with other
voluntary associations of workers, or with individuals.
Mediation and arbitration procedures are carried out
independently of government control. A system of labor courts
hears cases arising from disputes over interpretation of labor
laws. In addition, the Arbitration Commission and the
Mediation Service are available to handle wage disputes and
assist in maintaining effective labor relations. There are no
export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
All workers are protected from forced or compulsory labor by
law and in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children under the age of 15 may not be employed without
special government approval and must not work between the hours
of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. These laws are effectively enforced by
the Department of Labour .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
New Zealand enforces a 40-hour workweek, a minimum of 3 weeks'
annual paid vacation for all employees, and observance of II
paid public holidays. The government-mandated minimum wage is
adequate for a decent standard of living. In most cases.
951
NEW ZEALAND
minimum wage recipients also receive a variety of welfare
benefits. Most workers earn more than the minimum wage.
New Zealand has an extensive body of law and regulations
governing health and safety issues. Rules are enforced by
Department of Labour inspectors who have the power to shut down
equipment if necessary, and unions may file safety complaints
on behalf of workers.
952
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Papua New Guinea (PNG), with some 1,000 tribes and over 800
distinct languages, is one of the world's most diverse
societies. PNG has a federal parliamentary system based on
universal adult suffrage. The Constitution is similar to that
of other English-speaking parliamentary democracies in its
emphasis on respect for individual rights. The four transfers
of power since independence in 1975 have been constitutional
and peaceful .
The civilian government generally controls the military,
police, and intelligence organizations, but there have been
significant human rights abuses by individual members of the
police and the military. The former Papua New Guinea Defense
Force (PNGDF) commander for Northern Solomons Province
(Bougainville), Col. Leo Nuia, was rebuked by the Government
for undertaking an unauthorized military raid in the troubled
province in April.
Papua New Guinea's economy is characterized by a relatively
small but modern free enterprise sector heavily dependent on
foreign investment and a traditional subsistence sector that
involves the vast majority of the population. The modern
sector produces most of the wealth and slightly less than 80
percent of state revenue, with the balance of the Governinent ' s
budget needs made up by aid from Australia. PNG has great
difficulty in reconciling traditional land claims with official
efforts to develop its rich natural resources.
Resolving the insurgency in the North Solomons Province of
Bougainville remains a high priority for the Government. PNG
officials and Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) leaders
signed the "Honiara Accord" in early 1991, but efforts to
implement the agreement have been hampered by periodic
confrontations between soldiers and BRA rebels. The security
forces, in contrast to their earlier behavior, have begun to
demonstrate restraint toward members of the public in
reoccupied areas. Col. Nuia, however, admitted in April that
his forces had carried out several extrajudicial executions the
previous year. There were also credible allegations of BRA
torture and "disappearances" of persons in rebel-held areas.
PNG's fundamentally democratic social and political
institutions attempt to promote respect for human rights
throughout the country through the ombudsman mechanism.
However, individual members of the Royal Papua New Guinea
Constabulary (RPNGC) and the PNGDF committed significant human
rights violations, including murder, torture, physical
mistreatment, collective punishment, and arbitrary detention.
Although police and military offenders are sometimes tried and
convicted by the courts, not all the perpetrators of these
abuses are effectively punished.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Several possible cases of political or extrajudicial killing by
the PNGDF were reported in 1991. Gql . Leo Nuia, former PNGDF
commander in the North Solomons Province, stated on an
Australian television show in April that the PNGDF had executed
a United Church pastor, Raumo Benito, and- five of his
953
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
parishioners in February 1990 and thrown their bodies into the
ocean from a helicopter. The Government immediately relieved
Col. Nuia and prohibited further PNGDF Defense Force comments
to the media. Col. Nuia was apparently relieved for his
comments confirming that the incident had taken place. He has
not been court-martialed in connection with the original
incident. A soldier indicted for the killing of a
Bougainvillean mother and child in 1990 was court-martialed
and is currently serving a prison sentence. A BRA spokesman
claimed in late 1991 that government security forces and a
progovernment paramilitary group killed 48 residents of Buka
Island in some 36 separate incidents, but these allegations
have not been independently verified.
BRA insurgents killed two government soldiers in north
Bougainville in July and attacked PNGDF forces on two other
occasions. BRA leader Sam Kauona admitted in a February
television interview that the BRA killed four alleged criminals
in 1990.
Attorney General Bernard Narokobi appointed a senior magistrate
in September to conduct an inquest into the deaths of 11
persons during the 1989-90 conflict on Bougainville, including
three persons allegedly killed by the BRA and one by government
forces. The inquest, however, deals with only one of the 16
deaths attributed to security forces by a human rights group,
and the magistrate will face serious problems in gaining access
to potential witnesses located on Bougainville. Prime Minister
Namaliu has also promised to set up a commission of inquiry
into the Bougainville crisis that will deal with human rights
violations, once government control on Bougainville has been
reestablished .
RPNGC members are alleged to have engaged in extrajudicial
killings. One person reportedly was shot dead during a police
raid at Wanigela, near the capital of Port Moresby. Persons
from the Goilala region west of Port Moresby, angered at the
killing of one of their clan members during a shootout with
police, claimed the police have killed 28 youths from their
area but provided no evidence. Three policemen were convicted
separately of unlawful killing, manslaughter, and murder in
cases dating to 1989. Another police constable is being sought
for the murder of a student in 1989.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances
perpetrated by the Government or its forces; however, there
were credible allegations of BRA-perpetrated disappearances in
rebel-held areas.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other cruel or degrading treatment or punishment
are forbidden by the Constitution; nonetheless, there were
credible reports that government security forces, including the
PNGDF and RPNGC, engaged in such practices. Col. Nuia, former
Defense Force commander in North Solomons Province, was
reported to have severely beaten the cochairman of the
Government's Bougainville task force, Bernard Simiha, in Rabaul
in May for alleged BRA sympathies. PNGDF soldiers who
reoccupied Buka and portions of Bougainville generally
exhibited significantly improved discipline over their
performance a year ago. Six PNGDF soldiers, however, were
954
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
charged with shooting a Buka civilian — wounding him in the
head — and throwing a gasoline bomb at his house. The soldiers
are to be tried by the national court.
The BRA continued to control large portions of Bougainville,
primarily through physical intimidation. Criminal BRA elements
are reported to have extorted money and goods from storeowners,
destroyed schools, and robbed people. Limited communications,
however, impede the flow of information about government and
insurgent conduct on Buka and Bougainville.
Members of PNG's police force continue to inflict torture and
other punishment on prisoners and detainees. Intoxicated
police who abuse their authority are a major source of public
complaints. Five community school teachers in Chuave were
reportedly beaten up by drunken police in March, and a senior
Justice Department official was assaulted at a police
checkpoint in Port Moresby by intoxicated police in April.
Police also retaliated against persons who file complaints.
For example, police fired on a Mount Hagen security guard
supervisor (who had reportedly simply inquired about the
beating of one of his employees) and wounded another employee.
Excessive use of force by the RPNGC occurs frequently during
arrests. Two Popondetta policemen were sentenced to prison for
assaulting a man they had detained and firing a shotgun next to
his head. A national court office revealed in April that seven
complaints, supported by medical affidavits, had been filed
regarding police abuse in Wewak . There were also repeated
reports of criminal suspects appearing in court with signs of
physical brutality allegedly caused by the police.
Police misconduct sometimes provokes large-scale conflict with
communities. Policemen in Finschhafen, near Lae, were attacked
by villagers angered by police brutality. Police in Banz, in
the Western Highlands province, rampaged through several
villages after the station commander was injured in a melee
over an illegal bingo game. Repeated reports of blatant sexual
harassment by police against female citizens in Lae have
stimulated complaints by women's groups. Incidents of police
mobile squads burning houses and destroying property to punish
communities suspected of harboring criminals or engaged in
tribal warfare were reported in Chimbu, Eastern Highlands, and
Western Highlands provinces.
The Government recognizes the seriousness of police abuses.
Police Minister Ijape ordered Police Commissioner Geno to
discipline his men in February in response to "numerous
complaints from all sectors of the community on the behavior of
policemen." Shortly thereafter, however, the Government
Ombudsman deplored "police bashing." In August Commissioner
Geno ordered an investigation into the RPNGC 's public
complaints reporting system.
The courts willingly hear cases of police abuse and mete out
proportional punishment when convictions, based on evidence,
are obtained. In addition to the judicial proceedings
previously noted, three policemen were convicted of
participating in a gang rape and sentenced to 6 years in
prison. Papua New Guinea's active free press and network of
churches expose incidents when they can, and abuses can be
investigated by the Ombudsman Commission. The problems,
however, are aggravated by the RPNGC ' s tendency to adopt
paramilitary tactics and attitudes, widening the gap between
themselves and the communities they serve.
955
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The courts, grounded in the Australian system of jurisprudence
and English common law, strongly enforce constitutional
protections against arbitrary arrest and detention. Exile is
not practiced, and judicially issued warrants are required for
all arrests. Suspects have the right to legal counsel.
Accused persons are informed of charges, their arrest is
subject to judicial review, and they have the right to bail,
except when judges rule otherwise. Police misconduct, as
described previously, sometimes limits these rights in
practice, but constitutional protections are upheld when cases
come to the attention of the courts.
In April 133 suspected BRA members and criminals were reported
to have been detained at the Hahela Care Center on Buka Island,
in some cases for up to 3 months without trial. A national
court judge who visited Buka in May ordered authorities to
release or charge the detainees. They released 99 detainees
without charge; charged 21, who were released pending trial;
and announced that 13 had requested to remain in protective
custody. At year's end, there were some 26 cases involving
allegations of human rights abuse pending on Buka island.
These cases are to be taken up in February 1992 during the next
quarterly judicial circuit visit. National M.P. Michael Ogio,
who spent 13 months in isolation at his home village on
Bougainville under BRA orders, reported that the BRA was
keeping many people under house arrest
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The independent court system in Papua New Guinea is similar to
those in other countries with English common law traditions.
The law guarantees a public trial, and due process rights are
provided for in the Constitution. Defendants have the right to
an attorney, even at public expense, in felony cases involving
violence. The defendant and his or her attorney may confront
witnesses, present evidence, plead their cases, and appeal
convictions. Given the relative shortage of police and
judicial resources and an exceptionally high crime rate,
periods between arrest and trial can be long. Such periods of
detention, however, are subject to strict judicial review. The
courts are completely independent of executive, political, or
military authorities, and the Government does not hold any
prisoners on purely political grounds.
The judiciary is hampered in investigating human rights abuses
on Bougainville by its lack of access to the island, which is
largely controlled by the BRA. Up to 66 applications alleging
human rights violations by the Government have been filed with
the national court in Rabaul by Bougainvilleans, but they have
not been adjudicated because the court has been unable to gain
access to the complainants on Bougainville.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Privacy rights are not widely abused, but police are known to
burn homes in the highlands to quell intertribal conflict and
punish communities suspected of harboring criminals. There
have also been reports of forcible entry into homes by police
searching for criminals or retaliating against persons who
complain about police misconduct. A national M.P. was evicted
from his government-owned residence by police acting without
authority, but his eviction was overturned the next day by the
956
" PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Government. The forced eviction of squatters became a
significant issue in the towns of Rabaul, Lae,. and Wau during
1991.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Armed conflict on Buka and Bougainville islands (which together
make up the North Solomons Province) continued during 1991 but
at much reduced levels compared to the previous 2 years,
primarily due to the Government's desire to settle the
insurgency through negotiation rather than confrontation. The
January 1991 Honiara Accord between the Government and the BRA
held out hope that services could be restored while deferring
the issue of Bougainville's political status, but progress in
implementing the accord was slow. The PNGDF reoccupied part of
Bougainville in April, sparking BRA charges of bad faith and,
ultimately, renewed BRA attacks on government forces. The
Government hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance to
Bougainville by nongovernmental organizations (NGO's),
prompting the Australian Government to request improved access
for Australian NGO's.
Government security forces exercised restraint in areas they
reoccupied, i.e., Buka island and part of northern
Bougainville. Most specific allegations of security force
abuses now date to 1989-1990. The PNGDF was reported in
January to have strafed Bougainville villages from helicopters,
but there have been no more such claims since then. The
Government continues to restrict movement of people and
supplies to Bougainville. Its blockade, aimed at undercutting
support for the BRA, has imposed significant hardships on the
people of Bougainville. M.P. Michael Ogio claims that the
fighting on Bougainville has caused 1,500 deaths, with another
3,000 deaths due to the government- imposed blockade. Others
have made similiar claims, although a recent visit by NGO
relief officials raises questions about these claims.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech, including
freedom of the broadcast media and publications. An
independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning
democratic political system have combined to promote freedom of
speech and press. Decreased tension over the Bougainville
insurgency led to fewer clashes between the Government and the
media .
The Government nonetheless continued to exhibit sensitivity to
adverse foreign reporting about Papua New Guinea. In
particular, the Government barred Australian television
reporters in April because their station had produced an
unflattering show about Papua New Guinea. Australian
television network SBS employees were also barred after they
had illegally entered Bougainville to produce a television show
on which Col. Nuia, the Government's former military commander
in the North Solomons, confirmed PNGDF atrocities to an
interviewer. M.P. Galen Lang complained about media
sensationalization of crime in PNG and said he hoped criminals
would assault journalists, sparking an outcry from PNG media.
Despite these restrictions, the Government refrained from
interfering with domestic media. For example, the National
Broadcasting Commission, operating PNG's key network of radio
957
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Stations, continues to exercise complete autonomy over its news
reporting. The Censorship Act, prohibiting pornography, went
into effect in 1990 but has had little visible impact.
Academic freedom is generally respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Private associations and public assemblies are legal.
Associations do not require formal registration. International
affiliation of church and civic groups is also freely
permitted. Public demonstrations require police approval; this-
is not denied for political purposes but is occasionally denied
for reasons of public order.
c. Freedom of Religion
There are no restrictions on and no discrimination against the
practice of religion, which is protected by law. Many
indigenous and Christian denominations flourish side by side
with small Buddhist and Muslim minorities. Missionaries work
and move freely throughout the country and provide the majority
of such social services as are available in many remote areas.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The only real restriction on freedom of movement is the
Bougainville blockade, which limits travel and communication to
and from that island province. In November the blockade was
relaxed somewhat. Freedom of movement within and outside the
country is not restricted by law, although several provincial
premiers have taken steps to evict squatters from other parts
of the country and encourage them to return to their homes.
The Government hosts between 4,500 and 5,000 Melanesian
refugees from Irian Jaya, the neighboring province of
Indonesia, with support from the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) . Approximately 1,500 to 2,000 of these have
land or kinship ties with Papua New Guineans and live just
inside Papua New Guinea. They are not provided services by
either the Government or the UNHCR. While Papua New Guinea
recognizes Irian Jaya as an integral part of Indonesia, the
Government nonetheless grants asylum to qualified refugees.
Although the Government closed Irian Jayan refugee camps close
to the border in July, it helped to organize large-scale
voluntary repatriations in conjunction with the UNHCR and the
International Committee of the Red Cross. The Government
continued to administer UNHCR assistance to about 3,000
refugees at the sole remaining camp at East Awin.
Mecky Salosa, an Irian Jayan, ethnic Melanesian and Organisasi
Papua Merdeka (0PM — Free Papua Movement) leader extradited from
Papua New Guinea in 1990, was sentenced to life imprisonment in
Indonesia for organizing and participating in an attack on a
transmigration camp in which 14 people died. Salosa reportedly
escaped from an Irian Jayan prison in August and was found dead
of starvation. The Government arrested a number of 0PM
supporters and destroyed 0PM camps along the 450-mile border
from April through June. There were no known repatriations of
0PM members to Indonesia during 1991. One human rights group
urged the Government to cease the forced repatriation of Irian
Jayan opponents of Indonesian rule.
958
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Section 3 Respect for- Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens freely exercise their right to change their government
through direct elections with a secret ballot and universal
adult suffrage. The voters elect a unicameral Parliament made
up of 109 members from all 19 provinces and the Port Moresby
National Capital District. Any citizen can stand for election,
and several foreign-born citizens sit in the Parliament. With
a multiplicity of small parties, coalition governments tend to
be weak and shifting; none has yet survived its 5-year
electoral mandate. There have been four peaceful changes of
government since independence. National parliamentary
elections will next take place in June 1992, and the Government
is expending over $17 million to educate and employ polling
workers to ensure open, fair elections.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
While there are no official barriers to the formation of local
human rights groups, so far as is known none has been formed.
The Government's attitude toward investigation of alleged
violations of human rights by local and international human
rights groups has been defensive but not repressive. The
Government permitted Amnesty International (AI) to visit Papua
New Guinea during 1990, although high-ranking officials
declined to meet with AI delegation members. The Government
has not responded yet to specific allegations, detailed by
Amnesty International in a November 1990 report, of
extrajudicial executions and torture committed by security
forces on Bougainville, except to include one of the deaths in
a coroner's inquest authorized by the Attorney-General.
The BRA, before a U.N. working group in Geneva meeting on
indigenous populations, accused the Government of violating the
Genocide Convention and called for international monitoring of
the Honiara Accord. The Government rejected the charges.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Extreme ethnic and geographic diversity prevent domination by
any one tribe or clan. The democratically elected government,
based on loose coalitions, cannot afford to favor one group
consistently over another.
Despite extensive rights for women provided by the Constitution
and law, traditional patterns of discrimination against women
result in significant human rights abuses. Some women in the
modern sector have achieved significant positions, serving as
doctors, lawyers, business executives, civil servants, and in
high government positions. No woman currently sits in the
Parliament nor are there women in the Cabinet. However,
despite legal guarantees regarding family law, marriage, and
property rights, most women still live in a traditional system
which relegates them to secondary status. PNG judges said, in
their 1990 annual report issued in 1991, that women are
frequently imprisoned by village courts for essentially marital
difficulties. A number of women prisoners jailed by village
courts in highlands provinces were set free by judges.
Violence against women, including rape, is widespread. Some
tribal and clan cultures emphasize antagonism between the
959
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
sexes. While women are ostensibly protected by their family
and clan, they are nonetheless often victims of violence and
force. Attacks on women remain common in intertribal warfare.
Fear of rape, especially gang rape, is common among women and
constrains all their movements and activities. The authorities
attempt to punish rape with prison sentences, but assailants
are seldom apprehended, in part because the police force is
understaffed and undertrained . The death penalty, adopted in
August but not yet in effect, will apply to persons convicted
of gang rape.
Both the Government and public organizations are working to
upgrade the status of women. The Government provides a grant
to the National Council of Women. The Prime Minister's wife is
active in the national family planning movement.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right to form and join labor unions is protected by law,
subject to registration by the Department of Labor. While the
Government does not use registration as a form of control over
unions, an unregistered union has no legal standing with the
Department of Labor or before the courts and accordingly could
not operate with full effectiveness. Unionized workers number
approximately 140,000 of the 280,000 wage earners in the formal
economy and are organized into some 50 trade unions, most of
which are associated with the Trade Unions Congress. Unions
are independent of the Government and of political parties.
Both private and public sector unions have the right to strike,
though public workers have rarely done so. An example of a
strike in the public sector occurred in 1990 and again in 1991,
when post and telecommunications workers struck. During the
latter strike, the National Court issued an injunction ordering
workers back to work in response to a formal request from the
Post and Telecommunications Corporation, a wholly government-
owned firm. Workers did return to work, and their demands were
later addressed. Unions may freely affiliate with
international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Constitution ensures workers the right to engage in
collective bargaining, to join industrial organizations, and to
seek employment. These rights are exercised freely. The law
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against union
members and organizers. The Department of Labor and
Employment, as well as the courts, resolve complaints. There
are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution forbids slavery and all forms of forced or
compulsory labor, and no reports of their practice have been
received .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum working age is 18. However, children between the
ages of 11 and 18 may be employed in family related work
provided they have parental permission, a medical clearance,
and a work permit from a labor office. Such employment is rare
except in subsistence agriculture. There is no compulsory
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PAPUA NEW GUINEA
minimum education requirement. The Department of Labor and
Employment and the courts take steps to enforce the minimum age
law but are hampered by a lack of resources.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The workweek is limited by law to 42 hours (44 in rural
areas). The basic minimum wage provides a bare minimum
standard of living by local standards. Minimum wages are set
by the Minimum Wage Board, a qua si -governmental body with
worker and employer representation, and vary according to the
type of work and industry and whether the work is urban or
rural. Wage levels, allowances, rest periods, holidays, leave,
and overtime are regulated by law. Under the Employment Act of
1978, a housing allowance or provision of housing is a
perquisite in employment, although this latter benefit is
enjoyed mostly by public sector employees.
Enforcement of the Industrial Health and Safety Law and
regulations is the responsibility of the Department of Labor.
The law requires that inspections take place on a regular
basis, but because there are too few inspectors, they generally
occur only when requested by workers or unions. Sanctions for
violations are rarely applied. Moreover, the health and safety
regulations are still under revision.
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The Philippines has a republican form of government with a
democratically elected president and a bicameral legislature.
The nation continues to be troubled by a declining but still
potent Communist insurgency, active in many of the country's 73
provinces. The threat from rightwing military rebels has
subsided considerably, due in part to government success in
arresting a number of their leaders during the first half of
the year .
With the abolition of the 42,000-man Philippine Constabulary
(PC) in January and its absorption into the newly created
Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) number some 125,000 men. Under the law
establishing the PNP, the police in 1993 are scheduled to take
over responsibility for the counter insurgency effort from the
military. A civilian militia force, the Citizen Armed Forces
Geographic Units (CAFGUS), is paid and trained by the
military. Augmenting the CAFGUS and providing security and
intelligence in areas cleared of the insurgency are Civilian
Voluntary Organizations (CVO's). They are generally unarmed.
Elements of the security forces again committed human rights
abuses in the course of counter insurgency efforts.
A significant portion of the Philippine economy remains
agricultural, and most enterprises are family owned. Land
reform, a key element of the Government's economic strategy,
remains bogged down in the face of resistance from powerful
landholding interests. The eruption of Mount Pinatubo and the
subseqiient mud flows dealt another blow to the already weak
economy. Overall, gross domestic product declined by 0 . 6
percent in the first half of 1991, largely from a drop in
industrial sector output and capital investment. The inflation
rate in November 1991 rose to 16 percent on an annualized basis.
Statistics on violations and abuses of human rights are
collected by the Philippine government and a number of
international and private human rights organizations. On the
government side, the constitutionally mandated Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) gathers information and investigates
allegations of violation and abuse. Among the private groups.
Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP) is the most
prominent .
Aggregate information from CHR, TFDP and other groups showed a
drop in reports of violations and abuses for 1991, continuing a
trend first seen in 1989. Many human rights violations were
committed in the context of the counter insurgency . Police
units also seriously abused human rights in the course of
ordinary law enforcement duties. Principal human rights abuses
by government forces included extrajudicial killings;
disappearances; arbitrary arrest; torture; and harassment of
suspected insurgents and their supporters. Such labels can be
attached very casually and have been used as a justification
for acting against critics of the government, labor union
activists, civil rights attorneys, and, sometimes, innocent
bystanders. Although the Government remains committed to the
respect of human rights, it has not been effective in curbing
and punishing abuses. In an effort to exert more control, it
adopted a number of new policies, including the extension of
the jurisdiction of civilian courts over military personnel.
It is too early to know how effective these policies will be.
The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed
wing, the New People's Army (NPA), were also responsible for
many abuses of human rights — although they also showed a
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declining pattern, reflecting a general decrease in guerrilla
activity during the period. Government supporters make the
point that false claims by insurgents of official abuse
weakened the credibility of all reports of human rights abuses
and undermined administration efforts to enforce strict
standards of accountability among the military and police.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
CHR reported 138 incidents of murder during the January-June
period of 1991. It reported 386 in 1990 and 525 in 1989. TFDP
reported 49 people murdered and 36 people killed in massacres
through December 15, 1991. TFDP listed 223 killings for all of
1990 and 368 for 1989. The numbers given by CHR are larger
because it monitors violations by both the Government and
insurgent groups, including the CPP/NPA.
Many of the killings in which military and police involvement
is alleged occurred in the context of counter insurgency
operations. For example, 10 persons were killed in separate
incidents between November 29 and December 24 in the environs
of Clark Air Base, apparently sparked by the November 27 murder
of a Philippine army sergeant assigned to an intelligence unit
of the 24th Infantry Battalion. The National Democratic Front
(NDF), the political wing of the CPP, charged that the murders
were connected with military efforts to root out the CPP/NPA 's
political infrastructure in the area of Clark through a program
of assassination. A review of the evidence suggests that the
military may have been responsible for 3 of the 10 murders.
The 24th Infantry Battalion was subsequently transferred out of
the area. No charges were filed in connection with the
murders, and the military men involved were neither relieved
nor otherwise administratively punished. Philippine Department
of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors complain that witnesses to the
shootings have not come forward, preventing them from pursuing
the cases. Witnesses to human rights violations are frequently
unwilling to testify for fear of reprisals. Senior military
officers believe that the men of the 24th were responding
legitimately to a provocation from the NPA.
A more complex series of incidents running from September 1990
through February 1991, collectively referred to as the
Pangasinan massacres after the northern Luzon province in which
they occurred, claimed the lives of some 27 persons. The
incidents led to the organization of a DOJ fact-finding
mission. The alleged perpetrators of the killings include
elements of the military, police, CAFGUS, and armed civilian
vigilantes. Bishop Gabriel Garol of the Ecumenical Movement
for Justice and Peace (EMJP) decried "terror tactics through
the use of private armies" for the purpose of "silencing
people" viewed as potential opposition. However, a review of
the DOJ report and one issued by the local Pangasinan diocese
of Alaminos shows that the motivations and circumstances of the
killings range from an encounter between military and NPA
forces in Labrador municipality to a possible reprisal for
cattle rustling in Malimpin, to a personal vendetta in
Magatarem, to likely criminal activity in Peralta. The
Government failed to prosecute these cases vigorously,
particularly in those instances involving military, police, and
local government officials. Too often, instances of criminal
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activity are excused by depicting the victims as deserving
their fate because of their alleged support for the
insurgency. Ironically, groups on the left give credence to
these views by linking most violations to the counter insurgency
effort. The result is a legal paralysis that undermines
respect for the law and encourages an environment in which
violations of basic human rights are tolerated.
The CAFGUS continvje to be implicated in a number of murders.
TFDP found CAFGUS involved in 41 out of 357 (H percent) of
reported incidents of abuses during the first half of the
year. Figures from CHR found involvement in 50 of 669
incidents. One flagrant example occurred on November 22, 1990,
when three members of Teatro Obrero, a theater group sponsored
by the National Federation of Sugar Workers, were killed in
Murcia, Negros Occidental, while allegedly attempting to escape
from the custody of a unit of CAFGUS attached to the 11th
Infantry Battalion. There is good reason to believe that the
three were executed, but local commanders have exonerated the
CAFGUS unit involved, presumably reasoning that the victims
were supporters if not members of the NPA.
Many murders were attributed to the NPA. High on the list were
former insurgents who had surrendered to the Government. On
January 4, 1991, rebel returnee Esteban Domingo was executed by
the NPA in full view of his family in Dumalneg, Ilocos Norte.
Targeting of management in labor disputes also occurred. On
February 18, 1991, Aurelio Reginaldo, the personnel manager at
a leading Mindanao banana plantation, was gunned down by the
rebels while out on a Sunday drive with his family. Innocent
bystanders were also murdered in the course of NPA ambushes and
robbery attempts. On June 7, 1991 10 persons, including 4
children, died when the guerrillas opened fire on a passenger
jeepney bus near New Corella, Davao del Norte.
Assassinations by NPA hit teams operating in metropolitan
Manila declined sharply in 1991. Only two were recorded for
the year, compared with over 60 in 1990. In response to the
murder of 10 Americans by such NPA hit teams, and with ongoing
threats to Philippine civilian and military officials as well
as to official and private U.S. citizens, the Philippine
Government intitiated a coordinated police effort to identify
and apprehend members of these organizations. The decline in
1991 was due less to NPA restraint than to effective police
work, which resulted in the arrest of several key leaders of
the Alex Boncayo Brigade and the capture of the alleged
director behind the NPA program of urban terrorism, Romulo
Kintanar. However, the military and police were accused of
human rights abuses in the course of this antiterrorism drive.
Specifically, nongovernmental organizations charged that
government security personnel were involved in the killings of
alleged NPA hit men Jose Lascano on January 3 and Fernando
Baldomar on August 8. In general, however, the operation
achieved great success within the limits of the law.
Violence related to Muslim groups was concentrated in the
handful of provinces in Mindanao where they hold a majority.
Typically, the violence was as much between rival Muslim groups
as it was against Christians. An example is a shooting
incident in Jolo, Sulu, on May 23, 1991, in which 6 persons
died and at least 21 were injured. The shooting originated in
a longstanding feud between the families of Vice Governor Kimar
Tulawie and Jolo Mayor Soud Tan.
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Tensions between the Muslim and Christian communities also run
deep, as seen in the series of kidnapings in Cotabato City
discussed in Section l.b. Another example is an April 13
drive-by incident in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in which 3
people were killed and 17 wounded. Police believe that the
incident was triggered by a series of kidnaping-murders in
which three Muslims were killed, possibly by Christian CAFGUS
members .
Two journalists died violently in 1991. Nesino Toling, editor
and publisher of the Pangli Bay Monitor in Ozamis City,
Mindanao, was shot and killed April 14. Toling had been active
in exposing organized crime activities. Although his murder
generated high-level interest and two suspects were arrested,
the case remained unsolved at year's end. On May 5, Philippine
Punch editor Candido Baslisco was murdered in Cebu. Police
have made several arrests in connection with the case. His
killing is thought to have been connected to Basilisco's
championing of the workers' side in a local labor dispute.
Although several arrests were made, the case was still
unresolved at year's end.
b. Disappearance
CHR listed 14 cases of disappearance in the first half of
1991. It reported figures of 46 in 1990 and 64 in 1989.
During the period from January 1 through December 15, TFDP
reported a total of 37 disappearacnes . This was a sharp
decline from the 77 persons it listed as missing during all of
1990. In 28 of the 37 cases, persons were reported as having
disappeared after arrest and detention by the military.
Government counter insurgency efforts are centered on "Special
Operations Team" (SOT) operations aimed at uprooting the
CPP/NPA political infrastructure at the barangay level.
Central to the theory of the SOT process are "seminars" at
which a dialog is established between residents and government
and military representatives to uncover local grievances and
persuade the people of the Government's intent to remedy them.
However, practice often departed from theory in the field, and
many alleged instances of disappearance occurred in the context
of SOT operations. An example is a credible report of the
"disappearance" between February 8 and 13 of Manuel Capitulo, a
relative of alleged local NPA leader Alex Capitulo. One
objective account indicated that the approach taken in SOT
operations by the 24th Infantry Battalion outside Clark Air
Base in late 1990 depended more on intimidation than persuasion.
Aggressive interrogations frequently escalate into torture or
killing. This may have happened to Olimpio Poso, whose naked,
bound body was found on January 13 about 3 weeks after his
arrest by soldiers from the 19th Infantry Battalion in San
Isidro, northern Samar .
Despite the decline in recorded disappearances for 1991, the
number of cases outstanding from previous years remains large.
In organizing a special task force in January to follow up on
disappearance cases, the Government acknowledged that 560 cases
remain unsolved, 300 of which occurred since the bloodless
uprising which brought Mrs. Aquino to power in 1986. According
to one credible local human rights organization, of the more
than 50 persons alleged to have disappeared in 1990, 15 have
reappeared and 5 have been found dead. The whereabouts of the
others is unknown.
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On June 18 a memorandum was signed between CHR, the military,
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), and the
DOJ setting new guidelines for the release of detainees. Under
these guidelines, release from detention must be witnessed by
the family of the detainee, legal counsel, or CHR. The local
prosecutor or some person of standing in the local community
must also be present. If these procedures are not followed, it
is the Government that bears the burden of proof for
establishing the veil-being of the detainee, should he have
disappeared. The agreement is a step forward but does not deal
with the problem of "attempted escape" that has been used
sometimes by the military and police to cover up murder and
torture. On November 18, Elias Carullo was arrested by
elements of the 42nd Infantry Battalion in Mulaney, Quezon.
Carullo has subsequently made allegations of torture. The
military says that his bruises occurred during an escape
attempt on November 21.
The CPP/NPA is also implicated in many disappearances. It has
"arrested" and killed activists in the party and front
organizations on suspicion of being government agents. On
October 19, 1990 the NPA seized Arvey Duane Drown, an American
traveling in Northern Luzon. At year's end, the NPA had still
not released Drown from captivity. On September 1, government
troops unearthed the remains of 36 NPA members apparently
killed by other NPA members in Calatrava, Negros Occidental.
The bodies were reportedly those of victims of plan "Zombie,"
an NPA internal purge designed to rid guerrilla ranks of
alleged government informers.
During the 6-month period between September 1990 and March
1991, Cotabato City witnessed a series of 29 kidnapings
engineered by a renegade Muslim National Liberation Front
(MNLF) faction. The kidnaping on March 27 of a French priest
finally led the Government to dispatch a Marine battalion to
the city. The targets of the kidnapings were largely
Chinese-Filipino businessmen and the motive ransom, but
tensions in the city between the Christian majority and the
Muslim minority encouraged and prolonged the violence.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhxim.an, or Degrading
Treatment and Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture and makes evidence obtained
thereby inadmissible in court. Guidelines issued by CHR in
1988 direct all law enforcement agencies and military elements
to avoid unnecessary force during investigation, arrest,
detention, interrogation, and other activities. Despite these
prohibitions, torture does occur. CHR recorded 5 cases in the
first half of 1991 and 79 in 1990. TFDP reported 135 cases of
torture for the period January 1 through December 15, 1991. In
1990, it recorded 249 cases. The difference may be accounted
for by the fact that victims of torture fear reprisal from the
military or police if they approach CHR to seek redress.
Unlike TFDP, CHR only occasionally investigates a case if there
is no formal complaint from the victim.
Mistreatment most commonly takes place during counter insurgency
operations in the field by the military, police, and CAFGUS.
Beatings said to have occurred in the course of January 22-30
operations by the 21st Infantry Battalion in Conner,
Kalinga-Apayao, are a typical example. During tactical
interrogations, the soldiers allegedly boxed the ears of a
13-year-old boy, hit another person with the butt of an M-16
rifle, and tied the hands and feet of two young men and left
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them out in the rain overnight. The boy was forced to point
out local NPA members at a checkpoint set up by the soldiers;
the person hit with the M-16 rifle was arrested on charges of
illegal possession of a weapon; and the young men were forced
to admit that they were members of the NPA and were later
released after agreeing to "surrender." Similar violations may
have occurred as well in July during operations conducted in
Zambales by the military and police in the wake of the Mount
Pinatubo eruption. The objective was probably to root out CPP
and NPA cadre forced out of the hills and into refugee camps in
search of food and shelter. TFDP asserts that as many as 13
persons were arrested and beaten in the municipalities of Santa
Cruz and Mansinloc.
Women have not escaped such violence. TFDP reports an incident
on June 6 in which a 6-month-pregnant woman in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya was allegedly raped and her husband beaten by a CAFGUS
unit attached to the 17th Infantry Battalion while searching
their home in a remote barangay for weapons. CHR reported the
rape case of a young married woman in Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayo,
whose father was accused of being a supplier for the NPA. The
young woman filed charges in court against the rapists. She
and her sister were subsequently murdered by a second armed
trio whose camouflage-clad leader allegedly was identified as a
member of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA), a
locally based paramilitary group.
Ordinary citizens involved in common criminal cases are not
immune to the dangers of brutality at the hands of the police.
Rodolfo Herrera, Jr., claimed that he had been beaten by
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents after his arrest
for a September 7 shootout with police in which his father was
killed. Although the NBI disputes it, a CHR investigation
confirms Herrera 's account. Following an earlier series of
cases involving police brutality, CHR dispatched a letter to
PNP Director General General Cesar Nazareno on February 5
asserting that such incidents "demonstrate a breakdown of
discipline in the police forces."
Although physical punishment is prohibited by law in the
Philippine penal system, it occurs frequently in jails and
prisons. Most brutality in jails and prisons is committed by
other inmates rather than by prison guards. Recognizing this,
the DOJ agreed in September to requests that detainees held on
subversion charges at nationally administered Muntinlupa prison
be segregated from the criminal prison population.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution requires a judicial determination of probable
cause before issuance of an arrest warrant and prohibits
holding prisoners incommunicado or in secret places of
detention. Detainees have the right to a judicial review of
the legality of detention and, except for offenses punishable
by a life sentence, to bail. An executive order requires
authorities to file charges within 12 to 36 hours of arrest,
depending on the seriousness of the crime.
CHR listed 69 cases of illegal detention for the January-June
period of 1991, compared with 195 in all of 1990 and 212 in
1989. TFDP found that 1053 persons were arrested illegally
during the period January 1 through December 15, 1991. Some
884 were later released. This compares with 3,789 arrested in
1990, of which 357 were still in custody at the year's end.
Most of the TFDP cases involved demonstrators who were picked
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up for illegal assembly and were released a few hours after
their arrest.
The Supreme Court of July 1990 decision permitting warrantless
arrests on the basis that subversion is a "continuing offense"
did not produce the flood of arrests feared by its critics.
Still, Philippine security forces did frequently violate
constitutional requirements when handling suspected Communist
insurgents. Suspects were sometimes held and interrogated
without legal proceedings for periods ranging from several days
to several months. When charges were filed, they often had a
weak evidentiary basis.
At the heart of the Government's legal problems in combating
the insurgency is its internal security law. Rebellion or
subversion is a crime punishable by a maximum sentence of 12
years, entitling those charged to bail. The relatively light
punishment for these crimes is an outgrowth of years of
oppression under Marcos when opponents of the regime were
arrested for subversion, held without bail, and sentenced to
long prison terms. Faced with this constraint, the Aquino
Government routinely has filed criminal charges of illegal
possession of firearms, murder, and kidnaping that allow denial
of bail, in order to prevent the release of captured insurgents
who could return to the underground. This practice sometimes
places government cases on shaky legal grounds and invites
abuses, at times actually undermining counter insurgency
efforts. For example. National NDF Chairman Saturnino Ocampo
and his wife, Carolina Malay, a prominent CPP leader, both
imprisoned for 2 years without bail, were acquitted of
kidnaping charges filed by the Government, although additional
charges remain pending. Ocampo remains in custody, while Malay
was released on bail to care for the couple's children.
Several hundred military officers and men are still detained
for their role in the August 1987 and December 1989 coup
attempts and in the October 1990 Mindanao mutiny. As military
personnel they are to be tried in courts-martial and are not
eligible for bail. New AFP Chief of Staff Lisandro Abadia has
since May 1991 pursued a policy of reconciliation with the
rebel military that has resulted in the release of many junior
officers and enlisted personnel to the custody of their
commanders, although they still must face the courts. The move
has sparked demands that similar consideration be given to
leftist detainees, such as former CPP Secretary Rafael Baylosis
who has remained in prison since his 1987 capture. So far, the
Government has refused to entertain this rec[uest. One
Communist leader was released from detention and another is
scheduled for release in 1992. Former NPA chief Juanito Rivera
was convicted on charges of subversion and rebellion in August
1991, and his sentence commuted to time served on humanitarian
grounds. Rivera stated that he will not return to the
underground movement. Former Party Chairman Rodolfo Salas
pleaded guilty to similar charges in May and took an oath of
allegiance to the Government. He is scheduled to be released
in the spring of 1992 after serving the minimum 6-year sentence.
The Government has rarely used internal or foreign exile for
political purposes. It ended the ban on the return of Mrs.
Imelda Marcos and her children on July 31. The Marcoses were
issued one-way travel documents to the Philippines. The
remains of the late President Marcos are still banned from the
country, because of the fear that their return might lead to
disorder. The revocation on national security grounds of the
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passport of NPA founder Jose Maria Sison was still in effect at
year ' s end .
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution calls for an independent judiciary and
provides that those accused of crimes shall be informed of
charges against them and have the right to counsel. Trials are
public. Defendants are presumed innocent and have the right to
confront witnesses against them, to present evidence, and to
appeal their convictions. The right of defendants to a lawyer
is generally respected. There were no convictions in a major
human rights case in 1991. The one significant decision was
the acquittal by a military court of the soldiers involved in
the August 1990 Sultan Kudarat cases, in which 19 members of a
family were massacred by a military patrol.
Moreover, a number of particularly egregious cases from past
years remain unresolved. Six policemen charged in the
assassination attempt on November 10, 1987 of Polytechnic
University of the Philippines President Nemesio Prudente are
out on bail as their case slowly moves through the legal
system. Arrests have yet to be made in the murder of Attorney
Emmanuel Mendoza on July 2, 1988, despite President Aquino's
express order to then NBI Director Antonio Carpio for speedy
progress .
The repeal of Presidential Directive 1850 in June 1991
transferred jurisdiction in all criminal cases involving
military and police defendants back to civilian courts. There
are exceptions when the charges are "service related,"
however. It remains to be seen, whether the civilian courts
can be more effective. Moreover, as the Mendoza case
demonstrates, in the absence of good police investigative work
justice cannot be pursued effectively. Acts of harassment,
however, impeded lawyers' defense efforts. On January 2, Free
Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) lawyer Nerio Zamora was
threatened by a local police official when he sought to meet
with a client held in the stockade. On May 24, two FLAG
lawyers were charged with subversion by another local
policeman, angered by their defense of a human rights worker
suspected of ties to the NPA.
Despite the introduction of the continuous trial system, most
trial courts remain backlogged, and only a few are in
compliance with the 90-day limit for hearing a case. There is
an urgent need for more judges and courtrooms.
TFDP reports 650 political prisoners are detained in the
Philippines. This count is derived from the number of persons
in prison charged with subversion and rebellion. These include
senior CPP/NPA members, but not military officers and enlisted
personnel involved in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts, whose
cases are being tried in the military court system. CHR does
not keep statistics on political prisoners and points out that
many held on charges of subversion are also facing counts of
murder, kidnaping, or other serious crimes.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under the Constitution, search warrants may be issued by a
judge on a finding of probable cause. Restrictions on search
and seizure are generally observed, although raids on private
homes without search warrants are occasionally reported.
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Judges have thrown out evidence obtained illegally, even in
politically sensitive cases, such as that of former NDF
chairman Satur Ocampo — although he still remains incarcerated
on other charges. The Government does not interfere with the
free personal use of the mails or other public communications
systems, except upon issuance of a court order during the
course of an investigation.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The effect on local civilian populations of fighting between
the AFP and the NPA emerged prominently as a political issue in
1991 in step with the AFP's implementation of a constriction
strategy that led its units to penetrate the more remote areas
of the country, where the guerrillas previously had held free
rein. These incursions resulted in civilian casualties from
aerial bombardment and indirect artillery fire and in sickness
and death of the young and old from the destruction of housing
and granaries and the imposition of food and medicine blockades.
According to figures provided by the Ecumenical Commission for
Displaced Families and Communities (ECDFC) for the first half
of 1991, 10,400 families were displaced and some 22,000
families were affected by the fighting in 1990. The Department
of Social Welfare and Development listed 4,200 families or
22,000 people for assistance as internal refugees from fighting
in their localities during the first half of 1991; in 1990 the
DSWD assisted some 34,000 families.
The incident that brought the issue of evacuations forcefully
into the public consciousness in 1991 was the AFP's Marag
valley campaign, which occurred during October-November 1990.
The 10-mile-long valley is located in northern Luzon on the
border of Cagayan and Kalinga-Apayao provinces. It has long
been considered an NPA sanctuary, with no civilian government
presence since 1985.
The 2-month AFP campaign included incidents of bombing and
strafing runs on supposed NPA camps and granaries. Human
rights groups reaching the Marag valley in the wake of the
fighting charged that some 88 homes were burned and rice crops
destroyed as a result of the campaign. CHR investigations
produced somewhat lower figures, but a senior AFP official
acknowledged that the military's attention to the needs of the
civilian population in the area was " inadeqTiate. " An AFP
engineering battalion is now building a road into the valley
and civilian government agencies are carrying out relief work.
TFDP and the EMJP have charged that the suffering inflicted on
civilians in the Marag valley was replicated in 1991 in
military operations that took place in the "railroad towns" of
Camarines Sur, in the "chicks" area of Negros, and in the
border area of Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Sur in
northeastern Mindanao — all priority fronts for the AFP in
combating the insurgency. In response to criticisms of AFP
operational shortcomings, the administration, through the forum
of the Presidential Human Rights Committee (PHRC) (see
discussion of the PHRC in Section 4), issued new guidelines to
the military on the handling of civilian evacuations and
guaranteed access by medical teams to areas of conflict. Even
more significantly, new rules of engagement have been drawn up
forbidding unobserved indirect fire and requiring division
approval of lower units' requests for air support.
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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
There are virtually no legal restrictions on freedom of
expression or speech. Freedom of the press is generally
respected. There are some 30 privately owned daily newspapers
in Manila and many more in the provinces that cover the
political spectrum and pull no punches in criticizing the
Government. CPP publications are illegal but circulate
clandestinely, and Communist views are expressed in other
media. Journalists have been able without legal penalty to
meet and interview antigovernment rebels, including the
Communists and the rebellious rightwing military. Like the
press, radio and television stations report views across a wide
political spectrum. The Philippine courts have been consistent
in their protection of the media. In February a $714,000 libel
suit filed by senior military officers against the Philippine
Daily Inquirer for a series of articles it ran in early 1990 on
the origins of the rightwing military rebels was dismissed by
the court as without merit.
As the deaths of two journalists in 1991 evidence, however, the
press continues to face considerable hazards in carrying out
its responsibilities. The dangers are greatest for those
working outside the capital, where powerful vested interests
involved with gambling, illegal logging, or the drug trade may
use financial inducements or pressures as well as the threat of
violence to control the media. The memorandum of agreement
signed in September 1990 between the Department of National
Defense and the President of the National Press Club appears to
have resolved at least some of the problems encountered by
journalists in reporting on the insurgency. The National Press
Club is satisfied that the military observed the agreement in
1991, and TFDP reports no harassment of journalists during the
first half of the year. Reporters who accompanied the
nongovernmental organization (NGO) mercy missions to the Marag
Valley encountered no apparent problem in reporting on the
incident, and their stories played a big role in focusing
public attention on the tragedy. Publications from abroad,
except those considered pornographic, are not censored.
Foreign journalists are able freely to report and move about
the country even in areas of rebel influence. Major foreign
newspapers and television networks have bureaus or
representatives in Manila.
Academic freedom is respected in theory and practice. The
Government does not censor subject matter in classes,
university publications, or conferences.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assemibly and Association
Permits from local authorities are required for outdoor
demonstrations in public places and are routinely issued.
Nevertheless, rallies and marches are often held without
permits. Philippine law enforcers have been instructed to
follow a policy of "maximum tolerance," i.e., not dispersing
rallies held without permits as long as they do not disturb
public order. To prevent conflicts on college campuses,
government authorities and student leaders have agreed that
soldiers and police will not disperse rallies on campus, while
students agreed to conduct their mass actions peacefully and
not disrupt classes. There was no breach of this understanding
in 1991 .
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In comparison with the violence that accompanied the October
1990 general strike, antigovernment demonstrations were
generally orderly in 1991. Arrests were sometimes made but
those held were quickly released and not brought to trial.
Some controversy accompanied the large anti-U.S. base rally
held on September 10 when police held up demonstrators heading
for the rally site in front of the Philippine Senate because of
an ongoing progovernment rally led by President Aquino.
Private, professional, religious, social, charitable, and
political organizations are permitted to affiliate with
recognized international bodies in their fields. The CPP,
which advocates the violent overthrow of the Government, is
outlawed, but nonviolent Marxist parties exist.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion. Freedom of religion is fully
respected, and no official discrimination is practiced against
any religious group or its members. Although over 80 percent
of the population is Roman Catholic, the country's sizable
Muslim minority, the indigenous Iglesia Ni Kristo and Aglipayan
church, Protestant congregations, and other sects enjoy full
religious freedom. Foreign clergymen and missionaries of many
faiths practice their profession freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Filipinos enjoy unhampered freedom to change their place of
residence and employment within the Philippines. Movement
within the country is largely unimpeded, although both military
and rebel groups erected roadblocks in provincial areas where
they conducted operations during 1991. Reacting to the
practice by local law enforcement personnel of using
checkpoints to extort money from travelers. Secretary of
Interior and Local Government Luis Santos rescinded this
authority just days after the police came under the purview of
his expanded department.
Filipinos freely travel and work abroad. The right to emigrate
from and return to the Philippines is not restricted for
political reasons. In a few exceptional cases, such as that of
CPP founder Jose Maria Sison who now resides in the
Netherlands, the Government on national security grounds has
revoked the passports of Filipinos outside the country.
Although the Government does not accept refugees for internal
resettlement, it provided first asylum for 1,108 Indochinese
boat people in 1990 and 252 in 1991 and permitted the United
Nations to operate a major processing center for 16,000
refugees in Bataan province. Approximately 26,000 refugees
passed through these facilities in 1991.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government through
genuine periodic elections. The Constitution ratified in 1987
returned the Philippines to a presidential system of government
similar to that in existence from 1946 to 1972. It established
a bicameral legislature and an independent judiciary as checks
on executive power. Presidential authority to declare martial
law was curtailed. The Philippines has a multiparty political
system with free elections based on universal (18 years and
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PHILIPPINES
older) suffrage. Filipinos are free to organize political
parties as long as they do not seek to overthrow the Government
by force. Democratic opposition to the Government is widely
tolerated and there are no restrictions in law or practice on
participation by women and minorities in politics.
Under the new Constitution, congressional elections were held
in 1987, provincial and city elections in 1988, and "barangay"
(village or ward) elections in 1989. The 23-member Senate is
divided among four different parties and independents. In the
House of Representatives, the progovernment party enjoys a
solid majority. Most legislation is initiated by the members
of Congress themselves, and the debate is lively.
Government-sponsored legislation is often criticized, amended,
or defeated. The next presidential, congressional, provincial,
and city elections are scheduled for 1992, and the next
barangay elections for 1994.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The best known human rights NGO is Task Force Detainees of the
Philippines (TFDP), established in 1974. TFDP collects
information on alleged human rights violations and publishes
statistics on abuses attributed to government forces. Other
groups active in the human rights area include the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG), the Philippine Alliance of Human
Rights Advocates (PAHRA), the Ecumenical Movement for Justice
and Peace (EMJP), and the Ecumenical Commission for Displaced
Families and Communities (ECDFC) .
These groups operate without government restriction but are
often viewed with suspicion by the military and police. Local
officials have also been uncooperative in some instances. A
mission headed by the EMJP to the Marag valley in December 1990
was denied entrance to the area by the local military
commander. A later group in January 1991 did get through.
Even after the publication of guidelines forbidding harassment
of medical mercy missions, problems have occurred. In August
some members of a medical group were harassed and detained for
nearly 2 days and their supplies and equipment seized by the
Mayor of Pinukpuk, Kalinga-Apayao . Local field workers of
human rights groups have also faced harassment. In June
Cecilia Palino, a TFDP worker in Camarines Norte, was arrested
by the local PNP on charges of "teaching human rights to the
NPA." TFDP reports two other instances of harassment of
private human rights workers during the first half of 1991.
With 16 field offices and a staff of 679, the constitutionally
mandated CHR is charged with investigating all alleged
violations of human rights. It has come under criticism for
its failure in many instances to conduct field investigations,
the quasi-judicial character of its proceedings that pose risks
and special burdens for potential witnesses, its tendency to
become involved in issues unrelated to .fundamental human rights
concerns, and its inability to monitor the progress of cases
referred to the Department of Justice or the military courts.
More serious allegations include overly close ties with the
military and an antagonistic relationship with private human
rights groups.
However, because of its province-wide network and extensive
resources, the national CHR office generally is more efficient
in responding to human rights inquiries. CHR has also been
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PHILIPPINES
tenacious in following up on a few particularly egregious
instances of violation, most notably the June 1988 murder of
attorney Alfonso Surigao in Cebu.
Still, resource constraints and the uneven quality of personnel
below senior levels have been a problem, especially in the
field. Given CHR's sometimes strained relationships with
private human rights groups, the Presidential Human Rights
Committee (PHRC) has increasingly emerged as a forum for public
debate on human rights policy. Established by executive order
in late 1988, primarily to address the problem of
disappearances, the PHRC broke new ground this year when it
sent a team to investigate the situation in the Marag valley.
Out of this effort emerged the guidelines on evacuations and
the use of air support and indirect fire cited in Section l.g.
Membership in the PHRC includes the Justice Secretary as
Chairman, representatives from CHR, the Departments of National
Defense and Foreign Affairs, the Office of the President, the
Congress, and two private human rights group, the Philippine
Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA) and the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG) . TFDP and other groups attend as
observers .
Representatives of international human rights groups are free
to travel in the Philippines and investigate alleged abuses.
Government officials discuss human rights problems with outside
governmental and nongovernmental organizations and the United
Nations and routinely agree to meet with those who visit.
Resident delegates of the International Committee of the Red
Cross monitor prison conditions and assist persons displaced by
the conflict.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Women enjoy most of the legal rights men do, but Philippine law
and custom continues to discriminate against women in some
respects, including a limitation on their right to buy and sell
property. Laws against abuse of women are also inadequately
enforced. While criminal law prohibits violence against women,
both women and girls in the lower economic strata are
vulnerable to exploitation. Unethical operators may promise
legitimate employment in Manila or overseas, or arrange
marriages with foreign men. Some of these women end up working
as prostitutes or suffering abuse at the hands of their
employers or husbands. Late in the year, the death under
questionable circumstances of a Filipina entertainer working in
Japan initiated a furious public debate over the exploitation
of female contract workers serving overseas. Immigration
officials and the Administration moved quickly to limit exit
permits for Filipina women entertainers seeking employment in
Japan.
In December the Congress approved the "Women in Development
Act," a law setting aside development funds to promote women's
integration into the workplace. The Government designated
March 8, 1991, as the first National Women's Day, which was the
occasion for commemorative activities by the many women's
organizations active in the Philippines.
Muslim Filipinos, living principally in Mindanao, together with
non-Muslim and non-Christian groups located mostly in the
mountainous cordillera area of northern Luzon and in Mindanao,
constitute approximately 10 percent of the Filipino
population. These minorities hold public office at the local
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PHILIPPINES
and national levels and are employed in government positions.
However, some discrimination against Muslims and other
minorities persists. Philippine culture — with its emphasis on
tribal and regional loyalties — creates informal barriers
whereby access to jobs or resources is provided first to those
of one's own group. Another factor is that many Muslims prefer
to educate their children in Muslim schools, which has deprived
them of the skills required to advance in some occupations.
Muslims and other cultural minorities have not always been
accorded equal legal protection. Minority groups have
sometimes been deprived of their ancestral lands by logging and
mining operations and the arrival of farmers from other areas.
The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), inaugurated in
November 1990, is the latest attempt by the Government to deal
with the demand of Muslims for local autonomy in areas where
they hold a majority or are a substantial minority. However,
the newly constituted ARMM suffers from problems of identity
and finance. Limited to four provinces, it falls short of
representing the aspirations of all Muslims in the region.
Additionally, an inadequate tax base and a shortfall in the
promised subsidy from the national Government raise questions
as to its capacity to carry out a meaningful development
program.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of workers, including public employees, to form and
join trade unions is assured by the Constitution and
legislation and is freely practiced without formal government
interference throughout the country. Attempts by elements in
the Government and the military in the aftermath of the violent
October 1990 general strike to outlaw the leftist May First
Movement (Kilusang Mayo Uno — KMU) union federation were
strongly resisted by all unions, which saw in the move a threat
against the labor movement generally. KMU head Crispin
Beltran, who was arrested in the aftermath of the strike, was
quickly released, and charges against him were dropped.
Unions have and exercise freely the right to form federations
or join federations and confederations and to affiliate with
international trade union organizations. Subject to
restrictions in the Labor Code and emergency executive powers,
strikes in the private sector are legal, and take place
frequently. According to the Herrera Act, four conditions must
be met for a legal strike: notice must be given to the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE); a 30-day cooling-off
period must be observed; all available means of conciliation
must be exhausted; and the issue has to be relevant to the
labor contract or the law. Nevertheless, the Committee of
Experts (COE) of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
declared in 1991 that some of the Philippine labor code
provisions are not in conformity with ILO Convention 87 on
freedom of association. In response to the COE ' s comments, the
Government has informed the ILO that tripartite consultations
are being undertaken with a view to revising the act.
The right to strike and the status of employees in statutory
government agencies, such as the Philippine National Railways
(PNR) and the port authority, have not been clarified. Strikes
by public sector employees occurred frequently during the
year. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the suspension of
and dismissal orders against some 2,000 striking public
975
PHILIPPINES
schoolteachers, issued by the Secretary of Education, Culture,
and Sports in 1990. A complaint by the teachers was reviewed
in 1991 by the COE which found that the suspension and
dismissal orders are not in conformity with the principal of
freedom of association and urged the Government to review the
orders and reinstate the affected teachers without loss of
pay. Most of the teachers were reinstated or exonerated of the
charges against them. However, a small number of the remaining
teachers staged a- hunger strike to protest the Government's
enforcement of the law. The local ILO representative publicly
endorsed the administration's stance on this issue.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Labor's right to organize and bargain collectively is provided
for in law. Since 1986 the number of collective bargaining
agreements in force has increased from 3,112 to 4,982. In the
same period, the number of registered unions increased by more
than 10 percent.
It is an unfair labor practice to dismiss a union official or a
worker who is trying to organize a union. Nevertheless,
employers sometimes attempt to intimidate workers by threats of
firing or closure. Allegations of intimidation and
discrimination for union activity are actionable as unfair
labor practices before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) .
There is a history of industrial relations violence in the
Philippines which has been exacerbated by the insurgency and
the counter insurgency . However, labor-related violence
declined significantly in 1991. Reports indicated that two
trade union officials and two representatives of management
were killed during 1991 in connection with labor disputes.
There was also no repetition of the 1990 Goldilocks bakeshop
incident, in which security guards opened fire on demonstrating
union members. One factor in the relative quiet on the labor
front was the negative reaction within union circles and the
general public to the bus burnings and killings that
accompanied the general strike in October 1990.
A second contributing element has been the better operation of
DOLE conciliatory mechanisms. Through the NLRC and the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), the DOLE has
in place a quasi-judicial system for hearing and adjudicating
workers' claims. The process has been slow, but no slower than
other parts of the courts and the bureaucracy. Through
September DOLE reported 147 work stoppages. There were 197 in
all of 1989 and 183 in 1990. Through September, 1991, 850,000
workdays were lost compared with 955,000 in 1989 and 1.3
million in 1990. Labor law and practice are uniform throughout
the country, including in the several export processing zones
(EPZ's). The rate of unionization and the number of collective
bargaining agreements concluded in the EPZ's is similar to that
in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Compulsory or Forced Labor
Compulsory labor is illegal, and there were no reports of
forced labor being practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Constitution prohibits the employment of children below age
15, except under the responsibility of parents or guardians.
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PHILIPPINES
and then only if the work does not interfere with schooling.
It allows employment for those between the ages of 15 and 18
for such hours and periods of the day as are determined by the
Secretary of Labor, but forbids employment of persons under 18
years of age in hazardous or deleterious work.
The most serious violations of child labor laws occur in
piecework or contracting out of embroidery and other
garment-related production. Children have also been used in
dangerous and ecologically damaging forms of fishing that use
dynamite. Child prostitution is another serious issue. The
Government has attempted to investigate and reduce violations
of child labor laws outside of the agricultural sector, but the
DOLE has deployed too few inspectors and other resources to
reduce significantly the number of violations.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Minimum Wage Act of 1989 is the authority for minimum wage
setting by regional wage boards. The rates were last set in
December 1990, with the highest rate in the metropolitan Manila
area and lower rates set by regional wage boards in rural
areas. DOLE surveys estimate that the national average of
firms in noncompliance with minimum wage laws is 27 percent.
In region 5, for example, noncompliance is 80 percent, while it
is 6 percent in region 3, and 20 percent in metropolitan
Manila. Additionally, substantial numbers of workers (mostly
domestics, laborers, janitors, messengers, drivers, and
clerk-typists) are not covered by them. The average wage of
workers in the large cities is close to the minimum wage, and
in the industrial sector the average is considerably above it.
In rural areas, wages often fall substantially below it. The
minimum wage works out to a monthly equivalent that is below
the poverty threshold figure established by the Government for
a family of six persons. Most families have more than one wage
earner, and the figure varies by region. Still, more than half
of the families now live below the poverty line, reversing the
progress seen in the first years of the Aquino administration.
The legal maximum workweek before overtime is 40 hours for most
industrial workers, most of whom average 48 hours per week.
The law mandates a full day of rest weekly. The enforcement of
workweek hours is managed through periodic DOLE labor standards
inspections. Employees with more than 1 year on the job are
entitled to 5 days of paid leave annually.
A comprehensive set of occupational safety and health standards
exists in law. However ,• little or no information is available
on industrial and occupational health hazards in the
Philippines. The last report on industrial accidents prepared
by the DOLE is dated 1987: it shows the number of persons
killed or injured but gives no breakdown as to cause of
accident or by industry sector.
Large, successful multinational firms apply U.S., European, or
Japanese standards of worker safety and health because of the
requirements of their home-based insurance carriers. Beyond
the poorly enforced Philippine safety and health laws, there is
no comparable standard for domestic firms.
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SINGAPORE
Singapore, a city-state of 3 million people, has a republican
form of government based on the Westminster parliamentary
system. The majority of the population is ethnic Chinese (78
percent), with Malays (14 percent) and Indians (7 percent)
constituting substantial minorities.
Politics are dominated by the People's Action Party (PAP),
which has held pover since Singapore gained autonomy from Great
Britain in 1959. Lee Kuan Yew's chosen successor, Goh Chok
Tong, completed his first year as Prime Minister in November.
Lee remains active politically, holding the title of Senior
Minister and serving as Secretary General of the PAP. In the
August 1991 general election, the PAP received 61 percent of
valid ballots cast and won 77 of 81 parliamentary seats.
The Government maintains active internal security and military
forces to counter perceived threats to the nation's security.
It has frequently used security legislation to control a broad
range of activity. All young males are subject to national
service (mostly in the military) and receive nationalistic
indoctrination conforming to the credos held by the PAP. The
Internal Security Department (ISD) is responsible for
enforcement of the Internal Security Act (ISA), including its
provisions for detention without trial.
Singapore's economic system is one of the most open in the
world. The economy in recent years has made impressive
gains — gross domestic product grew by 6 . 5 percent in
1991 — enabling Singaporeans to enjoy a relatively high per
capita income. Individual ownership of housing, mostly
government-built, is enjoyed by 90 percent of Singaporean
families. Wealth is distributed relatively equally in what is
essentially a full -employment economy.
The major human rights development in 1991 was the August
general election, which marked the emergence of a more credible
opposition to the PAP. Voting and vote-counting were fair,
accurate and free from tampering, but, during the campaign, the
Government used its extensive powers to keep its opponents at a
disadvantage. Other important developments in 1991 were an
agreement with the Asian Wall Street Journal allowing its
return to limited circulation and passage of a constitutional
amendment creating an elected presidency. This amendment
changed Singapore's ceremonial presidency into one with
extensive veto powers over budget decisions and key
appointments, without a veto override mechanism in most cases.
There were no ISA detainees in 1991; all remaining detainees
had been released in 1990, and no new detentions occurred in
1991. While the overall trend in human rights developments was
positive, the Government continued to have wide powers at its
disposal, including the authority to detain people and
subsequently to restrict their travel, their right to make
public statements, their right to associate freely, and other
activities without judicial review, and there was no evidence
of a change in the Government's basic view of human rights
issues .
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SINGAPORE
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known instances of such killing.
b. Disappearance
There were no known instances of politically motivated
abduction, secret arrests, or clandestine detentions by either
the Government or the opposition.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is prohibited by law, and government leaders have
stated that they oppose its use. There were no credible
reports of mistreatment in 1991, although such reports do exist
for 1990 and earlier years. In contrast to previous years,
there were no reports in 1991 of government efforts to use the
indefinite length of confinement to pressure detainees to
"rehabilitate" themselves as well as to make admissions of
wrongdoing. The Government has acknowledged that, in the case
of detentions without trial under the Criminal Act, the
indef initeness of the detentions served to pressure detainees.
Theoretically, persons alleging mistreatment under detention
may bring criminal charges against those in the Government who
are alleged to have committed such acts, but the Government in
the past has not investigated or otherwise responded to such
claims. Fear of government retaliation, e.g., redetention
under the ISA, also discourages the making of such allegations.
The Penal Code mandates caning in addition to imprisonment as
punishment for certain offenses, including rape, theft,
robbery, extortion, housebreaking, and vehicle theft. The
courts routinely order caning for convictions for these
offenses. Since 1989 illegally working aliens and their
employers are subject to the same punishment (see Section
6.e.), although no one has been caned under this provision.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arrest without warrant is legally permitted under the ISA, the
Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act, and the Misuse of
Drugs Act. Those arrested must be charged before a magistrate
within 48 hours. At that time, those detained under criminal
charges may obtain legal counsel. There is a functioning
system of bail for those charged. There were no reported
abuses of the bail system in 1991.
The ISA and the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act
authorize detention without trial. This latter act is used
almost exclusively in cases involving narcotics and secret
criminal societies and is not used for political purposes. The
Director of the Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) can also commit
suspected drug users to a 6-month term in a drug rehabilitation
center in cases of positive urinalysis tests. Singapore law
does not treat involuntary commitment for drug rehabilitation
as a criminal matter, but suspected drug-abusers have a legal
right to challenge such findings through the court system.
Those persons detained without trial under the ISA and the
Criminal Law Act are entitled to counsel but have no legal
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recourse through the courts to challenge the substantive basis
for their detention.
The ISA also permits the Minister of Home Affairs to order
detention without charges if the President determines that a
person poses a threat to national security. The Government has
broad discretion in determining what constitutes such a threat.
The President may- authorize detention for up to 2 years;
thereafter, he must redetermine whether the detainee should be
held, and may so order for up to 2 more years. There is no
limitation on the number of times a detention order may be
renewed. A detainee's case is reviewed periodically by an
advisory board, to which the detainee may make representations.
The board can make nonbinding recommendations that a detainee
be released prior to expiration of the detention order.
Persons are released when the Minister for Home Affairs
determines they no longer pose a threat to national security
and are unlikely to resume subversive activity. The Minister
may also revoke the order for release. The ISA empowers the
police to detain a person for up to 48 hours; any police
officer at or above the rank of superintendent may authorize
that the detainee be held for up to 28 days longer. ISA
detainees normally have been allowed access to lawyers and
visits by relatives once initial interrogation has been
completed.
No one was detained under the ISA in 1991, and the last two
remaining ISA detainees were released in 1990. However,
government-imposed restrictions on the right to travel, make
public statements, and associate freely are in effect against
some former ISA detainees. For example, Chia Thye Poh, a
former Member of Parliament (M.P.) released in 1989 after 23
years of preventive detention under the ISA, was originally
allowed freedom only on a small island adjacent to Singapore,
from which he could not leave without permission from the ISD.
In September 1990, the Government relaxed the restriction,
granting Chia permission to visit Singapore proper from 6 a.m.
to 9 p.m. daily. Chia can be employed, subject to the ISD's
approval. Vincent Cheng, a detainee released in 1990, must
still appear at the ISD monthly, cannot issue public statements
or publish without ISD's prior consent and cannot travel
outside of Singapore without ISD's prior written approval. Teo
Soh Lung, an ISA detainee released in 1990, also must seek
ISD's approval for foreign travel, and was refused permission
to attend a meeting in New York in 1990.
According to the Government, 1,092 persons were in detention
under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act as of
October 31.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Singapore judiciary system is based on the British model.
There are two levels of courts — the Supreme Court, which
includes the High Court and the Appellate Courts, and the
subordinate courts. In normal cases, the Criminal Procedures
Code provides that a charge against a defendant must be read
and explained to him as soon as it is framed by the
magistrate. The accused has the right to be represented by an
attorney. Trial is by judge rather than by jury. Persons
detained under the ISA and the Criminal Law (Temporary
Provisions) Act are not entitled to a public trial, which is
accorded in all other cases. In 1989 the Government amended
the Constitution and the ISA to eliminate any judicial review
50-726 - 92 - 32
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SINGAPORE
of the objective grounds for detentions made under the ISA.
The constitutional amendment also prevents the courts from
reviewing the constitutionality of any law passed by Parliament
to prevent subversion and allows such statutes to restrict, or
even eliminate, judicial review in cases of alleged
subversion. This constitutional amendment was made valid
retroactive to 1971. The ISA amendment placed ISA detentions
outside of the purview of judicial review, except with respect
to compliance with procedural requirements of the act. These
amendments in essence put the executive in charge of
delimiting, on vaguely defined national security grounds, the
scope of certain fundamental liberties provided for by the
Constitution. In 1989 a High Court judge ruled that no legal
challenge to these amendments can be sustained.
Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President on
the recommendation of the Prime Minister in consultation with
the Chief Justice. A Supreme Court justice may remain in
office until the mandatory retirement age of 65, after which he
may continue to serve at the Government's discretion for brief,
renewable terms at full salary. Subordinate-court judges are
appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Chief
Justice. These appointments are for fixed periods and may be
revoked. Subordinate-court judges and magistrates, as well as
public prosecutors, are civil servants whose specific
assignments are determined by the Legal Service Commission
which can decide on job transfers to any of several legal
service departments. The Legal Service Commission is headed by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; other members include
the Attorney-General, a Supreme Court justice, and three
members from the Public Service Commission. Judicial
officials, especially in the High and Appellate Courts, are
well entrenched in the Singapore establishment and have close
ties to the Government and its leaders.
The Constitution allows for the appointment of "judicial
commissioners" to the Supreme Court as a stopgap measure to
clear up case backlogs. Judicial commissioners have the same
powers and perform the same functions as a Supreme Court
judge. In 1991 there were 7 judicial commissioners, 11 judges
and 1 chief justice on the Supreme Court. Most judicial
commissioners are subsequently offered permanent appointments
to the bench. Critics of the Government have charged that the
judicial commissioner system in fact serves as a probationary
period and gives the Government an opportunity to review
rulings made by a judicial commissioner before offering an
appointment to the bench.
In 1989 Parliament greatly restricted appeals to the judicial
committee of the Privy Council in London. This made
Singapore's appellate courts the final courts of appeal in most
cases. In explaining this change, the Government said that
political, social, and economic circumstances in Singapore had
become different from those in the United Kingdom and
Singapore's laws were thus best interpreted by its own judges.
In the view of government critics, however, the legislation was
adopted in response to a Privy Council decision reinstating
prominent oppositionist J.B. Jeyaretnam to the Singapore bar
and strongly criticizing what it termed the miscarriage of
justice perpetrated against him. At the discretion of the
courts. Commonwealth Queen's Counsels (Q.C.'s) are allowed to
argue cases in Singapore. Following habeas corpus hearings on
an ISA case in 1989, however, the Government barred the Q.C.
representing the petitioner on the grounds that he had involved
himself in Singapore's domestic politics by championing his
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SINGAPORE
client's cause outside of the courtroom, even though the
remarks were made in London.
Government leaders continued their unbeaten string of libel or
slander suits against domestic opposition defendants. In
August Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew won a defamation suit
against Quek Teow Chuan, formerly a member of the opposition.
The court awarded Lee the ecjuivalent of $237,000 in damages for
remarks made by Quek at an 1984 election rally. In November
J.B. Jeyaretnam paid Lee Kuan Yew the equivalent of $214,000 in
legal costs resulting from a 1989 libel case filed by Lee. By
paying those costs, Jeyaretnam averted being declared bankrupt,
which would have resulted in his being barred by the Legal
Profession Act from practicing law and by the Constitution from
running for Parliament.
In October Francis Seow, a prominent opposition lawyer now
living in the United States, was found guilty of failing to
submit tax information to the Inland Revenue Department, in a
case dating back to 1987. Seow was also found guilty, in
absentia, of tax evasion and ordered to pay a fine equivalent
to $268,000 or face a prison sentence of 95 months. Human
rights observers and legal scholars have protested Seow's
conviction on the grounds that neither he nor legal counsel for
him was present at the trial. This conviction in absentia has
been described as an unprecedented breach of international
human rights standards in Singapore.
Legislative action in recent years has tended to expand the
discretionary power of the Government, with judicial review
limited to the examination of adherence to procedures.
Examples include a 1989 amendment eliminating judicial review
in the ISA, the explicit denial of judicial review in the 1990
Religious Harmony Act, and 1990 amendments to the Newspaper and
Printing Presses Act which strengthened governmental controls
over the foreign press. The result of these measures has been
to reduce the authority of the judiciary to act as a check on
the Government .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government uses its wide discretionary powers when it
believes that the security of the nation is threatened. In
most cases, search warrants are required for intrusion into the
home. Law enforcement officers may, however, search a person,
home, or property without a warrant if they decide searches are
necessary to preserve evidence. Warrantless searches can also
be conducted under the Misuse of Drugs Act and the Criminal Law
(Temporary Provisions) Act in dealing with drug- and secret
society-related offenses. Judicial review of such searches can
be undertaken by the courts at the request of the defendant but
it is not automatic.
Divisions of the Government's law enforcement agencies,
including the Internal Security Department and the Corrupt
Practices Investigation Board (CPIB), have wide networks for
gathering information. The authorities have the capability to
monitor telephone and other private conversations and conduct
surveillance, but there were no credible allegations that they
used this capability in 1991.
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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution permits official restrictions on the freedom
of expression, and, in practice, freedoms of speech and press
are circumscribed. The law forbids statements that might
arouse tensions among the various races and religions or might
threaten national security or public order. The Government has
in some cases applied a broad definition of these laws to
restrict political opposition and criticism of the Government.
Inflammatory discussion of race, religion, and language is
illegal. The government-owned Singapore Broadcasting
Corporation (SBC) follows government guidelines and has a near
monopoly on broadcasting, with all 3 television channels and 9
of 10 radio stations. The Government, however, is moving in
the direction of deregulation and liberalization of the flow of
information into Singapore. Television broadcasts from
Malaysia and radio broadcasts from Malaysia and Indonesia can
be received uncensored in Singapore. SBC allowed live, all-day
news broadcasts from Cable Network News (CNN) during the Gulf
War, and 1-hour live CNN broadcasts are now a permanent feature
twice daily. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) world
service broadcasts locally on the FM band, and the BBC's
television service is discussing with SBC placement of its
service on a new SBC subscriber (pay television) news channel.
In March the Government announced that it would allow up to
three subscription television channels over SBC, although the
Government would still be able to censor programs deemed
undesirable; talks are under way with a Hong Kong-based
company. In April the Government ended a prohibition of
installation of satellite dishes, and allowed businesses and
financial institutions — but not hotels and households — to apply
for licenses. At least 37 institutions, mainly banks, have
obtained approval to install satellite dishes.
All newspapers, except for a small-circulation Tamil-language
daily, are published by Singapore Press Holdings (SPH), which
has close ties to the national leadership. The Newspaper and
Printing Presses Act creates two classes of stock for newspaper
companies: ordinary shares that are freely traded, and
management shares whose ownership is restricted to persons
approved by the Government. Through a weighted voting system,
holders of management shares can control all SPH personnel
decisions. Holders of management shares, as government
nominees, can be removed at the Government's discretion.
Hence, while Singaporean newspapers, especially the
English-language Straits Times, print a large and diverse
selection of articles from a variety of foreign sources, their
editorials and coverage of domestic events closely parallel
government policies and the opinions of government leaders. In
November the Government suspended publication of a local
lifestyle magazine. Woman's Affair, because of a supposedly
unflattering article on Singapore's female M.P.'s, all of whom
belong to the PAP.
A wide range of international magazines and newspapers can be
purchased uncensored in Singapore, although newspapers printed
in Malaysia are not circulated. The Government can limit the
circulation of foreign publications that, by the Government's
broad determination, interfere in Singapore's domestic
affairs. The Asian Wall Street Journal (AWSJ), Asiaweek, and
the Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) are still restricted on
this basis. The Government prints and distributes in Singapore
a limited number of unauthorized photocopy editions of the FEER
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without advertisement, while a prescribed number of copies — per
issue — of PEER (270), AWSJ (2,500) and Asiaweek (12,500) can be
distributed in full. The Government has allowed neither the
PEER nor the AWSJ to post a correspondent in Singapore since
1987 and 1988 respectively. The Government did permit a
journalist from the Wall Street Journal's Tokyo bureau to cover
the August election, and, beginning in November, the Government
has allowed an AWSJ correspondent to spend 7 workdays each
month in Singapore.
The Government and the AWSJ in 1991 reached a partial solution
to their dispute, which dates back, to a government charge in
1987 that the AWSJ had interfered in Singapore's domestic
affairs. A second problem developed in 1990, when the AWSJ
voluntarily ceased circulation in Singapore altogether rather
than adhere to the Press Law amendment of that year which
required offshore newspapers to post a bond equal to $118,000.
In March Lee Kuan Yew and the AWSJ settled all outstanding
lawsuits stemming from 1987. After additional negotiations in
September, Dow Jones, the U.S. parent company of the AWSJ,
reluctantly agreed to post the required $118,000 bond. The
AWSJ returned to circulation in October, but the Government
imposed a 2,500 circulation limit, half the AWSJ ' s former
circulation. Dow Jones would have preferred that market demand
determine the AWSJ ' s circulation. Under the 1990 amendments,
the Government initially required three foreign publications to
obtain circulation permits and post bonds of $118,000, but for
the time being exempted 14 others from these requirements.
Faculty members at Singapore public institutions of higher
education are government employees. A number of university
lecturers are concurrently PAP M.P.'s. Academics sometimes
criticize government policies, but criticism of individual
government leaders and government authoritarianism is
infrecpjent because of possible sanctions. Tenure and renewal
of appointments can be, and have been, refused to academics
whose work deviates substantially from government views.
Published social science and think-tank papers generally
support government policies.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Assemblies of more than five people in public, including
political meetings and rallies, must have police permission.
The Government closely monitors political gatherings regardless
of the number present. Associations, societies, clubs,
churches, and other organizations with more than 10 members
must be registered with the Government under the Societies
Act. The Government denies registration to societies it
believes likely to be used for unlawful purposes or for
purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare, or public
order. The Government has absolute discretion in applying this
broad and vague language to register or dissolve societies. It
prohibits organized political activities, except by
organizations registered as political parties. This
prohibition extends to the opposition, but it is not clear that
it applies to the PAP, which enjoys the support of residential
committees and neighborhood groups ostensibly organized for
nonpolitical purposes but whose leadership contains many
grass-roots PAP members. (See also Section 3).
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution and
usually respected in practice. Missionaries are permitted to
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work and to publish religious texts. However, all religious
groups are subject to government scrutiny and must be legally
registered. The Government restricts some religious sects by
application of the Societies Act and has banned others, such as
the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Unification Church. A
Presidential Council on Minority Rights exists to ensure that
legislation does not infringe upon the rights of religious or
ethnic minorities. There is no state religion, although there
are periodic campaigns to make Confucian ethics the "national
ideology" of Singapore. The Government has provided financial
assistance to build and maintain mosques. There is no
religious test for employment in the Government or for
membership in the PAP.
In 1990 Parliament passed the "Maintenance of Religious Harmony
Act," making it illegal to proselytize in a manner that could
inflame religious enmity and proscribing what the Government
deemed to be the inappropriate involvement of religious groups
and officers in political affairs. There were no cases in 1991
resulting from this legislation, but the Act has had the effect
of causing some religious groups to exercise more self-
restraint. The Act explicitly denies the judiciary the
competence to review possible denials of rights which could
arise from the application of the Act, and specifically denies
judicial review of the enforcement of the Act. The Government
justified adoption of the Religious Harmony Act by citing
concern over the growth of charismatic Christian groups which
do not recognize the unofficial agreement among establishment
religious organizations not to proselytize among those of other
faiths. A 1990 government white paper on religious harmony
cited the Reverend Rick Seaward and his church as an example of
such groups. Seaward was charged in 1990 with criminal breach
of trust (fraud) in a case involving the lease-purchase of
sound equipment by his church from a firm affiliated with
Seaward. In January government prosecutors requested a delay
in the trial until August, when the trial was again delayed,
until February 1992.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
All Singapore citizens and permanent residents over the age of
13 are required to register with the Government and carry
identification cards. The Government may deny a passport, and
it frequently does so in the case of released detainees, one of
many devices that seem to inhibit such persons from resuming
opposition to or criticism of the Government.
The ISA allows the Minister for Law and Home Affairs to suspend
or revoke a detention order or to impose restrictions on former
detainees' activities, places of residence, and travel abroad.
Chia Thye Poh is restricted in his movements within Singapore,
while foreign travel of others formerly detained under the ISA
is subject to approval by the ISD.
The right of voluntary repatriation is extended to holders of
Singaporean passports. In 1985 Parliament provided for the
loss of citizenship by Singaporeans who reside outside
Singapore for more than 10 years consecutively. Action under
this law is discretionary and has been taken in at least one
case involving a well-known government opponent. Tan Wah Piaow.
Singapore does not offer first asylum to refugees. Government
policy permits Vietnamese asylum-seekers rescued at sea to
disembark and remain for up to 90 days only if Singapore was
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the rescuing vessel's next scheduled port of call and if a
resettlement country provides a removal guarantee. The
Government agreed in July 1991 to permit the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to make status
determinations for those Vietnamese in the Hawkins Road camp in
accordance with the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) adopted
in Geneva at the June 1989 International Conference on
Indochinese Refugees. However, the Government has not
permitted the UNHCR to announce the results of the
status-determination interviews, thereby blocking both
resettlement for those eligible and repatriation counselling
for those ineligible for resettlement. Singapore has not
accepted the CPA, and continues to insist that its policy
requires Vietnamese asylum-seekers to depart within 90 days.
In practice, Singapore limited the disembarkation of rescued
Vietnamese in July 1990 and halted it completely in June 1991
because removal within 90 days could not be guaranteed. Ten
asylum-seekers who were rescued at sea by an LPG-carrier in
October were denied permission to enter Singapore; they were
forced to leave Singapore on the same ship after it had waited
unsuccessfully in port for 5 days to disembark them. As of
September 1, 1991, there were 150 asylum-seekers at the Hawkins
Road camp which has a stated capacity of approximately 1,000
persons. Persons of other nationalities who enter Singapore
and who come to the attention of UNHCR are permitted to have
their status determined for possible resettlement elsewhere.
There is no systematic procedure for ensuring that
asylum-seekers are referred to the UNHCR.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Theoretically, Singaporeans have the right to change their
Government peacefully. The voting and vote-counting systems in
elections are fair, accurate, and free from tampering.
However, the Government has extensive powers which it can use
to place formidable obstacles in the path of current and
would-be opponents. Despite these PAP advantages, the August
elections marked the emergence of a somewhat more credible
opposition to the PAP. Opposition candidates received 39
percent of the popular vote and won 4 seats. In addition, in 8
constituencies, there were substantial vote swings against the
PAP. As a result of the election, the PAP occupied 77 of
Parliament's 81 seats, the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) 3,
and the Workers' Party (WP) 1. In a post-election interview.
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong said he was against having an
opposition for fear it would prove divisive for a country as
small as Singapore. It remained to be seen how the new
Parliament, which will be seated in January 1992, will
implement legislation enacted in 1990 providing for a system of
"Nominated Members of Parliament" (N.M.P.'s). This legislation
allows for the appointment of as many as six N.M.P.'s, usually
neutral and talented individuals not interested in running for
office, who can raise the level of debate and decisionmaking in
Parliament. The actual implementation of this bill is
determined by each new Parliament, which decides how many
N.M.P.'s, if any, it wishes to appoint. The system of N.M.P.'s
is similar to an arrangement developed in 1988 allowing for
four to six "Non-Constituency Members of Parliament"
(N.C.M. P. ' s) , should no opposition candidate win an election.
Both N.M.P.'s and N.C.M.P.'s enjoy restricted voting
privileges .
The Government introduced N.M.P.'s and N.C.M.P.'s in response
to a popular call for alternative voices in Parliament to
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provide debate and checks on government action. This role now
devolves on the four elected opposition representatives.
While opposition parties have contested every election, none
has been able seriously to challenge the PAP since the late
1960 's. The PAP attributes the lack of effective opposition to
disorganization, lack of leadership, and lack of alternative
policy programs. Political parties, while legally free to
organize, are subject to strict regulations on party
constitutions, fund-raising, and accountability. While the PAP
has been able to enjoy the support of ostensibly nonpolitical
organizations, the Government has used its broad discretionary
powers to hinder the creation of support organizations for the
opposition parties.
The PAP's access to the instruments of power and its ability to
intimidate opposition parties was much in evidence during the
August election campaign. Press coverage throughout the
campaign was heavily pro-PAP. PAP leaders indirectly
threatened to invoke the ISA against one WP candidate for
supposedly agitating the voters on racial issues. The PAP also
held out the threat of future slander suits. Halfway into the
campaign, the local press prominently reported that Lee Kuan
Yew had just won a defamation suit against Quek Teow Chuan, an
ex-opposition member, for remarks made by Quek at an 1984
election rally. One opposition figure, WP candidate Gopalan
Nair, was found guilty in November of contempt of court for
questioning the independence of Singapore's judiciary in an
August 28 campaign speech, and fined the equivalent of $4,800.
Despite the stronger showing by opposition parties in the
August election, the PAP's domination of politics in Singapore
continues, as it has for three decades under the authoritarian
leadership of Lee Kuan Yew. The PAP's grip on power has been
enhanced by patronage, such as the network of town councils;
political control of the press, courts, and religion; and
strong party discipline and performance. Under the PAP's
leadership, Singapore has achieved rapid economic growth,
enabling the Government to provide a wide array of public
services. The PAP's broad base includes representatives of all
racial communities in Singapore and is rooted in neighborhood,
youth, and labor associations. National servicemen receive
indoctrination based on ideas derived from the PAP. The
still-forming national ideology is replete with PAP themes.
National holidays are usually celebrated with PAP members in
highlighted roles. PAP members regularly preside at
dedications and ribbon-cuttings.
In January Parliament passed a constitutional amendment
changing Singapore's ceremonial presidency into one with veto
powers over government budgets and key public appointments.
The amendment went into effect in November. There is no
mechanism for overriding presidential vetoes, except in the
case of "supply bills," legislation that authorizes government
expenditures. The elected President, who will serve a 6-year
term, can withhold concurrence to ISA detentions contrary to
recommendations of a special advisory board; this provides a
check on decisions by the Minister responsible for internal
security to continue detentions despite the advisory board's
recommendation for release. The elected President may also
cancel, vary, confirm, or reject restraining orders made under
the 1990 Religious Harmony Act. Aspiring presidential
candidates must receive certificates of eligibility from a
three-member committee, which will consider such factors as the
prospective candidate's character and ability. The first
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election must take place before the term of Singapore's
incumbent President expires in September 1993. The amendment
to establish an elected President had been debated at length
since its proposal in 1988. The Government defended the bill
as an additional safeguard against bad government. Some
critics saw the new post as tailored to fit Lee Kuan Yew,
although he had said he would not serve as Singapore's first
elected president.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Governmental bodies, such as the presidentially appointed
Minority Rights Council, monitor alleged violations of minority
rights, primarily those concerning the Malay minority. There
are, however, no nongovernmental organizations, with the
exception of the opposition political parties, that actively
and openly monitor alleged human rights violations. The
Government denies that international organizations have any
competence whatsoever to look into human rights matters in
Singapore. Visa regulations do not recognize monitoring human
rights as a "business purpose" for visiting Singapore, but
neither is such activity regarded as a "social visit." Amnesty
International is not allowed to operate in Singapore, but in
1989 the Government allowed a group of observers from a foreign
human rights group to attend the habeas corpus hearings of ISA
detainees. The Government did not receive any requests in 1991
from human rights organizations asking to examine the human
rights situation in Singapore.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Because of Singapore's history of intercommunal tension, the
Government takes affirmative measures to ensure racial, ethnic,
religious, and cultural nondiscrimination. Social, economic,
and cultural facilities are available to all citizens
regardless of race, religion, or sex. Minorities are
constitutionally afforded equal rights and actively participate
in the political process.
The Singapore Constitution acknowledges the "special position"
of Malays as the indigenous people of Singapore, and charges
the Government to support and promote their "political,
educational, religious, economic, social, and cultural
interests." The Government has concentrated on creating
equality of opportunity, especially in education, and does not
promote the concept of equality in result, instead leaving it
up to the ethnic communities, individual initiative, and the
marketplace to determine economic success.
While precise statistics are not readily available, government
officials acknowledge that Malay Singaporeans are represented
disproportionately in the bottom quarter of Singapore's
economy. De facto employment discrimination against Malays and
Indians exists. Job advertisements often specify the ethnicity
and gender required of applicants.
Women have the same rights as men in employment, education,
child care and custody, and in the running of a household, but
do not have equal rights with men in the transmission of
citizenship to their children or in the conferral of the right
to residence of a foreign spouse in Singapore. Women can vote
and hold any public office. Although the political and
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business elite is still overwhelmingly male, women are found
throughout the rest of the job spectrum, enjoying eqxial pay for
equal work. There is no evidence of any widespread practice of
violence or abuse against women. Singapore's laws protect
women against domestic violence and against sexual or physical
harassment. Domestic violence can be dealt with under either
the Penal Code or the Women's Charter. The Women's Charter,
enacted in 1961, abolished arranged marriages and gave husband
and wife equal rights with respect to property ownership and
divorce. Muslim women are not covered by the Women's Charter,
but enjoy the same rights and protections under other laws,
except that Muslim men may divorce unilaterally whereas Muslim
women may not. The Government enforces the Women's Charter as
a fundamental aspect of the Republic's family law. Through the
latter, a battered wife can obtain court orders barring the
spouse from the home until the court is satisfied that he will
stop his aggressive behavior. The Penal Code prescribes
mandatory caning and a minimum imprisonment of 2 years for
conviction on a charge of outraging modesty so as to cause the
victim fear of death or injury.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Singapore's Constitution gives all citizens the right to form
associations, including trade unions. Parliament may, however,
impose restrictions based on security, public order, or
morality grounds. The right of association is delimited by the
Societies Act and labor and education laws and regulations. In
practice. Communist labor unions are not permitted. The Trades
Union Act authorizes the formation of unions with broad rights,
albeit with some narrow restrictions, such as prohibitions on
the unionization of uniformed employees and of the holding of
union office by persons with criminal records. The national
work force comprises about 1.5 million workers, of whom some
213,000 are organized into about 83 trade unions. Some 74 of
these unions, which represent about 98 percent of the unionized
workers, are affiliated with the National Trades Union Congress
(NTUC), an umbrella organization which has a close relationship
to the Government .
The NTUC unabashedly acknowledges that its interests are
closely linked with those of the ruling PAP. The Second Deputy
Prime Minister, Ong Teng Cheong, serves as NTUC Secretary
General. Several NTUC officials are PAP M.P.'s. After
August's general election, Lim Boon Heng, NTUC Deputy Secretary
General, resigned his union position to become Senior Minister
of State for Trade and Industry. NTUC policy prohibits
unionists who actively support opposition parties from holding
office in affiliated unions. While the NTUC is financially
independent of the PAP, with income generated by NTUC-owned
businesses, the NTUC and PAP share the same ideology.
Workers have the legal right to strike" but rarely do so; the
most recent strike took place in 1986. Reasons given include a
cultural aversion to confrontation, concern about maintaining
Singapore's attractiveness to investors, a labor shortage that
has increased wages, and economic success that has allowed
employers to pay higher wages.
The NTUC is free to associate regionally and internationally.
SINGAPORE
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is a normal part of management-labor
relations, particularly in the manufacturing sector. However,
the International Labor Organization's Committee of Experts
noted in 1991 that certain issues are excluded by law from
collective bargaining and that the Industrial Arbitration Court
has the power to refuse to register the collective agreement of
newly established enterprises in certain instances. On
average, collective bargaining agreements are renewed every 2
to 3 years. A National Wages Council (NWC) brings business,
labor, and government representatives together to establish
guidelines for annual wage packages. Collective agreements
negotiated between labor and management generally follow the
wage guidelines issued annually by the NWC. In recent years,
the NWC has issued its guidelines in the form of qualitative
recommendations rather than the quantitative form used
previously. The NWC continued to recommend in 1991 that
employers follow a "flexiwage" system wherein the annual
increase in the fixed portion of employee income (wages) is
kept small, with greater emphasis on varying the amount of
bonuses based on employee performance. This system, under
which the NWC fosters cooperation between the NTUC and employer
organizations — allows management to reward workers for
performance and sacrifices made during bad times, yet allows
those in sectors experiencing downturns to let wages reflect
the circumstances. The NWC also recommended that the rate of
compensation increases be less than the increase of the rate of
productivity, in order to curb inflation and keep salaries in
line with productivity. The Industrial Relations Act makes it
an offense to discriminate against anyone who is or proposes to
become a member or an officer of a trade union. The offense is
punishable by a fine equivalent to $600 and/or a 12-month
prison sentence. Labor laws and regulations are enforced
uniformly. There are no export-processing zones, nor are
special concessions given to firms producing for export.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Singapore law forbids the use of forced or compulsory labor,
and such labor is not found in Singapore.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Government enforces the Employment Act, which sets the
minimum age for the employment of children at age 12. Children
under age 14 are not allowed to work in any "industrial
undertaking." Industrial employers must notify the Ministry of
Labor within 30 days of hiring a child between the ages of 14
and 16.
Ministry of Labor regulations prohibit night employment of
children and restrict industrial work to no more than 7 hours a
day. Children cannot work on commercial vessels, with any live
electrical apparatus lacking effective insulation, or in any
underground job. These laws and regulations are effectively
enforced by the Ministry of Labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Singapore has no minimum wage or unemployment compensation, but
the labor market offers relatively high wages and working
conditions. The standard legal workweek under the Employment
Act (Section 38) is 44 hours. Laws and regulations
establishing working conditions are effectively enforced by the
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Ministry of Labor. The Ministry of Education enforces
comprehensive occupational safety and health laws. Enforcement
procedures, coupled with the promotion of educational and
training programs, have reduced the frequency of job-related
accidents by a third over the past decade. The average
severity of occupational accidents has also been reduced.
Because of the domestic labor shortage, more than 250,000
foreign workers are employed legally in Singapore, 16 percent
of the total work force. Most are unskilled laborers and
household servants from other Asian countries. Foreign workers
face no legal wage discrimination; however, they are
concentrated in low-wage, low-skill jobs. Some 30,000 Filipina
maids are employed in Singapore, and there have been occasional
complaints of abuse or poor working conditions. The Government
does not bar complainants from seeking legal redress, and there
are reports that employers who have abused domestic servants
have been fined or imprisoned. The Government acknowledged the
problem of illegal aliens working in Singapore by passing a law
in 1989 imposing a caning penalty on aliens who overstay in
Singapore by more than 90 days. Parliament has passed a law to
impose a caning sentence and fines on businessmen who employ
more than five workers illegally. No one has been caned under
either law.
991
SOLOMONS
Over 300,000 people occupy Solomon Islands, an archipelago
stretching over 840 miles in the South Pacific and the second
largest (after Papua New Guinea) of the Melanesian countries.
Its Government is based on a modified parliamentary system
consisting of a single-chamber legislative assembly of 38
members. Executive authority lies with the Prime Minister and
his Cabinet. The Prime Minister, elected by a majority vote of
Parliament, selects his own Cabinet. This system, adopted when
the country became independent in 1978, accords with both
Solomon Islands' experience and the Melanesian tradition of
leadership based upon individual achievement and political
consensus. Political legitimacy rests on direct election by
secret ballot.
A police force of around 500 men is under civilian control.
There are no other armed forces. The courts are independent
and vigorously protect individual rights. There have been
three general elections since independence; the most recent, in
February 1989, resulted in the first government led by a single
party since independence. Following his resignation from the
majority Peoples Alliance Party (PAP) in October 1990 when it
appeared he would be replaced as party head. Prime Minister
Solomon Mamaloni dismissed 5 of his 14 PAP Ministers and formed
a coalition Government which remained in power throughout 1991.
Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy. About 85 percent
of the population engages to some extent in subsistence
production, obtaining food by root-gardening and fishing, and
has little involvement in the cash economy. With increasing
prices for most its export commodities, the Solomon Islands
economy experienced a modest improvement in its trade balance
and its terms of trade in 1991. However, the country's fiscal
and current accounts deficits continued a long-term decline.
Poor economic performance was exacerbated by a population
growth rate of about 3.5 percent, which ensured continued
pressures on public and private resources.
Most basic individual rights are provided for in the
Constitution, respected by the authorities, and defended by the
courts, but discrimination and violence against women are
serious problems. There is a constitutionally provided
Ombudsman to look into and provide protection against improper
or unlawful administrative treatment.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Political and other extrajudicial killing did not occur.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of political disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is prohibited by law and not practiced.
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SOLOMONS
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There is no evidence of politically motivated arrests.
Exile is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system is a blend of British and traditional
systems. There is a high court plus magistrates' courts.
Accused persons are entitled to counsel. Provision is made for
writs of habeas corpus under the law. It is illegal to coerce
statements. Violations of civil liberties are punishable by
fines and jail sentences.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In addition to legal provisions, the traditional culture
provides strong protection against these types of abuses.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Constitutional provisions, an independent press, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure
freedom of speech and press. There are two private weekly
newspapers, weekly and monthly national government news-
letters, and one provincial government weekly. The state-owned
radio gives significant coverage to statements of opposition
politicians. There is no television, and the importation of
satellite dishes is strictly controlled. The Government and
established churches are reluctant to permit the introduction
of television since they are concerned that outside images of
violence, sex, and materialism could have a negative influence
on the public.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right of association is provided for in the Constitution
and freely exercised. Demonstrators must obtain a permit, but
permits have never been denied on political grounds.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is guaranteed by law, there are no controls
on the practice of religion, and there is no religious
discrimination. Although Christianity is the predominant
religion and a wide variety of Christian denominations are
represented, indigenous beliefs also continue to be practiced
without restriction. Missionaries work without restrictions,
but the Government and established church leaders have voiced
concern about what they view as the socially disruptive effect
of new charismatic evangelical movements entering the country
from overseas.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no legal or administrative restrictions on freedom of
movement of Solomon Islands' citizens within or out of the
country. Native-born citizens may not be deprived of
citizenship on any grounds.
SOLOMONS
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government through
periodic free elections. Since independence, Solomon Islands
has had three parliamentary elections (the most recent in early
1989) and several elections for provincial and local councils.
Besides the general elections, three additional changes of
government were accomplished by votes of Parliament. Suffrage
is universal over the age of 18.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There were no allegations by outside organizations of human
rights violations in Solomon Islands or any request for
investigations. While there are no restrictions on formation
of local organizations to monitor and report on human rights,
none have been established to date.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is a high degree of tolerance in Solomon Islands'
society. However, while the law accords women ecpaal legal
rights, the traditional society, where males are dominant and
women are seen in customary family roles, has hampered them
from taking more active roles in economic and political life,
and indigenous Solomon Islanders are favored over naturalized
citizens in the matter of land ownership. Only one of the 36
Members of Parliament is female. None of the 15 Government
ministers is female and only one of the 15 permanent secretary
positions immediately below minister in the government
hierarchy is held by a female. A shortage of employment
opportunities throughout the country has inhibited the entry of
women into the work force. Following his election in 1989, the
new Prime Minister announced a policy restricting the
employment of expatriate Freemasons in the Civil Service, based
on objections to what he perceived as Masonic ritualistic
secrecy.
While actual statistical data are scarce, incidents of wife
beating and abuse appear to be common. In the rare cases that
are reported, charges are often dropped by the women before
their court appearance or are settled out of court. Police are
reluctant to interfere in what they perceive as domestic
disputes. In addition, many of the laws benefiting women are
in the British tradition and are viewed by many Solomon
Islanders as "foreign laws" not reflective of the customs and
traditions of Solomon Islands. The magistrate courts deal with
physical abuse of women on the basis of inherent common law
powers and deal with it as they would any other assault,
although prosecutions are rare.
The government-supported National Council of Women is actively
involved in trying to improve the position of women in
society. Though progress is slow, the Council continues to
work to familiarize women with a proposed amendment to the
Affiliation, Maintenance, and Separation Law pending since 1989
which would ensure that women who bring cases to court are
protected against harassment from husbands or members of
husbands' families, at home and in places of employment, and
would ensure womens ' s rights to child support and
compensation. The Council continues to hold workshops and to
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SOLOMONS
conduct programs to train women in various skills, to enhance
their self-confidence, and to strengthen their participation in
the political and economic life of Solomon Islands.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Solomon Islands' law recognizes the right of workers to
organize, to choose their own representatives, to determine and
pursue their own views and policies, and to engage in political
activities. Both public and private sector unions have the
right to strike — a right they have often exercised. Both civil
servants and public school teachers struck in 1991 for wage
concessions and in protest over the removal by the Government
of career civil service permanent secretaries and their
replacement by highly paid political appointees. The small
percentage of workers actually involved in the wage economy
means that employers have an ample supply of replacement
workers if disputes are not resolved quickly.
Solomon Islands' unions are free to affiliate internationally,
and the largest trade union, the Solomon Islands' National
Union of Workers, is affiliated with the World Federation of
Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to collective bargaining is provided for by the Trade
Disputes Act of 1981 and unions engage in it frequently. Wages
and conditions of employment are determined by collective
bargaining. If disputes between labor and management cannot be
settled between the two sides, the disputes are referred to the
Trade Disputes Panel for arbitration. During arbitration, both
public and private sector workers may be legally required to
return to work. A decision by the Trade Disputes Panel is
legally binding, but may be varied by the Government "in the
interest of the economy," according to section 8 of the Trade
Disputes Act of 1981. Workers are protected by law against
antiunion activity, and there are no areas where union activity
is officially discouraged. There are no export processing
zones .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law, except as part of a court
sentence or order, and this prohibition is observed.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Solomon Islands has comprehensive laws on worker rights, but
there is no enforcement mechanism. Child labor is forbidden
for children under the age of 12 except in the company of
parents in light agricultural or domestic work. Children under
15 are barred from work in industry or on ships; those under 18
cannot work underground or in mines.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Provincial governments have the power to set minimum wages.
Although the minimum wage is supposed to be adjusted annually
to reflect changes in the retail price index, the present rate
was established in 1988 on the recommendation of the Minimum
Wage Advisory Board and following approval by the Minister of
Labor. While the minimum wage is small, it provides an
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SOLOMONS
adequate standard of living in areas outside the capital when
supplemented by the subsistence farming and fishing practiced
by most families. Since most of the population is dependent to
some extent on the subsistence economy, and as there is high
unemployment and underemployment, workers are readily available
at this wage.
Labor laws regulate premium pay, sick leave, the right to paid
vacations, and other conditions of service. The standard
workweek is 45 hours and is limited to 6 days weekly. There
are provisions for premium pay for overtime and holiday work as
well as provisions for maternity leave. Both an active labor
movement and an independent judiciary ensure widespread
enforcement of labor laws in major state and private
enterprises. The Commissioner of Labor, the Public Prosecutor,
and the police are responsible for enforcement of labor law.
However, they are reactive to charges of labor law violation
rather than than taking the initiative in monitoring adherence
to these laws. The extent to which the law is enforced in
smaller establishments and in the subsistence sector is
unclear. There appear to be no safety and health standards.
Workers at construction sites are not required to wear
protective clothing or helmets. Malaria is endemic in the
Solomon Islands, including Honiara, and affects the health of
many employees. Agricultural workers with a high risk of
contracting malaria are not provided with malaria
suppressants.
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THAILAND
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy whose history has been
marked by frequent military coups and powerful military-
bureaucratic influence over political life. The King exerts
strong informal influence. In the most recent coup on February
23, military leaders acting as the "National Peacekeeping
Council" abrogated the 1978 constitution and abolished the
bicameral legislature. Under the terms of an Interim Charter,
the Council named a civilian Prime Minister who in turn chose a
cabinet composed mainly of civilian technocrats. A council-
appointed national legislative assembly drafted a new
Constitution which was promulgated on December 9. A new
election law has also been approved, and parliamentary
elections are scheduled for March 22, 1992. Critics charge
that certain elements of the new Constitution will serve to
extend the military's political role beyond the election.
Thai security services have wide-ranging legal powers, largely
deriving from past military administrations. Under the Interim
Charter, the Peacekeeping Council Chairman and the Prime
Minister were empowered to counter threats to the monarch,
national security, public order, or the economy. This summary
legal power was not used, however, and expired with the
promulgation of the new permanent Constitution on December 9.
The Government usually takes steps to discipline or prosecute
security officials found to have committed abuses. However,
credible reports of occasional summary executions and physical
abuse of detainees by police officers continue. Prosecutions
in such cases are infrequent and convictions rare.
A middle-income developing country with a free enterprise
economic system, Thailand is currently enjoying rapid economic
growth. The Thai system generally provides strong protection
for individual economic interests, including property rights.
While the industrial sector is expanding, the majority of the
people are in rural areas where agriculture is the chief source
of livelihood.
While Thai citizens continued to enjoy a wide range of civil
liberties, the 1991 coup was a setback to progress in recent
years toward democratic rule. Limitations on worker rights,
mistreatment of detainees, some restrictions on freedoms of
speech and press, and trafficking in women for purposes of
prostitution continue to be problems.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There are credible reports that occasionally police summarily
execute criminal suspects without regard to due process,
particularly in areas outside the Cctpital with high local crime
rates. Some officials assigned to these areas acknowledge the
practice, which they appear to regard as an unexceptionable
method of dealing with alleged habitual criminals. Credible
sources also have reported cases in which police staged
posthumous shootings of detainees to cover up deaths caused by
beatings and physical abuse (see Section l.c). Victims in such
cases were then reported to have committed suicide or to have
been shot while resisting arrest or trying to escape.
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THAILAND
The press at times quotes warnings from senior police officials
that a "shoot to kill" policy has been imposed. A "shoot to
kill" order was reported to have gone out in 1991 during a
crackdown on auto thefts. One unconfirmed newspaper account
reported police shot and killed 20 suspected car thieves during
the campaign, allegedly while they were resisting arrest. The
April 5 murder of reputed major organized crime figure Klaew
Thanikun raised suspicions of military involvement since it
occurred in the midst of a high profile campaign to suppress
"Mafia-style" godfathers. However, no clear evidence of
official complicity in Klaew' s death emerged, and no suspects
in the case have been arrested.
There is criminal activity by poorly disciplined individual
policemen, including substantiated cases of low paid junior
policemen committing crimes or hiring themselves out as
contract killers. During 1991 eight policemen were charged
with murder in five separate cases involving a total of seven
victims. At least three of these cases appeared to involve
summary execution of criminal suspects.
In one case, a policeman was arrested and charged with the July
31 shooting death of a Burmese student of concern to the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) . The student was shot
when he attempted to flee custody. The policeman claimed to
have acted in self-defense. A preliminary hearing was held in
November; at year's end the case had not yet come to trial.
The body of a second Burmese student of concern to the UNHCR
was discovered on November 4 along the border in Kanchanaburi
province. He had reportedly been killed by police a week
earlier. The Government promised a full accounting to the
UNHCR. Amnesty International and other human rights groups as
well as the U.S. and several other embassies have also
expressed concern about this case. One policeman was convicted
and sentenced to death in another case in which robbery
appeared to be the primary motive. Credible reports indicate
that convicting police suspected of committing summary
executions is difficult, as evidence is often fabricated and
witnesses are intimidated or paid not to testify.
b. Disappearance
Prior to 1991, there had been no allegations of official
complicity in the disappearance of any person for at least 9
years. On June 19, Thanong Podhiarn, president a leading labor
federation, disappeared in Bangkok. Shortly after Thanong
vanished, his car was discovered parked outside his union
office. Despite police efforts to determine Thanong 's
whereabouts, no solid evidence as to his fate has been
uncovered.
Despite the lack of evidence to substantiate charges of
official involvement in Thanong ' s disappearance, a number of
labor unionists and members of the local human rights community
are convinced Thanong was abducted and killed by elements of
the military or the security forces. They attribute his
disappearance to anger in the military over Thanong ' s critical
stance toward the February 23 coup and subsequent changes in
Thai labor legislation. Government officials deny any
involvement in Thanong ' s disappearance and say they have no
knowledge of his fate. Some officials have claimed that
Thanong vanished intentionally, either for political or
personal reasons, but they have failed to present any evidence
to back up the charge.
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THAILAND
c. Torture and (Dther Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Pxinishment
Although Thailand's Criminal Code forbids cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, there continued to be many
credible reports of police beatings of prisoners and detainees,
and the Government has done little to address the problem. A
proposal to give civilian prosecutors authority to oversee
police interrogations of suspects has met with strong
bureaucratic resistance from the police department and has yet
to be approved.
Observers complain that conditions at the Suan Phlu Immigration
Detention Center (IDC) constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. As many as 1,500 illegal immigrants are held for
extended periods of time in extremely crowded conditions with
no opportunity to leave the cell or engage in exercise.
Medical care is minimal, and many detainees suffer from malaria
and other serious diseases.
In recent years international attention has focused on reports
of murder and rape of displaced Cambodians living in camps
along the Thai-Cambodian border. Most of the violence is now
committed by Khmer against other Khmer, and banditry involving
armed Khmer resistance soldiers is becoming more common inside
the camps and in border areas. Although the Thai Displaced
Persons Protective Unit (DPPU), which was deployed in 1988 to
provide external security for Khmer displaced persons camps,
has performed with substantially greater professionalism than
the force it replaced, two violent incidents involving the DPPU
were reported during 1991, resulting in one death and one
serious injury. Thai paramilitary rangers were responsible for
one violent incident outside a camp which resulted in a
fatality.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Thailand's Criminal and Penal Codes are based largely on
Western European models. Except in cases of crimes in
progress, arrest warrants generally are required but are issued
by the police themselves rather than the courts. Specific
charges must be brought against detainees within 48 hours, but
police have the authority to extend the period to 7 days if
required to complete the investigation. Detainees do not have
the right to have their lawyers present during questioning.
There is a functioning bail system. The only legal basis for
detention without specific charges for long periods (up to 480
days) is the Anti-Communist Activities Act. Currently, no one
is being detained under this Act's provisions.
Following the February 23 coup, deposed Prime Minister
Chatichai Choonhavan, Deputy Prime Minister Arthit Kamlang-ek,
and eight of their aides were held in detention by the armed
forces for a total of 2 weeks. A ninth aide was released after
2 or 3 days because of a health problem. No criminal charges
were filed against any of those detained. The detainees were
held in military guesthouses, apparently in comfortable
circumstances, and suffered no inhumane treatment.
Soon after their release, Chatichai and Arthit left the country
for extended visits abroad. While they characterized their
travel as voluntary, and coup leaders stressed that the two
were free to return at any time, it is likely that the
departures reflected the coup group's desire that Chatichai and
Arthit exile themselves from politics at least temporarily. At
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THAILAND
the time of his release, Chatichai also announced his
resignation from all political positions. The former Prime
Minister returned to Thailand for 1 week in April and again in
August. At year's end, Chatchai remained in the country and
reportedly was considering resuming his political career.
Former Deputy Prime Minister Arthit returned to Thailand on May
20 and resumed his activities as the leader of the Thai
People's Party without incident.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Thai legal system provides for the presumption of innocence
and access to courts or administrative bodies to seek redress.
The civilian judicial system includes three levels of courts;
courts of first instance, courts of appeals, and the Supreme
Court. A separate military court system tries cases in which
the accused are military personnel, cases involving threats to
the royal family, and security-related cases brought to trial
during periods of martial law. Ordinary courts may be
designated to sit as military courts for the purpose of hearing
such cases. A serious flaw in providing due process rights is
the lack of appeal from decisions of a military court.
Separate Islamic courts are permitted to hear certain civil
cases involving members of the country's Muslim minority.
Trials are decided by a single judge rather than a jury in
courts of first instance and by a panel of judges at the
appellate level. The courts are relatively independent of
external pressures and appear not to be intimidated in
rendering verdicts that might displease senior government
officers. While most trials are public, the court may order a
closed trial. This is most often done in cases touching on
religious sensitivities, foreign policy matters, or the royal
family.
Defendants tried in ordinary criminal courts enjoy a broad
range of legal rights. Although they have no right to counsel
during the investigative phase of their cases, detainees are
granted access to a lawyer of their own choosing before the
trial. A pilot government program provides free legal advice
to the poor, but indigent defendants are not automatically
provided with counsel at public expense. Most free legal aid
comes from private groups, including the Lawyers' Association
and the Women Lawyers' Association.
Court proceedings continued in the cases of four persons
charged with lese majeste and inciting unrest in a June 1990
protest rally sponsored by Shia Muslims in Pattani province.
Authorities have denied bail to the accused on national
security grounds, and hearings have been closed to the public.
Another five suspects in the case remain at large.
By year's end the trial of 14 members of a self-styled
"Revolutionary Council," first arrested in 1989 on charges of
sedition, had still to be concluded. All but one defendant,
however, have been freed on bail.
On May 24, prosecutors indicted two former members of the
outlawed Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) on charges of having
joined in a 1982 plot to assassinate the Queen, the Prime
Minister, and the Army Commander ! Six other persons named in
the indictment remain at large, including fugitive army officer
Manoon Roopkachorn. The accused could face the death penalty
if convicted in the trial, which the court has ordered closed
to the public. The case is being tried in military court, from
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which no appeal is possible. Police also filed a separate
charge against former Chatichai government minister Chalerm
U-Bumrung, alleging he paid the two CPT defendants to lie about
the case. Chalerm fled abroad following the coup and was
granted political asylum in Denmark. He returned to Thailand
in late December, was arrested, and freed on bail.
Various aspects of the case suggest that the charges against
Manoon and Chalerm may be politically motivated. Relations of
the coup leaders with Manoon and Chalerm had been acrimonious
for some time. Moreover, some human rights groups have noted
military leaders' use cf the case to pressure the Government in
the months before the coup, as well as the military's citing of
the Government's alleged inaction on the case to justify the
February 23 coup. They also point to the lengthy time between
the alleged crime and the indictment, and the decision to drop
charges against another 37 alleged participants, including a
number of military officers.
Shortly after the coup, the ruling National Peacekeeping
Council ordered a freeze on the assets of 25 members of
previous Chatichai governments, pending an investigation to
determine whether they had been acquired illegally, and
appointed a committee to examine their financial records. The
committee initially exonerated 12 of the original 25 and
released their assets while making a preliminary judgment that
the remaining 13 possessed "unusual wealth." By mid-December,
the committee had accjuitted two more of the accused. It found
three others guilty, among them former Prime Minister
Chatichai, and ordered that their suspect assets be forfeited
to the State. By placing the burden of proof on the accused
and combining the powers to investigate and to rule on guilt or
innocence, the committee's procedures raised questions of due
process and the rights of the accused to a fair trial. Under a
law passed by the National Legislative Assembly in November,
however, those found guilty may appeal the verdict to the
Supreme Court .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Thai law requires that police possess a search warrant prior to
entering a home without the owner's consent. However, search
warrants are issued by the police themselves and are not
subject to prior judicial review. There are credible reports
that officers sometimes endorse warrants in advance and then
allow their noncommissioned subordinates to apply them as
needed. The Ant i -Communist Activities Act allows officials
engaged in "Communist suppression operations" to conduct
searches without warrants, but these powers rarely have been
invoked in recent years. After the February 23 coup, credible
sources reported several instances of searches being carried
out without proper warrants. While the searchers in these
cases failed to identify themselves, witnesses believe they
included military or civilian security personnel.
In recent years, it has been widely assumed that security
services engage in surreptitious monitoring of persons
espousing leftist or controversial views. Following the
February 23 coup, credible sources reported a significantly
stepped up monitoring effort aimed at those suspected of
opposing the military leadership. Alleged targets of
monitoring included politicians, academics, labor and student
leaders, human rights activists, and employees of certain
nongovernmental organizations.
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THAILAND
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
While Thai citizens generally enjoy a substantial measure of
freedom of speech, several laws place limits on this freedom.
The principal legal restrictions are prohibitions on defaming,
insulting, or threatening the King, Queen, heir apparent, or
regent (lese majeste); defaming the character of other persons;
advocating a Communist system of government; and speaking in a
manner likely to incite disturbances, threaten national
security, or insult religion.
In addition to the four Shiite Muslims charged with lese
majeste in 1990 (see Section I.e.), police in September issued
a warrant for the arrest of writer and social critic Sulak
Sivaraksa on charges that he committed lese majeste and defamed
the character of the army commander in an August 22 speech at
Thammasat University. Following the issuance of the warrant,
Sulak fled abroad where he remained at year's end.
Thai governments generally permit criticism of their policies,
though prominent critics have on occasion been targets of
violence by mysterious assailants. The privately owned press
practices self-censorship. It is particularly cautious about
criticism of the monarchy and, to a lesser degree, the military
and the Buddhist ecclesiastical hierarchy. In February the
Thai language daily Matichon voluntarily ceased publication for
3 days as a gesture of contrition for having printed a letter
to the editor critical of Thailand's senior Buddhist monk.
Public expression of opposition views decreased sharply in the
immediate aftermath of the February 23 coup but resumed
gradually in the following months. By the latter part of the
year, public criticism of the Government and especially the
military appeared to equal or even exceed precoup levels. Such
criticism reached a peak on November 19, when over 50,000
people attended a peaceful rally to protest "undemocratic"
clauses in the draft constitution.
Senior police and military officials responded to the stepped
up criticism later in the year with occasional public
"warnings" to newspapers about particular articles but stopped
short of legal action. In August, however, the Air Force
briefly barred reporters and copies of the daily Naew Na from
facilities under its control, including the Airport Authority
and Thai Airways. The action followed Naew Na's publication of
a column alleging corruption at the airport. The Air Force
lifted the ban after the author of the offending column stopped
writing for the paper.
Radio stations are government licensed and operated by
government, military, and private entities as commercial
enterprises. They are rec[uired to broadcast government-
produced newscasts four times daily and a military-produced
commentary once a day, but are free to originate other news and
commentary.
Of five national television networks, two are run by the army
and three by the Government. Critics charge that news coverage
on the stations is biased in favor of those who oversee them.
Programming about controversial subjects and persons continues
to be barred or subject to censorship. While the Government
allowed the broadcast of a wider range of viewpoints at times
during the year, news reports on the activities of critics of
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THAILAND
the draft constitution vanished from the airwaves in
mid-November and did not return until after the charter was
promulgated. In December the cabinet member responsible for
government-run media announced that beginning in January 1992
each station would be required to set up its own censorship
committee rather than submitting programs to the broadcasting
directing board for prescreening.
Representatives of the Thai film industry complain that the
film censorship board, composed largely of police officers,
regularly deletes all references in films to a number of topics
deemed politically sensitive. Among the topics subjected to
such censorship are police corruption, misconduct by members of
the Buddhist clergy, and the 1973 student uprising.
Thai domestic publications continued to present a wide range of
political and social commentary in 1991. Unless critical of
the royal family or the monarchy, foreign and domestic books
normally are not censored and are permitted to circulate
freely. The 1941 Press Law empowers the police director
general to prohibit the import of printed matter deemed
dangerous to public order and morals. The Government imposed
no new permanent or temporary bans on the import of foreign
publications during 1991. However, the local distributor of
the International Herald Tribune voluntarily withheld the
February 26 edition of the newspaper, which contained an
editorial critical of the coup.
Academic and technical literature circulated freely for the
most part. In March, however, charges of inciting unrest were
filed against a researcher for a private labor foundation
caught printing leaflets critical of the February 23 coup. The
charges against the researcher were dropped shortly after the
lifting of martial law in May.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
While the Thai legal system generally recognizes the right to
peaceful assembly, in practice, government officials at times
act to restrict this right. Official intolerance of public
demonstrations appears highest in rural areas, particularly in
the northeast of the country. Residents of these areas who
stage apparently peaceful public protests are sometimes charged
under the Penal Code with inciting unrest and with the assembly
of 10 or more persons with intent to commit violence.
In September, for example, police and army troops in Nakhon
Ratchasima province stopped a group of several hundred
villagers from neighboring Buri Ram province who were on their
way to show support for villagers subject to an army-sponsored
resettlement plan. The ensuing confrontation ended in a
violent clash and the arrest of 10 persons, including a monk
known for his advocacy of forest conservation. The marchers
and the authorities accused each other of starting the
violence, in which 14 demonstrators were reported injured.
Authorities generally are less prone to interfere with peaceful
public gatherings in other parts of the country. Permits are
not required for meetings and gatherings except when they are
held on public property or if sound amplification systems will
be used.
Freedom of assembly was severely restricted for over 2 months
following the February 23 coup. During that period. National
Peacekeeping Council orders banned political gatherings of four
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or more persons and prohibited political parties from holding
meetings or engaging in political activity.
A total of 58 persons were arrested in two separate incidents
and charged with violating the order banning public
gatherings. They included 15 persons arrested during an
anticoup demonstration at Bangkok's Ramkhamhaeng University in
February and 43 residents of Yasothon Province arrested in
March while demanding increased compensation for land lost to a
reservoir project." Prosecutors dropped the charges after the
National Legislative Assembly voted to rescind the ban on
gatherings, as well as the ban on political party activity, on
May 9. The Yasothon defendants remain on trial on several
other counts, however, including assembly of 10 or more persons
with intent to commit violence.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is generally practiced and protected by law
and custom. The de facto state religion is Theravada Buddhism,
but other faiths are not restricted. Religious publishing,
regardless of faith, is allowed. Foreign clergy are permitted
to preach freely, although there are limits on the number of
foreign missionaries admitted. There are no restrictions on
religious ceremonies or instruction, or on conversions from one
faith to another, but members of minority religious movements
have on occasion been subjected to legal action. One example
of this has been the two ongoing trials (beg\in in 1990) of Phra
Potirak, leader of a dissident Buddhist sect, and his
followers, who have been accused of violating the law governing
the Buddhist ecclesiastical hierarchy and impersonating
Buddhist monks or nuns. Phara Potirak and his followers remain
free on bail and have continued their religious practices.
Like other private associations, religious groups are generally
required to register with the Government. In an effort to
limit the number of separate registrations by Christian
denominations, since the 1970 's the Government has recjuired
most Christian church bodies to join one of five umbrella
groups. Fixed numbers of work permits for missionaries and
church workers are allocated to each umbrella group.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) has
applied to the Government unsuccessfully for independent
registration for a number of years. Thai officials have
repeatedly declined to grant such registration and insisted
that the church should join an existing umbrella groups if it
desires registration. However, under a longstanding tacit
arrangement, the Government has allowed Mormon church workers
and missionaries to enter the country on tourist visas. In
June the church's former mission president was convicted in
Bangkok of defaming Buddhism in an article written for an
in-house church publication. He was given a 6-month suspended
sentence and fined $200. Shortly thereafter, he departed
Thailand after completing a scheduled 3-year assignment.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Longstanding restrictions on the travel and place of residence
of certain Chinese and Vietnamese aliens living in Thailand
remained in place in 1991. The right of citizens to change
their residence or workplace was unabridged. Travel within the
country was restricted in certain border areas where foreign or
vestigial domestic insurgent groups remain active.
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At the time of the February 23 coup, the ruling National
Peacekeeping Council ordered a ban on foreign travel by a total
of nine persons, most of whom had served as advisors to deposed
Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan. Two of the nine were
later charged with criminal offenses, and a third was made
subject of a corruption investigation. Three of the nine
apparently mangaged to evade the ban and travel abroad
surreptitiously. The Peacekeeping Council eventually dropped
the order in the case of the remaining six, and several have
since made foreign trips without hindrance. Some persons named
in a Peacekeeping Council-ordered asset freeze and corruption
investigation apparently are also required to seek the
Council's permission before undertaking foreign travel.
Passport applications by single Thai women and children under
the age of 14 must be approved by the Department of public
Welfare. In addition, a 1985 statute criticized by some
women's rights advocates reqiiires that female passport
applicants under age 35 sit through a series of interviews
regarding their employment records and finances. These
provisions are intended to prevent the export of children for
sale and women for purposes of prostitution.
The Government has not revoked citizenship for political
reasons .
While not a party to international conventions on the the
status of refugees, Thailand has acted in the spirit of those
agreements by providing first asylum to over 1 million people
from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam since 1975, including about
350,000 Cambodian displaced persons in camps on its side of the
Thai -Cambodian border. Repatriation to Cambodia of this
population under auspices of the UNHCR is expected to begin
during the first half of 1992.
Thailand continues to provide first asylum to Vietnamese and
Lao asylum seekers and to process them in accord with the
Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) agreed to in Geneva in
1989. There were no reports of any pushoffs of Vietnamese
asylum seekers in 1991. According to statistics from the
UNHCR, there were no attacks by Thai pirates on Vietnamese boat
people recorded during the year. The Thai marine police
arrested three persons in the first 8 months of 1991 and
charged them with involvement in two earlier piracy attacks.
Thai courts convicted seven persons in 1991 for previous piracy
incidents. Lao asylum seekers in Thailand continue to be
screened under provisions of the CPA to determine their
eligibility for refugee status. There were isolated reports of
pushbacks of Lao asylum seekers by Thai government officials in
1991. Thailand continues to cooperate with the UNHCR and Laos
in a trilateral program to manage the voluntary repatriation of
certain Lao asylum seekers.
It has been official Thai policy since April 1, 1989, that
Burmese asylum seekers in Thailand are illegal immigrants
subject to deportation. The Thai continue to arrest and detain
Burmese asylum seekers in Bangkok and along the border, and
some Burmese "of concern" to the UNHCR have been included in
deportations of large groups of illegal workers back to Burma.
In August the Thai Government moved most Burmese detainees "of
concern" who had completed their sentences for illegal entry
into Thailand to a police academy north of Bangkok. The UNHCR
has been permitted access to the facility. Approximately 1,528
Burmese students live in camps along the Thai/Burmese border
with over 54,000 members of Burmese ethnic minorities. There
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have been reports that the Thai Government plans to move this
population back into Burma by early 1992. Voluntary agencies
and international humanitarian assistance organizations
continue to provide food and medical assistance.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Events in 1991 clearly demonstrate that the right of Thai
citizens to change their government through democratic
processes can still be negated easily by military
intervention. Senior military officers, assisted by
bureaucrats, traditionally have exercised disproportionate
influence over Thai politics. In recent years, these elements
have been challenged by politicians, many of them representing
a newly prosperous business elite. The February 23 bloodless
coup marked the latest reassertion of traditional elite control
as well as a reversal of 12 years of halting progress toward a
more democratic political system.
After a lengthy drafting process, the military-appointed
National Legislative Assembly completed work on a new
Constitution, which took effect on December 9. The new charter
requires that a general election for a 360 member House of
Representatives be held within 120 days, and it has been set
for March 22. Many politicians and others charge that the
Constitution's provisions for an appointed Senate will permit
inordinate military influence over the political system in the
future .
Historically, women have voted in numbers equal to men, but
have been grossly underrepresented in national politics and in
high governmental positions. This pattern is repeated in the
current Interim Cabinet and National Legislative Assembly.
Under a 1978 cabinet decision and standing Interior Ministry
regulations, women are barred from serving as deputy district
officers, a key position in Thailand's highly centralized
system of local administration. By extension, this rule
precludes women from serving in more senior positions such as
district officer and provincial governor. Exclusion from these
positions has impeded women from rising to senior levels in the
powerful Interior Ministry. During 1991 Interior Ministry
officials continued to insist that women were physically
incapable of fulfilling the job's demands, particularly in the
area of crime fighting. In October, however, the semi-
autonomous Bangkok Metropolitan Administration parted company
with the Ministry by naming its first female deputy district
chief. Women enjoy better prospects in several other
ministries and government agencies, notably the Commerce
Ministry.
Female military and police officers are not permitted to attend
service academies or the command and general staff college,
creating a major obstacle to their promotion beyond the rank of
colonel. Since retired senior bureaucrats and military
officers have been the source of much of Thailand's political
leadership, these limitations have also been a key factor in
women's under representation in politics and government.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Thai human rights organizations have had some success in
specific areas, including pressuring the Government to address
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THAILAND
abuses in child labof practices and in prisons. Although
government officials are generally willing to talk to these
groups, it is not uncommon for them to encounter official
suspicion or even hostility, particularly when working in rural
areas. In August interim Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun
criticized such attitudes toward nongovernmental human rights
organizations.
In the past, Thailand has answered specific inquiries on human
rights matters from Amnesty International and the International
Commission of Jurists. With occasional exceptions, it has been
willing to allow international human rights organizations to
visit Thailand, to meet with appropriate government officials,
and to lobby for corrective action.
Following the February 23 coup, senior government and military
officials on several occasions responded negatively to
criticism from foreign and international organizations alleging
human rights violations in Thailand. In July the Interior
Ministry ordered the last minute cancellation of a Bangkok
seminar sponsored by the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) and other foreign and regional
organizations. The cancellation appeared to be in retaliation
for a June 25 ICFTU call for its affiliates to push for trade
sanctions against Thailand for alleged violations of worker
rights .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Thailand has made considerable progress in integrating its
minorities, but some problems remain. Fewer than half of an
estimated 500,000 to 700,000 members of hill tribes are
believed to possess documentation as Thai citizens. Advocates
consistently cite the difficulties faced by many hill tribe
members in obtaining Thai citizenship as the primary obstacle
to their successful integration into society. In addition,
credible sources report many hill tribe members have been
subjected to deportation or resettlement efforts, often without
regard to how long they have resided in Thailand.
Muslims are a significant minority and represent a majority in
four of Thailand's southernmost provinces bordering Malaysia.
The Government has targeted development efforts and attempted
to expand educational opportunities in order to integrate Thai
Muslims into Thai society. However, Muslims remain
underrepresented in government service, the professions, and in
higher education, primarily because of the effects of lower
educational standards.
The community of approximately 45,000 Vietnamese which fled
Indochina in the 1940 's and 1950 's to northeastern Thailand
lives under a set of laws and regulations restricting its
members' movements, residences, education, and occupations.
Since 1980, these Vietnamese have even been forbidden to buy
new cars. Some of these restrictions are laxly enforced.
Those born in Vietnam are not eligible for Thai citizenship
under existing laws. In 1991 the Interior Ministry completed
work on new regulations aimed at easing the way for some 20,000
to 34,000 Thai-born descendants of this community to be granted
Thai citizenship. Informed sources report local and provincial
administrative officials have been slow to implement the new
policy, however, apparently because of their unwillingness to
lose the discretionary power they have long had in deciding on
applications for citizenship.
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THAILAND
Upon taking office, the Interim Government enunciated a goal of
introducing new policies and laws aimed at enhancing protection
of the rights of children, women, aind the disabled. The
Government subsequently upgraded a former subdivision within
the Prime Minister's office to a national commission on women's
affairs. The Government also won passage of a law to improve
the lot of the disabled by means of regulations and tax
incentives aimed at both increasing employment of the disabled
and improving the accessibility of public and private buildings.
Women generally have equal legal rights, with specific
guarantees of equality with men in the areas of matrimonial
property, the right to choose habitation and employment, and
child custody. However, legal inequality remains in the area
of divorce rights. Whereas a man may sue for divorce on the
grounds that his wife has committed adultery, a woman under
similar circumstances faces the additional legal burden of
proving her husband has maintained or honored another woman in
a manner equal to that accorded his wife.
Currently, Thai law denies Thai nationality to children born of
alien fathers and Thai mothers, regardless of place of birth
unless the birth is registered as illegitimate. Children of
Thai fathers receive citizenship without regard to the mother's
nationality.
Though no Thai law specifically addresses violence within the
family, the Criminal Code's provisions on assault and abuse
effectively make both wife beating and child abuse a crime.
Laws on rape and abandonment also provide for harsher penalties
when the victim is a child. While Thai governments have
denounced physical abuse of women and children, law enforcement
in this area has been less than vigorous. Thai law provides no
means to intervene short of criminal prosecution of the abusive
spouse or parent. Rules of evidence often make prosecuting
such cases difficult, especially when the victims are
children. For a combination of these reasons and ingrained
cultural attitudes, which tend to be tolerant of male
prerogatives, police are often reluctant to pursue such cases.
Plans to establish a new police unit staffed by female officers
to handle cases of abuse of women and children have not yet
been implemented.
Within their limited resources, private women's and children's
rights groups provide shelter to victims of abuse who come to
their attention and ably assist them in pursuing legal action.
Reliable data on the extent of abuse of women and children are
not available. However, those with extensive experience in the
field believe family violence is prevalent in all social
classes and that the number of such cases is rising.
Prostitution is acknowledged within Thailand as one of the
country's most troubling social problems. Estimates of the
numbers of women engaged in prostitution vary widely. A 1990
Public Health Ministry survey placed the number at 86,000.
Most other sources agree the number exceeds 100,000, with some
placing it as high as 1,000,000. Estimates of the number of
child prostitutes show similar variations.
Women engaged in prostitution typically come from relatively
poor rural areas, particularly in the country's northern
region. With scant economic opportunities in their home
villages, many turn to working as prostitutes in urban areas as
a way to fulfill their familial obligations as well as to
obtain the material fruits of industrial society. Procurers
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THAILAND
often advance the parents of young women a substantial sum
against their future earnings, money that frequently goes to
pay off debts or to build a new house. The women are then
obligated to work in a brothel for a fixed period in order to
pay back the loan. In public discussions of prostitution,
parents who accept money under such conditions are often
described as having "sold" their daughters for a certain sum.
It is not known what percentage of these women are forced into
prostitution against their will. Human rights monitors believe
that the majority of the women who engage in prostitution are
not kept under physical constraint. There are, however,
numerous cases of women and female children being forced or
tricked into working as prostitutes and being held as virtual
captives by brothel operators. Information from well-informed
sources, confirmed by police arrest reports, also describes a
disturbing recent trend toward increasing traffic in women from
hill tribe minorities and neighboring countries. Some brothel
operators reportedly favor such women because they may be
obtained more cheaply and their inability to speak Thai makes
them easier to control.
There have also been a number of we 11 -documented cases of local
networks trafficking in women "exporting" prostitutes to such
countries as Germany and Japan. In February police arrested 15
employees of the state-owned Thai Airways International and
charged them with complicity in such activity.
Despite occasional high profile raids on brothels, overall
enforcement of the laws against prostitution has consistently
been all but nonexistent. Senior government officials
themselves have cited corruption as a major factor in police
willingness to turn a blind eye to the problem. Since taking
office, the Interim Government has followed a policy of
cracking down on brothels engaging in child and forced
prostitution. In June the Interior Ministry's Public Welfare
Department announced the establishment of a national center to
coordinate the rescue of child prostitutes and those forced
into prostitution against their will. While police raids
against brothels engaging in such practices did increase
following the announcement of the new policy, informed sources
say the crackdown has had little practical effect and that the
brothels targeted usually reopen within a few days.
Women are well represented in the labor force and are holding
more professional positions, particularly in the commercial
sector. They are not barred legally from positions
traditionally held by men except for government and miltary
posts described above and a limited number of occupations
deemed to pose excessive physical hazards. Government
regulations require employers to fix the same wages and
benefits for similar work by men and women. Discriminatory
practices persist, however. State-owned Thai Airways, for
example, requires women flight attendants to retire or accept
transfer to a ground job at age 45. No such requirement exists
for male employees. Women continue to be concentrated in
traditionally lower paid jobs, and there appears to be a
significant gap between average salaries earned by men and
women, although no accurate statistics are available. In rural
areas, sex stereotypes are more pronounced with respect to
social roles. These barriers are being modified as mass
communications bring new role models to even the most remote
communities .
1009
THAILAND
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Thailand's basic labor law is the Labor Relations Act of 1975,
which applies only to the private sector. Until April 1991,
the Act also applied to workers in state-owned enterprises. As
amended, the 1975 Act extends only to private sector employees
the right to form and join unions or employee associations of
their own choosing without prior authorization; to decide on
the constitutions and rules of these associations and unions;
to express their views without government or employer
interference; to confederate with other unions; to receive
protection from discrimination, dissolution, suspension, or
termination by any outside authority because of union
activities; and to have employee representation in direct
negotiations with employers. However, no law explicitly
protects workers from discrimination due to their participation
in organizing new unions which have not yet been officially
registered.
The 1975 Act specifically withholds from government workers the
right to form unions. Nonetheless, civil servants may and do
form "employee associations," which are influential in
determining salary scales, benefits, and conditions of
employment .
In April the military-appointed National Legislative Assembly
amended the 1975 Act to exempt state enterprise workers and
enacted a State Enterprise Employee Relations Act that
dissolved unions in this sector. In place of unions, workers
in each state enterprise may form a single "association" after
at least 30 percent of the enterprise's employees have
submitted a petition to the Department of Labor to register
their association. These bodies may submit employee grievances
to management and negotiate benefits, but not wages.
Associations do not have the right to confederate. Officials
have stated that these groups will be allowed to affiliate with
international labor organizations, but one large state
enterprise in August issued regulations forbidding such an
affiliation.
The new Act, like the 1975 Act, denies all state enterprise
workers the right to strike. In the past, public sector unions
circumvented this prohibition by holding "extraordinary
meetings" which took workers off the job for days at a time.
The new Act rec[uires associations to hold general meetings only
on weekends and holidays. One of the National Peacekeeping
Council's first actions after the February 23 coup was to ban
strikes and lockouts. This ban was rescinded with the lifting
of martial law in May. Like other groups, unions could not
stage rallies or protests during the period of martial law. In
addition, in February the Council issued a decree amending the
1975 act to require that a majority of a union's members
approve strikes in a secret ballot. Previously the only legal
requirement for a strike in most of the private sector was a
24-hour notice to management. The same decree also requires
that the Department of Labor certify advisors selected by the
unions to represent them, which is importeuit in a country of
small, weak unions.
Under the 1975 Act, the Government has the authority "to
restrict the right to strike whenever a strike would affect
national security or cause severe negative repercussions for
the population at large." However, the Government seldom uses
1010
THAILAND
this provision and did not do so in 1991. Thai labor law also
forbids strikes in "essential services", defined much more
broadly than the International Labor Organization (ILO)
standards, to include ports, education, transportation, fuel
and energy, telecommunications, hospitals, and waterworks.
Since a period of social unrest in the mid-1970 's, Thailand has
averaged fewer than 10 strikes a year. Since the lifting of
martial law, very few strikes have occurred.
Even before the dissolution of state enterprise unions reduced
total union membership by about one-half, less than 3 percent
of the total work force, or about 12 percent of the industrial
work force, was unionized. Almost 60 percent of the work force
is employed in the largely unorganized agricultural sector.
Factors discouraging the growth of organized labor are the
antiunion and paternalistic attitudes of employers, the Thai
preference to avoid face-to-face confrontation, and a provision
of Thai labor law permitting the formation of private sector
labor unions with as few as 10 members. This provision has
resulted in a proliferation of small, weak unions — about
700 — grouped into 7 national federations.
The only verified incident in 1991 of Thai unionists suffering
violence due to their union activities was a scuffle in late
November outside an American owned factory pitting strikers and
their sympathizers against factory guards. It is unclear who
started the trouble. The disappearance since June of Thanong
Podhiarn, a prominent vinion leader and probably the most
outspoken critic of postcoup government labor policy, remains
unsolved by the police (see Section l.b.).
Thai unions generally operate independently of the Government
and other outside organizations. The 1975 act encourages this
policy by exempting union officials from prosecution in
pursuing the interests of their followers "provided that the
activity does not involve politics." Unions are free to
associate internationally with other trade union organizations
aind they maintain a wide variety of such affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is recognized
for Thai private sector workers under the 1975 Labor Relations
Act. Both labor and management usually seek to resolve
potential differences informally before turning to formal
collective bargaining. The 1975 Act defined the mechanisms for
such negotiations and for government-assisted conciliation and
arbitration in cases under dispute. Under the 1991 State
Enterprise Employee Relations Act, associations may negotiate
working conditions, but not wages, with a government-dominated
labor relations committee in each enterprise. (The Cabinet
decides state enterprise wages based on recommendations of the
overall State Enterprise Labor Relations Committee.) A system
of labor courts created in 1980 exercises judicial review over
most aspects of labor law for the private sector. However,
when Thai courts determine that a worker has been unjustly
dismissed, they usually order severance pay compensation rather
than reinstatement. Workers may also seek redress for their
grievances from a tripartite Labor Relations Committee under
the Ministry of Interior.
The State Enterprise Employee Relations Act has no explicit
provision allowing public sector employees to appeal to the
Icibor courts. Instead they may apply to an overall state
enterprise labor relations committee.
1011
THAILAND
There are several special Export Processing Zones (EPZ's) in
Thailand, with many more planned to stimulate the growth of
export-oriented industry. No separate labor legislation
applies to EPZ's, in which wages and working conditions, in
fact, usually exceed national norms. There are some trade
unions and a few collective bargaining agreements in Thai EPZ's,
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
As was the case with the former Constitution, the new one
contains provisos prohibiting forced or compulsory labor except
in the case of national emergency, war, or martial law. On
October 31, the Police made a highly publicized raid on a
factory where 31 boys, aged 13 to 17, were detained and forced
to work 16 hours a day. The owners are under arrest. The
Government has announced that it is developing a program to
combat such violations of rights, including harsher penalties
against perpetrators. The question of adult and child
prostitution is discussed in Section 5.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
In January 1990, the Government raised the minimum age for
employment from 12 to 13. The Government's policy is to raise
the minimum employment age gradually to the ILO standard of 15,
although no timetable for meeting this standard has been set.
The law still permits the employment of children between the
ages of 13 and 15 in "light work", although the employment of
children at night (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.) is prohibited. The
Government has estimated that there are 100,000 children
between 13 and 15 in the labor force, but the actual number is
probably much greater. The current 5-year plan, which runs to
1996, provides for an increase in the minimum requirement for
schooling from 6 to 9 years by the end of the period, and there
are reasonable prospects it will be successful.
Child labor continued to cause considerable domestic and
foreign criticism in 1991 as noted above. Foreign trade union
and human rights groups have focused heavily on the
exploitation of working children. In June the ILO Standards
Committee issued a "special paragraph" chastising the Thai
Government for its lack of effective implementation of laws
prohibiting child labor. The "special paragraph" is the most
severe rebuke the ILO can mete out to member states.
Complaints against Thailand allege that Thai standards continue
to be low, that enforcement is inadequate despite recent
increases in the number of labor inspectors, and that penalties
for violations of the law are not severe enough. Police raids
on sweatshops, including that noted in Section 6.c. above, have
found children under age 13 working illegally. There are
continued reports of children over age 13 illegally employed in
dangerous, unhealthful, or otherwise harmful circumstances.
Thai efforts to remedy these problems are hampered mostly by
inadequate resources devoted to inspection and enforcement, and
fines which do not sufficiently deter potential violators. The
Department of Labor division responsible for child labor issues
has more than doubled its corps of inspectors in the last 2
years and has received authorization to increase further the
size of the corps by nearly 100 percent. In addition, the
number of general labor inspectors has also more than doubled
in the last 2 years. Despite these efforts, fully adequate
enforcement of child labor laws will require even more manpower
and funding and more effective penalties for violations.
50-726 - 92 - 33
1012
THAILAND
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
A tripartite wage committee consisting of government, employer,
and worker representatives in 1991 increased the daily legal
minimum wage. Rates vary by region, but they are minimally
adequate to provide a worker and his family with a decent
standard of living. The unskilled workers who pour into
Bangkok from the far poorer countryside often are willing to
work at less than the minimum wage. In rural Thailand too,
many workers are willing to work for less than the minimum wage
mandated there. The rural minimal wage provides workers and
their families with a marginally adequate standard of living,
given the lower cost of living in these areas. Government
officials report that large groups of laborer sestimated at
about one-third of the total — receive less — than the legal
minimum wage. The Government has tasked labor inspectors with
enforcing prescribed rates more effectively.
The Government has not mandated a uniform workweek for the
entire labor force. Commercial employees work a maximum of 54
hours per week, employees in industry 48, and those in
"dangerous" work 42. Transportation workers are restricted to
no more than 8 hours per day.
Working conditions vary widely in Thailand. In medium and
large factories government health and safety standards are
maintained. However, Thailand's large informal sector is
subject to minimal inspection, and health and safety standards
mandated under Thai law are generally little understood by
workers and seldom followed by employers.
1013
TONGA
The Kingdom of Tonga comprises 169 islands scattered over a
large area of the South Pacific. Almost all of the
approximately 108,000 inhabitants are Polynesian. Tonga is a
constitutional monarchy, in which political life is dominated
by the King, the nobility, and a few prominent commoners.
Formerly a British protectorate, Tonga became fully independent
in 1970 and joined the Commonwealth of Nations.
The security apparatus is composed of the Tonga Defense
Services (TDS) and a police force. The 300-man TDS force is
responsible to and controlled by the Minister of Defense. The
Commissioner of Police supervises a 300-man police force.
Tonga's economy is based primarily on the cultivation of
tropical and semitropical crops. An increasing demand for
imported manufactured goods and products unavailable locally
has led to a substantial trade deficit. This has largely been
offset by remittances from Tongans employed abroad, overseas
aid, and, to a lesser degree, tourism.
The principal areas of human rights problems are restrictions
on the right of citizens to change their government and
discrimination against women. The Constitution, which dates
back to 1875, has come under increasing challenge from
commoners, who are disadvantaged by it.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No such killings occurred.
b. Disappearance
There were no disappearances, and no evidence of people being
abducted, secretly arrested, or clandestinely detained.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or other such
treatment are forbidden by the Constitution, and there were no
reported instances of such practices.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The right to judicial determination of the legality of arrest
is enshrined in the Constitution and observed in practice.
There is no preventive detention and no exile, internal or
external .
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
In 1990 Tonga took a significant step in reorganizing its
judiciary system by creating the Court of Appeal. This court
is both separate from the political system and, as the new
appellate court of last resort, the highest court in the land.
Previously, this role was played by the King's Privy Council
Court of Appeal. The latter now presides only over cases
relating to disputes over titles of nobility and estate
boundaries. The King still retains the right to commute a
1014
TONGA
death sentence in cases of murder or treason. In addition,
Tonga's court system consists of the Supreme Court (which has
original jurisdiction over all major cases), the Police
Magistrate's Courts, a General Court, a Court Martial for the
Tongan Defense Services, a Court Tribunal for the police force,
and a Court of Review for the Inland Revenue Department.
The right to a fair public trial is provided for by law and
honored in practice. No one may be summoned before any court
without first having received a written indictment clearly
stating the offense with which that person is charged.
Defendants are entitled to counsel, and lawyers have free
access to defendants. There are no political prisoners.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
By law no one may enter or search the home of another, or
remove any item of property unless in possession of a warrant
issued by a magistrate. There is no arbitrary intrusion by the
State or political organizations into a person's private life.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is provided for in the
Constitution. Tonga has five newspapers (one of which is
government owned) and one national magazine. The only radio
station is government owned. While there is generally little
editorializing in the government-owned media, opposition
opinion appears regularly alongside government statements and
letters. In 1985 a member of the Legislative Assembly, Akilisa
Pohiva, lost his job as a senior education officer for using
his fortnightly radio program to criticize the distribution of
wealth in Tonga. In 1988 the courts reinstated him and awarded
him damages for wrongful dismissal. He has since created his
own newspaper Kele'a (The Conch), which openly criticizes the
Government. The Government has not interfered with it. The
Catholic monthly Taumu'a Lelei also speaks out freely. The
Minister of Police has threatened action against the media in
one or two cases, but no action has ever been taken. One
serious infringement on press freedom occurred when Radio Tonga
was ordered not to broadcast or report on the proceedings of a
1991 Special Session of Parliament called to consider the issue
of sales of naturalization certificates and passports.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Peaceful assembly and association are provided for by law. On
March 8, a group of between 1,000 and 1,500 Tongans marched to
the Royal Palace to protest the Parliament's retroactive
legislation legalizing the sale of Tongan passports.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution and
observed in practice. Missionaries may proselytize freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Tongan citizens are free to travel anywhere within the Kingdom
and abroad. There are no restrictions on repatriation. There
are no displaced persons in Tonga.
1015
TONGA
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the ability to change their leaders or the
system of government. The King and a small group of hereditary
nobles dominate political life in Tonga. They assert authority
largely through their control of substantial landholdings. The
Constitution allows the monarch broad powers, many of which do
not require the endorsement of the legislative branch. The
King appoints and presides over the Privy Council, which makes
major policy decisions. (When the King is not presiding, the
Privy Council is called the Cabinet). The King also selects
the Prime Minister and other cabinet ministers, who hold office
at his pleasure. Tonga's unicameral legislature, the
Legislative Assembly, consists of 12 cabinet ministers, 9
nobles elected by their peers, and 9 People's Representatives
elected by all literate, tax-paying males and all literate
females. Those above 21 years of age are eligible to vote.
The speaker is appointed by the King from among the Nobles'
Representatives. Government ministers generally vote with the
Nobles' Representatives as a bloc. People's Representatives
sometimes vote against the Government. Elections are held
every 3 years. There are no political parties. In 1989
frustration over their minority status in the House led six
People's Representatives to walk out.
In 1991 there were continued calls for more democratic change
both by people inside and outside the government establishment.
Teisina Fuko, a commoner member of the Legislative Assemby,
called for the resignation of the Prime Minister, Prince
Fatafehi Tu' ipelehake. The latter resigned on grounds of ill
health in mid-1991 and was replaced by Baron Vaea of Houma. Of
even greater significance was the climax to the passport
issue. In 1984 the Tongan Government began selling Tongan
citizenship passports to foreigners who did not meet the
naturalization qualifications outlined in the Constitution.
The ensuing lawsuits by People's Representative Pohiva led to a
special session of the Parliament in February which amended the
Constitution to render the sales legal. In the following
month, a group of between 1,000 and 1,500 Tongans marched to
the Royal Palace to protest the retroactive legislation. Under
the Constitution, the people do have a right to petition the
King directly. The People's Representatives asked for an
audience with the King to present petitions regarding the new
amendments and calling for the removal of the official deemed
to have the greatest responsibility in the affair. Police
Minister Akau'ola. They were refused and instead told to
present their petitions to the King's acting secretary.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
While there are no known barriers to the formation of local
nongovernmental organizations that concern themselves with
human rights, such organizations do not exist. No outside
organizations have made requests to investigate human rights
violations .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Social, cultural, and economic facilities are available to all
citizens regardless of race or religion. However, members of
the hereditary nobility have substantial advantages in Tongan
1016
TONGA
society. These include control over most of the land and a
generally privileged status. Nonetheless, it is possible for
commoners to rise to cabinet positions in government and to
accumulate great wealth and status in the private sector.
In Tonga's male-dominated society women generally occupy a
subordinate role. While the strong Polynesian cultural
tradition has discouraged the rise of women to positions of
leadership, some have become members of the legislature and
served in responsible positions in various occupations.
Little information is available on the incidence of domestic
violence in Tonga. The authorities generally do not take an
active role in such cases. Wife beating is generally dealt
with in traditional ways between the families and village
chiefs; abused wives sometimes return to their families if
mediation fails.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to form unions under the 1964 Trade
Union Act, but to date no unions have been formed.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Since no unions have been formed, collective bargaining is not
a widespread practice, but a kind of collective bargaining does
occur informally. As yet, there is no legislation permitting
and protecting collective bargaining in Tonga. Labor laws and
regulations are uniformly enforced in all sectors of the
economy, including in export enhancement zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law and not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Child labor is not used in Tonga although there is as yet no
legislation prohibiting it.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
By regulation the workweek in Tonga is limited to 40 hours.
Labor laws and regulations are enforced by the Ministry of
Labor, Commerce, and Industry. A panel chaired by the Minister
is empowered to set minimum wage guidelines but has not done
so. Although Tonga still does not have a minimum wage law, it
has for some years set minimum daily wages for such sectors of
the economy as manufacturing and tourism. Existing minimum
wages are not adequate to provide a worker and family with a
decent standard of living. Workers are protected to a degree,
however, by the ease with which they can return to their
villages and live without a cash income if wages offered are
inadequate. The Tongan cultural tradition of extended family
support provides an additional economic safety net. Industrial
accidents are rare as few industries exist that would expose
workers to significant danger.
1017
TUVALU
Tuvalu, with about 8,500 people occupying a land surface area
of 26 square kilometers on 9 atolls in the central South
Pacific, is one of the world's smallest independent nations.
The population is primarily Polynesian. Tuvalu became
independent from the United Kingdom on October 1, 1978, and is
now a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Its Constitution,
revised in 1986, provides for a Westminster-style parliamentary
democracy. Tuva-lu's head of state is the British monarch,
represented by a governor-general who must be a Tuvalu citizen.
A 32-member police constabulary, the only security apparatus,
is responsible to and effectively controlled by civilian
authority.
The nation's economy, primarily subsistence based, relies
mainly on coconuts and taros and fishing. Tuvalu depends
heavily on foreign aid, mainly from Great Britain, Australia,
and New Zealand, to meet both its recurrent and capital
expenditures. Remittances from Tuvaluans working abroad, the
sale of commemorative and thematic postage stamps, and the sale
of fishing licenses to foreign vessels provide additional
sources of foreign exchange. The island's isolation and meager
natural resources severely limit prospects for economic
self-sufficiency.
Tuvaluan society is egalitarian, democratic, and respectful of
human rights. Social behavior, as determined by custom and
tradition, however, is considered as important as the law and
ensured by the village elders. Land is also key to much of the
structure of Tuvaluan society. There were no reports of
specific human rights abuses in 1991. In the traditional
culture of the islands, women occupy a subordinate role, with
limits on their job opportunities.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no politically motivated killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no disappearances, and no evidence of people being
abducted, secretly arrested, or clandestinely detained.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and inhiiman or degrading punishment or other such
treatment are forbidden by the Constitution, and there were no
reported instances of such practices.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Constitutional safeguards against arbitrary arrest and
detention are observed in practice. There is no exile,
internal or external.
1018
TUVALU
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to a fair public trial is ensured by law and observed
in practice. The Constitution provides that an accused person
must be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is
charged and be provided given time and facilities to prepare a
defense. The position of an independent people's lawyer is
ensured by statute. The services of this public defender are
available to all Tuvaluans free of charge. The right to
confront witnesses, present evidence, and appeal convictions is
enshrined in law. Procedural safeguards are based on English
common law. The judiciary is independent and free of
governmental , interference. Tuvalu has no political prisoners.
The judicial system consists of the higher courts, namely, the
Privy Council, the Court of Appeal, and the Higher Court, and
the lower courts, i.e., those of the Senior and Resident
Magistrates, the Island Courts and the Land Courts. The Chief
Justice, who is also Chief Justice of Nauru, sits on the High
Court about once a year .
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The privacy of the home is protected in law and respected by
the Government. There is no arbitrary intrusion by the State
or political organizations into the private life of the
individual. Membership in political organizations is voluntary.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is provided for in the Constitution
and observed in practice. Tuvalu has a radio station and a
mimeographed newspaper, Tuvalu Echoes, published on a bimonthly
basis. Both are government controlled.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association, including the right to form or belong to
associations for the advancement or protection of the group's
interests. There are no significant restrictions in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion
Complete freedom of religion prevails in Tuvalu. In 1990 the
Church of Tuvalu, a Protestant church, requested the Government
to recognize it as the official and only religion of the
country; 70 percent of Tuvaluans belong to this church. Prime
Minister Bikenibeu Paeniu rejected the proposal, stating his
belief in the separation of church and state, and warning that
such action would threaten the rights of other religious
denominations .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens are free to travel within the country and abroad.
There are no restrictions on repatriation. Tuvalu has no
refugees or displaced persons.
1019
TUVALU
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The people freely elect their government. Tuvalu has a
12-member unicameral Parliament elected directly by the
people. Parliament is presided over by a Speaker elected by
Members of Parliament. The normal life of Parliament is 4
years. The minimum voting age is 18 years.
The Cabinet consists of the Prime Minister, elected by secret
ballot from among the Members of Parliament, and up to four
other ministers, appointed and removed from office by the
Governor-General with the advice of the Prime Minister. The
Prime Minister may be removed from office by a parliamentary
vote of no confidence. The current Government of Prime
Minister Paeniu was elected in 1989.
Each of the islands is administered by six-person councils,
also elected by universal suffrage to 4-year terms. In the
outer islands, social behavior, determined by custom and
tradition, is considered as important as the law. Local
hereditary elders exercise considerable traditional
authority — including the seldom invoked right to inflict
corporal punishment for infringing customary rules — which can
be at odds with the national law.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There have been no reported allegations of human rights
violations by the Government and no known requests for
investigations. While there are no known barriers to their
establishment, there are no local nongovernmental organizations
that concern themselves with human rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
creed, sex, or national origin. Tuvaluan society is
egalitarian, democratic, and respectful of human rights.
Nevertheless, there is still resistance to changing the role of
women from the traditional emphasis on childrearing and
housekeeping. Despite such traditional attitudes, Tuvalu
counts a female minister in its small Cabinet, and women
increasingly hold positions in the health and education
sectors. This trend is no doubt partly due to the efforts of
the current Prime Minister, who is known to favor greater
opportunities for women. Violence against women is not a
problem in Tuvalu. If wife beating occurs, it is rare and has
not become a source of societal concern.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers in Tuvalu are free to organize unions and choose their
own labor representatives. The right to strike is provided for
by law, but no strike has ever been recorded.
The country's civil servants, teachers, and nurses — who, taken
together, total less than 1,000 employees — are grouped into
associations which do not presently have the status of unions
but may develop into them over time. The only registered trade
1020
TUVALU
union, the Tuvalu Seamen's Union, has about 600 men±)ers who
work on foreign merchant vessels around the world. The
Seamen's Union is a member of the International Transportation
Workers' Federation (ITF). The South Pacific and Oceanic
Council of Trade Unions (SPOCTU) in recent years has held
seminars in Tuvalu to promote the creation of labor unions
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Industrial Relations Code (1978) provides for conciliation,
arbitration, and settlement procedures as well as inquiry into
trade disputes. Although there are provisions for collective
bargaining, wage setting is the rule. The Minister of Works,
Labor, and Communications may establish an incomes commission
to determine appropriate levels of pay. For both the private
and public sectors, the legal mechanisms for resolving labor
disputes noted above are normally set aside in favor of
nonconf rontational deliberations in the local "maneapa"
(multipurpose meeting hall). There are no export processing
zones .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Article 74 of the Tuvalu Employment Ordinance (1978) prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, and there have been no reports of
either being practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
In Tuvalu, children under the age of 14 are prohibited from
employment. Children of 15 years of age are prohibited from
industrial employment and work on any ship. Workers under the
age of 18 years are not allowed to enter into a contract.
Children are rarely employed outside the traditional economy.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The modest minimum wage, set administratively by the
Government, is sufficient to allow persons in the wage economy
to maintain a decent standard of living. The Commissioner of
Labor may, by order, specify the days and hours of work for
workers in various industries. Currently, 8 hours is
considered a workday. The majority of workers are outside of
the wage economy. Rudimentary health and safety standards are
provided for by law. They recjuire an adequate potable water
supply, basic sanitary arrangements, and medical care.
Specific provisions of the law provide for the protection of
women workers.
1021
VANUATU
Vanuatu, a South Pacific island natibn 'with a population of
170,000, became independent in 1980, after many years of joint
British-French rule. It has a parliamentary system of
government with a prime minister and a 46-member parliament.
The President has largely ceremonial powers, except when he is
acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers. Vanuatu's
citizens are divi^ded by a variety of languages, by its
separation into more than 80 islands that make up the nation,
and by the colonial experience. Over time Vanuatu has largely
overcome these differences to forge a strong sense of
nationhood. Political legitimacy is based on majority rule,
supported by both Melanesian and Western tradition. The
civilian authorities control the small police and paramilitary
mobile forces.
Because the Vanuatu economy is dependent on international
trade, it is vulnerable to shifts in world market prices. In
the past, tourism earned more foreign exchange than all exports
combined. The downward trends in tourism and foreign
investment, started by cyclone Uma in early 1987 and
exacerbated by civil strife in 1988 and subsequent political
uncertainty, were completely reversed in 1991. Tourism and
Vanuatu's offshore banking center report record earnings and
continue to lead other sectors of the economy in growth.
Restrictions on freedom of speech and press, freedom of
assembly, and women's rights were the principal hximan rights
problems in 1991. The courts played an important role in
resolving a major political crisis in 1991 (see Section 3).
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Neither the Government nor any organized group resorted to
political or other extrajudicial killing.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Constitutional provisions against torture and cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment are observed in practice and enforced by
the courts. While the law provides that prisoners shall, have
recourse to an Ombudsman, that position has not been filled
since Vanuatu became independent. Former Prime Minister Lini
announced his intention to appoint an Ombudsman in August 1991,
but by year's end none had been appointed.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There were no reports of arbitrary arrests in Vanuatu. Arrest
is by warrant. The constitutional provision that suspects must
be informed of charges and given a speedy hearing before a
judge is observed in practice. There is no exile.
1022
VANUATU
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The courts uphold constitutional provisions for a fair public
trial, presumption of innocence until guilt is proven,
prohibition against double jeopardy, the right of habeas
corpus, and appeal to the Supreme Court. The courts are free
of military or executive interference. Even during the
constitutional turmoil of December 1988 and the subsequent
trial of the members of the "interim government" (see Section
3), the courts functioned freely, and their authority was
upheld without question. The Government acquiesced without
complaint in the appellate court's ultimate dismissal of
charges against the four convicted members of the "interim
government." There were no reports of arbitrary or unfair
exercise of judicial authority in 1991. There are no political
prisoners.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There is no arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home,
or correspondence.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:'
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of speech and
press, there are significant restrictions in practice. The
Government controls the country's national newspaper and
manages the only national radio. There is no independent
newspaper or radio. In the past the previous government denied
its opponents access to the media.
In 1991 both the state-owned national radio and newspaper
defied government efforts to prevent them from reporting the
views of then-Prime Minister Lini's political opponents. The
Government responded to the refusal of the manager of Radio
Vanuatu to accept government censorship by retiring him
involuntarily. Government news censorship was sharply
criticized by the Pacific Islands News Association and the New
York-based Committee to Protect Journalists. In response to
complaints of government censorship, the Vanuatu High Court
issued an order in August against any government prohibition or
restriction on the broadcasting and publication of statements
relating to the Vanua'aku party leadership struggle.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Permits must be obtained to hold public demonstrations and
rallies. Although permits are not generally refused,
opposition leaders complain that government restrictions on the
timing and venue of rallies are politically motivated.
There are no restrictions on the formation of political parties
or other groups. The politicians who had left or been ejected
from the then-ruling Vanua'aku party have formed their own
political parties and are free to compete in elections.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is protected by law and has been generally
respected in practice. Missionaries of various Christian
denominations work without restriction. However, prompted by
former Prime Minister Lini's concerns that charismatic and
1023
VANUATU
evangelical groups undermine the traditional culture, the
Constitutional Review Committee will consider restrictions on
the activities of other than established religious groups. The
Committee is expected to complete its recommendations and
submit them to Parliament in early 1992.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
All Vanuatu citizens are free to travel internally and
externally and to return from abroad without restrictions.
However, the previous Government continued the practice of
arbitrarily revoking the residency permits of foreigners who
displeased high-level party or government leaders and their
supporters. In 1991 a blow was struck against this practice
when two foreign businessmen successfully challenged the
revocation of their residency permits in court.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have the right freely to change the government through
periodic multiparty elections. Numerous candidates competed in
parliamentary elections in 1983, 1987, and 1991; both the
campaigns and voting were considered by outside observers to
have been fair. Elections to provincial and local councils
have also been freely contested and fair. However, measures
under consideration by the Constitutional Committee, including
extending the terms of the President and Prime Minister, could
seriously undermine Vanuatu's democratic system.
Beginning with a violent protest march by antigovernment
demonstrators in May 1988, Vanuatu underwent a period of
domestic political turmoil. Subsequent ejections and
resignations of antigovernment members from Parliament led the
President to attempt to sack the Vanua'aku Party Government,
install a caretaker "interim government," and call for a new
general election. After the Vanuatu Supreme Court declared the
President's action illegal, the Government arrested the
President and his five-man "interim government" on charges of
sedition, incitement to mutiny, unlawful assembly, and
conspiracy to overthrow the Government. They were tried in
February 1989, and four of the six were convicted; however, all
were freed in April 1989 by the Appeals Court for lack of
sufficient evidence.
From independence until December 16, when a new government was
installed, the Vanua'aku Party had been the primary
policymaking body, and its decisions were implemented by the
Government. A major rift within the Vanua'aku Party erupted in
April 1991 as a result of former Prime Minister Lini's
increasingly autocratic behavior evidenced by the firing of
most of his ministers when they declined to sign loyalty
oaths. In August 1991, the Vanua'aku Party replaced Father
Lini as its leader at an extraordinary session of the Party
Congress, an act which he unsuccessfully challenged in court.
Following Parliament's no-confidence vote in September, Father
Lini was replaced by Donald Kalpokas who was elected by a
coalition of 5 Tan Union Party and 20 Vanua'aku Party members
of Vanuatu's 46-member Parliament. After elections on December
2, Kalpokas was in turn replaced by a coalition of the Union of
Moderate Parties and the National United Party, formed by Lini
after his ouster by Kalpokas. The elections appeared to be
free and fair.
1024
VANUATU
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Although there are no restrictions on the formation of local
nongovernmental human rights organizations, none has been
founded to date. There were no requests for investigations by
outside human rights organizations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Most of the population is comprised of Melanesians whose
ancestors probably migrated from New Guinea. The small
minorities of Chinese, Fijians, Vietnamese, Tongans, and
Europeans, generally concentrated in the two towns and on a few
plantations, experience discrimination with regard to land
ownership. Although there have been allegations of corrupt
practices by members of the Government, there is no evidence to
suggest a pattern of ethnic discrimination in the provision of
basic services. However, there are reports of discrimination
in hiring and the provision of services against both persons
and communities suspected or known to support opposition
political candidates.
While women have equal rights under the law, they are only
slowly emerging from a traditional culture characterized by
male dominance, a general reluctance to educate women, and a
widespread belief that women should devote themselves primarily
to childrearing. There are no women leaders in Vanuatu's
municipal or village councils, churches, or Chambers of
Commerce. In 1991 there was one female Member of Parliament.
Nevertheless, an increasing number of women are finding work in
the unskilled, semiskilled, and service occupations. Members
of the National Council of Women have expressed concern that
the Constitutional Review Committee established in September
1990 may recommend strengthening the legal authority of village
chiefs, who are viewed as a primary obstacle to the attainment
of social, political, and economic rights by women. Should the
Parliament approve such a recommendation, it would be a major
setback to new efforts to improve the status of women in
Vanuatu .
While no accurate data are available, violence against women,
particularly wife beating, is reportedly common. Several
severe cases have been reported in which victims have died.
Although there are no specific laws against spouse beating, the
courts have dealt severely with such cases, using common law
assault as a basis for imposing punishment. However, very few
cases of wife beating are brought to the attention of the
authorities, and even fewer are actually prosecuted. Usually
the cases are dropped by the women involved before going to
court. The police are reluctant to intervene in what are
considered purely domestic matters.
The majority of women in Vanuatu enter into marriage through
"bride price payment." On those islands where the custom of
paying "bride price" is observed, there is often a feeling that
the bride is the property of the husband and may be dealt with
as he chooses. The National Council of Women is working to
educate women about their rights and to urge establishment of
legal protection for women against abuse and neglect.
1025
VANUATU
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Vanuatu's workers have the right to organize unions, choose
their own representatives, and strike, but strikes have seldom
occurred, due in part to high rates of unemployment. Unions
may not affiliate with international labor federations without
government permission. The fundamental legislation
establishing the right to organize into unions, setting out the
scope of union activity, and providing for the arbitration and
conciliation of labor disputes consists of the Trade Union Act
of 1983 and the Trade Disputes Act of 1983. There are some 20
trade unions, grouped under an umbrella organization, the
Vanuatu Trade Union Congress, which is a member of the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The trade
unions are independent of the Government .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions in Vanuatu exercise the right to organize and bargain
collectively. The high percentage of the population still
engaged in subsistence agriculture and fishing, however, serves
as a deterrent to extensive union activity. There are no
export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law, and there have
been no reports that either is practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children under 12 years of age are not permitted to work
outside of family owned agriculture, where many children assist
their parents. Employment of children from 12 to 18 years of
age is restricted by occupational category and conditions of
labor — such as shipping and nighttime employment. In general,
the high level of adult unemployment discourages the use of
child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Vanuatu has a legislated minimum wage, which is effectively
enforced by the Labor Department. There are also minimum wages
for agricultural workers tied to the market prices for copra
and cocoa. Most workers are not in the wage economy and are
thus outside the scope of the minimum wage laws. For those
covered by them, they provide an adequate standard of living
within the local context. There are laws to regulate the
rights to sick leave, annual vacations, and other conditions of
service. Vanuatu's Employment Act, enforced by the Labor
Department, includes provisions for safety standards and a
maximum workweek of 44 hours.
The major occupational health hazard in Vanuatu is malaria.
For those workers involved in coconut production, falling nuts
are a not infrequent cause of injury and in some cases death.
1026
VIETNAM
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) remains a Communist
one-party state ruled by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP)
through a 13-member Politburo and a Communist Party Central
Committee nominally elected by a party congress held, in recent
times, about every 5 years. The Seventh Party Congress in June
elected 146 members to the 'Central Committee. Government
policies, carried out under the Council of Ministers, reflect
guidelines — if not specific directives — laid down by the
Politburo. More southerners were selected for key positions in
the party and Government in an apparent effort to mitigate
tension resulting from historically derived cultural and
political differences between southern Vietnamese and a
predominantly northern leadership.
The security apparatus consists of civil and military elements
under the control of the Government and the VCP. Police and
other security personnel continue to be responsible for
numerous human rights abuses, including severe physical
mistreatment of detainees and prisoners, either while
undergoing interrogation or while confined in the penal system.
The economy, predominantly agricultural, was undermined by
years of doctrinaire socialism and isolation. Increasing
efforts to liberalize trade and effect other reforms have led
to a resurgence in rice production and commercial activity but
have not been able to compensate for recent sharp cutbacks in
Soviet assistance or to restore a decaying infrastructure.
The Government's campaign against dissenters, begun in the
spring of 1990, continued throughout 1991, particularly in the
period leading to the party congress at the end of June. As
part of a protracted security crackdown, intellectuals, clergy,
journalists, and some foreigners were arrested and detained.
Arbitrary detentions, torture, and mistreatment of detainees
continued. Restrictions also continued on access to persons in
reeducation camps by outside independent observers, although in
December it was reported that the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) would be allowed to visit the reeducation
camps. Other human rights problems included severe
restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly,
association, movement, worker rights, and the right of citizens
to change their government. In addition, the Government
continued a program that over the years has resettled hundreds
of thousands of people — some forcibly — into "New Economic
Zones" (NEZ's). On the other hand, it remains easier to travel
abroad and inside the country than was the case a few years
ago. People talk much more freely with foreigners, and there
is an increasing separation between the party and the State.
Finally, some prominent political prisoners and some detainees
who had been in reeducation camps since 1975 were released in
the latter part of 1991.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Statistics on the number of deaths of political prisoners are
not available. In 1991 there were no known executions of
political prisoners or politically motivated extrajudicial
killings. According to credible reports, however, prisoners
have in the past died of exhaustion, physical abuse.
1027
VIETNAM
malnutrition, lack of medical care, and other effects of
conditions in prisons and reeducation camps.
b. Disappearance
There were no documented incidents of political abductions by
government security organizations or by antigovernment forces.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although the law prohibits physical abuse and recently released
reeducation camp detainees report that camp conditions have
been relaxed since 1989, there continue to be credible,
consistent reports from refugees and asylum seekers about
police brutality against suspects undergoing investigation and
about the severity of conditions for those confined in
prisons. These reports indicate that beatings or ill-treatment
are still a feature of police investigations and a means of
punishment in prisons, despite legal safeguards.
Thai fishermen released from Vietnamese prisons during the year
testified that they suffered from severe malnutrition and
reported that they had to eat rats and snakes to survive. They
said punishment included isolation in a dark cell, beating, and
withholding of food. One Vietnamese prisoner confined with the
Thai was reportedly starved to death after trying to escape.
In general, detainees face substandard nutrition, poor or
nonexistent medical care, and severe and often arbitrary
punishment for minor infractions of camp rules.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Throughout 1991, particularly in the period prior to the Party
Congress in late June, Vietnam continued arbitrarily to arrest
and imprison people in contravention of its own Constitution.
The 1989 Criminal Procedure Code provides for various rights
for detainees: time limits on pretrial detention, the right of
a lawyer to be present during interrogation, prohibitions on
nighttime interrogations; the right of the accused to be
informed of charges against him or her; a ban on coercion or
corporal punishment; and the presumption of innocence.
Amendments to the Code in 1989 and 1990 provide further
safeguards, stipulating periods of detention that may be
imposed by various authorities and providing for approval of
detention by a monitoring body called the People's Organ of
Control .
These safeguards are frequently ignored by the authorities.
Credible reports indicate that detainees continue to be held
for indefinite periods without formal charges, with authorities
using old administrative procedures in contravention of the new
legislation. The retention of these administrative procedures
and recourse to them instead of to the newer legislation appear
to be a deliberate government policy.
During 1991 the Government continued its campaign against
suspected opponents of the regime. Specifically, it continued
its efforts to implement Party Directive 135, promulgated in
August 1990, which called for the arrest of those who incite
opposition to the Government and advocate political pluralism.
At least several foreigners were arrested or deported for
associating with Vietnamese deemed politically untrustworthy.
Targets of Directive 135 appear to include politically active
1028
VIETNAM
intellectuals, clergy, journalists, artists, and student
leaders.
Legislation designed ostensibly to prevent inordinate delay in
pressing charges is often, if not routinely, ignored. For
example, 3 Vietnamese (Doan Thanh Liem, Do Ngoc Liem, Nguyen
Van Tan) listed in last year ! s report among persons arrested
for nonviolent political activity during 1990, were detained
for over a year before being charged. They had been arrested
in early 1990 in connection with the arrest of an American
businessman detained for investigation of alleged "spying"
activities. Credible reports indicate that Catholic priests
Chan Tin and Nguyen Ngoc Lan, detainees mentioned in last
year's report, remain under house arrest and internal exile.
The charges against the two priests included "the crime of
anti-Socialist propaganda."
Credible reports also indicate Le Van Tien, 70 years old and
with a serious heart condition, was arrested, along with a
number of associates, in Ho Chi Minh City on December 20,
1990. This occurred on the eve of his legal emigration to the
United States, after having just been released from 13 years'
detention in labor camps. Tien was secretly charged with
maintaining overseas contacts for the purpose of conducting
espionage for the United States. In late 1991 the human rights
activist Dr. Nguyen Dan Que was sentenced to 20 years'
imprisonment, and his associate Nguyen Van Thuon was given a
10-year sentence.
Duong Thu Huong, a well-known author, was arrested in Hanoi on
April 14 on charges of sending abroad documents detrimental to
state security. On March 30 the police also arrested a friend
of Huong's, an American citizen of Vietnamese origin, charged
with bringing in and attempting to take out documents
detrimental to state security. The latter was released and
expelled on May 31, and Huong was released in late November.
Several other prominent prisoners of conscience, including the
long-held poet Nguyen Chi Thien and novelist Doan Quoc Sy, were
reportedly released in late 1991. After 1 1/2 years of no
progress in efforts to obtain their release, 15 former South
Vietnamese officials or officers were reported released in
September; it is estimated that a little over 100 are still
detained in reeducation centers without charge or trial since
1975. In December Vietnam announced it would release all of
these reeducation center detainess in the next several months.
A credible report on Vietnam mentioned that there are about 70
political prisoners in addition to the detainees left from the
1975 era. However, no official statistics are available for
the number of detainees held for antigovernment activities.
Moreover, persons can be detained without charges being filed,
and trials and sentences are sometimes secret.
Exile is not used as a means of political control, although
over the years the Government has resettled hundreds of
thousands of people — some forcibly — to NEZ ' s (see Section l.f.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Vietnamese court system consists of local people's courts,
military tribunals, and the Supreme Court. The latter may
review cases from either of the lower courts. Either the
National Assembly or Council has the authority to establish
special tribunals, which may be superior to the Supreme Court.
In addition, local mass organizations are empowered to deal
1029
VIETNAM
with minor breaches of law or disputes. Although technically
judges in all regular courts are elected, candidates are
selected by the party organization. Article 131 of the
Constitution provides for the "independence" of judges and
jurors. However, this is negated at all levels by an electoral
system that is closely controlled by the VCP and a selection
process that puts a premium on political reliability.
The Penal Code consists of the Criminal Code and a Criminal
Procedures Code which was amended in 1990. Vietnam has a
long-established body of family law, but lacks civil law codes.
There is virtually no evidence that legislative improvements
made in 1990 have been implemented. The shortage of competent
public defenders alone would probably preclude most defendants
from receiving legal assistance while they are being
investigated and tried. Public defenders are provided at state
expense, but during 1991 there were no indications that any
measures had been undertaken to upgrade their poor quality.
Torture and coercion to elicit confessions make fair trials
virtually impossible, and secret trials are still being held
for some political prisoners.
During the past few years, reeducation sentences have been
frequently imposed by administrative procedure without benefit
of due process or judicial review. In addition, such sentences
are imposed on persons sentenced for peaceful expression of
their views. The SRV criminalizes certain forms of peaceful
expression, including for example, "anti-Socialist propaganda."
Over the years people have been sentenced to long prison terms
for such "crimes."
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In 1991 the Government continued to operate a nationwide system
of surveillance and control through household registration and
party-appointed block wardens who use informants to keep track
of individual activities. The system appears to be somewhat
less intrusive in the south. In general, reports suggest that
the system is unevenly implemented throughout the country and
that local caprice is a significant factor. In urban areas, in
both north and south, many people enter into casual,
nonpolitical relationships with foreigners and even invite
foreign guests into their homes. Some Vietnamese are quite
outspoken in criticism of their political and economic
situation. While such events may come under surveillance and
the Vietnamese host may be questioned later by the public
security police, unless antiregime activity is suspected, they
appear to cause no problem. Urban dwellers appear to be
increasingly relaxed about sending mail overseas.
It appears that the Government is combining tightened
surveillance designed in part to intimidate potential critics
with some relaxation vis-a-vis the general population.
Therefore, although censorship of mail and the confiscation of
packages continued throughout 1991, it appears to have been on
a quite selective basis.
The party pressures people to belong to one or more mass
organizations, which exist for villages, city districts,
school, work (trade union), youth, and women. These
organizations disseminate party propaganda, support
party-sanctioned activities, and play a watchdog role but have
1030
VIETNAM
become increasingly ineffectual. Membership in the VCP remains
a great aid to advancement in the state sector .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, but
in practice such freedoms are severely limited. The Government
owns and operates broadcast media and does not permit the
airing of opposing views, although it has broadcast reports of
debates during National Assembly meetings. Party organs and
the Ministry of Culture, Information, Sports, and Tourism
control all newspapers, books, and other publications, as well
as all cultural exhibitions.
During 1991 the party continued to tolerate (and at times
invite) criticism concerning the performance of the party or of
persons deemed to be corrupt or incompetent. Howevar,
criticism of the legitimacy of the VCP or its exclusive role is
not tolerated. Short of clearly proscribed writing, (e.g. ,
advocacy of a multiparty system), the limits of criticism are
not clear; some ideas may be expressed in internal party
meetings (e.g., party plenums) and in internally circulated
documents but not publicly.
Other criticism may be expressed publicly within an established
forum, such as a National Assembly proceeding broadcast over a
Radio Hanoi radio station, but not privately to news
correspondents. For example, the Eighth Party Plenum in March
1990 stripped Tran Xuan Bach, a strong advocate of reform, of
his membership in the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the
Communist Party, ostensibly for "breaches" of "party
discipline" rather than the substance of his remarks. Bui Tin,
a retired colonel with many years of outstanding war service
for Hanoi, while still a party member and Deputy Editor of the
Nhan Dan newspaper, the Voice of the Central Committee,
traveled to Paris and launched a strong critique of the party
leadership and its policies. He was stripped of his party
membership and fired from the newspaper. In contrast, Phan
Dinh Dieu, a critic who used party channels to advocate reform,
was allowed to travel abroad in 1991.
The Government does not use prior censorship to control the
media, but guidance from party watchdogs is pervasive, and
national security legislation is sufficiently broad to
accomplish effective self-censorship in the media. A system of
informants also chills free speech to a considerable extent.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right of assembly is restricted in law and practice.
Persons wishing to gather in a group are required to apply for
a permit which is issued or denied by local authorities, often
arbitrarily. According to refugees, in some localities
citizens must obtain permission for gatherings of over three
people. Demonstrations are sometimes, but not usually,
forcibly suppressed. Nongovernmental organizations are
permitted, but they may meet only for approved and narrowly
defined objectives. Opposition political parties or
organizations are not permitted.
1031
VIETNAM
c. Freedom of Religion
Buddhism is the dominant religion in the country. According to
some estimates nearly three-fourths of the population of 66
million are Buddhists. The Government has claimed, however,
that only 6 million Vietnamese are practicing Buddhists. The
Vatican believes that some 6 million Vietnaunese are Catholic.
A much smaller number are Protestant.
Adherence to a religion is not permitted for party members.
During the past few years, visitors to Vietnam have reported
that attendance at religious services seemed to be growing.
These impressions, however, are derived from large urban
centers. While restrictions on religious organizations are
heavy, they vary widely by locality. This is also true of
church attendance.
Freedom of worship is provided for in the Constitution, along
with the proviso that no one may use religious adherence or
belief to violate state laws and policies. The Government,
concerned that religious groups might become competing centers
of influence within the society, has consistently attempted to
divide and control religious groups, in part by establishing
government-controlled policymaking bodies such as the Catholic
Patriotic Association.
The Government has attempted to prevent the growth of religious
groups by inhibiting the publication of religious materials and
the training of new clergy through rigid screening of all
applicants. The Government exercises approval authority on the
content of speeches and sermons by clergy, but reports continue
to indicate that approval is generally granted as long as the
content cannot be construed to challenge the legitimacy of
Vietnam's one-party system.
The Government has regularly detained and arrested religious
figures of all faiths on political grounds and restricted their
activities. Charges of "possessing and disseminating
counterrevolutionary propaganda," "fomenting unrest," or
"anti-Socialist propaganda," have been leveled against Buddhist
monks and nuns and Catholic, Protestant, and other religious
leaders. A number of Catholic and Buddhist clergy arrested
soon after the Communist victory remained in prison throughout
1991. One priest, Le Thanh Que, was released in late 1991
after 10 years' imprisonment.
Almost all leading Buddhist monks from the pre-Communist
victory period who are still living in Vietnam are either in
prison or under house arrest. Many religious leaders remain
under house arrest, are prohibited from conducting services,
are denied family registration and ration cards, or are
otherwise harassed and impeded in their attempts to conduct
their ministries. There have been a number of recent arrests,
including of Protestant clergy and lay Buddhist notables. For
example, Protestant pastors Dinh Thien Tu and Tran Dinh Ai were
arrested in 1991. Both had extensive contacts with foreign
groups. Several Protestant pastors who had been incarcerated
for long periods after 1975 were released in 1990 and 1991 and
allowed to depart Vietnam.
Vietnam has expanded its dialog with the Vatican. In late 1990
two new bishops for Vietnam were named apparently without
government interference, and for the first time the Government
allowed the bishops' conference to make their obligatory 5-year
visit to see the Pope. Also, the Government now permits
1032
VIETNAM
Catholic seminarians to be admitted to seminaries every 3 years
instead of 6. However, the Government still places sharp
limits on the recruitment, training, ordination, and assignment
of new seminarians, priests, monks, and nuns. The selection of
both students and teachers is subject to government veto, and
there are continuing difficulties in obtaining teaching
materials and in expanding religious training facilities. Some
religious leaders believe that the Government's goal is to
weaken the churches as, a social force by denying them personnel
and the ability to move their people around the country. There
are for example, only 15 priests in Haiphong to serve over
150,000 Catholics, and no religious women have been allowed to
establish convents or novitiates there.
Most property of religious institutions remains under
government control, including temples, churches, convents,
seminaries, former religious schools, libraries, and
orphanages. Sharp restrictions are exercised on the use,
repair, or extension of those facilities that are returned.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
During 1991 the Government continued the trend of recent years
of allowing freer movement within the country for most
citizens. Vietnamese are required to obtain permission to
change their residence, but most reports concur that this has
not been difficult during the past few years.
The Government generally continued its requirement that
foreigners travel in supervised groups rather than
independently. Private travel abroad is authorized for
education, tourism, medical treatment, and visits to close
relatives. Such travel is restricted to 3 months, except
travel for education or medical treatment. Violators of this
limitation faced being barred from further travel for 3 to 5
years .
The Government continued its program of relocating people into
sparsely populated NEZ's. During 1991 Vietnam reported serious
failings in this policy but said the policy would continue.
The state-run radio said that more than 2 million people have
been moved from their homes in cities or crowded areas in the
past 8 years, but only a quarter of them have substantially
improved their living standards. The report admitted that many
of the NEZ's were unfinished or short of basic facilities.
While the Government's professed rationale for relocating
people to NEZ's is to reduce urban crowding, exploit
little-used land, and thereby help develop the economy, refugee
and other reports claim that the Government also uses NEZ's as
a means of social control.
The Government continued to permit emigration for family
reunification and for Amerasian Vietnamese and their close
family members. In January 1990 the first departures of former
reeducation camp detainees and their families began pursuant to
a U.S.-SRV agreement in July 1989 to permit such emigration.
By the end of September 1991, some 31,000 former reeducation
camp inmates and their families had departed since the
agreement was signed. The Orderly Departure Program greatly
expanded in 1991. Total departures in all aspects of that
program, including Amerasians, former reeducation detainees,
and family unification cases, reached some 63,000 in fiscal
year 1991.
1033
VIETNAM
Vietnamese who emigrate are generally free to return. The
Vietnamese Government regards overseas Vietnamese both as a
valuable potential source of foreign exchange and expertise and
as a potential security threat. Thus, the Government generally
granted visas to overseas Vietnamese and encouraged them to
visit Vietnam whether they emigrated legally or had been
granted permanent resettlement after illegal departures from
Vietnam. At the same time the Public Security Police keep an
eye on them, especially those who come under suspicion as a
result of their actions or associations. During the year some
overseas Vietnamese were arrested, detained, and deported for
activities deemed to be subversive, as described in Section
1 . d . above .
In 1988 Vietnam signed a memorandum of understanding with the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to
increase acceptance of voluntary repatriates, provided there
was financial assistance. This agreement included a commitment
by Vietnam to waive prosecution and punitive measures for
persons who departed the country illegally and who return under
the UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation Program. Vietnam also agreed
to permit the UNHCR to monitor the returnees by followup visits.
In 1989 Vietnam joined 56 countries in the adoption of the
Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) at the International
Conference on Indochinese Refugees in Geneva. Under the CPA,
Vietnam agreed to encourage volunteers to return from
first-asylum camps in the region. By the end of 1991, over
15,000 asylum seekers, most of them from Hong Kong, had
returned voluntarily to Vietnam. The UNHCR' s monitoring
program has entailed visits to some 12 to 13 percent of
returnees in the south and about 45 percent of those in the
north, as well as visits to local authorities. The visits have
found no instances of returnees being abused or harassed. The
Government appears to be actively accelerating the integration
of returnees by quick issuance of their family registration
document and rapid enrollment of school-age children.
Although the total rate of clandestine departures fell in 1991,
arrivals in Hong Kong increased significantly. During 1989,
76,239 Vietnamese arrived in first-asylum camps in southeast
Asia and Hong Kong. During 1990 some 31,723 Vietnamese boat
people arrived in first-asylum camps. As of September 1991,
the figure was 22,452. For first-asylum countries other than
Hong Kong, total arrivals up to September 1991 were only 2,780.
In 1991 the Government continued to arrest and try people for
organizing illegal departures under "crimes against the state"
statutes. Penalties range as high as 20 years in prison.
While seeking to discourage and inhibit clandestine departures,
the Government continued efforts to encourage people who
desired to depart Vietnam to apply for orderly departure.
Although the source of refugees itself, Vietnam has also been
the country of first asylum for 15-20,000 Cambodian refugees
(mainly ethnic Chinese) who fled to Vietnam since 1975. These
refugees are cared for by the UNHCR in well-organized camps.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens are not free to change their government. All
authority and political power is vested in the VCP. Political
opposition is not tolerated, and there are no other political
parties .
1034
VIETNAM
The Politburo of the Central Committee of the VCP is the
supreme decisionmaking body in the nation. The Central
Committee oversees day-to-day implementation of its
directives. Debate and criticism is limited to certain aspects
of individual, state, or party performance determined by the
party itself. No challenge to the legitimacy of the one-party
state is permitted, and it is off limits as a topic for debate.
Citizens elect members of the National Assembly, ostensibly the
chief legislative body, but still constrained by party
guidance. The increasingly active Assembly debated a new draft
constitution that is scheduled for ratification in 1992. The
draft would strengthen the role of the Assembly and recognize
economic reforms under way but would still maintain the
supremacy of the party. Although all candidates are approved
by party front groups, they are not required to be party
members themselves, and multiple candidates contest some
seats. The law provides for equal participation in politics by
women and minority groups, but in practice minority groups and
especially women are underrepresented.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Vietnam does not permit private human rights organizations to
form or operate in Vietnam. Moreover, it prohibits private
citizens from contacting international human rights
organizations. Since 1989, however, the Vietnamese Red Cross
has been permitted expanded cooperation with the American Red
Cross in assisting persons seeking missing relatives, including
those in reeducation centers.
The Government carries on some dialog with human rights
organizations. Some visits by human rights organizations are
permitted, but the Government has limited their access to the
penal system and its inmates. In December it was reported that
the ICRC would be allowed to visit political prisoners in
reeducation camps. During earlier visits by the ICRC and
Amnesty International, access was very limited, and visitors
reported being shown only model camps .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Many citizens face discrimination in employment, education, and
social services, or are subject to relocation in NEZ's, based
on family background or political views. Family members of
former South Vietnamese government and military officials and
people affiliated with ant i -Communist associations or religious
sects have been systematically discriminated against. People
released from reeducation camps face considerable
discrimination in education, housing, and employment, according
to refugees. They do not regain their citizenship rights until
1 year after leaving the camps, if then. While their children
sometimes are allowed to enter the university, they still face
discrimination within the university system.
Gradual assimilation and co-option appear to be the
Government's long-term strategy for most minorities. The
Government has created special schools in the Hanoi area for
the education and indoctrination of minorities to be the "eyes
and ears of the party" among their own people. Highland
minorities in central Vietnam are subject to repression if
suspected of ties with resistance groups. Officially
1035
VIETNAM
programmed resettlement of ethnic Vietnamese into the highlands
is designed in part to increase government control over
minority groups. On the more positive side, the Government is
trying to narrow the gap in the standard of living between
highlanders and lowland ethnic Vietnamese.
Priority in social services is given to families of party
members and families -of soldiers who fought for the
Government. Testing standards of university entrance
examinations are reportedly lower for children of party
officials. Arbitrarily high standards are set to keep the
children of suspect background out of a university. Study
abroad is also restricted to politically acceptable persons.
In general, women do not appear to face discrimination in
employment. Problems faced by women competing with men for
higher status positions are generally a function of attitudes
deeply ingrained in traditional Vietnamese society. Such
problems persist in spite of government efforts to mold popular
attitudes to conform with the Constitution, legislation, and
regulations mandating equal treatment before the law in
virtually all respects. Article 63 of the 1980 Constitution
provides that women and men receive equal pay for equal work,
and a large body of legislation and regulations is devoted to
the protection of women's rights in marriage as well as in the
workplace. Government statistics indicate that approximately
50 percent of the primary school students are girls and that
women represent about 39 percent of university students. The
Government has claimed that women hold 46 percent of the senior
posts in government and that 22 percent of the National
Assembly membership are women. The most senior leadership,
however, is predominately male, as can be seen, for example, in
the all-male Politburo and Council of Ministers.
There are no statistics available on the frequency of violence
against women within the home. In 1987 then-Chairman of the
Council of Ministers Do Muoi issued a degree banning spouse
beating.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Vietnamese workers are not free to form or join unions of their
own choosing. All workers automatically become members of the
"union" in their workplace, and dues are deducted from their
pay. These groups are organized by the Government and belong
to the government-controlled Confederation of Vietnamese
Workers. Strikes are considered unpatriotic and officially
forbidden; none are known to have taken place in 1991.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Vietnamese workers do not have the right to organize unions of
their own choosing or to bargain collectively. The Chairman of
the Confederation of Vietnamese Workers is empowered by the
legislation to attend conferences of the Council of Ministers
and raise issues on behalf of labor that cannot be resolved at
lower levels.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is permitted by the Constitution, which states
in Article 58 that "people fit for work must work as provided
by law." Refugees report that every Vietnamese is required by
1036
VIETNAM
law to contribute 15 days of work per year to the State or pay
a fee. In addition, unemployed persons, especially unemployed
young people, are compelled to work in exchange for small wages
and food. A number of government projects have used forced
labor provided by reeducation Ccimp prisoners.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
According to existing regulations inherited from the former
French colonial administration, the minimiom age for workers in
Vietnam is 17. There is no reliable information concerning the
enforcement of these regulations, nor are any statistics
available on the number of child workers in Vietnam. Refugees
report that children under 15 are exempt from compulsory labor
requirements .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government inherited from the former French colonial
administration a system of regulations pertaining to working
conditions, including a minimum wage; a maximum workday of 8
hours, 6 days per week; and safety standards. However, except
for some safety standards and workers covered by Ho Chi Minh
Labor Regulations or employed by foreign enterprises, these
regulations have not been updated since 1975, nor are existing
standards enforced universally.
Such safety standards as exist are developed jointly by the
Ministry of Labor and worker organizations at individual
workplaces. Enforcement of the standards has been uneven.
Labor union legislation promulgated in July 1990 stipulates
that if the union sees a life-threatening situation in the
workplace, it may request that management correct the problem
immediately and that a cessation of work, if necessary, be
authorized. It further stipulates that the union has the right
to participate in investigations of industrial accidents and to
request that the Government or a court fix the responsibility
for an accident. Wages are generally low in Vietnam,
inadequate to provide the vast majority of workers and their
families a decent living. Moreover, they frequently are paid
late, sometimes by as much as several months. According to
reports from refugees, nearly all workers experience delayed
paydays in their workplace. Observers agree that doctors,
nurses, and teachers are most often the victims of delayed
paydays. Possibly as a result, many are reportedly leaving
these professions, and there is a chronic shortage of
teachers .
1037
WESTERN SAMOA
Western Samoa is a small Pacific island covintry located 1,600
miles northeast of New Zealand. It is a parliamentary
democracy with certain concessions to Samoan cultural
practices. The Constitution provides for a Samoan head of
state, a unicameral legislature of matai (family heads) elected
by universal suffrage, an independent judiciary, protection of
Samoan land and traditional titles, and guarantees of
fundcimental rights and freedoms. Executive authority is vested
in the Head of State, with the Government administered by the
Cabinet, consisting of the Prime Minister and 12 ministers
chosen by him. All legislation passed by the Legislative
Assembly needs the approval of the Head of State. The present
Head of State, Malietoa Tanumafili II, holds the position for
life. His successors will be elected by the Legislative
Assembly for 5-year terms.
The culture of Western Samoa is essentially Polynesian but
uniquely Scimoan. Traditional authority is vested in the matai
who is appointed by a consensus of the aiga (extended family)
or by decision of the fono (council of matai). Ownership of
land is legally vested in the matai whose responsibility is to
direct the economic, social, and political affairs of the
aiga. There are 362 villages in Western Samoa with a total of
over 25,000 matai (Samoa's population is approximately
160,000). Each village is governed by a fono, which can fine
or otherwise punish offenses against village rules. Western
Samoa does not have a defense force. The small national police
force is firmly under the control of the Government but has
little impact beyond the capital city.
The economy is primarily agricultural, with limited potential
for development. It is susceptible to shifts in world prices
for its export commodities, such as coconut oil. Western Samoa
is heavily dependent on foreign aid and on remittances sent to
family members by more than 100,000 Samoans living abroad in
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.
Western Samoan society is based on a collective value system in
which obligations and responsibilities to the aiga are often
given precedence over individual rights. The rule of law is
tenuous outside the capital, Apia, and most disagreements are
settled by decision of the fono (which can include corporal
punishment, banishment, and destruction of houses).
Principal human rights problems arise out of discrimination and
violence against women; societal pressures may interfere with
the ability to conduct fair trials. A government-established
public defender's office and an ombudsman's office help Samoans
in their dealings with the courts and the Government.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Such killings are not known to occur.
b. Disappearance
There have been no reports of politically motivated
disappearance .
1038
WESTERN SAMOA
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, such as
torture, are prohibited by law, and there have been no reports
of such practices by police or other government authorities.
However, villages are controlled by customary law, and the
fonos mete out beatings, stonings, the burning of houses, and
other traditional punishments on occasion.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The law contains safeguards against arbitrary arrest and
preventive detention, and these are observed.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Western Samoan law assures the right to a fair public trial,
which is honored by the official court system, modeled on the
British system. However, many civil and criminal matters are
not handled by the Western-style courts but by village fonos.
The 362 village fonos each have their own procedures handed
down by oral tradition, and they differ considerably both in
their decisionmaking style and in the number of matai involved
in the decisions. The Village Fono Law of 1990 gave legal
recognition to the decisions of the fono but gave recourse of
appeal to the Lands and Titles Courts. The Supreme Court has
yet to review the law to determine whether appeals on
constitutional grounds will.be permitted.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Samoan law provides for protection from invasion of the home or
seizure of property without substantive and procedural
safeguards, including search warrants. Practically, however,
there is little or no privacy in the village. Village
officials by law must have permission to enter homes, but there
can be substantial social pressure to grant such permission.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental parts of the
Constitutio) Two major newspapers are printed regularly in
the country In addition to the government radio station, a
private rad ) station is also permitted to broadcast. There is
no televisi i in Western Samoa, but broadcasts from American
Samoa are readily available to viewers.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the right of peaceful assembly
and the right to form associations. There are no significant
restrictions .
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution, along
with freedom of thought and conscience. There is no
government-favored religion. Nearly 100 percent of the
population is Christian. While the Constitution grants each
person the right to change religion or belief and to worship or
teach religion alone or with others, in practice the matai
1039
WESTERN SAMOA
often chooses the religious denomination of the aiga. There is
strong societal pressure to support church leaders and projects
financially with contributions often totaling more than 30
percent of income. Younger Samoans have begun to resist these
enforced payments.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides for freedom of internal movement and
resettlement in Western Samoa, but in practice some citizens
are or have been banished either from village activities or
completely from the village. This is one of the harshest forms
of punishment in this collective society. Emigration is
actively supported by the Government because it is a "safety
valve" for the disenfranchised, frustrated, and potentially
rebellious youths, and because it increases foreign income
through remittances. Foreign travel is not arbitrarily
restricted. The right of citizens to return is guaranteed.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Samoan citizens have the right to change their government
through direct, multiparty elections. Following a plebiscite
held in 1990, suffrage, previously granted only to matais, was
extended to all citizens above the age of 21. This new right
was exercised for the first time in the April 5 national
parliamentary elections, which returned the ruling Human Rights
Protection Party to power. The right to run for 47 of the 49
seats in Parliament, however, remains the prerogative of the
approximately 25,000 matai (virtually all of whom are men).
The remaining two seats are filled by citizens not of Samoan
heritage. While all Samoans may now vote, matai continue to
control local government through the village fono. The matai
system is conservative but does allow for change, as the 1990
plebiscite demonstrated. While Samoans must show respect and
obedience to their matai in family and communal affairs, the
matai have well-defined responsibilities which, if not met, can
result in their removal.
Western Samoa has only rudimentary political parties. The
first one, founded in 1982, was the Human Rights Protection
Party (HRPP); its leader, Tofilau Eti, is currently Prime
Minister. Two of the HRPP's 32 seats in Parliament are
occupied by women. Although a second party, the Samoan
National Development Party (SNDP), was formed in 1988,
replacing the previous Christian Democratic Party founded in
1985, the political process in Western Samoa is very much a
function of personality rather than party. As a result,
several previous governments fell before the end of their
prescribed 3-year terms when supporters defected to the
opposition. On November 25, the Parliament passed an amendment
to the Constitution extending the term of Members of Parliament
to 5 years.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
While there are no official restrictions, no official or
private human rights organizations exist. There are no reports
of any international or nongovernmental requests for
investigations of alleged violations of human rights.
1040
WESTERN SAMOA
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Samoa is a homogeneous society with no significant ethnic
minorities. Samoan politics and culture are the product of a
heritage of chiefly privilegfe and power, and members of certain
families have some advantages. There is clear discrimination
based on social status and sex, with women traditionally
occupying a subordinate role. The passage of universal
suffrage and the establishment of a Women's Affairs Ministry
provide substantial new political rights for women; however,
their subordinate social position is expected to change only
gradually.
Abuse of women is prohibited by law, but it is believed to be a
problem and is often unreported or ignored. No reliable data
about its extent are available. Some view wife beating as a
male prerogative. As noted above, traditional punishments
sometimes involve beatings; this is generally directed more at
men than women. There are many cases of rape that go
unreported. The few convictions generally result in light
punishment .
The Constitution makes special provision to preserve the
political rights of non-Samoans . Persons of mixed ancestry who
are culturally Samoan are fully accepted and can attain
positions of considerable wealth and influence. Several of
them have held or hold cabinet positions and a number serve in
the Parliament.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Western Samoan workers have complete and unrestricted rights to
establish and join organizations of their own choosing. While
trade unions have not emerged in the private sector, the
Government does not restrict efforts to develop them. The
Public Service Association, representing government workers, an
increasingly important sector of the work force, functions as a
union. The Supreme Court has upheld the right of government
workers to strike, subject to certain restrictions imposed
principally for reasons of public safety. The Public Service
Association freely maintains relations with international
bodies and participates in bilateral exchanges.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
While workers have the right to engage in collective
bargaining, there is little practice of this right because of
the absence of unions in the private sector. However, the
Public Service Association engages in collective bargaining on
behalf of government workers. Arbitration and mediation
procedures are in place to resolve labor disputes, although
these rarely arise. Labor law and practice in the one export
processing zone are the same as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
While the Government does not demand compulsory labor and it is
prohibited by law, in this collective society people are
frequently called upon to work for their villages. Most people
do so willingly, but, if not, the matai compel them to do so.
1041
WESTERN SAMOA
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Under the terms of the Labor and Employment Act of 1972 and
Regulations of 1973, it is illegal to employ children under 15
years of age except in "safe and light work." The Director of
Labor refers complaints about illegal child labor to the
Attorney General for enforcement. The law does not apply to
service rendered to the matai, some of whom require children to
work at what might be considered child labor, primarily on
village farms.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor and Employment Act of 1972 and Regulations of 1973
established for the private sector a 40-hour workweek and a
small minimum wage. This minimum wage suffices for a minimum
standard of living when supplemented by the subsistence farming
and fishing in which most families engage.
The law also establishes certain rudimentary safety and health
standards, which the Attorney General is responsible for
enforcing. Independent observers report, however, that the
safety laws are not strictly enforced except when accidents
highlight noncompliance. In addition, many agricultural
workers, among others, are inadequately protected from
pesticides and other dangerous conditions because of limited
employer awareness of the hazards. Government education
programs are addressing these concerns. The law does not apply
to service rendered to the matai . Government employees are
covered under different, more stringent regulations, which are
adequately enforced.
1042
ALBANIA*
Albania experienced profound political change in 1991, moving
from a one-party Marxist-Leninist dictatorship under Ramiz Alia
toward a multiparty parliamentary form of government with
constitutional protection of human rights. In March, in
multiparty legislative elections flawed by harassment and
intimidation of opposition candidates, newly formed opposition
parties won approximately one-third of the seats in the 250-
member People's Assembly; leading officials of the ruling
Albanian Party of Labor (APL) were defeated in several
contests. An APL government formed in February under Prime
Minister Fatos Nano continued in office for a short time
following the elections, and the People's Assembly elected
Alia, the inciimbent President and head of the APL, to a new
presidential term on April 30. However, a general strike
called by the Federation of Independent Trade Unions to protest
worsening economic conditions and the postelection killings of
opposition demonstrators in Shkoder led to the resignation of
the Nano government in early June. On June 12, the People's
Assembly approved a Government of National Stability led by
Prime Minister Ylli Bufi of the Socialist Party of Albania
(formerly the APL), but 12 of 24 Cabinet seats went to members
of the opposition parties. However, in early December the two
leading opposition parties withdrew from the Bufi Government,
asserting that the Socialist Party was blocking further reform.
Bufi then resigned, and on December 10 Alia appointed Vilson
Ahmeti to form an interim nonparty government to administer the
country until new elections are held. On December 21, Alia
proposed March 1, 1992, as the date for these elections.
The Bufi Government took some initial measures to reform the
secret police (Sigurimi), the organization charged with
enforcing the repressive controls that guaranteed the APL a
monopoly on power and severely limited the rights and freedoms
of Albanian citizens. Prior to and immediately following the
March elections, the security forces, including the army and
the police, used deadly force against unarmed opposition
demonstrators on several occasions. Deadly force was also used
to control crowds of would-be emigrants in March though not in
August; in later incidents the army was able to maintain order
without the use of firearms. However, according to the report
of the Rapporteur Mission of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which visited Albania in September,
the staff of the new National Intelligence Service is composed
entirely of former Sigurimi members. A July law subjected the
National Intelligence Service to democratic civilian control,
but in October the Government conceded that the process of
dismissing personnel guilty of abuses under the Marxist-
Leninist dictatorship had not been completed.
In 1991 Albania began to implement a reform program intended to
establish a market-oriented economy. Most prices were freed,
and the national currency was devalued to more realistic levels.
Significant progress was made in the privatization of
agricultural land and the establishment of small-scale private
enterprises. The legal foundation was laid for the
* U.S. diplomatic relations were reestablished with Albania on
March 15, 1991, after a 35-year break, and the U.S. Embassy
opened in Tirana on October 1, 1991.
1043
ALBANIA
privatization of some large state enterprises as well. However,
living standards, already the lowest in Europe, declined due to
disruptions in food production and distribution, and shortages
were common in the cities.
Albania's human rights performance improved notably in 1991.
The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions, passed on April 30,
provides for internationally recognized human rights, including
the rights of ethnic minorities. Significant progress occurred,
both in law and in practice, in the areas of freedom of speech,
press, religion, and travel. All political prisoners were
released by June. An Albanian human rights organization, the
Human Rights Forum, was established and assumed an active
monitoring and advocacy role. Workers obtained the right to
associate freely, to organize, and to strike, and formed strong
independent unions. However, the legal system has not yet been
overhauled, and the legislature has not yet adopted a new
constitution.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of targeted political killings in 1991,
but there were a number of instances of the use of excessive
force by police and military personnel. On February 23, APL
sympathizers demonstrated for restoration of APL founder Enver
Hoxha's statue, which had been toppled, and at least three
unarmed counterdemonstrators were killed by fire from army
personnel. On April 2, 4 members of the opposition Albanian
Democratic Party were killed by gunfire as they were trying to
calm an estimated 30,000 demonstrators who had gathered in front
of local APL headquarters in the northern town of Shkoder to
protest alleged fraud during the March elections. Nearly 60
were wounded by the gunfire, which came from the APL building.
A commission of the People's Assembly, formed to investigate the
Shkoder incident, held the security forces responsible. The
chief of the Shkoder police and three assistants were arrested.
However, the trial was suspended in mid-November, and the case
was returned to the investigative authorities for further
review. A date for the resumption of the trial has yet to be
set.
According to credible Western observers, the authorities used
deadly force on several occasions in March in efforts to control
groups of would-be emigrants. On March 9, 4 persons were
reported killed and 10 wounded when security forces seized a
ship in Durres which had been commandeered by would-be emigrants
seeking to flee the country. On March 23, border guards
reportedly fired into a group fleeing into Yugoslavia, killing
one and wounding several. On March 25, 1 person was reported
killed and some 29 wounded by security forces attempting to
control a crowd which had stormed the harbor area of Durres in
search of ships to transport them out of Albania. However, the
authorities refrained from using deadly force to control would-be
emigrants in later incidents, including the massive August exodus
to Italy and Malta. In early December, the Army was called out
to assist the police in controlling groups seeking to seize food
supplies from stores and warehouses. According to Western
observers and press reports, several looters and one soldier
died in various incidents throughout the country.
50-726 - 92 - 34
1044
ALBANIA
b. Disappearance
There were no reported disappearances in 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The criminal code prohibits the use of physical or psychological
force during investigations and provides penalties for those
found guilty of such abuse. The prohibition on the use of force
appears to have been respected since the March elections.
Many political prisoners freed in 1991 recounted that they had
suffered beatings during interrogation and extremely harsh prison
conditions afterward, including a severe hard-labor regime,
inadequate food and clothing, long-term solitary confinement,
and cramped and unheated cells. Although these accounts dealt
with events that took place before 1991, none of those guilty of
abusing prisoners has yet been charged or tried.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arbitrary arrest and detention are no longer common practices,
and procedural safeguards are being erected to prevent their
recurrence. The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions makes
the strict and equal application of juridical norms compulsory.
Although these norms are not clearly defined and may not be
until a new constitution is adopted, the draft constitution
proposed by the APL on April 10 would prohibit arbitrary arrests
and imprisonment without a court verdict and provides for a
3-day time limit on detention without charge, the right of
immediate appeal to the courts in cases of detention, the right
to be defended by an attorney, and the presumption of innocence.
In the period prior to the March elections, opposition party
leaders reported that at least 200 opposition activists had been
arrested and briefly detained and that some of them were beaten.
During the general strike which brought down the Nano government,
union leaders were briefly detained on several occasions. Since
the formation of the National Stability Government, however,
there have been no reports of arbitrary arrests or detentions.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system, which includes the Supreme Court and
regional and district courts, is being depoliticized and is
moving toward independence. In 1990 the Ministry of Justice was
reestablished and given a mandate to supervise the process of
reform. The People's Assembly elected a new Supreme Court and a
new Attorney General in May 1991; and the Minister of Justice in
the Bufi Government was chosen by the opposition Social
Democratic Party. The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions
declares Albania to be a state "based on the rule of law,"
provides for the separation of powers and an independent
judiciary guided "solely by law," and mandates depoliticization
of the courts and the entire legal system. Candidates for the
lower courts are proposed by the Minister of Justice and approved
by the President. According to law, they may not be transferred
or dimissed for political reasons.
In May 1990, the People's Assembly amended the penal code to
provide for the right to be defended by an attorney, the right
to a speedy trial, and the right to appeal a case. The process
of restructuring the legal system is not complete. The private
practice of law, prohibited since 1967, was authorized in
1045
ALBANIA
November 1990. As of March 1991, Albanian lawyers had identified
several serious problems with the legal system as it currently
operates. For example, a defense attorney may not see a
defendant without the investigating judge being present
(however, neither may a judge see a defendant without the
presence of a defense attorney) . Convicted prisoners do not
receive a copy of their judgment of conviction and sentencing;
although a lawyer may see the judgment, he or she is barred from
showing it to the client without permission of the court.
All political prisoners were freed by the summer of 1991, and
their families released from the internal exile to which they
had frequently been subjected. In May the Association of Former
Political Prisoners and Internees was formed to seek compensation
for the injustices political prisoners had suffered in the past.
On September 20, approximately 100 members of the Association
went on a hunger strike and succeeded in forcing the Government
to concede to their demands. The Government pledged to pay a
monthly allowance to all former political prisoners who were
unemployed and to provide them with employment and housing on a
priority basis; and on September 29 the People's Assembly passed
a law which declared those previously convicted of political
crimes to be innocent and to be considered as never having been
convicted.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions is silent on the
issue of arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, or
correspondence, although it states that Albania "guarantees the
human rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual ... (as)
accepted by international documents." Warrants issued by the
Attorney General or the district attorneys are required for
searches, and in practice cases of arbitrary interference with
privacy, family, home, and correspondence became the exception
rather than the rule in 1991. Nevertheless, there were credible
allegations that the National Intelligence Service continued to
conduct politically motivated surveillance operations against
some political figures even after the formation of the Government
of National Stability in June; and there were widespread
suspicions of surreptitious wiretapping and interception of
correspondence .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions does not specifically
address freedom of speech. In practice, freedom of speech,
including criticism of the Government and government officials,
is respected. Albanians now openly discuss the issues of the
day among themselves and with Western visitors. However, the
continuing activities of the security services are a limiting
factor in that some individuals still fear reprisals for
expressing critical opinions.
Opposition parties, the independent trade unions, and various
citizens' groups have been allowed to publish their own
newspapers since January. These publications often contain
harsh attacks on government policies and officials and do not
appear to practice self-censorship of any kind.
Nevertheless, the editors and staff of opposition papers allege
that the state-controlled publishing and distribution system
1046
ALBANIA
discriminates against their publications, and several claim that
they have received death threats both in writing and by
telephone. The brother of one editor, who is also a Member of
Parliament, reportedly was severely beaten and told specifically
that it was because of the editor's opposition activity. Dr.
Elez Biberaj , head of Voice of America's Albanian Service, was
injured while on a visit to Albania in September when the car in
which he was traveling with several Albanian journalists was
struck several times by another vehicle. Following a
preliminary investigation, the Government concluded that the
incident was a simple traffic accident and placed the alleged
perpetrator under arrest. However, the opposition Democratic
Party has publicly stated its view that members of the Sigurimi
were responsible for the incident.
Radio and television remain state monopolies. Following
credible charges that broadcasts prior to the March elections
unduly favored the APL, the newly elected People's Assembly
placed Albanian radio and television directly under its own
jurisdiction. On November 24, Albanian radio and television
were placed by law under the control of a nonpartisan managing
council charged with ensuring that the media do not serve the
interest of any party and that broadcasts are impartial and
objective.
Albania's major university, the University of Tirana, was closed
in March by the Minister of Education following a series of anti-
APL student demonstrations in February pressing for further
reforms. It reopened on October 1 in a new atmosphere of greater
academic freedom, and the curriculum is being revised.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions guarantees political
pluralism and provides that political parties be fully separated
from state institutions, including the military and security
services. The draft constitution proposed by the APL would
guarantee citizens "freedom to assemble. .. according to the
conditions defined by law" but does not specify these conditions.
In practice, the authorities have demonstrated growing respect
for freedom of assembly, particularly in the period after the
formation of the Government of National Stability. Prior to
June, opposition party rallies and demonstrations were frequently
disrupted, often violently, by state security forces. On March
1, all demonstrations not related to the elections were banned.
On May 29, police used water cannon to break up a peaceful
demonstration in Tirana in support of the general strike called
by the Federation of Independent Trade Unions. After June,
police permission for public gatherings, a legal requirement,
was generally granted, and opposition assemblies were held
without disruption. A September 14 rally called by several
opposition parties, the unions, and the Association of Former
Political Prisoners attracted 50,000 participants and took place
without incident. On October 6, the Democratic Party held a
rally without police permission. The authorities allowed the
rally to take place but warned that in the future organizers of
illegal rallies would be prosecuted.
Freedom of association is largely respected. New political
parties must be approved by the Ministry of Justice according to
the law on the formation of political parties passed by the
People's Assembly, but numerous parties representing widely
divergent views have received such approval. However, that law
appears to prohibit the formation of parties based on ethnic
1047
ALBANIA
considerations, a cause of concern to the Omonia Party, which
represents Albania's Greek minority. Independent nonpolitical
organizations of various kinds, including trade unions, human
rights groups, and cultural and civic organizations, were
established in 1991 and functioned freely.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religioh has been established in both theory and
practice. The Government legalized the private practice of
religion in May 1990 and public practice in December 1990. The
Law on Major Constitutional Provisions declares Albania to be "a
secular state" which "respects the freedom of religious faith
and creates conditions to exercise it."
There were no reports in 1991 of governmental obstruction of tbe
practice of religion. Numerous mosques and churches reopened
throughout the country. Delegations and missions from the
Vatican, the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the Muslim
World League visited Albania in 1991; and diplomatic relations
with the Vatican were resumed after a break of 46 years.
However, due to the years of repression prior to 1990, there are
few clergy of any denomination left in the country, and
(questions concerning property confiscated from religious
organizations remain unresolved.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no longer any restrictions on freedom of movement
within the country, and regulations on foreign travel and
emigration have been revised. The Passport Law of May 1990 made
passports available to all citizens, and the practice of
limiting passports to specific countries of destination was
abandoned in 1991. Under legislation that went into effect on
July 27, exit visas are no longer required for travel abroad,
except in the case of minors under the age of 16.
During 1991 thousands of Albanian would-be emigrants sought to
leave the country by seizing vessels in Albanian ports and
forcing them to sail to Italy or Malta. Mass departures took
place in March and August. Most Western observers, including
officials of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
believe that the vast majority of these would-be emigrants were
motivated by economic considerations. A joint UNHCR-
International Organization of Migration mission which visited
Albania in August concluded that the only way to prevent the
recurrence of mass departures was the inauguration of emergency
relief measures by foreign donors, followed by long-term
development assistance to revitalize the economy.
Almost all would-be emigrants who actually arrived in Italy and
Malta in August were repatriated to Albania following interviews
with UNHCR officals to determine their eligibility for asylum.
The Government of Albania provided assurances that none of these
returnees would be prosecuted or suffer reprisals of any kind;
and according to Western observers, including UNHCR and U.S.
government officials, there have in fact been no prosecutions or
reprisals .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions changed the country's
title from Socialist People's Republic of Albania to Republic of
1048
ALBANIA
Albania and provides citizens with the right to change their
government "by free, general, equal, direct, and secret ballot."
Under this law, voters directly elect menUDers of the legislature,
the People's Assembly, which elects the President. In 1991 the
People's Assembly also elected the members of the Supreme Court.
The people's effort to exercise the right to change their
government in the March 31 legislative elections, the first
multiparty elections in Albania since 1945, was hindered by
government interference. While observers concluded that the
casting and counting of votes was generally fair, the campaign
leading up to the elections was marred by acts of intimidation
against opposition candidates and serious inequities in the
Government's treatment of opposition parties. The ruling APL
enjoyed an overwhelming advantage in access to government-
controlled broadcast media, although the opposition parties were
allotted some time for televised political broadcasts. The APL
also enjoyed advantages in access to newsprint, transportation,
and office facilities. There were credible reports of widespread
intimidation of opposition party candidates and activists and
the creation of an atmosphere of fear in many districts. In
several cases, opposition speakers and activists were reportedly
beaten or stoned.
The APL won 169 of the 250 People's Assembly seats, and 1 went
to the Committee of Veterans, an organization tied to the APL.
The opposition Democratic Party won 75 seats, while 5 went to
Omonia, a group representing the interests of the Greek minority.
Voter turnout was over 98 percent. On April 30, the new Assembly
elected Ramiz Alia, the incumbent President, to a new 4-year
term.
On May 3, Alia directed Fatos Nano, the incumbent Prime Minister,
to form a new government. The Democratic Party rejected Nano ' s
proposed coalition government, and an all-APL government was
formed. As the result of a general strike called by the
Federation of Independent Trade Unions to protest worsening
economic conditions and the Shkoder killings, the Nano government
resigned in early June. On June 5, President Alia appointed
Ylli Bufi Prime Minister of the coalition Government of National
Stability. Bufi was a member of the Socialist Party (formerly
the APL); one of two Deputy Prime Ministers was a member of the
Democratic Party; and cabinet positions were split evenly between
Socialist party and opposition representatives.
In early December, the Democratic Party and the smaller
Republican Party withdrew from the Government of National
Stability, asserting that the Socialist Party was blocking
further reform and calling for new elections within the next
several months. Bufi then resigned and on December 10 Alia
appointed Vilson Ahmeti, formerly Minister of Food in the
National Stability Government, to form an interim government
composed of "intellectuals" not formally affiliated with any
party. According to a statement issued by the President's
office announcing the appointment, the mandate of the Ahmeti
Government is to ensure the food supply and maintain public
order while preparing for new elections. On December 21, Alia
proposed March 1, 1992, as the date for these elections.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In 1991 the Government recognized Albania's first domestic human
rights organization, the Forum for the Defense of Human Rights
1049
ALBANIA
and Fundamental Freedoms. The Forum, which has established
branches in several Albanian towns, has taken an active and
public role in defending human rights, particularly those of
former political prisoners.
The Government in 1991 reversed previous policy and permitted
visits by several international and nongovernmental human rights
organizations. These included a delegation from the
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights in March,
which met with government officials and members of opposition
parties, toured several prison and labor camps, conducted
interviews with persons convicted of political and common
crimes, and investigated several killings attributed to the
security forces. On June 19, Albania was admitted to the CSCE;
on September 16, President Alia signed the Helsinki Final Act;
and on that date Albania received a CSCE factfinding mission.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Greeks form the largest ethnic minority in Albania, but there
are also small numbers of Serbs, Macedonians, Vlachs, and
Gypsies. Estimates of the size of the Greek minority vary from
59,000 (from an official Albanian census) to as high as 400,000
(from groups promoting the interests of ethnic Greeks in
Albania) .
The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions provides for "the
human rights and fundamental f reedoms . . .of national minorities,
(as) accepted by international documents." The draft
constitution proposed by the APL would gurarantee national
minorities the right "to freely express, preserve, and develop
their ethnic, cultural, or religious identity, to use their
mother tongue and to teach it in school and to develop their
culture in all its aspects." In practice, there are limitations
on the extent to which minorities may exercise these rights.
Members of the Greek minority may receive schooling in their
mother tongue during the first 4 years of primary school only in
those areas of the southern part of Albania where the Greek
minority is concentrated. Tirana radio broadcasts Greek-
language programs periodically and a Greek-language newspaper,
Liko Vima, is published in the southern town of Gjirokaster.
In 1991 a political party, the Democratic Union of the Greek
Minority (Omonia), was formed to represent the interests of the
Greek community, and the Government accorded it legal status.
During the legislative election campaign, Omonia contested six
races and won five seats in the People's Assembly. However, a
law passed following the establishment of the Government of
National Stability in June appears to bar the formation of
parties based on ethnicity. It is not clear what effect this
law will have on the ability of Omonia to contest the next
elections or whether Omonia intends to challenge the law before
the Supreme Court .
The Gypsy population in Albania is small. Popular attitudes
toward Gypsies are negative, but they do not suffer from any
overt forms of discrimination.
The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions is silent on the
subject of women's rights. The draft constitution proposed by
the APL prohibits discrimination based on gender and guarantees
women equal rights "in regard to work, compensation, holidays,
social security, education, in all sociopolitical activity, as
well as in the family." However, Albanian law has long provided
1050
ALBANIA
for equal pay for equal work and the right of women to equal
access to education, employment, and elective office. According
to reliable observers, approximately 50 percent of students at
the University of Tirana are women, and women hold key economic
positions in urban areas. No information is available on the
extent of violence against women or government efforts to reduce
it.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
In 1991 workers obtained the right to associate freely and
proceeded to form trade unions of their own choosing. On
January 17, the Government issued a decree on the right to
strike and 2 days later authorized the formation of trade unions
independent of the APL-1 inked United Trade Unions of Albania.
On March 11, the Ministry of Justice approved the formation of
the Federation of Independent Trade Unions (BSPSh). Such
approval — a legal rec[uirement for the establishment of unions
and union federations — is routinely granted if a union's program
is in accord with the Law on Major Constitutional Provisions.
The trade unions affiliated with the BSPSh have a total
membership of approximately 250,000, according to recent
estimates. They and the BSPSh are totally independent of both
the Government and of Albania's political parties. Those unions
which were arms of the APL in the former one-party state have
retained links to the Socialist Party.
Workers frequently exercised their right to strike in 1991. In
mid-May, for example, BSPSh called a general strike against the
Government to obtain its demands for a 50-percent increase in
wages and pensions, a 6-hour day, a ban on night-shift work for
women, and the immediate arrest and trial of those responsible
for the Shkoder killings. Within a week, almost 350,000
workers, or approximately 75 percent of the industrial work
force, had joined the strike. Some union members were briefly
detained during the course of the strike, and some reportedly
received death threats. However, the strike forced the
resignation of the all-APL Nano Government on June 3; and on
June 7 the strike ended following a meeting between union
leaders and Prime Minister-designate Bufi at which he agreed to
address their demands following the formation of his government.
On June 17, the Government of National Stability announced a
general 50-percent increase in wages in the state-owned sector
of the economy (virtually the entire economy at that time),
while miners, who had received a raise of 60 percent in January,
were to receive a 15-percent increase. A similar increase in
pensions was announced at the same time. The increases took
place in two stages, half in July and half in October.
Despite dramatic progress in the area of worker rights, much of
the legal and administrative machinery necessary to protect and
promote the exercise of these rights is still not in place.
Many independent union leaders assert that the administrative
functions of the Government are still largely in the hands of
personnel held over from the Marxist dictatorship.
Albania resumed membership in the International Labor
Organization on May 29, after a hiatus of almost 25 years, and
Albanian trade unions are now free to affiliate with
international trade union organizations, such as the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
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ALBANIA
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions provides for the trade
unions the status of "juridical persons" who "may sign collective
working contracts" with both state and private employers. The
BSPSh leadership had the opportunity to review the Law on
Collective Contracts with state enterprises passed by the
People's Assembly in the fall, and the Law on Collective
Contracts with private enterprises was approved on December 3.
It is too early to assess the effectiveness of these laws, but
Western observers report that unions are in practice conducting
collective bargaining with state and private enterprises. There
are no special economic zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions is silent on the
subject of forced or compulsory labor. The draft constitution
proposed by the APL would guarantee citizens "the right to
choose and exercise their professions according to their
capabilities and personal preference." Persons convicted of
common crimes are not remunerated for the work they perform in
prison.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
According to the Labor Code of 1980, amended in 1981, the
minimum age of employment for children is 15. Those under 16
years of age may not work more than 6 hours per day.
Information on enforcement of this law is unavailable.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no information available on the current minimum wage;
the proposed law on collective contracts is expected to set a
minimum wage. According to the Labor Code, the workweek is 48
hours. Women, youths under the age of 18, and those with a
doctor's certificate are prohibited from working underground.
The Labor Code contains regulations pertaining to occupational
health and safety, but enforcement is minimal. Unsafe working
conditions are among the major complaints of Albanian unions.
There are approximately 50 accidental deaths a year in the
mining sector alone, according to independent union leaders.
1052
AUSTRIA
Austria is a constitutional parliamentary democracy. A
coalition government (Social Democratic Party and People's
Party), formed originally after the 1986 national election,
continued in office after the October 1990 election. The
liberal/nationalist Freedom Party and the loosely united Green
Party comprise the opposition.
The police and security organs are subordinated to the
executive and judicial authorities. The Interior Ministry
during 1991 took several steps to respond to allegations of the
mistreatment of detainees while in police custody.
Austria has a developed economy, and its citizens enjoy a high
standard of living.
Human rights are highly respected in Austria, and individual
rights and political freedoms are provided for in the
Constitution and generally protected.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated killings either
by government authorities or opposition groups.
b. Disappearance
There were no political abductions.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is banned by Article II of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which
is incorporated into the Austrian Constitution.
In 1991 discussion of police brutality continued in the wake of
reports charging that persons who file complaints against the
police risk being charged with slander by the accused officials.
In response, the Interior Minister issued a report in January
stating that there were 2,622 allegations of police brutality
between 1984 and 1989. In 1,142 cases of criminal complaints,
33 police officers were convicted. Investigations of 120
officers resulted in disciplinary measures being taken against
26 of them.
Among the Government's interim measures to mitigate the
ill-treatment of detainees was the Interior Ministry's issuance
of a leaflet to be given to any person arrested or detained by
the police. It stipulates the person's right to call a lawyer
or "person of confidence" and his or her own doctor if a
medical examination is required. A new police law, passed in
October and scheduled to enter into effect in May 1993 (to
allow sufficient time to train police officers in the new
regulations), stipulates more clearly the limitations on police
conduct during investigations and limits to 7 days the time a
person may be held on charges of "aggressive behavior" without
being brought before a magistrate. During this time, arrested
persons may appeal their arrest to "administrative senates"
composed of independent judges.
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AUSTRIA
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary detention or exile. In
criminal cases the law provides for investigative or pretrial
detention for up to 48 hours (except in cases in which
"aggressive behavior" is charged, as noted above) by which time
an investigative judge must decide on the legality of continuing
the detention. Provided the investigative judge agrees, the
accused may be held pending completion of an investigation for
a maximum of 2 years. Grounds for investigative detention are
enumerated in the law, as are conditions for release on bail.
The law is respected and closely followed in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is independent of the executive and legislative
branches of government. Trials are public. Judges are
appointed for life. Jury trials are prescribed for major
offenses (those for which a sentence of over 5 years might be
passed), and those convicted have the right of appeal. Written
charges must be presented to the accused, who has the right to
be represented by a lawyer .
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The law provides for the protection of personal data collected,
processed, or transmitted by government agencies, public
institutions, or private entities. Constitutional provisions
also protect the secrecy of the mail and telephone. Following
the restructuring of the state police as a result of a 1990
scandal involving the unauthorized monitoring of private
citizens by police, a new federal police law has been written
(see Section i.e.) that will introduce parliamentary control
over the state police and the military secret service on a
permanent basis. Separate parliamentary subcommittees will
have authority for these organs.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms are guaranteed by the Constitution and respected
in practice. Austria has a free, independent, and multifaceted
press, ranging from conservative to Communist.
Publications may be removed from circulation if they violate
legal provisions concerning morality or public safety. As a
matter of practice, such cases are extremely rare. Opposition
viewpoints are given wide attention in Austrian publications.
Freedom of academic expression is respected. Austria's well-
established democratic political system, its active and
independent press, and its effective judiciary combine to
assure continued freedom of speech and press.
Austrian radio and television are government monopolies, but
are also multifaceted. There have been no complaints of subtle
or direct attempts at censorship. Cable television is widely
available, allowing Austrians access to broadcasts from the
United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, among others.
Austrians also listen to private radio broadcasts from other
European countries.
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AUSTRIA
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association. Public demonstrations require a permit from the
police authorities, who may consider only the public safety
aspect of the proposed demonstration and not its political
purpose. Permits are routinely issued.
The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 makes an exception to freedom
of association in the case of Nazi organizations and activities.
The Constitutional Law of 1945, amended in 1947, also prohibits
Nazi organizations and activities. The law on the formation of
associations stipulates that permission to form an association
may be denied if it is apparent that the organization will
pursue the illegal activities of a prohibited organization.
c. Freedom of Religion
This right is provided for in the Constitution, although the
Treaty of St. Germain, which also is a constitutional provision,
restricts this freedom to the practice of religions that are
compatible with public safety and morality. In order to qualify
as a recognized religious organization under Austrian law,
religious groups register with the Government. Although 88
percent of the population is Roman Catholic, most of the world's
major religions are represented.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions concerning freedom of movement within
the country or the right to change residence or workplace.
Austrian residents are free to travel abroad and to emigrate.
Citizens who have left the country have the right to return.
As a result of the democratization process in Eastern Europe,
Austria's traditional role as a country of asylum for refugees
has changed. As political refugees from Eastern European
countries have been replaced by economically motivated
immigrants seeking work, the Austrian Government has taken
measures to stem the flow. These have included introducing
visa recpjirements for Romanians and Poles (the visa requirement
for Poles was lifted on September 1) and the use of the armed
forces at the frontier with Hungary to prevent illegal
immigrants from Romania from entering Austria. During the
summer and fall of 1991, several thousand Yugoslavs fled to
Austria as a result of civil war in their country.
Between January and August 1991, 16,500 persons applied for
asylum in Austria, an increase of 420 over the same period in
1990. By the end of 1991, this number had reached 27,000.
Because of increasingly restrictive asylum policies, in 1991
the Austrian media and human rights groups, along with the
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in
Vienna, repeatedly warned that Austrian authorities are in many
cases violating the right to apply for asylum, the right of
asylum seekers to reside, while their applications are pending,
in the country where they filed their application, and their
right to care and maintenance while their applications are
processed.
Reliable reports indicate that more than 100,000 persons were
prevented from entering Austria or were forced to leave the
country (generally by expulsion at the original point of entry)
in 1991, a substantial number of whom may have qualified for
1055
AUSTRIA
refugee status. In the spring of 1991, the Interior Ministry
ordered that, as of April, refugee applicants from Romania or
Bulgaria — who form the great bulk of asylum seekers — no longer
be taken into federal care since "political persecution no
longer exists" in these countries.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Austria is governed through a democratic parliamentary system.
Under the Constitution, national elections must be held at
least every 4 years. Elections are free and regularly draw
high levels of participation. There is universal suffrage for
those over 19 years of age.
The national elections of 1990 resulted in the continuation of
a coalition government composed of the two largest political
parties. No party won an absolute majority. The Social
Democratic Party, which won 80 seats in Parliament, went into
coalition with the People's Party, which won 60 seats. Two
other parties are represented in Parliament: the liberal/
nationalist Freedom Party won 33 seats, and the Greens won 10.
Several small parties participating in the elections, including
the Communist Party, did not receive sufficient support to
elect candidates to the Parliament.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Allegations of improper activities on the part of the
authorities are discussed and investigated by the press, public
groups, and private individuals without government hindrance.
Both international and local human rights groups operate freely.
Austria recognizes the competence of the European Human Rights
Commission in Strasbourg for enforcing the European Convention
on Human Rights. Austria concerns itself extensively with
international human rights matters, especially the human rights
situation in Eastern Europe.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Austria has an extensive public welfare system, the benefits of
which are available to all citizens on a nondiscriminatory
basis. In employment and in other areas, there is legal
protection against discrimination because of race, sex,
religion, language, or social status. In practice, there is no
pattern of such discrimination.
Legal restrictions on women's rights have long been abolished.
Women are entering the work force in increasing niambers and
have made substantial progress toward economic equality in the
postwar era. Nevertheless, in practice, inequality still
exists in political, economic, and social fields, where women
are generally under represented.
The number of reported rapes in Austria has risen significantly
over the past 3 years. While 336 charges were filed in 1988,
the number rose to 533 in 1990. In response, police
authorities have issued information brochures on how women can
better protect themselves against rape. In 1989 the Government
passed a law making spousal rape a criminal offense and
providing an expedited procedure for barring husbands from
1056
AUSTRIA
their homes for 3 months when they had threatened their wives
with violence. The latter procedure is available even in the
absence of a divorce action, a significant change from previous
law. There has been no significant expression of concern by
women's groups about the issue since passage of the law.
The human rights of Austrian minorities are fully respected.
While the subject of Slovene- language instruction for the
Slovene minority in Carinthia has been an issue in past years,
this question has largely been resolved through the
establishment of such language courses. Occasional calls are
still made for extending these rights, by, for example, setting
up bilingual village signs in Carinthia.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to form and join unions of their own
choosing without prior authorization. This right is protected
under general constitutional guarantees of freedom of
association. In practice, Austrian trade unions have an
important and independent voice in the political, social, and
economic life of the country.
In 1991, 60 percent of the work force was organized in 15
national unions, each of which is a member of the Austrian
Trade Union Federation (ATUF) . This organization has a strong,
centralized leadership structure. Individual unions and ATUF
are independent of government or political party control,
although there are formal factions within these organizations
that are closely allied with political parties.
Although the right to strike is not explicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution, it is universally recognized as a right of
the workers. Strikes in the postwar period have been
comparatively few and usually of short duration. There were
three strikes in 1991 (by the Printers' Union, the Media Union,
and the Public Employees Union). High on the list of reasons
for Austria's record of labor peace is the system of "social
partnership" — Austria's nearly unicjue unofficial forum for
cooperation among labor, management, and government. At the
center of the system is a Joint Parity Commission for wages and
prices, chaired normally by the Federal Chancellor, which has
an important voice on major economic questions.
The ATUF and its members have affiliations with all three world
labor federations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions have the right to organize and bargain collectively.
The labor movement enjoys widespread acceptance and almost all
large companies, private and state owned, are strongly
organized. Worker councils representing all workers in a unit
operate at the enterprise level, and workers are entitled by
law to elect one-third of the members of the boards of major
companies. Collective agreements are negotiated by the ATUF on
behalf of its member unions with the National Chamber of
Commerce and its associations, representing the employers
within a framework of wage-price policy guidelines set by the
Joint Parity Commission. A 1973 law imposes on employers the
obligation to prove that job dismissals are not motivated by
antiunion discrimination. The Committee of Experts of the
International Labor Organization reiterated in 1991 its earlier
1057
AUSTRIA
requests that the Government take the necessary measures to
protect workers in enterprises with fewer than five employees
against acts of antiunion discrimination and bring its
legislation into conformity with ILO Convention 98 on the right
to organize and collective bargaining.
Workers are further protected by membership in the Austrian
Chambers of Labor, to which all employees except civil servants
belong. These Chambers fulfill several functions that are
handled by trade unions in other countries, such as carrying
out studies and preparing legislative proposals. As of
September, the Chambers are also obliged to provide free legal
assistance, including a lawyer, to any employee requesting it.
Typically, legal disputes between employer and employees
regarding job-related matters are handled by a special
arbitration court for social affairs. The ATITF is exclusively
responsible for collective bargaining. The leaderships of both
the Chambers and the ATUF are elected democratically. Austria
has no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum legal working age is 15. The law is effectively
enforced by the labor inspectorate of the Ministry for Social
Affairs. Compulsory school education in Austria comprises ages
6 through 14, and virtually all school-aged children attend.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no legislated national minimum wage in Austria.
Instead, nationwide collective bargaining agreements set
minimum wage rates by job classification for each industry. A
worker whose annual income falls below the established poverty
line is eligible to receive social welfare benefits. The
average Austrian has a high standard of living, and even
workers at the low end of the wage scale have a relatively
decent minimum standard. Although the legal workweek has been
established at 40 hours since 1975, more than 50 percent of the
labor force is covered under collective bargaining agreements
setting a maximum workweek at 38 or 38.5 hours.
Austria has enacted extensive legislation setting occupational
health and safety standards, under which a labor inspectorate
attached to the Ministry of Social Affairs conducts inspections,
and it ensures the effective protection of workers in these
areas. Inspectors have the authority to "tag" an observed
safety or health risk without a court order, an action that
effectively shuts down the affected machinery or process until
it comes into line with mandated safety standards. Workers may
file complaints anonymously with the labor inspectorate, and
the inspectorate may bring suit against the employer on behalf
of the employee. In practice, this option is rarely exercised;
workers normally rely instead on the Chamber of Labor, which
files suits on their behalf.
1058
BELGIUM
Belgium is a longstanding parliamentary democracy under a
constitutional monarch. King Baudouin I, whose role is largely
ceremonial. The Council of Ministers (Cabinet), led by the
Prime Minister, is responsible for government decisions. The
Cabinet holds office as long as it retains the confidence of
the democratically elected bicameral Parliament.
National, municipal, and judicial police forces bear the primary
responsibility for domestic security in Belgium. The armed
forces play no role in domestic law enforcement. In 1991
Parliament passed legislation which shifts control over the
Gendarmerie (National Police Force) from the Defense Minister
to the Interior and Justice Ministers in order to make it more
responsive to political and judicial authorities.
Belgium is a highly industrialized state with a mixed, free
market economy. A vigorous dominant private sector, with
government participation in certain industries, and an
extensive social welfare system support a relatively high
standard of living for most Belgians.
Respect for human rights in Belgixim is provided for in the
Constitution and laws and observed in practice. The Government
is sensitive to allegations of human rights violations. In a
decree issued in 1991, the European Court of Human Rights
criticized the Belgian judicial system for failing to act
swiftly on criminal law cases; the Government responded with
legislation, approved by Parliament, to hire more magistrates.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known political killings.
b. Disappearance
Abductions, secret arrests, and clandestine detentions are not
known to occur .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no reports of torture or inhuman treatment.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment is provided for
by law and respected in practice. Arrested persons must be
brought before a judge within 24 hours. Pretrial confinement
is allowed only under certain legally specified circumstances.
The premise for such confinement is subject to monthly review
by a panel of judges, which may extend pretrial detention based
on carefully circumscribed criteria (e.g., if, in the court's
view, the arrested person would be likely to commit further
crimes or attempt to flee if released) . Arrested persons are
allowed prompt access to a lawyer of their choosing or, if they
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the State.
Bail exists in principle under Belgian law but is rarely
granted in practice. Exile is not permitted by law.
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BELGIUM
Following publication in 1990 of the findings of a special
parliamentary investigatory committee which strongly criticized
the law enforcement agencies for failing to deal adequately
with organized crime. Parliament in 1991 adopted a bill that
established two permanent control committees over the police
and intelligence services. The committees must report to
Parliament, may issue opinions on policy matters, and have an
independent investigatory arm empowered to requisition documents
and call witnesses, including law enforcement officers.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
A fair public trial is assured by law and honored in practice.
A suspect is formally charged, if the evidence so warrants,
once a preliminary judicial investigatory phase is completed.
Charges are clearly and formally stated, and there is a
presumption of innocence. Defendants have the right to be
present, the right to counsel, provided at public expense if
needed, and the right to confront witnesses and present
evidence. Defendants enjoy the right of appeal. The
judiciary's independence is provided for by the Constitution
and observed in practice. Imprisonment for political beliefs
is prohibited. Belgium also has a system of military tribunals,
before which military personnel are tried for both military and
common law crimes. One civilian judge sits on the panel. The
accused has the right of appeal to a higher military court.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy by the State
is guaranteed by law and respected in practice. Search
warrants issued by a judge are recjuired, unless the residents
of a domicile agree to a search. Prior to the dissolution of
Parliament in October, legislation was enacted allowing judges
discretion to order wiretapping in narrowly circumscribed cases
to further judicial investigations into serious crime.
Parliament also enacted privacy legislation aimed at restricting
the data which authorities may collect and regulating access
thereto. There is no forced political membership or other
coercive control of the population.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms are assured by law and respected in practice.
An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning
democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of speech
and press. Academic freedom is respected.
The Government operates several radio and television networks
but does not control program content. Programs are supervised
by boards of directors which represent the main political,
linguistic, and opinion groups. A government representative
sits on each board but has no veto power. Private radio and
television stations operate with government licenses. Almost
all homes have access by cable to television from other Western
European countries.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Public assembly is subject to regulations concerning public
order but is otherwise unrestricted. Groups protesting
government policies or actions are free from harassment and
1060
BELGIUM
persecution. Permits are required for open-air assemblies but
are granted routinely, although there are restrictions on
blocking major arteries to and from downtown Brussels and on
entering a small zone near the Royal Palace and Parliament.
Belgians are free to form organizations and establish ties to
international bodies.
c. Freedom of Religion
Belgium has a long tradition of religious tolerance. The Roman
Catholic, Protestant, Anglican, Jewish, and Muslim religions
are accorded a "recognized" status in law and granted a
government subsidy. Minority "non-recognized" religions enjoy
full freedom to practice and are not subject to harassment or
persecution. Organized religions may establish places of
worship and train numbers of clergy adequate to serve believers.
Links may be maintained with coreligionists in other countries,
and foreign missionaries may proselytize. By law, all
officially "recognized" religions have the right to provide
teachers to give religious instruction in the schools.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Belgians are free to travel both at home and abroad and may
return to Belgium at any time. Emigration is not restricted,
nor is citizenship revoked for political reasons. Citizens are
free to choose their places of work and residence.
The Government does not force political refugees to return to
countries where they face persecution. Due to the heavy influx
of refugees. Parliament in 1S91 adopted legislation designed to
speed up the processing of applications, and screening has been
tightened for Ghanaian, Indian, Pakistani, and Polish asylum
seekers. The Government in 1987 issued an exception to five
municipalities which, because of the large immigrant proportion
of their population (generally more than 40 percent), are not
reqijired to accept additional foreigners for residence. In
breach of this regulation, a number of other municipalities in
1991 refused to register additional foreigners.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Participation in the democratic political system is open to all
citizens. Direct popular elections for parliamentary seats
(excluding 77 of the 183 senate seats apportioned by other
means) are held at least every 4 years under a system of
universal, secret, and compulsory suffrage for all adults (age
18 and over). Unweighted voting (one person/one vote) has been
in effect since 1919 for men and 1949 for women. In law and
practice, opposition parties are free to operate without
constraints or repression. There are no restrictions, in law
or in practice, on the participation of women or minorities in
government or politics. Of the 19 political parties,
representing the full range of the political spectrum, that
competed in the general elections in November, 12 gained seats
in the new Parliament, but no party won a majority.
Negotiations for a new coalition were continuing at year's
end.
The existence of Dutch-, French- and German-speaking communities
engenders significant complexities for the State. All major
institutions, including political parties, are divided along
linguistic lines. There are special provisions for Dutch-,
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BELGIUM
French-, and German-speaking councils at the regional level .
Regional and linguistic needs are taken into account in national
political and economic decisions.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Several active independent human rights groups exist. The
Ministry of Justice and other governmental agencies are
sensitive to allegations of human rights abuses and take steps
to correct perceived shortcomings in national legislation. No
requests have been made for outside investigation of the human
rights situation in Belgium. The Government is a party to
various international hiiman rights treaties and has been active
in international forums in promoting human rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Belgium is a culturally vibrant, pluralistic society in which
individual differences in general are respected and linguistic
rights in particular are protected. Some 60 percent of Belgians
are native Dutch speakers living primarily in the northern
provinces that constitute Flanders. The 40 percent of the
population who are French speakers live mostly in the capital,
Brussels, and the southern provinces of Wallonia. A small
minority of German speakers lives along the eastern border.
Language differences have been the subject of hundreds of laws
over the last century, leading to a fairly rigid structure
designed to protect each language group from cultural,
economic, or political dominance by the others.
Food, shelter, health care, and education are available to all
residents regardless of race, sex, religion, language, social
status, or ethnic background. Some 27 percent of the residents
of Brussels, the nation's largest city, are foreigners. Many
of these are North African and Turkish immigrants. Encouraging
the further integration of the immigrant population and dealing
with new influxes of asylum seekers and Eastern European
immigrants is increasingly a focus of public debate. The
immigrant influx has also nurtured the growth of the extreme
rightist, openly anti-immigrant Flemish "Vlaams Blok" . Running
on a "Belgium for Belgians" platform in the November 1991
national elections, the party increased its representation in
Parliament from 3 to 12 seats.
In May Brussels was the scene of a series of riots by Moroccan
and other immigrant youths, apparently reacting to frequent
police patrols checking identity papers. The Government
responded by attempting to improve the dialog with the immigrant
community and address problems of youth unemployment, but many
underlying integration issues have yet to be addressed.
Belgium is an advocate of women's rights, both within the
country and in international meetings on the subject. A number
of commissions have been established to ensure that women's
rights are protected and to oversee women's education and
working conditions. To highlight the importance attached to
promoting women's rights internationally, a consultative
commission for the condition of women was established within
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A women's center is being
constructed at government expense.
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BELGIUM
Physical abuse of women is punishable by law, and the law is
enforced. In reaction to a 1988 government study which
concluded that 25 percent of Belgian women had encountered some
form of physical abuse, new legislation on sexual abuse was
enacted in 1989, broadening the scope of the previous
legislation to allow for prosecution of conjugal sexual abuse
and making penalties more severe. Certain sexual abuse cases
may be tried before a court of assizes, a higher court than the
usual district court.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to associate freely and to strike. With
an estimated 70 percent of its labor force organized, Belgium
is one of the most unionized countries in the world and has a
long tradition of democratic trade union elections. Unions
striking or protesting government policies or actions are free
from harassment and persecution. In certain narrowly defined
circumstances, such as the provision of essential public
services, the right to strike of public employees may be
limited.
Labor unions are strong and independent of the Government but
have important informal links with, and influence on, many of
the major political parties. Unions in Belgium are affiliated
with the major international bodies representing labor.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is recognized
and exercised freely. In the fall, management and the leading
unions reached a nationwide collective bargaining agreement
covering 2.4 million private sector workers, which set the
framework for negotiations at branch and plant levels.
The right to due process and judicial review are guaranteed for
all protected activity. Effective mechanisms exist for
adjudicating disputes between labor and management. Belgium
maintains a system of labor tribunals and regular courts which
hear disputes arising from labor contracts, collective
bargaining agreements, and other matters. There are no export
processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is illegal and does not occur.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment of children is 14, but there is
compulsory schooling until the age of 18. New legislation has
been submitted tightening conditions of child labor in show
business and related occupations. The labor courts effectively
monitor compliance with national laws and standards.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The minimum wage rates in the private sector are set in biennial
nationwide negotiations between the leading trade unions and
the Belgian Business Federation. After agreement is reached, a
formal collective bargaining agreement is signed by the National
Labor Council and is made mandatory upon the entire private
sector by royal decree. In the public sector, the minimum wage
1063
BELGIUM
is determined in negotiations between the Government and the
public service unions. These wages provide an adequate minimum
standard of living for full-time workers over age 21. By law,
workers in the private sector receive at least 4 weeks of
vacation per year and an annual bonus egpaal to approximately 14
percent of their annual wage. Unemployment benefits are also
guaranteed.
Working hours, mandated by law and through collective bargaining
agreements, are among the shortest in Europe. A maximum 40-hour
week is mandated by law, although many collective agreements
call for workweeks between 36 and 39 hours.
Comprehensive health and safety legislation is supplemented by
collective bargaining agreements on safety issues. The Labor
Ministry implements this legislation through a team of
inspectors and determines whether a worker qualifies for
disability and medical benefits. Health and safety committees
are mandated by law in companies with more than 50 employees
and by works councils in companies with more than 100 employees.
Labor courts effectively monitor compliance with national laws
and standards .
1064
BULGARIA
Two years after the overthrow in November 1989 of Communist
dictator Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria is a constitutional republic
ruled by a democratically elected government. Formed after
free multiparty elections in October, the Government of Filip
Dimitrov succeeded a transitional coalition regime led by
former nonparty judge Dimitur Popov, which had replaced the
all-Socialist (ex-Communist) government brought down by a
general strike in November 1990. In these second post-
Communist parliamentary elections, the Union of Democratic
Forces (UDF) won 110 seats to 106 for the Bulgarian Socialist
Party (BSP) and 24 for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms
(MRF) , which largely represents the Turkish minority. In the
first direct presidential elections in January 1992, President
Zhelyu Zhelev, former UDF Chairman, was elected to a 5-year
term with about 53 percent of the vote.
Reforms of the security apparatus continued in 1991. The
Interior Ministry, which oversees the police, national security
service, internal security troops, border guards, and special
forces, sought to modernize its anticrime services and bring
its practices into line with European human rights standards.
The Ministry established a new service to combat organized
crime and drug trafficking. Although both the intelligence
service, under control of the President, and the Interior
Ministry claimed that all monitoring of opposition and other
political figures had ceased, an apparent listening device was
discovered in the office floor of UDF Deputy Prime Minister
Dimitur Ludzhev in September .
The economy underwent enormous turmoil in 1991 as "shock
therapy" reforms were implemented to move it from a command
system toward a free market. Most prices were freed on
February 1, leading to price rises of up to 10 times in many
basic consumer items. Chronic fuel and energy shortages led to
frequent blackouts through the winter and interrupted
deliveries of many goods. Overall production fell dramatically
in 1991. However, the economic transition also progressed.
Privatization of state enterprises was begun, a new land law
provided for the return of agricultural land to its prewar
owners beginning in the autuirai of 1991, and foreign investment
was encouraged by new laws allowing full foreign ownership of
firms and full repatriation of profits. Many small businesses
began to appear, especially in the service sector.
Bulgaria's overall human rights performance continued to
improve in 1991. Freedom of press, assembly, religion, speech,
association, and travel were generally respected. Particularly
in rural areas, however, many people continued to fear that the
former state security persisted in monitoring citizens'
activities, although there was little precise evidence. The
Grand National Assembly, elected in 1990, adopted a new
Constitution in July 1991. Treatment of ethnic minorities
improved, although discrimination and inecjuities remain. The
issue of Turkish-language instruction in the schools sparked
nationalist protest and counterprotest by ethnic Turks (see
Section 5). Also controversial was an attempt to use legal
bans on ethnic- and religious-based political parties to
prevent the MRF, with a predominantly ethnic Turkish
membership, from running a list of candidates. The
Constitution prohibits registration as a political party of any
organization formed on "ethnic, racial, or religious lines."
1065
BULGARIA
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of such killings in 1991.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported instances of disappearance in 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no reports of such practices.
The new Constitution expressly prohibits torture; cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment; forcible assimilation; and
subjection to medical, scientific, or other experimentation
without consent. There were unconfirmed charges, generally
from patients, that psychiatric treatment is still used as a
form of punishment. These charges appear to stem from residual
fear of former practices, and there was no concrete evidence
that such practices continued in 1991.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution guarantees access to legal counsel from the
time o£ detention. Judicial authorities must rule on the
legality of a detention within 24 hours. There were no reports
of arbitrary detentions. Neither internal nor external exile
has been employed as a form of punishment since 1990. A new
penal code has not yet been completed by Parliament.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Under the Constitution ratified in July, the judiciary has
independent and coequal status with the legislature and the
executive. The Constitution stipulates that "all courts shall
conduct their hearings in public, unless provided otherwise by
a law." Closed trials may be held in cases involving state
security or to preserve state secrets. Defendants are
considered innocent until proven guilty, may not be compelled
to confess, and may not be judged guilty solely on the basis of
a confession.
Due process was generally observed during 1991, although some
human rights groups expressed concern about the unfair
treatment of former dictator Todor Zhivkov during his trial on
charges of fraud and misappropriation. Zhivkov was placed
under house arrest in 1990 and was not allowed access to the
foreign press until shortly before the commencement of the
trial. The trial itself initially attracted significant media
attention, provoking concerns about anti-Zhivkov bias in the
proceedings. Temporarily adjourned in May due to the poor
health of the defendant, the trial was resumed in late October.
The Constitution established the Constitutional Court, based on
Western European models, to decide matters of constitutional
import. Military courts handle all cases involving military
personnel and some cases involving national security matters.
The Constitutional Court does not have specific jurisdiction in
matters of military justice. While there has been no major
1066
BULGARIA
Structural reform in the military courts, there have been major
personnel changes effected by the President as Commander in
Chief.
Bulgaria's remaining political prisoners were released in
January. There remain five prisoners whose cases are
questioned by some human rights groups but who are not
generally considered political prisoners. These include three
ethnic Turks sentenced for terrorist acts and a former
government minister imprisoned for fraud and embezzlement.
There is no internal or foreign exile.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution stipulates the inviolability of the home,
protects the freedom and confidentiality of correspondence, and
provides the right to choose one's place of work and
residence. Police may not legally conduct a search without the
permission of a judge or prosecutor. There were no reported
violations of this requirement.
Charges persisted in 1991 that the intelligence services
continued in some instances to monitor correspondence and
telephone communications, as was common before the fall of the
Zhivkov regime. Such allegations were strengthened in
September when a listening device was reportedly discovered in
the office of Deputy Prime Minister Dimitur Ludzhev, a member
of the opposition UDF. According to experts, the device was
not operational at the time but was fully capable of
operation. It has not been determined when the device was
planted. Opposition leaders alleged, without specific
evidence, that conversations were also being monitored in the
headquarters of the UDF and the Podkrepa trade union.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and a free and independent press flourished
in 1991. Nearly every political party and many smaller, local
organizations published newspapers representing the full
spectrum of political opinion. The MRF and the Chief Mufti's
office both regularly published papers with editions in both
Turkish and Bulgarian, and one national weekly is published
half in Bulgarian and half in Turkish. Censorship of the press
and mass media is prohibited by the Constitution. Newsprint,
which was previously available only from the Government or with
hard currency, was sold for local currency to any organization
with sufficient funds. However, it proved prohibitively
expensive for many smaller opposition organizations, which thus
had difficulty publishing their own papers.
Bulgarian radio and television remained state monopolies under
the supervision of the National Assembly but were generally
operated independently. The news directors of both radio and
television came under fire from the BSP for allegedly being
biased in favor of the opposing parties. Both radio and
television expanded news and public interest programming during
1991 and introduced a much greater variety of programming. The
Assembly has not yet passsed legislation concerning the media.
Two private radio stations that attempted to broadcast early in
1991 were shut down on the grounds that no legal provisions yet
existed for their licensing.
1067
BULGARIA
Private book publishers proliferated during 1991, numbering
over 50 by late in the year. Academic freedom continued to
increase as university rectors and other academic leaders were
replaced by persons less closely associated with previous
Communist policies.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly cind Association
The right to peaceful and unarmed assembly is provided for by
the Constitution. No permit or notification is required for
meetings held indoors. Permits are required for rallies and
assemblies held outdoors. Except in rare instances when public
order was thought to be threatened, legally registered
organizations were routinely granted permission to assemble.
Political rallies and protest demonstrations were a common
occurrence in 1991.
The Constitution protects the right to free association in
general terms but forbids the formation of political parties
defined along religious, ethnic, or racial lines. An
additional clause in the electoral law prohibits any
organization that is not legally registered as a political
party from running an independent list of candidates in
parliamentary or local elections. These restrictions were
challenged when Ahmed Dogan, the leader of the MRF, which is
largely composed of ethnic Turks and which won 23 parliamentary
seats in the 1990 elections, attempted to register the party
for the October elections. The courts rejected the
registration, but the Central Electoral Commission ruled that
the registration of the MRF for the parliamentary elections in
1990 was a permanent registration, thus permitting it to
participate. The constitutional ban on ethnic- and
religious-based political parties seems to conflict with
Bulgaria's commitments within the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
The "Roma" union, an organization dedicated to protecting the
rights of Gypsies, was denied registration as a political
party, and the Supreme Court upheld the decision in July. The
courts determined that, because it sought to protect the rights
of a specific ethnic group even though its membership was open,
the organization qualified as an ethnic-based party and could
not be registered. It became an observer in the UDF in
September but was not offered any places on the UDF candidate
lists for the elections. Participating in a coalition with a
smaller party, it failed to get any representatives elected to
Parliament .
The Constitution also prohibits "citizens' associations,"
including trade unions, from pursuing political objectives or
engaging in political activities. This restriction has not yet
been tested to determine the extent of limitations it will
place upon organizations' activities.
c. Freedom of Religion
Religious freedom continued to expand throughout 1991. The
Constitution states that Eastern Orthodox Christianity is the
"traditional" religion of Bulgaria, but all of the major
religious bodies receive some degree of governmental financial
support. The Government is committed to restore a number of
churches and mosques, and the Ministry of Finance allocated a
sizable sum to the restoration of Sofia's synagogue, which is
reportedly the largest in Europe.
1068
BULGARIA
The former committee on religious affairs in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs was replaced by the Directorate for Religious
Affairs within the Council of Ministers. The Directorate's
mandate included reforming the Government's policies toward
religious institutions- and its relations with them. Many
churches applied for and were granted registration, including
the Hare Krishna Society, the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, and a number of other Protestant groups.
The return of church property confiscated by the State under
the Zhivkov regime began in January with the return of Rila
Monastery, one of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church's most revered
monuments. Former church property will also be affected by the
new land law, which limits the amount of agricultural land that
churches may own. One contentious issue was the Directorate's
refusal summarily to remove church leaders appointed by the
Communist regime, including members of the Orthodox Church's
Holy Synod, the Chief Mufti, and the pastor of at least one
Protestant church. These persons were considered compromised,
and many reformers sought their removal. The Directorate
refused to intervene, however, insisting that such matters were
internal church affairs and should no longer be decided by the
Government .
Although the question of allowing voluntary religious
instruction in the schools has not yet been decided, there are
no restrictions on private instruction. There is now a school
for imams and a Muslim cultural center, two universities have
theological faculties, and religious primary schools opened in
September. There are no restrictions on attendance at
religious services.
Bibles and other religious materials in the Bulgarian language
were both freely imported and printed in Bulgaria. Mosques
still suffer from a severe shortage of Korans and other printed
religious materials in Bulgarian, although the difficulty
appears to stem from administrative and financial shortcomings
rather than governmental interference. The Chief Mufti
published a newspaper in both Bulgarian and Turkish, and the
Faith and Culture publishing house began publication of a
Catholic newspaper. A newspaper directed at Bulgaria's small
Jewish community was regularly released in both Bulgarian and
Hebrew. Missionaries of various faiths appear to operate
unhindered throughout the country.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement within the country and the right to leave
the country are constitutionally enshrined and not limited in
practice, except in rare cases determined to affect national
security. The only such reported instance in 1991 was the
withholding of the international passports of several members
of the Macedonian rights group I linden. In 1990 the
organization was judged to be separatist, and therefore
illegal, and several of its members had their passports
confiscated while attempting to cross the border into Yugoslav
Macedonia. At least three of them were reportedly unable to
obtain new passports in 1991.
The requirement for exit visas was abolished in January.
Thousands of Bulgarians left throughout the year in search of
economic opportunities in the West. Every citizen has the
right to return to Bulgaria, may not be forcibly expatriated,
and may not be deprived of citizenship acc[uired by birth. An
1069
BULGARIA
increasing number of former political emigrants were granted
passports and returned to visit or live in Bulgaria.
Bulgaria receives few applications for asylum, more often
serving as a temporary refuge for third country nationals
seeking to enter Western Europe. New procedures were
established for handling asylum applications, limiting the
length of time in which the Government must respond to all
requests. Bulgarian law provides for the granting of asylum to
persons persecuted for their opinions or activities in defense
of internationally recognized rights.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Bulgarian citizens have the right to change their government
through the election of members of the National Assembly and
the President. That right was exercised on October 13 when,
after several postponements, multiparty elections were held for
the Assembly and for local government bodies. Over 40
individual parties and coalitions and a number of independent
candidates participated. Only three parties gained more than
the minimum 4 percent of the national vote required to win
parliamentary seats. The UDF won a plurality with 110 seats,
while the BSP won 106 and the MRF 24. The election was
generally observed to have been free and fair, despite some
administrative problems, including those affecting the
electoral rolls in ethnic Turkish areas. The first direct
election of a president, which is for a 5-year term, must be
held within 3 months of the National Assembly elections.
Parliamentary elections are to be held by secret ballot every 4
years, and 240 deputies are elected by a proportional system
from party lists. Suffrage is universal over the age of 18. A
distinct separation of powers exists between the Government
(Prime Minister and Cabinet) and the President, who is the
Chief of State. A continuous 5-year residency requirement
prevented former Tsar Simeon from returning from exile to run
as a presidential candidate.
While opposition groups operated freely, they remained
disadvantaged by a lack of resources, while the Socialists
(former Communists) retained the majority of their property
from 45 years of single-party rule. However, in mid-December
the BSP minority in Parliament was unable to prevent the
passage of a bill confiscating all property obtained from the
state by Communist organizations between 1945 and 1989.
Opposition leaders also complained of persistent fear of old
party structures in rural areas which may have given the BSP a
campaign advantage in those regions. (For the challenge to the
electoral participation of the MRF, see Section 2.b.)
There are no restrictions on the participation of women in
government or politics.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Both local and international human rights groups were active in
Bulgaria in 1991. The Independent Society for the Defense of
Hiaman Rights and the Bulgarian Association for Free Elections
and Human Rights issued reports, hosted international
observers, and held a niomber of seminars. Both organizations
have worked to become truly independent monitors of human
1070
BULGARIA
rights developments in Bulgaria. Members of international
human rights organizations consulted with Bulgarian
parliamentarians on drafting the new Constitution and were
active in monitoring the Zhivkov trial and the rights of ethnic
minorities. Bulgaria hosted a visit by the chairman of the
U.N. Human Rights Commission and was an active participant in
both U.N. and European human rights forums.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
While the Constitution guarantees individual rights and
equality, representatives of Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish and
Gypsy minorities did not believe it went far enough in
protecting their rights. In particular, they sought specific
recognition of ethnic and national minorities and their group
rights. Parliamentarians from the MRF and Manush Romanov, a
UDF deputy representing the Gypsy union "Roma," joined the
opposition walk-out of Parliament in late spring due to what
they saw as insufficient guarantees of minority rights.
The Government made progress in redressing the grievances of
ethnic minorities, particularly those acts of discrimination
perpetrated during the forced assimilation campaign of
1984-89. All official restraints have been removed from the
practice of Muslim religious traditions, the speaking of
Turkish in public, and the use of non-Slavic names.
The Government took initial steps to redress longstanding
complaints of ethnic Turkish families who were forced to sell
their homes when they fled to Turkey in 1989 and later returned
to find they were unable to recover their property. Over a
thousand families are reportedly still without housing. A
group of women representing the affected families staged a
relay hunger strike in a central Sofia square for several
months until the Council of Ministers issued a decree in August
requiring all government bodies still in possession of such
property to return it to its original owners. The decree also
provided opportunities for families to purchase housing at the
former prices and obtain credits at reduced interest rates to
build or purchase new apartments. The decree, which is not yet
in effect, is considered by many ethnic Turkish activists to
provide insufficient relief.
Some nongovernmental discrimination persisted. The
Constitution guarantees the right of all citizens to study
their mother tongue in addition to the obligation to study
Bulgarian. In March a Government plan to introduce 2 hours per
week of voluntary, extracurricular Turkish- language classes in
public schools sparked strikes and protests throughout those
regions with a mixed Turkish and Bulgarian population.
Nationalist groups stridently objected to any teaching of
Turkish, while ethnic Turks led strikes against the schools,
protesting the "experimental" and limited nature of the
classes. On November 8, the Ministry of Education, acceding to
the demands of the ethnic Turks, reinstituted voluntary
Turkish-language classes, and most ethnic Turkish boycotts
ended. Some Bulgarians accused the MRF of attempting to
"turkify" parts of the Bulgarian population, that is the Pomaks
(ethnic Bulgarian Muslims), by forcing them to learn Turkish
although Bulgarian is in fact their mother tongue.
Discrimination against minorities became an important issue as
Bulgaria began to suffer massive unemployment for the first
time. Ethnic Turks, Gypsies, and Pomaks claimed they were
1071
BULGARIA
usually among the first to be laid off in any factory
closures. They suffer widely from exclusion from positions of
responsibility. Supervisory jobs are generally given only to
ethnic Bulgarian employees. Muslims and Gypsies were
reportedly offered only the most inferior housing in many
cities. During their periods of compulsory military service,
male Muslims and Gypsies are generally given the worst
assignments. Construction troops, which undertake a variety of
civilian as well as military building and maintenance projects,
are largely composed of minority conscripts of ethnic Turkish
or Gypsy descent. However, ethnic Bulgarians claimed to face
similar discriminatory treatment regarding dismissal from
employment in areas where they formed the minority ethnic
group.
The large community of Vietnamese guest workers also came under
increasing pressure as unemployment rose. A riot sparked by an
argument between a Vietnamese man and a taxi driver brought a
massive response from the police and resulted in the deaths of
two Vietnamese men from police fire as well as several
injuries. There were also several minor conflicts between
Gypsy and Vietnamese communities involved in black market
activities. After the first incident, the Government undertook
to return to Vietnam the majority of some 13,000 Vietnamese
workers before the expiration of their contracts.
Several organizations purport to defend women's rights and
interests, including a number of small political parties
supporting both the UDF and the BSP. The Constitution forbids
the granting of privileges or the restriction of rights on the
basis of sex. Women are not generally discriminated against in
education or employment. No statistics are available on
violence directed against women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
According to the Constitution, all workers may form or join
trade unions of their own choosing. Many members of the civil
service have organized themselves into trade unions. Bulgaria
has two large trade union confederations, the Confederation of
Independent Trade Unions of Bulgaria (KNSB), and Podkrepa. The
KNSB is the successor to the trade union integrated with the
former Communist Party and is ostensibly independent of the
BSP. Podkrepa, the independent confederation created in 1989
and one of the first opposition forces, has continued to
strengthen and broaden its base. There are few restrictions on
trade union activities, and both confederations operated freely
in 1991. While the new Constitution prohibits trade unions
from undertaking political activity, Podkrepa, through its
chairman Dr. Konstantin Trenchev, continued to play an active
role in the UDF. Both confederations supported candidates in
the parliamentary elections and were active critics of various
government policies.
The law recognizes the right to strike, as does the
Constitution, when other means of conflict resolution have been
exhausted, but political strikes are forbidden. There were
numerous strikes throughout the year, including symbolic
strikes, rotating or "relay" strikes, and sit-ins. Some of
these were called to protest the new Constitution and delays in
the elections, but those accused of engaging in a politically
motivated strike were not prosecuted. The largest and most
disruptive action was a 2-week nationwide miners' strike called
1072
BULGARIA
by Podkrepa in August. The dispute was eventually settled when
the Government agreed to concessions on wages and job security.
There are no restrictions on affiliation or contact with
international labor organizations, and Bulgarian unions now
actively exercise this right.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
During the first half of 1991, wages were set by the Trilateral
Commission involving the Government, employers, and trade
unions. Collective bargaining was to have been instituted in
July, but as privatization and demonopolization of state
enterprises had not progressed significantly, negotiating
partners were not always clearly identifiable, and the
Commission is still involved in negotiating wage agreements at
the national level,
Bulgaria's Labor Code, which at present does not address
antiunion discrimination, is expected to be amended in 1992.
Some newly established export processing zones exist on a small
scale. There do not appear to be any special restrictions on
worker rights in these zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and
there were no reported violations.
d. MinimujTi Age for Employment of Children
According to the Constitution, school attendance is compulsory
up to the age of 16. The Labor Code also sets the minimum age
for employment at 16, and at 18 for dangerous work. Employers
and the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare enforce these
provi'sions. There is an increasing incidence of children
engaged in street trading in central Sofia where a number of
informal bazaars have become fixtures.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
A national minimum wage was set by the Trilateral Commission
and periodically adjusted as inflation and devaluation of the
currency dramatically increased the cost of living. The
minimum wage is not sufficient for a single wage earner to
provide a decent standard of living for a family. The
Constitution stipulates the right to social security, welfare
aid, and assistance for the temporarily unemployed.
The legal code provides for a standard workweek of 42 1/2
hours. Enforcement is the responsibility of the Ministry of
Employment and Social Welfare. The Trilateral Commission also
actively oversaw enforcement of most provisions relating to
working conditions.
Bulgaria has a national labor safety program with standards
established by the Labor Code, and the Constitution states that
workers and employees are entitled to healthy and nonhazardous
working conditions. The generally poor state of much
industrial equipment, which is often outdated and lacking spare
parts, complicated enforcement of safety regulations.
1073
CANADA
Canada is a constitutional monarchy with a federal parliamentary
form of government. Representatives in the multiparty political
system are elected by universal suffrage at local, provincial,
and federal levels. The national Constitution defines
government responsibilities and is subject to interpretation by
an independent judiciary.
Elected civilian officials control the federal, provincial, and
municipal police forces, which are responsible for national and
local law enforcement and the armed forces, which have no role
in domestic law enforcement except in strictly defined national
emergencies.
Canada has an open economic system that encourages private
ownership, investment, and entrepreneurship.
Canadians enjoy, in law and in practice, a wide range of
freedoms and individual rights as enumerated in the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, added to Canada's revised Constitution in
1982. Principal complaints of human rights abuses arise in the
area of discrimination against ethnic minorities (including
actions by police) and discrimination (much of it familial)
against women. The Constitution and laws provide avenues for
legal redress of such abuses, and the Government and private
organizations try to ensure that human rights are respected in
practice at all levels of society. Canada actively promotes
respect for human rights around the world.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no politically motivated killings. However,
Canadian authorities and the general public are concerned about
the potential for terrorist activity by resident ethnic groups
with active ties to troubled homelands. On May 10, a Sikh-
Canadian was found guilty on charges related to the explosion
on June 23, 1985, that killed two baggage handlers at Tokyo's
Narita Airport.
b. Disappearance
Secret arrest, clandestine detention, and politically motivated
disappearances did not occur.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
These abuses are prohibited by law, and none was reported.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Canadian law prohibits arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and
this prohibition is respected in practice. A 1988 law
authorizes the Federal Government to take special measures to
ensure safety and security during national emergencies,
including the suspension of civil liberties. The 1939 Official
Secrets Act prohibits the private possession, distribution, and
publication of information deemed prejudicial to the interests
of the State and provides that persons under suspicion may be
arrested without a warrant.
1074
CANADA
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system is based on English common law at the
federal level and in most provinces. In the Province of
Quebec, the judicial system is based on the Napoleonic Code.
Judges in Canada are appointed. In criminal trials, Canadian
law provides for a presumption of innocence of the defendant
until proven guilty, as well as the right to a public trial and
to counsel. Free counsel is provided to indigents.
The Official Secrets Act provides that trials involving
classified government information be held in secret, with
certain presumptions in favor of the State. Prosecutions under
this statute are extremely rare, and convictions are hard to
sustain on appeal. There are no political prisoners in Canada.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Federal and provincial governments do not interfere with a
person's basic rights. Intrusive searches may only be carried
out when there is a reasonable basis for presuming that the
person is involved in criminal activity. Police officials face
judicial penalties if they abuse a person's privacy without
first obtaining a search warrant.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a . Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is provided for by the Constitution
and respected in practice. Laws prohibiting certain forms of
hate literature and pornography, restrictive decisions by
provincial film censorship boards, and legislation that
specifically protects language and cultural rights are the sole
exceptions to these freedoms. The Canadian Hxoman Rights Act
makes it illegal to make repeated communications by telephone
that expose a person or people to hatred or contempt .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly and association is guaranteed. Permits are
not required for meetings.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is complete freedom of religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on movement within or outside Canada,
including the rights of emigration and repatriation. Canada
continues to be a haven for many refugees and displaced
persons. Widespread concern that many economic migrants have
taken advantage of Canada's generous attitude toward true
refugees and made spurious requests for asylum led to the
passage of a new refugee law, which went into effect in January
1989 and has not resulted in a reduction in asylum applications.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Canada is governed by federal and provincial governments that
are freely elected by the Canadian people through universal
1075
CANADA
suffrage. Legislative elections at both the federal and
provincial levels must be held at least every 5 years and often
result in a transfer of power to opposition parties. Voter
participation rates are high. The Governor General is the
British Queen's representative as Head of State. In practice,
power is exercised by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, who
usually are elected members of the 295-seat House of Commons.
Three main parties are represented in the Commons, and several
others function at the provincial level. All provinces and
territories have similar freely elected legislatures.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
A wide variety of private human rights organizations operate
freely. The Canadian Human Rights Commission and its
provincial counterparts investigate and resolve complaints of
discrimination in public and private cases.
Canadian natives have brought allegations of human rights
abuses related to a 1990 standoff between Mohawk Indians and
the Government near Montreal, as well as other longstanding
grievances, including land claims, to the attention of the
United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) and various
international human rights organizations. The Canadian
Government submitted information to the UNHRC on the cases and
permitted a Europe-based human rights organization to monitor
the situation involving the Mohawks.
Canada actively promotes hxoman rights in international forums,
and the Federal Government encourages nongovernmental
organizations to pursue investigations of human rights abuses
throughout the world.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Food, shelter, health care, and education are available to all
inhabitants without discrimination. Article 15 of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms guarantees equal benefits and protection
of the law regardless of race, national or ethnic origin,
color, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.
These rights are respected in practice.
Nevertheless, Canada's multicultural society does have racial
problems. Canada's treatment of its native peoples is probably
the most important human rights problem facing the country.
Age-old disputes between the Federal and Provincial Governments
and Aboriginals have led to civil disobedience and
confrontation. Native (Indian) protests during the summer of
1990 led to enmity between Indians and their nonnative
neighbors south of Montreal. Natives, religious groups, and
human rights activists alleged human rights abuses during the
78-day armed standoff between Mohawks and the Government at
Oka, Quebec. In January 1991, tension between police and
natives again erupted at a police checkpoint near Montreal.
There was also a confrontation between whites and Mohawks near
the Kanawake reserve on April 4.
The Federal Government in 1991 began to address many of the
issues underlying aboriginal complaints. On September 24, as
part of a constitutional reform package, the Government
proposed a guaranteed, court-enforceable right to self-
government. Under the proposal, the definition of self-
1076
CANADA
government would be negotiated between the Provincial
Governments and the native peoples over a maximum of 10 years,
after which the court system would define self-government where
agreements could not be reached. The Government also proposed
aboriginal representation in a reformed Federal Senate. A poll
taken after the proposals were announced indicated that
Canadians strongly support an aboriginal right to self-
government. It is likely that some form of aboriginal self-
government will be part of the final constitutional package.
On August 27, the Federal Government established the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Affairs. The Commission, in which
Aboriginals have majority representation, has a broad mandate
to examine aboriginal concerns including self-government, land
claims, and native justice. The work of the Commission will
likely play an important role in future constitutional
negotiations .
On August 6, Ontario became the first province to acknowledge
that aboriginal peoples have an inherent right to be self-
governing. The accord will be used as a basis in resolving
land claims and in devolving some provincial powers to native
groups .
Tensions also continued between the black and white communities
in Halifax, Nova Scotia. On July 18, two blacks were allegedly
beaten by a group of whites. In retaliation, approximately 150
blacks rioted and assaulted 15 whites on July 19 and 20.
Discrimination toward blacks in Halifax bars is thought to be
the root cause of the incidents.
Women's groups have been effective in bringing the issue of
family violence to the fore. Various reports have documented
the incidence of physical, psychological, and emotional abuse
within families. Federal and Provincial Governments have
attempted to address the issue of family violence.
Women are well represented in the labor force, including
business and the professions, at wages comparable to those of
men, according to an official from the Canadian Advisory Council
on the Status of Women. Ontario law requires all employers
(public and private) with more than 10 workers to provide equal
pay to men and women for work of comparable skill. Women enjoy
marriage and property rights equal to men.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers in both the public and private sectors have the right
to associate freely and to strike. The Labor Code, which
covers all employees under federal jurisdiction, protects these
rights at the federal level, while provincial labor legislation
protects all other organized workers. About 36 percent of
Canada's nonagricultural work force is organized into trade
unions. Worker rights that are protected in law are respected
in practice. Trade unions are independent of the Government
and may freely affiliate with international organizations.
Slightly more than one-third of the member unions of the
Canadian Labor Congress are also branches of American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
unions .
In practice, certain groups of essential public sector
employees are not allowed to strike. Restrictions vary from
1077
CANADA
province to province. In the federal public sector strike that
began on September 9, approximately 46,000 of the 155,000
eligible members of the Pviblic Service Alliance of Canada were
designated essential. These included: border crossing guards,
airport workers, prison guards, administrators who process
government income security checks, and meat inspectors. The
strike was ultimately ended by legislation extending the
contract for an- additional 2 years, thus removing the
employees' right to strike.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers in both the public and private sectors have the right
to organize and bargain collectively. Collective bargaining is
protected by law and freely practiced, though some essential
public sector employees have limited collective bargaining
rights which vary from province to province. Antiunion
discrimination is banned by law, and there are effective
mechanisms for resolving complaints.
All labor unions have full access to mediation, arbitration,
and the judicial system. Canada has no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is illegal and not practiced.
d. Minim.um Age for Employment of Children
Child labor legislation differs from province to province. The
Federal Government generally prohibits those under 17 years of
age from working for the Federal Government while school is in
session. Provinces generally prohibit those under age 15 or 16
from working without parental consent, working in any hazardous
employment, or working at night. These prohibitions are
effectively enforced through inspections conducted by the
Federal and Provincial Labor Ministries.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wages are established in both federal and provincial
jurisdictions. The federal minimum wage covers about 10
percent of the Canadian work force. Five provinces (Prince
Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Alberta, and British
Columbia) have lower minimum rates for youths and students.
Collectively, only 1 percent of workers governed by the federal
minimum wage are paid at the minimum rate. Eight percent of
all workers are paid at the respective minimum wage covering
their class of employment. A family with only one member
employed and working at minimum wages would fall below the
poverty level. All provinces have established minimum wages
higher than the federal minimum. Labor standards vary from
province to province, but all limit the standard workweek to 40
or 48 hours.
The Federal Government establishes health and safety standards
for the approximately 10 percent of workers covered by federal
labor legislation. Provincial legislation provides for health
and safety standards for other workers. Federal and regional
authorities enforce these standards through inspections.
1078
CYPRUS
Cyprus has been divided since the Turkish military intervention
of 1974, following a coup d'etat directed from Greece. Since
then, the southern part of the country has been under the
control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, and the
northern part under an autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration
supported by the presence of Turkish troops. In 1983 that
administration proclaimed itself the "Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus," which is recognized only by Turkey.
The internal political systems of the Republic of Cyprus and
the Turkish Cypriot administration are democratic, based on
free elections, and accord basic human rights to their
populations both in law and in practice.
Both Cypriot economies are based on free enterprise, private
initiative, and the right to own property. The Greek Cypriot
economy has prospered in recent years, particularly in the
tourism and manufacturing sectors, and continued to be strong
in 1991 despite the effects of the Gulf War. The weaker
economy in the Turkish Cypriot area, closely linked to that of
Turkey, was depressed in 1991 due to the combined effects of
sustained drought, the Gulf War, the collapse of a major
Turkish Cypriot business conglomerate, and Turkey's clampdown
on duty-free goods imported from northern Cyprus.
Conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities
during the 1963-74 period, the Turkish intervention in 1974,
and the subsequent presence of Turkish troops in the north
resulted in the uprooting of Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots from the northern and southern parts of the island,
respectively. The resultant loss of lives, homes, and
livelihoods has led to continuing charges of human rights
violations .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or extrajudicial killings in
1991.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of persons abducted, secretly arrested,
or held in clandestine detention during 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Both the Cyprus Constitution and the basic document governing
the Turkish Cypriot community specifically prohibit torture.
Freedom from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment is provided for in law and respected in practice in
both communities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Laws providing for freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention
are respected in practice by the Government of Cyprus and
Turkish Cypriot authorities. No one may be held for more than
1 day for investigation of a crime without referral of the case
1079
CYPRUS
to the courts for extension of the period of detention. Most
periods of investigative detention do not exceed 8 to 10 days
before formal charges are filed. Attorneys have unimpeded
access to detainees. Exile is specifically prohibited by the
Cyprus Constitution and by the basic document governing the
Turkish Cypriot community.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
In both parts of Cyprus, fair public trial is provided for in
law and accorded in practice. The judiciary is independent of
executive or military control. Defendants have the right to be
present at their trials, to be represented by counsel (at
government expense for those who cannot afford one) , to confront
witnesses, and to present evidence in their own defense. Cases
are generally tried before a judge or panel of judges, although
a request for a jury trial is usually granted. There are no
special courts to deal with security or political offenses. On
the Turkish Cypriot side, civilians deemed to have violated
military zones are subject to trial in a military court. These
courts consist of one military and two civilian judges and a
civilian prosecutor. There are no political prisoners in
Cyprus .
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Both the Cyprus Constitution and the basic document governing
the Turkish Cypriot community include provisions protecting the
individual against arbitrary interference by the authorities.
A judicial warrant is required, for example, for a police
official to enter a private residence. Abuses of privacy run
counter to the democratic traditions of both communities.
However, Turkish Cypriots continue to complain that mail coming
through the Republic of Cyprus postal system is delayed or not
delivered.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These rights are provided for by law and are freely practiced
throughout the island. The press is free and represents the
entire political spectrxom. There is no press censorship. Greek
Cypriot authorities do, however, exercise monopoly control over
local television broadcasting, while Turkish Cypriot authorities
do so over both radio and television. Cable services offering
Cable News Network and other international broadcasts are
available throughout the island. The Cypriot House of
Representatives adopted a law in 1990 authorizing private
broadcasting, and several privately owned radio stations have
commenced operations. With the passage of further implementing
legislation, expected sometime in 1992, this law is expected to
end monopoly control over television broadcasting in the part
of the island under government control. In addition, the
proliferation of party and independent newspapers and
periodicals in both communities enables ideas and arguments to
circulate freely. Opposition papers on both sides of the
island frequently criticize the authorities.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The freedom to associate, organize, and hold meetings is
protected by law and respected in practice.
1080
CYPRUS
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is respected in Cyprus. In the south, the
vast majority of the population is Greek Orthodox; in the north,
Sunni Muslim. The Greek Orthodox Church in the south has the
character of a state institution; all its activities and
holdings are exempt from taxation. Missionaries are permitted
to proselytize in both communities, although both Greek Cypriot
and Turkish Cypriot authorities closely monitor missionary
activities .
Approximately 100 Turkish Cypriots who still live in the south
of the island are allowed to practice their religion freely.
In the north, non-Muslims include approximately 700 Greek
Cypriots, over 300 Christian Maronites, and some foreign
residents — all of whom are free to practice their religions.
The only incident of religious controversy recorded in 1991 was
an attempt by Greek Cypriots to stop construction of a minaret
at the mosque in Cyprus ' s only remaining mixed village. The
dispute was settled peacefully when the U.N. intermediary
convinced the Greek Cypriots that the minaret would not be used
as an advance observation post for the Turkish forces on the
island, and the Turkish Cypriots agreed to lower its planned
height .
Persons who conscientiously object to military service on
religious grounds are required by the Cyprus Government to
carry out unarmed military service or face imprisonment. A new
law, passed on January 9, 1992, allows alternative nonmilitary
service for conscientious objectors; either 34 months of
unarmed military service or 42 months of Civil Defense Force or
social service, compared to 26 months of military service.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Turkish and Greek Cypriots enjoy general freedom of movement
within their respective areas. Turkish Cypriot authorities
regulate travel into and out of the Turkish Cypriot area. In
general, they have barred Greeks, Greek Cypriots, and sometimes
third-country nationals with Greek surnames from entering the
north, and Turkish Cypriots from visiting the south. The
applications of Greek Cypriot residents of enclaves in the
north to visit the south are usually granted, but the applicants
must return within a designated period or risk losing their
right to return, along with their property. A representative
of a Greek Cypriot enclave has complained that applications to
visit the south are processed slowly by the Turkish Cypriot
authorities — sometimes taking up to 15 days for approval.
Foreigners coming from the south must obtain permission to
enter the north. The Government of Cyprus has sometimes barred
foreign tourists from crossing into the north for certain
periods in retaliation for Turkish Cypriot policies and actions,
such as the 1990 detentions of Greek Cypriot youths by Turkish
Cypriot authorities. The Government of Cyprus has barred travel
to the north by foreigners intending to depart the island from
the Turkish Cypriot area. At the same time, it bars entry into
the Greek Cypriot area by foreigners who have entered Cyprus at
Turkish Cypriot ports of entry.
The right to travel abroad and to emigrate is observed, although
persons facing military service or legal action in either part
of Cyprus may not travel without specific permission. Turkish
Cypriots have difficulty in traveling to some countries because
1081
CYPRUS
travel documents issued by the Turkish Cypriot authorities are
not generally recognized. Usually in such cases, they travel
on Turkish passports provided by means of a special arrangement
with Turkey. Citizens may repatriate freely.
The Government of Cyprus does not accept third-country refugees
for resettlement in Cyprus on the grounds that it already has
enough responsibilities in caring for the Greek Cypriots
displaced after the 1974 Turkish intervention. The Greek
Cypriot authorities prefer that they make their claims
elsewhere and generally endeavor to remove or deport all such
third-country refugee claimants to their country of embarkation
or to a country that will accept them as refugees.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Both the Government of Cyprus and the administration of the
Turkish Cypriot community have lively multiparty political
systems. Parties compete for popular support actively and
without restriction. Suffrage is universal, and elections are
held by secret ballot. Elections for the office of President
of the Republic of Cyprus are held every 5 years, and for the
House of Representatives every 5 years or less.
The Turkish Cypriots elect a leader and a representative body
every 5 years or less. Such elections were last held in 1990.
Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north — the latter
having chosen before independence in 1960 to be regarded as
members of the Greek Cypriot community — do not participate in
Turkish Cypriot elections but elect their own village officials.
They are eligible to vote in Greek Cypriot elections but must
travel to the south in order to exercise that right.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are organizations in both parts of the island which
consider themselves human rights groups, but all appear to be
primarily concerned with alleged violations of the rights of
members of their community by the other community. There are
no restrictions preventing the formation of human rights groups
in either part of the island.
The question of human rights in Cyprus is closely connected to
the political differences that divide the two communities.
Each group continues to blame the other for alleged human
rights abuses stemming from the events in 1974. Representatives
of international human rights organizations have access to both
the south and the north.
In March the European Commission on Human Rights accepted
petitions from two Greek Cypriots who charged that Turkey
deprived them illegally of their liberty when Turkish Cypriot
authorities arrested and held them for 12 days after they
entered the buffer zone during a demonstration in July 1989.
U.N. officials have described the entry into the buffer zone by
over 1,000 Greek Cypriots during the demonstration as a
"violation of the status quo," which the United Nations Force
in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is charged to maintain. The demonstrators
clashed with some 100 UNFICYP personnel who had formed a cordon
to prevent the Greek Cypriots from proceeding. UNFICYP
persuaded the majority of the demonstrators to return home.
1082
CYPRUS
The Commission also agreed in March to accept a petition from a
Greek Cypriot contending that she has been denied the peaceful
enjoyment of her property in Cyprus since Turkey's intervention
in 1974. The Commission limited its consideration of her
petition to the period since 1987, the year Turkey acceded to
the European Convention on Human Rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Food, shelter, education, and health care are usually available
to members of both communities and the tiny Maronite, Armenian,
and Latin minorities, regardless of race, religion, ethnic
background, or political opinion. Nevertheless, there are
continuing complaints that the welfare of minorities in the
north is impaired by Turkish Cypriot restrictions on housing,
education, and movement. For example, Greek Cypriot students
studying in the south continue to have difficulty obtaining
permission to spend their holidays with their families in
enclaves in the north. U.N. officials indicate that Greek
Cypriots in the north are unable to travel outside their
communities without Turkish Cypriot authorization. U.N.
officials point out that they also receive complaints of human
rights violations from Turkish Cypriots living in the south
who, they say, are unable to speak with U.N. officials unless a
police officer is present.
The Cyprus Red Cross sends supplies weekly to Greek Cypriots
remaining in the north; this effort is coordinated by UNFICYP
and financed largely by the United States. UNFICYP monitors
the welfare of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north,
as well as that of the Turkish Cypriots in the south.
Throughout Cyprus, women generally have the same legal status
as men. In the north, legal provisions requiring equal pay for
men and women performing the same job are effectively enforced.
In the south, government workers receive equal pay for equal
work, regardless of sex. In October 1989, a law was passed
requiring equality of pay between men and women working in the
private sector. The 3-year grace period for full implementation
expires in October 1992. Meanwhile, private sector employers,
who hope to be in full compliance by October 1992, have begun
gradually to implement the law.
Social taboos, traditions, and family honor shroud incidents of
wife and family abuse in Cyprus. Moreover, it is understood
that police files on incidents of domestic violence are
sometimes destroyed under the pretext that these are "personal
matters." Nevertheless, the Crisis Center for Family Violence,
a private organization in the south, has indicated that the
number of reported domestic abuse cases, including wife beating,
is on the rise. The Crisis Center, as well as several other
support groups, was established in part to draw public attention
to this problem and to encourage government action in dealing
with it. Neither the Government of Cyprus nor the Turkish
Cypriot authorities have made pronouncements or taken specific
action on this issue.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Trade unions and confederations are free to organize in both
the north and south. In late 1990, the Government of Cyprus
amended its trade union laws to allpw trade unions to elect
1083
CYPRUS
their leaders regardless of whether or not they are union
members — a previous source of contention with the International
Labor Organization (ILO).
Almost 85 percent of Greek Cypriot workers and 40-50 percent of
Turkish Cypriot workers belong to independent trade unions.
Union officials in the north, however, allege that the ruling
party tends to exert its influence to split the labor movement,
especially in the public sector, by supporting the establishment
of rival unions. In both communities, trade unions freely and
regularly take stands on public policy issues affecting workers.
All Cypriot workers have the right to strike. Strikes usually
are of short duration. Both the Government of Cyprus and the
Turkish Cypriot authorities have the power to curtail strikes
in what they deem to be "essential services." The Government
of Cyprus has used these regulations in the past to intervene
during strikes involving port workers. At its 1991 meeting,
the ILO Committee of Experts renewed its earlier observation
that "essential services" should be more strictly interpreted
in Cyprus as those whose interruptions would endanger the life,
personal safety, or health of the whole or part of the
population.
Unions in both parts of Cyprus freely take part in international
meetings. Most unions are affiliated either with the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions or with the
Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. Labor
unions, more than most other organizations on Cyprus, attempt
to maintain contact and cooperation across the dividing line.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
By law and in actual practice, trade unions and confederations
are free to organize and to bargain collectively in both parts
of Cyprus. In both the north and the south, parties to a
dispute may request mediation by the authorities. In both
sectors, legislation prohibiting dismissal for participation in
trade union activity is effectively enforced.
Small export processing zones exist in Larnaca in the south and
Famagusta in the north, but the laws governing working
conditions and actual practice are uniform throughout the
country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law, and no
instances were reported.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Government of Cyprus has set the minimum age for employment
of children in an "industrial undertaking" at age 16. In the
north, the age is 15. The law is effectively enforced in both
sectors by government labor inspectors.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is a legislated minimum wage in the south which is renewed
every year and covers clerks, salespersons, nursery assistants,
practical nurses, and hairdressers. The legislated minimum
wage is not sufficient to provide an adequate living for a
worker and his family. All other occupations are covered under
collective bargaining agreements between trade unions and
1084
CYPRUS
employers within the same economic sector, and the minimum
wages set in these agreements are at least $100 more per month
than the legislated minimum wage. The legislated minimum wage
in the north, which is renewed annually after tripartite
negotiations, is more broadly applicable. It would not be
adequate to support a worker and his family, although most
workers earn more than the minimum wage.
The Government of Cyprus sets 40 hours as the maximum number of
hours of work per week except for shop workers and drivers, for
whom the legal limit is 42 hours. In the north, the maximum
number of hours of work per week in the winter is 38 and in the
summer 36. These laws are effectively enforced by government
labor inspectors.
Although in both sectors the standards are not equivalent to
those in Western industrialized countries, occupational safety
and health regulations are administered effectively. In both
sectors, an Inspector of Factories receives and processes
complaints and inspects factories and businesses in order to
ensure that occupational safety laws are observed. Workers who
file complaints are protected by law and the court system in
the Greek Cypriot sector but not in the Turkish Cypriot
sector. In both sectors, however, workers risk losing their
jobs if they unilaterally remove themselves from a position
which they believe endangers their health.
1085
CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC
The Czech and Slovak Federal Reptiblic (CSFR) is ruled by a
democratically elected government formed after parliamentary
elections in J\ine 1990. It replaced the Government of National
Understanding which was installed in December 1989 after
popular opposition led to the fall of the totalitarian
Communist regime that had ruled Czechoslovakia since 1948.
Under the prevailing federal structure — which is emphasized in
the country's official title — free elections resulting in
democratic governments were also held for parliaments in the
CSFR's two constituent republics.
Under Communist rule, both regular uniformed police and an
internal security apparatus known as State Security were used
as instruments to control the population. The democratically
elected Government undertook steps in 1990 that dismantled
repressive security organs and brought both uniformed police
and the security apparatus under its control. The Government
in 1991 continued with its program to reform police and
security units, including a reorganization of the Federal
Ministry of Interior that placed the federal police under the
direct control of a civilian director. A July 1 law, codifying
the activities of the new domestic intelligence and security
service, the Federal Security and Information Service, grants
explicit oversight authority to the Federal Assembly. The
Slovak republic and Czech republic each have their own police
forces, under directors responsible to the republic interior
ministers, who are civilians. In accordance with the 1990
Czechoslovak-U.S.S.R. agreement, all Soviet troops stationed in
the CSFR were withdrawn by June 30, 1991.
The year 1991 was a year of economic transition in which the
Government began the massive privatization of an economy that
had been heavily dominated by state-owned industrial
enterprises and by state farms and state-run cooperatives. The
Federal Government in 1991 continued to implement an economic
reform program, including price liberalization, the institution
of internal exchange convertibility, and the elimination of
most governmental subsidies, designed to transform the formerly
centrally controlled economy into a market economy. In
addition, privatization programs were launched to transfer
ownership of state-owned economic establishments and
enterprises to private persons and firms. Privatization of
small firms proceeded smoothly in 1991; privatization of larger
companies was delayed until early 1992. The restitution of
property seized by the former Communist government from private
persons has also begun.
Following up on the progress made in restoring human rights
during 1990, the Federal Government took additional steps in
1991 to guarantee the full spectrum of human rights for its
citizens. Highlights included the passage of a comprehensive
constitutional law on basic rights and freedoms and creation of
a Constitutional Court with jurisdiction to hear human rights
cases .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No political or extrajudicial killings were known to have
occurred.
1086
CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of abductions, disappearances, secret
arrests, or clandestine detentions.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There was no evidence of such practices.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Czechoslovak law requires arrest warrants issued by the courts,
except in cases such as hot pursuit. Persons may be held
without being charged for 24 hours. The arrestee has the right
to consult with counsel during this period. A person charged
with a crime has the right to appear before a judge for
arraignment. If charges are formalized at the arraignment, the
judge then determines whether the person charged should be kept
in custody or released pending trial. The law permits a person
committed to pretrial detention to be held for a period not to
exceed l year. Any person so held appears before a judge
monthly for a determination of the necessity for continued
detention. He or she may consult with legal counsel and
receive regular visits from family members. Procedural
safeguards related to arrest and detention are observed in
practice. There is no exile either in law or in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court system consists of district courts, regional courts.
Supreme Courts of the republics, and the Supreme Court of the
CFSR. The law on judges and the judiciary of July 19
transformed the judiciary from its former role as an arm of the
Communist government and party to an independent and impartial
judiciary. Most judges who served during the Communist regime,
including virtually all who were involved in political trials,
have left the profession or been removed.
Persons charged with criminal offenses are entitled to fair and
open public trials. They have the right to be informed of the
charges against them and of their legal rights, to retain and
consult with counsel of their own choosing or court-appointed
counsel, and to present a defense. They enjoy a presumption of
innocence and have the right to refuse to testify against
themselves. Defendants may appeal any judgment against them.
These rights are honored in practice.
In early 1991, the Federal Assembly created a special
commission to screen federal government officials for past
collaboration with the secret police during the period of
Communist rule. It is estimated that hundreds of officials
resigned as a consec[uence of the screenings, including members
of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministries and the Federal
Assembly.
The screening process was criticized as not providing those
identified as collaborators with an adequate opportunity to
review and rebut the evidence against them and not setting up
an adequate administrative or judicial mechanism whereby
disputed cases could be heard. The law's defenders argued that
the removal of collaborators from high governmental positions
was a political necessity and that archival records identifying
persons as collaborators were reliable.
1087
CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC
A new screening law, passed in the fall of 1991, widened the
scope of the screening process by barring many former Communist
party officials, members of the People's Militia, and secret
police collaborators from holding a wide range of elective,
nominative, and appointive government offices for a period of 5
years. The law recjuired an applicant for such positions to
obtain a certificate from the Federal Interior Ministry showing
he was not ineligible to serve as a consec[uence of his past
association with the specified organizations. The law provided
a formal administrative mechanism whereby disputed cases could
be reviewed; a pardon could be issued in certain cases.
This second screening law also drew criticism on the grounds
that it violated Czechoslovak and international legal and human
rights standards, including prohibition of discrimination in
employment. Several Czech and Slovak trade unions filed
complaints before the International Labor Organization (ILO)
charging that the law violates ILO conventions prohibiting
discrimination in employment on the basis of political belief.
The law's defenders, in turn, argued the necessity of excluding
those closely associated with the Communist past from important
government positions during the transition period.
All laws detailing political offenses have been repealed.
There are no political prisoners.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Federal Government does not practice extralegal electronic
surveillance, home searches, the tapping of telephones, and the
interception of mail. Police may conduct searches of homes
only with a warrant issued by a court.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is provided for by law and
respected in practice. Persons are free to speak out on
political and other issues and to criticize the Government and
public figures without fear of harassment and persecution.
Hundreds of different newspapers, magazines, and journals are
now published in the CSFR. Most newspapers are organs of
political parties, but many independent newspapers not
connected with political organizations have also been
established. Newspapers, magazines, and journals are free to
publish what they wish without censorship or fear of government
reprisal.
All domestic television broadcasting facilities are government
owned. A federal channel broadcasts throughout the country,
while Slovak and Czech channels focus their programming on
their respective republics. A third government-sponsored
channel, known as OK-3 , broadcasts programs from Western
sources. The directors of each television channel, who are
appointed by the Federal Government, have editorial control
over programming. Government channels during 1991 featured a
wide range of opinions, including opinions opposing government
policies .
The Government also supports radio broadcasting facilities
whose program content, like that of television, is determined
by the management of each station. Although most radio
1088
CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC
Stations are government sponsored, a nximber of privately owned
and controlled stations now exist. Radio Free Europe, the
British Broadcasting Corporation, and Europa 2 also broadcast
on local frequencies.
Legislation grants universities the authority to decide their
internal affairs, including pedagogic and academic orientation
and internal structure. Academic freedom is guaranteed by law
and is respected in practice.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right of persons to assemble peacefully is protected by
law. Permits for some public demonstrations are required by
law but are routinely granted. In addition, police have not
interfered with spontaneous peaceful demonstrations for which
organizers lacked a permit.
The right of persons to associate freely is also protected by
law, as is the right of persons to form political parties and
movements. Certain organizations, such as political parties,
are required to register, but registration is essentially a
formality.
c. Freedom of Religion
Czechoslovakia enjoys religious freedom. There is no official
religion, and no religion is banned or discouraged by law.
The Federal Government has returned to religious orders the
property confiscated from them by the former Communist
government. During 1991 government and church officials also
discussed the extent to which other church property confiscated
by the Communist regime should be returned to church ownership,
but no final decision concerning disposition of the property
was made.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on domestic or foreign travel,
emigration, and repatriation. Passports are freely available
to all wishing to travel abroad. Czechoslovak citizens who
emigrated during the period of Communist rule are now free to
return to visit or live in Czechoslovakia and may regain their
Czechoslovak citizenship if they desire.
The Government abides by internationally accepted standards in
processing requests for refugee status and political asylum. A
person granted refugee status is given permission to reside in
Czechoslovakia for a 5-year period. Thereafter, the person may
be granted Czechoslovak citizenship or have his refugee status
continued.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have the right and ability to change their government
peacefully. All citizens 18 years of age and older may vote in
national and local elections. Voting is by secret ballot.
Opposition groups, including political parties, function openly
and freely participate in the electoral process. The Federal
Assembly amended the criminal code' in December to make the
spread of fascism and communism punishable with prison terms of
1 to 5 years. The chairman of the Czechoslovak Supreme Court
1089
CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC
maintains that the law does not affect members of the Communist
Party of Bohemia and Moravia unless they violate human rights.
President Havel condemned the amendment and warned against
efforts to ban the Communist party. The next parliamentary
elections are expected to be held in June 1992.
Czechoslovakia has two major nationalities — Czechs and
Slovaks. Differences between their political representatives
were often evident during 1991. The debate generally centered
on the appropriate division of powers between the federal and
republic governments and on the appropriate level of
sovereignty for each. Much of this debate took place over the
content of new republic and federal constitutions, but the
issue also surfaced in discussions of nearly all other issues.
The year 1991 ended without new constitutions and with the
political debate over the future of Slovak-Czech relations
unresolved.
There are no restrictions, in law or in practice, on women's
participation in politics and government.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Local human rights groups which became active during Communist
rule, such as Charter 77, the Committee for the Defense of the
Unjustly Persecuted, and the Czechoslovak Helsinki Committee,
continue to monitor the human rights situation in the country.
Other groups concerned with human rights, such as the
organization Human in Slovakia, have been formed since the
revolution and now also work for human rights in the CSFR.
Czechoslovakia cooperates with international and domestic
investigations of alleged violations of human rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Health care, education, retirement, and other social services
are provided without regard to race, sex, religion, language,
or social status. Women are eqxial under the law and receive
pay equal to that of male colleagues for the same job.
However, only relatively small numbers of women are found in
the higher levels of professional and government employment. A
few organizations concerned about women's issues have been
created in the CSFR since the November 1989 revolution, but
they have tended to focus their attention on issues of
particular concern to mothers rather than on issues of equality
in the workplace.
Violence against women, including wife beating, is generally
believed by local human rights observers to be uncommon in the
CSFR. Statistics on violence against women are not kept.
Observers believe that some cases of spouse abuse may go
unreported and that police on occasion are reluctant to
intervene in such cases. Prosecutorial authorities are thought
generally to accept and conscientiously prosecute charges
involving cases of violence against women brought to their
attention.
There are two sizable minorities — Hungarians and Romanies
(Gypsies). Hungarians, who are concentrated in southern
Slovakia, form the country's largest minority (approximately
600,000, according to official statistics). The State provides
some primary and secondary education in Hungarian, but no
1090
CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC
Hungarian- language universities exist in the CSFR. Ethnic
Hungarians complain that the lack of opportunities for higher
education in Hungarian contributes to a shortage of qualified
Hungarian-language teachers. As a practical matter, virtually
all Hungarians who reside in the CSFR and who are of college
age speak Slovak and have access to higher education
opportunities within the CSFR. Some Hungarians who live in the
CSFR do choose to attend university in Hungary, although
financial barriers and stringent admissions requirements limit
their numbers.
A 1990 Slovak republic law designates Slovak as its official
language and provides that, in communities in which a
non-Slovak-speaking ethnic group constitutes 20 percent of the
population, official business may also be transacted in the
language of that group. Some Hungarian representatives have
complained that the language law has had the effect of making
it difficult or impossible to use Hungarian in official
business in some communities where Hungarians constitute less
than 20 percent of the population but nonetheless are present.
Romanies constitute the CSFR's second largest minority group.
They are officially recognized as a minority and are accorded
the rights enjoyed by other minorities. Although only
approximately 114,000 persons identified themselves as Romanies
during a 1991 census, knowledgeable observers believe that at
least another 300,000 persons could have claimed Romany
ethnicity but chose instead to identify themselves as Czechs,
Slovaks, or Hungarians on census forms. Romanies tend to
suffer disproportionately from high rates of poverty, crime,
and disease. These problems appear to stem more from
traditional conditions and a strong popular prejudice against
Romanies rather than from current governmental policies,
although anecdotal evidence suggests lower level government
officials at times tolerate and fail to take action to correct
discrimination against Romanies.
Officials in both the Federal and republic Governments during
1991 established policies intended to improve the situation of
Romanies, but the policies had little immediate effect. In
fact, the growing unemployment that accompanied economic
restructuring hit Romanies especially hard, with the
unemployment among Romanies approaching an estimated 50 percent
in some areas of the CSFR.
Romanies in the Czech Repiiblic were also the victims of
racially motivated attacks during 1991, mostly by youth gangs
known as skinheads. Government officials have acknowledged
that at least six deaths have resulted from such attacks,
although some Romany organizations have claimed that at least
seven poeple were killed. Government authorities condemned
these attacks and generally prosecuted persons responsible for
the attacks, but in some circumstances police apparently were
slow to intervene to stop the violence.
Although perhaps only a few thousand Jews reside in the Slovak
republic, there were signs of rising anti-Semitism there during
1991, generally in the form of graffiti and ethnic slurs
directed at random against members of the Jewish community.
There were several cases of anti-Semitic slander and threats
made in the context of political rivalries. CSFR government
leaders, including President Vaclav Havel, strongly condemned
anti-Semitic actions and sentiment in both republics.
1091
CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC
At the start of 1991, some 20,000 Vietnamese were temporarily
working and residing in the CSFR. The Governments of
Czechoslovakia and Vietnam concluded an agreement that allows
Czechoslovak enterprises to terminate the employment of
Vietnamese guest workers before the formal conclusion of their
work agreements. Those terminated early are entitled to
receive 5 months' salary as compensation.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association ,
The 1990 law on freedom of association provided workers the
right to form and join unions of their own choosing without
prior authorization. These rights were given added protection
by a constitutional law, the Law of Basic Rights and Freedoms,
enacted in 1991. Over 70 percent of workers are members of
labor organizations. Most workers in the CSFR are members of
unions affiliated with the democratically oriented Czech and
Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions (CSKOS) . There is a
separate Confederation of Arts and Culture and other smaller
independent trade unions that are not affiliated with CSKOS,
including a union formed during 1991 and led principally by
officials from the former Communist trade union organization.
CSKOS and its affiliated unions grew out of strike committees
formed to support a November 1989 general strike against the
former Communist regime. The Communist-controlled labor
organization known as the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement
(ROH) disbanded in March 1990, and its assets were taken over
by the new democratic unions. The new unions are totally
independent of the Government and political parties.
Workers, except those in what are described as essential
services, were granted the right to strike by the law on
collective bargaining passed in 1991. A strike is illegal
unless mediation procedures prescribed by law have been
exhausted. Strikes during 1991 were rare, of short duration,
and affected only small numbers of workers. In November there
was a symbolic 1-hour work stoppage in Slovakia protesting the
failure of the Government and employers to live up to
guidelines for wage increases provided for in the 1991
tripartite general agreement in which government, unions, and
employers were represented. The following are prohibited by
law from striking: judges, prosecutors, members of the armed
forces and police, air traffic controllers, nuclear power
station workers, persons who work with fissionable material,
and oil or gas pipeline equipment workers. In addition, health
and social care workers may not strike if to do so would
endanger life or health. Members of fire fighting and rescue
linits and telecommunications employees may not strike if to do
so would endanger life, health, or property. Mediation and
arbitration of collective bargaining disputes is mandated for
workers who are not permitted to strike.
A law passed in 1991 that would bar former secret police
collaborators and certain Communist party officials from
holding designated government offices was the subject of
complaints presented to the ILO (see Section I.e.).
Unions in the CSFR are free to form or join federations and
confederations and may affiliate with and participate in
international bodies, and this freedom is fully exercised.
1092
CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
A new collective bargaining law went into effect in
Czechoslovakia in 1991. The law provides a framework in which
collective bargaining may occur, allows solidarity strikes
under certain limited conditions, and prevents the use of
replacement workers for strikers. A substantial number of
collective bargaining contracts were completed within the
framework of the new law, but trade union officials noted that
the process of converting state-owned enterprises to private
firms sometimes made it difficult to identify employer
representatives with whom to bargain. Government, trade
unions, and employer representatives in 1991 negotiated a
tripartite general agreement on minimum wage, wage indexation,
and other employment standards for the CSFR as a whole.
Technically, the tripartite agreement was not a legally binding
agreement, but in practice it set the pattern for subsequent
collective negotiations at both the industry and plant levels.
The Czechoslovak labor code provides that, when competing
unions claim to represent the same group of workers, an
employer has an obligation to deal with the most representative
organization in the workplace. However, the code provides no
explicit administrative or other mechanism for making or
challenging such a determination. A charge of antiunion
discrimination may be filed with a republic ministry of labor
and social affairs, which may impose fines against those found
to have violated the antiunion discrimination prohibition.
Victims of such discrimination may also institute proceedings
in the courts. The courts may issue injunctions against
antiunion activities as well as order reinstatement of
dismissed workers and payment of back wages and other damages.
The first export processing zone was established in the
Moravian region of the CSFR in 1991. Workers in the export
processing zone have the same right to organize and bargain
collectively as other workers in the CSFR.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is expressly prohibited in the
constitutional Law on Basic Rights and Freedoms adopted in
January, and there is no evidence that such practices occur.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Generally, persons must be 16 years of age before they may
work. However, those 15 years of age who have completed
elementary school may work. Those who have completed the
course of study at "special schools" (schools for persons with
severe disabilities) may work at the age of 14. Workers
younger than 16 years of age may work no more than 33 hours per
week. The Slovak and Czech Offices of Labor Safety enforce
these provisions.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
A minimum wage was introduced in Czechoslovakia in 1991 for the
first time as a result of the tripartite general agreement.
The Federal Ministry of Labor establishes mandatory minimum
wage rates for general occupational categories. The minimum
wage provides an adequate standard of living for an individual
worker and, when combined with special family allowances paid
to families with children, provides an adequate standard of
living for a worker and his family. Republic ministries of
1093
CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC
labor are responsible for enforcement of the minimum wage law,
and enforcement efforts appear effective.
A standard workweek of 42.5 hours is mandated by law, as is a
paid rest period of at least 30 minutes during the standard
8.5-hour workday and annual leave of from 3 to 4 weeks.
Overtime generally may not exceed 150 hours per year or 8 hours
per week. Thes^ limits may be exceeded by receiving permission
from the ministry that oversees an industry. The ministry,
however, may not grant permission unless it has first consulted
with a trade union representing workers in the industry involved
about lifting the restriction on maximum overtime. Republic
labor and social affairs ministries are responsible for
enforcement .
The Slovak and Czech Offices of Labor Safety and the Federal
Office of Standards and Measurement are responsible for
enforcement of health and safety standards. Under the
Communist regime, less attention was paid to occupational
health and safety than in advanced industrial countries, and
officials believe that workplace safety conditions have
continued to deteriorate since the 1989 revolution. Industrial
equipment that is obsolete by Western standards complicates the
efforts of the Government to improve occupational safety and
health conditions.
1094
DENMARK
Denmark is a constitutional monarchy with a tradition of
democratic parliamentary rule. Queen Margrethe II is titular
Head of State. The Cabinet, accountable to the unicameral
Folketing (parliament), leads the Government. A minority
coalition led by Prime Minister Poul Schlueter has ruled since
1982.
Denmark has a unified national police. Its higher ranks are
often filled with lawyers on internal rotation from the civil
service. It is fully controlled by and responsible to civilian
authorities .
An advanced industrial state, Denmark has a mixed economy
combining private and public ownership. The Government is
seeking ways to reduce the public sector's share of the economy.
Personal freedoms and the right to pursue private interests and
to hold private property are protected by law and respected in
practice.
Deeply rooted democratic principles, an egalitarian tradition,
a lively press, and highly developed educational and social
welfare systems have made Denmark a leading defender of human
rights in the world. There is an Ombudsman, established by the
Folketing as mandated by the Constitution, to whom anyone may
protest if he or she feels wrongly treated by any national or
municipal authority.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Such killings did not occur.
b. Disappearance
There were no abductions or disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Such practices are prohibited by law. Torture does not occur.
Allegations of inhuman treatment are rare, and there are legal
means of redress when it occurs. Two cases alleging excessive
use of police force against African tourists were being
investigated in 1991.
An innovative Center for Torture Victims at a Copenhagen
hospital, supported by the Foreign Ministry, treats patients,
assists torture victims, and studies ways to hinder the use of
torture worldwide.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
No person may be deprived of personal liberty without due
process of law. Arrestees must appear before a judge within 24
hours. A judge may order that they be held in pretrial
detention, including detention in isolation, for a period up to
the length of the prison sentence for the crime for which they
were arrested. All accused have the-right to obtain their own
attorney or a public attorney. Bail is allowed. There is no
exile.
1095
DENMARK
e. Denial of Fair Pxiblic Trial
The Danish judicial system consists of a series of courts,
local and regional, up to the Supreme Court. Trials are
usually public; judges may make exceptions, e.g., in paternity
and divorce cases. In criminal cases, trials are closed when
necessary to protect a victim's privacy, such as in rape cases,
or to safeguard a witness' identity.
The rights of the accused are carefully protected. Defendants
have the right to be present, to confront witnesses, and to
present evidence. They enjoy the presumption of innocence.
Both the defendant and the prosecution may appeal a sentence.
The judiciary is fully independent. Judges appointed by the
Minister of Justice serve until age 70. They may not be
dismissed but may be impeached for negligence or criminal acts.
There are no political prisoners.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
A constitutional prohibition against searching homes, seizing
papers, and breaching the secrecy of communications without a
court order is respected.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including;
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a democratic
political system ensure freedom of speech and press. There is
one large state-owned radio and television company. Editorial
control is exercised by a board independent of the Government.
A second national television channel is one-third government
subsidized. In both cases, management decides programming
content, but operational decisions are restricted by government
mandate. Programs critical of the Government appear on both
channels. The growing popularity of cable television and
satellite dishes has greatly increased access to foreign news
broadcasts .
The state radio operates the only normal wattage stations. The
Government has said it will favorably consider an independent
nationwide radio station. Private stations are otherwise
restricted to transmitters of 10 watts for radio or 100 watts
for television. Direct relay transmission of foreign radio
broadcasts such as those of the Voice of America and the
British Broadcasting Corporation is prohibited.
Publications, including books and newspapers, reflect a wide
variety of political opinion. Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Danes may freely assemble and form associations. Public
meetings require permits, which are routinely given. Any
organization may affiliate with international bodies in their
fields.
c. Freedom of Religion
Religious freedom is guaranteed to all. The Evangelical
Lutheran Church, which is the state church, receives large
subsidies. No religion is banned or discouraged; conversion is
unrestricted. No one may be discriminated against for religious
1096
DENMARK
beliefs. Nevertheless, many Danes are clearly uneasy with
57,000 Muslims, mostly from the Middle East, in their midst.
Though there have been few instances of overt anti-Muslim
action, letters to the editor and articles in the popular press
regularly warned that Denmark is in danger of being taken over
by Muslims.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Danes have full freedom of travel and movement. Persons
determined to be political refugees are never repatriated
against their will. However, the Government decided recently
to start repatriating Palestinians who had been unsuccessful in
claiming political asylum. Over 100 of those affected took
refuge in a state church to protest the decision. The situation
was still unresolved at year's end.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Danes have the right- to change their government peacefully.
Ministers are responsible to the Folketing and may be removed
by a vote of no confidence. The Prime Minister is appointed by
the Queen after consultation with parties in the Folketing.
Parliamentary elections must take place every 4 years, or by
decision of the Prime Minister, a parliamentary vote of no
confidence, or the Government's resignation. The Folketing's
179 members are chosen in free and open elections under a
complex system of proportional representation designed to help
small parties and to reflect the popular vote. Twelve parties
ran in the 1990 election; eight, with a wide range of political
views, achieved the minimum 2 percent of the vote needed to
obtain seats. The current Government is a two-party minority
coalition. Danes over 18 years of age may vote. Resident
foreigners may participate in local elections. They hold 13
city council seats nationwide. Women head 4 ministries and
hold 56 seats in Parliament. There are no restrictions, in law
or in practice, on the participation of women in government or
politics .
The territories of Greenland and the Faroe Islands have
democratically elected home rule governments with broad powers
encompassing all but foreign and security affairs.
Greenlanders and Faroese are Danish citizens and enjoy the same
human rights as in Denmark. Each territory elects two
representatives to the Folketing.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Domestic human rights organizations operate freely. The Danish
Human Rights Center, a government -funded institution, conducts
research and provides information on human rights. Denmark is
party to various international human rights conventions that
promote and protect human rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Denmark provides food, shelter, health care, and education to
all inhabitants, regardless of race, religion, sex, or ethnic
background.
1097
DENMARK
The rights of the people in Greenland and the Faroe Islands are
well protected. Greenlandic law is specially designed for Inuit
customs. It includes local untrained judges rather than outside
professionals, and there are holding centers, rather than
prisons, whose inmates are encouraged to work, hunt, or fish
during the day. Despite a recent high level of violence and
murders in Greenland, the Government rejected suggestions that
the treatment of criminals be made more severe.
The inflow of ethnically and racially dissimilar refugees and
immigrants (mostly Iranians, Palestinians, and Sri Lankans) has
provoked tensions between Danes and immigrants. Incidents of
random racially motivated violence occur regularly. In a major
case, the Supreme Court rejected racial and ethnic quotas in
public housing. Towns may no longer limit the number of
immigrants who can live in a building. Proponents had claimed
the policy prevented ghettos, while opponents thought it was
discriminatory.
Denmark places no restrictions on the participation of women in
the civilian work force. Women hold positions of authority
throughout society, including in politics, though they are much
less represented at the top of the business world. Some 73
percent of all women work, and 46 percent of the work force is
female, while only 15 percent of all supervisors are women.
Inequality in wages is mitigated by the generally high wage
rates — women earn an average $11 an hour, and men $12.75.
Danish authorities do not tolerate, in law or in practice,
violence or abuse against women. Crimes against women are
considered serious and are vigorously investigated. Experts
estimate, however, that very few cases of domestic violence are
reported. Denmark has no rape and domestic violence prevention
programs, though there are 30 crisis centers for counseling and
housing victims, supported by local governments, volunteer
workers, and donations. In addition, Denmark's first center
for abused men and its first shelter for abused families opened
in 1991.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The law states that all workers, including military personnel
and the police, may form or join unions of their choosing.
Approximately 80 percent of Danish wage earners belong to
unions, which are independent of the Government and political
parties. The Danish Federation of Trade Unions (LO), which
includes about half of the country's work force, remain closely
associated with the Social Democratic Party. Over the years
there have been a few — but widely reported — incidents in which
workers who joined trade unions not affiliated with the LO were
harassed or rejected by members of the mainstream unions in the
workplace. All but civil servants have the right to strike.
The number of workdays lost due to labor conflicts in 1990
reached 97,600. Unions may freely affiliate with international
organizations. Greenland and the Faroes have the same respect
for worker rights, including full freedom of association, as
Denmark.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers and employers acknowledge each other's right to
organize. Collective bargaining is widespread. In the private
sector, salaries, benefits, and working conditions are agreed
1098
DENMARK
upon in biennial negotiations between the various employers'
associations and the union counterparts. In the event of a
stalemate, the Federation of Danish Employers' Associations and
the LO will conduct these negotiations. If the negotiations
fail, a national conciliation board tasked with mediating labor
contracts mediates, and its proposal is voted on by both
management and labor. If the proposal is turned down, the
Government may force a legislated solution on the parties
(usually based upon the mediators' proposal). The agreements,
in turn, are used as guidelines by the rest of the labor market,
including the public sector. Collective bargaining in the
public sector is conducted between the public sector employees'
unions and government representatives, led by the Finance
Ministry. There are no export processing zones.
Labor relations in Greenland, a beneficiary of the Generalized
System of Preferences, are conducted in the same manner as in
Denmark. Working conditions are negotiated through collective
bargaining, usually led by the largest Greenlandic union, SIK,
which has 8,000 members, virtually the entire indigenous work
force. In disputes, Greenlandic courts are the first recourse,
but Danish mediation services or the Danish labor court may
also be used.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited and does not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age. for full-time employment is 15. The law
prescribes specific limitations on the employment of those
between 15 and 18 years of age, and it is enforced by the
Agency for Supervision of Labor Standards, an autonomous arm of
the Ministry of Labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no legally mandated national minimum wage, but the
lowest wage in any national labor agreement is sufficient for a
decent standard of living for a worker and his or her family.
Danish law provided for 5 weeks of paid vacation and a 37-hour
workweek. Danish law prescribes conditions of work, including
safety and health; duties of employers, supervisors, and
employees; work performance; rest periods and days off; and
medical examinations. The Labor Inspection Service ensures
compliance with labor legislation.
Similar conditions of work are found in Greenland and the
Faroes, except that their workweek remains at 40 hours and
there is no publicly supported unemployment insurance
available. Unemployment benefits in both places are either
contained in the labor contract agreements or come from the
general social security system. Sick pay and maternity pay, as
in Denmark, fall under the social security system.
1099
ESTONIA
After more than 50 years of Soviet occupation, Estonia regained
its independence in 1991. On September 2, the United States
Government, which had refused to recognize the forcible
incorporation of Estonia into the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (U.S.S.R.) in 1940, established formal diplomatic
ties with the Estonian Government, and the Soviet Union itself
recognized the independence of Estonia on September 6. Estonia
was also admitted as a member of the United Nations in 1991.
In early 1991, reactionary forces in the Soviet Union tried to
intimidate and undermine the legitimate government of Estonia
and, in August, forcibly to overthrow it as part of the
attempted coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.
During an anonymous bombing campaign in January and February,
several bombs exploded in Tallinn, including one on Toompea
Hill, the seat of Estonia's Government. In January Moscow
announced that it would commence "joint patrolling" of the
streets of Tallinn by the Soviet military in conjunction with
local militia. The Soviet garrison commander in Tallinn,
however, did not carry out the directive. Interfront, a
Moscow-sponsored political organization which ostensibly
represents ethnic Russians in Estonia, issued ultimatums
threatening both general strikes and other, unspecified
"political actions." These threats were not carried out. The
Interior Ministry's Black Beret special forces (OMON) attacked
an Estonian customs post in the spring but no casualties
occurred.
Residents of Estonia confirmed their strong support for
independence at the ballot box on March 3 in a nonbinding,
"advisory" referendum. A convincing majority of voters favored
independence. However, about 60 percent of Estonia's ethnic
Russians (particularly those living in Estonia's northeastern
border region with Russia) voted to remain in the U.S.S.R. The
arrest of the coup leaders in Moscow in August marked the end
of the attempted putsch in Estonia as well. Although the
Estonian Government did not outlaw the Communist Party, it
confiscated some of its property.
Estonia is a parliamentary democracy. The highest legislative
authority is the Supreme Council; its Chairman serves as Head
of State. A prime minister, elected by the Supreme Council, is
the chief executive official. Day-to-day government operations
are the responsibility of the Council of Ministers, elected by
the Parliament and directed by the Prime Minister.
The primary law enforcement organization is the Estonian
police, newly organized to replace the Soviet-period militia.
Until independence, Soviet militia forces. Interior Ministry
troops, and the Committee for State Security (KGB) were present
in Estonia in large numbers and continued to monitor the local
population. Since the coup, the KGB has been outlawed, and
Soviet Interior Ministry troops are being withdrawn. However,
large concentrations of regular Soviet army troops remain on
Estonian soil .
Estonia enjoys a higher standard of living than the U.S.S.R.
Nevertheless, the general Soviet economic decline has affected
Estonia, leading to shortages and some rationing. Although the
Estonian Government is gradually liberalizing the economy, many
Soviet economic structures remain.
The human rights situation improved as respect for the
individual and for civil liberties increased. A constituent
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ESTONIA
assembly is to draw up a new constitution which, together with
additional legislation, should institutionalize human rights
improvements and set the stage for new elections in 1992.
Questions about the ramifications of possible changes in the
citizenship law remain unresolved.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known cases of such killings in 1991.
b. Disappearance
There were no known instances of abductions or disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
Such practices are prohibited by law. However, prior to
independence, prisons were administered according to Soviet
practice. Harsh treatment of prisoners occurred during both
interrogation and confinement in labor camps and prisons.
Physical and psychological abuse of prisoners, overcrowding,
and detention under extremely unhealthful conditions were
common .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Estonian law forbids arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.
There were no known instances of Estonian authorities engaging
in such activities. Warrants are required to make an arrest.
In addition, detainees have access to legal counsel within 72
hours of arrest.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Estonian judicial system is based on a three tier court
system: city courts, county courts, and the supreme court.
The county courts and the supreme court are appellate courts.
Court decisions are based on majority rule, with a judge and
two jurors sitting in judgment.
Until the August coup attempt, Soviet practice continued to
prevail in Estonia, and the State retained the ability to
control the judicial process and to determine arbitrarily the
outcome of trials. Estonian authorities are now working to
improve existing procedural safeguards and to establish a
judicial system based on the rule of law.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Until Soviet Internal Ministry troops and the KGB departed
Estonia in the wake of the August coup attempt, the Soviet
security apparatus continued to operate in Estonia. Soviet
security organs employed informers and technical means to
monitor correspondence and telephone communications in selected
cases. Estonian law requires a search warrant for search and
seizure of property.
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ESTONIA
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Estonians enjoyed wide freedom of speech throughout 1991. The
press in 1991 harshly criticized both the Estonian and Soviet
Governments. Despite the seizure of the Tallinn television
tower during the August coup attempt, the media were never
silenced during the coup or at any other time during 1991. The
Government does not ration newsprint. However, government-
owned publications have access to newsprint at a lower price
than privately owned publications. Estonia has one state-owned
radio and television station. Private radio stations, however,
are beginning to emerge around the country.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the right to assemble freely.
Permits for all public gatherings must be obtained 3 weeks
prior to the date of the public gathering. The authorities
have wide discretion to prohibit such gatherings but seldom
exercise it. In 1991 numerous mass gatherings took place
peacefully without government interference.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of conscience and freedom of religious proselytism are
guaranteed by law and honored in practice. There were no known
instances of discrimination based on religious belief.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The law permits free movement within the country; it is honored
in practice. Prior to independence, Soviet law and practice
governed foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, although
Soviet authorities did not appear to hinder such travel in
1991. Estonian law guarantees the right of repatriation.
After the U.S.S.R. recognized Estonian independence, Soviet
border officials cooperated with Estonian authorities in
transferring border controls to Estonia. Until trained
Estonian replacements are available, Soviet border guards
continue to function at most ports of entry.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Despite the best efforts of reactionary forces in Moscow to
undermine and overthrow Estonia's legitimately elected
Government, the country achieved full independence in 1991.
During the August coup attempt, the Estonian Government
announced that it would form a constituent assembly to draft a
new constitution and that new elections would be held in late
1992 after the adoption of the constitution. The ad hoc
assembly, the members of which were chosen by the Supreme
Council and the Congress of Estonia (representing the citizens
of the pre-1940 Estonian republic and their descendants), was
established in September. The Constitution has been drafted
and was adopted in December by the Constituent Assembly.
However, implementing legislation is still being drafted.
Several political parties and movements offering a broad array
of viewpoints are in active competition. There is no
1102
ESTONIA
discrimination, in law or in practice, against the
participation of women in government or politics.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights.
Estonia welcomed visits by human rights organizations and
received a delegation from the U.S. Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or other groxinds is
prohibited by the Constitution. Tensions are present, however,
in the relationship between ethnic Estonians and the large
Russian population- in Estonia. During the years of forcible
incorporation into the U.S.S.R., thousands of non-Estonians
emigrated to Estonia to work as laborers and administrators.
Today, Estonians constitute approximately 63 percent of the
population.
Not surprisingly, the issue of citizenship is at the center of
politics. In November the Parliament voted to reestablish the
1938 citizenship law and asked the Government to propose
implementing legislation. This legislation will specify the
residence and language requirements for citizenship, a matter
of deep concern to non-Estonian residents. Non-Estonians,
especially Russians, have alleged job, salary, and housing
discrimination based on Estonian- language recpairements for
certain jobs.
Women possess the same legal rights as men and, in addition,
have significant day-care and maternity benefits. Women also
are legally entitled to equal pay for equal work. Statistics
are not available on violence against women. Women's rights
organizations have been formed in Estonia and are attempting to
increase public awareness of women's issues.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Soviet labor law and practice were enforced in Estonia until
the August coup attempt. Since that time, Estonia has moved to
reform its labor code to permit the formation of independent
trade unions, and, in January 1992, it rejoined the
International Labor Organization. Several political strikes
took place during 1991 without police interference.
The major trade union, formerly the Estonian branch of the sole
Soviet labor confederation, is now a purely Estonian
organization and is seeking to reform itself under the name of
the Central Organization of Estonian Trade Unions (EAKL) . It
claims about 650,000 members organized in 34 unions. A smaller
rival Confederation of Free Trade Unions has also been formed
recently.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Under Soviet law, Estonian workers did not enjoy the right to
bargain collectively. Under the old system, the union was
essentially an arm of the Communist Party, with the function of
distributing fringe benefits such as housing and vacation
1103
ESTONIA
trips. Both the employers and the unions were organs of the
State and Party system.
Although Estonian workers now have the right to bargain
collectively, the private sector is only beginning to emerge,
and collective bargaining is still virtually nonexistent. The
EAKL still looks to the Government to resolve labor issues.
Early in 1991, before Estonia declared its independence, the
Estonian Government consulted with the EAKL before establishing
a new minimum wage.
No export processing zones have been established.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor was common in Soviet-administered Estonian
prisons prior to August. Conditions in these prisons were
often harsh and degrading. Estonia has moved quickly to
improve conditions since August.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
According to labor law prevailing in Estonia, the statutory
minimum age for employment is 16. Minimum age and compulsory
education laws are enforced by state authorities through
inspections.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Labor conditions in Estonia are similar to but usually better
than those in the Soviet Union. Under Estonian law, the
maximum permitted work week is 41 hours. The average workweek
is 40 hours for most white-collar workers and 41 hours for most
blue-collar workers.
According to union sources, the minimum wage rate agreed to in
early 1991 between the EAKL and the Government was overtaken by
inflation by the end of the year. The EAKL states that a rate
three times the existing one is required to provide a minimum
standard of living. 'The law establishes minimum standards of
occupational health and safety, which are widely ignored.
1104
FINLAND
Finland is a constitutional republic and a multiparty,
parlicimentary democracy. Executive power is vested in the
President. The Cabinet, consisting of the Prime Minister and
16 ministers who are responsible to Parliament, works with the
President in governing the country. Legislative power is held
by the unicameral Parliament. Judicial power is exercised by
an independent judiciary, including the Supreme Court and
Supreme Administrative Court.
The security apparatus is controlled by elected officials and
supervised by the courts.
Finland has a mixed economy with state-owned, privately owned,
and publicly owned companies. Citizens are free to pursue
their legitimate private interests, hold private property, and
engage in economic activity without government interference.
During 1991, there were no reported violations in Finland of
fundamental human rights. Members of national minorities and
women enjoy the same economic and political rights as all other
citizens .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Killing for political motives by the Government or opposition
political organizations is not known to occur.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported cases of disappearances, abduction, or
clandestine detention.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment is provided for by law and is respected in
practice. By law, prisoners must be treated justly with
respect for their human dignity and without distinction on the
basis of race, sex, language, nationality, religious or
political conviction, social position, wealth, or any other
grounds .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment or exile is
provided for in law and respected in practice. Police may hold
a suspect for up to 7 days without charge. The suspect has
access to a lawyer during that time. Once arrested, the
accused must be given a court hearing within 8 days in a city
or within 30 days in rural areas. The State pays legal fees
for indigent defendants.
Circumstances surrounding the arrest are subject to judicial
review at the time the accused is brought to trial. If found
to have been innocent of the crime charged, the accused may
apply to the same court for civil damages, and the arrest is
deemed invalid.
1105
FINLAND
Bail does not exist as such in Finland. While those accused of
serious crimes must by law remain in custody, those charged
with minor offenses may be released on personal recognizance at
the court's discretion. Preventive detention is authorized
only during a declared state of war for narrowly defined
offenses, such as treason, mutiny, and arms trafficking.
Supervisory personnel from the Ministry of Justice and the
Ministry of the Interior as well as the Parliamentary Ombudsman
and the Chancellor of Justice have authority to enter prisons
and to order the release of prisoners held without charges.
There is no exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to fair public trial is provided for by law and
respected in practice. Finnish citizens and aliens legally
residing in Finland have the right to effective counsel. The
law provides that charges must be clearly stated and that
civilians may not be tried by military courts except in time of
war .
Local courts may decide to conduct a trial behind closed doors
in juvenile, matrimonial, and guardianship cases, or when
publicity would offend morality or endanger the security of the
State. In national security cases, the judge may withhold from
the public any or all information pertaining to charges against
individuals, verdicts, and sentencing. Sanctions may be
imposed if such information is made public. Provisional
tribunals are constitutionally prohibited.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The right to privacy and the sanctity of the home, including
prohibition of eavesdropping and mail tampering, are provided
for by law and respected in practice. The police are not
allowed to tap telephones under any circumstances, a
restriction they find hampers their ability to deal with drug
cases. Senior police officials rather than judges have the
authority to issue search warrants; there is no indication that
this power is abused. The police are subject by law to
judicial scrutiny.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and the press is provided for in the
Constitution and respected in practice. There have been no
reports of abuse or legal decisions restricting freedom of the
press. The press occasionally exercises restraint in treating
issues deemed potentially harmful to the national interest but
is under no compulsion from the Government to do so. Full
academic freedom exists.
Until recently, there existed a consensus at the highest levels
of Government and the media that the press would exercise
restraint in reporting anything that might cause problems with
the Soviet Union. Recent events in the U.S.S.R. have
effectively ended this form of self-censorship. A law remains
on the books allowing the Government to censor films for foreign
policy reasons. In practice, this has usually meant that anti-
Soviet World War II movies could not be shown. Some politicians
have called for the repeal of the censorship law.
1106
FINLAND
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of peaceful assembly and association is provided for by
the Constitution. Public demonstrations require prior
notification to the police. The Government encourages voluntary
organizations and subsidizes private groups formed to achieve
public purposes. They are permitted to maintain relations with
other international groups in both East and West.
c. Freedom of Religion
Finland has two state religions: Lutheran and Eastern Orthodox.
Taxes are collected by the Government from church members to
support churches belonging to these religions. Other
denominations and religions enjoy unrestricted freedom of
worship. About 88 percent of the population belonged to the
Lutheran Church in 1991.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Finns are free to travel within the Nordic coxintries — Finland,
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland — without passports and
need not apply for exit visas for travel to other countries.
No restrictions have been placed on emigration or repatriation.
The granting of political asylum is a matter of considerable
public debate, especially because of increasing numbers of
asylum seekers. In 1990, 2,725 applied for asylum (compared to
174 in 1989); the largest groups in 1991 were Yugoslavs, Soviet
citizens, Somalis, and Turks. The Government states that it
grants asylum in accordance with the standards of the 1951 U.N.
Convention and the 1967 Protoccl and not to people wishing to
escape economic hardship.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Finland is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy in which all
citizens over the age of 18 elect their representatives from
among multiple lists of candidates, representing a wide spectrum
of political ideologies. The country has the longest tradition
of women's suffrage in Europe (since 1906) and there are at
present 77 women representatives (of a total of 200) in
Parliament and 7 female ministers (of a total of 17) in the
Cabinet .
Elections to Parliament take place every 4 years, as do
municipal elections. At present, there are nine political
parties in Parliament, of which four form a non-Socialist
coalition, headed by a Center Party Prime Minister.
Presidential elections are held every 6 years. In July
legislation was passed providing for direct presidential
elections beginning in 1994.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Several organizations in Finland monitor human rights
performance, including the Finnish Red Cross, the government-
sponsored Equality Council, and the Women's Rights Union. A
Finnish Helsinki Watch Group was established in 1985 but has
not been very active lately. In conjunction with the Swedish-
language University in Turku, a Human Rights Institute was
1107
FINLAND
founded in 1985 with the stated purpose of conducting human
rights research, performing studies, and distributing
information on human rights. Finland participates actively in
international human rights organizations and has not been the
subject of an international investigation of alleged human
rights violations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Food, shelter, education, and health care are available to all
inhabitants without discrimination. Lapps, who constitute less
than one-tenth of 1 percent of the population, benefit from
legal provisions protecting minority rights and customs.
The government-established Council for Ec[uality coordinates and
sponsors legislation to meet the needs of women as workers,
mothers, widows, and retirees. In 1985 Parliament passed a
comprehensive equal rights bill which ensured equal treatment
for women in the workplace and a bill which permitted women to
retain their maiden name after marriage as their only surname.
The Government's Equality Ombudsman monitors compliance with
regulations against sexual discrimination. Of 152 complaints
to the Ombudsman in the first half of 1991, violation of the
law was established in 17 cases.
The law provides stringent penalties for violence against
women; it is vigorously enforced by the police and the courts.
The first shelter for female victims of violence was opened 10
years ago. The Union of Shelter Homes has 12 shelter homes,
while municipalities and other communities support 50 similar
units all over the country. The Government Statistics Office
estimates that 12,000-14,000 police calls each year result from
domestic violence, probably less than half of the nimiber of
actual incidents.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Trade unions are constitutionally guaranteed the right to
organize, assemble peacefully, and strike — rights which are
respected in practice in both the public and private sectors.
Trade unions enjoy a protected status and play an important
role in political and economic life. About 85 percent of the
work force is organized. Of the four major labor
confederations, the l-mi 11 ion-member mostly blue-collar
confederation, the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions
(SAK), dominates the trade union movement.
The three other central organizations cover white-collar,
professional, and technical employees. The four confederations
divide along jurisdictional rather than political lines. All
trade unions are democratically organized and managed and are
independent of the Government. The majority of the SAK is
closely associated with the Social Democratic Party, which its
\inions helped to create. There is also a significant minority
faction aligned with the Left Alliance, comprising various
leftist groups and the old Communist party. The trade unions
engage freely and actively in Nordic and international labor
activities. The right to strike was exercised 455 times in
1990, according to government statistics; 1991 statistics were
not yet available.
50-726 - 92 - 36
1108
FINLAND
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively exists in law
and practice and is exercised extensively.
Finland is a highly organized society in which over 80 percent
of both workers and employers are members of trade unions and
employers' collective bargaining associations. With very few
exceptions, collective agreements since 1968 have been based on
incomes policy agreements between central employees' and
employers' organizations and the State. The central agreement
covers the general level of wage and salary increases, other
terms of employment, and a "social policy package" which
provides for vacation, holidays, sick pay, maternity and
paternity leave, travel costs, taxes, and rents. Workers are
effectively protected against antiunion discrimination, which
is prohibited by law. Finland has no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition~of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by the Constitution
and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Sixteen-year-olds may work a full 8-hour day. Children between
ages 14 and 16 may do "light" work for up to 6 hours a day, or
36 hours a week, during school vacations only. Finland has
compulsory education legislation, and child labor laws are
effectively enforced by health and safety authorities.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no legislated national minimum wage, although all
employers — including nonunionized employers — are required to
meet the minimum wages agreed to in collective bargaining
agreements in their industrial sector. These minimum wages are
sufficient to provide a worker and his family a decent standard
of living. The standard legal workweek must not exceed 40
hours; in practice, most contracts call for a workweek of about
37-38 hours.
Finland's national occupational health and safety laws are both
strict and comprehensive. They are effectively enforced by
government inspectors and actively monitored by the unions.
1109
FRANCE
France is a democratic republic with constitutional provisions
for human rights, freely functioning political parties, regular
elections, and universal suffrage.
France's military/security apparatus consists of the three
traditional services, a 90,000-strong gendarmerie (national
police/paramilitary force), and police forces in major cities.
These forces comte under civilian control and are highly
professional. Nevertheless, in 1991 there were several
confrontations between police and members of minority groups
which deteriorated into violence (see Section l.a.).
France has a developed and diversified economy and a skilled
labor force. It has substantial agricultural resources and a
modern industrial system based on a mixture of public and
private enterprises.
French authorities respect human rights and civil liberties.
France's Secretary of State for Human Rights is tasked with
encouraging respect for human rights both in France and abroad.
The Government in 1991, as in previous years, consistently
condemned sporadic acts of violence against ethnic and religious
minorities. The National Consultative Commission on Human
Rights — which includes government representatives, leaders of
religious and ethnic groups, and representatives of private
human rights groups, and which is responsible to the office of
the Prime Minister — worked closely with various human rights
groups during the Gulf War to prevent and defuse ethnic
conflicts.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There is no evidence that French authorities engaged in
political or other extrajudicial killings in 1991. The level
of terrorism in France remained generally low, although the
assassination near Paris of former Iranian Prime Minister
Shapur Bakhtiar in August was widely believed to have been
committed by foreign terrorists. The investigation of the
incident continues. The incidents of violence perpetrated by
domestic terrorist groups (particularly Basque and Corsican
separatists), although increasing in frequency relative to
1990, were nonlethal and largely symbolic.
An example of confrontation between police and members of
minorities is the incident in Mantes-la- Jolie near Paris.
Following an apparently deliberate hit-and-run incident by
youths in a stolen car, which resulted in a policewoman's
death, her partner shot and killed a passenger in another
stolen vehicle a few minutes later. The policeman was charged
in connection with the shooting.
b. Disappearance
There is no evidence that the authorities have engaged in
abduction or secret arrests.
1110
FRANCE
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
France does not condone or practice torture or cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment. In the occasional
instances of alleged police brutality, there are administrative
and judicial mechanisms for determining guilt and punishing
transgressors. In regard to a case noted in the 1990 report,
in which an American alleged mistreatment by police during his
arrest in 1986, the French authorities denied he had been
mistreated, although the examining magistrate found the
American's accusations credible. The American served his
sentence and was released. In another case reported in 1990,
the police took no action on an American's allegations that
they had used unnecessary force during a December 1989 search
of his home. There were no accusations of police brutality by
Americans arrested during 1991.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
French law provides for freedom from arbitrary arrest and
imprisonment. There is no direct equivalent of habeas corpus
in the French legal system, but there is a limit of 2 days —
4 for drug and terrorist cases — before a suspect must be
referred to a magistrate for investigation.
The judiciary plays a determining role in the detention process.
Government authority to hold a person beyond the prescribed
periods is severely restricted, and such detention must be
ordered by the competent court .
There is no evidence that the authorities detained any person
for political reasons. There is no provision for exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right of fair public trial is provided by law and respected
in practice. Suspects are presumed innocent until proven
guilty and have the right to legal counsel as soon as their
cases are transferred from the police to the magistrate. For
misdemeanors, pretrial confinement — which is very rare — is
limited normally to 4 months, with extensions in special
circvmistances of approximately 8 to 12 months. Although all
drug-related crimes are technically classified as misdemeanors,
those convicted of serious narcotics offenses are subject to
penalties otherwise reserved for felonies. Those found guilty
of some drug offenses may be sentenced to up to 20 years'
imprisonment. Pretrial confinement in drug cases and in
felonies is not limited. This pretrial period can be lengthy,
depending upon the seriousness and complexity of the case.
Evidence is gathered and assessed by an independent examining
judge. Defendants are free to request and present evidence
during this investigatory period.
Trials in France are normally open and public, but provisions
exist for the defense to request a closed proceeding. All
felonies are tried before juries, and a defendant does not have
the right to refuse a jury trial. The press has free access to
records of court proceedings, although under French law the
prosecutor may not disclose information about cases being tried
or investigated. French law provides for the right of appeal
for those convicted of misdemeanors. Those convicted of
felonies may appeal to the Court of Cassation only on
procedural grounds.
nil
FRANCE
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
French law provides for freedom from invasion of privacy, and
this freedom is respected in practice. The search of a private
residence requires a search warrant and must take place between
9 a.m. and 6 p.m., except in special circumstances, such as in
drug cases, when the search may be undertaken at any time.
Telephone conversations may be monitored by authority of a
court order in conjunction with criminal proceedings. However,
no court order is required in national security cases.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press are guaranteed by law and respected
in practice. Newspapers and magazines are free from government
control and present views ranging across the political spectrum.
There are three state-owned and three private television
networks, in addition to private cable channels. Hundreds of
private radio stations offer a wide array of independent,
uncensored programming. Academic freedom of expression is
respected in both public and private academic institutions.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of peaceful assembly and association is widely respected
in France, although — except for a specific reference to trade
unions — it is not mentioned in the Constitution. Groups wishing
to organize public meetings, protest marches, or demonstrations
must obtain a permit from the local authorities. Permits are
usually granted for both political and nonpolitical gatherings.
Local authorities have on occasion, however, denied permits to
extremist groups. Private associations, whether political or
apolitical, must register with the prefecture in the department
in which they are established, but they do not require the
prefecture's authorization to exist. Such registration is
considered routine in France. Informal associations, such as
those without officers, bylaws, or dues, need not register.
c. Freedom of Religion
Although Roman Catholics comprise by far the largest religious
group in France, all religions are tolerated. Separation of
church and state is guaranteed by law, although both private
and parochial schools receive substantial subsidies from the
Ministry of National Education.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
French law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign
travel, emigration, and repatriation. All lawful resident
aliens, including refugees, may undertake foreign travel and,
in most instances, return to France. France has a long history
as a haven for refugees. During 1991, however, the Government's
expulsion of Moroccan political refugee Abdelmoumen Diouri to
Gabon after he was accused of fraud and political agitation
sparked widespread criticism by human rights groups. A Paris
administrative tribunal overturned the expulsion order, and
Diouri returned to France less than 1 month after his forced
departure.
1112
FRANCE
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The people have the right and ability to change their government
by peaceful means, not only through the election of the
President, the National Assembly, and local officials, but also
through amendment of the Constitution by means of national
referendum. The Constitution guarantees the equality of all
citizens before the law, without regard to origin, race, or
religion. All French citizens who have reached the age of 18
may vote, except for most convicted criminals, bankrupt persons,
and persons certified to be mentally incompetent. These
provisions are fully respected in practice. Presidential
elections are held every 7 years, and elections for the
National Assembly are held every 5 years, unless the Government
is dissolved, in which case elections may be called sooner.
Voting is by secret ballot.
A wide variety of political parties compete freely in regularly
scheduled national and local elections. Many special interest
groups — business, labor, veterans, consumer advocates,
ecologists, and others — organize freely and regularly support
candidates for elective office.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Both local and international human rights organizations operate
freely in France. France has traditionally been a leader in
the human rights field. In October France hosted an
international human rights conference held under the auspices
of the United Nations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Statutes ban discrimination based on race, religion, sex, ethnic
background, or political opinion. Nevertheless, amid rising
anti-immigrant sentiment fueled by a rising unemployment rate,
incidents of racism have been directed at the large Arab/Muslim
and black African immigrant communities, as well as toward the
Jewish population. The Government and a wide spectrum of public
opinion have consistently condemned these incidents.
The French media and French political leaders in 1990 became
very sensitive to a perceived increase in anti-Semitic sentiment
and activity, and an accompanying rise in popularity of
rightwing extremist political groups. A law passed in 1990
called for restricting participation in the political process
for up to 5 years by anyone convicted of committing racist,
anti-Semitic, or xenophobic acts. Prior laws proscribed
"racism"; the new law was more broadly targeted, aimed at
helping "victims of discrimination based on national, ethnic,
racial, or religious origin." During 1991, people were brought
to court, convicted, and began serving prison sentences under
the new law.
A report of the National Consultative Commission for Human
Rights, submitted to the Government in March, noted no
substantial increase in violent crime of a racist nature and
expressed a belief that firm judicial penalties had begun to
bear fruit. However, the Commission expressed concern over an
increase in 1990 in so-called soft racist incidents — anonymous
threatening letters and telephone calls, tracts, and graffiti.
1113
FRANCE
In 1991, at the start of the Gulf War, human rights groups
feared another rise in racist incidents and redoiibled their
education and mediation efforts. In any event, there was no
apparent increase in racist incidents during or immediately
following the war.
The French are assertive about the primacy of the French
language in the educational system but are tolerant of the
numerous residents of France who have non-French origins and
whose mother tongue is not French.
The Government does not tolerate violence and abuse against
women, and such violence, including wife beating, is prohibited
under article 309 of the penal code. The State Secretary for
Women's Rights has estimated previously that as many as 10
percent of French homes experience family violence of a
physical, psychological, or sexual nature. The Government
sponsors an educational campaign underscoring the need to
address the problem.
While French law requires that women receive ecjual pay for eqiaal
work, this requirement is not met in many cases. Women's rights
groups actively lobby for full implementation of equal rights
statutes and seek solutions to the increasingly publicized
phenomenon of violence against women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Freedom of labor union association is provided for by the
Constitution. Although less than 10 percent (12-15 percent for
the public sector; 5-6 percent for the private sector) of the
work force is unionized, trade unions exercise significant
economic and political influence. Their principal role and
legitimacy derive from elections held by workers for
professional works councils and other tripartite (government,
employer, and worker) bodies dealing with social matters.
These include labor courts and the Economic and Social Council,
a constitutionally mandated consultative body.
All unions are technically independent of the political parties,
but many of the leaders of the General Confederation of Labor
belong to the Communist Party. Leaders of most other unions
are members of one or another faction of the Socialist Party,
although members of other parties are also active in the labor
movement. There are no restrictions on the unions'
international activities, and all three world trade union
confederations have French affiliates.
French workers, including civil servants, are free to strike,
with a few exceptions in cases where strikes are determined to
be a threat to public safety. There were strikes of short
duration almost daily in September and October. The attempt to
organize a general strike by the Force Ouvriere Labor
Confederation on October 24 was unsuccessful.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers, including those in the two small export processing
zones in France, have the right to organize and bargain
collectively. French law strictly prohibits antiunion
discrimination. Amendments added in 1982 require at least
annual bargaining on wages, hours, and working conditions at
both plant and industry levels. The 1982 law does not require
1114
FRANCE
that negotiations result in a signed contract. Outside
mediators, drawn from the upper ranks of the civil service, may
impose solutions that are binding unless formally rejected by
either side within a week. About 20 percent of France's
private sector work force is covered by annually updated,
bilaterally conducted collective bargaining agreements. There
are also trilateral consultations on such subjects as the
minimum wage, temporary work, social security, and unemployment
benefits.
French law requires that businesses with more than 50 employees
have a works council, in which workers are consulted on
training, working conditions, profit sharing, and similar
issues. Works councils are open to both union and nonunion
employees, and elections are held every 2 years.
Trade union rights, as guaranteed by the Constitution, extend
to France's overseas departments and territories. Social
benefits, such as the minimum wage or supplemental retirement
payments, may be reduced in the overseas departments and
territories to take into account the local economies.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law, and this
prohibition is effectively enforced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
With a few exceptions for those enrolled in recognized
apprenticeship programs, children under the age of 16 may not
be employed. Work considered arduous or work between the hours
of 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. may not be performed by minors under the
age of 18, except in certain circumstances. Laws prohibiting
child employment are effectively enforced through periodic
checks by labor inspectors.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
France has an administratively determined minimum wage, revised
whenever the cost of living index rises two percentage points,
and which is sufficient to provide a decent standard of
living. The legal workweek is 39 hours, and overtime, in an
effort to increase employment, is restricted to 9 hours per
week. Women may not perform arduous work or night work, except
in certain exempted categories, such as hospitals and a few
service industries. In October 1991, however, a police court
acpaitted a factory director of all charges in a long-running
case in which he was accused of having permitted 77 female
employees to work a night shift.
French labor legislation and practices, including those
pertaining to occupational safety and health, are fully
comparable to those in other industrialized market economy
countries. The Ministry of Labor has overall responsibility
for policing occupational safety and health laws. Standards
are generally high and well enforced. To assist the Ministry,
French law requires that any enterprise with 50 or more
employees have an occupational health and safety committee.
Sixty-five percent of all enterprises covering 80 percent of
employees had such committees as of 1989.
1115
GERMANY
The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is a constitutional
federal republic and a parliamentary democracy. National power
is divided among executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
The head of the Federal Government, the Chancellor, is elected
by the Bundestag, the lower house of Parliament. The powers of
the Chancellor and of the Parliament, which are substantial,
are set down in the Basic Law, Germany's constitution.
Governmental authority is also divided between national and
state governments. The states enjoy significant autonomy,
especially in matters relating to law enforcement and the
courts, culture and education, the environment, and social
assistance.
As a result of German unification on October 3, 1990, the laws
and constitution of the FRG were extended to the Germans of the
five new eastern states, who now enjoy the same rights and
privileges as Germans in the west. Representatives of the
eastern states took their places in the Federal Parliament, and
the people of those states gained a new judicial system.
Organized essentially at the state (Land) level and operating
under the direction of state governments, the German police are
well-trained and disciplined and scrupulously respect citizens'
rights. In dealing with hostile elements, including terrorists,
special care is taken to respect the rights of the accused.
The legacy of the East German secret police, the Stasi, was
still felt in the allegations that individual politicans, police
officials, physicians, educators, and others had been affiliated
with the Stasi, as well as in unsubstantiated reports that the
Stasi were still engaged in the surveillance of ordinary
citizens .
The industrialized market economy provided one of the highest
standards of living in the world to those living in the western
parts of Germany. In the eastern states, however, the
transition to a free market economy introduced tumultuous
change. The privatization or liquidation of state-owned
enterprises continued at a rapid pace. Unemployment became
widespread, reaching nearly 12 percent in October. Those
categorized as on "short-time work" — but generally working no
hours — accounted for an additional 13.6 percent of the work
force. The Government extended unemployment benefits,
established retraining and special job programs, and sought to
attract investment capital to produce new jobs. Transfer
payments to the eastern states significantly increased
disposable income there.
The Basic Law, adopted in 1949, rests firmly on the principles
of liberty, equality, and the free exercise of individual
rights. In practice, these human rights are rigorously
protected; further, protection against racial and ethnic
intolerance is provided for under German law. A new and
disturbing phenomenon, however, emerged in 1991. Social and
economic instability, especially among frustrated young people,
contributed to the growth of racial and ethnic intolerance.
Moreover, outbreaks of violence and harassment directed at
non-European foreigners by rightwing extremists and neo-Nazis
occurred with increasing frequency in the second half of 1991.
Such events have taken place in both the eastern and western
parts of Germany.
1116
GERMANY
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Politically motivated killing by the Government or by mainstream
political organizations is unknown. Terrorist groups on the
far left and the far right, as well as Middle Eastern
terrorists, however, continue to engage in political violence.
The Red Army Faction (RAF) machinegunned the chancery of the
U.S. Embassy in Bonn on February 13; there were no injuries in
that incident. On April 1, the RAF assassinated the head of
the Trust Fund Agency, which is charged with selling off and
privatizing industries in the five new eastern states. Between
two and six deaths are believed to have occurred in 1991 as a
result of violence directed toward non-European foreigners by
rightwing extremists and neo-Nazis.
b. Disappearance
Governmental or police authorities do not abduct, secretly
arrest, or otherwise illegally detain persons.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Police authorities do not physically or mentally torture
prisoners, nor do they engage in cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment short of torture. There were no reports of torture
in the new eastern states.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
No person may be arrested except on the basis of an arrest
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. Any person
detained by the police must be brought before a judge and
charged no later than the day following the day of
apprehension. The court must then issue an arrest warrant with
stated reasons for detention or order the person's release.
Despite accusations that some officials in the east had
previously been affiliated with the East German security police
(Stasi), there have been no reported cases of arbitrary arrest
or detention in the eastern states since German unification.
There is no preventive detention. A suspect may be held in
custody for up to 24 hours while awaiting a formal charge if
there is evidence that he might seek to flee the country to
avoid prosecution. The right of free access to legal counsel
has been restricted only in the cases of some terrorists who
were suspected of using contacts with lawyers to promote and
continue terrorist activity even while in prison. Only judges
may decide on the validity of any deprivation of liberty. Bail
bond exists but is seldom employed. There is no exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Trials are public. The Basic Law assures due process and
prohibits double jeopardy. The judiciary is free of both
government interference and intimidation by terrorists. There
are no political prisoners.
1117
GERMANY
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The inviolability of the home is ensured by the Basic Law and
fully respected in practice. Prior to nonconsensual entry by
police into a home, a warrant must be issued by a judge or, in
an emergency, by a public prosecutor. Electronic surveillance
or monitoring of mail may be undertaken only after authorization
by a court orders Membership in political parties is voluntary.
Following the 1989 revolution in the German Democratic Republic,
the routine and comprehensive surveillance once practiced in
the eastern states ceased. Occasional rumors of continuing
Stasi activity have not been proven.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The provisions of the Basic Law, an independent press, an
effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic political
system combine to ensure freedom of speech and press.
Criticism of the Government is unrestricted. The media and
artistic works are not censored. Academic freedom is
guaranteed. There is no censorship of foreign or domestic
books. Newspapers and magazines are privately owned. Radio
and television networks and stations function, for the most
part, as corporations under special public laws. They are
governed by independent boards made up of representatives of
churches, political parties, and other organizations.
Several private television cable stations and local television
cable networks set up since the late 1980 's continued to
operate in 1991. Legislation was enacted in all states of the
FRG to facilitate and encourage private television stations
using cable, satellites, and other "new" media. In accordance
with the terms of the 1990 second unification treaty,
legislation was passed, which took effect at the end of
December, that integrated former East German public
broadcasting outlets into an all-German system.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The rights of assembly and association are fully respected, as
is the right to demonstrate. Organizers of street
demonstrations are required to obtain police permits beforehand
and may be asked to pay a deposit to cover the repair of any
damage to public facilities. Such police permits are routinely
granted. When demonstrators have not obtained the rec[uired
permits, police have exercised considerable restraint, showing
concern ultimately only for the continued functioning of public
facilities and for the safety of the general public. There are
no restrictions on freedom of assembly and association in the
eastern states.
Membership in nongovernmental organizations of all types,
including political parties, is entirely open. Parties found
to be "fundamentally antidemocratic" may, however, be outlawed.
Under this constitutionally based provision, the Federal
Constitutional Court, in the 1950 's, declared both a neo-Nazi
and a Communist party to be illegal. This ban is still in
effect, and several parties have been careful to stay just
within the law.
1118
GERMANY
c. Freedom of Religion
The full practice of religion is permitted. Almost 50
different churches and religious denominations exist, but most
of the population belongs to the Catholic and Protestant
churches. Together with the small Jewish community, these
churches hold a special legal status as corporate bodies under
public law, giving them, for instance, the right to participate
in a state-administered church tax system. The rest of the
population either practices no religion or belongs to small
independent Christian churches or other faiths, such as Islam
(to which almost all Turkish guest workers and their families
belong). The Government subsidizes church-affiliated schools
and provides religious instruction in schools and universities
for Protestants, Catholics, and members of the Jewish community.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
German citizens are free to move anywhere within the country
and to leave and return at any time.
The Basic Law guarantees automatic German citizenship and the
right to legal residence without restrictions to ethnic Germans
who arrive in Germany from Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. The number of such ethnic Germans coming to settle in
Germany in 1991 began to decrease from the all-time high of
1990. In 1991, 221,995 of these ethnic Germans had registered
to resettle in Germany. These numbers include 147,320 from the
Soviet Union, 40,129 from Poland, and 32,178 from Romania.
The right of asylum for foreigners who are politically
persecuted is guaranteed under Article 16 of the Basic Law and
respected in practice. The number of those seeking asylum
continues to increase dramatically. During 1991, the total
number of asylxim seekers was 256,112, about a third more than
in 1990. The German Government attributed much of this increase
to the tripled number of asylum seekers from Yugoslavia.
Once formally granted asylum status, and to a lesser extent
while being processed, asylum seekers have essentially the same
access to social welfare benefits as German citizens. Short of
the right to vote, they also enjoy complete civil rights.
While only about 7 percent of the asylum seekers succeed in
their reqiaests for political asylum, denial of political asylum
does not automatically result in deportation. The vast
majority of applicants who are rejected are typically allowed
to remain in the country for other humanitarian reasons.
Deportations have thus been extremely rare. The Government and
opposition have agreed on establishing "assembly accommodations"
for those asylum seekers considered least likely to be granted
asylum. The stated goal is to finish the processing of these
applications in only 6 weeks, after which unsuccessful
applicants would be deported.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Under the Basic Law, Germany is ruled by a government chosen by
the people through orderly elections based on universal
suffrage. The Bundestag, which chooses the Chancellor, is
elected through a mixture of direct constituency candidates and
party lists. Members of the upper house of Parliament, the
Bundesrat, are appointed by the state governments. New
political parties are free to form and enter the political
1119
GERMANY
process, but the Basic Law and the state constitutions stipulate
that parties must receive at least 5 percent of the vote in
order to be represented in the federal and state parliaments.
Although party discipline plays an important role, voting on
issues in the Bundestag is ultimately a matter of individual
decision. The first all-German Bundestag elections took place
on December 2, 1990.
Women are entitled by law to full participation in political
life, and all parties have expressed a commitment to encourage
their greater participation. For example, the opposition
Social Democratic Party's new rules require a 40-percent quota
for women on all party committees and governing bodies, with an
eventual goal of 50-percent female representation in several
years. The Cabinet Minister for Youth, Family, Women, and
Health Affairs is responsible for furthering women's interests
in both the public and private spheres.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Private nongovernmental human rights organizations operated
freely and without harassment in all of Germany, as did
international organizations. The Government considers the
international promotion of human rights one of its highest
priorities .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Denying access to shelter, health care, or education on the
basis of race, religion, sex, ethnic background, political
opinion, or citizenship is illegal.
Some societal prejudice against foreign ethnic groups, such as
Turks and Gypsies, does exist and is characterized by instances
of verbal harassment, housing discrimination, and physical
harassment and violence. Rightwing extremists and neo-Nazis
appeared to be responsible for violent attacks against asylum
seekers and other foreigners in which between two and six
persons died.
The Government has pursued a three-point policy with regard to
foreign workers, who comprise some 5.9 percent of the work
force: integration of longtime residents, limitation of further
entries, and repatriation aid for those willing to return to
their home countries. A national debate has been under way for
some time over whether the rights of guest workers should be
broadened to permit unlimited residence and the right to vote,
or reduced by limiting the right of entry for dependent
children.
Women generally enjoy full and equal protection under the law,
including property and inheritance rights. Young women
experience difficulties in gaining access to training in some
traditionally male fields, but recent court rulings and
government pilot programs have helped break down some of these
attitudinal and institutional barriers.
Salaries for women in the private sector tend to be lower than
salaries for men in similar jobs. The Government, through its
Ministry for Youth, Family, Women, and Health Affairs, has
acknowledged the existence of unequal, sex-differentiated pay
scales in the private sector as a violation of the
1120
GERMANY
constitutional prohibition against discrimination on the basis
of sex, religious affiliation, or race. Several decisions by
the national labor court in recent years have been in favor of
women who initiated litigation to redress pay inequities.
Movement on the issue of equal pay for equal work also takes
place in the private sector in collective bargaining between
unions and firms.
With unification, abortion became a controversial issue. East
German women continue to enjoy a legal right to an abortion
without restriction during the first trimester, whereas
abortion in the western part of Germany is permitted only on
medical grounds or in case of economic difficulties. Under a
compromise reached in 1990, abortion laws will continue to
apply in the eastern states for 2 years, a period during which
the Parliament is to develop a unified national law.
Following currency unification and the privatization of industry
in the eastern states, the involuntary unemployment rate for
women increased about twice as fast as the rate for men. As of
September, women made up 60 percent of the unemployed in the
eastern states. ~
Violence against women, including wife beating, is not condoned
either in law or in practice. The women's movement has urged
public discussion of the problem and tougher penalties for
crimes against women. According to the Interior Ministry, the
number of rape cases officially reported in the FRG in 1990 rose
by 2 . 5 percent over 1989. Some reports have indicated that
marital rape occurs in one out of every five marriages.
Attempts to bring forward legislation to make marital rape a
punishable offense have so far been unsuccessful. Annual
statistics for rape and violent crimes against women in the
eastern states are not available, but government officials
reported that violent and sexual crimes against both women and
children increased significantly there in 1991.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right to associate freely, choose representatives, determine
programs and policies to represent members' interests, and
publicize views is recognized and freely exercised in Germany.
About 35 percent of the total eligible work force belongs to
the highly organized labor movement. When the Free German Trade
Union, an appendage of the Communist Party in the eastern
states, officially dissolved itself on September 14, 1990, its
functions were taken over by independent trade unions in the
FRG, most of them affiliated with the German Trade Union
Federation (DGB) . The DGB represents approximately 82 percent
of organized workers and actively participates in various
international and European trade union organizations.
The right to strike is guaranteed by law, except for civil
servants (including teachers) and personnel in sensitive
positions, such as members of the armed forces, and was
extensively exercised in 1991. International Labor Organization
(ILO) bodies in 1991 were critical of the Government's broad
definition of "essential services" which prevents teachers from
legally striking. Sanctions imposed on teachers who struck in
Hesse in 1989 and the replacement of striking postal workers in
an earlier incident were the specific cases that provoked a
complaint to the ILO.
1121
GERMANY
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is guaranteed by
the Basic Law and is widely practiced. No government mechanism
to promote voluntary worker-employer negotiations is required
because of a we 11 -developed system of autonomous contract
negotiations, now extended to the eastern states. There is a
two-tiered bargaining system whereby basic wages and working
conditions are established at the industry level and then
adapted to the circumstances prevailing in particular
enterprises through local negotiations. A characteristic of
German industrial relations is the legally mandated system of
works councils which provide a permanent forum for continuing
selective worker participation in the management of the
enterprise. Workers are fully protected against antiunion
discrimination. Germany has no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is barred by the Basic Law and is
nonexistent in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Federal law generally prohibits the employment of children
under age 15, with a few exceptions: children aged 13 and 14
may do farm work for up to 3 hours per day or may deliver
newspapers for up to 2 hours per day; children aged 3 through
14 may take part in cultural performances under stringent
conditions with regard to number of hours, time of day, and
form of activity. The Federal Labor Ministry effectively
enforces the law through its Factory Inspection Bureau.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no legislative or administratively determined minimum
wage rate. Wages and salaries are set either by collective
bargaining agreements between industrial unions and employer
federations or by individual contract. These agreements, which
cover about 90 percent of all wage and salary earners, set
minimum pay rates and are legally enforceable. These minimum
wage levels provide an adequate standard of living for workers
and their families. The niomber of hours of work per week is
regulated by contracts which directly or indirectly affect 80
percent of the working population. The average workweek in the
western part of Germany is 37.6 hours, and in the eastern
states it is about 40 hours.
Germany has an extensive system of laws and regulations on
occupational safety and health and incorporates a growing body
of European Community-wide standards into its own legislation.
This system includes the right to refuse to perform dangerous
or unhealthy work without jeopardizing employment. For each
occupation, there is a comprehensive system of worker insurance
carriers which enforce requirements for safety in the workplace.
This system has recently been extended into the eastern states,
where lax occupational health and safety standards and
conditions under the Communist regime created serious long-term
problems. The Federal Labor Ministry effectively enforces
occupational safety and health standards through a comprehensive
network of government structures, including the Federal
Institute for Work Safety. At the local level, professional
and trade associations — self-governing public law corporations
with delegates of the employers and of the Government — oversee
the prevention of workplace accidents as well as worker safety.
1122
GREECE
Greece is a constitutional republic and parliamentary democracy.
The Government under Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis,
formed after free elections in April 1990, holds a two-seat
majority in the Parliament. President Constantine Karamanlis,
the largely ceremonial Head of State, was chosen by Parliament
in April 1990.
The police and security services are subject to a broad variety
of legal and constitutional restraints. Their activities are
monitored by the Parliament, a vigorous free press, the
judiciary, and human rights groups.
The Greek economy has a very large state sector with a strong
tradition of patronage. Among the least developed countries in
the European Community (EC), Greece relies heavily on EC
subsidies and loans. Efforts by the Government to reduce the
budget deficit and strengthen the private sector are hampered
by, among other things, political polarization and opposition
from labor unions and other groups.
The Constitution protects fundamental human rights which in
large part are respected in practice. Some Muslim Greeks have
complained that they face discriminatory governmental practices.
These complaints led the Government in 1991 to pledge corrective
action, a process which is ongoing. Complaints of religious
discrimination also occurred in 1991, including arrests of
Jehovah's Witnesses for proselytizing. About 400 Jehovah's
Witnesses were imprisoned because nonmilitary alternative
service to conscription is not available in Greece.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Neither government forces nor legal opposition groups engage in
political killing. However, an alleged drug dealer was beaten
to death while in police custody (see Section I.e.).
Domestic terrorist organizations claimed responsibility for the
bombing murder of an American serviceman in March, the fatal
shooting of a Turkish diplomat in October, and attempted bombing
murders of several Turkish diplomats and Athens policemen. In
April, while trying to disarm a bomb which it had intended to
place at the British Consulate in Patras, an Arab group caused
a blast which killed one of the group and six other persons.
Police arrested several suspects, but a trial date has not been
announced .
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of official disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
A 1984 law makes the use of torture an offense punishable by a
sentence of from 3 years to life imprisonment. This law has
never been invoked, and there were no allegations of police
torture in 1991. However, the press reported in January that
an alleged drug dealer was fatally beaten while in police
1123
GREECE
custody. Three police officers were charged, and a magistrate's
investigation is continuing.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution requires judicial warrants for all arrests
except during the actual commission of a crime. The legal
system generally protects against arbitrary arrest orders.
Suspects are sometimes detained, briefly and informally, pending
confirmation of their identity, but there is no evidence of a
pattern of serious infringements of civil liberties. A person
arrested on the basis of a warrant or while committing a crime
must be brought before an examining magistrate within 24 hours.
The magistrate must issue a detention warrant or order the
release of the detainee within 3 days, unless special
circumstances rec[uire a 2-day extension of this time limit.
The effective maximum duration of pretrial detention is 18
months for felonies and 9 months for misdemeanors. Release
pending trial, with or without bail, may in some cases be
granted by decision of a panel of judges.
Exile is unconstitutional and does not occur.
e. Denial of Fair Piiblic Trial
The judicial system is characterized by three levels of courts,
appointed judges, an examining magistrate system, trial by
judicial panel, and the right of appeal by both prosecution and
defense. The independence of the judiciary is provided for in
the Constitution. The press and opposition political parties,
however, occasionally accuse judges of allowing political
criteria to influence their judgments. The defense has the
right to cross-examine witnesses. The Constitution provides
for public trials, and court sessions are open to the public,
unless the court decides that privacy is reqaiired for the
protection of victims or in matters of national security. The
latter provision is not abused. A defendant enjoys the
presumption of innocence and the right to counsel, and lawyers
are provided to defendants who need them.
The decisions of military courts are not subject to review by
the Supreme Court. Military courts have no jurisdiction over
civilians except in draft refusal cases.
There are no political prisoners in Greece. There are, however,
a number of persons in jail for refusing military service on
religious grounds (see Section 2.c.).
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Greek authorities comply with constitutional prohibitions
against invasions of privacy, searches without warrants, and
the monitoring of personal communications. Judicial warrants
showing probable cause are recpiired for home searches, and
there are limits on conducting such searches at night. At
year's end, a former Prime Minister and his onetime national
intelligence service director continued to await a trial date
for a 1989 parliamentary indictment for illicit wiretapping. A
1991 decision by the European Parliament gave the former
intelligence director, who is now a member of the European
Parliament, immunity from trial until the end of his term in
1994.
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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and the press are provided for in the
Constitution and generally respected in practice. Greek
publications, representing a gamut of political and ideological
inclinations, are published and sold freely, and many foreign
publications are readily available on newsstands in major
cities. The Constitution allows for the seizure of
publications which insult the President, offend religious
beliefs, contain obscene articles, advocate the violent
overthrow of the political system, or disclose military and
defense information.
Charges are occasionally filed against newspapers for articles
which "insult authority." In November editors of the newspaper
Kathimerini were sentenced to a fine or 6 months in prison for
insulting the Prim.e Minister. The case is on appeal. A law
designed to counter terrorism, which took effect in January,
includes a section allowing the Supreme Court prosecutor to
prohibit publication of statements by terrorist groups. In
September, seven Athens newspaper editors became the first
persons convicted of violating this law. Initially sentenced
to jail, they were freed after paying fines totaling about
$16,000. The Government has expressed willingness to discuss
the issue with journalists' professional associations. By
year's end, no such discussion had taken place.
Commercial television was legalized in 1989, and private
channels air a wide range of political viewpoints. State-owned
channels tend to emphasize the views of the Government but
allot time as well to the activities of opposition figures.
Academic freedoms are protected by democratically chosen
faculty organizations, though such groups tend to be
politicized.
In areas of western Thrace, Turkish-language satellite
television broadcasts became available in 1991. Turkish-
language publications are published and circulate locally.
Newspapers and other periodicals from Turkey are distributed
privately when brought in by taxis and travelers.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly. Police
permits are routinely issued for public demonstrations, and
there were no reports that the permit requirement was abused.
The right of association is provided for by the Constitution
and is generally respected. In 1991, however, a "Macedonian
Cultural Center" in Fiorina, organized by some Greek citizens
of Slavic descent, lost an appeal of a lower court decision
denying it registration because of the use in its title of the
word "Macedonian," which the court held would cause confusion.
The decision has been appealed to the Supreme Court. Official
government policy, supported by most Greeks, denies that Greeks
of Slavic descent constitute a distinct minority.
Greek authorities, while recognizing a Muslim minority, do not
recognize a separate ethnic Turkish minority (see Section 5).
Organizations may not include the word "Tourkos" ("Turk") in
their title, Such groups may, however, identify themselves as
"Tourkoyennis" , i.e., of Turkish descent, affiliation, or
ethnicity (also see Section 5). In April, two groups using the
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word "Tourkos" in their names were ordered by government
authorities to disband, in conformity with a 1987 court
decision. As of December, the groups reportedly had not yet
disbanded.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion and prohibits
discrimination against religious minorities. However, the
Constitution also establishes the Greek Orthodox Church, to
which 98 percent of the population at least nominally adheres,
as the "prevailing" religion, and prohibits proselytizing by
any religious group. In 1991, according to the Jehovah's
Witnesses, 106 members of their faith were arrested for
proselytizing, 18 were taken to trial on this charge, and 1 was
convicted. These convictions usually result in jail sentences
of 3 to 5 months, which can be satisfied by paying a fine.
Although Greece provides for alternative noncombatant military
service, it has no provision for nonmilitary alternative
national service to its universal conscription of men. As of
October, approximately 400 Jehovah's Witnesses were serving
prison sentences of between 3 and 5 years for draft refusal.
(At least two secular draft refusers were also reportedly
imprisoned.) A part of these sentences may be served on a
minimum security civilian prison farm, where each day served is
credited as 2 days against one's sentence. In 1991 the
Jehovah's Witnesses organization reported that conditions for
their members in the military prison at Avlona had improved
significantly and that transfers to the prison farm, previously
blocked, had resumed.
In past years, the Government has not granted Jehovah's
Witnesses ministers the exemption from military service
accorded clergy of other faiths. In 1990 and 1991, however,
the Greek Council of State set what appears to be an important
precedent by ordering the release of three Jehovah's Witnesses
clerics who had been imprisoned for refusing military service.
There are currently no Jehovah's Witnesses clergy so imprisoned.
All churches require the permission of the local Greek Orthodox
bishop to open and operate. Such permission is sometimes
delayed or withheld, though religious services are often
conducted while awaiting formal permission. In 1991 Jehovah's
Witnesses were arrested for allegedly operating an unlicensed
house of worship, and the building was sealed. The case is
being appealed.
Mosques and other Muslim religious institutions operate in
western Thrace, where most Greek citizens of the Muslim faith
reside. In March the Greek and Turkish Governments traded
charges over Greece's denial of entry to a group of Turkish
preachers who wished to help the Muslim community in Thrace
observe Ramadan. The Turkish Government claimed that the
preachers were barred because they refused to call on an
appointed mufti (see below), while the Greek Government
insisted that the Thracian Muslim community had adequate
clerical resources and that the Turkish clerics' application
had xinacceptable nationalistic overtones. In contrast with
previous years, there were no complaints in 1991 that Greek
authorities had withheld permission for construction and repair
of mosques. Some members of the Muslim minority claim that
Greek Law 1091 of 1990 (promulgated in January 1991) weakens
the financial autonomy of the wakfs, Muslim religious
endowments .
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In 1991 the Greek Government appointed a new mufti (Muslim
community religious leader) in Xanthi, a district capital in
western Thrace. In doing so, the Government was acting under a
1990 Presidential decree which abolished a never-implemented
1920 law providing for direct election of muftis. The 1990
decree did, however, incorporate formal consultation with local
Muslim leaders into existing practice. Opponents of the
appointment, who favor having muftis elected by their
communities, demonstrated and clashed briefly with non-Muslims
in Xanthi. In September and October, a number of mosques in
the Xanthi district were closed by their imams in protest over
the appointment of the new mufti. Greek government policy is
that muftis must be appointed, as they are also judicial
f\inctionaries paid by the Greek State, with authority in many
civil and domestic matters.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution protects freedom of movement within the
country, foreign travel, and emigration. Ethnic Greeks
intending to emigrate, and emigrants who return to Greece,
experience no discrimination. However, Article 19 of the Greek
citizenship code distinguishes between Greek citizens who are
ethnic Greeks and those who are not. The latter may be deprived
of citizenship if it is determined that they have left Greece
with the apparent intent not to return. Most such cases involve
Muslims from western Thrace. Proceedings under Article 19 are
initiated on the basis of reports by local authorities in Greece
or by Greek embassies or consulates abroad. A hearing is held
by the Interior Ministry, at which the affected person is not
present, nor is the affected person notified of the hearing.
Those who lose Greek citizenship as a result of such hearings
sometimes learn of this loss only when they seek to reenter
Greece. In December 1991, the Foreign Ministry said that, in
the preceding year, 628 persons had lost citizenship under
Article 19.
Persons who lose their Greek citizenship under Article 19 have
the right of "administrative appeal" to the Interior Ministry
and may also appeal to the Greek Council of State and to the
Council of Europe. Leaders of the Turkish-origin Greek
community complain that the time and expense involved tend to
discourage such appeals. According to the Foreign Ministry,
there were 39 "administrative appeals" during 1991, of which 2
were successful, 21 unsuccessful, and 16 still pending as of
December. There was also an average of two or three appeals
per month to the Council of State, most of which were
successful. There were no appeals to the Council of Europe.
The Government has provided high-level assurances that Article
19 will be abolished in 1992.
Increasingly a destination for economic migrants, Greece offers
temporary asylum to a large number of refugees from Eastern
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, as well as, since 1986,
about 32,000 ethnic Greeks from the U.S.S.R., known as
Pontians. Pontians who migrate to Greece are recognized as
Greek citizens and accorded full rights.
Permanent resettlement in Greece is not usually available for
non-ethnic Greek refugees. There was a major refugee flow of
Albanians into Greece in 1991. Very few Albanians entering
Greece, according to the figures of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, were granted asylum status, though
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GREECE
much larger numbers were informally permitted to remain and
work, often at subsistence wages.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Greece is a multiparty democracy in which all citizens enjoy
full political rights. The President is elected by Parliament
to a 5-year term. ' Members of the unicameral 300-seat
Parliament are elected to 4-year terms by secret ballot, and
universal suffrage for those over 18 is compulsory (i.e.,
enforced by fines and administrative penalties) . Opposition
parties function freely and have broad access to the media.
Under a 1990 electoral law, no candidate may be elected whose
party does not receive 3 percent or more of the nationwide
vote. Current independent members of Parliament (two of whom
are of Turkish origin) will be unlikely to be reelected unless
they run as candidates of one of the national parties. There
are no restrictions, in law or in practice, on the
participation of women in government or politics.
Section 4 Governmental Attitudes Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Domestic human rights organizations are allowed to operate
freely and to assist Greeks who believe their rights have been
violated. The Government has not obstructed visits and
investigations by human rights organizations.
Prime Minister Mitsotakis suggested to the Council of Europe
(COE) in April that Greece would welcome COE observers who
wished to see for themselves the minority situation in western
Thrace.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), Greece formally recognizes
a "Muslim minority" in western Thrace. Greece has also
accepted later Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) documents which address the treatment of minorities.
The Government estimates the Muslim minority in Thrace at
roughly 120,000 persons, consisting of people of Turkish
origin, Pomaks (speaking a language akin to Bulgarian), and
Gypsies. Some Muslims live on Greek islands near the Turkish
coast, in Athens, and other industrial areas. Various areas,
mostly in northern Greece, are home to Greek citizens speaking
or descended from speakers of Arvanite (an Albanian dialect),
Vlach (a Romance language), and one or more Slavic dialects.
In addition to speaking Greek, many of these people possess
some level of fluency in one of these dialects, although
younger individuals tend increasingly to be monolingual in
Greek. Gypsies (both Christian and Muslim) are scattered
throughout Greece.
The Government in 1991 showed increasing sensitivity to
criticism of official policy toward the Muslim minority in
Thrace. In a visit to Thrace in May, the Prime Minister
conceded past errors in the treatment of Muslim citizens and
pledged the latter 's full equality before the law. Though
problems of discrimination remain, the situation in Thrace has
begun to improve.
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GREECE
In 1991 official harassment of Muslim Greeks in Thrace,
including impediments greater than those encountered by-
non-Muslims in buying land and obtaining hunting, drivers', and
tractor licenses and building construction and maintenance
permits, by most accounts eased significantly. The current
concern of Muslims is to legalize the status of buildings built
without permits in past years. One complaint was received that
several Muslims' houses were demolished by local authorities
for having been constructed without permits. Greek officials
noted that several non-Muslims' houses had been razed for the
same reason at the same time. In years past, there were
complaints that land purchases by eminent domain for public
construction projects affected Muslim landowners
disproportionately. There was only one such complaint in 1991,
and it involved a project that was subsequently canceled.
Some Turkish-origin Greeks claim that they are hired only in
small numbers for lower level public sector employment in
Thrace, and rarely or not at all at higher levels. The
Government cites the need for a university degree as a factor
which reduces the number of Muslims qualified for high-level
civil service employment.
Public offices do their business in Greek; the courts provide
interpreters as needed. In the Komotini district in Thrace,
where many members of the Muslim minority live, the office of
the district governor (nomarch) has interpreters available.
The Treaty of Lausanne guarantees the Muslim minority the right
to Turkish-language education and contains a reciprocal
entitlement for the Greek minority in Istanbul. There are both
Koranic and secular Turkish-language schools in western
Thrace. Disputes with Turkey over teachers and textbooks have
caused the secular schools serious problems in obtaining
sufficient faculty and teaching materials in quantity and
quality. The Greek Government plans to issue new texts for the
lower grades in Thracian Turkish-language schools; these were
not ready in time for the 1991-92 school year. In the summer
of 1991, new Turkish-language high school texts were sent from
Turkey for the first time since the late 1970 's. As of
December, Greek authorities were still examining these texts
for suitability.
Some Turkish-origin Greeks complain that it is difficult to
obtain permission to bring in teachers from Turkey or to hire
Turkish- language teachers locally, particularly for the two
secular Turkish- language high schools. Under a bilateral
agreement, Greece and Turkey may annually exchange up to 35
teachers each to serve, respectively, in Istanbul and western
Thrace. In September 1991, Greece did not seek to send
teachers to Istanbul; Turkey applied to send 35 high school
teachers to Greek Thrace and, as of December, was still
awaiting their work permits.
Muslim villages elect Muslim-dominated local governments. In
Komotini and Xanthi, the principal towns of western Thrace,
both Muslims and non-Muslims are elected as town councillors.
The use of the word "Tourkos" ("Turk") is prohibited in titles
of organizations, though individuals may legally call
themselves "Tourkos". To most Greeks, the word "Tourkos"
connotes Turkish citizenship and loyalties, and many object to
its use by Greeks of Turkish origin. Use of a similar
adjective, "Tourkoyennis" ("of Turkish descent/affiliation/
1129
GREECE
ethnicity"), is allowed (see also Section 2.b.), but it is
considered bookish and not colloquially used.
Northern Greece is home to a small number of Greek citizens who
are descended from speakers of a Slavic dialect and who have
the same rights and responsibilities as other citizens. Some
of them still speak that dialect (along with the predominant
Greek), and a small number of them identify themselves as
"Macedonians." The exact number of all citizens of Slavic
descent is difficult to determine, but unofficial estimates
range from well under 10,000 to about 50,000. Organizations of
these citizens are not able to use the word "Macedonian" in
their names. In 1991 the Thessaloniki appellate court upheld a
ban against a cultural center in Fiorina on those grounds (see
Section 2.b.). That organization has appealed the court
decision.
There are broad constitutional and legal protections for women,
including equal pay for equal work. Gradually, women are
entering the higher echelons of business and government as
traditional barriers erode. The Government has a General
Secretariat for Equality of the Sexes, which coordinates
efforts to remove these barriers. Muslim women in western
Thrace have the option of Islamic or civil marriage and Islamic
or civil jurisdiction in domestic disputes.
Violence against women is a problem identified by women's
rights groups, but there is a strong cultural bias against
reporting cases of rape, incest, and wife beating. There are
no reliable statistics to indicate the extent of these
problems. Police and local authorities generally do not
intervene in domestic conflicts. The social infrastructure for
battered women is almost nonexistent, despite past funding by
the European Community. Women's groups continue to press the
government for improvements; it acknowledges the need for more
active measures.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers, except the military and police, are entitled to
form or join unions of their own choosing. The right of
association is provided for in the Constitution and in specific
legislation passed in 1978 and amended in 1982. In 1991 an
estimated 35 percent of wage and salary earners were organized
in unions.
Unions receive most of their funding through a Ministry of
Labor organization, the Workers' Hearth, which distributes
mandatory contributions from employees and employers. Only a
few of the more powerful unions have dues-withholding
provisions in their contracts with employers. Legislation
passed in December 1990 will eliminate Workers' Hearth funding
for labor unions effective in January 1992, and it is the
subject of a Confederation of Greek Labor (GSEE) complaint to
the International Labor Organization (ILO).
More than 4,000 unions are grouped into regional and sectoral
federations and two umbrella confederations, one for civil
servants and the other for private sector workers. The unions
are highly politicized, with party-affiliated factions within
the labor confederations, but they are not controlled by the
parties or by the Government in their day-to-day operations.
There are no restrictions on who may serve as a union official.
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GREECE
There are no restrictions on international contacts, and Greek
unions maintain a variety of international affiliations.
The 1990 law qualifies the right to strike by requiring
skeleton staffs during strikes in workplaces providing such
public services as electricity, transportation, communications,
and banking. In strikes that took place in November and
December 1991, skeleton staffs, mandated by the 1990 labor law,
did not completely ensure that essential services went
uninterrupted. The Government did not bring charges against
unions or individuals who may have violated the law.
Some 250 strikes took place in 1991, including public
transportation strikes that caused considerable disruption and
engendered popular irritation with the labor federations.
Although the courts may declare strikes illegal, the effective
right to strike was legally restricted in 1991 only by the
Government's power to declare the civil mobilization of workers
in case of danger to national security, life, or property or to
the social and economic life of the country. This provision,
which was not used in 1991, is considered by the ILO to violate
the standards of ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association
and was the subject of criticism by the ILO Committee of
Experts .
Addressing union complaints that most labor disputes ended in
compulsory arbitration, legislative remedies were enacted in
1989 providing for mediation procedures with compulsory
arbitration as a last resort. In 1991, the Ministry of Labor
completed work on implementing procedures and announced that
the law would take effect in January 1992.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is ensured by
legislation passed in 1955 and amended in 1990. There are no
restrictions on collective bargaining for private workers.
Civil servants collectively negotiate their demands with the
Office of the Minister to the Prime Minister but have no formal
system of collective bargaining.
Antiunion discrimination is prohibited. Complaints of
discrimination against union members or organizers may be
referred to the Labor Inspectorate or the courts, where most
cases are resolved. Court rulings have mandated the
reinstatement of improperly fired union organizers.
Greece has no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by the Constitution
and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment in industry is 15, with higher
limits in certain activities. In family businesses, theaters,
and the cinema, the minimum age is 12. Enforced by occasional
Labor Inspectorate spot checks, these age limits are generally
respected. However, families engaged in agriculture, food
service, or merchandising often have younger family members
assisting, at least part-time.
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GREECE
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The minimum wage is determined in collective bargaining between
the GSEE and the employers' association. The Ministry of Labor
routinely ratifies this minimum wage, which thereby has the
force of law and applies to all Greek workers. The minimum
wage is sufficient for a decent standard of living for a worker
and his fcimily.
The maximum legal workweek is 40 hours in the private sector
and 37.5 hours in the public sector. Legislation in July 1989
allowed greater flexibility in business hours as long as, over
a period of time, the average workweek did not exceed the legal
maximum. The law mandates paid vacation of 1 month per year
and sets maximum limits on overtime.
Minimum standards of occupational health and safety are
provided for by legislation. Although the GSEE characterizes
health and safety legislation as satisfactory, it charges that
enforcement, the responsibility of the Labor Inspectorate, is
inadequate, and cites statistics indicating a relatively high
number of job-related accidents in Greece. Inadequate
inspection, failure to enforce regulations, outdated industrial
plants and equipment, and poor safety training of employees,
contribute to the accident rate. Inspectors are prohibited
from divulging names of workers who lodge complaints about
unsafe working conditions.
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HUNGARY
Hungary is completing its second year as a newly democratic
republic under the amended 1989 Constitution that contains a
broad range of human rights protections. The country has a
democratically elected Parliament, a coalition government, and
an independent judiciary.
The nation's 32, 000-strong police force, of which approximately
18,000 are uniformed, is controlled by the national police
headquarters. Although the police are independent of the
Ministry of the Interior on day-to-day operational matters, the
Minister of the Interior is still ultimately responsible for
the police before Parliament. Since 1990 the state security
services have reported to a Minister without Portfolio,
and these oversight mechanisms have proven effective. In
accordance with the 1990 Hungarian-U.S.S.R. agreement, all
Soviet troops stationed in Hungary were withdrawn in 1991.
Hungary continued to transform its economy from one based on
state ownership and management to one based on the domestic and
international markets. Many new private ventures were started,
as well as thousands of foreign joint ventures. A major
milestone was government passage of legislation to compensate
(at least in part) property owners whose holdings were
nationalized by former regimes. The legislation reestablished
the legal basis and mechanism for private ownership and trade
in land and real property. The transformation has been
characterized by high inflation and greatly increased
unemployment. The resulting lower tax revenues and increasing
costs of social benefits for the unemployed have caused a
significant rise in the budget deficit. Those whose fixed
incomes have not kept up with the high rate of inflation have
felt the greatest burden.
The Constitution provides for human rights, civil liberties,
and freedom of the press. Members of all political parties
perceive some elements of the press as biased against their
interests. Efforts to enact legislation codifying the status
of the media have been ensnared in an intense political
dispute. The legislation also is to lift the current
moratorium on granting radio and television licenses. The most
recent draft would limit non-Hungarian ownership and content in
the electronic media, restrictions which, according to some,
could have implications for freedom of the press.
Major public incidents of anti-Semitism decreased in 1991
compared to 1990. However, several graves were desecrated at
the Kozma Jewish Cemetery in Budapest. Of major concern to the
Jewish community were the speeches of some prominent
politicians, including members of the coalition parties, who
allegedly engaged in expressions of anti-Semitism. The Prime
Minister and other government officials have several times, at
home and abroad, reiterated a commitment to respect and protect
the Jewish community. The Government has been relatively
generous in supporting the growing number of refugees from
neighboring countries, especially those from Yugoslavia and
Romania. Many Hungarians, however, continue to discriminate
against the Gypsy population.
1133
HUNGARY
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There is no evidence that such killings occurred.
b. Disappearatice
There were no reported disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
No known instances of torture or other cruel or degrading
treatment occurred.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.
In contrast to conditions during the Communist period, persons
are not subject to arbitrary arrest. Upon arrest, they must be
informed of the charges against them and may be held for a
maximum of 72 hours before charges must be filed. It is a
requirement that persons be allowed access to counsel from the
moment they are suspects undergoing questioning and throughout
all subsequent proceedings. The authorities must specifically
provide counsel when a person is mentally handicapped,
juvenile, or unable to afford counsel. There is no bail
system. Depending upon the nature of the crime, the accused
may be released upon his or her own recognizance. Pretrial
detention is limited to 1 year while criminal investigations
are in progress. This period may be extended with the approval
of a judge. There is no evidence that these procedures were
violated during 1991 or that any illegal or incommunicado
detention occurred.
There is no exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Under the Constitution, the courts are responsible for the
administration of justice, and the Supreme Court exercises
policy control over the operations and administration of all
courts. There are four levels of courts in the current
system: the Supreme Court, the Budapest Appeals Court, county
courts, and local courts. There is no jury system; hence,
judges are the final arbiters. Decisions may be appealed to
the Supreme Court, which has supervisory responsibility over
all other courts and whose decisions are binding.
The Constitutional Court is charged with reviewing the
constitutionality of laws and statutes brought before it for
review. The Court's 10 members are elected by Parliament for
nonrenewable 9-year terms. (According to the law, the
Constitutional Court is to be composed of 15 members; 10 have
been elected to date, and the remaining 5 are scheduled to be
seated by 1995.) No judge or member of the Supreme Court or
the Constitutional Court may belong to a political party or
engage in political activity.
The right to a fair public trial is provided for by law and
respected in practice. In some cases, however, judges may
agree to a closed trial if it is for the protection of the
1134
HUNGARY
accused, such as irr some rape cases. This is also true for
military trials which follow civil law and may be closed if
state, service, or morale grounds justify a closed trial.
Juvenile cases are afforded the protection of a closed trial.
In all cases, sentencing must take place publicly. Defendants
are entitled to counsel during all phases of criminal
proceedings and are presiimed innocent until proven guilty.
Judicial proceedings are generally investigative rather than
adversarial in nature; there is no trial by jury. Decisions of
the courts may be appealed. In the case of military trials,
appeals also may be addressed to the Supreme Court.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Search warreints under current law may be issued independently
by the prosecutor's office. House searches must be carried out
in the presence of two witnesses. A written inventory of items
removed from the premises must be prepared.
According to the law, only the Minister of Justice has the
authority to approve wiretapping for national security reasons
and for legitimate criminal investigations. The State respects
the individual's freedom of choice in family matters.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech is provided for in the Constitution and is
respected in practice. A variety of uncensored newspapers,
magazines, and books express a wide range of opinion, and
independent news publications continue to proliferate. Foreign
partners have invested in numerous publications, particularly
in Budapest where the Hungarian dailies compete fiercely.
Nearly all radio and television stations are owned by the
State. Until recently NAP-TV was the sole private television
station in Hungary, broadcasting on a frequency rented from
state television. It now operates more like a private
production company, producing programming for state
television. The one private radio station of any size. Radio
Bridge (also a Voice of America affiliate) broadcasts in
English on an FM frequency, reaching Budapest and its immediate
environs .
No legislation was adopted in 1991 implementing the
constitutional provision of freedom of the media. The
Government is drafting bills on the print media and the
broadcast media which will regulate the allocation of
frequencies and set limits on non-Hungarian ownership anad
content. The opposition parties and the government coalition
differ sharply on the question of media legislation. (Any
media law will require a two-thirds majority for passage;
hence, coordination and ultimate agreement among the government
coalition parties and at least part of the opposition will be
necessary.) At issue is the desirability of press legislation
in the first place, as well as ultimately the content of such
legislation, including questions of supervision and control,
foreign investment, cable television, commercial broadcasting,
and licensing procedures.
The case against Szent Korona, the weekly indicted for
incitement of anti-Semitic feelings, is pending before the
Constitutional Court (also see Section 5). The case is
1135
HUNGARY
especially difficult in that the Court is being asked to
balance freedom of speech against protection of minorities.
Szent Korona has been allowed to continue publishing pending a
decision by the Constitutional Court on the broader question of
what constitutes freedom of the press.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Peaceful public gatherings are essentially unrestricted. In
general, no permits are required for assembly except in cases
when a public gathering is planned near sensitive installations
such as military facilities, embassies, and key government
buildings. Police may sometimes alter or revoke permits, but
there is no evidence that this right is abused. There were no
reports of interference with the right of peaceful assembly in
1991.
Any 10 or more persons may form an association, provided that
it does not commit criminal offenses or disturb the rights of
others. Associations with charters and elected officers must
register with the courts.
c. Freedom of Religion
Hiangary is largely Roman Catholic by tradition; members of
other faiths practice their religions freely. There is no
officially preferred religion, and religious affiliation
carries no benefits or penalties. In July Parliament passed
legislation that provides for the return of some former church
properties, confiscated during Communist rule. If the return
of property proves impossible, there is a formula for partial
compensation. Limited state subsidies are available to
religious organizations that maintain educational facilities.
Since 1990 conscientious objectors to military service may
perform alternate civilian service.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on movement within or outside
Hungary, including the rights of emigration and repatriation.
Emigration may be delayed, but not denied, for those who have
significant court-assessed debts or who possess state secrets.
Economic and political conditions in the region resulted in a
rising flow of refugees into Hungary, most recently from
Yugoslavia. The Government reported that since 1988 over
70,000 refugees have been registered. Despite the difficult
economic situation, Hungary continued to provide basic food and
housing assistance. The Government does not force refugees to
return to countries where they face persecution.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Hungarians over the age of 18 have the right to change their
government through national and local elections held every 4
years. The Parliament's 386 members are elected through a
complex formula of individual and party lists. The Prime
Minister is the head of the largest party in Parliament, the
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). Currently, Hungary has a
center-right coalition government, formed by the MDF, the
Independent Smallholders Party, and the Christian Democratic
People's Party, which effectively exercises power. Three
1136
HUNGARY
center-left parties constitute an active opposition in
Parliament.
There are no restrictions, in law or in practice, on the
participation of women in government or politics.
Nevertheless, it is only in the judiciary that women have a
significant presence. There are 27 women in Parliament.
Minorities represented in Parliament include nine Germans, two
Gypsies, one Croat and one Slovak.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Hxunan Rights
Several human rights organizations operate in Hungary.
Prominent among these are the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, the
Wallenberg Association for Minority Rights, and the Hungarian
Human Rights Foundation. A 25-member parliamentary Committee
for Human, Minority, and Religious Rights oversees the field of
hioman rights.
Hungary worked actively in the United Nations and the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to promote
human and minority rights. Hungary's particular concern is the
welfare of Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries,
especially as the Government estimates that approximately 4
million Hungarians reside outside Hungary's borders.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Gypsies, who account for roughly 5 percent of Hungary's
population of 10.5 million, constitute the largest minority
group (though not officially recognized). Conditions of life
within the Gypsy community are significantly poorer than among
the general populace. Gypsies tend to be considerably less
educated, have lower than average incomes, and have a life
expectancy that falls several years short of national norms.
Gypsies also have a higher unemployment and crime rate. The
Government sponsors programs both to preserve Gypsy languages
and cultural heritage and to assist social and economic
assimilation. Nevertheless, widespread popular prejudice
continues. Gypsy organizations, such as Roma Parliament and
Phralipe, claim that there is discrimination against Gypsies
in education, vocational training, employment, access to loans
and subsidized housing, and career opportunities. The
Government has criticized attacks on the Gypsy community and
continues to seek to improve their situation. Gypsies are
generally regarded as untrustworthy and treated as such. Gypsy
organizations, while divided among themselves, seek to improve
the status of their people.
In 1991 overt incidents of anti-Semitism decreased. However,
several graves were desecrated in the late spring at the
Budapest Kozma Jewish Cemetery. The Jewish community is also
concerned that while the Government does not condone anti-
Semitic activities, prominent members within the parties of the
coalition continue to fuel anti-Semitic sentiment. While
acknowledging the existence of anti-Semitism in Hungary, the
governing coalition disputes the validity of this charge. The
Government has often demonstrated its support for the Jewish
community, most recently when Prime Minister Antall, during his
speech before the United Nations General Assembly on October 1,
1991, condemned the U.N. resolution equating Zionism with
racism. Both the Prime Minister and the President have met
1137
HUNGARY
with prominent local Jewish and Israeli leaders to reiterate
their commitment against anti-Semitism. As noted above, in
1991 Szent Korona, the weekly pxiblication of the National
Federation of Hungarians, the Christian National Union, and the
Hungarian National Party — organizations generally characterized
as rightwing extremist — was indicted for incitement of
anti-Semitic feelings. The case is pending before the courts.
Legally, women havd the same rights as men, including identical
inheritance and property rights. There is no overt
discrimination against women. However, the number of women in
middle or upper managerial positions is low. Women are heavily
represented within the judiciary, and the medical and teaching
professions .
Women's rights groups are still in their infancy and have had
no noticeable impact on societal attitudes. While there are
laws against rape, it often goes unreported because public
attitudes toward crimes of rape have not kept up with legal
prohibitions. Police attitudes towards victims of sexual abuse
reportedly are often unsympathetic. No data are available on
the frequency of marital sexual abuse, and this is not an
acknowledged legal concept.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Legislation passed in 1989 recognizes the right to organize,
establishing the possibility of trade union pluralism.
Excluding judicial and military personnel and the police,
workers have the right to associate freely, choose
representatives, publish journals, openly promote members'
interests and views, and go on strike. Three so-called unions
in the armed forces operate more as professional associations
than as trade unions.
A number of competing trade union formations have emerged. The
1989 legislation guaranteed workers the right to call strikes
to defend their economic and social interests, but strike
action has been limited and more often directed against
government policies rather than employers. Twice since June,
the Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions (MSzOSz), the
successor to the former monolithic Communist union, threatened
to call a 2-hour warning strike over a series of demands.
Following intense negotiatioris at the Interest Reconciliation
Council (IRC), in which representatives from the trade unions,
the employers' association, and the Government met to negotiate
and coordinate policies, the strike was averted. Unions
participate freely in international organizations.
In practice, the right of association was marred by the
existence of a so-called checkoff system that workers had to go
through at the workplace to relinquish membership in MSzOSz in
order to join newer unions. Other unions — e.g., the League of
Independent Democratic Unions and the Federation of Workers'
Councils — denounced this checkoff system as an unfair pressure
tactic that favored MSzOSz. In July Parliament intervened by
passing legislation that effectively killed the checkoff system
by prohibiting employers from deducting trade union or business
federation dues from an employee's wages except with the
express consent of the employee.
1138
HUNGARY
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to bargain collectively exists in law, although in
practice wages have been excluded and are centrally negotiated
in a tripartite macroeconomic policy body to control the rate
of inflation. The right to bargain collectively was
established in a 1969 law, which was amended in 1989 to allow
collective bargaining at the enterprise and industry level.
Trade union views are expressed at the IRC. The Ministry of
Labor is responsible for drafting labor-related legislation,
while special labor courts enforce labor laws. The decisions
of these courts may be appealed to the civil court system.
Under the new legislation passed in July, employers are
prohibited from discriminating against unions and their
organizers. It is too soon to judge the effectiveness of this
legislation. There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law, which is
enforced by the Ministry of Labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Labor courts enforce the minimum employment age of 16 years,
with exceptions for apprentice programs, which may begin at
15. There does not appear to be any significant abuse of this
statute.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The legal minimum wage is established by the IRC and
subsequently implemented by Ministry of Labor decree. The
current minimum wage is insufficient to provide an adequate
living for workers and their families. Real incomes continued
to drop by around 4 percent in 1991, and consumption declined
by an estimated 12 percent. In order to maintain a decent
standard of living, many Hungarians supplement their primary
employment with second jobs.
The average official workweek varies between 40 and 42 hours,
depending upon the nature of the industry. The amended Labor
Code of 1967 sets the workweek at 42 hours, but this varies
slightly in some industries. Under existing law, workers
receive overtime, a minimum of 15 days' paid leave per year,
free health care, maternity leave, and pensions. Labor courts
and the Ministry of Labor enforce occupational safety standards
set by the Government, but specific safety conditions are not
always up to internationally accepted standards.
1139
ICELAND
Iceland is a constitutional republic and a multiparty
parliamentary democracy. Its literate and educated people
participate in high percentages in regular fair and free
elections which determine the distribution of power among
political parties and leaders.
The civil and criminal justice systems offer equal protection
to all. The nation has no indigenous military forces or
political security apparatus.
Iceland has a mixed, open economy in which all of its citizens
have the right to hold private property.
Icelanders have long been strong defenders of human rights both
at home and internationally, and the country has an exemplary
human rights record.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Political killings do not occur.
b. Disappearance
There were no instances of abductions or disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment are all prohibited by law and do not occur.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Due process is provided by law and observed in practice. The
Constitution states that any person arrested by the authorities
must be brought before a judge without undue delay. The judge
must rule within 24 hours whether the person is to be further
detained. Although the Constitution allows for bail, it is not
usually imposed as a condition for release. A judge's ruling
may be appealed immediately to a higher court. Preventive
detention is not practiced. There were no allegations of
arbitrary detention. There is no exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Defendants may confront witnesses and otherwise participate in
public trials, which are fair and free from intimidation. They
are guaranteed the right to competent legal counsel of their
own choice. In cases in which defendants are unable to pay
attorney's fees, the State does so. The courts are free of
political control. Although the Ministry of Justice administers
the lower court system, the Supreme Court carefully guards its
independence and fairness. Juries are not normally used, but
multi judge panels are common, especially in the appeals
process. There are no political prisoners.
50-726 - 92 - 37
1140
ICELAND
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under the Constitution and in practice, there is deep respect
for the autonomy and rights of individuals. A warrant from a
court is required for entry into a home, except in cases of hot
pursuit. Arbitrary intrusions by official entities, political
organizations, or any other organized group into the private
beliefs or personal liberties of individuals do not occur.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution expressly forbids censorship and other
restrictions on the freedom of the press and on a person's
right to express his thoughts. Citizens and the media exercise
this freedom extensively. Academic freedom of expression is
vigorously exercised.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the right to assemble unarmed,
except when it is feared that such gatherings may cause riots.
In practice, plans for public meetings are virtually never
rejected, and the authorities only rarely modify them.
In addition, the Constitution provides citizens the right to
join together formally or informally to form associations
without governmental authorization. A varied and wide spectrum
of voluntary organizations plays a vital role in Icelandic
politics and society.
c. Freedom of Religion
Although the Lutheran Church is the established church, and
most citizens are nominally members, there is complete freedom
for other faiths. Both Christian and non-Christian faiths are
allowed to proselytize freely. They may maintain ties with and
receive support from coreligionists abroad.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Icelanders have freedom to travel at home and abroad, to
emigrate, and to return at will. Refugees are never compelled
to return to a country in which they would face persecution.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
To Change Their Government
The political system is an open, fully functioning,
parliamentary democracy in which voters freely choose the
members of the Althing (parliament) who, in turn, make the laws
of the land and determine the composition of the Cabinet.
Parliamentary elections are held at 4-year intervals unless the
Althing dissolves itself before the end of its full term.
Voting in elections and membership in the various political
parties are open to all citizens who are 18 years of age or
older. Primary elections and party caucuses are used to select
Althing candidates. Multimember districts and proportional
representation increase the chances for minority points of view
to be represented. In addition, there is a strong cultural
insistence on having the views of all significant groups
represented in the Althing. A center-right coalition
1141
ICELANP
government was formed following national elections in April
1991. The Government consists of the Independence Party and
the Social Democratic Party, with David Oddsson of the
Independence Party as Prime Minister.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Hximan Rights
Hxunan rights organizations are active in Iceland. No serious
human rights violations have been alleged. The Government and
populace support international efforts to improve human rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Iceland's ethnically homogeneous population is fiercely
egalitarian and opposed to discrimination regardless of whether
it is based on sex, religion, or other factors. Government
legislation and practice reflect this attitude.
Violence against women, both physical and mental, occurs. The
problem is not widely publicized, but the Women's List
political party raises it periodically in political debate. A
public women's shelter, financially supported by national and
municipal government and private contributions, operates in
Reykjavik and offers protection to approximately 180 women per
year. About 50 percent of those who make use of the shelter
cite alcohol abuse by their male partners as a factor
contributing to the violence they suffer. Counseling is
available from social workers and lawyers at the shelter. The
Women's List, on the basis of credible research, asserts that,
despite legislation requiring equal pay for equal work,
Icelandic women do not receive pay equal to that of men. The
party and other active women's organizations have given this
issue top priority.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers in Iceland make extensive use of the right to establish
organizations, draw up their own constitutions and rules,
choose their own leaders and policies, and publicize their
views. The resulting organizations are not controlled by the
Government or any single political party. Unions take active
part in Nordic, European, and international trade union
bodies. With the exception of limited categories of workers in
the public sector whose services are essential to public health
or safety (e.g., air traffic controllers), unions have had and
have used the right to strike. In 1991, for example, merchant
seamen struck for 2 days in November for higher wages.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
About 76 percent of all eligible workers belong to unions.
There are no impediments to union membership in law or in
practice. Virtually all unions utilize the right to bargain
collectively on wages, working conditions, and related issues.
In February 1990, with the assistance of government mediation,
a 20-month agreement was reached between the central labor and
management organizations covering a majority of workers. The
agreement formally expired in September 1991 but continued to
be observed in practice pending the conclusion of negotiations
between the parties to the 1990 agreement. Labor courts
1142
ICELAND
effectively adjudicate disputes over labor contracts and over
the rights and provisions guaranteed under the 1938 Act on
trade unions and industrial disputes, which prohibits antiunion
discrimination. There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law and does not
exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The employment of children below the age of 16 in factories, on
ships, and in other places that are hazardous or require hard
labor is prohibited by law, and this prohibition is observed in
practice. Children of 14 and 15 may be employed in light,
nonhazardous work, but their work hours may not exceed the
ordinary working hours of adults in the same occupation. The
Occupational Safety and Health Administration enforces child
labor regulations.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Although there is no minimum wage law, union membership is so
pervasive and effective that labor contracts, in effect, assure
even the lowest paid workers a sufficient income for a decent
standard of living. The standard legal workweek is 40 hours.
Icelandic workers are protected by laws which effectively
ensure their health and safety as well as provide for
unemployment insurance, paid vacations, pensions, and
reasonable working conditions and hours. Health and safety
standards are set by the Althing and effectively administered
and enforced by the Ministry of Social Affairs through its
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Food, shelter,
health care, and education are all guaranteed without
discrimination to those lacking adequate income because of
their age, youth, illness, or other reasons.
1143
IRELAND
The Republic of Ireland is a parliamentary democracy with a long
tradition of orderly transfer of power. Individual liberties
and civil rights are protected by the 1937 Irish Constitution
and subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
A civilian police force maintains public safety. Successive
Irish governments have had to deal with the spillover into the
Republic of terrorist violence from Northern Ireland. That
violence led Irish authorities to adopt special legislation in
1984 granting the police increased powers to detain and
interrogate those suspected of acts of terrorism. During 1991
Irish officials continued to show restraint in exercising these
powers .
The Irish economy, based largely on free enterprise, has grown
rapidly as a result of long-term policies of industrialization
and diversification which are agreed among government, the labor
unions, and the business community. It performed well in 1991
despite continued fiscal austerity and a 17-percent rate of
unemployment. Exports were strong, and the budget deficit was
reduced.
The Government and people of Ireland attach great importance to
the observance and maintenance of human rights. There were no
reports of significant human rights abuses in 1991.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
In the past, politically motivated killings have occurred in
Ireland as a spillover from the violence in Northern Ireland.
In these cases, such groups as the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (PIRA) or the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) usually
claim responsibility. The Government uses the full force of
the law to pursue and prosecute such cases wherever possible.
In 1991 there was one such political killing in the Republic.
b. Disappearance
People are not abducted, secretly arrested, or held in
clandestine detention by the Irish authorities.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other cruel, inhioman, or degrading punishment are
prohibited by laws which are observed in practice.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution provides that a person shall be deprived of
personal liberty only in accordance with the law. This is
respected in practice. The same section of the Constitution
provides for a judicial determination of the legality of a
person's detention and requires in such cases that the
arresting authorities make written explanation to the court
about the person concerned. Neither in law nor in practice is
anyone subject to arrest for the expression of political or
religious views.
1144
IRELAND
The use of short-term detention without charges being brought
is restricted. It is permitted for a maximum of 48 hours in
cases covered by the Offenses Against the State Act of 1939,
legislation designed to "prevent actions and conduct calculated
to undermine public order and the authority of the State." This
legislation, reactivated in 1972, was broadened to include other
"scheduled offenses" against peace and order. The police may
now arrest and detain for questioning anyone suspected of any
terrorist offense involving firearms, explosives, membership in
an unlawful organization, or malicious damage to property.
After the 48-hour period, the person must be brought before a
magistrate, presented with written charges, and given legal
representation .
The Omnibus Criminal Justice Act of 1984 gives the police some
increased powers in the area of detention for interrogation.
It did not come into effect until 1987 after implementation of
the companion complaints procedure. Neither incommunicado
detention nor exile is used.
e.- Denial of Fair Public Trial
Fair public trial is provided for by the Constitution and
respected in practice. A defendant has the right to legal
counsel. The courts are independent, and jury trial is the
norm. There is provision for free legal aid and appeal against
conviction or sentence.
The Constitution provides, however, for the creation of
"special courts" to deal with cases in which the "ordinary
courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of
justice, and the preservation of public peace and order." The
Offenses Against the State Act of 1939 formally set up such
courts and provided that they may try persons for offenses
against national security, particularly cases of political
violence perpetrated by terrorist groups likely to intimidate
regular juries. Rather than having juries, these courts have
panels of judges, each consisting of an uneven number of judges,
but in any event not less than three. Their verdicts are by
majority vote. Rules of evidence generally are similar to those
of regular courts, except that the sworn statement of a police
chief superintendent that the accused is a member of an illegal
organization is considered prima facie evidence of such
membership. Court sessions are usually public but may exclude
certain persons, other than genuine press representatives.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Though not specifically provided for in the Constitution, the
inviolability of personal privacy, family, and home is affirmed
by the Supreme Court and generally observed. The Constitution,
however, provides that the State shall enact no law "providing
for the grant of the dissolution of marriage." A proposal to
amend the Constitution to permit divorce in limited
circumstances was overwhelmingly defeated in a 1986 nationwide
referendum. In the same year, the European Court of Human
Rights ruled that the prohibition of divorce is not a breach of
the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Ireland is a
party.
1145
IRELAND
Section 2 Respect for Civil Rights, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms are provided for by the Constitution and
respected in practice. Publication or utterance of
"blasphemous, seditious, or indecent matter" is an offense
punishable by law. The law in practice is directed against
pornographic material. Convictions result in sentences
requiring fines.
Official censorship is used in certain circumstances. In
particular, the state-owned radio and television network, on
the basis of the constitutional provisions dealing with public
order and the authority of the State, denies air time to members
of organizations on a list that includes (Provisional) Sinn
Fein, the legal political wing of the illegal PIRA. In 1982
the Irish Supreme Court upheld this action on constitutional
grounds. All political parties not on the list are given
access to both publicly owned radio and television facilities
and major independent daily newspapers. Criticism of the
Government in such media flourishes. Academic freedom is
respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are provided for by the Constitution and
respected in practice. Certain terrorist organizations, such
as PIRA and INLA, however, are illegal, and membership in them
is an offense against national security. Political parties or
groups associated with such organizations, such as (Provisional)
Sinn Fein, are not proscribed.
c. Freedom of Religion
The population of Ireland is 94 percent Roman Catholic. The
Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and there are no
restrictions upon freedom of worship. Some Irish laws, such as
the prohibition against divorce, reflect the point of view of
the majority of the population. The area of family law —
including the rights of illegitimate children — is the subject
of current debate in which minority religious communities have
taken a vocal and active role.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There is complete freedom of movement within the country, as
well as freedom to engage in foreign travel, emigration, and
voluntary repatriation. Irish authorities have accepted asylum
seekers only on a limited basis and firmly apply international
definitions to those who claim refugee status.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Since the end of the Irish civil war in 1923, periodic elections
have resulted in the orderly transfer of political power. There
are several political parties, and independents may stand for
election to either house of the Parliament. The constitutional
requirement that elections be held at least every 7 years has
always been met. Ireland uses a proportional voting system,
and the secrecy of the ballot is fully safeguarded. There is
universal suffrage for those over 18 years of age.
1146
IRELAND
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Irish Council for Civil Liberties operates freely and
without hindrance as the principal independent organization
interested in domestic human rights issues. The Council for
the Status of Women, representing over 70 national women's
organizations, provides the central focus in Ireland for
pursuit of legislative and other reforms to end discrimination
against women and to promote fuller participation by women in
the social, economic, and political life of the country.
Irish governments generally cooperate with independent outside
investigations of alleged human rights abuses, although they
have not always been receptive to prisoners' rights groups.
Ireland has also actively promoted observance of human rights
in various international forums, including the U.N. Human
Rights Commission.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Government social services provide adequate shelter, nutrition,
health care, and education without regard to race, religion,
sex, ethnic background, or political opinion. Those whose
means are inadequate and who are not entitled to other benefits
may receive pensions or other payments from public funds.
The Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act of 1974 and the Employment
Equality Act of 1977 seek to provide protection and redress
against sex and pay discrimination. The Employment Equality
Agency monitors their operation. The number of cases has fallen
in recent years, but there has been only modest progress in
eliminating the differential in the key index of average hourly
earnings in industry. In June 1990, women's hourly earnings in
the manufacturing sector were 69.75 percent of men's earnings.
Violence against women occurs, but there have been no reliable
studies to show the extent of the problem. The Rape (Amendment)
Act of 1990 has criminalized rape within marriage. It also
makes provision for free legal advice to the rape victim.
Women's groups are seeking the extension of this provision to
that of actual legal representation, as well as increased
counseling and other support services for the victims of rape
and domestic violence.
The Prime Minister established a new Commission on the Status
of Women in 1990 with the mandate of promoting greater equality
for women in all facets of Irish life. As priority objectives,
the Commission identified child care, training and education,
the development of employment opportunities, legal rights and
protection, and the appropriate funding of representative bodies
and support services. At the Government's request, the
Commission in 1991 paid particular attention to the needs of the
full-time homemaker (only a third of Irish women work outside
the home) . In this regard, the Commission obtained from the
Government an early date for the introduction of legislation
providing for automatic joint ownership of the family home. In
addition, the women's movement continues to highlight family
law, rape law reform, and social welfare discrimination as
problem areas.
1147
IRELAND
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to associate freely and to strike. The
right to join a iinion is guaranteed by law, as is the right to
refrain from joining. The Industrial Relations Act of 1990
introduced some limitations on picketing but generally renewed
legal guarantees of immunity to union members and officials for
industrial actions with regard to terms or conditions of
employment .
About 58 percent of workers in the private and public sectors
are members of unions. Police and military personnel are
prohibited from joining unions or striking, but they may form
associations to represent them in matters of pay, working
conditions, and general welfare. The right to strike is freely
exercised in both the public and private sectors. A 2-week
strike by employees of the state-owned Electricity Supply Board
in the spring of 1990 led the Labor Relations Commission to
draft a code of conduct for industrial relations in essential
services which is still under discussion by the concerned
parties .
The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), which represents
unions in both the Republic and Northern Ireland, has 73 member
unions with 682,592 members. Both the ICTU and the unaffiliated
unions are independent of the Government and of the political
parties. The ICTU is affiliated with the European Trade Union
Confederation.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Labor unions have full freedom to organize and to engage in
free collective bargaining. Legislation prohibits antiunion
discrimination. Most terms and conditions of employment are
determined through collective bargaining, which took place in
1991 in the context of a national economic pact (Program for
Economic and Social Progress, or PESP) negotiated by
representatives of unions, employers, farmers, and the
Government. PESP inclxided an agreement between the ICTU and
the Federation of Irish Employers establishing standard pay
increases for the 3-year period of PESP. In addition, the
agreement provides for a wage increase of up to 3 percent to be
negotiated at the local level during the second year of PESP.
The Industrial Relations Act of 1990 established the Labour
Relations Commission which provides advice and conciliation
services in industrial disputes. The Commission may refer
unresolved disputes to the Labour Court. The Labour Court,
consisting of an employer representative, a trade union
representative, and an independent chairman, may investigate
trade union disputes, recommend the terms of settlement, engage
in conciliation and arbitration, and set up joint committees to
regulate conditions of employment and minimum rates of pay for
workers in a given trade or industry. There are no export
processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law and does not exist in
practice.
1148
IRELAND
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 14 years with the written
permission of the parents. Irish laws limit the hours of
employment for those 15 years of age to 8 hours per day and 40
hours per week. Those from 16 to 17 years of age may work up
to 9 hours per day and 40 hours per week. These provisions are
effectively enforced by the Labour Department.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no general minimum wage legislation. However, some
workers are covered by minimum wage laws applicable to specific
industrial sectors, mainly those that tend to pay lower than
average wages . Although the lowest of these minimum wage rates
would not be sufficient to provide a decent living for a family
of four, additional benefits are available to low income
families, including subsidized housing and children's
allowances. Working hours in the industrial sector are limited
to 9 hours per day and 48 hours per week. Overtime work is
limited to 2 hours per day, 12 hours per week, and 240 hours in
a year. As part of the national economic pact adopted in 1987,
the standard workweek has been reduced to 39 hours.
The Labour Department is responsible for enforcing four basic
laws dealing with occupational safety that provide adeq^aate and
comprehensive coverage. There were no significant complaints
from either labor or management in 1991 regarding enforcement
of these laws.
1149
ITALY
Italy is a democratic, multiparty republic with a parliamentary
system of government. Legislative power is vested in the
Parliament, which is directly and freely elected on the basis
of universal adult suffrage. Executive authority is vested in
the Council of Ministers, headed by President of the Council
Giulio Andreotti from the Christian Democratic Party. Italy's
judiciary is independent of the executive but subject to
political party pressure. The Chief of State, the President of
the Republic, is elected by Parliament and representatives of
Italy's 20 regions.
Terrorist violence of both the left and right has remained at
low levels in recent years. The most dramatic example of
terrorism may have been the killing in Bologna of three
policemen in January. Although terrorism has yet to be
completely overcome, its considerable reduction has freed
increased law enforcement resources for the struggle against
organized crime, which remains a serious problem. Despite
popular rejection of terrorism, however, the major terrorist
crimes of the 1970 's and 1980 's remain unsolved and the
perpetrators unpunished.
Italy has an industrialized market economy which is among the
world's largest. It is characterized by sizable government
ownership of the primary industrial sectors and a private sector
whose small and medium-sized companies are especially dynamic.
Much media attention in 1991 was devoted to the problem of
racism, directed primarily at third world immigrants. Violence
against children continued to be troublesome, especially in
light of a number of children killed in incidents attributed to
organized crime. Nevertheless, the human rights situation in
general continues to be good, and the trend toward openness in
dealing with sensitive human rights issues has continued.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Neither government forces nor legal opposition organizations
engage in politically motivated killings.
Levels of terrorist violence have continued to remain low in
recent years. The authorities have not yet determined whether
the murder of three policemen in January in Bologna, violent
attacks against Gypsies in late 1990 in Bologna, and the murder
of two Senegalese in Rimini in August had political roots or
were linked to organized crime. Twenty-two children were killed
in the first half of 1991, and authorities estimate that some
40 percent of these murders were committed by organized crime.
b. Disappearance
There were no cases of politically motivated disappearance or
kidnapings .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Freedom from torture is provided for by law and respected in
practice. Cruel and degrading punishment is forbidden by law.
1150
ITALY
and cases of violations have been rare. There were no
allegations of ill-treatment of prisoners during 1991, but past
allegations of ill-treatment, if investigated, rarely resulted
in disciplinary proceedings against those responsible, even
when the ill-treatment had been judicially proven.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Police procedures are carefully controlled by law and judicial
oversight. Arbitrary arrest is not practiced. Anyone detained
by the authorities must be charged within 48 hours. Italian
law imposes strict time limits on pretrial detention, which
includes all detention prior to the conclusion of all appeals.
In normal criminal cases, the maximum permissible duration of
pretrial detention varies according to the gravity of the
crime. Under reforms passed in 1989, the maximum time that any
person may be held in pretrial detention, even for the most
serious crimes, was set at 4 years, with no more than 2 years
at each step^of the trial and during the long appeals process.
The Government recently has moved to extend the total period to
6 years for defendants accused of serious crimes.
Provisional liberty may be granted to persons awaiting trial,
depending on the discretion of the judge and the seriousness of
the crime. Pretrial detention is not permitted for minor
offenses .
As a safeguard against abuse, "liberty tribunals" are empowered
to review evidence in cases of persons awaiting trial and to
decide whether continued detention is warranted. In the first
6 months of 1991, 2,795 men and 134 women, out of a prison
population of 31,053, were released because the length of time
during which they could be held had expired.
Exile abroad as a form of punishment is unknown. In July new
legislation was passed requiring persons convicted of Mafia-
type offenses to move their residence to their region of origin.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
A fair, public trial is assured by law and observed in practice
in almost all cases. Counsel is provided for the accused, free
of charge, if necessary. Good-faith efforts are made to
guarantee the due process rights set forth above. Trial
procedures can often be cumbersome, however, with the result
that trials frequently last an inordinately long time.
Decisions in criminal cases by the court of original
jurisdiction may be appealed to the next higher court by both
the defendant and the prosecuting attorney. It is possible for
a defendant who has been found innocent by a lower court to be
found guilty and sentenced by the higher court after an appeal
by the prosecuting attorney. Nevertheless, a defendant found
guilty in a lower court may, on appeal, be found innocent or,
if still found guilty, have his sentence reduced by the higher
court. All cases may be appealed to the highest appellate
court, the Court of Cassation.
In 1989 an effort was made to streamline the process with the
enactment of a revised Code of Criminal Procedure.
Unfamiliarity with the new system on the part of judicial
authorities, coupled with inf rastructural and bureaucratic
problems, led to disappointing results through 1991. The
revisions to the Code provided for a more adversarial-type
system designed to result in speedier trials. In 1991 the
1151
ITALY
authorities tried to resolve the problem through the
reassignment of judges.
The judiciary is independent of the executive, but it is widely
accepted that the political views of individual judges and
their links to political parties may affect proceedings. In
1991 the President of the Republic said publicly that members
of the judiciary were too closely linked to political parties.
Judges are subject to intimidation by organized crime, and in
1991 one judge investigating Mafia-type crime was murdered.
There are no political or security courts or political
prisoners .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The concept of the privacy of the home is legally safeguarded
and respected by the authorities. Searches and electronic
monitoring may be carried out only under judicial warrant and
in carefully defined circiomstances . One case of alleged
electronic monitoring created a media uproar.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Free speech and a free press are assured under Italy's
democratic political system, which allows expression of a wide
spectrum of political views. Although there is no censorship,
publications may be seized for violation of obscenity laws or
for defamation of state institutions. These powers are' seldom
invoked .
Government -run radio and television are politicized at the
administrative level but air widely differing views on political
and social issues. Politicians disagree, however, as to whether
time is allocated impartially to parties and issues. In 1991
the allocation of private television channels aroused keen
interest because of the belief that some parties would gain
political advantage from the distribution through their links
with private owners. Many private television and radio stations
broadcasting since the early 1980 's have provided competition
for the state-owned broadcasting system.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Italian citizens freely exercise their right of peaceful
assembly, which is limited only in cases where national
security or public safety is endangered. Permits are not
recjuired for meetings, but organizers of public demonstrations
must notify the police in advance. Professional and employer
associations organize and represent their constituencies freely.
c. Freedom of Religion
Persons are free to profess and practice any religious faith.
All religions are free to organize and proselytize within the
limits imposed by the laws governing public order.
Italy's relations with the Roman Catholic Church are governed
by a 1984 agreement (Concordat) between the Italian Government
and the Holy See, ratified in 1985. The agreement, which
replaced the Concordat of 1929, recognizes the rights and place
of Catholicism but no longer accords it the status of a state
religion. The Roman Catholic Church continues informally to
1152
ITALY
enjoy special standing in Italy because of the presence of the
Vatican and because the overwhelming majority of Italians are,
at least nominally, Roman Catholic. The State no longer
provides subsidy payments to the Church, but taxpayers may
elect to designate a small percentage, determined by law, of
their tax payment to the Catholic Church or other denominations
or humanitarian organizations. When the taxpayers do not
specify another denomination or organization, their payments go
to the Catholic Church with the result that the funds now
received by the Church are greater than when it received a
direct subsidy.
Roman Catholic religious instruction is offered in the public
schools as an optional subject. The Ministry of Education has
yet to resolve a controversy over the "hour of religion" in
schools. Proponents of religious instruction have advocated
that students who choose not to enroll in a religion course
spend the hour in school studying another subject instead. The
Constitutional Court expressed the view that it would violate
the students' rights to force them to do so. Not all schools,
however, have as yet followed the court's view, which has the
effect of an advisory opinion, and the issue remains open.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Italian citizens may travel freely both within the country and
abroad. Emigration is unrestricted. Citizens who leave are
guaranteed the right to return, and the Constitution forbids
deprivation of citizenship for political reasons.
Since the passage of the new immigration law in 1989, Italy has
granted permanent resettlement to 1,600 persons seeking asylum
in Italy. In addition, Italian authorities have provided
temporary haven for many persons fleeing persecution who are
eventually resettled in third countries. They have also
indicated a willingness to receive Yugoslavs fleeing war zones
in 1991.
Early in 1991, some 28,000 Albanians seeking better economic
conditions landed in southern Italian ports. More than half
were persuaded to return to Albania after a brief stay in port
areas. In August 19,000 more Albanians arrived by ship, most
of whom were sent back after a few days. Soon after, Italy
rounded up and forcibly repatriated approximately 2,500
Albanians who were not given the opportunity to request refugee
status. Due to the unprecedented and massive inflow of
Albanians, Italian authorities appeared unable to provide
adequate facilities to shelter and feed them. Approximately
14,000 Albanians who arrived in Italy in 1990 and 1991 were
permitted to remain temporarily. The Italian Government
undertook measures to facilitate their assimilation, and some
regional governments are providing assistance for employment,
housing, health care, vocational training, and education.
Between 7,000 and 10,000 have found work, another 2,000 no
longer receive grants from the Government, and 2,000 are
children.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Italy has a democratic, free parliamentary system. Although
the Constitution outlaws the Fascist party, a wide range of
organized and active political parties exists from the far left
to the far right of the political spectrum. Election campaigns
1153
ITALY
are free and open, and voting is by secret ballot. The
Government investigates allegations of voting abuses. The two
chambers of Parliament and regional, provincial, and municipal
councils are elected either at regular intervals or when
special elections are called due to a loss of confidence.
Opposition groups are active and are able to alter or reject
government policies. In 1991 one small party voluntarily
dissolved and a new one, which split off from the former
Italian Communist Party, was formed. In addition, the former
Italian Communist Party dissolved and reconstituted itself as
the Democratic Party of the Left.
There are no restrictions in law on the participation of women
in government and politics. Political and social customs
result, however, in a lower percentage of participation by
women than by men .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Nongovernmental organizations are free to investigate conditions
in Italy, attend trials, and publish their findings.
The Italian Government and nongovernmental human rights
organizations support human rights around the world. Italy
participates fully in various international human rights
organizations and is a staunch supporter of respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no legal discrimination on the basis of race, religion,
sex, ethnic background, or political opinion.
German speakers in the Alto Adige region bordering on Austria
have claimed for many years that they were discriminated against
on the basis of language, particularly in legal proceedings and
in the schools, and a recently enacted package of reforms is
aimed at providing further protection for them. Italian
speakers have complained that the new concessions to the
German-speaking minority have in fact resulted in reverse
discrimination. Italian speakers, who are a minority in many
parts of the region, have claimed that they are discriminated
against in obtaining housing and employment. The gradual
emigration of Italian speakers from the area will make the
achievement of a balance between the two ethnic groups more
difficult in the future.
Italians in general show intolerance toward North Africans
residing and working in Italy and toward the population of
Gypsy origin. Employees of international organizations in Rome
from third world countries report more difficulty in finding
housing than their European colleagues. The Government
maintains statistics on the number of cases of violence against
third world immigrants by third world immigrants, but it does
not keep statistics of violence directed against third world
immigrants by Italians.
The Lombard League and other recently formed, grass-roots
political groupings which espouse separatist and nationalist
themes continue to attract followers. Some of the League's
policies are widely perceived to have racist overtones. The
1154
ITALY
Lombard League's policy supporting strict limits on third world
iitmigration into Italy and on the rights and benefits which
those immigrants enjoy once in Italy are two examples cited by
critics. Another is the League's policy favoring greater self-
government for the north because it regards the poorer regions
of southern Italy as culturally and ethnically distinct areas
that allegedly inhibit the economic growth and development of
the more prosperous north.
Despite the Italian authorities' efforts to integrate the Gypsy
population into Italian society, Gypsy communities continue to
stand out and to attract negative, sometimes violent, attention.
Local administrations and communities have shown greater
sensitivity to the need to ensure equal treatment of those who
belong to "nomad" groups and who are, for the most part, Italian
citizens. While a number of initiatives are awaiting
implementation, however, the increase in pickpocketing and other
petty street crimes in which some members of these groups appear
to be the predominant participants is a serious concern for most
Italians and tourists. Approximately 4,000 Gypsies reside in
the greater Rome area. Most of them live in precarious and
unhygienic conditions. In August, partly due to the massive
protests by Roman families opposed to the idea of Gypsies
camping in or near their neighborhoods, the Roman authorities
removed a Gypsy settlement from one area of Rome to another.
Anti-Semitic graffiti and swastikas, probably by extremists of
both the left and the right, continue to appear on walls in
Rome and other Italian cities, but there were no acts of
physical violence against the Jewish community in 1991.
The condition of women has improved greatly over the past 20
years. Subject to social customs, women participate freely in
political and social life, but, despite legal guarantees,
employers continue to favor men over women in filling jobs,
particularly those with prospects for advancement to management.
Women fill only 3.3 percent of managerial positions and are also
poorly represented in the professions. Women tend to remain in
traditional employment areas, although female police officers
are beginning to appear in many Italian cities. Up to the early
1960 's, employers could legally dismiss a woman who married.
Since 1963 it has been illegal to dismiss a female employee
within one year of her marriage date except "for cause."
Women enjoy equal rights with men in marriage, but a women's
group linked to an opposition party estimated in September, on
the basis of a telephone hot-line service, that 30 percent of
Italian married women were subject to physical abuse in the
home. In the event of divorce, a woman is entitled to a share
of the survivor's pension and any inheritance in the event of
the death of her ex-husband. The property of a married couple
is considered community property unless husband and wife agree
to keep their property divided. All assets acquired prior to
marriage are exempt from the community property provision.
Demands by women's groups for more severe penalties against
rapists have been unanswered. Violence against children
continued to attract governmental and media attention during
1991. In a series of incidents, 22 children were killed either
accidentally in organized crime shootouts or because they were
witnesses to crimes.
Italy does not have any important national women's rights
groups independent of political parties or trade unions.
1155
ITALY
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Workers' Statute of 1970 provides for the right to establish
a trade union, to join a union, and to carry out union
activities in the workplace. Trade unions are not government
controlled, and the Constitution fully protects their right to
strike, which is frecpaently exercised. In practice, the three
major labor confederations have strong ideological ties to the
three major political parties and administer certain social
welfare services for the Government, which compensates them
accordingly. Moreover, the Workers' Statute favors the three
confederations to the extent that it is difficult for small
unions, including the so-called "base committees" (COBAS), to
obtain recognition. In 1990, however, one of the COBAS, that
of the locomotive engineers, finally was recognized and seated
at the bargaining table.
Perhaps as the result of a 1990 law limiting the right to
strike in essential public services, Italian workers went on
strike much less in 1991 than in previous years. The number of
hours lost to strikes declined by 53 percent in the first 9
months of 1991. Italian unions associate freely and actively
with international trade union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right of workers to organize and bargain collectively is
protected by the Constitution and is freely practiced throughout
the country. Labor-management relations are governed by
legislation, custom, collective bargaining agreements, and labor
contracts. A key element of labor-management-government
cooperation affecting the industrial relations climate is the
1986 agreement on indexing wages (scala mobile) to the cost of
living every 6 months. National collective bargaining
agreements in practice apply to all workers regardless of union
membership. Collective bargaining at the national level
(involving the three confederations, the public and private
employers' organizations and, where appropriate, the Government)
occurs irregularly and deals with issues of mutual concern,
particularly the system of wage indexation. Sectoral
negotiations, involving national-level industrial unions and
employers' organizations, typically occur every 3 or 4 years
and cover all aspects of labor relations; they also apply to
all workers, whether unionized or not. Voluntary, nonbinding
mediation is provided by the Ministry of Labor and is often
effective in bringing labor and management together.
There are no areas of the country, such as export processing
zones, where union organizing and collective bargaining are
impeded or discouraged. The law prohibits antiunion
discrimination by employers against union members and
organizers. A new law in 1990 encourages workers in small
enterprises (i.e., fewer than 16 employees) to join unions and
requires "just cause" for dismissals from employment.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor, which is prohibited by law, does
not exist in practice.
1156
ITALY
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Under current legislation, no child under 15 years of age may
be employed (with some specified exceptions). The Ministry of
Labor, having consulted with the labor organizations, may as an
exception authorize the employment on specific jobs of children
over 12 years of age. There are also specific restrictions on
employment in various dangerous or unhealthful occupations up
to the age of 18 for men and 21 for women, although no women,
regardless of age, are permitted to be employed underground, in
quarries, mines, or tunnels. Minimum age and compulsory
education laws (through age 14) are effectively enforced.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no minimum wage set under Italian law; basic wages and
salaries are set forth in collective bargaining agreements.
National collective bargaining agreements contain minimum
standards to which individual employment agreements must
conform. In the absence of agreement between the parties, the
courts may step in to determine fair wages on the basis of
practice in related activities or related collective bargaining
agreements .
Minimum work and safety standards are established by law and
buttressed and extended in collective labor contracts. The
Basic Law of 1923 provides for a maximum workweek of 48 hours
— no more than 6 days per week and 8 hours per day. The 8-hour
day may be exceeded for some special categories. Most
collective bargaining agreements provide for a 36- to 38-hour
week. Overtime may not exceed 2 hours per day or an average of
12 hours per week.
Basic health and safety standards and guidelines for
compensation for on-the-job injury are set forth in an
extensive body of law and regulations. In most cases, these
standards are exceeded in collective bargaining agreements.
Enforcement of health and safety regulations is entrusted to
labor inspectors, who are employees of local health units and
have the same status as judicial police officers. Inspectors
make periodic visits to companies to ensure observance of
safety regulations. Violators may be fined or even imprisoned.
It is common for Italian judges to find employees guilty of
infractions. Trade unions also play an important role in
reporting safety violations to inspectors. As of December 1990,
work-related deaths in industry totaled 1,368 and in agriculture
442, slight decreases from 1989 (when there were 1,550 in
industry and 607 in agriculture) . Part of the problem is an
inadequate number of inspectors. Due to high unemployment,
there is also pressure on workers to accept unsafe conditions
as a necessary evil if they need jobs. There are many
substandard workplaces in Italy, especially in the south.
1157
LATVIA
In 1991 Latvia regained its independence after some 50 years of
Soviet occupation. The United States Government, which had not
recognized the forcible annexation of Latvia by the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) in 1940, resumed full
diplomatic relations with the Latvian Government in September.
The Soviet Government recognized Latvia's independence, and
Latvia was admitted as a member of the United Nations in that
same month.
In January and again in August 1991, Soviet political and
military forces tried forcibly to overthrow the legitimate
Latvian authorities. After occupying the central publishing
house in Riga, the capital, Soviet Interior Ministry special
forces on January 20 stormed the Latvian Interior Ministry,
causing the deaths of two local militia guards and several
civilians. A self-proclaimed "Committee of National Salvation"
announced it was taking over the functions of the Latvian
Government, but after several weeks of confrontation the
legitimate Latvian authorities retained control of the
country. Residents of Latvia confirmed their strong support
for independence at the ballot box on March 3 in a nonbinding
"advisory" referendum.
During the attempted coup against Soviet President Gorbachev in
August, which was welcomed by the Latvian Communist Party,
Soviet Interior Ministry special forces (Black Berets) shot a
Latvian motorist to death and killed three other civilians.
The arrest of the coup leaders in Moscow marked the end of the
attempted coup in Latvia as well. The Latvian Government
subsequently outlawed the Communist party.
Latvia is a parliamentary democracy. The highest legislative
authority is the Supreme Council, and its Chairman serves as
Head of State. A prime minister, elected by the Parliament, is
the chief executive official. Day-to-day government operations
are the responsibility of the Council of Ministers, elected by
the Parliament and directed by the Prime Minister. The 1922
Constitution was restored in August. Pending the adoption of a
new constitution, the Parliament in December adopted a
constitutional law providing for basic rights and freedoms.
The Latvian economy in 1991 remained largely dependent on that
of the Soviet Union, but historically it has performed better
than the Soviet economy. Latvian authorities undertook
significant price reforms in 1991, allowing many prices to rise
closer to market levels than ever before. Efforts are under
way to privatize agriculture and return property nationalized
by the Soviets to its rightful owners.
On the whole, progress in the observance of human rights
continued in 1991 in terms of respect for the individual and
civil liberties, although legislative reforms that would
institutionalize human rights improvements remain to be
adopted. Questions about the ramifications of possible changes
in the citizenship law and implementation of the ban on the
Communist Party remain unresolved.
1158
LATVIA
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.
No such killings by Latvian authorities are known to have
occurred.
Soviet Interior Ministry special forces (Black Berets)
precipitated a crisis on January 2 by forcibly occupying the
central publishing house in Riga on the eve of its scheduled
transformation into a joint stock company. As Latvians
established barricades to protect important public buildings
from Soviet takeover, a Black Beret unit on January 16 shot to
death a Latvian truck driver whose vehicle was part of a
barricade. On January 20, Black Berets assaulted the Latvian
Interior Ministry with automatic weapons, killing two local
militia guards. Black Berets also killed two Latvian
journalists and a teenage boy who, along with many other
civilians, rushed to the scene when firing broke out.
On August 19, the first day of the attempted coup against
President Gorbachev, Black Berets shot to death a Latvian
motorist who apparently refused to stop his vehicle when they
fired warning shots into the air. Soviet forces killed three
more civilians in other incidents before the coup attempt
failed on August 21.
b. Disappearance
There were no known instances of abductions or disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhioman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
Torture is prohibited under Article 15 of the Constitutional
Law.
Prisons in Latvia were administered under Soviet standards for
much of the year. Prisoners were harshly treated during both
interrogation and confinement in labor camps and prisons.
Physical and psychological abuse of prisoners, overcrowding,
and detention under extremely unhealthful conditions were
common. Since the coup attempt, Latvian authorities have moved
to correct such abuses.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Soviet Black Beret forces illegally detained civilians (e.g.,
the director of the Latvian publishing house) as part of their
prolonged campaign of harassment and intimidation. Between
January and August, there were at least seven instances in
which dozens of Latvians were detained, beaten, robbed, and
killed by Black Beret forces. For example, between May and
June, attacks on Latvian border post guards by Black Beret
forces involved beating the border guards and stealing their
personal possesions and the property of the border posts (e.g.,
cars and typewriters). The Latvian prosecutor's office is
investigating these incidents. Latvian authorities have not
engaged in these practices. According to Article 15 of the
Constitutional Law, a person may be detained for up to 72 hours
without a judicial warrant. A system to check abuses of this
requirement is not yet in place.
1159
LATVIA
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There are two levels of courts in the Latvian judicial system:
an "initial" court and an appeals court. The present judicial
system is based on the Soviet judicial system. A draft law on
court reform is being reviewed by Parliament.
While it is the aim of the Latvian authorities to develop a
modern judicial system, efforts to reform it during the past
year have been limited. Criminal procedural codes have been
changed to make the prosecutor independent. Detainees are now
allowed the right to have their attorney present during
c[uestioning. Judicial operations were further hampered for
much of the year by the presence of two procurators in Latvia,
one representing the local authorities and one loyal to
Moscow. In general, the Latvian judiciary appears to be
independent of the executive authorities.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitutional Law provides for privacy of communications
and residence, with certain exceptions. Until the August coup
attempt, Soviet-controlled security organs interfered in the
personal lives of citizens through the use of informers, the
opening of mail, and technical surveillance, including
wiretaps. They also continued to monitor the contacts of
Latvians with foreigners. Latvian authorities are currently in
the process of dismantling the Soviet state security structure
on their soil. In August a decision was adopted eliminating
the offices of the U.S.S.R. Committee for State Security (KGB)
and other security organizations in Latvia and creating a
Supreme Council Commission to oversee Latvia's takeover of
property formerly belonging to these institutions.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Latvia enjoyed wide freedom of speech throughout 1991. There
was unfettered criticism of both the Latvian and Soviet
Governments, and no subject was off-limits. The Black Beret
takeover of the central publishing house in Riga forced
numerous newspapers and periodicals to find alternative means
of publication through much of the year, but both Latvian and
Russian-language papers appeared regularly. The Government
allocates newsprint. State-owned enterprises control the
central printing house which has been reorganized into a
joint-stock company.
The Latvian Press Law, made effective on January 1, 1991,
prohibits censorship of the press and other mass media. The
Constitutional Law contains provisions on free speech and
press. These laws are being reviewed as part of parliamentary
debates vis-a-vis privatization of the print media and
restructuring of the broadcast media.
The Supreme Council is debating different versions of a law
regarding television and radio. Currently an FM radio station
called "AA" is operating outside the control of the State
Committee for Television and Radio. However, it relies heavily
on government support. An independent television company has
been formed but thus far has not been able to gain access to
the airwaves. Several cable/satellite television companies
1160
LATVIA
have sprung up throughout Latvia, and the number of privately
owned television satellite dishes is growing rapidly.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.
Latvian authorities legally have the power to prohibit public
gatherings on grounds of, for example, fear of public disorder,
but seldom exercise it. In 1991 numerous mass meetings and
public gatherings took place without government interference.
The Constitution provides for the right to associate in public
organizations. As a result of the failed coup, however,
the activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as
well as of other organizations which actively supported the
coup (e.g., Interfront, a political organization representing
mostly ethnic Russians in Latvia), were officially banned.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Government does not interfere in the exercise of religious
freedom. The dominant faiths are Lutheran and Eastern
Orthodox. Foreign evangelists are permitted to hold meetings
and proselytize.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Since the U.S.S.R.'s recognition of Latvian independence,
Soviet border officials have cooperated with Latvian
authorities in the process of transferring border controls to
the Latvians. Until trained Latvian replacements are
available, Soviet border guards continue to function at most
ports of entry. The number of Latvians traveling abroad has
increased dramatically over the past 2 to 3 years. Currently
there are no obstacles to freedom of movement within the
country, foreign travel, or repatriation.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government.
Despite the determined efforts of conservative forces loyal to
Moscow, Latvia succeeded in reestablishing its independence
from the Soviet Union in August.
There are several political parties and movements representing
a wide array of opinions. There is no discrimination, in law
or in practice, against the participation of women in
government and politics.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights.
The Government welcomed visits by human rights organizations
and received a delegation from the U.S. Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or other grounds is
prohibited in the Constitution. Tensions are present, however,
in the relationship between ethnic Latvians and the large
Russian population in Latvia. During the years of Soviet rule,
there was a dramatic increase in the immigration of
1161
LATVIA
non-Latvians, largely Russians, brought in as laborers and
administrators. Today Latvians constitute barely 50 percent of
the population.
As a result, the issue of defining the requirements for
citizenship is highly contentious. No final decisions have
been made, but some groups in Latvia and abroad have been
concerned by proposals which appear to be openly discriminatory
against nonethnic Latvians.
According to the Supreme Council's law on human rights and
civic obligations only citizens may occupy state positions,
establish political parties, own land, choose a place of abode
on Latvian territory, leave Latvia, or return to it.
According to the Chairman of the Supreme Council on Hioman
Rights and Nationalities, there were no reported incidents of
prejudice or discrimination aginst Gypsies. The Gypsies have
organized their own national cultural society, which is one of
20 other such societies.
Women possess the same legal rights as men and, in addition,
have significant day-care and maternity benefits. Women also,
under the law, receive equal pay for equal work.
Statistics on the problem of violence against women, including
domestic violence, are unavailable. Human rights and women's
rights groups in Latvia are aware of the issue but have not
focused their efforts closely in this area.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Soviet labor law and practice were generally enforced in
Latvia. The Latvian branch of the U.S.S.R.'s All-Union Central
Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) , which disassociated itself
from the All-Union body in Moscow in 1990 and renamed itself
the Latvian Confederation of Free Trade Unions, has been
supportive of Latvian independence. A smaller alternative
Latvian Workers Union has also emerged, as well as independent
unions of civil engineers and public sector workers. New
Latvian legislation on trade unions and collective bargaining
has been passed. Unions have the right to strike, with some
limitations .
At year's end, Latvia renewed its membership in the
International Labor Organization. Unions, now free to
affiliate internationally, are developing contacts with
European trade unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Under Soviet law, workers in Latvia did not have the right to
organize outside the AACCTU, and free collective bargaining did
not exist. Under the new legislation, about which the trade
unions were consulted before it was passed, trade unions may
now function independently of the managers of state-owned
enterprises. However, collective bargaining is still in its
formative stages. With the new freedom, the rate of
unionization in Latvia has reportedly declined to 77 percent.
Union organization in the private sector, now some 7 percent of
the economy, is virtually nonexistent.
There are no export processing zones.
1162
LATVIA
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Prior to the August coup attempt, compulsory labor was a
feature of Soviet-administered prison camps; it has since been
banned .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The statutory minimum age for employment of children is 16.
Minimum age and compulsory education laws are, by all accounts,
enforced by state authorities through inspections.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Code provides for a mandatory 40-hour maximum
workweek, 4 weeks of annual vacation, and a program of
assistance to working mothers with small children. The minimum
wage is now set at a figure that is estimated by the Latvian
authorities to be below the poverty line. Labor conditions in
Latvia have been somewhat better than in the U.S.S.R. Wages in
Latvia are significantly higher, and worker amenities are
considered better, than in the U.S.S.R.
Soviet and Latvian laws establish minimum occupational health
and safety standards for the workplace. These standards seem
to be ignored frequently.
1163
LIECHTENSTEIN
The Principality of Liechtenstein is a constitutional monarchy
and parliamentary democracy whose present Constitution dates
back to 1921. The reigning Prince is the Head of State. All
legislation adopted by the unicameral legislature (Landtag)
must have his concurrence. The Government, whose members are
appointed by the Prince in agreement with the Landtag on the
latter 's proposal, is responsible for the entire administration
of the State.
The Principality's police force maintains internal order and is
aided by a part-time auxiliary police force. Both organizations
are \inder the control of the elected Government and respect
human rights.
Despite its small size (29,000 population, of which over
one-third are foreigners) and limited natural resources,
Liechtenstein has developed during the last three decades from
a rural agrarian society into a prosperous, highly
industrialized, free enterprise economy with an important
service sector. Through a 1923 treaty, it participates in a
customs union with Switzerland and uses the Swiss franc as its
national currency. Unemployment is virtually nonexistent, and
Liechtenstein enjoys one of the highest standards of living in
the world.
Individual human rights are ensured by the Constitution and
protected in practice. As it has become increasingly involved
in international forums during the past decade, Liechtenstein
has demonstrated a strong interest in and commitment to the
protection of human rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There is no history of politically motivated killings, and none
is known to have occurred in 1991.
b. Disappearance
There have been no known abductions, secret arrests, or
clandestine detentions.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
Torture and cruel punishment are prohibited by law, and there
have been no reports of violations.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention is provided for by
law and observed in practice. The rules of evidence and
procedure applied by the courts are to a great extent based on
Austrian models. Any person detained by the authorities must
appear before an examining magistrate not later than 24 hours
after arrest. The magistrate must either state formal charges
or release the prisoner. The right to legal counsel is
guaranteed. If the accused cannot afford representation, the
State provides the cost of defense. Release on personal
recognizance or bail is granted unless the examining magistrate
1164
LIECHTENSTEIN
believes the person is a danger to society or will not appear
for trial. There is no exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for public trials. There is a
procedure for judicial appeal, and the judiciary is separated
from the executive and legislative branches. Liechtenstein has
a three-tier system of courts, a lower court, a high court, and
a supreme court. The Constitution also provides for an
administrative court, which hears appeals against any government
decisions. A state court, which protects the rights accorded
in the Constitution, decides on conflicts of jurisdiction
between the law courts and the administrative authorities and
acts as a disciplinary court for members of the Government.
There are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for personal liberty, the immunity of
the home, and the inviolability of letters and telephone
conversations, including the freedom from wiretaps. Police
need a judicial warrant to search private property. No
violations have been reported.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
An independent press, effective judiciary, and democratic
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and
press. There are two newspapers, each representing the
interests of one of the two major political parties. There are
no television or radio broadcasting facilities within the
Principality, but residents freely receive radio and television
broadcasts from neighboring Switzerland, Austria, and Germany,
and many are also cable television subscribers. Academic
freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly and association are protected by the
Constitution and observed in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion
Liechtenstein enjoys religious freedom. The state church is
Roman Catholic, and 87 percent of the population practice that
faith. Other denominations are entitled to practice their
faiths and to hold religious services. Foreign clergy are free
to perform their duties in Liechtenstein.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Liechtenstein citizens have the freedom to travel in or outside
the country and can emigrate without difficulty. There is no
restriction on repatriation of Liechtenstein citizens abroad.
Refugees are not forced to return to countries in which they
fear they would be persecuted.
1165
LIECHTENSTEIN
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The monarchy is hereditary in the male line. The unicameral
legislature, comprising 25 deputies, is elected by the people
every 4 years by proportional representation. The Constitution
provides for the right to vote, which is universal, equal,
secret, and direct. A coalition of the two major political
parties has formed the Government since 1938. Although there
are some historical differences between these two parties, as
well as disagreements over some local issues, a high degree of
political consensus exists, and the rights of emerging
opposition and splinter groups are respected. The electorate
regularly makes use of its right to participate in initiatives
and referendums. Women gained the right to vote in national
elections in 1984.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The only known human rights group based in Liechtenstein,
Justitia, is an informal group of three or four persons who
monitor prison conditions. They do so without government
restriction.
There have been no requests for the investigation of human
rights violations. Liechtenstein has consistently cooperated
with international and nongovernmental groups in all areas of
human rights and has demonstrated a particular interest in and
support for human rights and minority rights in international
organizations .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination based on race, language, or social status does
not exist.
The ec[uality of women is not specifically guaranteed in law.
Several groups monitor and promote women's rights. They report
that the Government is cooperative with respect to their
concerns and in some cases provides financial support. Although
laws are in place against discrimination in the workplace,
these groups note that further implementation is necessary to
ensure equal pay and other benefits for women. The
discrimination that persists today is social and traditional,
not legal, but it nevertheless hinders opportunities for women
in fields that have been traditionally dominated by men.
Violence against women is unusual. Wife beating is prohibited
by law, and Liechtenstein has facilities through which women
who are victims of violence may obtain help and counseling.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers, including foreign workers in Liechtenstein, have
the freedom to associate, join the unions of their choice, and
select their own union representatives. The existing social
peace, in part due to a high standard of living and an economy
at full employment, has resulted in a low demand for organized
worker representation. The one trade union comprises 13 percent
1166
LIECHTENSTEIN
of the work force but looks after the interest of nonmembers as
well. It is free to affiliate internationally.
Workers have the right to strike except in certain work
categories, as outlined in work contracts and agreed to by the
employees concerned. No strikes are known to have taken place
in the last 25 years.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The law provides workers the right to organize and bargain
collectively. This right is recognized for all professions;
however, because Liechtenstein enjoys the world's highest per
capita income for a state without oil resources and because
wealth is well distributed, it is rarely exercised. There are
no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law and does not
exist in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The employment of children under the age of 15 is prohibited.
Children are required to remain in school for 9 years. Child
labor laws are enforced by the Government, and adolescent
workers are provided special protection by law.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no national minimum wage; wages are eimong the highest
in the world. Liechtenstein law sets the maximiim workweek at
46 hours in industrial firms and 50 hours in nonindustrial
firms. In practice the average workweek is 40-42 hours.
Workers under the age of 20 receive a minimum of 5 weeks of
vacation. After 20, they receive a minimum of 4 weeks.
Occupational health and safety standards are set by law and
protect the worker in the workplace. A safe working
environment is enforced by a government Department for Worker
Safety. The trade union also monitors working conditions.
There were no allegations of worker rights abuses from any
domestic or foreign source.
1167
LITHUANIA
Lithuania became independent again in 1991 after more than 50
years of occupation by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(U.S.S.R.). The United States Government, which had refused to
recognize Lithuania's forcible incorporation into the U.S.S.R.
in 1940, reestablished formal diplomatic relations with the
Lithuanian Government in September, and the Soviet Union, like
many other states, recognized Lithuania's independence. In
September Lithuania joined the United Nations.
In January and in August, Soviet authorities attempted to
overthrow the elected Government of Lithuania. On January 8,
Communist-organized protests, including a mob attack on the
Parliament building, led to the resignation of Prime Minister
Kazimiera Prunskiene. On January 10, Soviet military and
security forces, claiming that they were protecting Soviet and
Communist Party property, seized the central publishing house
and several other premises in Vilnius, the capital city. Three
days later, they forcibly took over the central television
tower in Vilnius, killing 13 civilians and injuring scores of
others. A shadowy National Salvation Committee declared itself
the legitimate government of Lithuania.
Despite the results of a referendum on February 9 in which 90
percent of the voters approved Lithuania's independence, Soviet
military and security forces continued to harass Lithuania,
capturing young Lithuanian males for induction into the armed
forces, seizing additional government buildings, attacking and
burning Lithuanian border posts, and beating and sometimes
killing customs and police officials. When the attempted coup
against Soviet President Gorbachev began on August 19, Soviet
military troops took over some communications and government
facilities in Vilnius and other cities but returned to their
barracks when the coup failed. The Lithuanian Government then
banned the Communist Party and ordered confiscation of its
property.
Lithuania is a parliamentary democracy. An elected, unicameral
legislature, the Supreme Council, passes laws and selects
government ministers. The Chairman of the Supreme Council,
Vytautas Landsbergis, serves as Head of State. The Government,
consisting of a Council of Ministers headed by a Prime Minister,
exercises executive authority with parliamentary approval.
Lithuania adopted a temporary Constitution in 1990, which is an
amended version of its 1938 constitution. A new constitution
is being drafted and will be voted on in a national referendum
when completed.
The primary law enforcement organization is the Lithuanian
police, which replaced the militia of the Soviet period. Until
independence, Soviet militia forces. Interior Ministry troops,
and the Committee for State Security (KGB) were present in
Lithuania in large numbers and continued to monitor the
Lithuanian population.
Lithuania enjoyed a higher standard of living than many of the
former Soviet republics. Nevertheless, the general Soviet
economic decline affected Lithuania, leading to economic
inefficiencies, shortages, and some rationing. In 1991 the
Lithuanian Government announced plans to establish a market
economy. To this end, the Parliament passed preliminary
legislation on privatization, investment, and banking, and the
Government began a program to raise prices to reflect market
conditions.
1168
LITHUANIA
The human rights situation in the first 8 months of 1991 was
characterized by severe Soviet repression, including harassment,
detentions, and killings which occurred against a backdrop of
rising aspirations of the Lithuanian populace for national
independence and full sovereignty. Following the failure of
the attempted coup in the U.S.S.R. in August, the Lithuanian
authorities fully took over the apparatus of government and put
into effect a number of laws intended to protect the rights of
citizens. Freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and
religion are provided in law and respected in practice. Concern
was expressed that the rights of the Polish minority may have
been infringed by the suspension of local government bodies;
the Lithuanian authorities say that there is no discrimination
in law or practice against ethnic Poles or other minorities.
The foreign press has reported on the rehabilitation of some
persons alleged to have been involved in crimes against
humanity during the period of Nazi occupation; the Lithuanian
Government has asserted that they are rehabilitating only
persons charged under Soviet law with anti-Soviet crimes, and
that persons charged with crimes against humanity cannot be
rehabilitated without a full review of those charges.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of such killings by Lithuanian
authorities .
During their campaign to seize government and other buildings
from the Lithuanian authorities, Soviet military and security
forces on January 13 assaulted the central television tower in
Vilnius, killing 13 Lithuanian civilians and injuring many
others. Soviet military and civilian authorities refused to
cooperate with the Lithuanian Procurator General in
investigating these deaths. The U.S.S.R. Procurator General's
office issued its own report on the January killings, blaming
the deaths on "armed Lithuanians" operating in the environs of
the television tower.
Later in the year, Soviet security forces attacked Lithuanian
border posts on several occasions. In one such incident on
July 31, seven Lithuanian police and customs officials at the
Medininkai border post were killed. Despite investigative
efforts by the Lithuanian Procurator's office and promises of
assistance from Soviet authorities, the perpetrators were not
identified. During the August coup attempt, a Lithuanian
Parliament guard was killed by Soviet soldiers who forced their
way onto the grounds of the Parliament. Two Soviet soldiers
were seized by Lithuanian security forces at the scene and
await trial; a third reportedly escaped.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of abductions or disappearances caused by
Lithuanian officials.
According to Lithuanian authorities, Soviet military patrols
before the recognition of Lithuanian independence forcibly
abducted several Lithuanians of draft age for induction into
the Soviet armed forces. At that time, many Lithuanian men
refused to submit to the Soviet military draft and were
1169
LITHUANIA
encouraged by the Lithuanian Government not to respect Soviet
draft laws. The Soviet authorities generally refused to
disclose the whereabouts of these men for some time, but all
have been released and have returned to Lithuania, as have all
Lithuanian troops previously serving in the Soviet army.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although such practices were prohibited under Soviet law,
Lithuanian officials and citizens report many instances in
which Soviet military and security personnel subjected numerous
Lithuanians, detained on various grounds, to brutal beatings
and degrading treatment. In some cases, the victims had to be
hospitalized and suffered permanent injury. Soviet security
personnel also reportedly beat Lithuanian customs officers
during attacks on border posts.
Lithuanians who were imprisoned by Soviet authorities,
particularly political prisoners, were harshly treated. They
commonly suffered physical and psychological abuse and were
detained under extremely unhealthful conditions. Since
reestablishing its independence, Lithuania has made serious
efforts to improve such conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Before independence Soviet military and security authorities in
Lithuania detained a nvimber of persons without warrant,
including the Lithuanian Defense Department head, a member of
Parliament. Lithuanian law forbids arbitrary arrest,
detention, or exile. There were no reported instances in which
Lithuanian authorities engaged in such activities. Police may
detain a person for up to 72 hours based upon reliable evidence
of criminal activity. At the end of that period, a warrant
must be approved by a magistrate and a decision made whether or
not to make a formal arrest. The authorities have a total of
10 days in which to present a prima facie case. The right to
an attorney reportedly exists from the moment of detention.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Soviet legal practices prevailed throughout much of the year,
but Lithuania began to establish its own control over the
judicial apparatus through appointments and elections of
procurators and judges without approval from Moscow. Until the
August coup attempt, this basic division was reflected in the
existence of two procurators general: one appointed by the
Lithuanian Parliament, and the other by Soviet authorities.
A defendant has the right to counsel. While there does not
seem to be a public defender system as such, a new association
of private lawyers has been formed. No political trials are
known to have taken place in 1991.
Lithuanian government efforts to rehabilitate persons charged
with anti-Soviet crimes led to reports that some people alleged
to have been involved in crimes against humanity during the
Nazi occupation were also benefiting from this rehabilitation.
Because of the international attention to this issue, however,
a special judicial procedure has been established to examine
when a crime against humanity may have been involved and whether
or not the person was ever formally charged with this offense.
Such persons may not be rehabilitated until their cases have
been fully reviewed.
1170
LITHUANIA
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence .
Prior to independence, the Soviet security apparatus continued
to operate openly in Lithuania, employing informers and
technical means to monitor correspondence and telephone
conversations in selected cases. These practices ceased with
the end of Soviet rule. Except in cases of hot pursuit or the
danger of disappearance of evidence, search warrants are
required before police may enter private dwellings.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech is widely respected in Lithuania. Despite
Soviet seizure of the central publishing house and radio and
television stations in January, the non-Communist Lithuanian
media were able to find alternate facilities to continue
publishing and broadcasting, albeit with reduced circulation
and broadcasting area. Free Lithuanian television programs
were broadcast from studios and transmission facilities in
Kaunas, except when Soviet troops briefly seized these sites
during the August coup attempt. According to the Government,
there is no exercise of prior restraint over either print or
broadcast media and no restriction on disclosure, save for
cases of national security. However, the press itself has
complained of various forms of restraint on its freedom and has
undertaken strikes and demonstrations to publicize its cause.
There are no private or independent radio or television
stations, although the Government and the Parliament are
discussing the establishment of independent media outlets.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Lithuania witnessed a large number of mass meetings and public
gatherings without interference from Lithuanian or Soviet
authorities. According to the Ministry of Justice, there are
currently no laws that prohibit or restrict public gatherings,
even on the grounds of public order. Large numbers of
Lithuanians stood vigil outside the Parliament in Vilnius on
numerous occasions, especially during the January events. Mass
gatherings also took place on the occasion of funerals for
those who died in January and July. The Lithuanian Popular
Front, Sajudis, held several large rallies in Vilnius without
incident, as did Lithuanian trade unionists and supporters of
the Soviet presence in Lithuania.
The 1990 basic law respects the right of Lithuanians to
associate freely, requiring only that they inform the Government
of large gatherings or demonstrations. The authorities are
working on regulations for the issuance of permits. However,
the Lithuanian Parliament on August 22 outlawed the Moscow-
backed Communist Party in Lithuania in light of its activities
in January and August and seized Communist Party properties.
It also banned other organizations associated with the Soviet
occupation authorities.
c. Freedom of Religion
There have been no arbitrary restrictions on the exercise of
religious freedom since the declaration of independence. The
Government recognizes no state religion and actively supports
religious diversity. The former Jesuit college in Kaunas was
reestablished, and numerous Catholic churches around the country
1171
LITHUANIA
were reopened. A Jewish Culture Center was established in
Vilnius.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Before Lithuania achieved full independence, Soviet authorities
possessed the means to exert control over movement within and
into the country but generally did not interfere with such
movement. Since recognizing Lithuania's independence, Soviet
border control personnel have worked closely with Lithuanian
authorities to monitor cross-border traffic. Under Lithuanian
law, Lithuanian citizens are permitted -.free movement within,
and return to, Lithuania.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Lithuania is now a parliamentary democracy. There are no
political parties as such, but the members of Parliament are
divided according to groups. At present there are nine groups,
and more are likely to be formed. They differ on matters of
ideology, national identity, and personal or political loyalty.
Nearly all derive from the Sajudis movement, which was a broadly
based, proindependence and proreform movement that led the
nation to independence. Elections are called by Parliament at
5-year intervals and are freely conducted by secret ballot
available in the Lithuanian, Russian, and Polish languages.
Suffrage is universal. There was one byelection in 1991, and
one local election is slated for March 1992.
There are no restrictions on women's participation in politics
or government .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Lithuanian authorities actively encouraged international and
nongovernmental human rights groups to travel to Lithuania to
bear witness to the effects of Soviet repression as well as to
investigate allegations of Lithuanian mistreatment of
minorities. Members of the U.S. Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe visited Lithuania on several occasions,
as did members of international human rights organizations.
According to the Lithuanian Government, several domestic human
rights groups have already been registered, and more are
expected to follow.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Lithuanian Constitution prohibits discrimination based on
race, sex, religion, or ethnic background. Non-Lithuanian
ethnic groups, comprising about 20 percent of the population,
include Russians, Jews, and Poles.
Relations between Lithuanian authorities and non-Lithuanian
communities, especially the sizable Polish community in Vilnius
and the southwest region of Lithuania, are strained. In the
spring, representatives of the Polish community voted to
establish a Polish autonomous region in Lithuania which the
Government of Lithuania declared illegal. After the August
coup attempt, Lithuanian authorities removed local officials
elected in the regions inhabited by a majority of Poles,
50-726 - 92 - 38
1172
LITHUANIA
alleging that they had worked closely with Moscow and supported
the coup attempt. Lithuanian administrators were appointed
pending the election of new officials. Although a date for new
local elections has not been announced, the Government has
indicated that they must be held by September 1992.
Non-Lithuanians, especially Poles, have alleged job and salary
discrimination based on the imposition of Lithuanian-language
requirements. A new citizenship law went into effect on
December 11, 1991. While ostensibly nondiscriminatory in its
precepts, the law mentions "Lithuanian origin" in establishing
claims to citizenship, which could work against ethnic Poles or
Russians who apply. The Polish community has also expressed
concern over Lithuanian proposals to redraw administrative
boundaries to break up predominantly Polish territorial units.
This idea has since been dropped by the Lithuanian authorities.
The Constitution provides the same rights for women as for men.
Women also possess significant maternity and day-care benefits.
Official policy specifies equal pay for equal work. However,
in Lithuanian society in general, there are inequalities based
on sex. Women are underrepresented in the political leadership,
in some professions, and in the still emerging new management
class.
Statistics are not available on the incidence of abuse directed
at women. Fledgling women's rights organizations are attempting
to increase public awareness of women's issues in the country.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Prior to the August coup attempt, Lithuanian workers remained
largely subject to Soviet labor law, which did not permit the
right to associate freely in practice. The Lithuanian branch
of the U.S.S.R.'s All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions
adapted to the trend toward Lithuanian independence by renaming
itself the Confederation of Free Trade Unions. However, by its
own admission, its membership is 70 percent Communist. In
January Communist-backed unions struck briefly in support of
Soviet authorities. During the August coup attempt, the
Confederation did not denounce the plotters. A genuinely free,
independent trade union called the Lithuanian Workers Union
(LDS) which emerged in 1990 was permitted, following the failure
of the coup attempt, to take over the headquarters that the
Government had confiscated from the Confederation. A third
grouping that is close to the Social Democrats also emerged in
1991.
Since the coup, Lithuania has adopted legislation reconfirming
the right of workers to form independent unions and, with
certain restrictions, to strike. However, the LDS maintains
that its organizing efforts are still hampered by the holdover
Communist managers in many enterprises.
On October 4, Lithuania was formally readmitted to the
International Labor Organization.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Under Soviet law, Lithuanian workers did not have the right to
organize outside the official trade union system, and free
collective bargaining did not exist in practice. Lithuanian
legislation since the coup confirms the right to organize and
1173
LITHUANIA
bargain collectively, but plant level bargaining is only in its
infancy. Since the economy is still predominantly in the hands
of the State, the unions seek redress at the political level.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.
Compulsory labor was a feature of Soviet-administered prisons
in Lithuania; it has since been banned.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Government has retained the minimum age for employment of
children at 16, and it has added 1 year to compulsory education,
bringing the total to 12 years of schooling. Lithuanian
authorities enforce minimum age and compulsory education laws
through a system of inspections.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Labor conditions in Lithuania were similar to, but sometimes
better than, those in the Soviet Union. According to known
Soviet statistics, wages in all categories of workers in
Lithuania were above the Soviet average. By law, white-collar
workers enjoy a 40-hour workweek; blue-collar staff, a 48-hour
workweek with premium pay for overtime.
Soviet and Lithuanian laws establish minimum health and safety
standards for the workplace. However, worker complaints
indicate that these standards seem frequently to be ignored.
1174
LUXEMBOURG
Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy with a democratic
parliamentary form of government. Executive authority is
exercised by the Prime Minister. The role of the Grand Duke,
the titular Head of State, is largely ceremonial. The Chamber
of Deputies, a unicameral legislature, encompasses the full
political spectrum, and an appointed body, the Council of State,
reviews legislation before it is submitted to the Chamber.
The police and gendarmerie maintain order throughout the country
and are subordinate to governmental and judicial authority.
Judicial and penal systems are considered open, efficient, and
fair .
Luxembourg has a prosperous free market economy with active
industrial and services sectors. Its standard of living and
its level of social benefits are high.
Human rights are valued and safeguarded throughout Luxembourg.
Individual rights are protected by law and respected in practice
by both the Government and the populace. Luxembourg's large
foreign population (28 percent) is well integrated into society
and the economy at large. National practices in apparent
conflict with human rights are quickly and publicly addressed.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Killing for political reasons did not occur.
b. Disappearance
There were no known abductions or secret arrests.
c. Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture or other unusual punishment is prohibited by law and
does not occur .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Due process is provided for by law and observed in practice.
Except in cases of hot pursuit, judicial warrants are required
for arrests. Detainees must be charged and appear before a
judge within 24 hours of arrest. Prisoners are not held
incommunicado, and immediate access to an attorney is granted.
Preventive detention is not practiced. Those who are charged
are held pending trial or released on bail at the judge's
discretion. Forced exile is never imposed.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Luxembourg has an independent and fair judicial system with a
right of appeal. Civilians are not subject to military courts.
All defendants have access to legal counsel, at public expense
if necessary. All charges are formally and publicly stated.
Defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court
of law. They have the right to a public trial, cross-
examination of witnesses, and presentation of evidence. Either
the defendant or the prosecutor may appeal a ruling. An appeal
1175
LUXEMBOURG
results in a completely new judicial procedure, with the
possibility that a sentence may be either increased or
decreased. There are no political prisoners.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The right to privacy is protected by law and respected in
practice. A judicial warrant is required to enter a private
home, to monitor private correspondence, or to conduct
electronic surveillance. Freedom of choice in private matters
is respected.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and of the press is legally protected and
respected in practice. Print media are privately owned and
free of governmental interference. A privately owned national
radio and television company has exclusive rights for radio and
television broadcasting within Luxembourg, although broadcasts
from neighboring countries are freely and legally available.
The company is subject to governmental oversight but functions
independent ly .
Censorship is not legally imposed, but the societal consensus
on propriety largely precludes dissemination of extreme
pornography or of sensitive information concerning national
security or the Royal Family. Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of peaceful assembly and association is provided for by
law and exists in practice. No limitations are imposed on
orderly public meetings or demonstrations. Permits for public
demonstrations are routinely issued.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion, and full freedom of religious
choice exists. No restrictions exist on the maintenance of
places of worship, religious training or instruction,
publication of religious material, or participation in
charitable activities. Foreign clergy practice freely. The
State pays the salaries of Roman Catholic, Protestant, and
Jewish clergy. Local governments often provide and maintain
facilities. Luxembourg is nominally about 95 percent Roman
Catholic.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There is full freedom of domestic and foreign travel,
emigration, and repatriation. Luxembourg asylum policy grants
asylum seekers due process and full consideration of their
cases. Asylum is granted those fleeing repression or risking
persecution in their home countries.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Luxembourg is a fully functional multiparty democracy.
Universal suffrage exists for all citizens aged 18 and above.
Policy is freely debated within government and society. There
1176
LUXEMBOURG
is no risk in dissent — opposition groups and political parties
operate without fear of government repression. National
elections are held every 5 years; local elections occur every 6
years. Representatives are chosen by secret ballots in direct
elections based on a proportional system. Multiple candidates
run for most positions. Luxembourg's foreign population may
not vote but may indirectly influence the political process
through membership in labor unions and other organizations.
Women participate freely in the political process.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The activities of local and international human rights groups
are not restricted. There were no requests to investigate
human rights abuses in Luxembourg in 1991. Luxembourg
consistently supports international and nongovernmental
investigations of alleged human rights violations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Racial, social, or sexual discrimination is prohibited by law.
In practice, blatant discrimination rarely occurs, and relations
between groups are good. The vast majority of the foreign
population (28 percent of the total) comes from within the
European Community. Luxembourg recognizes a need for foreign
workers, and foreigners generally assimilate into the overall
society and economy without difficulty.
Women and men enjoy the same property rights, and equal pay for
ec[ual work is mandated by law. Without a prenuptial agreement,
property is equally divided upon dissolution of a marriage.
Violence against women is not widespread and is not tolerated
by society or the Government. Several women's rights groups
are active in Luxembourg, including some that aid battered
women .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers have the right to associate freely, choose their
own representatives, publicize views, and determine agendas.
Both Luxembourg law and practice promote union activity and
protect union leaders and members from discrimination. About
65 percent of the labor force is unionized. Membership is not
mandatory. Unions operate free of government interference.
The two largest industrial unions are linked to, but organized
independently of, the Christian Social and the Socialist
parties .
Except for some government workers providing essential
services, all workers have the right to strike. Those
government workers who may strike must observe certain
conditions, such as cooling-off periods. Strikes rarely occur
in Luxembourg. In 1991 there were two 1-day demonstrations by
farmers and a 1-day work stoppage by bank employees. No other
strikes occurred.
Unions maintain unrestricted contact with international bodies,
including the European Trade Union Confederation and the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
1177
LUXEMBOURG
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is protected by law and freely practiced
throughout Luxembourg. Wages are set in free negotiations
between xinions and employers. All businesses having 15 or more
employees must have worker representatives. Businesses with
over 150 employees must form work councils composed of equal
numbers of management and employee representatives. In
businesses with more than 1,000 employees, one-third of the
membership of the boards of directors must be employees'
representatives. Effective procedures exist and are required
to adjudicate employment-related complaints. There are no
export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced compulsory labor is prohibited by law and does not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The employment of children under the age of 15 is prohibited.
Children are required by law to remain in school until they are
16 years old. Apprentices between 15 and 16 years of age must
also attend school. Adolescent workers receive additional
legal protections, including caps on overtime and the number of
hours that may be worked continuously. The Ministries of Labor
and of Education oversee strict enforcement of national child
labor and education laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The current minimum wage legislation, dating from April 1,
1991, provides for a minimum wage for workers at least 18 years
of age with no dependents. Lower, tiered minimum wage rates
apply to younger workers and students between 15 and 18 years
of age and increase yearly by age. Minimum wage rates apply,
without exception, to all sectors of the economy. All wages
and salaries are indexed to the general cost-of-living index.
Supplements to the minimum wage are added for workers with
dependents. Nonetheless, supporting a family in Luxembourg is
difficult on the minimum wage. In practice, Luxembourg's wages
are among the world's highest, and most employees receive more
than the minimum wage.
National legislation mandates a workweek of 40 hours. Premium
pay is required for overtime or unusual hours. Employment on
Sunday is prohibited except in continuous process industries
(steel and chemical) and for certain maintenance and security
personnel. All workers receive a minimum of 5 weeks of paid
vacation yearly, in addition to paid holidays.
Luxembourg's health and safety standards are among the highest
in the world. A safe working environment is mandated by law
and strictly enforced through an inspection system which
provides severe penalties for infractions.
1178
MALTA
Malta is a constitutional republic and parliamentary democracy.
Executive power is vested in a president who appoints as prime
minister the leader of the party which gains a plurality of
seats in the quinquennial elections for the unicameral
legislature. The two major political parties reflect widely
divergent political views. After 16 years of Labor Party rule,
the election in 1987 brought the Nationalist Party to power
with a one-seat majority in Parliament.
Law enforcement and internal security are the responsibility of
the Malta police under the command of a civilian commissioner.
The Minister of the Interior (concurrently Minister of
Education) has jurisdiction over the police. A specially
trained riot police, the Special Assignments Group (SAG), forms
part of the regular police force. Although human rights is a
subject included in the curriculum of the police academy, there
are reports of police brutality.
The Maltese economy is a mix of state-controlled and private
firms. Malta is heavily dependent on tourism. Foreign private
investment in export-oriented, light manufacturing industry is
actively promoted, and the Government is also developing Malta
as a container transshipment point and a center for offshore
business activities.
The Maltese Government is strongly committed to human rights.
Constitutional protection for the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the individual is upheld by an independent
judiciary. Women encounter a degree of culturally based
inequality. In 1991 the Government passed an amendment to the
Constitution, to become effective in July 1993, which prohibits
discrimination based on sex and stipulates equal rights for
women workers .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There have been no reports of political killing.
b. Disappearance
No cases of political disappearance are known to have occurred.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits inhuman or degrading punishment or
treatment. These prohibitions are generally respected in
practice. Allegations of mistreatment by prison authorities of
a foreigner imprisoned for drug smuggling caused the Government
to conduct a legal inquiry into the case, the results of which
were pending at year's end.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention is provided for in
the Constitution and generally respected in practice. The
police may, on the basis of reasonable suspicion, arrest a
person for (questioning. Within 48 hours, persons so arrested
must be brought before the court and charged or released.
1179
MALTA
There is no right to legal counsel during this 48-hour period.
Persons incarcerated pending trial have access to counsel, and
periodic hearings are mandatory. Provision for bail exists.
There are no reports of political exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution requires a fair public trial before an
impartial court. Defendants have the right to counsel of their
choice, at public expense if necessary. They enjoy a
presumption of innocence, may confront witnesses and present
evidence, and have the right of appeal. The courts'
jurisdiction is limited in certain areas. Lay tribunals (e.g.,
the Industrial Tribunal, the Commissioners for Justice, and the
Inheritance Partition Tribunal) have exclusive authority over
certain judicial functions, although their independence is not
legally guaranteed. Defendants in cases before the Industrial
Tribunal or the Public Service Commission may not be represented
by lawyers.
There are no political prisoners.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Protection of the privacy of the home is ensured by the
Constitution and generally respected in practice. Search
warrants may be issued, on reasonable suspicion of crime, by
police officers above the rank of inspector without a court
order. Electronic surveillance is prohibited by law.
Membership and participation in political parties is
voluntary. However, there is strong societal (e.g. , family,
employment) pressure for affiliation with particular parties.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of expression (speech and press) is protected by the
Constitution and generally respected in practice. The only
exception is the 1987 constitutional amendment that bans
foreign participation in local politics (e.g., guest foreign
speakers sponsored by a political party) during the period
prior to an election.
In 1991 the Government passed a new broadcasting law, which
effectively ended state monopoly of the broadcast media. It
provided for the licensing of private radio stations, including
stations for the political parties and the Catholic Church, and
laid down legal guidelines for a commercial cable television
system, which is expected to be in operation in 1992.
Ten privately owned daily, weekly, and monthly newspapers freely
express partisan views. Several newspapers are associated with
political parties. Academic freedom generally is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right of peaceful assembly is provided for in the
Constitution. Police permits are routinely issued for political
meetings and other public activities of political parties or
groups of citizens.
1180
MALTA
c. Freedom of Religion
The right to practice the religion of one's choice is protected
constitutionally and is respected. The overwhelmingly dominant
religion is Roman Catholicism; small numbers of people practice
other religions. State subsidies are granted only to Catholic
schools. In the state schools, students have the opportunity
at some stage to opt for religious instruction in the Catholic
faith.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on movement within the country,
foreign travel, or emigration. Maltese emigrants who have
acquired the citizenship of another country and resided abroad
for a minimum of 6 years may hold dual citizenship.
Foreign nationals claiming refugee status while visiting Malta
generally are not permitted to remain in Malta but are allowed
to stay until arrangements have been made for settlement in a
third country. The Emigrants' Commission, established in 1987
as the local representative of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) , has worked well in providing
assistance and counseling for refugees until they are accepted
by the UNHCR.
In 1991 some 700 Albanians on board two ships sought refuge in
Malta. The Government handled the influx in an orderly and
humanitarian manner, providing the refugees with food, clothing,
and some money. However, they were not permitted to remain.
One ship departed voluntarily, and passengers from the other
ship were returned expeditiously by air to Albania. The
refugees reportedly never asked for asylum.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Malta is a parliamentary democracy in which the incumbent
Nationalist Party and the opposition Malta Labor Party dominate
public life. Political activity is often intense, and partisan
feelings can be very pronounced, heated, and polarized.
Elections in which all parties participate freely are held
every 5 years, with universal suffrage for those 18 years of
age and over. During the 1987 election, 96.11 percent of those
registered actually voted.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Several local human rights groups and persons interested in
promoting and protecting human rights operate freely. The
Government places no restrictions on investigations by
international human rights groups. It is strongly committed to
human rights and is active in international human rights forums.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Maltese citizens have a legal right to housing, employment, and
education on a nondiscriminatory basis. The commissions
established by the Government to process complaints of
injustice inflicted during the previous government's rule
continued their investigations of alleged injustice with
1181
MALTA
respect to the appointments to public offices, the granting of
licenses, permits, and government contracts, and the provision
of public services.
For reasons derived from tradition and culture, Maltese society
has only recently begun to associate women's rights with human
rights. In 1991 the Government approved the publication of a
draft bill in the form of a white paper giving women and men
equal status in marriage. The bill would amend the existing
family law which subordinates married women to their husbands
in economic and financial matters, as well as authority over
the children. The draft bill was being widely publicized and
debated at year's end.
In 1991 the Government passed a constitutional amendment, to
become effective in July 1993, prohibiting all forms of
discrimination based on sex, with the particular aim of
ensuring ec[ual rights for working women and the same wages for
the same work as men.
There are no laws specifically prohibiting abuse of women.
Violence in the family and abuse against women and children
have only recently been brought out in the open. According to
women's groups, violence is more widespread than was previously
believed. A church refuge for women, which also assists
battered women, is partially supported by the Government.
There is also a privately organized association engaged in
counseling and assisting battered women. In response to
pressure by this association and the government-established
Commission for the Advancement of Women, the Government
introduced specialized training for police to deal with family
violence.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right, respected in practice, to associate
freely and to strike. The only groups restrained from striking
are the uniformed personnel of the armed forces and the
police. In 1991 there were 24 registered trade unions
representing 50 percent of the work force.
Although the Government encourages the development of free
trade unions, the largest trade union in Malta, the Gerneral
Workers Union, is institutionally tied to the Malta Labor
Party. The other, smaller unions are generally independent of
political parties. Maltese unions belong to a variety of
international trade union groupings.
During the first 9 months of 1991, there were eight strikes.
All were short stoppages with a maximum duration of 2 days and
a minimum of 2 hours. Reasons for the strikes ranged from
working conditions to recognition of trade unions. There were
no major disputes.
Under the Industrial Relations Act of 1976, the responsible
minister may refer disputes to the Industrial Tribunal for
binding settlement. The International Labor Organization (ILO)
objects to that provision, most recently in the 1991 Committee
of Experts report, pointing out that it in effect limits the
right to strike; however, both labor and employers appear to
have no objection to the clause. In practice, a striking union
can ignore an unfavorable decision by continuing the strike on
another ground. The Government has initiated a study of the
1182
MALTA
1976 Act aimed at bringing it into conformity with European
Community laws as well as ILO Convention 87 on freedom of
association and improving certain provisions, such as those
affecting job security.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers are free, in law and in practice, to organize and
bargain collectively. While most wages are negotiated between
unions and employers, the Government in 1990 mandated a
substantial nationwide wage increase after reaching agreement
with the unions and employers. On December 10, 1990, the three
social partners (government, trade unions, and employers)
signed a comprehensive agreement regulating industrial
relations and income policy. Cost of living increases are now
established in accordance with government statistics based on
the retail price index as calculated by a tripartite,
independent committee. During the term of this 3-year
agreement, the Malta Council for Economic Development will
inform all three partners semiannually of the projected changes
in the price index. The projections are to serve as a basis
for negotiations on collective agreements.
According to the Industrial Relations Act, an employer may not
take action against any employee because he or she belongs to a
trade union. Complaints may be addressed through a court of
law or an industrial tribunal composed of one member each named
by the employer, the union, and the Government. Complaints of
discrimination may also be lodged with the Commission against
Injustices .
There are no export processing zones in Malta.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is constitutionally prohibited and does not
exist. Any claimed violations would be submitted for
adjudication to the Constitutional Court.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children younger than 16 years may not legally be employed.
The law is generally respected and the Department of Labor,
which is responsible for enforcement, does so effectively.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The legal minimum wage, which is generally enforced, provides a
decent standard of living for a worker and family when
government subsidies for housing, health care, and free
education are also added in.
Maximxim hours of work are regulated by Wage Council orders for
various trades. For most sectors, the maximum is 40 hours per
week, but in some trades the maximum allowable is 43 or 45
hours per week. Government labor regulations prescribe daily
rest periods of 1 hour. The annual paid vacation according to
law is currently 22 working days. In general, these laws and
regulations are effectively enforced by the Department of Labor.
The proposed establishment of an authority for workers' health,
safety, and welfare has still not materialized. Enforcement of
occupational health and safety standards, the responsibility of
the Department of Labor, has been lax. Existing laws are
outdated and inadequate to protect workers effectively.
1183
THE NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a
parliamentary legislative system. Executive authority is
exercised by the Prime Minister and Cabinet representing the
governing political parties (traditionally a coalition of at
least two major parties). The bicameral Parliament, in which
the full range of the political spectrum is represented, is
elected through nationwide proportional voting.
The police. Royal Constabulary, and investigative organs
concerned with internal and external security are effectively
subordinated to the executive and judicial authorities.
The Netherlands has a mixed free market economy with extensive
involvement by governmental entities. A complex social welfare
system provides a high level of social benefits.
The Netherlands attaches great importance to human rights in
its foreign and domestic policies. Individual rights are
protected by Dutch law and are widely respected in practice by
both the State and the general public. The press, public
interest groups, and domestic and international human rights
organizations are quick to challenge practices which they
believe violate established human rights norms. Such
complaints are thoroughly discussed by the media and in
Parliament and are often subjected to a judicial process.
There are no significant differences in human rights practices
between the Netherlands proper and the autonomous regions of
the Kingdom, i.e., Aruba and the five islands of the
Netherlands Antilles.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No politically motivated killings by government or domestic
political groups are known to have occurred.
b. Disappearance
No known abductions, secret arrests, or clandestine detention
by police or other official security forces took place.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and cruel or inhuman punishment are prohibited by law
and were not known to occur.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Freedom from arbitrary arrest is provided for by law and
respected in practice. Preventive detention is permitted only
in an emergency declared by national or municipal authorities,
and even then the detention may be for only a limited time.
Under normal circumstances a suspect may be held for no longer
than 6 hours, or 9 hours if arrested at night, before charges
must be brought. Persons suspected of having committed serious
crimes may be held in custody for 48 hours with the agreement
of the public prosecutor, who is authorized to decide on an
extension of the detention for an additional 48 hours. Any
1184
THE NETHERLANDS
further decision on extending detention is made by an
investigating judge. Search and arrest warrants issued by the
judiciary are required in most criminal cases.
Forced exile from the Netherlands is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Netherlands has a civil court system with the right of
appeal. The judiciary is independent. The right to a fair
public trial is guaranteed by law and respected in practice.
Defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. Charges
must be formally stated. Defendants have the right to counsel.
A system of free or low-cost legal assistance exists for those
defendants unable to pay. There are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
A judicial warrant is required to enter a person's home or to
monitor private correspondence or telephone conversations. The
State respects individual freedom of choice in family matters.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
A functioning democratic political system, an independent press,
and an effective judiciary ensure freedom of speech and press.
Dutch media policy allocates broadcast time to a wide range of
social, political, and ethnic groups, ensuring that minority
viewpoints are heard. In addition, a cable system brings in
numerous television and radio broadcasts from neighboring
countries .
There are no prepublication restraints on any of the media. A
traditional consensus precludes the mainstream media from
disseminating sensitive information involving national
security, defense, or the royal family. Violent or sensational
crimes are treated with discretion, with suspects and victims
often identified only by their initials. In ongoing
investigations, only minimal personal data are released on
criminal suspects, both to maintain the privacy of the suspect
and his family and to protect the integrity of the
investigation. Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly and association is virtually unrestricted.
For large assemblies and demonstrations of a political nature,
permits from local governmental authorities are required.
These permits are routinely granted but may be denied when
authorities believe that "public order and safety" cannot be
guaranteed as a result of a rally or demonstration. Public
meetings of extreme rightist or racist groups have been
prohibited from time to time. The Government does not
arbitrarily impede membership in, or the formation of,
organizations .
c. Freedom of Religion
There is full freedom of religion. State subsidies are provided
to religious organizations that maintain educational facilities.
In 1991 the Cabinet decided not to introduce new subsidies for
1185
THE NETHERLANDS
minority religions to build more places of worship on the
grounds that enough places of worship were already available.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There is freedom of domestic and foreign travel, emigration,
and repatriation. Due to the housing shortage in larger cities,
there are some restrictions on the allocation of government-
subsidized housing.
The Netherlands has elaborate procedures for deciding asylum
applications; these procedures respect the applicant's right to
due process and take into account conditions in the applicant's
country of origin. Applicants who do not meet the criteria for
political asylum are nevertheless permitted to remain in the
Netherlands provisionally without refugee status if conditions
in their country of origin are so violent or unsettled that
returning them to that country would place them in danger.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Netherlands is a functioning multiparty democracy.
Elections are based on proportional representation. There is
universal suffrage for citizens aged 18 and older. Foreign
residents may vote in municipal elections after 5 years of legal
residence in the Netherlands. Dutch citizens elect the Second
Chamber (House of Representatives) of Parliament every 4 years
(more frequently if a government resigns or falls due to a
parliamentary vote of no confidence) . The most recent national
elections, held in September 1989, resulted in the formation of
a center-left coalition, with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers
remaining in office. Four major and five minor political
parties have seats in Parliament, representing the political
spectrum from far left to far right. There are no restrictions
in law or in practice on the participation of women and
minorities in government and politics.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Human rights groups, the media, and other interested parties
are free to pursue inquiries into human rights issues, and
Dutch authorities readily assist international and
nongovernmental organizations in their investigations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Integration of racial and ethnic minorities into the social and
cultural mainstream is a difficult domestic issue. Some 264,000
persons from the former Dutch colony of Suriname have come to
live in the Netherlands since 1975. There are also
approximately 85,000 persons from the Netherlands Antilles and
Aruba in the Netherlands.
In addition, there are about 207,000 Turkish and 168,000
Moroccan foreign workers and family members. These groups face
some de facto discrimination in housing and employment, as well
as practical limits on opportunities for economic and social
advancement as a result of educational and skill levels which
do not compare favorably with those of the majority of Dutch
citizens. Unemployment among large minority groups is four
1186
THE NETHERLANDS
times higher than the national average. The Government,
employers, and union leaders agreed in November 1990 on a
series of measures designed to reduce minority unemployment
levels to the national average. The goal was to assist 60,000
members of minority group members to find jobs. The results
were to be checked at the end of 1991, and additional measures
taken if necessary. However, the Government will refrain from
using contract compliance measures. Minorities now compose 3
percent of the personnel employed in the national Government;
the goal is to raise this to 5 percent by 1995.
The National Advisory and Consultation Board on Minority Policy
addresses the problems of minorities in the fields of health,
education, employment, and the law. Chaired by the Minister of
Internal Affairs, it includes representatives of seven ethnic
minority groups and acts as a consultative body to the Cabinet
on minority issues and as a conduit to the Government for the
expression of minority concerns.
Administrative tribunals have been set up for filing claims of
discrimination both against employers and the Government and in
housing matters. They provide a practical means of redress for
discrimination claims.
According to a recent study of violence against women financed
by the Dutch Ministry of Welfare, Health, and Culture, 20.8
percent of Dutch women in heterosexual relationships are or
have been victims of violence. Slightly over half of these (11
percent of women) experience repeated severe violence. The
Government supports programs to reduce and prevent violence
against women. Battered women find refuge in a network of
government-subsidized women's shelters offering the services of
social workers and psychologists. In addition, battered women
who leave their domestic partners become eligible for social
benefits which include an adequate basic subsidy as well as an
allowance for dependent children. There are also organizations
which advise and assist women who have been victims of sexual
assault .
Although traditional cultural factors, combined with structural
impediments such as provisions of the tax code which penalize
two-income families, continue to discourage women, especially
married women and women with children, from entering or
remaining in the labor force, the trend, especially for younger
women, is upward. Currently 52 percent of Dutch women hold
paid jobs, often part-time, an increase from 44 percent in
1987. Legislation passed in 1975 mandated equal pay for equal
work and prohibited dismissal because of marriage, pregnancy,
or motherhood. Additional legislation was passed in 1980 to
provide the basis for equality in other employment-related
areas. A legislatively mandated Equal Treatment Commission
actively pursues complaints of discrimination in these areas as
well as allegations of pay differentials. Women have full
legal and judicial rights and enter marriage with the option of
choosing community property or separate regimes for their
assets .
Women's groups dedicated to such issues as equal rights in
social security, the legal position of women, sexual abuse,
taxation, education, work, and prostitution operate freely
throughout the Netherlands. In February the Equal Rights
Council, in a report entitled "Sexual Intimidation in Work
Situations," called for tougher legislation to control sexual
harassment in the workplace.
1187
THE NETHERLANDS
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of Dutch workers to associate freely is well
established. The active trade union movement includes in its
membership just under 25 percent of the employee work force.
Members of the Dutch armed forces may belong to unions. Unions
are entirely free of control by the Government and political
parties. They may and do participate in political activities.
Unions have formed several domestic confederations and maintain
active relations with recognized international labor
organizations .
With the exception of most civil servants, all workers have the
right to strike, and this right is exercised freely. Disputes
involving civil servant complaints may be appealed to an
arbitration panel. The Government and unions continue to
discuss the issue of the right of civil service workers to
strike and the definition of "essential" civil services.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is recognized
and well established. Discrimination against workers because
of their union membership is illegal and does not exist in
practice. Approximately 76 percent of all paid workers are
currently covered by collective bargaining agreements, which
emerge out of the social partnership in industrial relations
developed among trade unions, private employers, and the
Government. Every year these three participants seek to
develop a "central accord" with agreed social and economic
goals for the coming year. Sectoral collective bargaining then
takes place under this umbrella agreement. A central
tripartite body, the Labor Commission, oversees implementation
of the industrial relations system. There are no export
processing zones.
There has been some controversy over the extent to which the
Government should be involved in certain sectoral agreements.
The trade unions (which have themselves made clear that they do
not consider this a "worker rights" issue) allege that the
Dutch Minister of Social Affairs, by law, is given too much
latitude to determine wages in the government-subsidized areas
of public health and transportation when collective bargaining
has failed to reach a "satisfactory" agreement. The Government
has asked the tripartite Dutch Social and Economic Council to
recommend changes in the legislation. International Labor
Organization bodies for a nximber of years have asked the
Government to amend the so-called "WAGGS" Act, which gives the
Government the power to freeze the terms and conditions of
employment in the public sector in the face of compelling
reasons of national economic interest.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by the Constitution
and does not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment of young people is 16. At that
age, they may work full time only if they have completed the
mandatory 10 years of schooling. Those still in school at age
16 may not work more than 8 hours per week. Young people under
1188
THE NETHERLANDS
the age of 18 are prohibited by law from working at night,
working overtime, or working in areas which could be dangerous
to their physical or mental development. The laws are
effectively enforced by the Labor Commission, a tripartite
entity which monitors hiring practices and conducts inspections.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The minimum wage for adult workers is established by law and is
adjusted every 6 months for changes in the cost of living.
There is a reduced minimum wage for workers under 23 which
ranges from 85 percent of the adult minimum wage for workers
aged 22 to 33 percent for those aged 16. The purpose of the
reduced minimum wage law is to provide incentives for the
employment of young people, one of the demographic groups with
the highest rate of unemployment among the population. The
legislated minimum wage, together with social benefits
available to all minimum wage earners, provides an adequate
living for workers and their families.
The maximum workweek is set by collective bargaining. The
average workweek for adults is currently 38 hours. Full-time
workers over age 16 receive a paid vacation of at least 190
hours per year. There are also generous welfare provisions for
workers who become sick or disabled. For unemployed workers,
there is an extensive system of benefits which allows
recipients to maintain an adequate standard of living.
Working conditions, including comprehensive occupational safety
and health standards, are actively monitored by the Labor
Commission. The Ministry of Social Affairs also polices
standards through its Labor Inspectorate.
1189
NORWAY
Norway is a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy
in which King Harald V, the titular Head of State, has a largely
symbolic role. Norway is governed by a Prime Minister, Cabinet,
and a 165-seat Storting (parliament) that is elected every 4
years and cannot be dissolved.
The police, security forces, and the military are scrupulous in
their protection of human rights. The Government (including
the judicial system and the Storting) exercises firm control
over these organizations and investigates thoroughly any
allegations of human rights violations.
Norway is an advanced industrial state with a mixed economy
combining private, public, and state ownership. Personal
freedoms, such as freedom of association and speech and the
right to pursue private interests and to hold private property,
are protected by the Constitution and respected in practice.
Deeply rooted democratic principles, a strong egalitarian
tradition, an independent press, and highly developed
educational and social welfare systems have made Norway a
leading advocate of hximan rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political Killing
Such killings have not occurred.
b. Disappearance
Secret arrests and detentions have not occurred.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment do not exist in Norway's penal system. Generous
furlough and visitation rights characterize the system, which
emphasizes rehabilitation. The maximum sentence for any crime
is 21 years.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Norwegian law recpiires arrest warrants, except in circumstances
such as hot pursuit. Persons may be detained for up to 4 hours
without being charged. A person charged with a crime has the
right, observed in practice, to appear before a judge for
arraignment within 24 hours. If charges are formalized at the
arraignment, the judge then determines whether the detainee
should be kept in custody or released pending trial. Bail need
not be posted. A strong case must be made to justify detention.
Possible grounds include fear of flight, the needs of the
investigation, and fear that a detainee may commit further
crimes .
Any person held in pretrial detention appears before a judge
every 4 weeks for a determination of the necessity of continued
detention. There is no legal limit on the time a prisoner may
be held before trial; however, lengthy pretrial detention is
rare. There is no exile.
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NORWAY
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to a fair, public trial is ensured by law and honored
in practice. Only in certain cases, including those involving
state security or private family matters, are trials closed.
In criminal cases, all Norwegian citizens and resident aliens
are entitled to free counsel. Indigent persons are granted
free counsel in certain civil cases as well.
The judiciary is independent of both the legislative and the
executive branches of the Government and tries military and
security as well as civil and criminal cases. The labor court
mediates industrial relations disputes.
Persons refusing both military service and alternative civilian
service have been held in prison for up to 16 months (a period
equivalent to military service) without trial. Detention is
based on an administrative rather than a judicial decision, and
prisoners held in this manner receive the salary and benefits
normally accorded to military recruits during their period of
confinement. Administrative decisions by the Justice and
Defense Ministries expanded the grounds for conscientious
objector status in 1988.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The privacy of the family and the person is free from arbitrary
interference by the Government. Police may conduct searches of
the home only with court approval and in instances of hot
pursuit or when they fear evidence is being destroyed. There
were no allegations of forced entry into Norwegian homes in
1991. In most cases, wiretaps are prohibited by law, but they
may be used in cases involving state security or narcotics
offenses when officially approved by the court within carefully
drawn legal guidelines. Correspondence may be opened only by
court order in cases involving state security.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is protected by the Constitution
and respected in practice. In addition to restrictions on
slander and libel, Norwegian law forbids racist or sexist
remarks in print or public speech, and such remarks are
uncommon. It is forbidden to publish information concerning
national defense which could prove damaging to Norwegian
security.
Norway's state broadcasting company maintains a near monopoly
on television broadcasting and national radio stations, but the
Government does not exercise editorial control over programming.
Private local radio stations exist, as do privately owned local
cable television stations. A private television network, TV
Norge, has been available on cable throughout Norway for almost
3 years. Norway has an active and diversified press, and many
newspapers are sustained by government subsidies. Some
newspapers are loosely connected to various national political
parties .
Certain restrictions apply to the showing of films. The
government Film Control Board has the authority to censor or
ban any film deemed overly violent, pornographic, or
blasphemous. The blasphemy clause in the censorship law.
1191
NORWAY
however, has not been used in the last 20 years. There is no
indication that films are censored because of political content.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Norwegians exercise these freedoms without restraint. Permits
for public demonstrations are granted routinely.
c. Freedom of Religion
The state church is the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Norway,
which is financially supported by the State and to which 93
percent of the population nominally belongs. There is a
constitutional requirement that the King and half of the
Cabinet belong to the state church. The Workers' Protection
and Working Environment Act permits prospective employers to
ask job applicants in certain fields, such as education,
whether they respect Christian beliefs and principles.
Approximately 4 percent of the population are registered
members of 20 other denominations which operate freely and may
proselytize. Foreign clergy are welcome in Norway. No
religious community is required to register with the Government
unless it desires state support, which is provided to all
registered denominations on a proportional basis in accordance
with membership.
Although the state religion is taught in all public schools,
children of other faiths are allowed to be absent from such
classes upon parental recjuest . If there are enough students of
the same faith, the school will organize religion classes in
that faith. Workers belonging to minority denominations are
allowed leave for religious holidays.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government does not impede foreign or domestic travel. The
right to voluntary repatriation is guaranteed. Refugees and
asylum seekers are provided generous benefits, including social
services, free medical care, and education while awaiting
decisions on their asylum applications. Norway maintains the
right to repatriate refugees and asylum seekers involuntarily
in certain situations. In practice, however, there have been
no recent cases in which a person with a valid claim to
persecution and fear for his or her life has been involuntarily
repatriated from Norway.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Norway is a multiparty democracy. Seven parties are represented
in the Storting, and the distribution of seats is based upon
proportional representation by district. The Storting may
reject or modify government proposals; if a government loses a
vote on a major issue of confidence, it resigns, and a new
government is formed. The minimum voting age is 18; voter
turnout traditionally is very high. Foreigners who have
resided in Norway for at least 3 years, and are otherwise
eligible, have the right to vote in local elections only.
There are no restrictions, in law or in practice, on the
participation of women in government or in the political arena
generally.
1192
NORWAY
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
A number of public and private organizations monitor alleged
human rights abuses either inside or, more often, outside the
country. The Government cooperates with nongovernmental
investigations of alleged violations of human rights and, in
recent years, has cooperated with both the European Commission
of Human Rights and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. Norway is an active participant in international
human rights organizations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Through a highly developed social welfare system that reflects
a long tradition of egalitarianism, the Government provides for
the health, education, retirement, and other needs of its
people regardless of race, religion, sex, ethnic background, or
political opinion.
Apart from an extremely small Finnish population in the
northeastern corner of the country, the Sami (Lapp) people were
Norway's only significant minority group until the influx of
immigrants during the 1970 's. In recent years, the Governm.ent
has taken steps to protect the cultural rights of the Sami by
providing Sami-language instruction at schools in Sami-
inhabited areas, radio and television programs broadcast or
subtitled in the Sami language, and subsidies for the
publication of newspapers and books oriented toward the Sami.
Norwegian Sami elected their own constituent assembly, the
Sameting, for the first time in 1989. The 39-seat body is a
consultative group which meets regularly to consider issues of
importance to the Sami people. In 1990 the Sami population of
Norway hosted the annual convention of the World Council of
Indigenous Peoples in Tromso, Norway.
There is continuing political debate on whether current
restrictions on non-Nordic immigration, in effect since 1975,
are racially motivated and whether immigrant minority groups
such as Pakistanis, Vietnamese, Turks, and Africans are accorded
equal rights by Norwegian authorities. The Government provides
legal protection for the rights of all minorities and has taken
active measures to help these groups adjust to Norwegian
society, including free Norwegian-language instruction for any
foreign resident.
As a result of a dramatic increase in the number of persons
seeking political asylum in the mid-1980 's, the Storting passed
a bill in 1988 that would no longer allow asylum applicants who
are not bona fide refugees to remain on humanitarian grounds.
The new law, while limiting the number of those granted asylum,
safeguards the rights of those asylum seekers allowed to remain
in Norway. Refugee policy continues to be a significant
political issue; some groups call for reducing the inflow of
refugees, while others — human rights groups and certain
political parties — urge the Government to accept more
refugees. Although there have been problems in dealing with
individual refugee cases, Norway has a well-organized system
which includes advance planning, careful dispersion of refugees
throughout Norway, and generous welfare, educational, and
vocational training programs. Occasional racially motivated
1193
NORWAY
attacks on non-European immigrant groups are dealt with firmly
by the police and judicial authorities.
Women are protected under the Equal Rights Law of 1978 and other
regulations. Under that law, "women and men engaged in the same
activity shall have equal wages for work of equal value." An
Equal Rights Council monitors enforcement of the 1978 law, and
an Equal Rights Ombudsman processes complaints of sexual
discrimination. The Government provides liberal maternity leave
and time off for either parent to care for his or her children.
Norway has an extremely low crime rate and, in that sense, crime
against women is not widespread. A recent general increase in
the crime rate has included the crime rate against women,
although police authorities believe that more women are willing
now to report rapes and incidents of wife beating than has been
the case in the past. The police vigorously investigate and
prosecute such crimes and have instituted special programs to
prevent rape and domestic violence and to counsel victims.
Public and private organizations run several free shelters
which give battered wives an alternative to returning to a
violent domestic situation after an incident of wife beating.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have and exercise the right to associate freely and to
strike. The Government, however, has the right, with the
approval of the Storting, to invoke compulsory arbitration
under certain circumstances. This procedure, which was invoked
several times in the 1980 's, particularly in the oil industry,
was criticized by the Committee of Experts of the International
Labor Organization, which argued that the circumstances did not
pose a sufficient threat to the public health and safety to
justify the action.
With membership totaling about 60 percent of the work force,
unions play an important role in political and economic life
and are consulted by the Government on important economic and
social problems. Unions are free to form federations and
confederations and to affiliate internationally. Although the
largest trade union federation is associated with the Labor
Party, all unions are free of party and government control.
Norwegian worker representatives are active in a wide variety
of regional and international trade union activity.
The 1991 collective bargaining negotiations between the
national union organization (LO) , Norway's largest trade union
federation, and the employers' organization (NHO) required the
services of a government wage mediator. The last-minute
resolution of wage negotiations resulted in moderate wage and
benefit increases and averted a threatened major strike.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
All workers, including government employees and military
personnel, exercise the right to organize and bargain
collectively. The right to organize is protected through the
"basic agreement" negotiated between the LO and NHO, which is
legally binding. Complaints of antiunion discrimination are
dealt with through the labor court. Collective bargaining is
widespread, with most wage earners covered by negotiated
settlements, either directly or through understandings which
extend the contract terms to workers outside of the main labor
1194
NORWAY
federation and the employers' bargaining group. There are no
export processing zones, and labor legislation and practice is
consistent throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is prohibited by law and does not exist. The
Directorate of Labor Inspections ensures compliance.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children aged 13 to 18 may be employed part-time in light work
that will not adversely affect their health, development, or
schooling. Minimum age rules are observed in practice and
effectively enforced by the Directorate of Labor Inspections.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Ordinary working hours are mandated by law and normally do not
exceed 37.5 hours per week, with 25 working days of paid leave
granted per year (31 for those aged 60 and older). A 28-hour
rest period is legally mandated on the weekend and for holidays.
There is no minimum wage in Norway, but wages normally fall
within a national wage scale negotiated by labor, employers,
and the Government. The average annual wage, not including
extensive social benefits, is adequate to provide a family a
decent living.
Under the Workers' Protection and Working Environment Act of
1977, all employed persons are assured safe and physically
acceptable working conditions. Specific standards are set by
the Directorate of Labor Inspections in consultation with
nongovernmental experts. According to the Act, working
environment committees, composed of management, workers, and
health personnel, must be established in all enterprises with
50 or more workers, and safety delegates must be elected in all
organizations. Workers enjoy strong rights to remove
themselves from situations which endanger their health. The
Directorate of Labor Inspections ensures effective compliance
with labor legislation and standards.
1195
POLAND
Poland in 1991 completed the transition from a Communist state
to a multiparty democracy. Following free local government
elections and the first popular presidential election in 1990,
a new Parliament was chosen in freely contested elections in
October 1991. Since no single party received more than 13
percent of the vote. President Lech Walesa asked Bronislaw
Geremek, a leader of the largest party — the Democratic Union —
and then Jan Olszewski, the candidate of a minority coalition
of five parties, to attempt to form a coalition government. In
late December, Olszewski put together a coalition Government —
supported by, among others, the Center Alliance, the Christian
National Union, and several peasant parties — that was ratified
by Parliament.
Although political disagreements delayed work on drafting a new
constitution to codify the new democratic system, virtually all
parties represented in the Parliament declared that the renewal
of this effort will be a priority task.
The restructuring of police and internal security forces within
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, begun in 1990, brought those
forces under the democratic Government's firm control in 1991
and strengthened institutional safeguards that they would not
be used for purposes of political repression. However, a rise
in reported police beatings of criminal suspects during initial
interrogations provoked a parliamentary investigation that is
continuing.
In 1991 Poland continued its historically unprecedented
transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy.
The Government maintained an economic austerity program to keep
inflation under control through a tight money supply in order
to provide a foundation for future sustained economic growth.
At the same time, its policies were aimed at promoting private
investment, both domestic and foreign, and privatizing large
state-owned industries and other government monopolies. While
inflation ran at about 3 percent per month, unemployment rose
to 11 percent, and declining budget revenues forced the
Government to cut back some social services and to cap wages
and benefits in the state sector. Real incomes dropped over 30
percent since January 1990 as a result of the recession and
austerity measures. These factors generated scattered strikes
and public criticism of government economic policy. However,
the nonagricultural private sector continued to grow and now
accounts for more than 20 percent of economic activity.
Progress in human rights continued in 1991. The privatization
of the print media was completed, and several private radio
stations and one private television station began to operate.
The Commissioner of Civil Rights Protection was active in
investigating complaints of police brutality and sexual
discrimination, as well as allegedly unfair dismissals of
former Communists from their jobs. On the other hand, examples
of popular intolerance, seen in incidents of anti-Semitism and
an anti-Gypsy riot in June, brought quick official action to
condemn such behavior and, where appropriate, to arrest and
bring to trial those involved in violence. The Senate's Office
of Intervention received reports of discrimination against
students who did not participate in voluntary religious
instruction classes in the public schools. There has been no
official action in response to these reports.
1196
POLAND
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of killings for political motives by the
Government or domestic political groups.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of abductions, secret arrests, or
clandestine detention by police or other official security
forces .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no reported allegations of torture.
Human rights activists, however, noted an alarming increase in
the number of beatings reported by persons in police custody not
yet charged with a crime. Nearly 100 such allegations were made
either to local prosecutors or to the Commissioner for Civil
Rights Protection in 1991. Approximately 20 police officers
were prosecuted for abusing detainees, and several were
dismissed after charges were proved. The Senate's Office of
Intervention, a human rights oversight office, initiated a
general investigation of these charges in September. Low police
morale, poor training, and a desire to elicit confessions from
suspects in an atmosphere of increasingly frequent violent
crime were cited by observers as possible causes.
Polish human rights groups reported continuing improvement in
prison conditions during 1991. The new director of the Central
Prison Administration, appointed in April 1990, initiated a
program of renovation of some facilities and improved training
for prison guards. Prison guards are now required to have high
school diplomas and to pass a 3-month basic training course
taught in part by outside experts. A new program of periodic
seminars for guards was also initiated in 1991. Most
restrictions on the number and size of food and clothing
parcels which relatives could send to prisoners were lifted.
While prison authorities continued to read outgoing mail,
including complaints sent to government authorities regarding
living conditions, prison guards were ordered to cease the
previously common practice of not forwarding complaints to
outside authorities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There were no reported instances of persons arrested or detained
for the expression of views critical of the Government.
Although the Polish administration is drafting revisions to the
criminal code, this rewriting remains incomplete. The law
continues to allow for a 48-hour detention period before the
authorities are required to bring formal charges; suspects are
not permitted access to a lawyer during this period. Most
allegations of mistreatment of criminal suspects by police
involve beatings or efforts to coerce confessions during this
detention period.
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POLAND
Polish law provides that once a prosecutor presents the legal
basis for a formal investigation, a detainee may be held under
"temporary" arrest for up to 3 months (with a possible court-
ordered extension) until the prosecutor files an indictment.
Prosecutors, however, reportedly used "temporary" arrest only
in the most serious criminal cases, such as murder or armed
robbery. Bail may be posted for less serious crimes, although
human rights activists noted that increasing economic hardship
during 1991 made it difficult or impossible for some criminal
suspects to raise the required bond.
The law guarantees the detainee under "temporary" arrest access
to a lawyer. Prosecutors must still authorize all visits to
detainees but may issue general authorizations for repeated
visits from particular individuals. General authorizations of
this type are routinely issued to defense attorneys on request.
Overcrowded court dockets resulted in increasingly frecjuent
extensions of pretrial detentions during 1991, with such
detentions occasionally lasting a year or more; at the end of
1991, approximately 70 persons held in pretrial detention had
been jailed a year or more.
The law contains no provision for forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Poland has a three-tier court system, consisting of regional
and provincial courts, and a Supreme Court which is divided
into civil and criminal divisions. Judges are appointed by the
President for set terms; most proposals for a new constitution
include provisions to establish a more independent judiciary.
Criminal cases are tried in regional and provincial courts by a
panel consisting of a professional judge and two lay assessors;
the seriousness of the offense determines which of these is the
court of first instance. Over the past year, difficulties in
finding persons willing to volunteer their time to act as lay
assessors has contributed to court backlogs and extended
pretrial detentions of criminal suspects. Ultimate appeals are
heard by a panel of judges from the Supreme Court.
Most cases are tried in open court. The court, however,
retains the option of closing a trial to the public in some
circumstances, such as divorce cases, trials in which state
secrets may be disclosed, or to protect public morality. The
latter concern was cited by a Warsaw district court in June in
barring the press and public from the pornography trial of
publisher and former Communist government spokesman Jerzy Urban,
who was acquitted by the court in July.
Once formal charges are filed, the defendant is allowed to study
the charges and consult with an attorney, who is provided at
public expense if necessary. Once the defendant is prepared, a
trial date is set. Defendants must be present during trial and
may present evidence and confront witnesses in their own
defense. All are presumed innocent until proven guilty. At
the end of a trial, the court renders its decision orally. The
court of original jurisdiction then has 7 days to prepare a
written decision. A defendant has the right to appeal within
14 days of the written decision. Appeals may be made, among
other grounds, on the basis of new evidence or procedural
irregularities. There were no accusations of politically
motivated court decisions in 1991.
The Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection criticized a lack
of due process in the dismissals of some schoolteachers and
1198
POLAND
Other government officials who were members or alleged
sympathizers of the former ruling Communist party. In some
instances, such persons were reportedly denied the opportunity
to defend themselves prior to dismissal or to appeal decisions
against them.
There were no reports of political prisoners being held in
Poland in 1991.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Search warrants issued by a prosecutor are required to enter
private residences. In urgent cases when a prosecutor is not
immediately available, police may enter a residence with the
approval of the local police commander. In the most urgent
cases in which there is not time to consult with the police
commander, police may enter a private residence after showing
their official identification. Although there are some
complaints that this procedure is occasionally abused, human
rights activists in 1991 detected no regular pattern of abuse
by Polish police.
The Government no longer monitors private mail and telephone
calls, unless it is ordered by the prosecutor in an official
investigation. Incoming overseas mail is occasionally opened,
but persons complaining of this practice believe that it
represents a criminal attempt to steal valuables rather than an
effort to monitor correspondence.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms are provided for in the Constitution and
respected in practice. Many new private newspapers and
periodicals expressing a wide variety of views were launched in
1991, and no barrier exists to the establishment of a private
newspaper other than readership demand and capital. Many small,
independent firms published an increasing variety of books
expressing a broad range of political and social viewpoints.
Foreign periodicals are also freely and easily available in
major cities.
In 1991 a government liquidation commission comprised of leading
journalists reflecting a broad political spectrum completed its
task of privatizing state-published newspapers and periodicals.
In several instances, the commission exercised its option of
refusing to accept the highest bid for a newspaper if it felt
the sale would not be in the national interest. Most observers
believed that the commission generally made its decisions fairly
and without political bias. However, in one controversial
decision in the city of Wroclaw, local authorities reversed a
decision by the commission to award the leading local daily to
a journalists' committee and instead placed its own supporters
in charge.
The Government owns and operates the two national television
channels and eight local television stations, the latter
broadcasting approximately 6 hours weekly. The Government also
operates 4 national radio networks and 16 regional stations.
Efforts to enact a new law governing broadcast media which would
significantly streamline licensing procedures for independent
stations stalled, resulting in a legal vacuum in which the
Government attempted to regulate independent broadcast stations
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administratively. A new private television station in Wroclaw
successfully resisted an effort by central authorities to shut
it down, as did several independent radio stations. During
1991 approximately 10 independent radio stations were operating,
including popular stations in Warsaw and Krakow. In the absence
of any established licensing procedures, stations which the
Government unsuccessfully ordered to cease operations contended
that their legal status was no different from that of stations
whose operations did not draw official disapproval.
Radio and television air a wide range of political viewpoints;
one Warsaw radio station runs several hours of Radio Free Europe
news and public service broadcasting daily. The television
news, according to many observers, produced critical and
balanced stories on the Government and leading public figures.
Polish journalists charged, however, that television news
editors occasionally refused to air stories which portrayed
leading government figures in an especially unfavorable light,
and accusations of political bias were made in connection with
the cancellation of an investigative program, "Observer," in
early 1991. All Polish political parties would have preferred
greater coverage of their candidates on state-run television
during the parliamentary elections. Most observers agreed,
however, that campaign coverage was fair; a desire to avoid
charges of bias may have led television news editors to provide
less coverage to events such as campaign rallies than might
otherwise have been the case.
Charges were filed in December 1990 against defeated
presidential candidate Stan Tyminski under pre-World War II
legislation making it illegal to defame state or government
leaders after he accused former Prime Minister Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, a rival candidate, of treason in one campaign
speech. The charges were dropped in January 1991 when Tyminski
publicly apologized for his remarks. Charges were also filed
in November against Boleslaw Tejkowski, chairman of the Polish
National Alliance Party, for repeated anti-Semitic statements
made during television appearances on behalf of his party's
campaign in the parliamentary elections. Tejkowski, whose
party received insufficient support to win parliamentary
representation, was charged with violating laws against
inciting racial or ethnic hatred.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Poles enjoy the freedom to join together formally and informally
to promote nonviolent causes and protest government policies.
Permits are not rec[uired for public meetings. Permits are
issued routinely for public demonstrations; the Government does
not interfere with otherwise peaceful and nondisruptive
demonstrations even if permits have not been applied for.
With government approval, private associations are permitted to
organize. Such approval is almost always granted and is not
withheld for political or other arbitrary reasons.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of conscience and belief,
and citizens enjoy the freedom to practice any religion.
Religious groups may organize, select, and train personnel,
solicit and receive contributions, publish, and engage in
consultations with coreligionists without government
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interference. There are no restrictions on establishing and
maintaining places of worship.
Poland is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic in religious
affiliation. The Catholic Church maintains over 16,000
churches, schools, and other institutions and vigorously
continues to build new ones. It also publishes significant
numbers of books and periodicals, as does the independent
Catholic press. Catholic Mass is broadcast on Sundays by the
state-run radio.
There is no government-sponsored interference with the practice
of minority religions. Eastern Orthodox, Ukrainian Catholic,
and much smaller Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim congregations
meet freely.
Public, opinion polls consistently showed a majority of Poles of
all religious persuasions expressing concern about the Catholic
Church's promotion of its social agenda. The Church-led
campaign for a strict antiabortion law, which provides for jail
sentences for those who perform abortions, became a cause of
intense controversy.
The Constitutional Court reviewed and upheld the
constitutionality of the Ministry of Education's decision on
religious education in the public schools. The vast majority
of public schools continued to provide facilities for voluntary
religious instruction of their students by Catholic priests.
Senior Church officials contend that this program is being
carried out without significant controversy and that the rights
of those students choosing not to attend religious instruction
are fully protected. On the other hand, the Senate's Office of
Intervention continued to receive reports from some students
complaining of discriminatory behavior by teachers and fellow
students because they did not attend religious classes. In
practice, students who chose not to attend such classes, or
their parents, were required to affirm their preference to
school administrators and frequently to explain their reason
for refusal. The Senate's Office of Intervention also received
credible reports that teachers were fired by local school
administrators for publicly protesting the methods by which
they believed students were pressured to attend religious
instruction. There has been no official action to investigate
the charges or to reinstate the dismissed teachers. In areas
heavily populated by Eastern Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholic
believers, public school space was made available to their
representatives to provide religious instruction. Non-Catholic
religious education is available privately in Poland, but aside
from the above exceptions it is unavailable in public schools.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no legal restrictions on domestic or foreign travel.
Virtually all Polish citizens are able to obtain passports for
worldwide travel valid for up to 10 years.
Citizenship may be revoked involuntarily only for reasons
specifically defined by law. There are no unusual provisions
in the law for the revocation of citizenship, and the
Government rarely invokes the law.
Poland became a destination for persons emigrating or fleeing
from the former Soviet Union, Albania, Romania, Lebanon, Iran,
Iraq, Ethiopia, and other countries for economic and political
1201
POLAND
reasons. Many of these persons used Poland as a transit point
to other countries, as did tens of thousands of Soviet Jews on
their way to Israel. Persons seeking political asylum,
especially from the former Soviet Union, may be granted
permanent resident status. Refugees generally are not forced
to return to countries in which they have a reasonable fear of
persecution. In December the Government adopted new regulations
incorporating international standards for defining refugees.
In addition, Polish authorities have granted refugee status on
humanitarian grounds to some persons outside the international
definition.
A Lithuanian deserter from the Soviet military was stopped by
German border guards as he attempted to cross the Polish-German
border, and turned over to a Polish border guard post. The
local Polish guard post, acting upon its own initiative and
understanding of a 1956 Polish-Soviet status of forces agreement
that called for the return of deserters to the Soviet army,
turned the Lithuanian deserter over to a Soviet military unit
stationed nearby, who in turn returned him to the Soviet Union.
Although this incident stirred up a political debate within
Poland, no disciplinary action was taken against the local
border guards.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Poland is a multiparty democracy in which all citizens 18 years
of age and older have the right to vote.
Following upon free elections for local government offices and
for the Presidency in 1990, more than 100 political parties
from across the political spectrum participated in free and
open elections for 460 seats in the Sejm (lower house) and 100
seats in the Senate (upper house) of the Parliament which
replaced the parliament chosen in partially free elections in
June 1989. With no single party receiving as much as 13
percent of the vote, the proportional system used resulted in
seats being won by 30 political parties and formations. The
turnout was under 44 percent of eligible voters. In late
December, after a number of unsuccessful attempts to form a
government, a coalition headed by Prime Minister Olszewski was
ratified by the Sejm. The coalition received support from,
among others, the Center Alliance, the Christian National
Union, and peasant parties.
In September electoral commissions in two electoral districts
invalidated petitions filed by Party "X," a political party
headed by former presidential candidate Stan Tyminski, claiming
that the petitions contained large numbers of invalid or
falsified signatures. The Central State Electoral Commission
thereupon declined to certify Party "X" as a nationwide party,
severely restricting the number of candidates it could field.
Party "X" unsuccessfully appealed the Commission's decision
through the courts.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Helsinki Committee, established by human rights activists
to monitor Poland's compliance with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
was asked by the Ministry of Interior to provide lecturers on
human rights issues for the police academy. Its members
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indicated that they were given a free hand to investigate
prison conditions in Poland. However, they also reported they
had encountered resistance when they requested permission to
visit police lock-ups to investigate allegations of beatings
and mistreatment there. Most branches of the Government
cooperated readily with independent domestic and international
nongovernmental human rights groups investigating allegations
of human rights abuses.
Poland has become a leading advocate of human rights in
international bodies. In April the CSCE established its office
for monitoring free elections in Warsaw. Beginning in June,
Poland proposed at several CSCE meetings the expansion of this
office's mandate to monitor the development of free
institutions throughout Europe.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no legally sanctioned discrimination against ethnic or
religious minorities or women. These forms of discrimination
are prohibited by Polish law.
In general, except in connection with the proposed antiabortion
law (see Section 2.c.), issues concerning women have not become
a major public issue in Poland, and women's organizations are
just emerging. The Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection
received a small number of grievances from women alleging
sexual discrimination in 1991. Although some women have become
prominent in Polish politics and society, most upper-level
management positions continue to be held by men, and, at a time
of increasing economic austerity, activists charged that female
workers were more likely to be laid off first from failing
concerns. The Ministry of Labor and many state-owned firms
continue to regard certain positions as being reserved for
either men or women. Anecdotal evidence suggests that women
sometimes do not receive equal pay for eqiaal work; statistical
data has not been compiled on this subject.
Spousal abuse is a criminal offense in Poland, and reported
incidents are often attributed to alcohol abuse. Persons
convicted of spousal abuse are subject to imprisonment from 6
months to 5 years. Because it is not discussed openly and such
incidents are rarely reported to the police, the extent to
which it occurs is not known.
Jewish organizations expressed concern over continuing evidence
of anti-Semitism in Poland. Anti-Semitic statements were
scrawled in public places, including on Jewish institutions and
monuments, and some Jewish cemeteries were vandalized during
1991. Several minor Polish political parties used anti-Semitic
slogans during the October parliamentary election campaign, and
a small gang of youths attacked Warsaw's sole active synagogue
in September .
Poland's governing bodies and leading political organizations
repeatedly and staunchly condemned these incidents and made
strong efforts to combat anti-Semitism. In March President
Walesa created a Presidential Council on Polish-Jewish
Relations consisting of 21 leading Polish Catholic and Jewish
intellectuals under the leadership of Walesa's political
secretary; the Council strongly condemned the use of anti-
Semitic slogans during the election campaign and created
subcommittees to study means of expanding educational efforts
to combat anti-Semitism. In January the episcopate of the
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Roman Catholic Church issued a pastoral letter condemning
anti-Semitism that was read in churches during Mass. President
Walesa himself made strong public statements condemning
anti-Semitism and all forms of intolerance.
A dispute over the former Jewish cemetery in Kalisz ended in
April when local authorities halted construction of a heating
pipeline that had resulted in the cemetery's desecration and
ordered the trench which had been dug through the cemetery to
be filled in. Since that time, although this cemetery — like
many other Jewish, Catholic, and other cemeteries in Poland —
remains in a neglected state, its condition does not appear to
have been deliberately altered.
Local authorities acted swiftly to suppress an anti-Gypsy riot
in the town of Mlawa in June, in which a number of Gypsy homes
were looted and other property destroyed and several Gypsies
injured. Police arrested five alleged riot leaders who in late
1991 had been formally indicted but not yet tried.
Representatives of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Lithuanian
minorities sought unsuccessfully to expand existing public
education facilities in minority languages. Currently,
regulations permit a minority language class to be formed upon
the application of eight or more students at the same level in
a Polish public school, but budgetary constraints have
occasionally been cited by local authorities for refusing such
reqiaests. Elementary school classes in Byelorussian and
Lithuanian are regularly held in the regions of the country
where these minorities are concentrated; they are less common
in Ukrainian, in part because the Ukrainian minority is more
generally dispersed throughout Poland. There are no minority
language classes in German.
Polish public radio stations initiated new radio programs in
minority languages such as Ukrainian and German during 1991.
Ukrainian Catholics continued efforts to reclaim Church
property which the former Communist regime had turned over to
the Roman Catholic Church; one particularly prominent case
involved a dispute in which a small group of Polish Roman
Catholics barricaded and occupied the Church of St. Theresa, a
large church in Przemysl. Although some ethnic Ukrainian Poles
believe that the Government should now affirmatively reverse
the former regime's decision, the present Government has taken
no official action and has avoided public comment of any kind
regarding the dispute. There were also incidents of anti-
Ukrainian graffiti.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Trade union legislation passed in 1991 establishes that all
workers, including the police and frontier guards, have the
right to establish and join trade unions of their own choosing.
As few as 10 persons may form a trade union, and a founding
committee of 3 persons must register the union at the
appropriate provincial court. A decision of the court refusing
registration may be appealed to a court of appeals. Interbranch
national unions and federations must register with the
provincial court in Warsaw.
These registration requirements are not pro forma and they have
been successfully challenged. Polish courts had previously
50-726 - 92 - 39
1204
POLAND
denied registration to Solidarity '80, a trade union offshoot
of the original Solidarity xinion, because it refused to accept
the provisions of the 1982 trade union law which imposed
burdensome restrictions on strikes and heavy legal penalties
against strikers. After a protracted legal dispute, the Warsaw
provincial court recognized the registration of Solidarity '80
in September .
Beside the Solidarity union, other major unions include the
Communist-inspired National Alliance of Trade Unions, OPZZ,
organized in 1982 as the sole legal alternative to the then
banned Solidarity union, and the Federation of Miners, an
independent union. According to new trade union legislation,
OPZZ will be required to relinc[uish some "inherited" properties
and return assets it acqiaired following the imposition of
martial law.
Unions are independent of the Government. They have the right
to join labor federations and confederations, as well as to
affiliate with international labor organizations. The
Government and legislature are presently engaged in the process
of revamping the labor code. New laws on employment and on
trade unions and collective bargaining were passed in January
and May.
The new Trade Union Act, which took effect in August, is less
restrictive regarding the right to strike than the 1982 version
but still prescribes a lengthy procedure before a strike may be
launched. If strictly adhered to, the law provides several
opportunities to challenge a strike, including the threat of
legal action. An employer — either state-owned or private
firms — must start negotiations the moment a dispute begins.
Negotiations end either with an agreement or a protocol
describing the differences between the parties. If negotiations
fail, a mandatory mediation process begins with a mediator
appointed jointly by the disputing parties or, lacking agreement
between them, by the Minister of Labor and Social Policy. If
mediation fails, the trade union may launch a warning strike
for a period of 2 hours or seek arbitration of the dispute.
A full-fledged strike may not be launched until 14 days after
the dispute is announced. Strikes are prohibited entirely in
the Office of State Protection, and by police, firemen, military
forces, prison services, and frontier guards. It may be
proclaimed by the trade union after approval by the majority of
voting workers and should be announced at least 5 days before
its commencement. If the strike is organized in accordance
with the provisions of the Act, the worker retains his right to
social insurance benefits but not to his pay. If a strike is
"organized contrary to the provisions of the law," the workers
may lose social insurance benefits; organizers are liable for
damages and may face civil charges and fines.
The Government hopes that such a lengthy process will discourage
major labor disputes that could potentially destabilize the
political and economic situation. The law has not yet faced a
real test involving a major labor dispute. Short-term warning
actions and strikes involving occupation of the workplace were
common occurrences in the second half of 1991 and were usually
settled by mutual compromise between the strikers and the
Government, which is still the dominant employer.
The mining union alleged in a complaint to the International
Labor Organization (ILO) supported by the OPZZ that the
Government had refused to submit a labor dispute to mediation
1205
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as required by law, but the pertinent ILO body dismissed the
complaint in December.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The May 1991 law on trade unions and collective bargaining
provides for legal sanctions for antiunion discrimination. A
notable weakness in the law, given Poland's transition from a
centrally planned to a market economy, is the lack of specific
provisions to ensure that the union has continued rights of
representation when a state firm undergoes privatization,
bankruptcy, or sale. Solidarity is particularly concerned that
many joint ventures are ignoring Polish labor law. According
to Polish officials, regulations concerning collective
bargaining are generally not recognized or enforced in the
private sector.
Wages are set in negotiations at the enterprise level between
unions, management, and workers' councils. Legislation passed
in 1991 does not require that wage agreements be registered
with the Government . The Government has sought to impose a
ceiling on wages in state enterprises through a penalty tax in
an effort to link wages to increases in productivity and to
reduce inflationary pressures on the economy. President Walesa
on January 2 signed a revised version of the law which lifted
wage controls on the private sector and granted greater
flexibility for firms to grant wage increases based on higher
profits. The penalty tax is charged on any state company that
increases its average wage in excess of a government-set
"inflation coefficient." As of September, the coefficient was
60 percent of the monthly increase in retail prices. Solidarity
and the Government negotiated a higher base in June, implemented
in July, which allows a greater wage increase before the penalty
tax applies.
Special duty-free zones exist in or have been contemplated for
some 15 locations throughout Poland but, with the exception of
one zone in Poznan, have not thus far attracted much attention.
There are no special labor regulations pertaining to these
zones .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor does not exist in Poland. Forced labor is
prohibited by law.
Legislation introduced during the martial law period that
permitted the use of police powers against persons inactive for
"socially unjustified reasons" was removed from the criminal
code in 1990.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Code forbids the employment of persons under the age
of 15. The employment of persons aged 15 to 18 is permitted
only if that person has completed basic schooling and if the
proposed employment constitutes vocational training. The age
floor is raised to 18 if a particular job might pose a health
danger. The Government is alert to reports of violations of
child labor laws and enforces the legal protection of minors,
but it appears unable at present to monitor the growing private
sector.
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e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The national minimum wage, negotiated every 3 months by the
Ministry of Labor and Social Policy and the trade unions, is
insufficient to provide a worker and his family a decent living.
The minimum wage is broadly applicable in the state economic
sector where enforcement and union representation ensure
compliance. It is not possible to determine whether the
minimum wage is observed in the burgeoning private sector,
although wages are generally higher there. The maximum legal
workweek is 48 hours, but in practice most Poles work 40 hours
a week most of the year .
The Legal Code defines minimum conditions for the protection of
workers' health and safety; a new draft of that Code was
scheduled for parliamentary approval by the end of the year.
Working conditions in Poland are poor; norms for chemicals,
dust, and noise are routinely exceeded. There were about
110,000 serious work-related accidents in 1990, involving 842
deaths, 5,000 cases of dismemberment, and another 102,000 cases
of serious physical impairment.
Enforcement of health and safety regulations is a growing
problem because of the rapid increase in private firms in the
economy. Less than 5 percent of the firms are monitored, and
there is an absence of clarity as to which agency is
responsible for the monitoring. On the one hand, the State
Labor Inspectorate, which is directly responsible to the
Parliament and has a staff of 800 inspectors, is charged with
monitoring the implementation of collective agreements and
health and safety laws but is prepared only to inspect
state-owned firms. On the other hand, the Ministry of Labor
and Social Policy is the government agency responsible for
setting standards and actually enforcing the law.
1207
PORTUGAL*
The Republic of Portugal is a parliamentary democracy with a
president and legislative assembly freely elected by secret
ballot. Former Prime Minister and Socialist Party head Mario
Scares was elected Portugal's first civilian President in 60
years in 1986 and reelected by a wide margin in 1991. In 1987
and again in October 1991, Prime Minister Cavaco Silva and his
Social Democratic Party (PSD) were returned to power to
continue the mandate of the first one-party majority government
since the 1974 revolution.
Internal security is primarily the responsibility of the
Ministries of Justice and Internal Administration. Security
forces are fully controlled by and responsive to the Government.
Portugal has a market-based economy and is a member of the
European Economic Community. An increasing proportion of the
population is employed in industry and services, while
employment in the agricultural sector continues to decline.
The human rights situation in 1991 was good. The Government
and its institutions continue to act in a manner consistent
with respect for human rights. Civil rights are outlined in
the Constitution in accordance with the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. An Ombudsman, chosen by the Assembly of the
Republic (legislature) to serve a 4-year term, is Portugal's
chief civil and human rights officer. Any citizen may apply to
him for relief. The Ombudsman receives about 3,000 complaints
annually, most of them concerning cases of alleged
maladministration by Portugal's cumbersome bureaucracy and
delays in the judicial process.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Government-sanctioned political killings do not occur. There
were no killings attributed to domestic terrorist groups.
b. Disappearance
Government or police authorities do not abduct, secretly
arrest, or otherwise illegally detain persons.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution forbids torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, and the use of evidence obtained under
torture in criminal proceedings. There are, however,
occasional complaints of mistreatment by police and prison
authorities, and these are investigated by the Ombudsman.
There have been allegations that the paramilitary Republican
National Guard detachment in the village of Sesimbra mistreated
several prisoners during the winter of 1991, causing minor
injuries. Judicial authorities were investigating these
accusations at year's end.
* A separate report for Macau, a dependency of Portugal off the
southern coast of China, follows this report.
1208
PORTUGAL
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under Portuguese law, an investigating judge reviews the case
against a person under arrest to determine whether that person
should be detained, released on bail, or released outright.
Persons may not be held for more than 48 hours without
appearing before an investigating judge. Investigative
detention is limited to a maximum of 6 months for each
suspected crime. If a formal charge has not been filed within
that period, the person detained must be released. In cases
involving serious crimes, such as murder or armed robbery, or
in cases involving more than one suspect, investigative
detention is permitted for up to 2 years and may be extended by
a judge to 3 years in extraordinary circumstances. A suspect
must be brought to trial within 18 months of his or her being
formally charged. Detainees have access to lawyers, who are
generally effective in protecting their clients' rights.
Exile and incommunicado detention are illegal and not practiced
in Portugal .
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Portugal has an independent and impartial judicial system. All
trials are public except those which may offend the dignity of
the victim, such as in cases involving the sexual abuse of
children. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
In trials for serious crimes, a panel of three judges (which
does not include the investigating judge) presides. In trials
for lesser crimes, a single judge presides. A ministerial
delegate assists the judges in reviewing the evidence. At the
request of the accused, a jury may be used in trials for major
crimes. Sentence may be passed only in the presence of the
defense attorney.
Portugal holds no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution forbids forced entry into homes and searches
without a judicial warrant. In addition, entry into a person's
home at night requires the consent of the occupant. The State
does not intercept private correspondence or place wiretaps
except with a court order.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is provided for in the Constitution
and respected by the State. The constitutionally mandated High
Commission for Social Communication acts as a watchdog to
protect freedom of speech and access to the media. The
Commission, whose members are chosen by the Government and by
the Assembly of the Republic, makes recommendations to the
Assembly and has enforcement powers. The academic community is
free to express its views.
Although the State owns both television channels in Portugal,
the provision of the Constitution making television a state
monopoly was removed in 1990. Licenses for two private
television stations were expected to be issued in the wake of
the October elections.
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PORTUGAL
In principle, the Government does not exercise direct control
over the state-owned television system, though it does wield
considerable influence through personnel appointments.
Opposition parties sometimes charge that the state network
ignores or distorts opposition views and activities. Station
news directors defend their decisions as based on editorial
judgments, not political partisanship. All political parties,
even relatively tiny ones, use their legal right to "antenna
time" during prime viewing and listening hours.
In 1989 the Government passed legislation permitting private
radio stations to operate for the first time. As of October
1991, more than 250 such local stations had been authorized and
were on the air.
The entire spectrxim of political thought is represented in the
Portuguese press. There is no press censorship. As a result
of postrevolutionary nationalization of the banks, to which
many of the newspapers were indebted, the State acquired title
to a number of newspapers . These papers were state owned but
editorially independent. In 1991 the Government divested
itself of the last of these publications.
"Fascist" organizations are prohibited by law, although some
small, extreme rightwing groups function without interference.
In addition, a person may be prosecuted for "insulting" certain
state authorities if the "insult" is intended to undermine the
rule of law. There were no prosecutions for "insult" in 1991.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Persons have the right, in law and practice, to associate
formally or informally to promote nonviolent causes. Public
meetings or protests require 24-hour advance notice to the
civil governor of the region in which the event is to be held.
Permission is routinely granted. The official registration of
a new political party requires 5,000 signatures.
c. Freedom of Religion
Portugal does not have a state religion. The Government does
not interfere with the free practice of religion, missionary
work, or religious publications. These freedoms extend to
foreign clergy, many of whom work in Portugal. Organized
religious groups may establish places of worship, train clergy,
and proselytize without government interference. To qualify as
tax-exempt institutions, religious groups must be established
as nonprofit, private societies.
Roman Catholicism is the predominant religion in Portugal.
Catholic religious instruction is offered as an elective course
in public schools. Other denominations offer religious
education in their own institutions without interference.
Success in a civil, military, professional, or political career
does not depend upon adherence to a religious creed. There
were no reported cases of religious persecution in 1991.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides for the right of freedom of movement,
foreign travel, and emigration. There are no restraints on
domestic travel or on the right of a person to change his
domicile. Citizenship is not revoked for political reasons.
1210
PORTUGAL
Displaced persons who qualify as refugees as defined by the
International Convention Related to the Status of Refugees are
entitled to permanent resident status and work permits.
Displaced persons are not forced to return to the country from
which they fled.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Portugal is a multiparty, participatory democracy. Candidates
for president and for legislative, regional, and municipal
offices are freely nominated and are elected by secret ballot
on the basis of universal suffrage.
The unicameral Assembly of the Republic is the legislative
body. The Prime Minister is the head of the Government.
Opposition parties and candidates operate freely and enjoy
access to the media. General elections are held at least once
every 4 years. The President has a 5-year mandate and may not
serve more than two consecutive terms.
There are no restrictions on the participation of women or
minorities in the political process.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Local and international human rights groups operate freely in
Portugal. The Government cooperates with independent outside
investigations of human rights conditions and actively
participates in the monitoring of human rights by the Council
of Europe .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There are no laws discriminating against any racial, ethnic, or
religious group; nor do any such groups have a privileged
status in Portugal .
Various women's groups in Portugal have drawn attention to the
largely hidden problem of violence against women, particularly
within the family. Portuguese law provides for criminal
penalties in cases of violence between husbands and wives
without referring specifically to violence against wives.
Women's groups point out that traditional attitudes discourage
many women who suffer such violence from seeking recourse in
the judicial system. They complain that Portugal lacks
institutions established specifically to provide relief to
battered women. There is no apparent reluctance on the part of
the judicial system to prosecute suspects accused of abusing
women .
The civil code provides for full legal equality for women.
Women are increasing their representation in universities,
business, science, government, and the professions.
Traditional attitudes of male dominance persist but are
changing gradually. The Commission on the Status of Women, an
official organization established in 1976, is a leading
advocate of women's rights.
1211
PORTUGAL
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers in both the private and public sectors have the right
to associate freely and to establish committees in the
workplace "to defend their interests." The Constitution
provides for the right to establish unions by profession or
industry. Trade union associations are guaranteed the right to
participate in the preparation of labor legislation. Strikes
are permitted for any reason, including political causes. They
are common and are generally resolved through direct
negotiations between management and the unions involved.
Lockouts are prohibited. These constitutional guarantees are
respected in practice.
There are two principal labor federations. The General
Confederation of Portuguese Workers Intersindical (CGTP-IN) is
linked to the Communist Party and engages freely in cooperative
activities with the Communist-dominated World Federation of
Trade Unions. The General Union of Workers (UGT) is a
pluralist democratic federation affiliated with the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the
European Trade Union Confederation.
Both federations and their affiliates function free from
government control but are closely associated with political
parties. The CGTP-IN generally supports the Communist Party's
policies and causes. UGT leaders are associated with either
the Socialist or Social Democratic parties. Although some UGT
leaders serve in the Assembly of the Republic, the federation
pursues a generally independent path that occasionally puts it
in conflict with the Socialist and/or Social Democratic
parties. The labor movement in Portugal exercises significant
influence on social and economic policymaking.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions are free to organize without government or employer
interference. Collective bargaining is guaranteed by the
Constitution and practiced extensively in the public and
private sectors. When collective bargaining disputes lead to
prolonged strike action in key sectors (for example, health and
transportation) , the Government is empowered to order the
workers back to work for a specific period. The Government has
rarely done so in practice, in part due to the fact that most
strike activity is limited to periods of 1 to 3 days. When
collective bargaining fails, the Government, at the request of
either management or labor, may appoint a mediator. Despite
recent amendments to legislation that rec[uired ministerial
authorization of collective bargaining agreements in public
enterprises, the International Labor Organization's Committee
of Experts asked for assurances in 1991 that the ability of the
concerned minister to intervene in the collective nargaining
process is appropriately limited.
Union officials and members are protected by law against
antiunion discrimination, and this law is observed in
practice. Complaints are promptly examined by the General
Directorate of Labor.
Portugal has no export processing zones.
1212
PORTUGAL
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited and does not exist. This
prohibition is enforced by the General Labor Inspectorate.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum employment age is 15 years. It will be raised to
16 when the law providing for 9 years of compulsory schooling
takes effect on January 1, 1997. The UGT and CGTP-IN have
charged that a number of "clandestine" companies in the
textile, shoe, and construction industries in northern Portugal
exploit child labor. A report compiled by an international
nongovernmental human rights organization at the invitation of
the Portuguese Government and based on 2 months of
investigation, alleged that as many as 200,000 school-age
children could be working. Although the Government disputed
the 200,000 figure, it acknowledged that abuses exist and
promised to act to curb them, but it has yet to allocate
resources sufficient to address the problem. The General Labor
Inspectorate is responsible for enforcement of child labor laws
but suffers from a lack of money and an inadequate number of
inspectors .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
A national monthly minimum wage for full-time workers was first
established in 1974. Minimum wages for rural workers and
domestic employees were legislatively established in 1977 and
1978 respectively. Except in 1982, minimum wages have been
increased every year. The current minimum monthly wage,
established on January 1, 1991, is generally enforced but
legally does not apply to workers below the age of 18. Even
with rent control and various social assistance subsidies, it
is difficult for a single-income family to maintain a decent
standard of living on the minimum wage, particularly in urban
areas. Workers receive a Christmas bonus equal to a month's
salary.
Current legislation limits regular hours of work to 8 hours per
day and 44 hours per week, but agreement has been reached to
reduce the workweek to 40 hours by 1995. In practice, the
average workweek is 42 hours. Overtime is limited to 2 hours
per work period, up to 200 hours annually. Work on a normal
day off is restricted to 8 hours. These limits are respected
in practice. Workers are guaranteed 15 days of paid annual
leave per year. The Ministry of Employment and Social Security
monitors compliance through its regional inspectors.
Employers are legally responsible for accidents at work and are
required by law to carry accident insurance. Portugal has
developed a body of legislation that regulates safety and
health. Labor unions consider these regulations inadequate and
continue to press for stiffer legislation. The General
Directorate of Hygiene and Labor Security develops safety
standards, and the General Labor Inspectorate is responsible
for enforcement. Accidents average between 70,000 and 75,000
per quarter. These figures have focused government attention
particularly on the construction industry. There is also
considerable concern about the poor environmental controls on
the textile industry centered in the north of Portugal. The
General Labor Inspectorate lacks sufficient funds and
inspectors to combat the problem effectively, and the ability
of workers to remove themselves from situations where these
hazards exist is limited.
1213
MACAU
Macau's current status is unique: This small piece of land,
only 6 miles square, located near Hong Kong, is recognized by
both China and Portugal as Chinese territory operating under
Portuguese administration. The "Organic Statute" of 1976,
which serves as Macau's constitution, grants it considerable
administrative, economic, financial, and legislative autonomy.
Macau's Governor, who holds expansive powers under the statute,
is appointed by the Portuguese President following local
consultation.
Legislative power is shared by the Portuguese Government and
the territory's Legislative Assembly. Portuguese metropolitan
law serves as the basis for the legal system, which features
Portuguese as the official language, an independent judiciary,
and jury trials. The fundamental human rights contained in the
Portuguese Constitution apply also in Macau. The small police
force is firmly under the control of the civilian authorities.
Macau's private enterprise economy is expected to grow about 3
percent in 1991. This growth is fueled by legalized gambling,
which has produced a thriving tourist industry, and by the
export of textiles and other light industrial products,
principally toys. With a population of less than half a
million people, Macau has a per capita gross domestic product
of over $6,900.
Under the agreement reached between the Portuguese and Chinese
Governments in 1987, Macau will become a Special Administrative
Region (SAR) of China on December 20, 1999. Macau's current
social, economic, and legal systems are supposed to remain
basically unchanged during the first 50 years of the SAR's
existence .
Citizens of Macau enjoy a wide range of rights and freedoms.
The principal human rights problem inherent in Macau's status
as a territory is the restriction on the right of citizens to
change their government. Although there are no legal
restrictions on trade unions, there are de facto problems in
realizing the full range of worker rights. Efforts are under
way, in the form of followup diplomatic negotiations and the
drafting of Macau's future constitution (basic law), to
conclude the legal and other arrangements necessary to effect
the transition to Chinese rule. Actions taken by Chinese
authorities against the prodemocracy movement on the mainland
have affected local confidence negatively, prompting concern
over the future effectiveness of such arrangements in
safeguarding existing rights and freedoms.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no indications of such abuses being condoned or
practiced by government authorities.
b. Disappearance
The authorities do not practice or condone secret arrests or
clandestine confinements.
1214
MACAU
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Such abuses are prohibited by law and were not known to occur
in 1991.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Legal prohibitions exist and are honored. The examining judge,
who conducts the pretrial inquiry in criminal cases, has wide
powers to collect evidence, order or dismiss indictments,
validate and maintain the detention of suspects, and determine
whether to release accused persons. Persons remanded in
custody must be presented to an examining judge within 48 hours
of being detained. The evidence is examined by the accused's
counsel. If the judge is not convinced that the evidence is
fully adequate, he may dismiss the accused, and the trial will
not take place. Exile is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Fair trial is guaranteed and practiced. The courts are
independent of the executive. All are courts of first instance
and are integrated into the Portuguese judicial system. Juries
determine questions of fact in serious criminal cases.
Decisions of the Macau courts are appealable to the superior
Portuguese courts, which are empowered to uphold, amend, or
reverse the decision of lower courts or to order a new trial,
except where administrative acts are declared invalid.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Macau currently has in effect laws ensuring the inviolability
of the home and of communication, the right of ownership of
private property and of enterprises, and the freedom to marry
and raise a family. There is no indication of any abuses
either condoned or practiced by the government authorities.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Independent or critical opinions receive consistent airing in
the mass media, public forums, and by public associations.
Newspapers and television stations are privately owned. The
academic community is free to express its views.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Legal guarantees exist and are observed in practice. With full
cooperation of the local authorities, fully half the population
participated in multiple, peaceful demonstrations in 1989 in
support of the mainland prodemocracy movement.
c. Freedom of Religion
Macau is a multireligious, predominantly Buddhist society.
Other religions may and do exist and practice freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Movement is subject neither to arbitrary nor discriminatory
limitation.
1215
MACAU
The Government's official policy since 1982 has been to guide
all Vietnamese boat people arriving in Macau waters into or
near Hong Kong territorial waters. While the Hong Kong
Government does not endorse this practice and would like Macau
to provide first asylum for Vietnamese, no formal protest has
been lodged. The Government closed its only refugee center in
July and moved the remaining 100 residents into public
housing. Prior to the closing, the camp had been run as an
open facility with virtually all able-bodied adults working in
the local economy.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have only a limited ability to change their
government. The 17-member Legislative Assembly is an
organizational hybrid in which 6 members are chosen in
universal, direct elections, an additional 6 are indirectly
elected by local community interests, and the remaining 5
members are appointed by the Governor. The Consultative
Council, an advisory group to the Governor, also provides some
measure of popular representation. The Macau Government, by
tradition, also consults informally on a regular basis with
local business and cultural leaders.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
A local organization known as the Union of Democracy works
openly to promote democratization and human rights in Macau.
There have been no reports that any international or
nongovernmental body has made any request to carry out human
rights investigations in Macau.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Freedom from discrimination in these areas is guaranteed by law
and observed in practice. Because Macau's governmental and
legal systems place a premium on knowledge of the Portuguese
language and metropolitan law, about 60 percent of the
approximately 130 senior government officials come from
Portugal. Among the 700 people in the Government's
professional grades, about half come from Portugal. Most of
the other middle- and upper-ranking civil servants are
Macanese. Legislation is now being drafted in both Chinese and
Portuguese, and both languages have equal status in the
Legislative Assembly and Consultative Council.
By tradition and custom, women play a minor role in local
political life. They are becoming more active and visible in
business and government, and some enjoy considerable influence
and responsibility in these areas. Reported cases of violence
against women are not common. For cases that are reported,
Macau's criminal statutes prohibiting domestic violence are
enforced and violators are prosecuted. Abuses are reported by
police and doctors to the Social Welfare Department, which
investigates them. If hospital treatment is rec[uired, a
medical social worker counsels the victim and informs her about
social welfare services. Until their complaints are resolved,
battered women may be placed in public housing, but no
facilities are reserved especially for them.
1216
MACAU
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Macau labor law recognizes the right and freedom of all workers
to form and join trade unions and of private sector unions to
strike. The Government neither impedes the formation of trade
unions nor discriminates against union members. No strikes
occurred in 1991. The police are legally prohibited from
striking but occasionally engage in massive "job actions" which
are strikes in all but name.
Local trade union activities, including the selection of union
leadership, are heavily influenced or directly controlled by
the interests of the People's Republic of China, which places
emphasis on maintaining Macau's economic and political
stability with minimum disruptions in the work force. Nearly
all of Macau's 7,000 private sector union members belong to a
pro-PRC labor confederation. Many local observers claim that
this organization is more interested in furthering the PRC
political agenda in Macau than in addressing classic trade
union issues. One tiny private sector union and all three
public sector unions are outside PRC control.
Macau unions may freely form federations and affiliate with
international bodies. The three civil service unions are
affiliated with the major non-Communist Portuguese union
conferation, which itself has international labor ties.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions tend to resemble local traditional neighborhood
associations, promoting social and cultural activities rather
than issues relating to the workplace. Local custom, moreover,
favors employment without the benefit of written labor
contracts, the exception being the importation of labor from
China, which is under contract. Reflecting the mainland
Chinese influence, unions traditionally have not attempted to
engage in collective bargaining. While Portuguese laws
protecting collective bargaining apply to Macau, and the Macau
Government does not impede or discourage collective bargaining,
there are no government mechanisms to promote voluntary
negotiations. There is no minimum wage law in Macau; wages are
set by the market. Some workers complain that they do not dare
speak out against unfair practices for fear of losing their
jobs. Portuguese law applied to Macau prohibits antiunion
discrimination. There were no complaints about this issue in
1991. There are no export processing zones in Macau.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is illegal and does not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Minors under the age of 15 are forbidden legally to work except
in businesses operated by their immediate families. The law is
enforced by the Macau Labor Department, which refers flagrantly
offending employers to the judicial authorities for
prosecution. The Labor Department claims that the incidence of
child labor has declined radically since effective enforcement
began in 1985. There were no prosecutions for child labor
violations in 1991.
I
1217
MACAU
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Existing labor legislation provides for a 48-hour workweek,
(regularly 8 hours per day, but no more than 10 1/2 hours per
day), overtime, annual leave, medical and maternity care, and
employee compensation insurance. The Labor Department is
responsible for processing complaints. However, Government
enforcement of the labor laws appears to be lax at times,
partly owing to limited fiscal resources and personnel, but
also as a matter of policy. Some workers complain that workers
receive no assistance from the Government in disputes between
workers and factories.
In the absence of any statutory minimum wage or publicly
administered social security program, some large companies have
provided private welfare and security packages. Calls for
labor reform, medical insurance, a social security system, and
increases in employee compensation figure regularly in
political campaign platforms. To offset a current labor
shortage, the Macau Government allows the importation of labor
from China under contract, while at the same time imposing
heavy fines on employers harboring illegal immigrants. The
number of imported workers probably totals between 1,500 and
3,000 workers out of an estimated work force of 195,000.
Laws on occupational safety and health are enforced by the
Macau Labor Department, which cited various employers for a
total of 83 infractions last year. Failure to correct
infractions leads to prosecution by the Macau Government.
1218
ROMANIA
The government formed after the May 1990 election, dominated by
the National Salvation Front (NSF) , remained in office until
September 1991. At that time. Prime Minister Roman was removed
in the wake of attacks on government buildings involving
striking coal miners and others who had come to Bucharest to
protest against economic reforms that had substantially reduced
their real income. Though the wage demands of the miners were
met, the new Government, which is primarily composed of NSF
reform-wing members but also includes representatives of the
National Liberal Party, pledged to continue the economic and
democratic reforms initiated by its predecessor. The NSF-
dominated Parliament, sitting as a constituent assembly,
completed work on a new constitution, which was approved by a
popular referendum on December 8. The new Constitution provides
for multiparty democracy and guarantees fundamental freedoms.
Controversy continues to surround the Romanian Intelligence
Service (SRI). Though the SRI ' s legal powers are limited to
investigation and do not include the authority to arrest, there
has been concern that the SRI engages in political surveillance.
Laws on the privatization of public enterprises and agriculture
and encouraging foreign investment were enacted. Most prices
were freed of government control, and subsidies were reduced.
These measures led to an increase in consumer products available
to Romanians but at prices that many cannot afford. The
dislocations associated with transition to a market economy and
the collapse of intraregional trade contributed to a fall in
production and in real incomes.
Romanians live under a government that generally respects the
fundamental liberties of the individual. The Government took
several positive steps in 1991, including replacing a large
number of judges and prosecutors from the Communist era,
adopting new laws on worker rights, and dismissing some SRI
employees. On the other hand, severe discrimination against
Gypsies, a problem endemic to the region, was in evidence in
Romania as well. Local authorities in several instances failed
to respond when Gypsy homes were burned down. The past year
also saw an increase in strident Romanian nationalism, which
added to the problems of establishing a modern, pluralist,
democratic state. Although ethnic Hungarians enjoy broad legal
and cultural rights, historical tensions between ethnic
Hungarians and Romanians persisted; anti-Semitism surfaced in
ultranationalist publications. Extremist groups, espousing
nationalism and authoritarianism, if reinforced by populist
discontent with market-oriented economic reforms, could
constitute a threat to the country's fledgling democratic
institutions .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reported political or other extrajudicial
killings. During civil disturbances created by striking miners
in Petrosani, Craiova, and Bucharest on September 25-28, at
least three persons, one of them a police officer, died, and
over 400 were injured.
1219
ROMANIA
b. Disappearance
There were no reported instances of disappearance in 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The new Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading
punishment or treatment. It also prohibits the death penalty.
There were no reports of the torture of detainees in 1991.
Romanian law also stipulates that torture or cruel and unusual
treatment of prisoners is illegal.
Numerous political figures, journalists, and others were beaten
by unknown assailants under suspicious circumstances, and
others, including trade vinionists, were subject to anonymous
threats, including death threats. Police investigation into
some of the assaults was continuing at year's end. (For police
beatings of journalists, see Section 2. a.) Beatings in prisons
and in police detention facilities are common, and leg irons
and chains are regularly used as punishment in Romanian prisons.
There have been no reports of a Romanian law enforcement
official prosecuted for mistreatment of prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Romanian law forbids police from detaining anyone for more than
24 hours without an arrest order from a procurator, with the
exception noted below. Detainees have the right to bail and
may ask for a hearing before a judge. The case must be heard
within 24 hours of such a request. In the absence of a reqxiest,
however, a person may be held for up to 65 days without a court
order. The Government is liable for damages to persons held in
violation of these provisions. In 1991, one person illegally
detained during the June 1990 events was awarded monetary
damages .
An arrestee has the right to be informed of the charges against
him. He also has the right to have an attorney present at all
stages of the legal process, and police must inform him of this
right, in a language that he understands, before obtaining any
statement from him.
Romanian authorities may detain a person without approval from
a procurator under Decree 153/1970 for up to 6 months.
Detention under this decree does not result in a criminal
record and may be appealed. It is mainly used for detentions
of short duration for disorderly conduct.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system consists of local courts, county courts,
and a Supreme Court. In addition, the military prosecutor has
jurisdiction over cases involving military personnel, criminal
acts against the State (including attacks against military
bases, police stations, and government buildings, as well as
treason and espionage cases), and cases involving acts committed
by police. Such cases are brought before military tribunals.
The Ministry of Justice controls the selection and promotion of
judges, and there has been a significant turnover in judicial
ranks since December 1989. The new Constitution provides life
tenure for judges, who are to be appointed by the President
upon recommendation from a panel of judges selected by the
Parliament. This panel also has disciplinary authority over
1220
ROMANIA
judges. A Constitutional Court, six of whose members will be
chosen by Parliament and three by the President, has judicial
responsibility for constitutional issues. Its decisions on the
constitutionality of laws may be overridden by a subsequent
two-thirds vote of both chambers of Parliament.
The Procurator General, appointed by the President, heads an
agency responsible for the administration of the law as well as
for criminal prosecutions. The agency used to be independent
but, under the new Constitution, is monitored under the
authority of the Minister of Justice, at least for
administrative purposes. The Procurator General appoints local
procurators throughout the country.
The criminal code requires that a defendant be informed of his
right to defense counsel. If the defendant cannot afford legal
representation or is otherwise unable to select counsel, the
law provides that an attorney will be appointed for him.
There were no known political prisoners.
The Constitution created the office of the People's Attorney,
an ombudsman whose responsibility is to "defend the rights and
liberties" of Romanians. The People's Attorney does not have
legal authority to redress grievances but, in reports to
Parliament, may provide recommendations regarding legislation
or other measures for the protection of the rights and liberties
of citizens.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Article 27 of the new Constitution provides legal protection
against warrantless searches of a residence, but this protection
is subordinate, under the provisions of law, to "national
security or public order." Entrances under such conditions
must be authorized by a magistrate. Article 28 states that the
secrecy of legal means of communication is inviolable. The law
on national security, however, as well as the law on the SRI
under debate at the end of 1991, contain provisions for
monitoring these areas when deemed necessary for national
security reasons. Relevant legislation does not clearly define
the term "national security." In general, the Government does
not appear to be interfering in the rights of individual
citizens to privacy so long as they are not perceived as
threats to the established order. Many allegations of the
unauthorized monitoring of telephone conversations and written
correspondence persist in an environment of continuing suspicion
of the authorities that is a legacy of Communist rule. The
Government, while acknowledging that some of the allegations
are true, has not investigated such allegations vigorously or
taken steps publicly to stop the abuses.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The new Constitution contains guarantees of freedom of
expression and prohibitions against censorship of any kind.
Romanians are generally free to express whatever opinions they
choose. Romanian courts have found, however, that in some
cases people were dismissed from their jobs due to their
political opinions. The courts ordered that these persons be
reinstated in their former jobs and paid monetary damages.
1221
ROMANIA
The print media publish a wide variety of opinions without
state censorship or interference. The Government has criticized
some of the more virulent allegations of the extremist press,
and one of the most vitriolic papers, Romania Mare, which often
publishes anti-Semitic material, suspended operations for a
month, following criticism of the paper by Prime Minister
Roman. Several major newspapers went on a temporary strike in
December to protest rising costs of production and distribution.
The strike ended following negotiations between the Government
and journalists on measures to ease the financial problems of
the print media. There were allegations that the authorities
manipulated the distribution networks and supply of newsprint
to the disadvantage of opposition newspapers. Reports indicate
that the price of newsprint is currently above world levels.
Romanian Television (RTV) is the sole station with nationwide
broadcasting capabilities. Though nominally independent, it
remains under state control. Taken as a whole, RTV s broadcasts
favor the establishment, and persons representing contrasting
political viewpoints insist that they do not get a fair hearing.
In December the Government agreed to broadcast special programs
during the next year's local electoral campaign and to reserve
time for all competing political organizations. It also agreed
to grant more broadcast time to independent television
stations. These measures were implemented in January.
On its second channel, which reaches approximately 30 percent
of the country's population, RTV started regular broadcasts of
British, Spanish, and French national news programs. In
February RTV substantially reduced its independent political
party and minority-language broadcasting on its first channel
but added some nonpolitical minority programming to the second
channel and to local broadcasts during nonprime hours. In
October an independent television studio, SOTI, obtained
permission to broadcast 4 hours per week on the second channel
in the late evening, and it began broadcasting in December.
Some local television stations have begun limited broadcasting,
using Ministry of Telecommunications facilities during the
off-hours when RTV is not broadcasting. There are many
independent radio stations in Romania, including five in
Bucharest. More stations would like to begin broadcasting, but
no new licenses are being granted, pending passage of a law on
radio and television.
There were several incidents in 1991 in which police beat
Romanian and foreign journalists, whose press badges were
displayed, while they were covering public demonstrations. In
the most serious incident of its kind in January, the Ministry
of the Interior apologized to the press corps and reportedly
demoted five of its officers in connection with such beatings.
The importation and distribution of foreign publications have
generally not been restricted, but there have been cases of
customs officials preventing certain Hungarian-language material
from entering Romeinia. The Romanian Government has sought to
justify these actions based on the law on national security,
specifically the prohibition on importation of materials with
an ant i -Romanian content.
The free flow of educational exchanges initiated after the
revolution continues to increase. More than 20 nonstate
institutions of higher education have been opened, but the
Government has not yet recognized their degrees.
1222
ROMANIA
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
The right to peaceful assembly is provided for by the new
Constitution and generally respected in practice. Approvals
for public meetings generally were routinely given under the
decree laws in effect until September, but a number of
unauthorized demonstrations were held in Bucharest and other
cities. Organizers and participants in these unauthorized
demonstrations were not charged, although the law provided for
short jail terms or fines for failing to observe the legal
requirements. Early in the year, several demonstrations, some
of which involved violence, were forcefully dispersed by the
authorities .
In September the Parliament passed Law No. 192 concerning the
right of Romanians to assemble peacefully. This law states
that public meetings must be peaceful and unarmed and not
interfere with other economic or social activities. Such
meetings may not be held near various locations such as
hospitals, airports, or military installations. Demonstration
organizers must provide information about the meeting to the
local authorities and police before the event. The authorities
may forbid a public meeting by notifying the organizers in
writing within 48 hours of the receipt of the request to hold
such a meeting. Public meetings to espouse Communist, racist,
or Fascist ideology or to commit actions contrary to public
order or national security are forbidden. Unauthorized
demonstrations or other violations of this law are punishable
by imprisonment and fines. There were no reports, however, of
any public demonstrations being forbidden under the provisions
of this law.
Decree Law 8 of 1989 establishes the right of Romanian citizens
to form political parties, with the exception of Fascist parties
or those promoting concepts contrary to public order. There
have been no reports of political or ethnic organizations denied
the right to form a party under this law. The current law
stipulates that all political parties and social organizations
must prove membership of at least 251 persons in order to be
granted legal status. It further provides a process for appeal
to the Supreme Court for any political party denied registration
rights. There are now over 200 political parties in Romania.
Political and social organizations are permitted to maintain
relations with international bodies.
A parliamentary investigation of the June 1990 violence in
Bucharest by vigilante miners and others resulted in separate
reports from government and opposition members of the panel.
The majority report sought to hold antigovernment demonstrators
primarily responsible for provoking the violence, while the
opposition minority attributed the primary responsibility to
the Government. The majority report also sought to exonerate
President Iliescu and the Government from their role in
bringing the miners to Bucharest.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution contains guarantees of religious freedom. The
Government no longer impedes the free observance of religious
belief. There are 15 recognized denominations and religions in
Romania. The Romanian Orthodox Church, to which approximately
80 percent of the population belongs, predominates.
The state licenses each religious denomination, a process which
confers legal status and exemptions from income taxes and
1223
ROMANIA
customs duties. The ultimate licensing authority will be
determined according to a new draft law to be submitted to
Parliament in 1992.
The dispute among the Uniate Church (also known as the Greek
Catholic Church), the Government, and the Orthodox Church over
the physical disposition of Uniate Church assets remains
unresolved. Approximately 2,000 Uniate properties, including
almost 1,900 churches, were seized in 1948. Most were
eventually turned over to the Orthodox Church. The provisional
government issued a decree in April 1990 stating that all
Uniate property still retained by the State would be returned
to that denomination. Government action on returning the 91
properties to which the Uniates have clear claim has continually
been deferred, however, although a few properties have been
turned over informally.
The c[uestion of the Uniates' former churches, now in the hands
of the Orthodox Church, is more difficult. The Uniates want
the State to ensure the return of their confiscated assets, but
the Government maintains that the two religious groups should
resolve the question between themselves, without government
interference. With one exception, the Orthodox hierarchy to
date has shown a marked unwillingness to return any of the
churches .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Except for certain small areas reserved for military purposes,
there are no official restrictions placed on travel within
Romania, nor are there any official limitations placed on
Romanian citizens who wish to change their places of work or
residence. Travel outside Romania is not restricted. Romanian
law stipulates that Romanian citizens have the right to travel
freely abroad. They may also emigrate and return to Romania.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
A new Constitution was approved by the Constituent Assembly on
November 21 and was adopted after a popular referendum oh
December 8. Until passage of the new Constitution, the Romanian
people's right and ability peacefully to change their government
was regulated by a March 1990 decree that provided for the
direct election of the President and for the election of a
two-chamber Parliament by proportional voting in 40 electoral
districts and Bucharest. Under its provisions, all citizens
over the age of 18 had the right to vote. The President
appoints the Prime Minister, the members of the Supreme Court,
and the Procurator General. New national elections were
reqiiired not later than 1 year after parliamentary ratification
of the new Constitution. Local elections will take place on
February 9, 1992, and the Government has proposed national
elections in the spring of 1992.
A serious setback to the democratic process occurred with the
renewed incursion of coal miners into Bucharest in September.
They vehemently protested their deteriorating standard of
living, assaulted government headquarters, the Presidential
palace, and the television station, and besieged the Parliament.
The incursion ended after 3 days of rioting in which at least
three persons were killed. In its wake. Prime Minister Petre
Roman and his government were removed from office when President
Iliescu accepted the miners' demands for their ouster.
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President Iliescu appointed Theodor Stolojan to form a new
government, which emerged as a coalition of members of the NSF
and other political parties.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
A number of domestic human rights monitoring groups have been
established since December 1989. These groups include the
League for the Defense of Human Rights, the Prodemocracy
Association, local chapters of Helsinki Watch and the Helsinki
Committee, the Independent Romanian Society for Human Rights,
and the Association of Former Political Prisoners. Some
mainstream groups, including political parties and trade unions,
also have human rights sections which monitor the human rights
situation in Romania.
The Government has permitted international human rights
organizations to circulate freely in Romania. International
groups have encountered no impediments in meeting with Romanian
human rights organizations and have, albeit with delays in some
instances, been able to meet with arrested persons and to visit
prisons .
In 1991 the Government established human rights offices in the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Reform, and Interior,
as well as a publicly funded Romanian Institute for Human
Rights designed to carry out educational and information
programs on human rights. Parliament has also created a
commission to review human rights issues and legislation.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Article 4 of the new Constitution states that Romania is the
common and indivisible country of all its citizens, without any
discrimination on account of race, nationality, ethnic origin,
language, religion, sex, opinion and political allegiance,
wealth, or social background. Article 16 states that citizens
are equal before the law and public authorities, without any
privilege or discrimination, although it then prohibits dual
citizens from holding any civil or military offices. The
Government states that its policy is to guarantee and protect
the rights of all citizens, regardless of ethnic, cultural, or
religious background. On November 20, it approved a declaration
on national minorities. Although the Government made the text
available to foreign embassies, the declaration has been given
limited domestic publicity.
There are approximately 22 ethnic minorities in Romania,
representing about 15 percent of the population. Ethnic groups
have formed political parties. The largest opposition party
currently represented in Parliament is the ethnic Hungarian
party. In the electoral law, the Government set aside seats in
the Chamber of Deputies to ensure that those minorities that
failed to elect members would be represented in Parliament, a
provision carried over into the new Constitution.
Gypsies, whose estimated numbers in Romania range from 227,000
(1977 census) to 2 million or more, continue to suffer many
forms of discrimination. They tend to receive fewer public
services, such as public housing or access to potable water,
than do most Romanian citizens. They are also subjected to
discriminatory treatment in schools. Almost all elements of
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Romanian society tend to view Gypsies as thieves and criminals,
and the extremist press publishes racist articles that blame
Gypsies for Romania's current economic difficulties.
A commission of inquiry from the International Labor
Organization found that Gypsies suffered both direct and
indirect discrimination in the workplace. It also noted that
Gypsies were directly discriminated against and relegated to
low-paying, low status jobs. It reported that Gypsies face
indirect discrimination by exclusion from educational and work
opportunities that might lead to higher paying or skilled
jobs. Such discrimination perpetuates the low status Gypsies
occupy in Romanian society. The Government has initiated some
job training programs for Gypsies and begun experimental
classes in the Romany language for Gypsy children. A half-hour
weekly television entertainment program designed for the Gypsy
minority is permitted.
Violence, including the burning of Gypsy homes, erupted against
Gypsy communities in several incidents in 1991. Gypsies
complain that the police often do not respond to attacks on
Gypsy quarters, and, in fact, sometimes participate in the
attacks. To date, no non-Gypsy has been arrested in connection
with these crimes.
Hungarians, as the largest ethnic minority, number between 1.7
and 2.2 million, although there are no reliable statistics.
Like most Romanian minorities, they are concentrated in
Transylvania, although more than 200,000 Hungarians reside in
Bucharest. Instruction in the Hungarian language is available
in primary and secondary schools when there are at least 7
elementary students or 15 secondary students to form a
Hungarian- language class. Some postsecondary educational
subjects are taught in Hungarian in institutions in Cluj and
Tirgu Mures. Ethnic Hungarians allege discrimination, however,
criticizing the requirement that history and geography are to
be taught only in Romanian. They also criticize the failure of
the Constitution to guarantee the use of minority languages in
courts (although it provides for the use of interpreters), its
general emphasis on Romania as a unitary state, and what they
assert are inadequate protections for minorities.
Although the Government has publicly condemned all acts of
extremism, the chauvinistic element of Romanian society saw an
increase in its visibility and influence in 1991. This was
evident in Parliament itself during debates on the Constitution
and security matters, including the parliamentary report on
allegations of abuses committed by ethnic Hungarians in Covasna
and Harghita counties.
There are only some 20,000 Jews in a total population of 23
million, but anti-Semitic opinions were rife in 1991. The
increase in chauvinism was accompanied by a marked increase in
anti-Semitic articles in the ultranationalist press, often
directed at government officials alleged to be of Jewish
origin. Government representatives condemned these extremist
provocations and participated in ceremonies in June marking the
anniversary of pogroms directed against Romanian Jews in 1941.
In principle, women are accorded the same rights and privileges
as men, including in the areas of education, access to
employment, and comparable wages. However, in a difficult
economic climate, they are usually the first to be dismissed.
There is no documented evidence of extensive violence against
women, including wife beating. The Government, political
1226
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parties, and the press have shown little interest in the
subject to date, and women's organizations are only slowly
becoming active.
Romania has inherited a legacy of discrimination against the
country's severely handicapped population, both children and
adults, as well as children residing in Romania's orphanages.
The Government has tried to improve conditions in the orphanages
and has set up special programs for the handicapped, including
vocational training and special schools for handicapped
children.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Parliament enacted several laws in 1991 which revised Communist-
era labor legislation. Law No. 54/1991 establishes the right
of workers to organize and join unions, recognizes the legal
character of labor organizations, and imposes criminal penalties
for interference with these rights. According to this law,
trade unions are independent bodies, free from government or
political party control, with the right to be consulted on
labor issues. No worker can be forced to join or withdraw from
a union, and union officials who resign from elected positions
and return to the regular work force are accorded protection
against employer retaliation.
Article 40 of the new Constitution guarantees employees the
right to strike, but permits Parliament to establish conditions
and limitations. Law No. 15/1991 prescribes procedures for the
settlement of labor disputes. It specifically guarantees
workers the right to petition employers to resolve labor-
related grievances and to engage in strikes if workers and
management fail to reach agreement. The law denies the right
to strike to certain categories of personnel employed in the
Ministries of National Defense, Interior, and Justice, as well
as in the Parliament, national defense enterprises, and those
involved in the production and distribution of energy. The law
limits the right to strike of workers employed in the health,
sanitation, education, telecommunications, and transportation
sectors. Workers in the latter category may strike but only if
they retain at least one-third of the normal work force on duty
to maintain public services. The right to strike was frequently
exercised in 1991 in a wide variety of sectors, including by
workers involved in health, education, and transportation.
There appear to be no serious impediments to the right of trade
unions to associate freely or to engage in strikes or other
labor actions to press their demands.
The overwhelming majority of Romania's approximately 10 million
working people are members of about 13 nationwide trade union
confederations and smaller independent trade unions. The
largest is the National Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(CNSLR), which succeeded the former Communist-controlled
General Confederation of Trade Unions (UGSR) . For the most
part, unions conduct rheir activities independent of government
or political party control.
Trade unions are free to affiliate internationally, and
representatives of foreign and international organizations
freely visit and advise Romanian trade unionists.
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In May the governing body of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) issued its report on alleged employment
discrimination against Romania's ethnic minorities. The report
distinguished between laws and regulations in effect both
before and after the filing of the complaint on June 26, 1989.
Nevertheless, the report concluded that discrimination against
Romania's ethnic minorities continues, especially against
Gypsies and Hungarians, despite the elimination of Communist-
era laws and regulations which had institutionalized such
discrimination.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Law No. 13/1991 establishes the collective bargaining agreement
as a legally recognized contract, which is the basis for setting
working conditions, wages, and other obligations of employers
and workers. The right to bargain collectively is also
enshrined in Article 38 of the Constitution. In addition to
basic wage scales established through collective bargaining,
workers and pensioners receive thrice-yearly increases indexed
to prospective price increases as a result of government
decision 579/1991, issued in September. The amount of the
indexed increases is determined through government-trade union
negotiations.
There are no export processing zones in Romania.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is currently no law that prohibits forced or compulsory
labor. Article 39 of the Constitution prohibits such labor but
excludes members of the military, convicts, and those working
during declared national emergencies from the definition of
forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Government states that it respects ILO conventions
concerning the employment of children. According to Decree-Law
147 of 1990, the minimum age for employment is 16, although
children as young as 14 or 15 may work with the consent of their
parents or guardians and only "according to their physical
development, aptitude, and knowledge." Working children under
16 have the right to continue their education, and employers are
obliged to assist in this regard. The Ministry of Labor and
Social Protection (MOLSP) has the authority to impose fines and
close sections of factories to enforce compliance with the law,
No violations of this policy have been documented by the media
or the MOLSP, and child labor does not appear to be a problem.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Most wage scales are established through collective bargaining.
However, minimum wages, which are promulgated by government
decisions, vary and are set according to a complex scale by
profession, taking into account experience and time on the
job. Minimum wage rates are generally observed and enforced.
Real incomes have declined as wages failed to keep pace with
spiraling inflation despite indexation to prices. Most trade
unionists do not believe that minimum wage scales in 1991
provided a decent standard of living for Romanian workers.
Basic necessities like housing and medical care are still
heavily subsidized by the Government, but rising prices for
food and energy consume the majority of the average worker's
income. It is becoming increasingly difficult for workers at
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ROMANIA
the lower end of the wage scale, in particular, to provide for
their families without additional means of support.
The 1985 Labor Code remains the basic document concerning
working conditions, although it has been modified since the
1989 revolution. The normal workweek is 40 hours or 5 days
with overtime paid for weekend work or work in excess of 40
hours. Paid holidays range from 15 to 24 days annually. Law
31/1991 establishes special benefits and allowances for workers
engaged in particularly dangerous or difficult occupations.
The Labor Code promises workers a safe working environment.
The MOLSP has established safety standards for most industries
and is responsible for enforcing them. Some labor organizations
also press for healthier, safer working conditions on behalf of
their members. Enforcement is not good, however. The MOLSP
lacks trained personnel for inspection and enforcement, and
employers generally ignore their suggestions. Neither the
Government nor industry, which remains almost entirely state-
owned, have the resources necessary to improve health and
safety conditions in the workplace.
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Spain is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional
monarch. King Juan Carlos I. In free and open parliamentary
elections in October 1989, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez was
elected to a third term.
The security forces are under the full control of the
Government; allegations of human rights abuse are investigated,
and those found guilty are punished by law. Spanish security
services also maintain anticorruption brigades that investigate
allegations of fraud and dishonesty within each service.
The Spanish economy is market based, with primary reliance on
private initiative, although there are still a sizable number
of public sector enterprises. Since Spain joined the European
Community in 1986, its economy has been one of the fastest
growing in Western Europe. Spain continues to experience high
unemployment, amounting to approximately 16 percent as of
September . High unemployment is due in part to the entry of
large numbers of people into the labor force, which has
disproportionately affected women and youth. Actual
unemployment is estimated to be considerably lower than the
Government's figures indicate, due to the existence of an
extensive underground economy.
The fundamental rights of freedom of speech, assembly, press,
religion, movement, and participation in the political process
are provided for in the Constitution of 1978 and are respected
in practice. In 1991 the principal source of human rights
abuses continued to be the protracted campaign of terrorism
waged by the Basque Fatherland and Freedom separatist group
(ETA) . The Government continued its efforts to bring individual
terrorists to justice while adhering to democratic standards of
due process and civil rights. While suspected terrorists
arrested and charged with crimes frequently asserted that they
were abused by police, there were no confirmed cases. The
Government and the public gave increasing attention to the
exploitation of the country's increasing number of illegal
immigrants .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known political or other extrajudicial killings
by government forces. In approximately 66 terrorist-related
incidents from January through November, approximately 36 people
were killed and 148 injured. The number of incidents increased
from 1990, as did the severity of these attacks, resulting in
more deaths and injuries. As in 1990, the vast majority of
those killed were members of the Guardia Civil, the National
Police, and the military. Of the 66 incidents, 54 were
attributed to the ETA, 4 to the First of October Anti-Fascist
Group (GRAPO), 3 to a Galician nationalist group, and the
remaining 5 to small extremist groups in Catalonia and the
Basque country.
Cooperation between the Spanish and French Governments in the
fight against the ETA led to the French Government's
extradition of several suspected low-level ETA terrorists to
Spain; so far, no high-ranking ETA leaders have been extradited.
Although ETA violence increased in 1991, the Spanish authorities
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scored a series of successes against the ETA, weakening key
cells in San Sebastian and Barcelona.
Violence from the GRAPO decreased in 1991 thanks in part to the
arrests in late 1990 of two key members of the organization and
several arrests in late 1991. In Catalonia, the nationalist
group Terra Lliure (Free Land) in July renounced its use of
violence and disbanded, vowing to achieve Catalan independence
via political means.
Two ranking police officers, who had been in pretrial custody
since 1988 on charges that they organized a secret antiterrorist
death squad (Antiterrorist Liberation Group, or GAL), were
convicted in July, and each was sentenced to 108 years in
prison in September. The delay in bringing the two policemen
to trial is not unusual for a criminal case (see Section I.e.).
b. Disappearance
There are no claims that police or government security forces
carried out secret arrests or kidnapings. No kidnapings for
ransom were reported in 1991.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although detainees charged with terrorism routinely assert that
they are abused during detention, and similar charges are
sometimes made by persons arrested for criminal offenses, there
were no documented instances of police abuse during 1991. In
April 1990, however, the ombudsman-like Office of the Defender
of the People expressed concern about the persistence of cases
of alleged ill-treatment of detainees by members of the security
forces. The Government actively investigates incidents in which
police officers are accused of such abuses and prosecutes when
the evidence warrants. An improved police attitude with respect
to human rights in recent years may be attributed to this
demonstrated willingness of the Government to punish improper
police behavior, as well as to enhanced police training and
discipline, publicity in the press, and concern by the police
unions themselves with denunciations of police misconduct.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under the Constitution, a person is free from arbitrary arrest
and detention, and normally a suspect may not be held more than
72 hours without a hearing. The penal code, as reformed in
1988, permits a suspected terrorist to be held an additional 2
days without a hearing. Exile is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary and the
right to a fair public trial. This right is observed in
practice. Defendants have the right to be represented by an
attorney, at state expense for the indigent. The right to be
released on bail is guaranteed, unless the court has reasons to
believe a suspect may flee or constitutes a serious threat to
public safety. The law provides for an expeditious judicial
hearing following arrest. Suspects may not be confined for more
than 2 years before being brought to trial, unless a further
delay is authorized by a judge. The period of pretrial custody
may be extended up to 6 years, at the judge's discretion. In
practice, pretrial custody generally is less than 1 year. In
cases of petty crime, suspects released on bail may face a wait
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of as long as 5 years before their trial comes up. Following
conviction, defendants may appeal to the next higher court.
The judicial structure comprises territorial, provincial,
regional, and municipal courts with the Supreme Tribunal at its
apex. The Constitutional Tribunal has jurisdiction over
constitutional issues. The European Court of Human Rights is
the final arbiter in cases concerning human rights.
In September the Spanish press publicized a report by the Human
Rights Committee of the Conference for Security and Cooperation
in Europe on alleged abuses of the pretrial custody system in
Spain. The report focused on the overcrowding of Spanish
prisons and the growing number of inmates who had already served
time equal to their probable sentences before reaching trial.
The Office of the Defender of the People denied the report's
allegations and pointed to a significant amount of work done in
the areas of sanitation and education in Spain's prisons.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Co r r espondenc e
The Constitution protects the privacy of the home and
correspondence. Under the criminal code, government authorities
must obtain court approval before searching private property,
wiretapping, or interfering with private correspondence. The
present antiterrorist law gives discretionary authority to the
Minister of Interior to act prior to obtaining court approval
"in cases of emergency." There have been no complaints that
the Minister has abused this authority.
The Ministry of the Interior in December 1990 proposed
legislation broadening police authority to search certain
residences and detain citizens without a court order. The
proposed law raised certain constitutional (juestions which
continue to be debated in the press and in the Parliament.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and the press are provided for in the
Constitution, and the Government scrupulously observes these
provisions. Opposition viewpoints, both from political parties
and other organizations, are freely aired and are widely
reflected in the media. In 1990 three new private commercial
television stations went on the air. Earlier, the only
television stations were government owned.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
As provided in the Constitution, all groups have the right of
free assembly and association for political or other purposes.
This right is fully respected and freely practiced.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion in Spain. Roman Catholicism is the
predominant religion, but other religions are represented and
function with full freedom. Adherence to a particular faith
neither enhances nor diminishes a person's status.
In February 1990, the Government concluded landmark accords with
federations of Spanish Jews and Protestants which ended a state
of official legal discrimination against the two religions.
The accords place Protestants and Jews on an equal legal footing
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with Catholics, except in the matter of financial support from
the Government, which both faiths have renounced. Protestant
and Jewish students now have the right to receive separate
religious instruction in public schools, as Catholics do.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Spanish citizens have complete freedom to travel within and
outside the country. The Government restricts neither
emigration nor repatriation. The law on aliens permits
detention of a person for up to 40 days prior to expulsion but
specifies that the detention may not take place in a prison-
like setting. Spain has a liberal refugee law. Generally, the
Government grants refugee status on the recommendation of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Spain is a multiparty democracy with open elections in which
all citizens 18 years of age and over have the right to vote.
Spaniards elect representatives to a two-chamber federal
Parliament as well as to provincial and local bodies. At all
levels of government, elections must be held every 4 years.
Elections were held in May to elect mayors and municipal
councils, as well as members of legislatures in 13 of Spain's
17 autonomous regions. Opposition parties and groups take an
active part in the political process. Candidates are drawn
from four major national parties, three major regional parties,
and a number of minor parties.
Spanish politics contain an important regional element which is
particularly strong in Catalonia and the Basque country. These
two "autonomous communities" (similar to U.S. states) support
several regional parties that reflect the desires of many
Basques and Catalans to give political expression to their own
linguistic and cultural identities. These parties advocate a
variety of views and provide a legitimate democratic alternative
to separatist groups that advocate achieving independence
through terrorist violence.
Participation of women in the political process continues to
increase. In 1988 the ruling Spanish Socialist Workers Party
(PSOE) instituted a quota system requiring 25 percent of its
candidates to be women. The number of successful women
candidates increased substantially in Spain's national
elections in October 1989. However, under Spain's electoral
system, the percentage of votes won determines the number of
candidates elected from the party list; hence a candidate's
place on the list is crucial in determining election. Since
many women candidates have been placed in the lower half of the
list, the number elected has never reached 25 percent.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Human Rights Association of Spain in Madrid is the largest
and most respected national human rights organization. The
association has a well-earned reputation for independence and
objectivity. The Human Rights Institute of Catalonia in
Barcelona offers seminars on resolving human rights issues
through the country's legal system. The Foreign Ministry,
through an Office of Human Rights Affairs, takes an active
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interest in human rights issues internationally. The Government
cooperates readily with international organizations
investigating allegations of human rights abuses (such as the
European Commission for the Prevention of Torture) and
international nongovernmental human rights groups as well as
with independent national groups.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens,
and an independent ombudsman actively investigates complaints
of human rights abuses by the authorities.
During the past 16 years of democracy, Spanish women have
achieved a greater degree of equality under the law, gained
increased access to the educational system, and entered the
work force in larger numbers. Nonetheless, traditional
attitudes continue to result in de facto discrimination. There
is considerable regional variation in the extent of such
discrimination. Since assuming power in 1982, the PSOE has
undertaken a niut±)er of significant initiatives for women,
including the establishment of the Women's Institute in 1983,
which actively attempts to promote social, political, and
economic equality. In 1991 the Women's Institute began to
draft an update of the 1988 plan for equality of opportunities
for women that targets several areas of concern. Although
one-third more women (mainly those younger than 29 years of
age) work outside the home than a decade ago, the frequency of
such employment in Spain is still relatively low.
The Government has continued to target sexual abuse, violence,
and harassment of women in the workplace as areas of great
concern. The majority of cases are probably not reported owing
in part to the unsympathetic attitudes of some police and
judicial personnel. However, the number of reported cases has
continued to grow in recent years, possibly indicating an
increased awareness among Spanish women of their right to seek
legal redress. In 1989 Parliament passed a law prohibiting
verbal and physical harassment in the workplace.
Several levels of government provide a number of institutional
remedies, such as shelters for battered women. The Government
also is attempting through educational programs to change public
attitudes that contribute to violence against women. The
Women's Institute has charged that some judges are reluctant to
get involved in what they feel should remain a domestic problem.
Similarly, in smaller towns some police officers have been
reluctant to accept complaints from battered women. To deal
with this problem, the Ministry of the Interior initiated a
program in 1986 that created special sections within police
departments to deal with violence against women, staffed by
specially trained women officers. In 1991 the overall niamber
of reports of rape increased as a result of new definitions of
the act of rape elaborated in past years.
Gypsies, a minority group representing 3 percent of the
population, continue to suffer de facto discrimination in
housing, schools, and jobs. Legal mechanisms exist by which
Gypsies may seek redress, and the Government has stated its
commitment to securing equal rights and treatment for Gypsies.
A representative of the Gypsy community serves as special
advisor to the Minister of Interior. Cases of discrimination
against Gypsies by local communities received wide press
condemnation in October and, in response, local authorities
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have taken positive actions to bring peace to those communities.
The local government in Madrid, for example, began a program to
relocate Gypsy families living in shacks on the outskirts of
the capital to housing projects in established communities and
has toughened enforcement of existing antidrug laws to assuage
fears that such relocations will increase drug-related crime.
In 1991 Spain's human rights groups and media gave increasing
attention to the question of human rights for the growing
numbers of illegal immigrants from north and sub-Saharan
Africa. The media criticized police authorities for their
alleged mistreatment of northern and sub-Saharan Africans
illegally in Spain, although there were no confirmed cases of
abuse. Following an increase in deportations of illegal
immigrants from northern Africa during 1991, Spanish
authorities announced that they were willing to legalize the
status of approximately 100,000 of these immigrants.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers, except those in the military services, judges,
magistrates, and prosecutors, are entitled to form or join
unions of their own choosing without previous authorization.
The only requisites for organizing a union are the formation of
a group of more than two workers and registration with the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security, which is routinely
granted. Spain has over 200 registered trade unions. The only
union presently in existence that is not legally registered is
the Unified Trade Union of the Guardia Civil, which the
Constitutional Court ruled in 1986 could not be registered as
it purports to represent military personnel barred from
unionization by the Constitution.
Under the Constitution, trade unions are free to choose their
own representatives, determine their own policies, represent
their members' interests, and strike. They are not restricted
or harassed by the Government and are independent of political
parties. A strike in nonessential services is legal when it
fulfills the requirement of 5 days' prior notice. Strikes
affecting essential services require 10 days' prior notice and
must respect legal minimum service requirements, which are
negotiated between the employer and the unions. Strikes occur
frequently in Spain, although most are of short duration. The
most significant strike in 1991 was held by public sector
employees, including transportation workers, demanding a wage
increase. The employees were successful and received the
increase after a 4-day strike. In 1990 a magistrate declared a
strike illegal for the first time since current legislation was
enacted, but the decision was overturned by the Supreme Court
in 1991.
Spanish unions are free to form or join federations and
confederations and affiliate with international bodies, and
they do so without hindrance.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively was established
by statute in 1980. Trade union and collective bargaining
rights were extended to all workers in the public sector,
except the military services in 1986. Public sector collective
bargaining in 1990 was broadened to include salaries and
employment levels, but the Government retained the right to fix
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salary and employment levels if negotiations did not achieve an
agreement. Collective bargaining is widespread in both the
private and public sectors. Private sector collective
bargaining agreements cover 60 percent of workers, although
only a minority are actually union members. In July the
Government attempted to reach a tripartite agreement with
employers and the two major trade union confederations on a
social progress pact to base wage increases on the rate of
inflation and on productivity gains. However, these talks
ended inconclusively when the union leaders withdrew from the
meeting. Labor regulations and practices in free trade zones
and export processing zones are the same as in the rest of the
country. Union membership in these zones is reportedly higher
than the average throughout the economy.
The law prohibits discrimination by employers against union
members and organizers. Discrimination cases have priority in
the labor courts. A prominent multinational company was fined
heavily in 1991 for discrimination against union organizers.
One practice that the unions consider discriminatory is the use
by employers of temporary employment contracts. Around 32
percent of the work force is employed under this type of
contract. The unions believe that employees engaging in union
organizing under this type of contract are frequently not
allowed to renew their contracts. Legislation adopted in 1990
has given trade unions a role in controlling work contracts to
prevent abuse of contract and termination actions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory labor
Forced or compulsory labor is outlawed in Spain and is not
practiced. The legislation is effectively enforced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum age for employment as established by statute
is 16 years. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security is
primarily responsible for enforcement. The minimum age is
effectively enforced in major industries and in the service
sector. It is more difficult to control on small farms and in
family-owned businesses. Legislation prohibiting child labor
is effectively enforced in the special economic zones. The
employment of persons under 18 years of age at night, for
overtime work, or in sectors considered hazardous by the
Ministry and the unions is also legally prohibited.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The legal minimum wage for workers over age 18 is considered
sufficient for a decent standard of living. Minimum wages for
those aged 16 and 17 are less. The minimum wage is revised
every year in accordance with the consumer price index. A
40-hour workweek is established by law. Spanish workers enjoy
12 paid holidays a year and a month's paid vacation.
Government mechanisms exist for enforcing working conditions
and occupational health and safety conditions, but bureaucratic
procedures are cumbersome and inefficient. Safety and health
legislation is being revised to conform to European Community
directives. The National Institute of Safety and Health within
the Ministry of Labor has technical responsibility for
developing labor standards, but the Inspectorate of Labor has
responsibility for enforcing the legislation through judicial
action when infractions are found. Workers have legal
protection for filing complaints about hazardous conditions.
1236
SWEDEN
Sweden is a constitutional monarchy and a multiparty,
parliamentary democracy. The King is Chief of State. All
executive authority is vested in the Cabinet, which is formed
through direct parliamentary elections every 3 years and
consists of the Prime Minister (Head of Government) and some 20
ministers. The Social Democratic Party, Sweden's largest, lost
power in the September 1991 elections and was replaced by a
minority non-Socialist coalition government.
The police, all security organizations, and the armed forces are
controlled by and responsive to the civilian authorities and,
with very few exceptions, are scrupulous in their protection of
human rights. Either the Government, the judicial system, the
Parliament, or an ombudsman investigates thoroughly all
allegations of human rights violations.
Sweden is an advanced industrial democracy with a high standard
of living, extensive social services, and a mixed economy. Over
90 percent of businesses are privately owned.
Swedes are entirely free to express their political preferences,
pursue individual interests, and seek legal resolution of
disputes. Ombudsmen, appointed by the Parliament but with full
autonomy, investigate private complaints of alleged abuses of
authority by officials and prescribe corrective action, if
required.
Respect for human rights is a basic social value that underlies
Sweden's active support of international efforts to improve
human rights observance. The human rights situation was largely
unchanged in 1991, except for the elimination of the
controversial provision for "communal arrest" under the Terrorism
Act (see Section 2.d.). Some human rights organizations again
alleged human rights violations, particularly with reference to
refugees seeking asylum who were rejected at the border.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Killing for political motives by the Government or by domestic
opposition groups does not occur.
b. Disappearance
Abduction, secret arrests, and clandestine detention by Swedish
authorities do not occur.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Swedish law prohibits these abuses, and the authorities respect
such prohibitions. Occasional accusations against individual
policemen of excessive use of force in connection with arrests
are carefully investigated and have not produced evidence of any
systematic problem. After some of these investigations, police
officers have been suspended or subjected to other disciplinary
actions .
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SWEDEN
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Statutory guarantees of individual liberty are observed.
Persons disturbing the public order or considered dangerous may
be held for 6 hours without charge. Criminal suspects may be
held no longer than 12 hours without formal charges. If a
person files for bankruptcy and refuses to cooperate with the
official investigation, a court may order detention for up to 3
months, with judicial review every 2 weeks. Arrest is public
and by warrant. Legislation in 1988 shortened the time between
detention and arraignment from 5 days to 48 hours. In
particularly difficult cases, the time between arrest and the
first court hearing may be extended to 96 hours. Bail does not
exist, but suspects not considered dangerous or likely to
destroy evidence are released to await trial. By law, Swedish
citizens may not be deported. Convicted foreign criminals are
often deported at the conclusion of their prison terms, unless
they risk execution or other severe punishment at home.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution forbids deprivation of liberty without public
trial by a court of law. The judiciary functions freely and
independently. The accused has the right to effective counsel,
though since 1983 budget cutbacks have restricted the
availability of public defenders to cases where the maximum
penalty could be a prison sentence of 6 months or more.
Convicted persons in most instances may appeal to a court of
appeals, and in some cases also to the Supreme Court. There are
no military courts in peacetime.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The law provides assurance against such arbitrary interference.
Home searches are limited to investigations of crimes punishable
by at least 2 years' imprisonment, such as murder, robbery,
rape, arson, sabotage, counterfeiting, and treason. Search
warrants are granted only on the basis of well-founded
suspicion. Wiretaps are permitted only in cases involving
narcotics or national security. Searches and wiretaps normally
require court approval. When the time factor is critical, or
when life is believed to be in immediate danger, the ranking
police officer may approve these measures.
In connection with the investigation of the 1986 murder of Prime
Minister Olof Palme, Swedish security police were charged with
using illegal wiretaps against some Kurdish suspects. Police
officials involved were brought to trial for this offense.
Three lower ranking police officers were found not guilty in
1991. Other higher ranking officials who were convicted are
appealing their verdicts. Debate continues about whether any
wiretapping should be allowed. The number of legal wiretaps has
remained steady at about 200 cases per year. There is no
indication that telephone monitoring is done arbitrarily, and
the vast majority of such cases involve serious narcotics crimes,
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Swedes enjoy these freedoms fully. Newspapers and periodicals
are for the most part privately owned. Government subsidies to
daily newspapers, regardless of political affiliation, help
assure a plurality of views. Broadcasting in Sweden operates
1238
SWEDEN
under a state concession. The Swedish Broadcasting Company and
its independent subsidiaries (TV-l, TV-2, national and
educational radio) have had a monopoly over terrestrial
broadcasting. In 1991 the Government decided to permit the
establishment of an independent commercial television channel.
A variety of commercial satellite television channels are also
available via satellite antenna or cable.
Publications containing sensitive national security information,
film and television programs portraying excessive violence, and
publications and broadcasts advocating racist views may be
subject to censorship. Commercial video tapes are also screened
and censored or banned if they contain scenes of excessive
violence.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Swedes exercise these freedoms without restraint. Public
demonstrations require a police permit, for which applications
are routinely approved.
c. Freedom of Religion
Swedes have unimpaired religious freedom. There is a state
Lutheran Church, supported by public funds, but all faiths are
freely observed. Parents have full freedom to teach their
children religious practices of their choice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement within and from the country and voluntary
repatriation are guaranteed to citizens by law and respected in
practice. Refugees, displaced persons, and others seeking
political asylum are on the whole generously treated, though
long waits and denial of asylum requests from applicants not
meeting internationally agreed criteria have become common.
Changes in Sweden's Terrorism Act, effective July 1, 1991,
eliminated the controversial provision of communal arrest.
Communal arrest allowed authorities to limit the movement within
Sweden of foreigners with suspected links to terrorist
organizations, who were judged deportable under the Terrorism
Act but could not be deported under other provisions of Swedish
law because they faced death or serious punishment in their home
countries. Under the amended Terrorism Act, foreign suspects
may still be required to report regularly to police authorities,
but there are no travel restrictions, and each case must be
reviewed by the courts on a regular basis, at least every 3
years. Communal arrest was lifted in 1991 for the last member
of a group of Kurdish suspects affected by this provision of the
law. Their deportation orders were also rescinded.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights; The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Sweden has a long history of vigorous democratic political life
within a representative, multiparty parliamentary system. The
349 seats in the unicameral Parliament are divided proportionally
among the 7 political parties currently represented. A party
must win a minimum of 4 percent of the votes cast to enter
Parliament. There is universal suffrage beginning at age 18.
Approximately 85 percent of eligible voters participated in the
1991 elections. Voting takes place by secret ballot. Aliens
1239
SWEDEN
who have been legal residents for at least 3 years have the
right to vote and run for office in municipal elections.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Ombudsmen serve as official governmental monitors of individual
rights in Sweden, effective both in making citizens aware of
their rights and publicizing and correcting abuse of state
authority. Active private organizations monitor issues such as
the impact on individuals of comprehensive social legislation
and the condition of the native Lapp population. Government
agencies are in close contact with a variety of local and
international groups working in Sweden and abroad to improve
human rights observance. State-supported Stockholm University
offers instruction in making human rights complaints to bodies
such as the European Commission of Human Rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Basic human needs for the entire population are thoroughly met
without discrimination. The State provides social welfare and
medical services, benefits to families, pensions, and disability
and unemployment insurance. The Government runs special programs
to help immigrants adjust to Swedish life and culture (including
240 hours of paid Swedish language instruction) .
Two of Sweden's 284 municipalities continue to refuse to permit
refugees to settle in them. Both the Government and the
politicalparties have tried to persuade these communities to
change their attitude. There were some incidents of anti-
immigrant sentiment during 1991, including one killing, and a
few individual politicians took anti-immigration positions
during the election campaign.
Certain refugee groups, particularly from the Middle East,
continue to complain that their relatives have difficulties in
obtaining nonimmigrant visas to Sweden. Sweden has been
restrictive in allowing such visits since many of the visitors
file for asylum upon arrival in Sweden. Large groups of ethnic
Turkish Bulgarians and Polish Gypsies were turned back during
1991 because they did not meet recognized political refugee
criteria.
The Government supports groups working against racism. Swedish
schools seek to provide education and information designed to
counter racist tendencies. There is a special ombudsman to deal
with complaints of racism and discrimination. The Government
continues to study the February 1989 government commission
report recommending that Sweden adopt more forceful legislation
against racism. All seven political parties in Parliament
support a new antiracism movement recently established
nationwide .
Many immigrants have complained that they have difficulties in
finding professional employment. The Government is trying to
find ways to evaluate and translate diplomas from foreign
countries to facilitate the hiring of foreign nationals with
documented professional skills.
Institutionalized efforts to extend equality between the sexes
continue. Employers are required to base hiring decisions on
merit and to pursue actively the goal of equality. A public
1240
SWEDEN
ombudsman, called the Equality Ombudsman, investigates complaints
of sex discrimination in the labor market.
Rape and abuse against women continue to receive a great deal of
attention by the Government. There are laws to protect abused
women from having their abusers discover their whereabouts or
contact them. In a few cases, women have been helped to obtain
new identities and homes. Both national and local governments
support voluntary groups that provide shelter and help to abused
women. Men who rape or abuse women are provided rehabilitative
treatment. The number of reported rapes, some 1,400 yearly, has
remained at approximately the same level since 1989.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to associate freely and to strike. A
large majority of the working population, including career
military personnel, police officers, and civilian government
officials, belongs to trade unions. Unions conduct their
activities with complete independence from the Government and
political parties although the Confederation of Labor Unions
(LO), the largest federation, has been allied for many years
with the Social Democratic Party. Swedish trade unions are free
to affiliate internationally and are active in a broad range of
international trade union organizations.
Several strikes took place in 1991, some of them wildcat
strikes. Most were in the private sector, protesting a general
wage restraint agreement. Accommodations were reached in almost
all instances.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers are free to organize and bargain collectively.
Collective bargaining is carried out in the form of national
framework agreements between central organizations of workers
and employers, followed by industry and plant-level agreements
on details. The Government set up an independent commission for
the 1991 wage negotiations with the task of curbing wage
increases and cooling the overheated economy. The commission
was successful in reaching agreement with the bulk of unions for
virtually no increase in wages. Swedish law fully protects
workers from antiunion discrimination and provides sophisticated
and effective mechanisms for resolving disputes and complaints.
Disputes concerning violations of labor laws are in the vast
majority of cases solved by informal discussions between the
involved parties. Should a settlement not be possible, there is
a labor court that tries cases of general interest for guidance
and interpretation of the law, and its rulings in turn are
followed by other courts. There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor, which does not exist, is prohibited
in law, and this prohibition is enforced by the police and
public prosecutors.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Compulsory 9-year education ends at age 16, and full-time
employment is normally permitted at that age under supervision
of local municipal or community authorities. Those under age 18
may work only during daytime and under a foreman's supervision.
1241
SWEDEN
During the summer and in vacation periods, children as young as
13 may be hired for part-time work or light "summer jobs" for
periods of 5 days or less, although it is rare for people under
15 to find a job except with family members. Violations are
few, and enforcement is considered good. These regulations are
enforced by police and public prosecutors, with the assistance
of the unions.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no national minimum wage law. Wages are set by
collective bargaining contracts, which typically have been
observed even by nonunion establishments. Even the lowest paid
workers are able to maintain a decent standard of living because
there is substantial help available from social welfare
entitlements .
The standard legal workweek is 40 hours, or less. The amount of
permissible overtime is also regulated, as are rest periods. A
government plan gradually to increase annual leave to 6 weeks
was shelved, but 2 extra days were added during 1991. Thus,
Sweden's vacation law now guarantees all employees a minimum of
5 weeks and 2 days of paid annual leave, and many labor contracts
provide more. A designated and trained trade union steward
monitors observance of regulations governing working conditions.
Occupational health and safety rules set by the government-
appointed National Board of Occupational Health and Safety in
consultation with employer and union representatives are closely
observed. Safety ombudsmen have the authority to stop life-
threatening activity immediately and call for a labor inspector.
The courts have upheld this authority. The authorities have
compiled a list of the 400,000 most dangerous jobs that cause
long-term health problems and started a program in the fall of
1990 to improve the situation for those employees. A fund of
about $3 billion exists to finance improvement measures.
1242
SWITZERLAND
Switzerland is a constitutional democracy with a federal
structure. Legislative power is vested in the bicameral
Parliament. Given the nation's linguistic and religious
diversity, the Swiss political system emphasizes local and
national political consensus and grants considerable autonomy
to individual cantons.
The Swiss armed forces are a militia based on universal
military service for able-bodied males. There is virtually no
standing army apart from training cadres and a few essential
headquarters staff functions. Police duties are primarily a
responsibility of the individual cantons, which have their own
distinct police forces. The national police authority has a
coordinating role and relies on the cantons for actual law
enforcement .
Switzerland has a free enterprise industrial and service
economy highly dependent on international trade. There has
been virtual full employment and labor peace for many years.
The standard of living is one of the highest in the world.
Human rights are widely respected. The most notable human
rights issue in 1991 was the call for further reduction of
inequalities experienced by women (see Section 5). The
authorities moved to restore public confidence in the
collection and protection of personal data on Swiss citizens.
Switzerland maintained its own strong association with human
rights issues, exemplified by hosting the U.N. Human Rights
Commission in Geneva. The headquarters of the International
Labor Organization and the International Committee of the Red
Cross are located in Switzerland.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no political killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of abductions or disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution provides freedom from all of the above. There
were no reports of any violations.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile is provided
by law. A detained person may not be held longer than 24 hours
without a warrant of arrest issued by the magistrate conducting
the preliminary investigation. A suspect must immediately be
shown the warrant and has the right to contact legal counsel as
soon as a warrant is issued. A suspect may be detained with a
warrant until an investigation is completed, but the length of
investigative detention is always reviewed by higher judicial
authority, and investigations are usually completed quickly.
Release on personal recognizance or bail is granted unless the
1243
SWITZERLAND
examining magistrate believes the person is a danger to society
or will not appear for trial. There is no summary exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for public trials. All courts of
first instance are cantonal courts, with right of appeal to the
federal courts and freedom from interference by other branches
of government. Minor cases are tried by a single judge,
difficult cases by a panel of judges, and murder or other
serious crimes by a public jury. Even the most serious cases
are usually brought to trial within a few months. There are no
political prisoners.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Police entry into the premises of a person suspected of a
criminal offense is regulated by cantonal legislation.
Regulations differ widely from canton to canton.
The Swiss Government moved in 1991 to ease public concern over
the collection and protection of personal data about individual
citizens, allowing those affected to view an extract (fiche) of
their file. Parliament discussed a new law designed to protect
personal data. The Government also proposed a new law on state
security in order to define the framework for actions to
safeguard national security.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
An independent press, effective judiciary, and democratic
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and
press. Groups or associations that are determined to represent
a potential threat to the State may have restrictions placed on
their freedom of speech and press. No groups are restricted at
the present time. Broadcast media are government funded but
possess editorial autonomy, and foreign broadcast media are
freely available. Press and publishing are private enterprises
operated without government intervention. Academic freedom is
respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The only restriction on peaceful assembly and association is a
requirement to obtain permits from police authorities before
holding public meetings. These are routinely granted unless
authorities have reason to believe the meeting will lead to
violence.
c. Freedom of Religion
Switzerland enjoys religious freedom. There is no single state
church, but individual cantons may support a particular church
out of public funds, and most cantons do so. Foreign clergy
are free to perform their duties in Switzerland.
The legal requirement for universal male military service
provides no exemption for conscientious objectors. They may
apply for military service that does not entail bearing arms,
but refusal to serve has nearly always led to prosecution and
conviction. A new law to ameliorate this situation, which took
effect in July, maintains that refusal to serve is a punishable
1244
SWITZERLAND
offense, but if the refusal stems from reasons of conscience,
the prescribed sentence is a period of community service rather
than prison.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Swiss citizens have freedom to travel in or outside the country
and may emigrate without difficulty. Switzerland traditionally
has been a haven for refugees, but public concern over the
growing number of asylum seekers, many of whom come for
economic reasons, created pressure on the Governnient to
implement swifter processing of asylum seekers and expel more
quickly those whose applications are rejected. Asylum seekers
continue to receive orderly consideration, and those whose
applications are rejected are allowed to stay temporarily if
their home country is torn by war or insurrection.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Switzerland is a highly developed constitutional democracy.
There is universal adult suffrage by secret ballot in federal
elections. Elections are free and are contested actively by
four major national parties and at least a dozen significant
regional or minor parties. Initiative and referendum
procedures provide unusually intense popular involvement in the
legislative process. Participation by women in politics has
been limited historically but continues to expand slowly.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Human rights advocacy groups in Switzerland concern themselves
almost exclusively with lobbying the Swiss and other
governments about human rights situations in other countries.
Switzerland cooperates with international and nongovernmental
groups in all areas of human rights. All major international
human rights groups are active in Switzerland, and some of the
leading ones — e.g., the United Nations Human Rights Commission
and the ICRC — are based there. The ICRC is made up of Swiss
nationals, and Swiss participate prominently in other
humanitarian nongovernmental organizations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Although the Constitution prohibits discrimination against
women in the workplace, government and other sources noted that
further implementation was necessary to ensure equal pay and
other benefits for women. The Federal Commission for Women's
Rights and several private groups, e.g., the Federation of
Women's Organizations, monitor and promote women's rights.
Discrimination that persists today is social, not legal, but it
nevertheless hinders opportunities for women in fields that
have been traditionally dominated by men.
In order to focus public awareness on discrimination, the Swiss
Trade Union Federation organized a women's strike on June 14 in
which some 10,000 women actively participated, while up to half
a million supported it in some form without walking off their
jobs. The themes stressed were that women earn 30 percent less
than men employed in ecjuivalent jobs, that social security laws
discriminate against married women, and that, as a result of
1245
SWITZERLAND
discrimination, women occupy few senior, managerial positions
in business.
Swiss policymakers have become aware in recent years of the
issue of violence against women. Observers believe that many
cases go unreported, so that accurate statistics are lacking.
There is, however, widespread agreement that a problem exists.
The Federation of Women's Organizations and other women's
advocacy groups have heightened public consciousness. Each
city has an emergency telephone number through which women who
are victims of violence may obtain help and counseling.
Specialists work with police authorities to interview women who
report attacks. Laws exist against wife beating and similar
crimes. Parliament approved a change in the penal code,
explicitly making spousal rape a criminal offense. While the
penal code is established at the federal level, enforcement is
the responsibility of the cantons. Thus, variations in
enforcement may occur .
Italian and Romansch linguistic minorities (respectively about
10 and 1 percent of the population) express concern that the
limited resources made available to them by the Federal
Government endanger the continued quality of these languages.
The Federal Council proposed a constitutional amendment in 1991
to bolster support for the minority languages. The amendment
would charge the cantons and the Federal Government to protect
and promote all Swiss languages in the regions in which they
are spoken. The amendment would also make Romansch an official
language in communications between the Federal Government and
Romansch citizens or institutions.
Employment opportunities and residence permits are limited for
foreigners; some assert that this reflects racial prejudice and
discrimination, but these limitations apply to all non-Swiss.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers, including foreign workers in Switzerland, have
freedom to associate freely, to join unions of their choice,
and to select their own representatives. However, less than a
third of the country's labor force belongs to a union today.
The change from an industrial to a service-based economy, the
high standard of living, and an economy at full employment are
some of the reasons for the decline in union membership.
Unions are free to publicize their views and determine their
own policies to represent member interests without government
interference. Unions may join federations or affiliate with
international bodies.
The right to strike is legally recognized, but a unique labor
peace agreement between unions and employers in existence since
the 1930 's has resulted in fewer than 20 strikes per year since
1975. Federal employees and most cantonal and local employees
do not have the right to strike. The only exception is the
canton of Jura where both local and cantonal authorities have
the right to strike. There were no strikes of note in 1991
except the women's strike of June 14 noted in Section 5.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Swiss law gives workers the right to organize and bargain
collectively and protects them from acts of antiunion
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SWITZERLAND
discrimination. The Government encourages voluntary
negotiations between employer and worker organizations,
although for the most part employers and workers alike seek to
exclude the Government from involving itself in their affairs.
Officials estimate that 30 to 40 percent of all Swiss workers
are covered by collective agreements. There are no export
processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced or compulsory labor, although there is no
specific statute or constitutional ban on it.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment of children is 15 years.
Children over 13 may be employed in light duties (e.g. , helping
in retail stores) for not more than 9 hours a week during the
school year and 15 hours otherwise. Employment between ages 15
and 20 is strictly regulated. For example, youths may not work
at night, on Sundays, or under hazardous or dangerous
conditions. These laws are observed in practice and enforced
through inspections by the Federal Office of Industry, Trades,
and Labor .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no national minimum wage. Employer associations and
unions negotiate industrial wages during the collective
bargaining process. The Labor Act established a maximum
45-hour workweek for blue- and white-collar workers in
industry, offices, and retail trades, and a 50-hour workweek
for all other workers. The workweek for blue-collar workers in
most industries is 43 hours and for white-collar workers 40 to
43 hours. Overtime is limited by law to 120 hours annually.
The economy is normally at or near full employment. The
resulting take-home pay provides Swiss workers and their
families with a standard of living among the highest in the
world.
The Labor Act and the Federal Code of Obligations contain
extensive regulations to protect worker health and safety. The
regulations are rigorously enforced by the Federal Office of
Industry, Trades, and Labor, providing a high standard of
worker health and safety. Female workers may not be employed
in dangerous work, and women in industrial enterprises may not
work at night or on Sundays. These special protections for
women were under review in 1991; the Government proposed to
eliminate restrictions against female Sunday or weekend work in
its effort to remove sexist bias from the labor law. There
were no allegations of worker rights abuses from domestic or
foreign sources .
1247
TURKEY
Turkey is a constitutional republic with a multiparty parliament
which elects the president. In the October parliamentary
elections the center-right Correct Way Party (DYP) obtained a
plurality of 27 percent of the national vote and its leader,
Suleyman Demirel, formed a coalition government with the Social
Democratic Populist Party (SHP) .
The Turkish National Police in the cities and the Jandarma
(Gendarmerie) in the countryside are responsible for
maintaining public order. Reflecting the concern within Turkey
and internationally about the past actions of these security
organs. Prime Minister Demirel announced his Government's
commitment to establishing a state of law based upon human
rights and democratic freedoms. Admitting that allegations
about Turkey's use of torture had hurt its image, he called
torture a crime against humanity and promised to bring an end
to such charges. Within days of its formation, the new
Government appointed a State Minister for Human Rights and
closed a prison where torture allegedly occurred.
A state of emergency declared in 1987, at the time martial law
was rescinded, continued in 10 southeastern provinces where the
Government faced increasing violence in its efforts to combat
Kurdish separatist terrorists. In addition, three adjacent
provinces remained under the authority of the regional governor
for security purposes. The state of emergency allows civilian
governors to exercise certain quasi-martial law powers,
including restrictions on the press and control or prohibition
of labor union activities. Government decrees renewed in
November 1991 retained stringent security measures in the area
under the state of emergency.
Turkey's economy has a strong, free market orientation,
although state-owned enterprises still account for an estimated
42 percent of manufacturing. The industrial sector in
particular has grown considerably, and approximately 80 percent
of Turkey's exports are industrial sector goods. The Persian
Gulf war took a great toll on the economy: energy prices
doubled, tourism plummeted, and Turkey sustained substantial
losses in trade and related services as a result of sanctions
against Iraq. Inflation in Turkey was running at an annual
rate of 71 percent through November 1991.
Although Turkey has signed several international conventions
against torture, it has not succeeded in reducing the incidence
of torture of persons in police custody. Other problems
include political killings and other terrorist acts by an armed
separatist movement and leftwing extremists, the use of
excessive force against noncombatants in the southeast by
security forces trying to suppress terrorism, some restrictions
on freedom of expression, and the absence of the right of
detained persons to have an attorney present during
interrogation. Parliament passed an Anti-Terror Law in April
1991 which quashed previously stipulated capital sentences,
amnestied thousands of prisoners, commuted sentences,
decriminalized the use of the Kurdish language and nullified
Articles 141, 142, and 163 of the Penal Code (the so-called
thought crimes articles).
However, the Anti-Terror Law also introduced a broad and
ambiguous definition of "terrorist" activities that could
invite abuses of power by security authorities. Portions of
the new law have been submitted to the Constitutional Court for
review as to their constitutionality. Parliament has not yet
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acted on proposed legislation to improve access to legal
counsel or to shorten the permissible detention period before a
suspect must be brought before a court.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known political killings attributable to the
Government, but political murder by terrorists occurred with
dismaying frequency, and there were 18 deaths in official
custody in 1991, at least some of which may have been due to
police torture (see Section I.e.).
The murder of Vedat Aydin, a prominent Kurdish politician and
human rights activist, remains unsolved. Aydin was taken from
his Diyarbakir home on July 5 by men who said they were police;
his body was found by a roadside 40 miles away several days
later. The authorities say he was never in their custody. No
one claimed responsibility for the killing. The investigation
into the disappearance and murder has yielded no results.
Some of the victims killed by terrorists in shooting and
bombing incidents during the year included: five retired
generals assasinated by terrorists; an American civilian
employee at Incirlik air base outside Adana;.an American shot
at his Istanbul office; a Jandarma commander; a British
insurance executive; a prominent Turkish archeologist and his
student; a U.S. Air Force staff sergeant killed in a car bomb
blast (a similar explosion the same day cost an Egyptian
diplomat his legs); and an Istanbul deputy police chief and his
driver. In most cases, police have not identified those
responsible, although the terrorist group Dev-Sol
(Devrimci-Sol , the revolutionary left) claimed to have
committed many of the killings, and the Kurdish Workers' Party
(PKK), a separatist and terrorist organization in the
southeast, may have been responsible for others.
b. Disappearance
There were no disappearances known to have been caused by
government forces. However, disappearances did occur in 1991.
Huseyin Toraman, reportedly a member of Dev Sol, vanished
October 27 while buying bread in Istanbul; press reports said
eyewitnesses saw him forced into a car by three gunmen "who
said they were from the police." Istanbul police denied that
Toraman was ever in their custody. The disappearance of
People's Workers' Party (HEP) member Muharrem Bozan, missing
since July 25 when he was seen leaving the party headquarters
in Diyarbakir, has not been explained. So far as is known,
Bozan 's case has never been officially investigated, nor has
any further information come to light. Other cases of
disappearance in which the police were said to be involved
include those of Yusuf Eristi, whom an unnamed witness claimed
to have seen in detention (while police deny having detained
him) and Haydar Altun, whom the Human Rights Foundation says
was either a PKK training cam.p commander or a PKK unit
commander .
PKK terrorists continued to abduct local villagers, teachers,
and security officials in the southeast. The PKK also targeted
foreigners in 1991, kidnaping 19 of them. In September PKK
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spokesmen warned foreigners not to travel in eastern Turkey
without first obtaining a "visa" from the PKK .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution outlaws torture, and Turkey is a signatory to,
inter alia, the European Convention Against Torture. As Turkey
has recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the European
Court of Human Rights, Turks are free to file applications with
the European Commission on Human Rights, and several have done
so. Early in 1991, the Grand National Assembly established a
multiparty Human Rights Commission and empowered it to
investigate allegations of human rights abuses that are
submitted to it. In September the Justice and Interior
Ministries announced that each of them was setting up a human
rights section. The Parliament sponsored an October symposium
on "International Protection of Human Rights." The police
academy announced in October that human rights is being taught
as the first course in its fall semester. Nevertheless,
despite these public commitments, pervasive and credible
reports of torture persisted throughout Turkey. The European
Parliament's human rights report approved on September 13 cited
Turkey as a country with cases of "death caused by torture."
Prime Minister Demirel appointed Mehmet Kahraman as the first
ever Minister of State for Human Rights. On November 22,
Kahraman and Justice Minister Seyfi Oktay, accompanied — at
their request — by Nevzat Helvaci, president of the Turkish
Human Rights Association (HRA), went to Eskisehir maximum
security prison to investigate allegations of torture. Earlier
in November, the escape of two suspected Dev-Sol assassins from
Ankara central prison during a holiday visitation by families
had prompted authorities to transfer about 200 political
offenders to Eskisehir from prisons elsewhere in Turkey.
Physicians certified that many of the inmates, after their
arrival at Eskisehir, bore signs of torture. Whether the
torture was inflicted while the prisoners were en route to
Eskisehir or after their arrival remains uncertain. Eskisehir
province's chief prosecutor immediately began an
investigation. After visiting Eskisehir, the Ministers
obtained a full cabinet decision to close down the prison, and
this was accomplished within a matter of a few days.
Knowledgeable observers contended that most persons charged
with — or merely suspected of — political crimes are tortured,
while significant numbers of those detained for ordinary crimes
are subjected to police brutality. This mistreatment continues
to occur in police stations, largely during periods of
incommunicado detention before a suspect is brought before a
court .
Figures compiled by the HRA show that, in the year to December,
18 persons had died while in police custody. Several deaths
resulted when youthful suspects committed "suicide" by
plummeting from third- and fourth-story windows of police
stations, two of them in Gaziantep. In Istanbul, Ali Reza
Agdogan died after jumping or being pushed from the fourth
story of the Beyoglu police station. Doctors reportedly found
evidence of trauma to the soles of Agdogan ' s feet, although he
died from a head-first fall. Birtan Altinbas, who was detained
for 15 days at the political section of Ankara police
headquarters, died January 16 at Gulhane Military Hospital,
allegedly as a result of torture. Haydar Arman died after
detention at the Ankara Security Directorate, and the head of
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the Diyarbakir HRA attributed the death of Remzi II to brain
hemorrhage as a result of torture by Diyarbakir police. A
police raid seeking Dev-Sol recruiters at Istanbul's Mimar
Sinan University culminated in the death of Seher Sahin, a
third-year student who either fell or was pushed from a
window. Senar Turgut, producer of the movie "Siyabed U Xeco"
based on a Kurdish legend, was detained in Van, and the Human
Rights Foundation reported that Turgut ' s attorney, Senay Gun,
stated her client was tortured while in custody.
Credible reports indicate that high-pressure cold water hoses,
electric shocks, beating of the genitalia, and hanging by the
arms are methods commonly employed. Systematic beatings,
including beatings on the soles of the feet, also occur;
however, a person claiming to have been tortured at Ankara
police headquarters in 1991 said that beating has fallen from
favor because it leaves marks. Psychological abuse in the form
of verbal intimidation and threats is said to be common, as is
the practice of keeping the detainee blindfolded.
The United Nations Human Rights Commission's Special Rapporteur
on Torture reports that detainees, including children, were
often forced to listen to the torture of family members.
Dr. Cemal Kahraman, president of Nusaybin's HRA, told observers
at his June trial in Diyarbakir that he had been suspended by
his arms with his wrists tied behind his back for up to an hour
at a time, beaten on the soles of his feet, subjected to a mock
execution, and forced to undergo psychological torture,
including threats to rape his wife. Yeni Ulke journalist Mecit
Akgun, also a member of the Nusaybin HRA, alleged he was
tortured in March and April during incommunicado detention at
Jandarma regimental headquarters in Mardin. Tempo magazine
published a graphic story in September on beatings suffered by
Istanbul transvestites rounded up by police. The head of
Istanbul's chapter of the HRA alleged that after the
transvestites publicized their mistreatment they were again
taken into custody and beaten in reprisal.
Other former detainees give similar descriptions of methods
employed by police. Although the Government asserted that
medical examinations occur once during detention and a second
time before either arraignment or release, former detainees
assert that some government-ordered medical examinations take
place too long after the event to allow any definitive
findings, some examinations are cursory in nature, and some are
done in the intimidating presence of police officials.
According to government-provided figures, 1,417 allegations of
torture were investigated between January 1 and September 30,
1991. Officials in 183 cases were acquitted, 549 cases
continue in judicial proceedings (some predating 1991), and 883
cases have been dismissed by the courts. No government
official was convicted of torture or inhuman and degrading
treatment under Article 243 of the Turkish Penal Code during
the January-September 1991 period; 17 were convicted for
maltreatment under Article 245.
Prosecution of alleged perpetrators of torture has been
sporadic. The Government has reopened approximately 250 cases
of alleged torture by authorities and is continuing court
proceedings against another 550 security officials charged with
mistreatment or torture of persons in custody. Credible
sources continued to estimate that judicial authorities
investigate only about half of the formal complaints involving
torture and prosecuted only a small fraction of those. Justice
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Ministry figures for January 1-September 30, 1991, show that of
the 1,417 incidents of torture or maltreatment brought to the
attention of judicial authorities, 463 resulted in lawsuits
against government officials. Those found guilty have
historically received light sentences. In one important case
(cited in the 1989 and 1990 reports) an appeals court
invalidated a light sentence given to a Jandarma major
convicted of beating southeastern Yesilyurt villagers and
forcing them to eat excrement and ordered a retrial. The
retrial, however, resulted in another light sentence — a 3-month
suspension from duty and a $500 fine — which was ultimately
suspended. The incident is currently being examined by the
Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe.
Five policemen charged with torturing a correspondent of
Mucadele (Struggle) magazine, Figen Baran, went on trial in
Ankara on October 8. The prosecutor asked that each policeman
be sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment. The court transferred
the file to the Ankara Provincial Special Administrative Board,
which handles disciplinary punishments for all civil servants.
The Board had not announced any decision by year's end. The
family of a university student who died after being tortured in
1980 successfully brought a case this year against the
responsible police officer, Sinan Yalcin, who was sentenced to
4 years and 5 months of imprisonment on October 15.
Article 15 of the Anti-Terror Law changed the way in which
officials accused of torture or other mistreatment are
treated. Formerly, a prosecutor could demand suspension of the
suspected offender from his duties while the case was being
investigated. Now the suspect may stay on the job until after
being convicted. In addition, the legal fees of the suspects
are paid by their agencies, with no limit placed on the amount
of such fees .
Limited government reforms that could contribute to a reduction
of abuse have not been effectively implemented. According to
government figures and estimates, the number of cases of
torture prosecuted or in the hands of judicial authorities for
prosecution fell from 812 in 1990 to 463 in the first 9 months
of 1991. The percentage of convictions declined in the same
period — from 3 to zero convictions for torture; from 185 to 17
convictions for maltreatment.
The HRA's Human Rights Foundation operates torture
rehabilitation centers in Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul. It is
raising money to establish another torture rehabilitation
center in Diyarbakir. Foundation head Yavuz Ozen said the
three existing centers were treating more than 120 persons as
of November 30.
Prison conditions, although far from ideal, generally do not
threaten the lives and health of prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Except in limited circumstances, such as when a person is
caught in the act of comir.itting a cri.-ne, a prosecutor must
issue a detention order. The detention period for those
charged with common or individvial crimes is generally 24 hours,
but persons detained because of crimes falling under the
provisions of the Anti-Terror Law "are to be presented to a
judge within 48 hours." Those charged with any crime of a
collective or conspiratorial nature may still be detained up to
15 days. In the 10 southeastern provinces under a state of
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emergency, incommunicado detention for collective crimes may
last up to 30 days. Access to counsel is not permitted during
these periods of detention.
Turkish law does not give detainees the right to have an
attorney present during questioning, although a proposal to
give detainees this right is pending in Parliament. Under
existing law, a detainee's next of kin must normally be
notified "in the shortest time" after arrest. Once formally
charged by the prosecutor, a detainee is arraigned before a
judge and allowed to retain a lawyer. Once arraigned, the
judge may release the accused on presentation of an appropriate
guarantee, such as bail, or order him held in detention if the
court determines that he is likely to flee or destroy evidence.
Prime Ministry circulars issued in 1989 and 1990 on the issue
of access to lawyers have not improved such access for most
detainees, particularly those charged with collective or
political crimes. According to the circulars, suspects
detained for individual or collective crimes are to be allowed
access to an attorney. Because the final decision is left to
the independent prosecutors, however, such access is routinely
denied, usually with an explanation that access would prejudice
an ongoing investigation. In some cases, police are reported
to make access impossible through time-consuming bureaucratic
requirements. The Constitution specifies the right of
detainees to request "speedy conclusion of arraignment and
trial." Nevertheless, judges have ordered a significant number
of persons detained while their cases progress, sometimes for
years. While many cases involve persons accused of violent
crimes, it is not uncommon for those accused of membership in
illegal organizations or the dissemination of ideas proscribed
by the Anti-Terror Law to be remanded in custody until the
conclusion of their trials. Large-scale detentions in the
southeast followed upon Vedat Aydin's funeral, when as many as
500 persons reportedly were taken into custody in Diyarbakir.
Most were released within 24 hours.
Detentions sometimes appear arbitrary. For example, the
16-year old student known as "N. A.," detained in October 1990
for having hung a "No to War" placard on her classroom wall,
was held in prison until the end of February 1991. In October
1991, police detained an Istanbul youth for having asked
President Ozal why "you always talk about the good things,
(but) don't mention the bad things you have done?" He was
charged and convicted of "insulting the President" and sent to
prison. The length of the sentence was not reported; the
maximum sentence for insulting the President is 6 years. The
num.ber of persons detained during the year for attempting to
exercise free speech or other human rights cannot be
established with any accuracy.
There is no formal external exile. The Government has
sometimes refused to renew the passports of Turks working
abroad who refused to return home to face court charges or
perform military service. These persons may apply to the
Interior Ministry for permission to return to Turkey. Since
the Anti-Terror law abolished elements of the old Penal Code,
some persons who had refused to return to face charges have
applied successfully for permission to return. Turkey's
internal exile law was lifted in 1987. In 1990 the Government
gave authority to the southeast regional governor to "remove
from the region," for a period not to exceed the duration of
the state of emergency, citizens under his administration whose
activities (whether voluntary or forced) "give an impression
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that they are prone to disturb general security and public
order." There are no known instances of this authority having
been used in 1991 .
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court system and judicial procedures are modeled on Western
European criminal and civil law codes. The judicial system is
composed of general law courts, state security courts, and
military courts. Three martial law courts remain in Ankara,
Istanbul, and Diyarbakir, clearing their dockets of cases
involving offenses committed during the period following the
1980 military takeover of the government and before 1985. The
majority of cases are prosecuted in the general law courts,
which include the civil courts, administrative courts, and
criminal courts. Appeals are heard in either the High Court of
Appeals or the Council of State. There is also a
Constitutional Court and a Court of Cassation.
The Constitution declares that judges shall be independent in
the discharge of their duties and provides for the security of
their tenure. It also prohibits authorities from giving orders
or recommendations concerning the exercise of judicial power.
In many instances, charges brought by prosecutors are dismissed
by courts. The High Council of Judges and Prosecutors,
appointed by the President and including the Minister of
Justice, selects judges and prosecutors for the higher courts
and oversees those of the lower courts.
Defendants normally have the right to an open trial, and the
Constitution states that no one shall be found guilty until
proven guilty in a court of law. The law requires the Bar
Association to provide free counsel to indigents who make such
a request to the court. Costs are borne by the Association,
but Parliament is considering a proposal for the State to
assume these legal fees. There is no jury system; all cases
are decided by a judge or a panel of judges.
Defense lawyers generally have access to the independent
prosecutor's files after arraignment and before the trial (a
period of a few weeks). In political cases, access may be
denied to files dealing with national intelligence or security
matters.
Eight state security courts, composed of two civilian judges
and one military judge, try defendants accused of crimes such
as terrorism, drug smuggling, membership in illegal
organizations, and espousing or disseminating ideas prohibited
by law as "damaging the indivisible unity of the state with its
territory and nation." Government sources indicate there are
currently 1,192 cases involving 7,110 defendants being tried in
the State Security Courts. State Security Courts may hold
closed hearings and admit testimony secured during police
interrogations or under torture if it is corroborated by other
sources. Sentences imposed under the Anti-Terror Law may not
be commuted to a fine or suspended.
Military courts, with their own appeals system, hear cases
relating to infractions of military law by members of the armed
forces .
The Constitutional Court is composed of 11 judges nominated by
members of the judiciary and appointed by the President. It
examines the constitutionality of laws, decrees, and procedural
rules of the Parliament. However, no "decrees with the force
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of law" issued during a state of emergency, martial law, or in
time of war may be brought before the Constitutional Court.
Available figures indicate that several dozen cases involving
close to 1,000 defendents remained in the martial law courts as
of the end of November, the majority of which have been
referred to the military supreme court of appeals. Since the
abolition of Articles 141, 142, and 163 in April 1991, a number
of persons have been convicted under the new anti-terror laws
but the number of those convicted for nonviolent crimes was
probably small .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of a person's
domicile and the privacy of correspondence and communication.
Government officials may enter a private residence and
intercept or monitor private correspondence only upon issuance
of a judicial warrant.
In the 10 provinces under a state of emergency, however, the
governor (or regional governor) may empower authorities to
search residences or the premises of political parties,
businesses, associations, and other organizations without a
warrant. Authorities in these provinces may also search, hold,
or seize without warrant persons, letters, telegrams, and
docviments. Roadblocks are commonplace in the southeast, and
security officials, in search of smugglers and terrorists,
regularly search vehicles and travelers.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Since 1984 a continuing and increasingly violent insurgency by
the separatist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) has claimed over
3,000 lives. The PKK ' s campaign of terrorism in southeast
Turkey is directed both against security forces and against
fellow Turks of Kurdish origin. In addition to casualties
among security forces, there were some 105 noncombatant deaths
as a result of these actions.
The PKK fired rockets at night into the centers of Turkish
towns, ostensibly aiming at security establishments or the
homes of Turkish officials but in fact, causing death, injury
or damage in surrounding neighborhoods. The PKK has also
continued its attacks against the educational system, killing
or threatening to kill ethnic Turkish teachers in many
districts. As a result, schools did not reopen in most rural
areas of southeast Turkey at the beginning of the 1991-92
school year. The PKK stopped five minibuses one night in Siirt
and killed 5 passengers, including one child. The PKK also
killed the village teacher and her parents in Gorkce in Tuncele
province. On two other occasions, the PKK attacked the homes
of the head of a village guard force and of a Jandarma
sergeant, wounding by gunfire the children of the first and
killing the spouse of the latter.
Government security forces have sometimes attacked villages
suspected of harboring PKK terrorists, thereby causing an
unknown number of casualties and destruction. In July,
citizens in Cizre and Idil villages accused government forces
of indiscriminate firing after a PKK incident. It is
impossible to determ.ine the instigating party.
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Vedat Aydin's funeral on July 11 (see Section l.a.) erupted in
violence; several people were killed by police gunfire, dozens
were wounded, and hundreds arrested. The facts are disputed;
all parties agree only that no one knows for sure who killed
Aydin. Even the numbers of dead in the funeral riot are
uncertain. Turkish government officials admitted to five, but
another informed source mentioned twice that number of victims
from a nearby town alone. The Government accused funeral
participants of provoking the police, while human rights
activists accused the Government of using the occasion to
attack Kurdish rights leaders.
Villagers complain that Jandarma and security team searches for
PKK terrorists and for evidence of local support for them have
resulted in expulsions, beatings, torture, and arbitrary
killing of innocent civilians. Claiming official intimidation,
Zubeyir Aydar, a lawyer, and his wife Evin, president of the
Siirt HRA, allege they have received death threats for their
activities since 1989, when Aydar publicized the existence of a
so-called "butcher's river" near Siirt. Aydar was excluded
from Siirt under the emergency situation legislation but was
allowed to return in 1990. In December of that year, he was
unable to attend Helsinki Watch ceremonies honoring his work as
a human rights monitor because he was refused a passport. In
May 1991, after a civilian was killed by the PKK, a Jandarma
commander allegedly told the dead man's relatives to seek
revenge by killing Aydar. Aydar also asserts that security
teams in August offered village guards inducements to
assassinate him.
Government decrees, codified in December 1990 as decree 430 and
most recently renewed in mid-November 1991, imposed stringent
security measures in the southeast. The regional governor may
censor news, ban strikes or lockouts, and impose internal exile
(see Section l.d.). The decree also provides for the doubling
of sentences for those convicted of cooperating with
separatists. Informants and convicted persons who cooperate
with the State are eligible for rewards and reduced sentences.
Provisions in the decree that specifically prohibited court
challenges to administrative decisions of the regional governor
were later amended to provide limited judicial review.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
With some significant exceptions, the freedoms of speech and
press are widely and vigorously practiced in Turkey. The
privately owned press, which reflects a broad range of opinion,
does not hesitate to criticize the Government. Penal Code
Articles 141, 142, and 163 — designed to prevent what were
historically considered threats to the democratic and secular
nature of the State — were abolished in April.
Prosecutions against authors, publications, and publishers
continued, however, under the provisions of the Anti-Terror
Law. It provides that "written and oral propaganda ... aiming at
damaging the indivisible unity of the state of the Turkish
republic with its territory and nation (is) forbidden,
regardless of the method, intention and ideas behind it."
Those conducting such activity are to be punished by a sentence
of between 2 and 5 years in prison and a fine eqxial to the
equivalent at the current exchange rate of $10,000 to $20,000.
If the offending "propaganda" is a periodical, the publishers
are liable to an additional fine of no less than $20,000.
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Responsible editors may be fined half the amount of the
publisher's fine and sentenced to between 6 months and 2 years
in prison.
Abolition of Article 141 (advocacy of a state based on class or
race dominance, i.e., communism or fascism), led to
decriminalization of the Communist Party and to acquittal in
October of Turkish United Communist Party leaders Haydar Kutlu
and Nihat Sargin, who had been on trial under Articles 140,
141, and 142, on most charges against them. Kutlu and Sargin
also benefited from an August decision by the International
Court of Justice declaring they had been wrongly imprisoned.
The Government has agreed to pay them compensation in an amount
still to be determined. Abolition of Article 141 also led to
the lifting of the ban on the leftist trade union confederation
DISK (see Section 6.a.).
Abolition of Article 142 (advocacy of a separate state based on
ethnic origins, e.g., Kurdish separatism), along with the
demise of Law 2932 prohibiting the use of the Kurdish language,
prompted a rash of Kurdish-language cassette tapes and of
publications on Kurdish subjects. Some of these initially ran
afoul of the new law. Sociologist Ismail Besikci, a familiar
figure in Turkish courtrooms, went on trial again (along with
his publisher) in Ankara State Security Court on October 3,
charged with producing antistate propaganda in his book "State
Terror in the Middle East." Judges denied his attorneys'
request that he be freed on bail until the case continued but
did release him on October 31 pending further hearings. His
freedom was short-lived, however, as Besikci was arrested again
in November for another objectionable volume. The Turkish
press wrote on December 17 that Besikci, now free on his own
recognizance, is on trial in Ankara Criminal Court for
"defaming Turkish citizenship and the Turkish republic" and
faces a possible 1-to 6-year prison term. The HRA reported on
October 3 that "Kurdish File," a book by journalist Rafet
Balli, was ordered confiscated by the Istanbul State Security
Court on the grounds that "it disseminated separatist
propaganda and praised activities that are considered crime by
the laws." The book interviewed leaders of several Kurdish
organizations. The same court earlier ordered confiscation of
the 49th issue of weekly Yeni Ulke (New Land) newspaper and the
50th issue of biweekly magazine Emegin Bayragi (Flag of Labor)
on grounds that they disseminate separatist propaganda. Yucel
Halis was sentenced in Ankara State Security Court to 10 years'
imprisonment for "disseminating PKK propaganda in Ankara."
Minister of Culture Fikri Saglar announced on December 15 that
he was immediately lifting the bans against all books
prohibited since the 1980 military takeover in Turkey. Saglar
said some 25,000 titles would be freed for publication and
sale. Saglar also has stopped any government actions against
Kurdish-language cassette tapes. A Turk resident in Sweden
began publication of a weekly Kurdish-language newspaper in
Turkey in December .
Journalists sometimes face harassment and aggressive
application of the law by public prosecutors. Publications
must designate a "responsible editor" who is legally
accountable for a publication's contents. Many have faced
repeated criminal proceedings. According to information
provided by the Justice Ministry, as of November 29, 1991, the
single "editor, writer, or journalist" in confinement of any
kind in Turkey is Gunes ' s Deniz Teztel, mentioned below. HRA
president Nevzat Helvaci confirmed that fact on December 10.
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The Justice Ministry adds that trials continue against 83
editors, writers, or journalists without their being detained.
Decree 430 superseded and modified some of the more severe
provisions of its predecessors. For example, although it still
requires self-censorship on all news reporting from or about
the southeast and gives the Interior Ministry the authority to
ban, upon the regional governor's proposal, the distribution of
any news regarded as misrepresenting events in the region, it
does not permit indefinite closure of printing houses that
violate the decree. Nevertheless, operations may be
suspended — 10 days for a first offense and 30 days for
subsec[uent offenses — if a government warning is not obeyed.
Gunes journalist Deniz Teztel was imprisoned in Ankara in July
for refusing to cooperate with authorities by providing
information on sources who are allegedly members of Dev-Sol.
She is currently imprisoned in Cankiri, awaiting trial for
violating provisions of the Anti-Terror Law.
Turkish radio and television (TRT) is a government monopoly.
Opposition figures asserted that its broadcasts have a
progovernment bias, despite coverage of opposition leaders and
their parties. A government commission generally apportions
party access to television and radio during election and
referendum campaigns based on the proportion of parliamentary
seats that each party holds. However, TRT television aired a
3-hour roundtable preelection debate with the leaders of six
parties — including the Socialist Party and the Islamic
fundamentalist Refah Party — participating on equal terms. In
1991 Turkish viewers with access to cable facilities or
satellite dishes have also been able to watch foreign
broadcasts, the Turkish-language "Star 1," and other private
channels operating from abroad. Obscenity and censorship laws
remain on the books and sometimes result in the confiscation
and banning of publications and films.
The leftwing weekly Toward The Year 2000, which had had its
publication suspended by the Interior Ministry during 1990,
resumed publication in 1991. It is published regularly, but
some issues have been confiscated. Other leftwing publications
that had stopped publication or were published only
sporadically during 1990 have benefited from the more liberal
provisions of Decree 430. There remains limited independent
reporting on southeastern Turkey.
In three instances, foreign journalists were either detained or
harassed by Turkish authorities: British journalist Robert
Fisk was expelled from Turkey for "biased and insulting
reporting" about Turkey; Elizabeth Schmidt, a German journalist
who covered Vedat Aydin's funeral in July, was beaten by police
and detained for about 2 weeks; and a Turkish member of the New
York Times team led by Chris Hedges was detained for having
photographed Turkish soldiers firing into the air to break up a
pro-PKK demonstration.
While it is generally permissible to criticize government
leaders or policies, the Criminal Code provides penalties for
those who "insult the President, the Parliament, and the army,"
ranging from a 3-year minimum sentence for insulting the
President to a 6-year maximum for insulting the other branches
of government. Judges have generally been rigorous in
examining evidence and have dismissed many charges brought
under these laws. Police still detain people and prosecutors
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Still bring them to court under this section, resulting in long
and expensive trials in many cases.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Peaceful assemblies are permitted with prior notification to
government authorities but may be restricted to designated
sites. Permission may be denied if the authorities believe the
assembly (for example, a May Day rally) is likely to disrupt
public order.
The law on associations reflects lingering concern over the
widespread violence that preceded the military intervention of
1980. It prohibits associations and labor unions from having
ties to political parties or engaging in political activity.
Police raided or closed branches of the Ozgur Dernegi (Freedom
Association) in various cities in Turkey during 1991.
Associations must submit their charters for government
approval, which is a lengthy and cumbersome process. The
Constitution and the law governing political parties proscribe
student and faculty involvement in political activities.
Political parties may not form youth branches. Students are
not eligible to join political parties, and faculty members who
are elected to Parliament must resign their university
positions. Students and faculty members may participate in
politics as individuals.
c. Freedom of Religion
Turkey is a secular state. The Constitution provides for
freedom of belief, freedom of worship (in specifically
designated places of worship), and private dissemination of
one's religious ideas. Turkey's population is 99 percent
Muslim. Although Turkey is a secular state. Islamic religious
instruction in state schools is compulsory for Muslims.
Turkish law exempts non-Muslims from Muslim religious
instruction upon written verification of their non-Muslim
background, although students who wish to attend may do so with
parental consent.
Many prosecutors view proselytism and religious activism on the
part of either Islamic fundamentalists or evangelical
Christians with suspicion, especially when their activities are
seen to have political overtones. Courts dismissed virtually
all charges brought against Islamic fundamentalists and Turkish
and foreign evangelical Christians in 1991. The police,
nevertheless, continued their surveillance and detentions of
evangelical Christians, refused to renew some residence
permits, and expelled some from the country. The Foreign
Ministry asserts that such expulsions are administrative
measures taken against activities harmful and disturbing to
public order. However, interviews with some detainees and
deportees disclosed that they denied having broken Turkish laws
and almost all assert they were never granted even an
administrative hearing before actions were taken against them.
One American obtained a written statement describing the
grounds for his deportation and is pursuing the matter in
Turkish courts.
Among Turkey's non-Muslim religious groups, there are some
60,000 Armenians, 25,000 Jews, 20,000 Syriac Christians, 18,000
Arab Orthodox, 4,000 Greek Orthodox, and several thousand Roman
Catholics and Chaldean Christians. Most religious minorities
are concentrated in Istanbul. They operate churches,
monasteries, synagogues, schools, and charitable religious
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foundations such as hospitals and orphanages. The Jewish
community reported no problems with the Government in 1991 (or
in recent memory) .
Armenian and Greek churches and their affiliated operations are
reportedly subject to careful official monitoring of their
activities. The curriculum in their schools is tightly
controlled by the Ministry of Education. Greek and Armenian
theological seminaries in Turkey, ordered closed in 1971, have
not reopened since then. Armenian and Greek churches also find
their ability properly to manage or dispose of their
considerable real estate holdings in Istanbul is affected by
legal and bureaucratic regulations. Complicated and
time-consuming bureaucratic procedures deter repairs to some
religious facilities, which often require government approval
because of their historical value. Under Turkish law,
religious buildings that become "extinct" (i.e., due to
prolonged absence of clergy or of lay persons to staff local
religious councils) revert to the possession of the
Government. Some non-Muslim minorities, particularly the Greek
Orthodox and, to a lesser extent, Armenians and Jews, are faced
with the danger of losing their houses of worship. Controversy
also arose in April when an Armenian town hall under
construction on Kinali island was razed allegedly because
required building permits had not been obtained.
The Turkish Government made no attempt to interfere in the
election by the Greek Orthodox Holy Synod of Metropolitan
Bartholomew as Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Turkish citizens enjoy freedom of movement within Turkey and
are generally free to travel abroad. The Constitution provides
that a citizen's freedom to leave may be restricted only on
account of the national economic situation, civic obligations
(i.e., military service), or criminal investigation or
prosecution.
Some human rights activists have experienced delays in
acquiring passports. For example, Hatip Dicle, formerly
president of the Diyarbakir chapter of the HRA and now an SHP
parliamentarian, was unable to accept an official invitation to
visit the United States in February 1991 because government
authorities delayed his passport application for several
months. Reportedly, he did obtain a passport later in 1991.
When Kurds and other Iraqis fled from Saddam Hussein's forces
in April, more than half a million found haven along Turkey's
border with Iraq. The Turkish Government opened a staging
center for hajj pilgrims to shelter some of the Iraqi refugees
in Turkey. With the assistance and cooperation of coalition
"Operation Provide Comfort" personnel, international
organizations, and numerous private voluntary organizations and
nongovernmental organizations, Turkey housed, fed, and provided
medical care for the refugees. Turkey also cooperated with
coalition efforts to establish a secure zone in northern Iraq
to which the refugees could return.
Turkey is still host to many refugees who did not feel they
could return to Iraq. Official figures released in mid-October
1991 showed that 5,538 Iraqis who fled Saddam's forces earlier
in the year remain in camps in southeastern Turkey, which
representatives of international organizations continue to
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visit grequently. An additional 5,933 Iraqi refugees were
granted temporary residence permits by the Turkish Government
and are living independently in Turkey. About 21,000 of the
60,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees who arrived in 1988 remain in
camps in the southeast. The Government does not recognize the
Iraqi Kurds' claims to refugee status but has also stated these
people will not be returned forcibly to Iraq. The Turks
historically have followed this policy towards all persons
seeking refugee status .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Turkish citizens have the right and ability to change their
government peacefully, within certain legal constraints. As
noted in Section 2.b., the repeal of Article 141 of the Penal
Code decriminalized the Turkish United Communist Party. Turkey
has a multiparty parliamentary system, in which elections are
held every 5 years on the basis of mandatory universal suffrage
for all citizens 20 years of age and over.
The Grand National Assembly (Parliament) elects the President
as Head of State every 7 years. In the October parliamentary
elections, the Correct Way Party (DYP) won a plurality of 27
percent of the vote and 178 seats in the 450-member unicameral
Parliament. Seats are allocated on a weighted proportional
representation basis in which parties that poll less than 10
percent of the total national vote are excluded. This
provision is intended to prevent political fragmentation. Four
other parties obtained seats in the Parliament, and the DYP
formed a coalition with the Social Dem.ocratic Populist Party to
achieve a parliamentary majority.
The Constitution provides equal political rights for men and
women. Eight women, representing three parties, were elected
to Parliament in 1991. Members of minorities, Muslim and
non-Muslim, face no legal limitations on political
participation. Although the People's Workers' Party (HEP)
experienced difficulties with authorities during the year and
some of its members were arrested and charged with speaking in
Kurdish before the language law was repealed, some 22
HEP-af filiated candidates won seats in Parliament as SHP
candidates. Several of these created a disturbance in
Parliament when they took their oaths as written and appended
Kurdish slogans to them. To date, no consequences have
followed their action. HEP held an extraordinary convention
that turned into a celebration of the PKK on December 15 in
Ankara. The Government is proceeding with an investigation.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
A nongovernmental Human Rights Association (HRA), officially
approved in 1987, has branches in 42 provincial capitals and
organizes discussions, publications, rallies, petitions, and an
annual Human Rights Day celebration. Its membership numbers
about 12,000. The HRA established the Human Rights Foundation
in 1990 which, as well as operating torture rehabilitation
centers in Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul, serves as a
clearinghouse for information on human rights.
The Government closed the Batman branch of the HRA for several
months in 1991 and has ordered other branches shut for greater
and lesser periods. It contended that HRA statements opposing
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the Persian Gulf war violated the law on associations which
restricts political activities to political parties. Police
have also reportedly raided HRA branches in Istanbul and
elsewhere and confiscated materials. In September police
detained 23 persons who attended an Ankara exhibit mounted by
the HRA to commemorate the anniversary of the military coup on
September 12, 1980. Four remain in custody. According to the
president of the Istanbul chapter of HRA, his association was
the subject of 17 separate police investigations and pending
prosecutions as of the end of September. Many of these, and
many arrests of human rights activists, stemmed from alleged
violations of the Law on Associations or the holding of illegal
demonstrations .
The Social Democratic Populist Party has a human rights
committee and has actively pursued human rights issues in
Parliament for several years. All the political parties
contesting the 1991 elections incorporated a human rights plank
into their campaign platforms. Parliament passed the bill
establishing its Human Rights Commission in December 1990. The
Commission began operating early in 1991. It has authority to
oversee Turkey's compliance with the human rights provisions of
Turkish law and international agreements to which it is a
signatory, investigate alleged abuses, and prepare an annual
report. The Commission has visited and reported on conditions
in Bursa Prison; has made a surprise inspection of a police
headquarters in Ankara; and has issued a report on the number
and types of cases brought to its attention. The Commission,
whose new chairman is an ethnic Kurd, announced on December 18
that it had established a subcommittee dedicated to
investigating disappearances. The first case it will
investigate is that of Huseyin Toraman, cited in Section l.b.
While representatives of diplomatic missions or foreign private
organizations who wish to monitor the state of human rights in
Turkey are free to speak with private citizens, official
visitors to the southeast may be followed by security police.
The Government contends that protection from possible terrorist
assaults is necessary, but the presence of security officials
may have an intimidating effect upon interviewees. The
Government continues to be ambivalent toward nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) because of its belief that their reports
do not reflect adequately the country's progress in human
rights and tend to overlook human rights abuses practiced by
terrorists. Access to government officials or facilities at
times may be refused or restricted.
Under the European and U.N. Conventions Against Torture
ratified by Turkey, committees or rapporteurs may visit all
places of detention at any time, following notification to the
government. In September the Council of Europe's Committee for
the Prevention of Torture visited Turkey and was given access
to prisons and police facilities. European parliamentary
representatives attending the human rights symposium sponsored
by the Turkish Parliament in October publicly stated their hope
that Turkey will authorize publication of the Committee's
report on its findings. Turkey formally recognized the
compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights
in 1989, and a number of cases involving Turks have been
referred to it.
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Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution proclaims Turkey to be a secular state,
regards all Turkish citizens as equal, and prohibits
discrimination on ethnic, religious, or racial grounds. The
Treaty of Lausanne (1923) also guarantees the rights of
Turkey's non-Muslim religious minorities. The Government
officially recognizes only those minorities mentioned in the
Treaty. Muslim ethnic or sectarian minorities face
difficulties in maintaining distinct separate identities within
Turkish society as a result of official attempts to assimilate
them.
Millions of Turkish Kurds who have moved to industrialized
cities in the western part of the country are by and large
fully integrated into the political, economic, and social life
of the nation. Most parliamentary representatives from
southeastern Turkey are ethnic Kurds, but representatives of
Kurdish ethnic origin have been elected from districts far
removed from the southeast. A niamber of Cabinet Ministers, as
well as other government officials, claim an ethnic Kurdish
background.
The controversial 1983 law declaring Turkish "the mother tongue
of Turkish citizens" and prohibiting publications and
unfettered communication in "any language other than first
official languages of states recognized by the Turkish
republic" was repealed in April. That action legalized
speaking in Kurdish, singing or recording Kurdish songs, and
publishing books, newspapers, or other material in the Kurdish
language. However, court proceedings continue to be conducted
in Turkish, and the poor quality of court-provided translators
may disadvantage some Kurdish-speaking defendants. Moreover,
materials dealing with Kurdish history, culture, and ethnic
identity continue to be subject to confiscation and prosecution
under the "indivisibility of the State" provisions of the
Anti-Terror Law. Foreign publications have been confiscated
for criticizing government policy toward the Kurds. The
question of Kurdish cultural identity within Turkey is more and
more openly debated, however, both in government and among the
general public.
The Gypsy population in Turkey is extremely small. There was
only one reported incident of public harassment directed
against a Gypsy tribe.
Although women are improving their situation in Turkish
society, including the professions, business, and the civil
service, they continue to face discrimination to varying
degrees. Traditional values, shared by large numbers of both
men and women, prevent many women from entering career fields.
The first female Vali (governor) was appointed in 1991.
Traditional family values in rural Turkey place a greater
emphasis on advanced education for sons than for daughters.
Primary education through the fifth grade is compulsory for all
children, but thereafter female school attendance declines
dramatically. According to 1985 census figures (the most
recent available), the literacy rate was 90.26 percent for
males under 50 and 76.19 percent for females under 50. Women
comprise about 36 percent of the paid Turkish work force and
generally receive equal pay for equal work. Although seldom
enforced, some laws that discriminate against women remain on
the books. The husband determines the legal domicile of the
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family, and a married woman needs her husband's consent to be a
legal partner in a company. In some parts of Turkey, laws
requiring civil marriage are ignored, and polygamy is accepted,
although technically illegal.
Spousal abuse is still considered an extremely private matter,
although government and public interest in the problem is
growing. The police do not normally intervene in domestic
disputes. Turks of either sex may file civil or criminal
charges but rarely try to resolve family disputes in court.
Turkish law makes no discrimination between the sexes in laws
concerning violence or abuse, and courts make no distinction
between men and women. In 1989 and 1990, Turkey's first three
homes for battered women were opened by a private organization
called the Purple Roof Foundation. In addition, in 1990 the
Government began a program to open shelters in the major cities
for abused women (and their children) who have left home. The
first such government shelter in Ankara opened in the fall of
1990 and was expanded in 1991. Istanbul's Bakirkoy
municipality also operates a shelter, opened in September 1990,
which has received over 4,000 applications to date and has a
waiting list of more than 2,000.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Most workers have the right to associate freely and form
representative unions. Exceptions are schoolteachers (both
public and private), civil servants, the police, and military
personnel. In November Prime Minister Demirel declared the
Government's intention to grant trade union rights to both
teachers and civil servants, and a draft bill was prepared for
submission to Parliament in January 1992. The law prescribes
that unions and confederations may be founded without prior
authorization on the basis of a petition to the governor of the
province where the union's headquarters are to be located.
Although unions are independent of the Government and the
ruling party, they must have government permission to hold
meetings or rallies and must allow police to attend conventions
and record the proceedings. Union officers may serve no more
than eight consecutive 3-year terms in a given union position.
The Constitution requires candidates for union office to have
worked 10 years in the industry represented by the union.
Both the 1983 law on trade unions and an amendment enacted in
1988 recognize the right of unions and their officers to
express views on issues directly affecting members' economic
and social interests, but it did not undo constitutional
prohibitions on any union role in party politics. Unions may
not establish organic or financial connections with any
political party or other association. In practice, union
leaders and the executive board of the Turkish Confederation of
Labor (Turk-Is) have been able to convey clearly in election
and referendum campaigns their support for, or opposition to,
given political parties, including in the October Parliamentary
elections .
Prosecutors may request labor courts to order a trade union or
confederation into liquidation based on alleged violation of
specific legal norms. However, the Government may not
summarily dissolve a union. The Turkish Confederation of
Revolutionary Workers Unions (DISK), which was Turkey's second
largest trade union organization in the 1970 's, had its
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activities suspended, its assets seized, and some 1,500 of its
members arrested following the 1980 military coup. After a
highly publicized 6-year trial, the Military Court in December
1986 convicted 264 DISK militants on subversion charges. The
Anti-Terror Law of April 1991 abolished the "thought crimes"
provisions of the Penal Code (Articles 141 and 142) under which
the DISK militants had been convicted. Thereupon, the DISK
secured a ruling from the Military Court of Appeals in July
that not only overturned the 1986 convictions but also lifted
the 11-year suspension on DISK activity. On December 7, the
DISK held an extraordinary national convention for the purpose
of amending its bylaws so as to bring then into conformity with
post-1980 labor legislation. Under the 1983 Trade Union Law,
the DISK had until April 1992 to hold a second national
convention for the purpose of electing officers. The DISK
scheduled a regular national convention to elect new officers
on January 18-19, 1992.
The right to strike, while guaranteed in the Constitution, is
subject to a number of restrictions. For example, workers in
the petroleum industry, workers engaged in the protection of
life and property, sanitation services, national defense, and
education do not have the right to strike. Turkish law and the
labor court system require collective bargaining before a
strike. The law specifies the series of steps a union must
take before it may legally strike and a similar series of steps
before an employer may engage in a lockout. Nonbinding
mediation is the last of those steps. In those sectors in
which strikes are prohibited, disputes are resolved through
binding arbitration. A party that fails to comply with these
steps forfeits the exercise of its rights. Once a strike is
declared, unions are restricted in the actions pickets may take
as well as in the number of pickets they may place at each
entrance and exit of a strike site. The struck employer may
respond with a lockout. The employer is, however, prohibited
from hiring strikebreakers or using administrative personnel to
perform jobs normally done by strikers. Unions are forbidden
to engage in secondary (solidarity), wildcat, or general
strikes .
Under Article 33 of the 1983 Law on Strikes and Lockouts, the
Government also has the power to suspend strikes for 60 days
for national security reasons. Unions have the right to
petition the Council of State to lift such a suspension, but if
this appeal fails the strike is subject to compulsory
arbitration at the end of the 60-day period. On January 25,
during the Gulf War, the Government invoked Article 33 to
suspend all labor strikes nationwide. This was the first such
blanket suspension of strike activity under the 1983 labor
legislation. Turk-Is appealed the suspension. On February 27,
the Council of State decided in its favor and lifted the strike
suspension on the grounds that the Government's blanket
suspension exceeded the norms of relevant legislation and would
cause economic hardship if allowed to continue. Some 393
strikes, involving about 165,500 workers, took place in the
first 10 months of the year. All strikes were peaceful, and
most resulted in sizable wage and benefit settlements.
Unions may and do form or join confederations and international
labor bodies. The law requires governmental approval to do so
and prohibits affiliations with organizations hostile to Turkey
or to freedom of religion or belief.
The Committee on Freedom of Association of the International
Labor Organization (ILO) reviewed several complaints against
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Turkey in November and asked the Government to return the
assets of the DISK and to expand its efforts to develop
constructive tripartite discussions on amendments to the labor
law.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
All industrial workers have the right to organize and bargain
collectively, and most industrial activity and some public
sector agricultural activities are organized. The law reqxiires
that, in order to become a bargaining agent, a union must
represent not only 50 percent plus one of the employees at a
given work site but also 10 percent of all the workers in that
particular industry. This has the effect of favoring
established unions. There is no agent election; the union
submits its membership rolls to the Labor Ministry and requests
certification as the collective bargaining agent. Once
certified, the union receives checkoff privileges, as well as
compensatory payment for nonunion members. The employer must
enter good-faith negotiations with the certified union.
Antiunion discrimination by employers is prohibited by law. An
effective means for resolving complaints of such discrimination
exists within the system of labor courts.
Union organizing and collective bargaining are permitted in the
duty-free export processing zones at Antalya, Istanbul, and
Mersin, but workers in those zones will not be allowed to
strike during the first 10 years of operation. Until then,
settlements not otherwise reached will be determined by binding
arbitration.
At the annual ILO Conference in June, criticism of Turkey
focused on ILO Convention 98 on the right to organize and
collective bargaining and Convention 111 on discrimination in
employment. In its 1991 report, the ILO Committee of Experts
(COE) again expressed concern about the numerical requirement
for certification as a bargaining agent and the requirement for
compulsory arbitration in sectors where strikes are forbidden.
The COE also reiterated that, in barring unionization of civil
servants, the Government's definition of "civil servant" was
too broad.
With regard to Convention 111, the COE took note of the
Government's report stating that nearly all of the public
employees dismissed or transferred between 1980 and 1987 as a
result of Martial Law Act 1402 have been reinstated. In regard
to the security investigation regulation of March 8, 1990,
concerning background checks on public employees, the COE asked
the Government to indicate the measures taken to ensure that
rejection or transfer of persons pursuant to this regulation is
not based on political or any other grounds that would
constitute discrimination under Convention 111.
The new Government which took office in November has pledged to
revise many provisions of the Constitution and labor laws in
order to bring them into compliance with ILO conventions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is prohibited by the Constitution and
statutes, and it is not practiced.
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d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Education is compulsory for the 5 years of primary school,
ending at age 11. In practice, however, children in rural
areas, especially in the east, sometimes leave school early.
The Constitution and labor laws forbid employment of children
younger than 15 years of age, with the exception that those
aged 13 and 14 may engage in light, part-time work, if enrolled
in school or vocational training. The Constitution also
prohibits women and children from engaging in physically
demanding jobs, such as underground mining, and from working at
night. The laws are effectively enforced by the Ministry of
Labor in the organized industrial sector but not elsewhere in
the economy.
In practice, many children work in Turkey. Families frequently
need the supplementary income their children can earn. In
family-owned businesses such as restaurants, boys visibly
younger than 15 work long hours, for example, as busboys . In
addition, there is an informal and essentially unsupervised
apprentice system in which young boys work at low wages, e.g.,
in auto repair shops, in the hope of learning a trade. Girls
are rarely seen in public in work circiomstances, but many are
kept out of school to work on indoor handicrafts, especially in
rural areas .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Ministry is legally obliged to set minimum wages at
least every 2 years through a Minimum Wage Board. In recent
years it has done so annually. The Board is a tripartite
government-industry-union body. On July 30, the minimum wage
was increased by 93 percent over the minimum wage set in July
1990. In comparison, inflation increased about 69 percent
during the period July 1990-July 1991. The minimum wage is
effectively enforced in the industrial sector.
Without support from other sources, it would be difficult for a
single worker, and impossible for a family, to live on the
minimum wage. Most workers earn considerably more. In
addition to wages, workers covered by the labor law also
receive a hot meal daily (or a food allowance), transportation
to and from work, a fuel allowance, and other fringe benefits
which, according to the Turkish Employers Association, make
basic wages alone only 34 percent of total remuneration.
Labor law provides for a nominal 45-hour workweek. Most unions
have bargained for fewer hours in the workweek, both to
increase premium-pay overtime and to obtain more leisure time.
Labor law limits the number of overtime hours a worker may work
to 3 hours a day for up to 90 days in a year. Wage and hour
provisions are effectively enforced by the Labor Inspectorate
of the Ministry of Labor in the unionized industrial, service,
and government sectors.
Occupational health and safety regulations are mandated by law,
but the Government has not carried out an effective inspection
and enforcement program. In practice, financial constraints,
limited safety awareness, carelessness, and fatalistic
attitudes result in scant attention to occupational safety and
health by workers and employers alike.
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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
The year 1991 witnessed a series of fast-moving events that .
profoundly altered the entire political and economic landscape
in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) and that
by the end of the year concluded with its dissolution. Until
August, the U.S.S.R. remained a centralized multinational state
governed and administered largely by a single, if increasingly
fractious, ruling party — the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) .
Despite the numerous reforms initiated in 1991, antireform
elements of the Soviet leadership continued efforts to reassert
central authority. Until August, U.S.S.R. President Mikhail
Gorbachev continued to bow to growing pressure from his Interior
and Defense Ministers and State Security chief to reassert the
authority of the internal Soviet security apparatus. President
Gorbachev also, however, pressed for a formula to renew the
U.S.S.R. under the terms of a new union treaty which granted
enhanced powers to republic governments. Such a formula was
agreed in principle by Gorbachev and the leaders of nine
republics ("Nine plus One") at Novo Ogarevo on April 23.
By August most of the nine republics had agreed to the text of
a new union treaty. An attempted coup d'etat on August 19
aborted the signing of the treaty and set in motion fundamental
political changes that included the liquidation of the CPSU.
It also radically changed the composition of the Soviet
leadership and the political scene and powerfully increased
autonomist sentiment in many Soviet republics. The Baltic
states declared independence and were admitted to the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe as independent member
states on September 10. The Soviet Government recognized their
independence on September 6 .
By December 1, when Ukraine voted overwhelmingly for
independence in a republicwide referendum, all of the Soviet
republics had declared themselves either independent or
sovereign. On December 8, the leaders of Russia, Byelarus
(Byelorussia), and Ukraine declared the U.S.S.R. central
Government dead and formed a Commonwealth of Independent
States. By year's end, 11 republics had joined the
Commonwealth and agreed that the U.S.S.R. had ceased to exist.
Traditionally, the Soviet leadership relied on a massive and
pervasive security apparatus to enforce compliance with its
decisions and directives. This apparatus included the Committee
for State Security (KGB), the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the
police, armed forces, and the state procurator. Until the
failed coup, these forces were heavily involved in continuing
human rights abuses, for example, in the Baltic states and in
Armenian-populated regions of Azerbaijan. In the wake of the
failed coup, profound changes took place in these institutions.
The new Chairman of the KGB eliminated a number of directorates
that monitored the private affairs of citizens and began to
transfer all armed units of the KGB to the U.S.S.R. armed
forces .
In October the U.S.S.R. State Council (the interim Soviet
executive) decided to eliminate the U.S.S.R. 's KGB by breaking
up the remaining directorates into a foreign intelligence
service, an interrepublic counterintelligence service, and a
state committee to protect the frontiers. The Soviet Defense
Ministry instructed its regional commanders to prevent the
armed forces from becoming involved in internal conflicts in
the republics, including in ethnic conflicts. With the formal
f;n-79R _ Qo
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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and the formation of the
Commonwealth of Independent States, the internal security
structure in the former Soviet republics was again in flux.
The All-Union Interior Ministry and the last vestiges of the
All-Union KGB have been dissolved. In December Russian
President Boris Yeltsin decreed the creation of a combined
Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs. However, the
Russian constitutional court, established in October, ruled in
January 1992 that Yeltsin's order was unconstitutional.
Internal security and intelligence organizations continued to
evolve in the other Commonwealth states as well.
Facing an economy in serious decline, the Soviet Government
announced its intention to introduce deep, far-reaching
economic reforms. In April nine republics plus the central
Government signed an agreement (the "Nine plus One") that
transferred key economic powers from Moscow to the republics.
After the failed coup, 12 republics negotiated and initialed an
accord laying the foundations of an economic community in which
the signatories agreed to form a customs and banking union,
cooperate on fiscal and monetary policy, and repay the foreign
debt. However, it never went into effect, and the December
agreement establishing the Commonwealth provided for no economic
coordinating mechanism. A coherent system of property and
contract rights, large-scale privatization, price decontrols,
and competition between producers had not emerged by the end of
the year .
The central Government under President Gorbachev and a number
of republic governments, including particularly Boris Yeltsin's
government in Russia, continued to implement the human rights
gains of recent years, albeit slowly and unevenly in the face
of kaleidoscopic political and economic changes. Freedom of
speech and press, assembly and association, religion, and
travel continued to expand. In September the U.S.S.R. Congress
of People's Deputies adopted the Declaration of Human Rights
and Freedoms, although its legal effect in the republics was
unclear. In June the popular election of Boris Yeltsin as
President of the Russian republic from a field of several
candidates — the first such election in Russian history — was a
major democratic milestone.
The most extensive human rights abuses occurred in the republic
of Georgia where the popularly elected leader. President Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, abused his mandate by trying to impose direct rule
on local governments seeking autonomy and by cutting off dialog
and compromise with the political opposition. In the process,
he imprisoned scores of political opponents, eliminated freedom
of expression, and initiated a virtual civil war, which led to
hundreds of dead, wounded, and missing. In early January 1992,
Gamsakhurdia was forcefully ousted by his domestic opponents
and fled the country, leaving Georgia in the hands of a
military council and a civilian government appointed by it.
Other significant human rights abuses included the killings in
January of unarmed civilians by Soviet Interior Ministry forces
in Lithuania and Latvia operating under the orders of hardline
elements in the central Government; the forced deportation of
Armenian villagers by the Soviet army and the Azerbaijan
government; and ethnic-based conflicts in several republics and
regions, including Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Chechen-
Ingushetia, and Ossetia. The defense of human rights remained
unevenly implemented in the former U.S.S.R. as a whole, and
many are still not effectively protected by law. The judiciary
in the Soviet Union and successor states had been neither
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independent nor empowered to act as a guarantor of human rights
by the end of the year. At times, union and republic leaders
vied with duelling laws and decrees, as each side argued that
its authority was supreme. The center became increasingly
irrelevant, with republics gradually assuming primary
responsibility for the protection of human rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no confirmed reports of political killings in 1991.
There have been assertions, however, that some reported killings
were politically motivated. On July 31, six Lithuanian police
and customs officials were shot to death by assailants at the
border post of Medininkai. A seventh official wounded in the
attack is still alive after being shot in the head. This attack
came after months of violent actions by hard-line Communist
elements opposed to Baltic independence. The investigation by
the Lithuanian Procurator General's Office concluded that the
killings were perpetrated by Riga-based "Black Beret" or "OMON"
forces of the U.S.S.R. Interior Ministry, though the trial is
still pending and who ordered or authorized the murders has not
been established.
Following the unsolved killings of Father Aleksandr Men' and
Father Lazar' (a priest investigating the Men' murder) in 1990,
another Russian Orthodox priest. Father Serafim Shlykov, was
murdered in Moscow in February.
In Georgia there were reports that civilian inhabitants of the
autonomous region of South Ossetia had been abducted by Georgian
troops and guerrillas and later killed and their mutilated
bodies dumped in front of their families' homes. In addition,
reputable human rights sources reported that the bodies of
kidnap victims were sometimes sold back to their families for
ransom. On one occasion, a mass grave containing the bodies of
40 victims was discovered.
b. Disappearance
In Georgia South Ossetians claimed that many Ossetian civilians
abducted by Georgian troops and guerrillas disappeared for
periods of up to 3 months. In other cases (see Section l.a.),
missing persons subsequently were found dead. Ossetians
estimated over 40 victims were unaccounted for as of October
1991.
In Azerbaijan an international human rights fact-finding group
heard reports that 100-200 persons had disappeared after being
taken into custody by Soviet and Azeri troops.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
In the conflict between the Azerbaijan and Soviet forces on the
one side and ethnic Armenians on the other, there were credible
claims that Armenians detained by Azeri interior ministry
personnel were tortured. Refugees recounted detailed reports
of torture and beatings. In Georgia, after Gamsakhurdia had
fled the country, press reports carried pictures of alleged
torture chambers and devices in the basement of the
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presidential offices where Gamsakhurdia tried to hold out
against the opposition's assault.
Soviet detention or incarceration practices remained harsh.
Many prisoners suffered from mental and physical abuse and
mistreatment during interrogation, trial, and confinement,
according to a wide variety of reliable sources. There were no
reports of law enforcement personnel being punished for use of
excessive force or of victims being able to seek redress.
No instances of long-term hospitalizations of sane persons were
reported in 1991. Current law, however, still provides the
basis for compulsory psychiatric hospitalization without
adequate legal protection of persons arrested under questionable
circumstances and then diagnosed as mentally ill. Allegations
persisted of the use of psychiatric examinations and the threat
of compulsory commitment to intimidate persons whose actions
irritated local officials. In the Khmara case in Ukraine (see
Section l.d.), codefendant Oleksandr Kovalchuk was allegedly
detained in a prison psychiatric ward and injected with
psychotropic drugs. The Ukrainian prosecutor general denied
petitions of Kovalchuk 's defense attorneys to perform an
independent medical examination of Kovalchuk. Human rights
sources, who have for many years followed the issue of
psychiatric abuse, claim that use of sulfazine as a form of
punishment continues in the former Soviet Union, especially
outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg (Leningrad).
Cruel and degrading treatment of military conscripts, sometimes
resulting in death, remained a problem in 1991. The Committee
of Soldiers' Mothers, an organization formed to draw attention
to this matter, pressed for a halt to the prevalent practice of
violent hazing of new recruits by their immediate superiors.
In contrast to his predecessor, the new Minister of Defense
after the coup attempt called publicly for help to put an end
to this practice.
A series of prison riots, strikes, and takeovers occurred
throughout the year, usually to protest substandard treatment
and conditions. Prisoners were frequently placed in punishment
cells for violations of camp rules, sometimes for several
months. Conditions in punishment cells are excessively
punitive. For example, at prison camp ug-42/14 in the town of
Vel'sk in Arkhangel ' skaya Oblast, prisoners claimed that camp
administrators put prisoners wearing only normal prison garb in
a punishment cell with only a grating for a roof and left them
there for up to 24 hours in all types of weather, including
extreme cold. As a result of a similar practice in the Tobol'sk
prison, one prisoner froze to death. No administrative process
exists to ensure that prisoners are not arbitrarily or
inappropriately sent to such cells. Prisoners held in Perm
labor camp 35, Vel'sk prison camp ug-42/14, and L'viv (L'vov)
camp V1315/48 during the coup attempt reported that, when news
of the coup arrived, camp authorities immediately instituted
harsh regimes and threatened prisoners with extended sentences.
Under the criminal codes of the republics (e.g.. Article 188-3
of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR)
criminal code), prisoners may receive an additional 3- to
5-year sentence for "malicious disobedience" in labor camps.
Whereas in the past this article was used to extend the
sentences of prisoners who had nearly completed their sentences,
there were no reports that this occurred in 1991.
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d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Few concrete improvements in criminal procedures were recorded
during 1991. Persons may still be detained arbitrarily and
without arrest warrants. The criminal code of the RSFSR, for
example, recpjires that detainees be charged or released within
72 hours. Once charged, however, the criminal code permits
holding an accused person in pretrial detention for up to 18
months at the sole discretion of the procurator's office.
There is no requirement for judicial approval or a preliminary
judicial hearing on the charges and the continued detention.
Similar procedures were generally applicable throughout the
republics. In criminal cases, detainees may be released and
restricted to their place of residence pending trial.
A 1990 law signed by President Gorbachev permitted defense
counsel to participate in a case from the moment a charge is
brought or from the moment a detention order is implemented.
These new procedures were being implemented only slowly.
Defense lawyers for the accused coup plotters complained that
they were denied access to their clients during initial
interrogations by investigators from the state prosecutor's
office .
Radical opposition Democratic Union Party leaders Valeriya
Novodvorskaya and Vladimir Danilov were arrested on May 13 and
21, respectively, under Article 70 of the RSFSR criminal code
(public calls for the violent overthrow or change of the Soviet
Government and social order). They had signed a letter
analyzing the actions of the Soviet Government in the Caucasus
and in Lithuania which had said "that in these conditions armed
counteraction, out of place in other times, becomes a legal
means of struggle by the people against the authorities whose
hands are stained with blood." The two were held without trial
in the KGB's Lefortovo prison in Moscow until their release in
the immediate aftermath of the attempted coup's failure. The
charges, however, were not dropped.
During the spring and early summer, Azerbaijan's police arrested
over 100 Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, a primarily Armenian-
populated district which was the site of prolonged conflict.
Azeri officials claimed that the Armenians were armed bandits;
Armenian officials maintained the detainees were "hostages "
taken during the enforced deportations of Armenians from
Nagorno-Karabakh that began in April. The Azeri police did not
bring charges against many of the Armenians. Some were held
for up to 2 months before being released. According to some
reports, some of the prisoners were subjected to frequent
beatings while in captivity.
In Georgia President Zviad Gamsakhurdia ' s government arrested
over 80 members of the opposition to prevent their public
activities (see Section i.e.).
There were no reports in 1991 of persons being punished by
being sent into internal exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Soviet court system is made up of layers of courts, each
political entity — district, city, oblast, republic, union —
having its own court, higher courts serving as appellate courts
to lower ones. Military tribunals served to handle cases of
military jurisprudence. To a large degree, the court system at
all levels remained strongly under the influence of the
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political leadership in 1991. In the republics, local, regional
and republic-level courts were presided over by judges who are,
for the most part, poorly trained and lacking a concept of an
independent judicial function. The U.S.S.R. Supreme Court and
the U.S.S.R. Procurator General's office remained, until after
the August coup attempt, organs designed to protect state power
rather than the rights of individuals. Once formal charges
were brought, the burden of proof of innocence remained
squarely on the accused.
Until August, the CPSU's control of society continued to
influence the legal and judicial system, thus placing limits on
the objectivity and independence of the judicial process. With
the banning of the CPSU following the attempted coup, this
influence diminished. However, the process of change was
uneven, and strong authoritarian control by officeholders in
some republics effectively replaced the party's influence. The
establishment of an independent judiciary has not yet been
accomplished.
Generally, trials are public. Defendants have the right to
attend proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence.
The court appoints an attorney for defendants who do not have
one. Defense lawyers, like judges, were subject to numerous
state controls. For example, lawyers for the accused coup
plotters cited Soviet legal practice that permits the
prosecution to discuss the details of an investigation with the
press but may subject defense attorneys to criminal prosecution
for similar public disclosures. Under Soviet law, the
Procurator's office was responsible for conducting all
preliminary investigations into allegations of criminal
conduct. During 1991 there was little evidence of change in
Soviet criminal procedures that permit prosecutors to conduct
initial interrogations of suspects in criminal cases without
the presence of defense lawyers.
Soviet criminal practice is based on the presumption of guilt
if, after having investigated an alleged crime, the state
procurator's office sees fit to press charges. Few criminal
cases result in acquittal. On the other hand, weak cases
increasingly were dropped. Defendants have a right to appeal,
as does the prosecution. This right was exercised by a growing
number of defendants, and higher courts continued to overturn
some cases.
In September the Soviet prosecutor general said there was no
evidence that prominent exiled writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn
had committed any crime. Solzhenitsyn ' s case officially had
been under investigation since 1974 when it was alleged he was
in violation of the high treason provisions of Article 64 of
the RSFSR criminal code.
No prisoners are known to be currently serving sentences solely
under the so-called political and religious articles of the
Soviet and republic criminal codes (e.g.. Articles 70, 142,
227, and the now abolished 190-1 of the RSFSR code). Since
1989 the U.S. and Soviet Governments have reviewed criminal
cases with possible political motivations. Of the 75 persons
whose cases were initially raised by the United States, the
last 2 persons were released in September after being pardoned
by republic governments. A commission under the Office of the
U.S.S.R. Presidency to review the cases of alleged political
prisoners was established in the fall of 1991 but had not begun
to consider such cases by the end of the year. Following the
August coup, the Russian government released a number of
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prisoners whom it considered to have been imprisoned for
political reasons. In July the Russian parliament passed a law
creating the Russian republic constitutional court, a first
step towards creating an independent, third branch of
government. In the fall, the Parliament confirmed the judges.
In Georgia local and international human rights groups reported
that President Zviad Gamsakhurdia ' s government arrested over 80
members of the opposition, including former national guard head
Dzhaba loselani, arrested in February, and Torez Kulumbegov,
chairman of the supreme soviet of the South Ossetian republic,
who was arrested in January. Kulumbegov was charged with
inciting interethnic hatred, abusing his official position, and
exceeding his authority. In September Georgian police arrested
two leading opposition members. National Democratic Party head
Georgiy Chanturia and National Congress member Georgiy
Haindrava. Chanturia was accused of antigovernment activities.
The government maintained that most of the others were suspected
of having committed violent crimes, such as robbery or
possession of illegal weapons. However, critics insisted these
charges were developed only as a pretext to incarcerate the
opposition. Many of those arrested are still awaiting trial,
pending conclusion of police investigations. In early January
1992, Kulumbegov, Chanturia, and many other political prisoners
were forcibly freed from prison by opponents to Gamsakhurdia.
There were numerous reports of instances in which charges were
trumped up for political reasons. As an example, in the
republic of Turkmenistan, writer Shirali Nurmuradov remained in
prison, where he was sentenced in late 1990 to 7 years for
alleged "swindling" (Article 158 of the Turkmen criminal
code). Nurmuradov and his defenders, including the
International PEN Society, claimed the charges were fabricated
at the behest of Turkmen Communist Party leader Saparmurad
Niyazov because the writer had criticized him. Niyazov
reportedly had earlier threatened to have Nurmuradov imprisoned
for his outspoken opposition.
In the republic of Kazakhstan, 28-year-old lawyer and Democratic
Union activist Viktor Leontev was arrested and sentenced to 2
years of correctional labor in June in the city of
Petropavlovsk under the 1990 law against insulting the honor
and dignity of the U.S.S.R. President. Leontev had been
selling an "anti-Soviet calendar" (sometimes seen being sold
openly on the streets of Moscow) which portrayed a caricature
of Gorbachev wearing a hammer and sickle crown. Reportedly, he
was the 16th person convicted under this law.
Ukrainian people's deputy Stepan Khmara was detained in a Kiev
prison without trial from November 1990 through April 1991.
Khmara and five codefendants were arrested for allegedly
attacking a militia colonel. The leaders of the Ukrainian
National Movement "Rukh" and the democratic opposition stated
that the arrest of Khmara, an outspoken anti-Communist, and his
codefendants was politically motivated. Khmara is a member of
the Ukrainian Republican Party. At his trial, which began on
May 14, the militia periodically denied access to the courtroom
to his defense attorneys and his close relatives, as well as to
people's deputies and the press. On July 18, special
detachments of the Ukrainian militia broke into the Kiev hotel
room where Khmara was staying, released tear gas, and began
beating about 40 people's deputies and other Khmara supporters
who had been staging a vigil inside his room. Khmara himself
was beaten, dragged out of his room, and taken to Kiev's
internal security prison.
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On August 25, following the Ukrainian parliament's declaration
of independence, the parliament's presidium declared amnesty
for Khmara and his codef endants, who were released the next day.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
During the first two-thirds of 1991, government interference
with privacy remained pervasive. Constitutional provisions for
the inviolability of the home provided citizens with little
real protection from illegal entry and search. Agents of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs continued to act under the
provisions of a U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet decree authorizing them
to enter private homes in pursuit of suspected criminals.
According to a law adopted prior to the August coup attempt,
permission from a procurator is required before a wiretap may
be installed. The number of KGB personnel engaged in wiretaps
reportedly was reduced by two-thirds. Electronic monitoring of
residences and telephones reportedly continue. Foreign radio
broadcasts were not jammed. Foreigners visiting refuseniks or
dissidents were not harassed.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
In the first half of 1991, U.S.S.R. security forces provoked
numerous violent incidents in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia
(which were forcibly incorporated by the Soviet Union from 1940
to September 1991). The situation was particularly acute in
January, after military units and armed units of the KGB and
Soviet Interior Ministry were sent into the Baltic states,
allegedly to enforce the military draft.
Beginning on January 11, Soviet paratroopers forcibly seized a
number of buildings in Lithuania. On the night of January
12-13, 14 unarmed civilians were killed and more than 100 were
injured when Soviet paratroopers and armored vehicles seized
the Vilnius television center. On January 20, four people were
killed when Soviet Interior Ministry special forces, known as
OMON, took over the Latvian Interior Ministry building in Riga.
Soviet military and Interior Ministry commanders involved in
these incidents reportedly acted at the behest of local
Communist Party organizations loyal to the Moscow-headquartered
CPSU, masquerading as "Committees for National Salvation." On
June 3, the U.S.S.R. Procurator General, in a preliminary
report on the activities of Soviet troops in Vilnius on the
night of January 12-13, said his office had found no evidence
that Soviet troops were responsible for 'the deaths at the
television center. The report contradicted the statements of
numerous eyewitnesses, including foreign journalists, present
at the television center.
Interethnic violence in the Caucasus resulted in hundreds of
deaths during 1991. By the end of December, hundreds of
persons had been reported dead and hundreds more wounded in
fighting between Armenians and Azeris throughout the year. In
April Soviet army and Interior Ministry forces and Azeri OMON
detachments attacked several Armenian villages in Nagorno-
Karabakh and forcibly deported over 1,000 residents to Armenia,
causing death, injuries, and loss of property. Deportations
continued until the August coup attempt in Moscow brought Soviet
army participation to a halt. As Soviet troops began to
withdraw at the end of 1991, Azeri and Armenian combatants
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increased the level of fighting, and reports of victims
continued to mount.
In Georgia politically motivated, interethnic violence resulted
in numerous deaths as Georgian militia and civilian armed bands
staged frequent attacks upon South Ossetians. Ossetian
nationalists estimated that Georgians killed over 300 Ossetians
in periodic fighting which began in 1989. Ossetians accused
the Georgian Government of cutting off access to power and
foodstuffs in the region.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech, press, and expression were exercised to an
unprecedented degree in 1991, but there were also direct,
violent assaults on those freedoms. Freedom to criticize the
Government, for the most part, expanded in 1991. Some anti-
Soviet political activists, however, were harassed, detained,
or arrested ostensibly for holding unsanctioned meetings,
slandering political leaders, conducting acts of malicious
hooliganism, and espousing violent, anticonstitutional acts.
In addition to the Novodvorskaya and Leontev cases (Sections
l.d. and I.e.), Gennadiy Smirnov, charged in 1990 with insulting
the honor and dignity of the U.S.S.R. President, was sentenced
to a year in an ordinary prison camp in February. Democratic
Union member Nasibulla Ratikov was similarly charged in June
when the prosecutor in Yurga in the Kemerovo region accused
Ratikov of distributing literature calling Gorbachev a Fascist.
On November 7, 1990, Valeriy Sedov of Mensk (Minsk) attached to
a statue of Lenin a symbolic figure of "a prisoner of the gulag"
during a demonstration. In May Sedov was arrested and held for
2 months before being released on bail after a 32-day hunger
strike in protest against prison conditions.
Although freedom of press, including the broadcast media, became
more widespread, it also came under savage attack as when in
January Soviet Interior Ministry special forces occupied the
entrance to the House of Print in Riga, Latvia, and Soviet
paratroops seized television and radio facilities in Vilnius,
Lithuania, with significant casualties.
While continuing to observe the letter of the U.S.S.R. law on
the press, the Soviet Government prior to August violated its
spirit on several occasions, particularly through efforts to
dictate the editorial leadership of influential media
organizations and to restrict access to supplies and
subscribers. The All-Union State Television and Radio Company
(Gosteleradio) canceled several of its most popular television
programs, including "Vzglyad" ("Viewpoint") and "TSN" (a
reform-oriented news program), and restricted broadcasts by
Radio Rossiya, largely because of pressure from its government-
appointed director. The Government was also accused of efforts
to oust the reform-oriented deputy editor in chief of the daily
newspaper Izvestiya and replace him with officials from the
state publishing company and the Communist Party's Ideology
Department. Those efforts failed when the newspaper staff and
the Moscow Union of Journalists threatened to go on strike in
protest, but the replacements were still added to the staff as
additional deputy editors, and the popular editor in chief of
the Izvestiya supplement Nedelya (The Week) was removed.
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Efforts to restrict freedom of the press included, in Moldova
and the Caucasus, death threats against journalists for several
publications and arson attacks by nationalist groups. In some
cases, journalists' families or the journalists themselves left
the area for their own safety.
The Georgian government, in response to articles it perceived
as anti-Georgian, prohibited journalists representing several
national publications from reporting from its territory. A
stringer for Radio Liberty was ordered to leave a press
conference by President Gamsakhurdia himself. A local
newspaper, Molodezh' Gruzii, was shut down by the government
for reporting that was objectionable to President Gamsakhurdia.
Georgian journalists who published articles critical of the
President claimed that government officials harassed their
families and put their homes under surveillance in an effort to
persuade them to stop writing. Some claimed they were
encouraged to leave Georgia. The Georgian government also
refused to broadcast any programming from Moscow or from the
Russian republic.
In Azerbaijan opposition newspapers were required to submit
their publications to government censors. By the end of the
year, an opposition newspaper editor reported that the
government had ceased censorship of his organization's
publications but continued to threaten other nominally
independent newspapers with restricted access to printing
supplies and services in the event of unfavorable reporting.
One of the chief targets of the August 19 coup d'etat was the
media. After the collapse of the coup and the victory of the
supporters of democratic reforms, official and latent
restrictions on the media were substantially relaxed in nearly
every region. On the other hand, the Russian government's
decision to suspend six publications accused of supporting the
coup and to force other publications to reregister provoked
concerns that it was also resorting to censorship and to
government control of the media. One weekly, Glasnost, a
publication of the Communist Party's Central Committee, was
closed down by both the coup plotters and the victorious
reformers. Most of the suspended publications were later
allowed to resume publication, but those media traditionally
reliant on funding from the Communist Party suffered a grave
financial crisis since the party's assets were frozen.
In the wake of the coup's failure and the backlash against the
Communist Party and central Government, many republics and
administrative districts also imposed restrictions on the
press. In several republics, including Ukraine, Moldova, and
Georgia, the media that had supported either Communist Party or
Russian nationalist points of view in the past were banned,
including, in some regions, Pravda, Trud, and TASS . Republic
governments reasserted their control of printing plants and
broadcasting stations in most regions. Chronic paper shortages
forced the Ukrainian government to cut back newsprint supplies
to both Communist papers and proreform, independent papers.
Former Communist papers in the wake of the coup changed their
names and appear to be transforming themselves into organs of
the republic government.
On October 30, the RSFSR Ministry of Press and Mass Information
reported that official warnings had been issued to two widely
read independent newspapers, Moscow News and Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, for their publication of reports that Yeltsin had
discussed the possibility of a nuclear strike on Ukraine. It
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termed the articles "propagation of war and interethnic
discord," which were held to be in violation of Part 1, Article
5, of the U.S.S.R. law on the press and other mass media. In
December former CPSU daily Pravda came under pressure from the
Ministry to give up some of its premises to the Russian
government's press organ, the Russian Information Agency (RIA).
After the August coup attempt, the rules for foreign journalists
did not change, but enforcement was increasingly lax. For
example, the Foreign Ministry continued its liberal policy of
granting visas to foreign journalists, access to Foreign
Ministry press briefings was open to all accredited foreign
journalists, and approval for travel was easier to obtain.
Travel to closed areas was not routine, but exceptions were
granted.
As in other areas, academic freedom was in flux in 1991. The
banning of CPSU activity nationwide affected all institutions
of higher learning, with all curriculums coming under wholesale
review and revision. While access to archives continued to be
difficult, access to Western-produced books, magazines,
journals, and other educational materials increased
dramatically.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Public demonstrations were an intrinsic part of the Soviet
Union's political landscape in 1991 — indeed, their number and
frequency made them almost commonplace in the larger cities.
Political rallies were a key part in the June electoral
campaigns in Russia. Small groups of protesters, picketing on
such issues as the environment and social benefits, were a
regular presence before legislative sessions from Tajikistan to
Byelarus. Massive public outpourings in Moscow and St.
Petersburg were critical in thwarting the attempted coup d'etat
of August 18-21 .
The law on demonstrations stipulates that demonstration
organizers must apply for permission to local officials 10 days
in advance, and that officials must respond at least 5 days
before the demonstration's scheduled date. Civil and criminal
penalties ranging from fines to 15-day jail sentences and
stiffer punishment may be levied against participants in
unauthorized demonstrations.
Communist authorities attempted to prohibit certain
demonstrations, including a student demonstration demanding
better university conditions in March and a pro-Yeltsin rally
in May. In Uzbekistan, people's deputy and opposition activist
Shovruk Ruzimurodov was arrested in May for participating in an
unsanctioned rally in protest against price rises. After the
Uzbek supreme soviet revoked his deputy's immunity, Ruzimurodov
was charged with a criminal offense and remained in detention
at the end of the year. Ruling authorities in other republics —
e.g., in Georgia — attempted to ban protests by political
opponents .
The junta also declared public protests illegal during the
short-lived coup attempt. These demonstrations were, however,
called — and given legal sanction — by President Yeltsin and the
Moscow and St. Petersburg mayors. After the failure of the
coup, there were no reports of local officials in Russia
denying permission to demonstrate.
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As of January 1, 1991, a new law on public organizations went
into effect in the Soviet Union. It legalized a multiparty
political system, allowed the formation of political parties
and mass social movements, and guaranteed such organizations
the right to propagate their views. The law also allowed
political parties to field candidates in elections, provided
that no citizen had his rights and freedom to participate
limited, and declared all parties equal before the law. All
public organizations must register their bylaws and the names
of their leaders with the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Justice or with
the republic-level justice ministries. In the case of
political parties, organizers must also present 4,000 valid
signatures of party supporters and a 4,000-ruble fee to
register as an all-Union party or 5,000 signatures and 5,000
rvibles to register as a Russian republic party.
Under the law on public organizations, organizations advocating
violent changes in the constitutional order were forbidden. In
late 1991, the only banned parties in the Russian republic were
the Communist Party (at the union and republic levels) and the
Liberal Democratic Party. In each case, they were prohibited
for their alleged activities in support of the failed coup.
The new law and the breakup of the CPSU's predominant position
in the political hierarchy intensified the trend towards
establishing new social and political organizations,
representing a broad range of social, ethnic, and age groups
throughout the Soviet Union. Popular fronts existed in all
republics and in certain ones — notably, Moldova, Byelarus,
Georgia, and Ukraine — were powerful political forces.
Sociopolitical movements seeking greater autonomy for minority
peoples also sprang up in autonomous regions and oblasts
throughout the Soviet Union, including an estimated 140 in
Russia alone.
These new organizations represented a wide spectrum of
political viewpoints, including monarchists, anarchists,
nativists/Fascists, Socialists, and social and liberal
democrats. In addition, numerous interest groups —
environmentalists, religious organizations, labor unions — were
also launched. Moreover, two broad coalitions. Democratic
Russia (Demrossiya) and the Movement for Democratic Reform,
were active in banding together proreform groups in Russia.
In Azerbaijan the state of emergency prevented opposition
parties from holding public political assemblies throughout
much of 1991. Azerbaijan's government lifted the state of
emergency in August .
In central Asia mass demonstrations occurred in various areas
in the wake of the August coup attempt. The most serious of
these occurred in Tajikistan after the Communist-dominated
parliament deposed the President and reinstituted Communist
rule. The city government supported the demonstrators who were
disciplined and peaceful, and there was no attempt made to
suppress them by force. In Uzbekistan, several attempts to
hold mass demonstrations after the August coup were suppressed:
for example, one in August and another on September 8.
Multiparty systems were formally introduced in much of Central
Asia, but pluralism remained in the early stages of development.
In Kazakhstan, the Communist Party disbanded and reformulated
itself as Socialist. President Nursultan Nazarbayev refused to
join. Instead, he addressed the founding session of the
People's Congress of Kazakhstan, a party uniting opposition
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forces, on October 6. In Uzbekistan, President Islam Karimov
allowed Erk, a moderate splinter group that broke off from the
nationalist movement Birlik, to register as a party. Birlik was
permitted to register as a movement but not as a party entitled
to enter electoral contests. The Islamic Rebirth Party was
banned in Uzbekistan, although it does function illegally in
some areas. In Tajikistan 2 weeks of demonstrations resulted
in repeal of the law barring registration of the Islamic Revival
Movement. Multiple parties and candidates participated in
presidential elections in Tajikistan, while Presidents Askar
Akayev of Kyrgyzstan and Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan faced no
opposition in their successful reelection bids.
Kazakh authorities banned a September 17 ride on horseback by
Cossacks from the RSFSR into Uralsk, in northern Kazakhstan, to
mark "400 years of Cossack service to the Tsars." The Kazakh
Government claimed the march was an incitement to ethnic
violence. Cossacks ignored the ban, and the demonstration took
place peacefully.
c. Freedom of Religion
In 1991 there was continued progress toward freedom of religion.
Authorities throughout the Soviet Union displayed a more
tolerant attitude toward religion, although pockets of
bureaucratic resistance or even hostility could still be found.
On January 7, 1992, Orthodox Christmas was observed as an
official national holiday in Russia for the first time since
the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.
The visibility of religion increased dramatically. Religious
services were televised, particularly during the Christmas and
Easter holiday seasons. In addition, Protestant religious
programming from the United States was broadcast on Sunday
mornings on Soviet television. Religious groups, official and
unofficial, continued to be allowed to hold seminars,
conferences, and revival meetings, frequently in public
facilities rented for that purpose. It was common to see
public proselytizing in major cities, including street stands
with placards calling passersby to rejoin and revitalize the
Russian Orthodox Church, persons speaking about their
Protestant faith, and appeals from adherents of such groups as
the Hare Krishna and the Baha ' i faith.
The press contained extensive coverage of religious issues,
statements of religious leaders, and complaints about the
collapse of Christian moral values in the Soviet Union. Visits
to the Soviet Union by foreign religious figures, including
representatives of evangelical Protestant ministries from the
West, were numerous and unimpeded. Missionaries from almost
every world religion were present in the Soviet Union, and many
organizations maintained permanent representatives in the
country. State academic institutions, including Moscow State
University, not only renamed their "departments of religion and
atheism" to focus instead on religious ethics and liberty but
also hosted Western lecturers on religious ethics and the role
of religion in public policy.
Obstacles to complete freedom of religion still existed at the
local level where remnants of the old state-party bureaucracy
sometimes hindered or harassed religious believers. A primary
cause of local problems was the fact that the 1990 legislation
that granted freedom of religion provided for registration of
religious groups of 10 adults or more by local authorities.
Some groups viewed the registration requirement itself as
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contradicting the tenets of their beliefs and therefore refused
to register officially. Although failure to register did not
result in harassment, groups had to register to acquire the
status of a "juridical person" and to have access to most of
the benefits of the new law, including access to the media and
the right to establish schools, own property, and engage in
social work. The registration process was used for
obstructionist tactics by some local authorities, i.e., lost
applications, endless reviews of applications, or denial of
adequate facilities, especially in the cases of non-Russian
Orthodox groups, principally Protestant groups, the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), and the Russian Orthodox
Free Church (ROFC) .
The ROFC is the new Russian branch of the U.S. -based Free
Orthodox Church, which earlier broke from the traditional
Russian Orthodox Church, charging that it was controlled by the
Communist regime. The ROFC found it especially difficult at
the local level to register new congregations or to acquire new
facilities. An additional issue at the local level was
favoritism toward the traditional Russian Orthodox Church by
local bureaucracies, resulting in fewer restrictions on the
Orthodox Church than on other religious groups.
The importation of religious materials into the Soviet Union
was largely unrestricted. Bibles and children's Bible stories
were common items on sale at street kiosks in major cities.
Korans were imported into the central Asian republics in large
numbers .
The number of clergy and places of worship in all parts of the
Soviet Union are still inadequate for the population, but
churches, synagogues, and mosques were reopened in many places,
and seminaries and other institutions of clerical education
expanded their enrollment.
As a rule, young men who objected to military duty because of
their faith continued to be subject to prison terms. In July
Moldova joined Georgia as the only two republics to pass a law
providing for alternative forms of service for conscientious
objectors. In some other republics, legislation providing
alternatives to military service for conscientious objectors
was under discussion.
In Ukraine parishioners of the long-banned Ukrainian Catholic
(Uniate) church and the UAOC continued to be registered
throughout Ukraine, a process begun in 1990. Uniate demands
for the return of their property confiscated after they were
banned in 1946 led to some violence in western Ukraine, where
some churches used by Russian Orthodox believers were forcibly
taken over by Uniates. However, city councils in western
Ukraine assumed a mediatory role in resolving property
disputes, often providing land and building materials for
Russian Orthodox parishes displaced by Uniate congregations.
The UAOC was granted permission to purchase abandoned church
buildings or construct new churches in Kiev, Kharkov, Poltava,
and Dniepropetrovsk.
Exiled hierarchs of the Ukrainian Catholic church and the UAOC
were allowed to return to Ukraine in 1991. Ukrainian Catholic
Cardinal Lubachivskiy (banished from Ukraine for over 40 years)
established his residence in L'viv. UAOC Patriarch Mstyslav
(living in the United States for nearly 50 years) was allowed
to establish a chancery in Kiev and to travel extensively
throughout the republic.
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Despite strong remaining currents of anti-Semitism among the
Soviet populace, Jews around the Soviet Union in general
experienced continuing and increasing freedom to pursue their
religion (see also Section 5). Synagogues were returned,
religious schools (yeshivas) opened, and the teaching of Hebrew
spread. City councils in Kiev and L'viv restored synagogues to
their respective Jewish communities. Hassidic and Lubavicher
Jewish communities were allowed to run summer camps for
children in Kiev and Poltava. A yeshiva was opened in Kiev in
1990. A U.S. citizen became the Chief Rabbi of Kiev's Jewish
congregation in 1990.
The governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan professed to
guarantee freedom of religion but practiced some restrictions.
Human rights activists charged that only two Christian churches
are currently functioning in the ethnic Armenian region of
Nagorno-Karabakh in predominantly Islamic Azerbaijan. In
Armenia there were reports of Muslim Kurds experiencing
discrimination at the hands of Armenian authorities.
Throughout Central Asia new working mosgues continued to open.
In Tajikistan alone, the number of mosqijes increased tenfold
over the last few years, and Islamic authorities completed a
new building for the theological seminary in Dushanbe.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Although citizens were generally free to move about within the
country, travel in certain areas, such as frontier regions or
areas of military significance, required special permission.
All adults are issued internal passports (identity documents)
which must be carried during travel and used to register visits
of more than 3 days with the local authorities, a requirement
for the most part ignored by -travelers not staying in hotels.
Although only about 15 percent of Soviet territory was formally
closed to travel by foreigners, in practice most territory
outside of major cities was difficult to visit or inaccessible,
because the closed areas often were transportation hubs.
The right to choose one's place of residence, though guaranteed
by law, was restricted in practice. Under the "propiska" (pass)
system, all citizens must register their place of residence.
The authorities limited the number of residence permits in an
increasing number of large cities, including Moscow, St.
Petersburg, and Kiev, where housing was at a premium. In
October the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee abolished
the "propiska" system and gave authorities until January 1,
1992, to make the necessary legislative revisions. The effect
of this decision remains to be seen.
On May 20, the Soviet Government passed the long-awaited law on
the procedure for Soviet citizens to exit and enter the U.S.S.R.
(the emigration law) . Since the demise of the Soviet Union,
Russian government officials have said that the Union's
practices with regard to exit and entry are being observed in
Russia. The Soviet rules have remained in effect in other
republics as well. The law making it a crime to leave the
U.S.S.R. without permission is still on the books — Article 83
of the Russian republic criminal code; one couple was arrested
under this article in 1991. The new emigration bill was not
scheduled to come into force until January 1, 1993, however,
and the requirement that Soviet citizens obtain an exit visa
before traveling abroad remained in effect. Nonetheless, under
the terms of an implementing resolution, the requirement that
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emigrants have an invitation from a first-degree relative in
the country to which they are emigrating was dropped. Instead,
emigrants could submit either an invitation from any relative
abroad or permission to enter the country to which they are
emigrating. The resolution also annulled the 1967 decree under
which emigrants to Israel were required to give up their Soviet
citizenship. Corruption in the passport and visa-issuing
offices — exacerbated by a shortage of new passports — remained a
major impediment to unrestricted emigration and travel abroad,
especially in Azerbaijan, where it was reportedly widespread.
The new emigration law perpetuated the practice of restricting
the emigration of those with access to state secrets and added
a new restriction on the emigration of draft-age men who have
not yet completed their obligatory military service. The state
secrets provisions were more clearly delineated and limited than
under previous administrative regulations. Under the new law,
Soviet citizens taking on employment requiring access to state
secrets will be presented with a document to sign, formally
accepting restrictions on emigration and travel abroad.
Further, the law stated that the normal maximum restriction
would be 5 years. Though the requirement to receive permission
from close relatives in the Soviet Union before emigrating
remained, a would-be emigrant under the new law could try to
settle this problem in the courts, to which there had been no
recourse in the past. Nevertheless, since the new law comes
into force in 1993, there were still scores of instances in
which access to state secrets or inability to obtain the
permission of relatives blocked emigrants' plans. A commission
set up under the U.S.S.R. presidency in the fall of 1991 and
carried over to the Russian presidency in December began to
review cases of refuseniks who had not worked with secrets in
more than 5 years. By January 1992, the commission had resolved
many such cases favorably, i.e., exit restrictions were lifted.
By the end of the year, the newly independent states continued
to permit high levels of emigration and appeared to maintain
the facilitated exit procedures established in the emigration
law passed by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. The Russian
government gave explicit assurances that it would fully
implement the emigration law by or before the law's original
deadline of January 1, 1993.
During 1991 hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens traveled
abroad and emigrated, and many former Soviet citizens who now
reside abroad, including prominent dissidents, were allowed to
return to the U.S.S.R. to visit.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Throughout 1991 CPSU influence in most sectors of society
waned. The 1990 decision to strip the CPSU of its
constitutionally protected leading role accelerated the process
of democratization in Soviet society. CPSU complicity in the
use of force against the freely elected Baltic governments in
January seriously damaged the party's ability to exercise its
traditional influence. Democratic forces rallied in the spring
throughout the U.S.S.R.; local and republic elections during
this time turned power over to the first freely elected
governments in Soviet history. Boris Yeltsin became the first
popularly elected President of the Russian republic. The
elections were carried out by secret ballot and, for the most
part, featured multiple candidates from a broad political
spectrum. This was the first practical demonstration of the
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right and ability of citizens peacefully to change their
governments .
Despite the strengthening of democratic forces during the year,
until the failed August coup the CPSU continued to be the single
most powerful political force in Soviet society. In the wake of
the failed August coup, however, CPSU activities were suspended
and later banned in Russia and then in other republics.
At the republic level, the right of citizens to change their
government in some cases faced problems. Azerbaijan, for
example, held presidential elections on September 8 in which
the current president ran unopposed. Some opposition
candidates declined to field candidates; another contender
withdrew his candidacy a week before the election, saying he
did not wish to lend it credibility. Opposition leaders
claimed that the state of emergency, which was lifted only a
few weeks before the election, prevented them from adequately
presenting their views to the public. Azerbaijan utilized the
traditional Communist system of voting, in which voters only
enter a private polling booth to cast a negative ballot.
Although suffrage in Azerbaijan was ostensibly universal, the
republic's traditional Islamic culture discouraged women from
voting.
In Georgia President Gamsakhurdia won a landslide victory in a
popular election held in the spring. His opponents, however,
charged that Gamsakhurdia, who earlier had been elected
President by Georgia's parliament, purposely scheduled the
election quickly in order to ensure that his competition would
not have time to mount an effective campaign. In January 1992,
the military council that forcefully ousted Gamsakhurdia
promised new elections in the near future.
In Moldovan presidential elections on December 8, President
Mircea Snegur was the only candidate on the ballot after two
others dropped out of the race because of a lack of popular
support. The pan-Romanian nationalist Popular Front
organization called for a voter boycott of the election in
protest against Snegur ' s refusal to commit himself to immediate
unification with Romania. Voter turnout, however, was high at
around 80 percent.
In central Asia, the right to change the government was limited.
Real political pluralism remained embryonic. The Communist
Party was suspended in all five republics after the failed
coup. Elections by secret ballot with universal suffrage were
held in Kyrgyzstan on October 12, but opposition parties put up
no candidates. Similarly, in Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev
ran unchallenged. In Uzbekistan the December 29 elections
featured two candidates — however, the attempt by the popular
"Birlik" leader Abdurakhim Pulatov to register as a candidate
was denied on technical grounds. In Tajikistan elections in
November involved seven candidates, including one backed by a
coalition of democratic, nationalist, and Islamic forces,
including the Islamic Party which until November had been
banned. However, ex-CPSU First Secretary Rohmon Nabiyev
emerged victorious amid charges of serious voter fraud.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Major domestic human rights groups include the Moscow Helsinki
group, which follows the issue of prisoners of conscience; the
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Association of Independent Psychiatrists, which covers the abuse
of psychiatry; the Soviet -American Bureau for Emigration, Human
Rights, and Anti-Semitism; the newspaper Ekspress Khronika,
which follows human and minority rights issues around the
former Soviet Union; and Memorial, which focuses on
rehabilitation of past victims of human rights abuses. All
such organizations were able to operate for the most part
without government interference or repression. They have
occasionally experienced difficulties in registering with
government entities, in gaining the cooperation of typographers
in what were formerly Communist Party-controlled print
facilities, and in receiving office space to run their
activities .
Soviet and republic authorities generally displayed a
forthcoming approach to foreign criticism and review of human
rights practices and permitted several international
nongovernmental human rights groups to establish offices or
conduct fact-finding missions. In September-October, Moscow
hosted the third meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, which was open to Soviet and foreign press and public,
as well as nongovernmental organizations. The Soviet
Government facilitated a short-notice visit by a group of
conference delegates to Perm 35 labor camp where alleged
political prisoners were held.
Discussion of human rights issues between the United States and
the U.S.S.R. remained institutionalized in regular meetings
with the Foreign Ministry's Administration for International
Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights. Staff members of
the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe were
permitted to travel to various republics as unofficial
observers of elections and referendums throughout 1991.
Azerbaijan's government allowed some international human rights
organizations, including members of the international Sakharov
delegation, limited access to conflict-ridden Nagorno-Karabakh,
but other observers were refused entry. Georgia's government
claimed to welcome inquiries concerning its human rights
practices. President Gamsakhurdia personally urged a visiting
delegation of the U.S. Helsinki Commission to send a
representative to Georgia on a long-term basis to observe the
human rights situation at first hand. However, human rights
activists and U.S. Embassy officials experienced difficulty in
meeting with imprisoned political activists due to bureaucratic
restrictions .
The government of Kazakhstan announced that it would welcome
the establishment in the republic of permanent representatives
of international human rights organizations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
As power in the Soviet Union devolved to more or less sovereign
republics, the issue of the central authorities' practice of
discrimination against nationalities disappeared. All 12
republics declared sovereignty or independence from the former
Soviet Union. As a result, each republic was free to enjoy
language, cultural, religious, and political rights according
to its own wishes. However, each was also freed from central
government restraint in dealing with internal minorities, and
the attitude towards and degree of discrimination against
minorities varied from republic to republic.
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Jews enjoyed increasing cultural and religious freedom but at
the same time continued to be subjected to public expressions
of anti-Semitism. On May Day, thousands of demonstrators
marched in St. Petersburg accusing Soviet leaders of favoring
Jews at the expense of Russians. Demonstrators carried
anti-Semitic placards and called RSFSR President Yeltsin "a
stooge for Jewish international capital," and anti-Semitic
posters were posted on a main boulevard in St. Petersburg. The
openly anti-Semitic organization Pamyat ' published a paper
containing excerpts from the long-discredited disinformation
tract "Protocols of the Elders of Zion." Pamyat' began radio
broadcasts in September. These expressions of anti-Semitic
attitudes added to Jews' fear that in times of economic
hardship and political unrest they would be singled out for
arbitrary retribution by an increasingly desperate populace.
Jewish groups' long-standing complaint that the Soviet
Government did not speak out strongly enough against anti-
Semitism was assuaged to some extent by the forceful statement
of President Gorbachev condemning anti-Semitism read at the
commemorative ceremony at Babi Yar in Ukraine in October. At
the same ceremony, Ukrainian President Kravchuk apologized for
injustices perpetrated by Ukrainians against Jews throughout
history.
Over 60 million Soviet citizens live outside their nationality's
administrative region or belong to a nationality that has none.
For many of these, devolution of power has meant a worsening of
discriminatory practices. In the worst cases, harsh
discriminatory treatment of national minorities in Georgia and
Azerbaijan escalated into conflicts just short of all-out civil
war and resulted in hundreds of deaths. As 1992 began, these
conflicts continued to erupt into violence. Developments
regarding the rights of national minorities are described below
by region.
Russia: In the Russian republic, several autonomous republics,
oblasts, and districts based on national minorities declared
sovereignty. The results were not always harmonious. In the
northern Caucasus, for example, territorial disputes flared
among various ethnic groups. In April, after the U.S.S.R.
Supreme Soviet annulled deportation decrees from the 1940 's,
Ingush and Ossetian groups clashed in north Ossetia when the
Ingush attempted to repossess their former homes in the area.
The Ingush also clashed repeatedly with Cossacks in the region.
The government of Chechen-Ingushetia was dissolved in November
when the Chechens declared independence from "Russian
chauvinism." The Ingush voted to remain inside Russia provided
that lands expropriated in the 1940 's were returned. This
exacerbated the Ingush territorial dispute with North Ossetia,
abd Ingush guerrilla attacks were met by crearion of an
Ossetian national guard. In Tatarstan old-line Communist
political leaders retained their hold on power. Violent
demonstrations occurred in Dagestan when Muslims were unable to
make the hajj. The cause of many of these problems was the
release of interethnic tensions built up and suppressed over
decades of harsh Soviet rule.
Ukraine: As a consecjuence of the Ukrainian act of independence
on August 24, advocates of Ukrainian cultural, linguistic, and
economic self-determination became a major political force in
the Ukrainian legislature. At the same time, the government and
major democratic (non-Communist) political parties appeared to
be open to all thenic and religious minority groups in Ukraine.
For example, in September the Ukrainian parliament appointed
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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ethnic Russians to key positions in the Ukrainian governnient
(prosecutor general and minister of defense) . The Ukrainian
parliament was expected to amend the Ukrainian citizenship law
so as to do away with notations in internal passports
identifying Ukrainian citizens by nationality or religion.
Some political organizations in the predominantly Russian-
speaking areas of southern and eastern Ukraine (particularly
Crimea) remained opposed to Ukrainian independence. They were
espacially concerned about increased use of Ukrainian as the
official language of the republic. The Ukrainian parliament
conceded to Crimean demands for political, economic, and
linguistic autonomy on the condition that Crimea remain under
Ukrainian territorial jurisdiction. The Crimean Tatr community,
in the process of returning to the region, has expressed
concern that their rights also to be protected within the
framework of the yet-to-be-negotiated Crimean constitution.
The Nationalities Declaration allows national minority groups
to use their languages in official transactions.
Moldova: The question of minority rights remained a central
issue in the Moldovan republic's internal politics. Ethnic
disagreements with the Russian and Gagauz minorities resulted
in 1990 in secessionist movements in the geographic areas where
those groups are in the majority. Both the Russian and Gagauz
minorities maintained that the government repressed their
cultures, gave preference to Moldovans in housing and
employment, and forcibly imposed Romanian as Moldova's official
language. Moldovans, however, claimed that they were only
righting old wrongs, especially the imposition of Russian as
the official language on the majority Romanian-speaking
population since 1940. Republic officials stated that they
were committed to meeting the concerns of ethnic minorities.
Tensions nevertheless continued, reaching a peak in December.
On December 1, both the secessionist Gagauz and Russian
trans-Dniester regions held independence referendums and
presidential elections. The central Moldovan government
declared the elections illegal and annulled them. Moldovans in
the trans-Dniester region claimed there were attempts to force
them to participate in the elections, including threats of job
loss for those who did not vote. On December 8, Moldova held
presidential elections. Voting in the trans-Dniester and
Gagauz areas was obstructed by the local authorities, with
numerous reports of harassment and intimidation of ethnic
Moldovan voters and a press and radio campaign discouraging
participation. Few polls were allowed to open in these areas,
and attempts were made to close some of those that did open.
The worst armed clashes of 1991 occurred on December 13 when a
firefight between Moldovan and trans-Dniester uniformed forces
in the trans-Dniester city of Dubossary resulted in seven
deaths and a dozen wounded. Both sides blamed the other for
the fighting. While negotiations brought a halt to this
outbreak, sporadic clashes continued in the early days of
January 1992.
The Moldovan parliament enacted a series of legal provisions to
protect minority rights, including the right of parents to
educate children in their own language and the right of each
region to preserve its flag and symbol. Schools teaching in
Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Hebrew, and Gagauz were opened in 1991.
In addition, all classes in the ethnic-Russian trans-Dniester
area were taught in Russian. Restrictive language laws were
eased somewhat, although they still required that persons in
certain positions, e.g., directors of industrial and research
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facilities, doctors, and high-level government officials, speak
both Russian and Romanian.
Tensions between Russians and Moldovans in the trans-Dniester
region remained high during the year, with sporadic clashes
occurring and some casualties reported. The Russian trans-
Dniester leadership expressed support for the attempted August
coup in Moscow; shortly thereafter, four of its leaders were
arrested by Moldovan authorities for allegedly attempting to
set up a new Moldovan government. In response, the trans-
Dniester leadership imposed a blockade on the principal rail
artery at Tiraspol, causing substantial economic losses for
Moldova. On October 3, the two sides reached agreement to end
the rail blockade and free the four detained trans-Dniester
leaders. They also set up a commission to resolve Russian-
Moldovan disputes, called for the disarming of civilian militia
groups, and agreed that both sides would do everything necessary
to guarantee peace and order and restore an effective economy
in Moldova. In September a fact-finding group from the RSFSR
visited Moldova and publicly acquitted Moldova of human rights
violations against Russians. Also in September, a Turkish
delegation visited the Gagauz region at the invitation of the
Moldovan government to investigate Gagauz complaints. The
Turkish delegation came away generally satisfied with Moldovan
treatment of the Gagauz and would not endorse the Gagauz
declaration of independence from Moldova.
Caucasus: As described above (see Section l.f., among others),
the picture in the republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan is one
of violent interethnic conflict spurred by harshly
discriminatory policies of the republic governments. The
dispute between Armenians and Azerbaijanis worsened
considerably as Azerbaijan's government deported whole villages
of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. Other Armenians were jailed
or killed during the conflict. The few Armenians remaining in
Baku (primarily spouses of Azeris) complained that they are
unable to find employment. In Georgia many ethnic groups
complained of de facto discrimination in housing and employment.
The Georgian prosecutor called the Armenian group Krunk ' s plans
to promote the Armenian language in the Armenian community of
Abkhazia a rude violation of the republic's language laws. In
a letter to the chairman of Krunk, the prosecutor threatened to
ban the organization if it did not correct its ways. Georgian
militia and armed civilians continued to attack Ossetian
villages in the former south Ossetian autonomous oblast. An
economic blockade of the region cut off power and supplies of
medicines, foodstuffs and other necessities. In Georgia
citizens were able to worship freely, but some minorities,
including Jews, claimed they are subject to discrimination in
housing and employment despite local laws.
Central Asia: Anti-Russian riots did not occur this year as
they did last, but fear of ethnic tensions was one factor
leading thousands of ethnic Russians to move from Central Asia
to Russia. The RSFSR has expressed concern over the fate of
Russians in Kazakhstan (where they numJDer 40 percent of the
population) and other central Asian republics. The Central
Asian republics have all adopted language legislation declaring
the language of the titular nationality to be the official state
language, while designating Russian as the language of
interethnic communication. In some of these republics,
particulary Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, this has
resulted in Russian emigration. Russians report that they
suffer difficulties now that they cannot speak the state
language. In Uzbekistan some Russians have reported that when
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they present their ration coupons they are brusquely told to go
to Russia. Some Jews and Tajiks living in Samarkand have
expressed fears of growing nationalism among some Uzbek groups.
Women nominally enjoy the same legal rights as men, including
the right to participate in all areas of the social, political,
and economic life of the Soviet Union. An extensive system of
day-care service and maternity leave benefits allowed women,
after they have borne children, to retain employment. Women
are well represented at many levels of the general economy and
paid the same as men for equal work.
Despite their nominal legal equality, women bear the brunt of
many of the hardships of Soviet daily life. Virtually all
women have no economic choice but to work both inside and
outside the home. One report estimated that more than 3
million Soviet women worked in conditions harmful to their
health, and 500,000 women worked at hard, physical labor. In
the central Asian republics, where women's rights in reality
most often diverged from those they nominally enjoy,
traditional national practices often prevented women from
taking their equal place alongside men in economic life.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of workers to form and join unions of their own
choosing showed little change in 1991. The passage by the
U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet in December 1990 of the Law on Trade
Unions provided for the existence of trade unions as independent
organizations which are equal before the law with official,
government-sponsored unions. However, this law did not diminish
the role and status of the official trade unions and their hold
on union membership because it protected their inherent
advantages arising from close links with enterprise directors
and exclusive control over workers' vacations, childrens' camps,
recreation facilities, and other social benefits. The 1990 law
also continued official union control over the state social
insurance system.
The approximately 30 sectoral trade unions of the former
officially sponsored All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions
(AUCCTU), which renamed itself in October 1990 the General
Confederation of Trade Unions (GCTU), continued to perform many
of its traditional functions as "the transmission belt from the
Communist Party to the masses." Despite its new name and
attempts to recast its image, the GCTU retained most of the
AUCCTU' s top leadership and apparatus and continued to enjoy a
privileged and close relationship with the Government and
Communist Party, at least until August.
Independent labor leaders considered the official trade unions'
control of social functions usually performed by the State as
the greatest obstacle to the growth of true, independent trade
unions in the U.S.S.R. Attempts during 1991 by the independent,
democratic unions to break this monopoly had little effect.
With the postcoup breakdown of central authority, labor
activists in some areas were emboldened to wrest for themselves
a role they were previously denied. Independent labor activists
reported throughout 1991 that enterprise directors, local
government officials, and police and judicial authorities
applied various forms of pressure on workers who attempted to
exercise their right to form and join unions. Most commonly,
worker activists faced physical violence or threats of
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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
violence, illegal arrest or threats of arrest, legal
harassment, threats of dismissal or the withdrawal of benefits
controlled by the state, or outright dismissal. Police beat
several independent labor activists badly in 1991, and at least
one died as a result of police brutality. Individual
enterprise directors prohibited independent worker activity in
some mines .
Notwithstanding the obstacles, the independent Soviet workers'
movement , which began as a mass movement only in the summer of
1989, continued to grow. The 9-week miners' strike in March
and April found support in some areas of Byelarus long
considered a bastion of Communist Party stability, bringing
life close to a standstill for short periods of time. Workers
in numerous coal-related factories in Ukraine and Siberia also
joined in support of the miners' demands.
There were credible reports of groups of workers forming small,
independent trade unions in various areas of the country. In
St. Petersburg, public transport workers displayed their
independence from the State on several occasions. In October
the Independent Union of Miners (NPG) formally established a
branch in Byelarus, textile workers formed a free trade union
in Donetsk in eastern Ukraine, as did railway workers in
western Ukraine. The NPG also founded an independent,
democratic union organization in Russia in November.
Cooperative employees in Kazakhstan joined together to form a
union, Birlesu. The independent airline pilots' and air
traffic controllers' unions grew in membership. Despite the
Soviet Constitution's prohibition of independent trade unions
in the armed forces, the clandestine union Shield continued to
organize .
The coal miners in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine and
Kuzbas region of western Siberia continued to represent the
largest and most potent centers of independent organized labor
in the Soviet Union. The miners' strike in the spring, which
at its height involved dozens of mines and more than 200
enterprises and caused severe disruptions to production in
vital coal-related industries, demonstrated the important role
that independent, democratic labor groups now play nationwide.
Repeating demands first raised in 1990 for radical changes in
Soviet political and economic life, including the resignation
of top Soviet leaders, the miners' strike forced the Government
to cede power from Moscow to republic-level coal ministries.
The Government responded to the miners' strike with a series of
decrees and administrative measures designed to restrict
further the circumstances under which workers can strike.
Labor legislation passed by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet in
October 1989 formally established the right to strike for the
first time but also provided for a lengthy dispute settlement
process. The law banned strikes in the Government and military
services and contained broad, undefined references to
"essential services" in which strikes could also be prevented.
In March the Government suspended completely the workers' right
to strike for 2 months.
In April the Ukrainian supreme soviet announced a ban on strikes
on Ukrainian territory. In May the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet
issued a decree providing for administrative and criminal
prosecution for persons organizing work stoppages in key
industries. It also amended the 1989 law, announcing that the
Government may postpone or suspend strikes and that "political"
strikes would henceforth be illegal. Despite these decrees.
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several hundred thousand workers remained off the job. Some
leaders of the workers' movement were prosecuted by local
authorities for their role in organizing the spring strikes.
The International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee of
Experts noted in 1991 that the 1990 Law on Collective Labor
Disputes still refers to the enterprise works committees as the
only competent trade union body for the settlement of labor
disputes, thus precluding the legal establishment of new
independent organizations outside the official structure.
The GCTU continued its control over the Communist labor
international, the World Federation of Trade Unions, which in
1991 played a much reduced international role following the
collapse of Communist-dominated trade unions in central and
eastern Europe and uncertainties created by the democratic
reform process.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Virtually all Soviet workers, who almost automatically were
made members of an affiliate of the AUCCTU, became members of a
GCTU affiliate when the AUCCTU was disbanded. Outside the
mining industry and some segments of the air transport
industry, the vast majority of Soviet workers still have to
rely on the official unions and factory and enterprise work
councils to express their interests.
Soviet authorities revealed a reluctant willingness to deal
with the independent labor movement. In the wake of the miners'
strike in July 1990, the central Government conceded one of the
NPG's major demands, the right to conclude wage agreements with
the central Government. After repeated attempts to get the
State to the bargaining table failed, the miners launched their
9-week strike in March 1991. Following that strike, the
Government again granted the NPG the right to negotiate on
behalf of its members the terms and conditions of employment
with their enterprises, which were supposed to be put on a
self-financing basis as part of the economic transition
process. The NPG, however, was frustrated in many attempts to
conclude collective agreements with individual mines.
Enterprise directors often refuse to negotiate with NPG
representatives .
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Soviet law contains no prohibition on forced or compulsory
labor, although the Declaration of Human Rights and Liberties
adopted by the All-Union Congress of People's Deputies in
September included language expressly forbidding it, and the
U.S.S.R. and the Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics have
ratified one of the ILO's forced labor conventions. Convicted
criminals, including those in some republics confined for
political offenses, were commonly forced to work, often under
very difficult conditions and for minimal wages, in local
projects and to assist in the production of primary and
manufactured goods. Inmates at some correctional labor
colonies struck over harsh work conditions, demanding that camp
norms be brought into conformity with international standards.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs discussed using part of the
large profits derived from the Soviet prison system to finance
penal reforms. Labor camp prisoners were widely known to be
the main labor force for the Soviet lumber industry.
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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law establishes a statutory minimum age for employment of
16. However, numerous reports appeared of child labor in the
Central Asian republics and the Caucasus, particularly in the
agricultural sector.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The bottom rung of the official pay scales for each industry in
effect serve as an administrative minimum wage. Reform plans
call for the establishment of minimum wages, usually republic
by republic, but by year's end these had not yet been
legislated. Even official trade union spokesmen estimate that
well over half of the population do not have an income to
afford a minimum standard of living.
The labor code sets a limit of 41 hours of work per week.
However, in practice, workweeks can range from considerably
less than this to considerably more, depending on local
circumstances. Many workers work significantly more hours to
meet end-of-the-month production goals. Other workers work far
fewer hours, since the disordered state of the Soviet economy
requires them to spend many hours a day, much of it during
official work time, searching for basic necessities for their
families. Officially, workers receive other benefits in
addition to their wages, such as heavily subsidized prices for
basic goods and foodstuffs in state stores. The value of these
benefits, however, has been significantly eroded by growing
shortages of basic consumer goods and food in state stores. In
addition, the qTjality of state-subsidized housing, health care,
and transportation, on which the vast majority of the
population must rely, is generally very low.
The law establishes minimum conditions of workplace safety and
worker health. However, these standards are generally ignored,
and no effective enforcement mechanism exists. The Parliament
in June heard testimony that in a single year over 14,000 died
on the job, 20,000 became invalids, and some 700,000 workers
were injured.
Workplace safety emerged as a major issue in the miners'
strikes, among airline pilots and air traffic controllers, and
in the armed forces. In 1991 there again were numerous mining
disasters in the Donbas, and workers report that few
significant safety measures had been adopted in the aftermath
of these accidents.
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND*
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK)
is a constitutional monarchy with a democratic, parliamentary
form of government elected in periodic, multiparty elections.
As there is no written constitution, human rights are
"residual," i.e., assumed unless limited by statute.
Throughout the UK, public order is maintained by civilian
police forces responsive to and controlled by elected officials.
Because of terrorist violence, the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC) in Northern Ireland is supported by army units.
The United Kingdom has a highly developed industrial economy.
Persons may own property and pursue private economic interests.
The Government provides comprehensive social welfare services.
Terrorist bombings and killings carried out by the illegal
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and other "republican"
(Catholic) and "loyalist" (Protestant) terrorist groups in
Northern Ireland and Britain are the greatest threat to public
order and security in the UK.
The tensions and long-held grievances between the two
communities in Northern Ireland have caused some persons.
Catholic and Protestant, to be denied equality of rights and
opportunities despite government efforts to redress these
grievances. After British courts held in three separate cases
that convictions of alleged terrorists in past years were based
on false evidence and coerced confessions, the Government
appointed a Royal Commission to review the criminal justice
system in England and Wales and announced that consideration
would be given to applying to Northern Ireland any resulting
recommendations .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no political killings by the Government. However,
questions about instances of extrajudicial killing continued to
be raised. In Northern Ireland, 94 persons were killed in
incidents related to terrorism, 6 of whom were killed by
security forces in 1991. In September a 19-year-old student
was shot and killed during a security incident by an RUC
officer. The RUC in effect acknowledged its error when it
stated that the student was not involved in terrorist activity.
The incident is being investigated, and no results had been
announced by year's end. Human rights groups and other
commentators contend that an in-house RUC investigation will
not be impartial.
Deaths as a result of shootings by security forces in Northern
Ireland continue to prompt allegations that soldiers resort to
"lethal force" precipitately. Such shootings have prompted
allegations that soldiers were carrying out a "shoot to kill"
policy, which the Government denies. The soldiers involved in
* A separate report on Hong Kong, a dependent territory of the
United Kingdom, follows this report on the United Kingdom.
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
such incidents have argued that they were in "imminent danger"
before opening fire. The courts have accepted the army's
defense, and there have been very few convictions of soldiers.
The Government states that members of the armed services are
required at all times to operate within the law.
Critics have argued that instructions to police concerning the
use of lethal force are inadequate. Current law requires use
of lethal force to be "reasonable in the circumstances." This
is in contrast to the European Convention on Human Rights,
which allows the use of lethal force only when "absolutely
necessary" in specific circumstances.
Security forces in Northern Ireland continued the use of
plastic baton rounds (PBR's or plastic bullets) for riot
control; there were no fatalities from PBR's in 1991.
The PIRA continued to carry out killings in Northern Ireland,
Great Britain, and continental Europe. "Human bomb" attacks
continued against security forces' targets in Northern Ireland,
during which several private citizens were forced to drive
vehicles loaded with explosives to security forces' checkpoints
while PIRA gunmen held family members hostage.
b. Disappearance
There were no known disappearances caused by government forces.
There continued to be instances of persons abducted or held
hostage by terrorists in Northern Ireland.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
British laws forbid torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment of prisoners and provide penalties for
violations of those laws. Confessions obtained by such methods
are not admissible as evidence in court. A new code of
practices that came into force in 1991 brought about greater
standardization of police interrogation procedures and
strengthened oversight requirements. Human rights groups
criticized treatment of accused terrorists in custody in
Northern Ireland, charging that they were subject to
psychological and physical abuse and urging, for example, the
videotaping of interrogations to prevent abuses.
Human rights groups continued to criticize conditions in some
British prisons. The Government outlined a long-term program
to improve overall prison conditions, particularly shortcomings
in sanitation facilities and recreational opportunities, based
in part on findings by a government inquiry into prison violence
and on extensive recommendations for penal reform.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
In instances when reasonable cause to suspect criminal guilt
exists, police may make arrests without warrants. Those
arrested without warrant must be released on bail within 36
hours unless brought before a magistrate's court. The court may
authorize an additional 60 hours of detention before charges
must be brought. Generally, persons charged with nonserious
offenses may be released on bail. In cases such as crimes of
violence, however, magistrates have remanded persons for periods
of up to 18 months before trial.
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
Reacting to the violence in Northern Ireland, the Government
adopted the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1991
(the first version was enacted in 1978) which is applicable only
to Northern Ireland; and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act of 1989 (first enacted in 1974), almost all of
which is applicable to the entire United Kingdom. Both acts
must be renewed annually by Parliament.
Under the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, police
and military personnel, in dealing with cases of suspected
terrorism, may enter and search without warrants, and members
of the armed forces on duty may arrest without a warrant, any
person suspected of having committed or being about to commit
any offense. Such persons may be held for up to 4 hours, after
which they must be transferred to police custody or released.
The 1991 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act introduced
the new offenses of directing a terrorist organization and
possessing items intended for terrorist purposes and gave
authorities new powers to examine financial and other documents
found in terrorist-related searches. The 1989 Prevention of
Terrorism Act allows the police to arrest, without warrant,
persons anywhere in the UK whom they reasonably suspect to be
involved in terrorism. Such persons may be detained for up to
48 hours without legal representation or judicial review.
Judicial review may be delayed up to a further 5 days on the
authority of the Home Secretary or, in Northern Ireland, the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Fair trial is provided for by law and observed in practice. An
indigent defendant has the right to counsel of his choosing.
All criminal proceedings must be conducted in public, with the
exception of juvenile court cases and cases involving public
decency or security. In a trial under the Official Secrets Act,
the court may be closed at the judge's discretion, but the
sentence must be passed in public. The UK has a multitier
court system with magistrate's, county, high, and appellate
courts. In some cases, appeals may be brought before the House
of Lords.
In March the "Birmingham Six" were freed when the Court of
Appeal quashed their convictions for terrorist bombings in
1975. The Court had received evidence that cast doubt on the
reliability of evidence in the case and supported the
prisoners' claim they had been intimidated into making
confessions. In a related case, the convictions of the
"Maguire Seven," who had already completed prison sentences on
possession of explosives charges, were quashed in June.
These two cases — plus the 1989 overturning of the "Guildford
Four's" conviction on terrorist bombing charges — were an
impetus for the Government's decision in March to appoint a
Royal Commission to review all aspects of the criminal justice
process in England and Wales. The Government indicated it
would consider whether changes implemented as a result of the
Commission's findings might also be applied in Northern
Ireland.
The independent Police Complaints Authority is supervising
police investigations into arrests made by the West Midlands
Serious Crime Squad, which handled the "Birmingham Six" case.
Although the Squad had been disbanded in 1989 after reports
that its members had intimidated suspects and fabricated
evidence, four officers were charged with perjury and conspiracy
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
to subvert the cause of justice, and recommendations for
prosecutions in other cases are being considered.
The right to trial by jury has been suspended for certain
terrorist- related offenses in Northern Ireland because of
intimidation of the judiciary, jurors, and solicitors. In such
cases, a "Diplock Court," in which a single judge presides over
a trial without a jury, is used. Although human rights groups,
attorneys, and others have criticized these courts, the
conviction rate of those who plead not guilty in Diplock Courts
is virtually identical to the rate in regular courts.
Under a 1988 change of law, a court may draw whatever inference
it deems proper, including an inference of guilt, if a subject
remains silent during questioning. This was to deal with the
"wall of silence" and "ambush testimony," whereby a suspect
does not speak until his trial and then presents a surprise
alibi. The Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights
continues to have reservations about the impact the law could
have on the public's sense of confidence in the system of
justice, but the law itself has not actually been invoked in a
case since its inception.
Persons under the age of 18 convicted of murder may be subjected
to indeterminate detention. In Northern Ireland, where public
attention has focused on this issue, 17 persons were serving
indeterminate sentences at the end of 1991 for murders
committed while they were under the age of 18.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The right of privacy is generally well respected in both law and
custom. Warrants are normally required for a police search of
private premises. However, under the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act of 1991, on-duty members of the
armed forces or any constable may enter any premises or other
place if he or she considers it necessary to preserve peace or
maintain order. The Act requires a standard of "reasonable
grounds of suspicion" before a dwelling may be entered without
a warrant .
In the Catholic communities in Northern Ireland, where distrust
of the Government has deep historical roots, many believe that
the conduct of some members of the security forces in carrying
out security checks constitutes unwarranted harassment and
intimidation. The Government conducts intensive training of
security personnel in proper procedures but acknowledges that
official guidelines are sometimes violated.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Strongly held tradition, an independent press, and a democratic
political system combine to secure freedom of speech and press.
Viewpoints critical of the Government are well represented.
The Government continued to restrict broadcasts of live or
recorded statements made by representatives of the PIRA or other
terrorist organizations or of Sinn Fein, the legal political
arm of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), or by others who express
views that "solicit, support, or invite support for such
organizations." There are no restrictions on reporting their
words, and exceptions are made for coverage of elections and
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
parliamentary proceedings. The final appeal in a case brought
by the National Union of Journalists that challenged the
measures as an infringement on the right of free speech and
press was rejected by the House of Lords in early 1991.
In 1991 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the UK
Government was wrong to prevent newspapers from publishing
excerpts from the memoirs of a retired British Security Service
official after the book became available abroad. The Court
also ruled that the Government's original injunctions to stop
publication were justified on national security grounds before
the book appeared in the United States.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Except in cases of extreme civil disorder, in which public
safety is judged to be at risk, the authorities do not exercise
their statutory right to limit the freedom of public assembly.
The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1989 and the Northern
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1991 include sections
prohibiting membership in, or support of, organizations
involved in terrorism. These organizations are specifically
listed in the statutes. The lists do not include political
parties .
c. Freedom of Religion
Government policy and general practice ensure freedom of
worship, although the Government provides funds for the schools
of the established churches in England and Scotland but not for
those of other religions and denominations. In Northern
Ireland, the Government also funds denominational schools if a
sufficient demand for them exists.
In Northern Ireland, the Constitution Act of 1973 specifically
prohibits discrimination by public authorities on the basis of
religious belief or political opinion (see Section 5 concerning
the Fair Employment Act). There is no similar law in Great
Britain. There are no religious bars to holding public office.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
UK citizens enjoy freedom of movement within the country and in
foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. The Home
Secretary, however, may exclude from mainland Britain anyone
connected with terrorism in Northern Ireland unless that person
was born in Great Britain or has been resident there for 3
years. Similar authority is granted to the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland to exclude persons not native to or
resident in that province. In ordering exclusion, the
Secretary of State must only be "satisfied" that a person is or
has been involved in the commission, preparation, or
instigation of acts of terrorism. Currently 102 persons are
subject to such exclusion orders. Human rights groups have
objected to such orders because the evidence used is not tested
in any court .
Immigration rules require that all requests for asylum be
considered by the Home Office in accordance with the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Government
admitted in 1991 that some requests for asylum from Turkish
Kurds were incorrectly denied by immigration officers in 1990
and has taken action, including staff training, to prevent
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
future recurrences. In November the Court of Appeals found the
Home Secretary in contempt of court for failing to halt the
deportation of a Zairian asylum seeker despite the existence of
a "judicial undertaking" (i.e., a court order) that he not be
removed from the country. Legislation was introduced in 1991
to reduce misuse of asylum procedures by persons who have no
legitimate claim to refugee status. Human rights groups claim
that the legislation would undermine Britain's commitment to
provide haven for legitimate refugees.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Government is formed on the basis of a majority of seats in
the House of Commons, won in elections held at intervals not
longer than 5 years. Participation in the political process is
open to all persons and parties, of which there are several.
All citizens 18 years of age and older may vote.
Most British dependent territories have small populations,
under 60,000, and are ruled by appointed governors or
administrators assisted by executive councils (usually
appointed) and legislative assemblies or councils (partly
elected) .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In 1973 the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights was
established by the Government to monitor human rights in
Northern Ireland.
A number of international nongovernmental human rights
organizations, including Amnesty International, are based in
the UK. The Government cooperates fully with international
inquiries into alleged violations of human rights and usually
takes steps to rectify its own laws and policies when they are
found not to be in conformity with human rights agreements to
which it is a party.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
British law bars discrimination on the basis of race, color,
nationality, or national or ethnic origin and outlaws incitement
to racial hatred. (Racial discrimination is not specifically
outlawed in Northern Ireland.) A government-appointed,
independent Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) supports
persons taking court action under the Race Relations Act of
1976, provides guidelines on good practice, and may initiate
court action. After formally investigating complaints, the CRE
may issue notices requiring that discrimination cease. Such
notices are followed up over a 5-year period to ensure
compliance. A CRE code of practice on employment issued in
1984 encouraged many private companies to adopt equal
opportunity policies and some degree of voluntary monitoring.
Equal opportunity for women is provided by law. An equal
opportunity commission supports women who bring discrimination
cases, most of which are labor related, before the courts and
produces guidelines on good practice for employers. Large
companies have begun to revise job classification and pay
structures in an effort to achieve parity. Following legal
changes in 1990, married women pay taxes on an equal basis with
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
Other taxpayers. Women have equal property rights and equal
rights in the divorce courts.
Offenders in domestic violence cases are prosecuted and may be
imprisoned. Women's shelters provide refuge for battered
wives, and local governments provide counseling services. Rape
victims receive similar support.
There is no evidence of governmental discrimination on religious
grounds in the United Kingdom. In Northern Ireland, anti-
Catholic discrimination in employment stemming from a complex
range of historical and social factors persists. The majority
Protestant community controls much of the local economy and is
more prosperous than the Catholic community (a recent study
showed the average weekly income among Protestants was 18
percent higher than among Catholics).
Within the Northern Ireland civil service, the proportion of
Catholics under age 36 reflects their proportion in the
population, but they continue to be underrepresented in the
upper age groups and grades. Despite an overall increase in
employment in Northern Ireland, the Catholic male unemployment
rate remained 2.5 times that of Protestant men.
The Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act of 1989 is intended
to end employment discrimination and is aimed at outlawing even
unintentional or "indirect" discrimination. All public sector
employers and private firms with more than 25 workers must
register with the Fair Employment Commission, monitor the
religious composition of their work force, supply annual
monitoring reports to the Commission, and review their overall
employment practices at least once every 3 years. These
obligations will be extended to small firms (employing between
11 and 25 workers) beginning in 1992. Employers who fail to
comply face criminal penalties and loss of government contracts.
Although the vast majority of companies are in compliance with
the legislation, fines have been imposed on some firms for
violations. No criminal proceedings have been undertaken in
part because the Government focuses its efforts on getting
employers to comply short of court action. While the
legislation has been criticized by some for not proposing
"strong and effective provisions for targets and timetables,"
in general it has been praised by leaders of the Catholic
community. Government efforts to increase recruitment of
Catholics into the police force and related security fields
have been hampered by PIRA assassinations and death threats.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to form and join representative
organizations, associate freely, choose representatives,
publish journals, openly promote members' interests and views,
and elect representative assemblies to determine union policies
and procedures. Unions participate freely in international
organizations .
Unions are free from government control but must register their
accounts with a government-appointed trade union certification
officer. Senior union officers must be elected by secret
ballot. The law mandates secret ballots before a strike call,
prohibits unions from disciplining members who reject a legal
strike call, and allows individual trade union members to lodge
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complaints against their union with a government-appointed
commissioner .
There is no specific statutory "right to strike" in the UK.
Voluntary cessation of work may be considered a breach of
contract. A system of legal immunities which protected unions
from prosecution when engaged in lawful industrial action has
been narrowed by a series of acts of Parliament introduced in
the 1980 's. These acts have excluded secondary strikes and
actions judged to have political motives. Unions encouraging
such strikes are subject to fines by the courts and may have
their assets seized. The legislation also restricts the
ability of unions to act against subsidiaries of prime
employers with whom they are in dispute where the subsidiaries
are not party to the dispute and are the employers of record.
This has led to union complaints that they have no protection
against the transfer of work within the corporate structure,
making unions the victims of a form of employer secondary
action. The 1990 Employment Act made unions liable for all
industrial actions, including unofficial strikes, unless the
unions concerned write to strikers repudiating their action.
Unofficial strikers may be legally dismissed. In instances
where the right to strike is prohibited, e.g. , for police
officers, there are alternative means to resolve differences.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts
(COE) in 1989 and again in 1991 upheld complaints against
government bans on the disciplining by unions of members who
reject lawful strike calls and on union indemnification of
members and officers for sanctions imposed for engaging in
approved union activities. The ILO Committee on Freedom of
Association (CFA) called for changes in legislation to protect
workers taking industrial action following a case involving the
dismissal of 2,000 striking seamen. The Government has
contested the conclusions of the COE and CFA and in 1990
adopted legislation that the Trade Union Congress (TUC) alleges
violates ILO conventions by narrowing the range of situations
in which lawful industrial action may be taken.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is deeply rooted
in common law. There is no legal obligation for employers to
bargain with workers' representatives, nor have collective
bargaining agreements historically been legally binding or
enforceable in the courts, but collective bargaining is
extensive, involving over 10.2 million workers, or about 4 0
percent of the work force. It is illegal to deny a worker
employment on the grounds that he or she is or is not a union
member, except in the case of the armed forces, the police, or
the security services.
The 1984 ban on membership in national unions by employees of
the high-security Government Communications Headqijarters (GCHQ)
led to complaints being lodged at the ILO by the TUC. The CFA
and COE have affirmed that the ban and the dismissal of workers
retaining union membership are in violation of ILO Convention
87. The 1991 International Labor Conference expressed "deep
concern" at the continuation of the ban and at the unwillingness
of the British Government to enter into a dialogue with the
unions. The British Government maintains that its actions in
the GCHQ case fall within Convention 87 's exemption for the
armed forces and are also consistent with ILO Convention 151 on
labor relations in the public service.
50-726 - 92 - 42
1300
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
Workers who believe themselves victims of antiunion
discrimination may seek redress through industrial tribunals.
Remedies include payment of indemnities and reinstatement by
employers found guilty of discriminatory practices, although
reinstatement rarely occurs. A backlog of tribunal cases has
developed in recent years .
The COE has also questioned whether British legislation
adequately protects against denial of employment on the grounds
of past or present trade union activity. Evidence of
blacklisting was collected by a House of Commons' select
committee. In September 1991, press reports detailed one
organization's compilation and distribution of a list of 22,000
activists to prospective employers.
Following a breakdown and abolition by the UK Government of a
longstanding bilateral collective bargaining negotiating
process, teachers' pay and conditions have been unilaterally
determined since 1987 by the Secretary of State for Employment.
The COE concluded that these procedures are not compatible with
ILO Convention 98 on the right to organize and collective
bargaining. In 1991 legislation was adopted which provided
that teachers' pay and conditions should be determined by an
independent review body, which was appointed in September.
Export processing zones do not exist.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited in the UK and its
dependent territories and possessions and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
School attendance until the age of 16 is compulsory. Children
under that age are not permitted to work in an industrial
enterprise except as part of an educational course.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no legislated minimum wage. In some low-wage
industries employing approximately 2 million workers, wage
councils of employers and trade union members establish minimum
hourly wages and overtime rates for adult workers. Provisions
are legally enforced by a team of inspectors. Minimum wage
rates vary from industry to industry, but all are substantially
below the national average earnings figure. The UK does not
have a law limiting daily or weekly working hours.
The Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974 requires that the
health and safety of employees not be placed at risk. A Health
and Safety Executive (HSE) enforces health and safety
regulations and may initiate criminal proceedings. In 1990,
following a number of accidents, responsibility for railway
safety was transferred to the HSE. A health and safety
commission submits regulatory proposals to the Government,
appoints investigatory committees, and encourages research and
training. The UK system of occupational health and safety is
viewed as efficiently managed and operates with the full
involvement of workers' representatives.
1301
HONG KONG
Hong Kong, a small, densely populated British dependency, is a
free society with legally protected rights but without a broad
democratic base. Its constitutional arrangements are defined
by letters patent and royal instructions. Executive powers are
vested in a British Crown-appointed Governor who holds
extensive authority. Ultimate control over the territory,
however, rests with the United Kingdom Government. The
Governor, by convention, rarely exercises the full extent of
his powers. The Government is advised by an appointed
Executive Council. The legislature is only partially elected
by universal suffrage. The judiciary is an independent body
adhering to English common law with certain variations.
Fundamental rights ultimately rest on oversight by the British
Parliament. In practice, however. Hong Kong largely controls
its own internal affairs.
A well-organized civilian police force maintains public order
and respects the human rights of the populace.
Hong Kong's free market economy continued its transition toward
becoming a shipping, marketing, and finance center. It serves
as an investment center of trade with China and as a
communication and transportation hub for Asia. Per capita
gross domestic product increased by 3 . 6 percent in 1991 to a
projected $13,534 .
Several significant events in 1991 strengthened human rights in
the territory. In June the legislature passed a Bill of
Rights, modeled on the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Although it provided a 1-year "freeze"
period during which six laws relating to law and order are
exempt, the bill is already beginning to have a real impact on
the protection of human rights. The People's Republic of China
(PRO Government said it reserved the right to review the bill
after 1997 when Hong Kong reverts to Chinese sovereignty. For
the first time in the territory's history, voters went to the
polls on September 15 to directly elect — in free and fair
elections — 18 members of the new legislature. Nevertheless,
the directly elected members constitute less than a third of
the membership of the legislature. Fully representative
government employing universal franchise does not exist in Hong
Kong, and people do not have the power to change their
government. Liberal forces that swept the direct elections are
pressing for a faster pace of democratization.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports that such killings occurred.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of any disappearances .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other extreme forms of abuse are forbidden by law
and subject to punishment. Individual acts of police brutality
occurred. More than 1,600 complaints of "police assault" were
1302
HONG KONG
made in 1990, of which 29 were substantiated. Disciplinary
measures ranged from instituting criminal proceedings to
placing warnings in the offenders' service record. In January
a panel investigating allegations of police brutality at a camp
for Vietnamese boat people called for disciplinary action
against some of the officers involved. The police are still in
the process of reviewing the recommended sanctions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
British legal protections and common law traditions govern the
process of arrest and detention and ensure substantial and
effective legal protections against arbitrary arrest or
detention. Exile is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Hong Kong's judicial and legal systems are organized according
to principles of British constitutional law and legal
precedents and feature, inter alia, an independent judiciary
and trial by jury. The right to a fair public trial is
guaranteed and practiced. In September the Appeals Court
overturned several provisions of the Dangerous Drug Law which
presumed a defendant guilty until proved otherwise.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The right of privacy is generally respected and provided for by
law. However, the extraordinary powers of the Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) have been criticized by
some human rights groups. Vested with powers which are
normally exercised only by a judicial officer, the ICAC has
independent authority to issue arrest or search warrants, and
it operates on the assumption that any excessive, unexplainable
assets held by a civil servant are considered to be ill-gotten
until proven otherwise. The ICAC's extensive powers are
expected to be modified or changed as a result of the enactment
of the Bill of Rights.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
There is a tradition of free speech and press as practiced in
Great Britain. Numerous views and opinions, including those
independent or critical of the British and Hong Kong
Governments, are aired in the mass media, in public forums, and
by political groups. In January the High Court cleared on
appeal five activists who were convicted and fined in July 1990
for an earlier incident, during which they used megaphones
without permits to protest the PRC-drafted Basic Law, Hong
Kong's constitution after 1997, and to collect money without a
permit to help prodemocracy activists in China. In a decision
described as "an historic affirmation of the independence of
the judiciary," the Chief Justice admonished the Executive
Branch for abusing the court process.
Accusing the Government of bowing to pressure from China,
student activists criticized the Government for denying entry
to several overseas Chinese students holding valid visas to
attend a conference in July on democracy in China.
1303
HONG KONG
International media organizations operate freely in Hong Kong
but restrictions, rarely imposed, may be placed on the press
under several ordinances of Hong Kong law. Hong Kong media
representatives have expressed concern over the provision of
the 1988 film censorship ordinance that permits the censoring
of a film if the film would seriously damage good relations
with "other territorial units." A local arts center canceled a
film series examining the June 4 Beijing massacre. The films
were eventually shown under a different sponsor. Pressure from
China, as exemplified by a PRC political figure calling on the
Chinese courts to take legal action against the local media,
raised concern within the territory. A survey released in
September revealed that 69 percent of local journalists
believed press freedom would be curtailed after 1997. There is
also concern that self-censorship is rising when dealing with
China. According to the same survey, 23 percent admitted they
were apprehensive about criticizing China.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are practiced without significant hindrance.
The Government, on grounds of maintaining public order and
security, may impose controls on the route and time of
processions .
c. Freedom of Religion
Government policy and general practice ensure freedom of
religion .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Travel documents are obtainable freely and easily, subject to
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory practices. There is
freedom of movement within Hong Kong. Citing the Bill of
Rights, the courts struck down in July provisions that
prevented people from leaving the territory for nonpayment of
taxes .
Hong Kong citizens, though citizens of a British dependent
territory, do not enjoy the right of abode in the United
Kingdom (U.K.). In February, however, the Government accepted
applications for full U.K. citizenship in accordance with the
British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act of 1990 which was passed in
the wake of the heightened concern over the future of the
territory after the June 4 crackdown in Beijing. The Act
granted U.K. passports with the right of abode in Britain to up
to 50,000 heads of family and their dependents. More than
65,000 applications were received for the 43,250 places
available in the first phase of the program.
In response to the large outflow of boat people from Vietnam to
Hong Kong, the Government implemented a screening program for
all Vietnamese arriving in Hong Kong after June 16, 1988. It
detains new arrivals in prison-like centers until and unless
they are classified as refugees. Those whom the Government and
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) conclude are
not refugees remain in the detention centers until their
repatriation to Vietnam can be arranged in cooperation with the
UNHCR.
During 1991 new arrivals were still held in austere, crowded
detention centers. The Government continued a screening
process to identify genuine refugees. The UNHCR and interested
1304
HONG KONG
observers noted during the year that the Government had
substantially improved this process since the inception of the
program. In April, nine Vietnamese, who had challenged the
fairness of the screening procedures with a lawsuit, settled
the case in return for a second evaluation of their claim by
the Government. After the review, the Government recognized
two of the nine people as refugees. The remaining seven
persons asked the UNHCR to use its mandate to classify them as
refugees. The UNHCR had not made a decision by the end of the
year .
The year 1991 saw a renewed influx of boat people, fueling
local calls for the Government to take further measures to
address the problem. By the end of September 19,500 boat
people had arrived, bringing the total number to 64,870, equal
to more than 1 percent of the territory's population. Despite
the steady inflow of people during the year, the Legislative
Council, reflecting the desires of many Hong Kong residents,
refused to appropriate money to build new living quarters. The
result was increasingly crowded conditions in the existing
detention centers. Sporadic, internecine violence flared up in
the centers between rival gangs. The homicide rate increased
slightly over previous years. There were no significant acts
of government intrusion.
Over the summer months, government representatives engaged in
negotiations with the Vietnamese Government and the UNHCR in
Hanoi regarding the establishment of an internationally managed
holding center in Vietnam for those people who have been
finally classifised as nonrefugees. The Vietnamese rejected
the proposal but agreed to a renewal of mandatory repatriation
from Hong Kong.
On November 9, the Hong Kong Government carried out the
mandatory repatriation of 59 Vietnamese boat people who had
previously returned to Vietnam voluntarily and then traveled to
Hong Kong a second time. Several of the returnees resisted,
and unarmed police officers carried them aboard the plane. The
Hong Kong Government repatriated, without incident, 16 more
"doublebackers" on December 10, together with 12 Vietnamese
asylum seekers whose claim to refugee status had been denied.
The United States Government reiterated its opposition to the
forcible return of persons classified as nonrefugees and its
support for voluntary repatriation.
The Government maintained its 10-year policy of forcibly
returning Chinese citizens to the People's Republic of China,
except in rare instances in which a person qualified as a
refugee within the meaning of the U.N. Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees. Some human rights groups criticized the
Government on one occasion for repatriating a person to the PRC
despite his claim of having a well-founded fear of
persecution. During 1990 an average of 76 Chinese people,
mostly young men, were arrested and returned per day.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
While Hong Kong is a free society with most individual freedoms
and rights protected by law and custom, citizens of the
territory do not have the right to change their government.
The Governor is appointed by, and serves at the pleasure of,
the Crown. He is advised on policy by an appointed Executive
Council. Legislation is enacted and funds provided by the
Legislative Council, which also debates policy and questions
1305
HONG KONG
the administration. Though the Governor has the ultimate
control of the administration of Hong Kong, by convention he
rarely exercises the full extent of his powers. In practice,
decisions are arrived at by consensus.
Representative government employing universal franchise does
not exist. In a limited step toward a more democratic form of
government, voters on September 15 were able to elect for the
first time 18 of the 60 members of the new legislature. Of the
rest, 21 were either appointed by the Government or are
themselves government officials. Another 21 were elected by
functional groupings, e.g., lawyers. Critics charge that
functional constituencies disproportionately represent the
economic and professional elites and, moreover, violate the
concept of one person, one vote, since voters in functional
constituencies can vote both in a functional and a geographic
constituency. Liberal forces won 16 of the 18 seats and urged
the Government to approach China to increase the number of
directly elected seats in the next legislature to be elected in
1995. China refused to consider any increase.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no official barriers to the formation of local human
rights groups. The Government has consistently cooperated with
international and nongovernmental organizations on human rights
issues. The UNHCR and nongovernmental human rights
organizations have full access to Hong Kong's centers for
Vietnamese boat people. In April delegates from the
Government, as well as from local human rights groups, attended
and submitted status reports to a U.N. Human Rights Committee
hearing on Hong Kong which focused on the importance of
continued international monitoring of human rights after 1997.
A delegation from the International Commission of Jurists
arrived in June to conduct hearings on human rights. An
international delegation observed the September elections.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or, Social Status
The Chinese language has equal status with English in many
government operations. Enabling legislation passed in March
1987 provides for principal legislation to be enacted on a
bilingual basis. The Attorney General's Chambers, moreover, is
responsible for translating existing laws into Chinese.
Legislative Council proceedings are also bilingual. The
Government is continuing its efforts to place Hong Kong Chinese
in top administrative and policy positions but progress has
been slow, especially in the legal and police departments and
the judiciary.
The only legislation to protect the rights of battered women is
the Domestic Violence Ordinance, passed in 1987, which enables
a woman to take out a 3-month injunction on her husband. This
may be extended to 6 months. In addition, domestic violence
may be prosecuted as common assault under existing criminal
statutes. The Government enforces these laws and prosecutes
violators. Nevertheless, women's action groups are pressing
for better legal and government provisions for battered wives.
They called for public housing to house women as soon as they
leave their violent husbands. Figures for cases of battered
spouses known to the Government have been dropping over the
past 3 years from 433 in 1988/89 to 252 in 1989/90 and 228 in
1306
HONG KONG
1990/91. Admissions to two women's refuges, one operated by
the Social Welfare Department and the other by Harmony House, a
private voluntary agency, have not shown a dramatic increase.
The number of women admitted to Harmony House ranged from 166
in 1988 to 105 in 1989, 141 in 1990 and 164 in 1991. Figures
for the government-run refuge showed a similar trend: 126, 97,
139, and 136. Nevertheless, all sources say that many
instances of domestic violence are not reported, owing partly
to cultural factors which frown on exposing family crises to
the public eye, but also to a lack of well-publicized
information about assistance and resources available.
Women's groups complained that the Bill of Rights does not
adequately deal with sexual discrimination, including on pay,
employment, and inheritance. They urge that the International
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women be extended to Hong Kong. A controversial
amendment to force spouses to testify against their abusive
partners was defeated in the legislature in May. While a
number of women hold senior appointive government positions,
only two women were elected to the legislature.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of association and the right of workers to establish
and join organizations of their own choosing are guaranteed
under local law. Trade unions must be registered under the
Trade Union Ordinance. The basic precondition for registration
is that at least seven persons must serve in the same
occupation. Once registered, unions become corporate bodies
and enjoy immunity from certain civil suits involving breaking
of contingent contracts or interference with trade owing to
work stoppages by their members. Unions also have the right to
elect their own representatives, publicize their views, and
determine their own bylaws and policies in representing
members' interests. The Government does not discourage or
impede union formation. An amendment to the Trade Union
Ordinance in 1988 permits unions to maintain political action
funds which are restricted to local elections. During 1990, 23
new unions were registered.
Nonetheless, only about 439,000 workers (or 15.8 percent) out
of a total labor force of 2.8 million belong to one of the 494
registered unions. Apathy toward unionism on the part of
workers, reinforced by the Confucian cultural heritage and its
emphasis on family responsibility, is the principal reason for
this phenomenon.
Work stoppages and strikes are permitted. However, there are
some restrictions on this right for civil servants. Employees
hired on a contract basis may be fired for breach of contract
if they walk off the job. As of the end of November, work
stoppages resulted in the loss of 202 workdays.
Hong Kong labor unions may form federations, confederations, or
affiliate with international bodies. Any affiliation with
foreign labor unions needs the consent of the Government; no
request has been turned down.
As a dependent territory of the United Kingdom, Hong Kong is
not a member in its own right of the International Labor
Organization (ILO). The United Kingdom makes declarations on
behalf of Hong Kong concerning the latter 's obligations
1307
HONG KONG
regarding the various ILO conventions. To date Hong Kong has
implemented provisions applying 29 conventions in full and 18
others with modifications. In the Basic Law, China has
undertaken to continue to adhere to these conventions after
1997.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is guaranteed
under local law. Hong Kong laws pertaining to collective
bargaining cover mainly the shipping, textile, public
transport, public utility, and carpentry trades, and the
catering, construction, public service, and teaching
professions. Wages are usually set by employers on the basis
of market factors. While collective bargaining does take
place, it is not widely practiced, and in general there are no
mechanisms specifically to encourage it.
Hong Kong law does, however, provide for a system to handle
settlement of disputes. Free conciliation service is afforded
by the Labor Relations Division of the Department of Labor
(DOL) to employers and employees involved in labor disputes or
grievances. This division is charged with finding a mutually
acceptable settlement, although it does not have the authority
to impose a solution. According to the Government, the vast
majority of disputes are resolved with the assistance of this
division. If initial conciliation efforts are unsuccessful, a
dispute may be referred to arbitration with the consent of the
parties, or a board of inquiry may be established to
investigate and make suitable recommendations. Use of this
system is widespread. Workers are protected against antiunion
discrimination under Hong Kong legislation. Employees who
allege such discrimination have the right to have their cases
heard by the DOL's Labor Relations Division. Employers who
attempt to prevent or deter an employee from joining a labor
union, or who terminate an employee for joining a labor union,
are liable to a fine of approximately $650.
Individual labor claims are adjudicated by the Labor Tribunal,
a part of the judicial branch, which provides quick,
inexpensive machinery for resolving disputes arising between
workers and management over breach of contract, wages in lieu
of notice, or termination of service, arrears of wages, and
other claims relating to pay. The Tribunal complements the
conciliation service provided by the DOL's Labor Relations
Division.
There are no export processing zones in Hong Kong.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Existing labor legislation prohibits forced labor, and it does
not appear to be practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Under the Women and Young Persons Regulations and Employment
for Children Regulations, minors are allowed to do limited
part-time work in nonindustrial establishments beginning at age
13, subject to conditions aimed at ensuring a minimum of 9
years' education. They are allowed to engage in full-time work
at age 15. Employment of females under age 18 in
establishments subject to liquor regulations is prohibited.
The Labor Inspectorate conducts workplace inspections to ensure
that working hours conform to the law and that no persons under
1308
HONG KONG
the age of 15 are employed. During 1990 the Inspectorate
carried out 220,148 inspections of more than 21,818
establishments in industrial and nonindustrial sectors, which
resulted in 63 cases of child employment brought before the
courts. Some labor observers maintain, however, that
successful prosecution against employers who hire underaged
workers is rare, partly because of the inadequate number of
inspectors and partly because of the reluctance of workers to
testify against their employers.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no legislated minimum wage. Wage rates are determined
by supply and demand. In view of continued tightness in Hong
Kong's labor market (unemployment was 1.7 percent for the third
quarter of 1990), higher wages were offered to workers,
particularly in the construction industry and service sectors.
Many employees also enjoy a year-end bonus of a month's pay or
more. Some employers in the manufacturing sector provide
workers with various kinds of allowances, free medical
treatment, and free or subsidized transport.
The Women and Young Persons Regulations under the Employment
Ordinance control hours and conditions of work for women and
young people in industry. Hours of work are limited to 8 per
day and 48 per week between 6 a.m. and 8 p.m. for women and
between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. for young persons under age 19.
There are no legal restrictions on hours of work for men.
Overtime is restricted to 2 hours per day and 200 days per year
for women and is prohibited for all persons under 18.
The Labor Department's Factory Inspectorate promotes workers'
safety and health in industry through education, publicity, and
inspection in accordance with the Factories and Industrial
Undertakings Ordinance and subsidiary regulations. The
Inspectorate pays particular attention to safety in high-risk
areas of factories and construction sites. During 1990
inspectors visted 17,769 factories and 630 construction sites
and issued 870 svimmons. As part of a complementary effort, the
Department's Occupational Health Division investigates claims
of occupational diseases, conducts environmental testing in the
workplace, and provides medical examinations to employees in
occupations that involve the handling of hazardous materials.
Independent labor vinions maintain that the small number of
qualified factory inspectors is a longstanding problem.
1309
YUGOSLAVIA
The Yugoslavia of 1991 bears little resemblance to the one
established by the 1974 Constitution that set up a Federal State
comprising six republics (with two autonomous regions in the
republic of Serbia) and a collective Federal Presidency as the
supreme state organ. Effective civilian federal authority
collapsed in 1991 as the republics and various independence
movements decisively rejected that authority and escalating
ethnic animosities propelled the country into a vicious armed
conflict .
The Federal Government's attempts to introduce multiparty
elections at the federal level and to advance economic reforms
were blocked by republic governments. Several republics adopted
legislation and new constitutions that gave primacy to republic-
level rather than to federal laws and routinely ignored federal
legislation. Blocked by Serbia in their attempts to restructure
Yugoslavia as a loose confederation, the republics of Croatia
and Slovenia on June 25 declared complete independence and
sought international recognition. In walking out of the
Federal Assembly (legislature), they effectively denied it a
quorum. In October Serbia and its allies in the Federal
Presidency assumed the right to act in the name of the
Presidency and to take over the Federal Assembly's authority.
Federal Prime Minister Markovic, a Croat, lost effective power
and finally resigned in December after Serbian-dominated rump
federal institutions sought his ouster. In December Stipe
Mesic, the President of the Federal Presidency and a Croat,
resigned his office.
The breakdown of federal authority seriously compromised the
principle of federal civilian control over the Yugoslav National
Army (JNA) which, along with elements of other security and
police forces, technically remained under federal civilian
jurisdiction in 1991. After its nominal Commander in Chief,
the collective Federal Presidency, became paralyzed, the JNA
allied itself squarely with Serbian politicians in the armed
conflict with Croatia.
The size and activities of other military, paramilitary, and
police units increased dramatically in 1991, including those of
the Croatian army and the irregular units organized by Serbian
residents of Croatia. The outbreak of fighting between these
groups and the aggressive role of the JNA in support of these
Serbs led to many civilian casualties, the displacement of
hundreds of thousands of persons from the war-torn areas, and
widespread brutality and disregard of the Geneva Conventions
and other international norms .
In the economy, the workers' self -management system, which
purported to enable workers to run their own enterprises
through elected workers' councils, is being phased out. The
Federal Government's economic reform program, aimed at
converting to a market system and encouraging private
enterprise, started promisingly in 1990 but collapsed under
high inflation, plummeting production, and growing unemployment
that were aggravated by the fracturing of the economy along
republic and ethnic lines. The National Bank of Yugoslavia
resorted to printing money and extending large credits to the
Federal Government to finance its growing expenditures,
primarily to support the military.
Respect for human rights deteriorated drastically in the
deepening political crisis and the breakdown of civil order.
Extreme interrepublic and ethnic animosities and the spread of
1310
YUGOSLAVIA
armed conflict undid 1990 's promising advances in human rights
and brought about serious new human rights violations. The
armed conflict claimed thousands of lives by year's end,
including those of many civilian noncombatants . In the areas
most affected by the fighting, there were widespread and
credible reports of atrocities, including the massacre of
villagers, the killing of prisoners, the use of human shields,
and the taking of hostages. Such behavior was rarely punished.
Croats and Serbs both fled areas of Croatia that came under the
control of the other ethnic group.
In the autonomous province of Kosovo, Serbian authorities
intensified repressive measures against the majority Albanian
population, eliminating virtually all Albanian-language
schooling. They arrested and beat hundreds of Albanians on
trumped-up charges and suppressed the Albanian community's
attempt to organize a referendum on Kosovo's future. In March
Serbian police and army troops in Belgrade used force to repress
large-scale opposition demonstrations to demand the Serbian
government's ouster, resulting in two deaths and hundreds of
injuries .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Political killings occurred with increasing frequency in 1991,
spurred by violent rivalry between political and ethnic groups
and the breakdown in civil order. Serbs and Croats regularly
accused each other of "massacres" and "genocide" against
innocent civilians (see Section l.g.). While both sides were
prone to exaggerate for propaganda purposes and hard evidence
was often scarce, the statements of those fleeing the fighting
and other evidence make clear that many deaths resulted from
summary executions on ethnic or political grounds. For example,
some 80 Croatian residents of the town of Dalj were reportedly
massacred in August. At least 35 Croats, mostly elderly, in
the Croatian village of Vocin, were murdered and mutilated in
December, apparently by Serbian irregular forces. Displaced
persons alleged that in at least one instance Croatian
journalists who witnessed the killing of Croatian civilians by
Serbian irregulars were themselves executed. There were also
credible reports of Croatian forces killing unarmed Serbian
villagers in the Sisak area and in Sarvas . In a Croatian
village near Glina, Serbian irregulars reportedly murdered 21
Croatian civilians aged between 5 and 65; Serbian authorities
in the area acknowledged the incident and promised to
investigate. There is no reliable way to ascertain the number
of such killings.
In an armed conflict with constantly shifting battle lines and
weakening civil authority throughout the country, there were
numerous reports of killings in areas not related to the
fighting. For example, two Muslims were shot in Bosnia,
apparently by Serbs angered by Muslim resistance to
conscription. A number of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo died at
the hands of police or the army; nine ethnic Albanians residing
in a contested area of Croatia were reportedly murdered by
Serbian irregulars in November. Several Croatian policemen
were arrested in Pula in connection with the murder of a Serb.
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b. Disappearance
There were many reports of disappearances, particularly in the
areas of Croatia which experienced the heaviest fighting and
produced the greatest numbers of displaced persons. The
Croatian government reported at year's end that 30,000 persons
were missing in Croatia, a situation exacerbated by the chaotic
breakdown of communications links within and between republics.
This figure included not only Croats but also cases such as the
24 ethnic Serbs abducted by masked men in Gospic in October .
Two Soviet journalists disappeared in September and were never
located. In the Sandzak region of Serbia, six Muslim draft
resisters who were arrested in December are missing. More than
one hundred Croatian residents of the village of Hvun were
reported "disappeared" after Serbian irregular forces withdrew
from the area.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Yugoslav law forbids torture, but prisoners in many parts of
Yugoslavia are beaten and otherwise mistreated during arrest
and detention. This practice is most widespread in Kosovo,
where Serbian police engage in frequent and flagrant abuse of
people arrested on suspicion of participating in unsanctioned
activity. Hundreds of instances of Serbian police detaining
and severely beating ethnic Albanians were reported in 1991.
In the areas affected by armed conflict, there were convincing
reports that police, military, and irregular armed units engaged
in severe beatings of persons, sometimes resulting in their
deaths. There were credible reports that local Serbian forces
operating in Croatia routinely tortured their detainees,
including civilian noncombatants , using electric shocks.
Serbian political and community leaders were reportedly
regularly detained and sometimes beaten by Croatian police in
contested areas in order to intimidate the local Serbian
population. In August the Federal Minister of Agriculture was
detained and beaten by Croatian security forces while driving
in Croatia. Croatian President Tudjman condemned the attack,
but those responsible were not prosecuted.
In apparently only one instance were offenders prosecuted for
the excessive use of force. In Macedonia, two policemen were
arrested and charged with the death by beating of an ethnic
Albanian.
In Serbia antiwar activists and opposition figures received
death threats from known radical Serbian paramilitary groups.
Most of those detained and abused in the context of the armed
conflict were held in makeshift places of detainment which
often did not meet minimum humanitarian standards for life and
health as specified in the Geneva accords.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Yugoslav criminal law and legal procedures include many
provisions inconsistent with internationally accepted human
rights norms. The federal law allows investigatory detention
for up to 3 months, with a possible 3-month extension. Access
to prisoners in pretrial detention is sometimes restricted,
ostensibly to prevent interference with investigations.
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Arbitrary arrest continued to occur frequently in Kosovo in
1991. Ethnic Albanians were routinely and summarily sentenced
to 30 to 60 days in jail, often on misdemeanor charges of
"disturbing public order" on the basis of an unsupported
statement by a single policeman. Although the numbers affected
appeared to be lower than the thousands reported in 1990,
arrest and imprisonment in this manner continues to be frequent
in Kosovo. Under judicial procedures pertaining to
misdemeanors, a prisoner may appeal a conviction only after
sentencing, and, because of the time required to file the
appeal, the sentence is often completed before the appeal can
be heard. Because of the speed of the trial and sentencing,
defendants often cannot obtain legal assistance, although they
have the legal right to an attorney.
Arbitrary detention with little or no attention to procedural
safeguards occurred with growing frequency in the areas of
Croatia most affected by armed conflict. In numerous cases
Croatian authorities detained politically active Serbs, usually
for several hours or days, occasionally longer. For example,
Momir Lazic, a Serbian opposition leader in the Croatian city
of Karlovac, was arrested with three others in April and
released 1 day later. Lazic claimed he was beaten during
detention and pressed charges against the Croatian authorities.
In areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina which came under the
control of Serbian paramilitary and irregular units, virtually
no safeguards against arbitrary detention existed. These
units, together with Serbian police, regularly detained persons
without charge and without the safeguards of due process, such
as the right to a hearing and legal representation. Three
American journalists were so detained by the police of the
so-called Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina in May. After
the JNA captured the Croatian city of Vukovar in November, it
took over 2,000 prisoners, including children, medical
personnel, and clergy, and held them in a variety of
overcrowded facilities. Although many, including the doctors
from the Vukovar hospital and the women and children, were
eventually released, the JNA continued to hold a large number
of captured adult men. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
Yugoslav civilians were arbitrarily detained and denied due
process in these areas in 1991.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court system comprises local, district, provincial, and
supreme courts at the republic level, and a Federal Supreme
Court to which republic supreme court decisions may be appealed.
There is also a federal military court system. The
Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of laws and
regulations, but its rulings must be enforced by the republic
authorities, who in 1991 routinely ignored them. The republics
are obliged to follow federal criminal procedure, but the
Federal Government is powerless to compel them to do so.
Reforms proposed in 1991 to the federal system to provide for
due process rights in greater conformity with international
standards were not adopted because the Federal Assembly was not
functioning normally.
Under federal law, defendants have the right to be present at
their trials and to have an attorney, at public expense if
needed. The legal system, however, still contains numerous
inequities unfavorable to the defendant, regardless of whether
the offense alleged is criminal or political. The defense is
sometimes restricted in the time allowed to prepare its case.
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While the prosecution may call as witnesses whomever it wishes,
the defendant may only request the court to call witnesses, and
the court has complete discretion as to whether or not to honor
the recjuest . Prosecutors are allowed to appeal a verdict of
not guilty.
Although the major changes made in federal and republic legal
systems in 1990 provided greater due process protection, the
breakdown or nonfunctioning of legitimate authority and of the
rule of law in many parts of Yugoslavia resulted in widespread
denials of due process, particularly in those areas of Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina where ethnic Serbs declared local
autonomy and rejected republic authority over their regions.
These denials of due process and persecution for political
offenses extended to ethnic Serbs in opposition to the Serbian
group in power as well as to members of other ethnic groups.
Thousands of noncombatants were imprisoned in the context of
the armed conflict often but not always for relatively brief
periods and usually without any form of due process. In
October it was estimated that some 2,500 such persons, including
prisoners of war, were being detained at any given time.
Noncombatants were detained because of the ethnic group to
which they belonged, because of suspected political activities
or sympathies, or as hostages.
The judiciary is not free of political influence nor of ethnic
bias. In the republic of Serbia, provincial courts in Kosovo
and Vojvodina were closed, and some of their functions were
transferred to Belgrade. In Kosovo, ethnic Albanian judges
were replaced by ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins, who were said
by ethnic Albanians to be unqualified, inexperienced, and anti-
Albanian. Ethnic Albanians in the republic of Macedonia also
charged that courts there are often biased against them. In
September Nevzat Halili, leader of the largest ethnic Albanian
party in Macedonia, was sentenced to 60 days' imprisonment for
refusing to cooperate in the federal census, an accusation and
trial which occurred months after the census had ended. The
sentence was later reduced to a fine.
Offenses by those in the armed forces or offenses by civilians
deemed to affect national security are tried in the federal
military court system. In 1991 the Croatian Minister of Defense
and several other Croatian defendants were charged with national
security violations in connection with efforts to arm a Croatian
force. The Minister of Defense, with the support of the
Croatian government, evaded arrest. The other defendants,
tried in military court, alleged that they were not permitted
to have their lawyers present during interrogation nor to
inspect prosecution-held documents; they were convicted on some
charges .
Changes made in the federal criminal code by the Federal
Assembly in 1990 narrowed the definitions of statutes regarding
political crimes. Thanks to these legal revisions, a number of
long-term political prisoners were released in 1991. Yugoslav
federal sources claimed that the 15 still imprisoned were guilty
of acts of violence. Other sources estimated the number of
political prisoners in mid-1991 at several hundred, including a
large number of ethnic Albanians imprisoned on such grounds as
"endangering the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia."
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f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Government efforts to monitor opposition or dissident activity
and the widening military conflict brought about increased
arbitrary interference in private life in 1991. Although
federal and republic-level constitutions and laws, including
Serbia's, include restrictions on arbitrary searches, these
safeguards were often ignored, particularly in Kosovo and in
areas of Croatia and Bosnia experiencing the most severe civil
unrest. Authorities eavesdropped on conversations, read private
mail, and tapped telephones in some cases. For example, ethnic
Croats in Vojvodina, an autonomous province of Serbia,
complained that Serbian authorities there were tapping the
telephones of opposition party leaders and searching Croatian
households under the pretext of looking for weapons. Serbian
residents of some Croatian areas complained that Croatian
authorities conducted unlawful searches of Serbian households.
The pattern of frequent, arbitrary police raids on homes and
people in Kosovo continued in 1991.
Faced with growing resistance to callups for military service,
the JNA in 1991 increasingly resorted to extraordinary measures
to round up recruits, including nighttime sweeps of restaurants
and homes and, in some cases, impressment of eligible males who
had not received callup notices. The threat of mobilization
was used on numerous occasions to intimidate antiwar activists.
For example, Vojvodina antiwar leader Nedad Canak was arrested
and then turned over to the JNA for conscription, though he was
demobilized some weeks later. Draft resisters were threatened
with dismissal from their jobs and with sentences to extended
prison terms for draft evasion, as approved by the Serbian-rump
Federal Presidency.
As part of Serbia's plans after the armed conflict, Serbs
dislocated by the war have been resettled in the homes and farms
of Croats and ethnic Hungarians who fled when the JNA and
Serbian insurgents seized and occupied those areas. Serbian
officials in the occupied areas, asserting that the Croats and
ethnic Hungarians had abandoned their properties, state that
the owners will not be allowed to return to their homes.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Massive violations of humanitarian law occurred during the
armed conflict. The JNA was increasingly aggressive in using
its superior ground and air power on civilian targets. Its
disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force, including
heavy artillery and air strikes during the sieges of Vukovar,
Osijek, Dubrovnik, and other Croatian population centers
resulted in thousands of civilian casualties, severe damage or
destruction to Croatian cities and villages, and the
displacement of hundreds of thousands of residents. It was
estimated that between 5,000 and 10,000 people died in the
civil conflict in Croatia by December, many of them civilian
noncombatants . In Slovenia about 100 persons were killed,
including some 30 civilians, during fighting between the JNA
and Slovene irregular forces in July.
In many instances, forces involved in the conflict failed to
observe humanitarian standards, notably in the treatment of
prisoners. For example, in September Croatian forces near
Karlovac reportedly killed more than 10 JNA soldiers who were
attempting to surrender. Both Croatian and Serbian forces
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regularly beat prisoners. There were credible reports of
Serbian irregular forces using civilian noncombatants as human
shields. International observers reported widespread looting
of Croatian villages by Serbian irregulars and JNA reservists
in the Dalmatian hinterlands. In September the government-
controlled Belgrade television broadcast interviews with
Croatian prisoners of war. The families of JNA soldiers
residing in Croatia were threatened and at times used as
hostages by Croatian forces. Members of opposing ethnic groups
were captured and held as hostages for barter in prisoner
exchanges. These instances of hostage-taking were in violation
of humanitarian conventions. The Croatian blockade of JNA
garrisons in Croatia resulted in the denial of essential food
and supplies to some families and noncombatants.
Conventions protecting medical personnel and relief supplies
were not respected. A convoy of medical and food supplies for
the city of Vukovar, besieged by the JNA, was repeatedly
stopped in October, despite the agreement of all sides that it
should proceed. The convoy was fired upon, allegedly by JNA
forces. Another convoy, led by the French organization.
Doctors Without Borders, came under artillery attack while it
was evacuating patients. In a separate incident, a clearly
marked vehicle carrying delegates of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) was attacked by mortar fire. In several
instances, international cease-fire monitors were attacked. In
numerous instances, including in Vukovar, Osijek, Vinkovci, and
Karlovac, clearly identified hospitals were repeatedly and
apparently intentionally hit by JNA and Serbian irregular
artillery and air attacks. In October Serbian irregulars fired
mortar rounds at a clearly marked ambulance near Karlovac and
killed the doctor inside it.
During its June effort to reclaim control of border posts in
Slovenia, the JNA admitted to several incidents in which it
falsely used Red Cross markings on its vehicles. There is
convincing evidence that Slovenian forces fighting the JNA also
committed numerous offenses, including firing on JNA medical
personnel and denying wounded JNA soldiers access to medical
treatment .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Yugoslav federal and republic laws provide for freedom of speech
and press. Federal rules, laws, and institutions, however,
became increasingly irrelevant in 1991. With the outbreak of
the armed conflict, the governments of some republics enforced
tighter controls on the press, mainly over coverage of domestic
politics, the armed conflict, and allegations of human rights
abuses. Although press freedom varied substantially from
republic to republic, most areas of Yugoslavia generally had
less press freedom in 1991 than they did in 1990.
Serbian and Croatian television increasingly presented only
their government's interpretation of events. The federally
supported Yutel news network failed to get acceptable air time
(it was shown after midnight in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia)
before finally being taken off the air completely in four of
the six republics. In Serbian-controlled areas of Croatia,
Serbian or JNA forces systematically converted Croatian
television retransmitters to receive only Serbian television.
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Serbia adopted laws that increased its control over Serbian-
based media, including Belgrade Radio/Television. In August
numerous senior editors at Belgrade Radio/Television were
demoted or dismissed and replaced with Serbian ruling party ■
loyalists. However, despite government restrictions,
independent media in Belgrade, including Studio B television
and radio, B-92 radio, the major daily, Borba, and the weekly
newsmagazine, Vreme, offered alternatives to the government-
controlled media. Both B-92 and Studio B were temporarily shut
down by Serbian authorities for carrying live coverage of the
demonstration on March 9 (see Section 2.b.). Growing
nationalistic fervor gradually drew attention away from the
issue of press freedom in Serbia. Nationalist politicians and
government officials regularly accused the independent media of
being anti-Serbian.
The minority media in Vojvodina and Kosovo came under strong
Serbian pressure. In Vojvodina the Serbian government prevented
the distribution of a new independent Hungarian- language daily.
In Kosovo the leading Albanian-language daily, Rilindja,
remained closed because its editors refused to agree to
censorship by Serbian authorities as a condition for resuming
publication. The only nongovernment sources of news in Albanian
were magazines. In October several editors of Albanian-
language magazines were summarily sentenced to 60 days'
imprisonment on misdemeanor charges because they printed stories
citing announcements by the banned "Government of the Republic
of Kosovo. "
In Croatia the movement towards independence and the siege
mentality engendered by the armed conflict encouraged self-
censorship in all media. In October a new decree affording the
government greater potential powers over the press during
wartime was introduced. Despite this decree and reports of
government- imposed guidelines and loyalty oaths, the daily
newspaper in Split maintained an independent editorial line,
and major Zagreb dailies, including new newspapers such as
Globus, did criticize the Croatian government. Croatian
authorities took control of a newspaper in strife-torn Osijek
because of its critical editorial line. The independent weekly
Danas was subjected to apparently officially sanctioned
financial and editorial pressures.
In Montenegro the media remained under government control and
hewed to a progovernment line. The offices of the weekly
magazine. Monitor, the only significant independent publication,
were bombed in October; the perpetrator was not found. Titograd
television fired six journalists who had been contributing
articles to the magazine. Montenegrin writer Jefrem Brkovic
was charged in October with "stirring up racial hatred,"
apparently because of statements critical of the behavior of
Montenegrin reservists in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In Macedonia government influence on the media was not heavy-
handed although the government sponsors Macedonia Radio/
Television and the Nova Makedonija publishing house, which
prints the major daily paper and most Macedonian- language
magazines. A Bulgarian-language newspaper was reportedly denied
permission to publish in Macedonia. In Slovenia, government
control of news during the Slovenian-JNA conflict was an
effective tool in its campaign to get the JNA out of Slovenia.
As a result, many officials remained reluctant to abandon an
oversight role, particularly in television. The director of
Slovenia Television removed 14 journalists in September,
allegedly for political reasons. At the same time, however, a
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new, independent Slovenian television station began broadcasting
in 1991.
Although the major media in Bosnia-Herzegovina are under
government sponsorship, the three ethnically based political
parties continued to vie for control over them, and the Bosnian
courts acted to restrain them.
Academic freedom and autonomy are being threatened by
educational reform efforts that centralize decisionmaking in
the hands of government. During the summer, the Serbian
legislature announced a draft university law that appeared to
challenge the autonomy of universities. Serbian authorities
effectively denied higher education to most ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo in 1991.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Despite federal constitutional provisions for freedom of
assembly and similar provisions at the republic level,
permission for assemblies is often denied to opposition groups.
On March 9, Serbian police backed by army troops broke up an
unauthorized opposition demonstration in Belgrade, which
demanded initially the resignation of the head of Belgrade
television and later the ouster of the Serbian government.
Police and the army used tear gas, water cannons, and tanks to
disperse the crowd of 40,000 to 50,000; one teenager and one
policeman were killed and hundreds were injured in the violence.
However, Belgrade authorities subsecjuently allowed other
opposition gatherings, even those which had been officially
"banned. "
In Kosovo practically any gathering of ethnic Albanians is
likely to be broken up on the pretext that permission has not
been obtained from the Serbian government or that the gathering
has separatist aims. Serbian police routinely used tear gas
and clubs against entirely peaceful crowds of Albanian
demonstrators, causing hundreds of injuries and arrests through
the year. Serbian authorities did not interfere with a peaceful
opposition gathering of some 100,000 ethnic Albanians in June;
however, a gathering of some 8,000 ethnic Albanians in September
protesting Serbian educational policies at Pristina University
was broken up by police using firearms and rubber truncheons.
One demonstrator was killed. Police arrested several dozen
participants to curb widespread protests against Serbian
controls of local schools in October. On occasion, peaceful
demonstrations against the armed conflict, such as that
organized by ethnic Hungarian and Croatian residents of
Vojvodina in September, were broken up by police; at other
times, similar antiwar gatherings were permitted.
The legal basis for greater freedom of association, begun in
1990, remained in effect in 1991. In January 1991, there were
54 registered political parties in Serbia alone. The total for
all of Yugoslavia numbered over 200.
There are still, however, serious restrictions on freedom of
association under existing laws. The law against association
for the purpose of hostile activities has been used to prosecute
ethnic Albanians who advocate republic status for Kosovo. No
organizations that "stir up racial, ethnic, or religious hatred"
are permitted, and no one who has been convicted of a crime may
be a founder of a citizens' association. These provisions are
frequently used by Serbian authorities to restrict the
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activities of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The Serbian election
law denies registration to any party that does not accept the
territorial integrity of Serbia, a provision that is aimed at
Albanian political parties, almost all of which have sought
separate status for Kosovo within Yugoslavia but outside Serbia.
An ethnic Croatian political party in Vojvodina complained that
Serbian authorities had banned all public party meetings on
security grounds. The Serbian government declared illegal
referendums organized by opposition parties in Kosovo and
Sandzak. In Kosovo, 68 people were arrested in this connection,
and in Sandzak charges were filed against 5 political party
leaders. The Serbian authorities later moved to ban the
Sandzak-based party.
c. Freedom of Religion
In many respects, the substantial expansion in religious freedom
achieved in 1990 was consolidated in 1991. While Eastern
Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism, and Islam are the
largest faiths in Yugoslavia, there is also a Jewish community
of about 6,000 members and a small Protestant community which
includes various denominations.
There are few hindrances for religious believers who wish to
associate with their coreligionists elsewhere. Foreign clergy
work and proselytize in Yugoslavia, though they sometimes
experience difficulties in obtaining permits from the
authorities. Religious institutions are allowed to propagate
their beliefs and offer religious education. Soldiers are now
allowed to possess religious materials.
Religion is identified with ethnicity in Yugoslavia. In the
context of increasing ethnic animosities and armed conflict,
the nationalist governments which came to power in 1990 in the
republics have established close public ties with the dominant
religious establishments and usually discriminated against
minority religions. Senior Catholic and Serbian Orthodox
clerics have taken political stands in support of the Croatian
and Serbian government positions respectively. The minority
Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia has complained of official
discrimination in such areas as the issuance of building
permits. It has protested the lack of police protection
against the vandalism of its churches in Croatia, including in
some instances the use of explosives. There has been little
official effort to identify and punish those responsible.
Several Serbian priests in Croatia, including Bishop Lukijan of
Pakrac, were reportedly placed under house arrest or prevented
from performing their duties freely. In August the Jewish
community center in Zagreb was badly damaged by a bomb; the
Government responded promptly with promises to investigate
fully but by year's end had not identified the culprits.
The Croatian government reported i:: December that 223 churches
and monasteries in Croatia had been damaged or destroyed in the
war. In addition to instances of vandalism by Serbian irregular
forces operating in the area, the Croatian authorities accused
the JNA of intentionally targeting Catholic churches in
artillery and air attacks. Although the JNA denied this
allegation and charged Croatian forces with staging attacks from
churches and other civilian buildings, the testimony of numerous
reliable international observers suggested that churches had
been intentionally and repeatedly targeted. In July a Croatian
Catholic priest in the Serbian-held town of old Tenja in Croatia
reported he was held hostage by Serbian forces. Four Franciscan
priests were taken prisoner by the JNA when Vukovar fell.
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Catholics in Vojvodina claimed that Serbs who allegedly placed
a bomb in Subotica's Catholic Cathedral, though known to the
police, went unpunished.
The construction of new places of worship requires the consent
of local government authorities. Although in many cases
building permits for new religious facilities are now easier to
obtain, minority religions still face obstacles. The Islamic
community has had a request pending for years to build a new
mosque in Belgrade. In Split, a predominantly Catholic area,
the Serbian Orthodox Church has long had difficulty in getting
permission to complete its cathedral. For the most part,
federal and republic authorities have not returned properties
confiscated by the previous Communist regime, though in
Macedonia, for example, some properties have been transferred
to the Macedonian Orthodox Church.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides for freedom of movement within
Yugoslavia, but the conditions of armed conflict and other
factors have severely limited this right. Slovenia instituted
entry controls on the Slovenian-Croatian border in October
although it promised easy entry to holders of Yugoslav
documentation. Travel became increasingly difficult as the
Zagreb and Ljubljana airports were closed, JNA units blockaded
Adriatic ports, and various military forces shelled or
threatened roads and train lines in Croatia and Bosnia.
Yugoslavs generally do not require exit permits, and passports
are routinely available to most Yugoslavs. Yugoslav authorities
in 1991, however, stepped up efforts to prevent draft-age males,
particularly from Serbia, from leaving the country. In November
federal authorities announced that draft-eligible men would need
special permits to travel abroad. The Croatian government
introduced the requirement that all draft-age males obtain
permission before leaving their area of residence. Ethnic
Albanians, particularly those who are politically active,
continued to face restrictions on their ability to travel
outside Yugoslavia. In August JNA border guards shot to death
two Yugoslavs who were ethnic Albanians while they were
attempting to cross the border into Albania. In several other
cases, Yugoslav border guards killed or wo\inded persons along
the Yugoslav-Albanian border, in one instance shooting an
Albanian border guard and leaving him to bleed to death.
Reentry into Yugoslavia by Yugoslav citizens has not usually
been a problem. Reports in 1991, however, indicate that ethnic
Croats and Hungarians who had sought temporary refuge in Hungary
from fighting or ethnic discrimination in Croatia and Vojvodina
were at times prevented forcibly from returning to their homes.
Refugees from Croatia interviewed in Hungary asserted that in
some instances the population of entire villages of ethnic
Hungarians or Croats had been forced at gunpoint by JNA or
Serbian forces to board buses to take them out of the country.
The law on the entry of foreigners into Yugoslavia provides a
process for granting permanent asylum and for government
assistance to persons granted that right. In practice,
Yugoslavia almost never grants permanent asylum or provides
assistance to refugees. In 1991, however, Yugoslav federal and
republic authorities decided to grant refugee status to about
2,000 Albanians of Montenegrin and Macedonian ethnic origin.
In general, it continued to be Yugoslav policy to extend only
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temporary asylum to refugees who, with the assistance of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) , seek permanent
resettlement in third countries. During the first 8 months of
1991, the UNHCR recognized as genuine refugees 770 asylum
seekers, 716 of whom were from Albania.
All asylum seekers who are caught entering Yugoslavia without
passports or visas serve a 1-month jail sentence for "illegal
border crossing" and are "prescreened" by Yugoslav authorities
before being presented to the UNHCR. In January 1991 alone,
the Yugoslav authorities forcibly returned 368 Albanians to
their country of origin without reference to the UNHCR,
including several who had been already approved for the U.S.
refugee program. The UNHCR expressed its concern to the
Yugoslav Government about these returns, as well as about the
absence of procedural or legal safeguards during the Yugoslav
"prescreening" process. Also of concern were credible reports
that refugees were beaten, some of them seriously, by Yugoslav
police.
At year's end, nearly 600,000 persons had been displaced by
ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia. They were predominantly ethnic
Serbs and Croats from contested areas of Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina but also included ethnic Hungarians and other
minorities fleeing towns and villages where another ethnic
group had secured a dominant position. An estimated 40,000
Yugoslav citizens, mostly ethnic Croats and Hungarians, were
estimated to have taken refuge in Hungary. The rest of the
600,000 displaced persons remained within Yugoslav borders.
The ICRC and the UNHCR assisted governments of the republics in
providing for these persons, over two-
thirds of whom are women and children.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change their Government
All six constituent republics were headed by leaders elected in
republic-level multiparty elections held in 1990. International
observers found all of these elections, with the exception of
those in Serbia, to have been consistent generally with
democratic rules and procedures. In Serbia, Croatia, and
Montenegro, the republic presidents held extensive executive
power. In Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia, power-
sharing among ethnic groups or with the legislature made for a
more diffused decisionmaking process. Serbs in Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina declared autonomous enclaves independent of
the republics.
Abusing the 1974 constitutional provision giving the autonomous
provinces an equal voice in the collective Presidency, Serbia
installed its own choices to represent Kosovo and Vojvodina and
used these votes, together with the regular support of
Montenegro, to exercise a decisive blocking role in the
Presidency. The Serbian-led bloc in the Presidency sought in
May to deny Croatian representative Stipe Mesic his turn as the
head of the rotating Presidency. Under intense domestic and
international pressure, Mesic was finally seated. After the
opening of the armed conflict, Slovenia and Croatia walked out
of the Presidency. Mesic declared several months later that
the JNA was acting in Croatia not at the behest of the
Presidency but on its own and that a de facto coup had taken
place. In October the Serbian-led bloc created a rump
Presidency by altering procedural rules concerning quorums and
the number of votes required for decisionmaking. The Croatian,
Slovenian, Bosnia-Herzegovinian, and Macedonian representatives
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refused to participate in the rump Presidency and denied its
legitimacy, as did Federal Prime Minister Markovic and a number
of foreign governments. In December Mesic resigned as President
of the Federal Presidency, and in a separate action Markovic
resigned as Federal Prime Minister.
Although there is legal equality of the sexes under Yugoslav
law, informal and customary barriers exist to women's
participation in politics. There is less female participation
in the leadership of the governments of the new republics than
existed under the federal regime.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Over 24 human rights organizations are registered at the
federal and republic levels. Some are considered political
parties; many concentrate on specific ethnic or minority rights
issues. According to Yugoslav human rights leaders, the
activities of these groups in 1991 suffered not so much due to
government repression as to problems related to the breakdown
of communications between the republics and to personal
financial hardships as a result of the Yugoslav economic
collapse. In the latter part of the year, as human rights
groups in Serbia became increasingly identified with the
antiwar movement, pressures against them increased. Several
antiwar and human rights activists were told that military
mobilization notices had been issued to them, and at least one
person was actually "selectively" conscripted. There were also
instances of death threats and vandalism against individuals
and facilities, which went unpunished by the Serbian police.
Federal and republic authorities generally accepted and often
welcomed investigations by international human rights groups.
A rapporteur mission from the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe arrived in Yugoslavia in December and
traveled throughout the country, meeting with federal and
republic-level officials as well as opposition and human rights
figures. They sought the assistance of the ICRC in dealing
with displaced persons and cooperated in ICRC prison visits to
political prisoners. After initial reluctance, the Serbian
government and the JNA accepted the European Community's
Observer Missions in Yugoslavia, and the Croatian President
repeatedly pledged that he would welcome international
monitoring and implementation of guarantees for Serbs living in
Croatia.
Several governments of republics established human rights
offices; Croatia's parliamentary committee for human rights was
increasingly active. These governments, sensitive to criticism
of their human rights records, accused human rights advocates
of disloyalty for questioning official commitment to human
rights. Ethnic Albanian human rights activists in Kosovo are
routinely harassed by police.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Federal Constitution of 1974 provided that each of the six
"nations" of Yugoslavia — Serbian, Croatian, Slovene, Muslim,
Macedonian, and Montenegrin — should be the majority nation in
its republic. It also provided for two autonomous provinces
within the repxiblic of Serbia — Kosovo and Vojvodina — in which
the Albanian, Hungarian, and other minorities would enjoy broad
1322
YUGOSLAVIA
individual and group rights. In Kosovo where the Albanians
totaled more than 90 percent of the population, Albanians
controlled the Communist party and government. In Vojvodina
Hungarians and Romanians were among the minorities with the
right to have schools in their languages, as well as their
newspapers, cultural associations, and radio programs.
Since 1989 the Serbian republic's policy has been to take away
the powers of the Kosovo government from the Albanians and to
assert Serbian domination over all aspects of life. This policy
has led to unrestrained discrimination against Albanians in
every area, including medical care and social services,
employment, and education. In 1991 at least 430 professors and
other professional staff were dismissed from Pristina University
on a variety of pretexts, including charges of using the
Albanian language for official work. Most of Kosovo's
Albanian-language primary and secondary schools were closed
because Albanian teachers (who are mostly Muslim) refused to
implement the Serbian republic's curriculum, which mandates the
teaching of Serbian and Christian Orthodox cultural themes. At
least 6,000 Albanian teachers have been fired for this refusal.
Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro also suffered
discrimination in education and political expression. Albanian
human rights activists claimed that scores of Albanian youths
serving in the JNA died under unexplained and suspicious
circumstances in 1991.
The rights of ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina came under pressure
from Serbian authorities who denounced ethnic Hungarian
publications and political groups as "anti-Serb." The
publication of the Hungarian- language weekly Magyar Szo was in
question, and Hungarian- language radio programs on Novi Sad
radio were canceled. In August Serbia introduced a new language
law which gave the Serbian government added power to restrict
the use of minority languages, including Hungarian and Albanian.
Reports of discrimination against Serbian residents of Croatia
increased in 1991. Ethnic Serbs working at nongovernmental
jobs who refused to sign loyalty oaths to Croatia were often
fired. Vandalism and violence against Serbs and their property
in Croatia also increased. Although Croatian authorities
investigated many such incidents and the state insurance company
paid claims on them, culprits were almost never identified and
punished. The Croatian government also imposed special, higher
taxes on property in Croatia owned by residents of Serbia, while
properties and businesses in Serbia owned by Croats and Slovenes
were seized and their assets frozen. There were allegation of
mass dismissals of Serbs in Croatia on ethnic grounds; although
some dismissals did appear to have occurred on ethnic grounds,
Croatian authorities claimed that in most cases they were for
cause or were due to the economic downturn. In December the
Croatian parliament passed a sweeping law granting increased
autonomy to communities of ethnic minorities in Croatia;
implementation of that law, however, was in large part
impossible due to the war and the loss of Croatian governmental
control over the affected areas.
Gypsies have complained that the rights extended to other
minorities have not been extended to them. Gypsies in
Yugoslavia do appear to suffer discrimination in employment,
social services, and education. There is a Gypsy cultural
organization, and the president of the World Romany Federation
is a Yugoslav Gypsy. In Macedonia, there is a Gypsy political
party with one representative in the legislature.
1323
YUGOSLAVIA
The Federal Constitution provides for the equality of citizens
regardless of sex. However, increasing rates of unemployment
throughout Yugoslavia and insufficient social welfare programs
due to the economic crisis affected women disproportionately.
Increasing public attention is being paid to the problem of
violence against women. Hotlines operating a few hours a day
exist for battered women in major Yugoslav cities. Legal
penalties for spouse abuse are the same as those for assault on
other persons, but the abused spouse must file a complaint, and
this is seldom done. There are feminist groups in the larger
cities of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia campaigning for
improvement in women's rights.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers, except military personnel, are entitled to form or
join unions of their own choosing without prior authorization.
National statistics for 1991 on the size of the organized work
force are not reliable. In the past, the Federal Government
claimed that the majority of the work force was enrolled in the
formal trade union system, with dues being automatically
deducted from workers' salaries. Workers are no longer formally
obligated to register with and pay dues to the official unions.
However, many do so because of the advantages of some material
benefits and the pressure to conform.
Given the breakdown of the federal system, the national labor
federation, the Council of Independent Trade Unions of
Yugoslavia (CITUY), has increasingly become an empty shell as a
federal body. While it is organized by republic and by industry
and in theory each republic and autonomous province has two
seats on the Federal Council of the CITUY, Croatia and Slovenia
no longer send representatives. Just as the federal structure
has come increasingly under Serbian domination, the CITUY has
grown close to the Serbian government and the Socialist Party
of Serbia.
New trade unions were formed in 1991 as the centralized national
federation structure eroded. Workers, both in blue-collar and
white-collar workplaces, left the progovernment CITUY or its
successor republic-level organizations and formed independent
local and republic trade unions, particularly in Slovenia,
Croatia, and Serbia. In July a group of independent workers
announced the formation of a trade union central called the
Independent Branch Trade Unions of Serbia (IBTUS), better known
as Nezavisnost (Independence), which includes independent
teamsters, journalists, metalworkers, university workers,
teachers, and others who left the Council of Independent Trade
Unions of Serbia. Individual managers and enterprises often
coerced or fired workers attempting to participate in such
organizing activities. Nezavisnost President Bronislav Canak,
a journalist at Belgrade Radio-Television, was threatened with
suspension from his job, and about 25 other Nezavisnost
activists were fired from other enterprises for their union
activities .
In Kosovo it is difficult to distinguish between discrimination
against an ethnic group and against a trade union. Although
the Federal Government formally recognized the Independent
Trade Unions of Kosovo (ITUK) in May, the new organization
continued to face huge barriers at the local level in
representing a work force that suffered from official repression
1324
YUGOSLAVIA
and repeated mass dismissals on ethnic grounds. Serbian
"special measures" have generally included suspension of
workers' councils and elimination, or at least severe
restriction, of the right of workers to engage in normal trade
union activities. ITUK officials and activities have frequently
been subject to harassment by the authorities. For example, in
September two ITUK officials were sentenced to 60 days in
prison, in part for trade union activities. It was estimated
in October that some 50,000 Kosovo Albanian families were
without a wage earner and that total dismissals of Albanian
workers exceeded 75,000.
The right to strike is recognized and was widely exercised
throughout Yugoslavia. Some 95 percent of strikes in Serbia
were said to be legally organized, that is, in compliance with
the Serbian law which requires a 30-day notification and limits
strike activities to the affected enterprise.
In June some 45,000 metalworkers in Bosnia-Herzegovina walked
off their jobs to demand payment of guaranteed wages and tax
relief for ailing industries. They were later joined in
solidarity strikes by other metalworkers (130,000) and some
150,000 in construction, transportation, and woodworking
industries, as well as by 35,000 teachers. Their protest ended
following government promises of salary support and economic
changes .
The CITUY, which abandoned the Moscow-dominated World Federation
of Trade Unions decades ago, has observer status in the World
Confederation of Labor and has applied for membership in the
European Trade Union Confederation. The new republic
federations, particularly in Slovenia and Croatia, state they
no longer wish to have federal organizations represent them
internat ional ly .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Western-style collective bargaining does not yet exist in
Yugoslavia. A 1989 law on labor relations introduced the
concept of "collective agreements" to be negotiated between the
unions and the semiofficial Chambers of Economy, but unions
found it difficult to identify the authorities with management
responsibility for negotiating contracts. Questions persist as
to the enforcement of such contracts or agreements, property
ownership, and the independence of management. Wages are set
generally at the factory or enterprise level by workers'
councils representing management and labor. Each job is graded
by "points" and salaries arranged hierarchically. Protection
for unions is provided by both federal and republic laws,
which, however, have not caught up with the recent changes.
Yugoslavia is now in transition from its old system of "official
unions" to a mixed one in which new independent groups of
workers exist alongside the old "reformed" organizations.
Ethnically based dismissals and persecution of union activists
remain problems.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Federal Constitution prohibits forced labor, and this
prohibition appears to be respected.
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YUGOSLAVIA
d. Minimum Age for the Employment of Children
The minimum age for child labor is 16, although in village and
farm communities, younger children often assist with family
agricultural obligations. Enforcement is carried out by the
Federal and republic Secretariats for Labor, Health, and Social
Policy.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wages are guaranteed by federal law, but there were
many instances in 1991 in which workers were not paid their
wages on time or in full and waited several months before
receiving their salaries. These arrearages occurred frequently
in both the private and public sectors. The official workweek
is listed as 42 hours. During the economic slowdown in 1991,
however, a number of enterprises, actually operated for fewer
hours. Enterprise work forces are also often divided into "A"
and "B" lists and "platooned" on a 2-week schedule in order to
reduce costs. There are generous sick leave and vacation
benefits.
Yugoslavia has extensive federal and republic laws and
regulations on occupational health and safety. Enforcement of
work safety rules, however, is lax.
1326
AFGHANISTAN*
The current regime in Kabul derives its political power from a
coup in 1978, the 1979 Soviet invasion, and — following the
withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 — massive military and
economic support provided by the U.S.S.R. through the end of
1991. The regime continues to face armed opposition from
mujahidin guerillas, supported by most of the population. The
regime controls the capital, Kabul, other major urban centers,
and garrisons to protect them. Some roads are open to military
movement by well-protected convoys. Over the past year the
regime has lost military control of some territory.
The keystone of President Najib's control is the Ministry of
State Security (WAD), which he headed before taking supreme
power. WAD is responsible for internal security functions in
regime-controlled areas. Besides its intelligence and secret
police functions, WAD controls sizable military forces. It is
responsible for serious, widespread human rights abuses.
Since 1978, over 1 million people have been killed and many
more maimed and wounded in the war, principally by regime and
Soviet air strikes, artillery and missile bombardment, and
landmines. Five million people, one-third of Afghanistan's
prewar population, have become refugees, primarily in Pakistan
and Iran, with at least a million more displaced internally.
During 1991 the regime stepped up its practice of bombing
civilian areas in response to mujahidin attacks.
The Afghanistan resistance political leadership is fragmented
among several major groups; most power in the countryside is
held by local military commanders and traditional leaders who
are nominally affiliated with these groups but not answerable
to them. The resistance continues to be plagued by
occasionally bloody rivalries. The Afghan Interim Government
(AIG), composed of the heads of some resistance parties, has
ceased to have any credibility or effectiveness.
Continuing international efforts to promote a settlement of the
Afghan conflict, the U.N. Secretary General on May 21 issued a
Statement of Principles for a political settlement that was
acceptable to outside interested powers, the regime, and many
resistance groups. It calls, inter alia, for a transition
process leading to a broad-based government for Afghanistan.
In a joint statment on September 13, the United States and the
Soviet Union pledged to discontinue arms supplies to all sides
by January 1, 1992, and to support U.N. efforts to promote a
political solution to the war.
The Afghan economy is agricultural, with land tenure in the
hands of individuals or family/tribal groups. An
entrepreneurial/trading class and some small-scale
manufacturing exist. The regime attempted, unsuccessfully, to
impose a centralized, planned economy in the Communist mode
until 1990, when it modified its Constitution to allow economic
liberalization. In resistance-controlled areas, economic
activity continues along traditional lines, but it has been
greatly affected by the devastation of the war.
*Since the staff of the American Embassy in Kabul was withdrawn
for security reasons in January 1989, the United States has had
no official observers in Afghanistan. This report therefore
draws to a large extent on unofficial sources.
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AFGHANISTAN
In practical terms, despite some largely cosmetic reforms in
the laws and Constitution adopted in 1990, virtually all of the
main categories of human rights remain restricted by the
regime. The number of political prisoners remains at about
3,000. In areas outside regime control, there are somewhat
fewer restrictions on personal freedoms, although there have
been credible reports that some resistance groups have
attacked, tortured, killed, or imprisoned persons, Afghan and
foreign, opposed to their programs.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Arbitrary killing and other acts of violence against suspected
opponents of the Kabul regime continue to be reported. Regime
forces and some resistance groups execute prisoners in the
field. Attempts, some of them successful, were made on the
lives of prominent Afghans in Pakistan during 1991, continuing
a practice of previous years. Some of those attacked were
political figures, while others were involved in refugee
assistance programs. These attacks have been ascribed to WAD
agents as well as to some resistance groups, particularly
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar ' s Hezb-i-Islami party, trying to intimidate
their opponents. Threats directed at moderate Afghans and
Afghans working for Western organizations in Pakistan increased
in 1991. Pakisteini authorities investigated these cases but
have not made arrests .
b. Disappearance
Afghans arrested by the regime for political offenses in effect
"disappear" as their families are usually not informed and
often do not receive official notice for months. Frequently,
young males are impressed into the military service off the
street without notification of families. Some persons also
disappear as a result of the action of resistance groups, who
have abducted or captured regime military and civilian cadre,
suspected regime collaborators, and Western aid workers,
several of whom were kidnaped and held for extended periods in
Afghanistan in 1991. Kidnapings of refugees in Peshawar,
Pakistan, continued during 1991. Most prominent was that of
Abdul Rahim Chenzai who was abducted in broad daylight on July
9 and was still unaccounted for at the end of the year.
Chenzai was a vocal supporter of a renewed political role for
former King Zahir Shah and a critic of Hekmatyar ' s
Hezb-i-Islcimi party, which is widely believed responsible for
this and other kidnapings.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or P\inishnient
As in previous years, there were reports of torture by regime
authorities to extract information or confessions, although
such activity is forbidden by the Constitution. Techniques
include beating, electric shock, and immersion in water.
Threats of abuse against family members and prolonged sleep
deprivation are typical forms of psychological torture. Some
victims of regime torture, later freed, have reported mental
disturbances resulting from their treatment in regime prisons.
The various resistance groups maintain prisons, both inside
1328
AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan and in refugee camps in Pakistan, reportedly
holding several thousand people. There are reports that some
groups keep their prisoners in overcrowded conditions and
routinely subject them to torture. There is no access for
Westerners to these facilities in Pakistan. The resistance
groups most frequently linked to these prisons and cited for
poor prisoner treatment are Hezb-i-Islami (Hekmatyar),
Hezb-i-Islami (led by Yunis Khalis), and the Ittihad-i-Islami .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Although the state of emergency has been lifted by the regime,
legal safeguards to prevent arbitrary arrest or detention in
regime-controlled areas are weak, and are ignored in state
security cases. Afghans continue to face seizure by regime
security personnel for vaguely defined antistate activities.
Often, arrests are made without warrants, although the
Constitution forbids detention without permission of the
court. Detainees often are held incommunicado. Although bail
is sometimes granted, it is not a standard feature of the
regime's legal procedures. Formal charges may come only after
months of interrogation. The regime now permits the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit
convicted prisoners. The ICRC does not yet have access to
detainees awaiting trial or under interrogation who are under
the authority of WAD.
Resistance groups detain regime personnel for extended periods,
and several groups operate prisons inside Afghanistan or within
refugee camps in Pakistan, which are used to hold political
opponents. The ICRC has tried to reach agreement with
resistance commanders to allow for visits to prisoners held in
Afghanistan. Some commanders, but not all, permit ICRC visits
to prisoners. The ICRC has had some access to Soviet and
regime prisoners of war held by the mujahidin.
The regime does not use exile as a form of punishment. In 1991
it restored the citizenship of former King Zahir Shah, who has
been living in Rome since he was deposed by a coup in 1973, and
several of his family members.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Most persons accused of nonpolitical crimes are tried in the
ordinary criminal court system under the provisions of judicial
codes in existence before the coup of 1978. Those political
detainees who are charged and brought to trial are usually
arraigned on allegations of antistate activities and are tried
and sentenced in secret. Political prisoners are held in
isolation for an initial period of interrogation lasting up to
several months. As a rule, the accused must provide their own
defense, without benefit of counsel.
The Constitution calls for presidential review of death
sentences. There is no judicial procedure to appeal a death
sentence. In areas not controlled by the regime, civil and
criminal cases are tried by Islamic judges (qazis) and
community elders under Shari'a (Islamic) law and according to
Afghan custom. There are credible reports that trials of
Afghan prisoners by resistance parties do not conform to
internationally recognized standards of fair trial.
An unknown number of Sov^iet prisoners, captured prior to the
withdrawal, are still being held by the resistance in the hope
of exchanging them for prisoners held by the regime and.
1329
AFGHANISTAN
resistance groups claim, by the U.S.S.R. The Soviets deny
holding any mujahidin prisoners.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution forbids arbitrary search of residences.
However, regime forces routinely sweep through residential
areas to arrest suspected resistance members and confiscate
property, including homes. Telephones are frequently tapped
and correspondence monitored.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
During 1991 the Kabul regime continued high altitude bombing,
artillery bombardments, and frequent launches of powerful but
inaccurate Scud and Frog surface-to-surface missiles. Attacks
were particularly heavy in areas in the northeast and around
the town of Khost, which fell into resistance hands during the
year. There were substantial but unknown numbers of civilian
casualties. Significant civilian casualties also have resulted
from rocket attacks by the resistance against targets in
regime-controlled urban areas. Resistance leaders assert that
they strive to minimize civilian casualties.
Millions of landmines emplaced by the Soviets or regime forces
remain around fortifications or scattered near roads and in the
countryside. Mines have also been sown by resistance groups.
There is a U.N. -sponsored program to detect and remove mines,
but the devices will pose a significant hazard to civilians for
years to come. In spite of regime media campaigns, little has
been done by the Soviets or the regime to remove mines or help
the U.N. accomplish the task.
Regime forces and some resistance groups have been reported in
the past to execute prisoners in the field. During 1991 this
practice was not reported after resistance defeats of regime
forces, although prisoners numbered in the thousands in some
cases. There were reports of execution of prisoners taken
during fighting between mujahidin factions in Konar province.
There were increased security problems for humanitarian
assistance workers inside Afghanistan, including kidnapings,
attacks, and hijacking of goods, which forced most humanitarian
assistance organizations to reduce their programs in
resistance-controlled areas of Afghanistan.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
There are indications of some marginal improvement in press
freedom under the Kabul regime. While the Constitution
contains provisions for freedom of expression, the regime
tolerates little criticism in the public media, and private
criticism can result in detention and arrest. Most media are
owned and controlled by the regime. Those that are not are
closely regulated, although criticism of the Government, within
very narrow limits, is increasingly allowed. The regime's
determination to keep the press under its control was
demonstrated in July when it closed a biweekly newspaper and
arrested its editor, Ghulam Sakhi Ghairat, for attempting to
publish an interview with a resistance commander. He
reportedly was released following protests and appeals by other
1330
AFGHANISTAN
writers. The major media, including all broadcast outlets, are
devoted to conveying the regime's policy and interpretation of
world events. Although resistance groups have little ability
to control media content, some Afghans in Pakistan avoid public
criticism of fundamentalist groups for fear of being attacked.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
In spite of constitutional guarantees, there is no effective
freedom of peaceful assembly and association in regime-
controlled areas. The Constitution was amended in 1990 to
allow a multiparty political system, but genuine opposition
groups still have not emerged. Nine parties registered in
coalition with the ruling party are, by and large, front
organizations and are not taken seriously by Afghans. The
Kabul-based National Salvation Society, formed in 1989 by
former high-ranking officials of pre-1978 governments,
continues to seek international support for a peace
settlement. However, it remains a small, poorly funded
interest group, neither possessing nor seeking mass support
among Afghans in regime-controlled areas. In September a party
called the Movement for the Freedom, Democracy, and Unity of
Afghanistan was established. A rally it held in support of an
open political process in November was broken up by security
forces. Political demonstrations are occasionally staged by
the regime on behalf of its positions. The regime strictly
controls any other type of assembly, forbidding criticism of
the President or the Constitution.
c. Freedom of Religion
The population of Afghanistan is overwhelmingly Muslim.
Afghans' constitutional right to worship in regime-controlled
areas is normally honored. The Constitution was amended in
1990 to identify Afghanistan as an Islamic state. The regime
seeks to broaden its popular support through evocation of
Islamic themes and symbols and support for mosques and
religious schools, although this is seen by most Afghans as a
cynical ruse. Members of minority religions are generally
allowed to worship freely in both resistance and
regime-controlled areas, but proselytizing is not allowed.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The turmoil in Afghanistan has generated the world's largest
refugee population, which is predominately women and children.
Over 3.2 million refugees are registered with the U.N. in
Pakistan, where they reside in approximately 350 camps. At
least another 2 million live in Iran, where they have been
largely integrated into local village and urban life. Up to
200,000 Afghans may have voluntarily returned since 1989,
although the porous borders and continued conflict make it
difficult to determine accurate numbers.
Domestic travel remains severely restricted by wartime
conditions. However, civilian travel between areas controlled
by the regime and by the resistance does occur. In many cases,
resistance groups allow the movement of goods, particularly
food, into regime-controlled areas. Both the regime and
resistance groups establish arbitrary checkpoints along
highways at which travelers are screened and frecjuently
required to pay fees. The large-scale Soviet and regime mining
of the principal overland routes and passes as well as the
smaller number of mines sown by resistance groups create
1331
AFGHANISTAN
serious risks for travelers as well as for returning refugees.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Afghan citizens do not have the ability peacefully to change
their government. Regime-controlled areas continue to be ruled
by a nondemocratic party kept in power by military force. This
is unacceptable to the vast majority of Afghans. In the past
regime officials stated their support for an election process
but insisted it remain under their control. However, the Kabul
regime has endorsed the U.N. Secretary General's five-point
statement on Afghanistan, which calls for "free and fair
elections." The ruling party, in spite of a name change and
"reorganization" in 1990, remains a centralized organization.
Despite constitutional amendments ostensibly designed to permit
a multiparty system, no genuine political opposition has
emerged. Of the parties or political groupings allowed to
form, none has been allowed to display genuine independence or
to criticize strongly the Najibullah regime.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no known domestic human rights organizations in
Afghanistan and it is \inlikely that any independent group would
be permitted to function.
The ICRC continues to visit convicted persons detained by the
Government. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, Felix
Ermacora, during his September 1991 visit to Kabul, received
full cooperation from the authorities as he prepared his sixth
report on human rights in Afghanistan. Other than Mr.
Ermacora, there were no other known visits to Kabul in 1991 by
international observers of human rights practices.
During 1991 the ICRC and journalists occasionally were
permitted to visit Afghans and Soviets held by the resistance
in Afghanistan. Security incidents forced the ICRC to curtail
its activities in Afghanistan in 1991, which reduced its
ability to visit prisoners Soviet and resistance officials
held direct talks at a senior level over the prisoner-of-war
issue in 1991 and some prisoners were exchanged, although the
regime again failed to deliver all the prisoners it agreed to
release.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
In traditional rural Afghan society, the participation of women
in activities beyond the home and fields is limited by long
established beliefs, customs, and religious practices.
However, beginning in the late 1950 's, Afghan governments
officially sanctioned a wider public role for women. Upper-
and middle-class women began working in the government and
private sectors in the 1960 's. While this practice was
generally limited to Kabul, girls from elsewhere in the country
attended secondary schools and sought admission to institutes
of higher education to pursue careers, including teaching and
nursing, which in some cases permitted employment in the
provinces. The social position of women in regime-controlled
areas has continued to improve over the past decade, and the
role of women in some nontraditional occupations has expanded.
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AFGHANISTAN
The war has significantly affected women, physically and
socially. In the refugee community in Pakistan, the freedoms
women were allowed have been greatly circumscribed, in part
because they have been removed from the familiar, village
environment. Women's roles are a subject of serious debate
within the resistance, and some fundamentalist parties seek
further restrictions on women.
Violence against women is known to occur in Afghanistan, but
little is known about its extent. Abuse within the family is
seldom mentioned publicly, and there are no official statistics
on the subject. The regime has discussed this problem in the
press and made some very preliminary efforts to deal with it.
The regime announced in 1990 the opening of a facility in Kabul
to counsel women who are in abusive relationships.
The campaign of intimidation against Western assistance
programs for women which was initiated in 1990 was not repeated
in 1991, but there were isolated incidents of harassment and
intimidation directed against these programs. The basic debate
over women's rights remained unresolved.
Afghanistan is home to several Muslim religious traditions and
a number of ethnic, tribal, and linguistic groups whose
relations to one another have historically been marked by
rivalry and occasionally by hostilities. Local loyalties often
override those to the nation as a whole. A particularly strong
line of cleavage along religious, ethnic, and geographic lines
lies between the minority Shi ' a and the traditionally dominant
Sunni Afghans. Relations between resistance groups and within
the Kabul regime reflect these ethnic and religious rivalries.
The regime manipulates these rivalries for its own purposes.
One practice is to use troops from one ethnic group in parts of
the country where that group is not normally present. This
tactic predates the Communist takeover and is designed to
repress local populations with greater ease and prevent
military defections. However, it also heightens hostilities
between groups and sparks frequent violence.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution and the Labor Law (enacted in 1987) assert
workers' right to form trade unions, and such unions are
theoretically independent of state organs. In fact, however,
union organization follows traditional practice of official
unions under Communist systems. Individual unions are
supervised by the Central Council of Trade Unions, controlled
by the ruling party, and there is no evidence of worker
participation in decisionmaking. The Central Council of Trade
Unions is affiliated with the Communist-dominated World
Federation of Trade Unions. The regime does not allow the
existence of independent trade union organizations. The
Constitution allows the right to strike. No strikes were
reported in 1991.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers have the theoretical right to organize and bargain
collectively. The labor law applying to large economic
organizations stipulates that, at the end of each Afghan year,
a new collective contract is negotiated between management and
trade union representatives and signed with the consensus of
the workers' collective. In practice, there is no genuine
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AFGHANISTAN
labor-management bargaining. The workers' collective
rubberstamps decisions taken by officials. Progress in
establishing labor courts and other mechanisms for the
resolution of disputes is unknown.
There is no indication that there are any special economic or
export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution forbids the imposition of forced labor but
notes that the "performance of compulsory labor in wartime,
natural calamity, and other states of emergency which threaten
public life and order shall be excluded from this." Given that
wartime conditions exist, this constitutional provision can be,
in effect, ignored. The most frecjuent manifestation of the use
of forced labor is the "voluntary" labor engaged in by students
for short periods on construction projects during their annual
vacations, when they are seconded to the military.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Labor Law specifies the conditions of work for adolescents,
noting that persons aged 13 to 15 may work a maximum of 30
hours a week, and those aged 16 to 17 should not work more than
35 hours a week. The law also specifies that adolescents
should receive the same pay as persons 18 and older. In fact,
children of all ages work without regard to conditions or law.
Economic circumstances for most Afghans are so harsh that many
families have no choice but to have every member work. There
is no evidence that the regime enforces labor law as it relates
to children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
No information on any statutory minimum wage is available. The
Labor Law stipulates that the usual hours of work on average
should not exceed 40 hours a week, and that on Thursdays
working time should not exceed 5 hours. Provision is made for
time off for prayers, meals, holidays, weekends, annual leave,
sick leave, and emergency leave. There are general provisions
which set out the employer's responsibility to ensure healthful
and safe conditions of work and accident compensation. There
appear to be no effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure fair
and safe labor practices. The State Committee on Labor and
Social Security remains understaffed and not very active.
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Under a Constitution adopted in 1989 Algeria was converted from
a one-party Socialist state, in which power was held by the
National Liberation Front (FLN) , to a multiparty parliamentary
system. In 1991 political power on a national level was held
by a government composed overwhelmingly of present and former
FLN members, with President Chadli Bendjedid wielding executive
power. He resigned on January 11, 1992.
In April the one-party National Assembly (last elected while
the FLN was the sole political party) approved a gerrymandered
electoral districting law which the major opposition party, the
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) vehemently opposed. In June an
unsuccessful FIS-led general strike protesting the law and
calling for early presidential elections led to violent
demonstrations and clashes with government forces in which
perhaps as many as 300 people were killed, the majority of them
as the result of the excessive use of force by the security
forces. As the situation spun out of control, President
Bendjedid declared a state of siege which lasted 4 months.
Internal security is maintained by the urban police (Surete)
and the national police (Gendarmerie), which have been known to
resort to brutal treatment, including torture, of prisoners and
detainees. During the June rioting there were numerous
accusations of police brutality.
The Algerian economy is largely under government control, with
the state operating almost all major industries, much of the
distribution and retail systems, and the entire banking and
credit system. Although the Government has been pursuing a
reform program emphasizing the decentralization of economic
decisionmaking and calling for the creation of a market system,
progress has been slow, apparently hindered in part by a lack
of governmental consensus about the nature of reforms. High
population growth, inflation, a scarcity of foreign exchange,
and the legacy of decades of economic inefficiency and
corruption have continued to hamper the Government's efforts to
meet social needs.
Although the Government had been making progress on human
rights, the Islamist violence and the government reaction
thereto in June brought a setback. Apart from the security
forces' use of excessive force to control the June rioting, the
ensuing declaration of a state of siege temporarily imposed new
restrictions and led to the detention of thousands of Islamists
and the imprisonment of some 350. National Assembly elections,
generally deemed free and fair, were held on December 26.
Subsequently, the High Security Council, in which the military
played the leading role, took over the Government and canceled
the second round of voting, thereby effectively negating the
result of the first round in which the FIS had won an
overwhelming victory. In addition to the suspension of the
constitutional provision that allows citizens to change their
national government, other human rights problems included
brutal treatment of detainees, restrictions on the freedom of
the press and freedom of religion, and women's rights.
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RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings
There were no known instances of politically motivated
extrajudicial killing by government forces, but a number of
deaths were caused by police use of excessive force during the
June rioting (see Section l.g.). Official and press sources
claimed that two police officers were abducted and killed by
FIS activists in Lakhdaria during the June rioting following
the unsuccessful general strike.
b. Disappearance
A number of pro-FIS rioters reportedly disappeared during the
June riots.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although prohibited by law, there continue to be reports of
torture and brutal treatment of prisoners by police. The
Government acknowledged one instance of torture by the security
forces in 1991 and noted that the guilty police officer was
punished, although the Government has not made public the
nature of the punishment. During the June riots, FIS
supporters reportedly were responsible for several instances of
torture of abducted members of the security forces.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and
stipulates that detention for questioning in criminal
investigation cases may not exceed 48 hours, after which the
suspect must charged or released. This period may be extended
to 4 days by written request of the government prosecutor.
Provisional liberty may be authorized when the detainee shows
that he can guarantee to be present at all necessary stages of
the inc[uiry. Detainees must be informed immediately of charges
against them. Once charged however, a person may be held under
pretrial detention indefinitely while his case is being
investigated. These constitutional provisions are adhered to
in practice. There were no cases of incommunicado detention in
1991.
There is no bail system. Lawyers enjoy access to their clients
at any time. Meetings are supervised visually by a guard.
Although the state of siege decreed by President Bendjedid
effectively suspended many constitutional protections, it
theoretically retained judicial protections of detainees once
they were formally charged with criminal actions and allowed
administrative detainees to appeal their arrest to an
independent board which reviewed their cases. According to the
Algerian League of Human Rights, no boards were ever
constituted because detainees were released quickly and had
neither need nor time to file appeals before they were released.
There were numerous arrests in the weeks following the
declaration of the state of siege. Six major detention centers
were set up temporarily to hold the detainees, most of whom
were released after questioning; all the centers were closed by
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August. , The Government acknowledged on July 10 that it had
brought in for questioning over 5,000 Islamists (local human
rights groups spoke of 8,000) under state of siege decrees
giving military and security authorities wide latitude to
enforce public order.
The Prime Minister released official figures on July 30
claiming that 327 detainees were being held in "administrative
detention", as provided for under the state of siege. In
December the Government said that all administrative detainees
had been released but that some 200-240 Islamists remained in
prison on criminal charges (including treason, sedition, and
conspiracy to overthrow the State) stemming from the June
events. Those charged included most of the top leadership of
the FIS; on October 12, the military tribunal charged with
prosecuting the cases of FIS president Abassi Madani and Vice
President Ali Belhadj rejected their lawyers' appeals for
provisional liberty.
Exile is not a legal form of punishment in Algeria and is not
known to be practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and it
is generally independent of the executive branch. This
independence was largely circumvented in cases prosecuted under
the state of siege. The judicial system is divided into civic
and military courts. There are no Islamic courts. Judges are
appointed and promoted by the Ministry of Justice through an
independent board, which was created in July.
Defendants in civil courts have unrestricted access to counsel,
who operate without government interference. The Algerian Bar
Association provides free services to defendants unable to
afford counsel. Defendants are made fully aware of the charges
against them at the time they are bound over for trial.
Defendants have the right to confront witnesses and present
evidence. Trials are public, although generally not
publicized, and defendants have the right of appeal.
During the approximately 4 months' duration of the state of
siege, military courts were given jurisdiction over crimes
allegedly threatening state security. Many of the rights
Algerians would have enjoyed under a civil court were ignored
or circumscribed. The presidential declaration of the state of
siege established military authority over those detained and
gave military courts competency to continue prosecutions even
after the eventual suspension of the state of siege. Judicial
cases included in this category are those of Abassi Madani and
Ali Belhadj (see Section l.d.). Of the approximately 350
people formally charged during the state of siege, Algerian
authorities said in December that 120-150 remain under military
jurisdiction and 80-90 have been charged under the civil penal
code.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the home.
The provision is generally respected, except during a state of
siege and in cases involving security forces. Police may not
enter a house without a warrant from the local prosecutor and
may not enter a residence during the night hours. During the
state of siege, security forces were given wide powers to enter
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ALGERIA
and search homes and reportedly actively sought for questioning
suspected FIS members in their residences. The police and
security services are believed to use telephone-
monitoring systems, reportedly without prior court
authorization as required by law.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violation of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
In the June riots and the repression that followed, numerous
Algerians died. Estimates range from the official toll of 55,
the Ministry of the Interior's figure, to 300, a figure
advanced by human rights sources. The majority of these
killings were due to the security forces' use of force to
control the riots. During the rioting, police and gendarmerie
units fired tear gas into crowded apartment buildings thought
to harbor FIS rioters; in at least one instance, an infant died
as a result. In another instance, police fired tear gas into a
public hospital being used by FIS rioters as a refuge, causing
a niomber of deaths according to credible sources. The security
forces' use of rubber bullets as well as their practice of
firing live ammunition above the heads of and, reportedly,
occasionally into crowds led to additional deaths. Twelve
police officers were also killed. In addition to the two
murdered in Lakhdaria (see Section l.a.), other officers
reportedly died as a result of hit-and-run attacks by vehicles,
drive-by shootings, stabbings, and stoning by rioters.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Except for those FIS leaders imprisoned after the declaration
of the state of siege, Algerians at all levels of society may
generally express their opinions, and criticism of the
Government is widely heard. Although the Government has not
abolished censorship and there are other constraints on press
freedom, the non-Islamist print media continued to enjoy a
greater degree of editorial freedom than they had during any
period since independence. However, the press was reticent in
its coverage of potentially controversial themes in the
aftermath of the June rioting. Additionally, two official FIS
journals were banned in August in the aftermath of the FIS
general strike, and a political tract by imprisoned FIS vice
president Ali Belhadj was confiscated prior to its
distribution. Since the state of siege ended, FIS newspapers
have again been appearing, but another political tract by Ali
Belhadj was confiscated prior to its public distribution.
Also, military authorities seized the September 16 edition of
the newspaper Al-Maser Al-Magharibi , not permitting it to be
printed. No official explanation for the seizure was provided.
The Government created an FLN-cont rolled holding company for 11
major Algerian newspapers and magazines in September. This
formalized the FLN monopoly on access to newspaper printing
presses in Algiers. Independent papers in Algiers, which lack
their own printing presses, are forced to go through the FLN
holding company in order to print their publications.
Nevertheless, numerous independent papers have strong
readerships, and new independent journals continued to appear
regularly. Individual Algerians, writing as columnists, often
expressed opinions contrary to those of the Government.
Criticism of government economic and social policies, but not
of military management of the state of siege, appeared
periodically in the established, FLN-controlled press, as well
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ALGERIA
as in the independent papers, but was more frequently seen in
the publications of various political parties.
During the Persian Gulf war, previously unaccredited foreign
journalists were denied access to Algeria on the grounds that
their coverage of Algerian events would be biased. This
position was revived during the June events, when foreign
journalists attempting to enter Algeria were denied entrance at
the border. In another instance, film of police action during
the June rioting was stolen from the hotel room of a Western
news agency's camera crew by unknown parties. During the first
round of National Assembly elections in December, the
Government was cooperative and open with foreign journalists
covering the electoral process.
Radio and television remained under government control, despite
government disclaimers to the contrary. The coverage continued
to be heavily biased in favor of governmental policies and the
FLN; however, because of the widespread accessibility of
satellite dish antennas among the Algerian middle class, many
Algerians have easy access to European television news, which
is watched regularly.
There are moderate restraints on academic freedom. Algerian
professors attend international conferences regularly, and many
Algerian professors are active in human rights circles without
apparent prejudice to their professional careers. However,
recently there has been an increase in social pressure on the
campuses to conform to Islamic norms of dress, thought, and
behavior. In the new atmosphere, some female teachers have
complained that they are finding it more difficult to continue
teaching. Religious indoctrination in Koranic themes has taken
the place of secular education in some elementary schools.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The 1989 Constitution provides for the rights of assembly and
association. Implementing legislation adopted in 1989 set out
procedures for obtaining permits to hold public gatherings.
With the exception of the 4-month period of the state of siege,
the Government routinely granted such permits in 1991. In May,
before the FIS general strike erupted into rioting, the
Government was still granting FIS organizers permission to use
public squares and streets for demonstrations. In early
October, a week after the lifting of the state of siege, the
Government again granted FIS organizers permission to organize
a mass rally in Algiers attended by an estimated 20,000 to
40,0000 FIS supporters. Just prior to the December 26
elections, the FIS held a rally estimated to have gathered
100,000 demonstrators. During the state of siege, all
gatherings were strictly forbidden.
According to the July 1989 Political Associations Law,
membership in political organizations is permitted for all
Algerians except judges, army and security service personnel,
and members of the Constitutional Council. All nongovernmental
associations must be approved by the Interior Minister.
Political groups across the spectrum were openly operating
throughout Algeria. These range from political parties — there
were over 50 parties active in 1991 — to specialized groups such
as the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (ALDHR),
which monitors Algeria's human rights performance; the
Committee Against Torture (CAT), which investigates allegations
of government torture; Islamic trade unions; and secular
women's groups. Despite the FIS' leading role in the June
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ALGERIA
riots and its continued calls for rebellion against the State,
it remained a legal party and participated in the first round
of the National Assembly elections in December.
c. Freedom of Religion
While the Constitution declares Islam to be the state religion,
it also prohibits discrimination based on opinion or any other
personal or social circumstance or condition. The Government
protects the rights of the very small Christian and Jewish
populations and includes leaders of these communities at
ceremonial state functions. The Jewish community numbers less
than 300; it maintains a synagogue in central Algiers.
Conversion from Islam to Christianity is severely sanctioned.
Consequently, the Christian clergy focuses its activities on
the foreign community. Those Algerians who do convert from
Islam do so clandestinely to avoid the sanction of family
andcommunity .
The Islamic clergy is government trained, and the Ministry of
Religious Affairs assigns imams to state-funded mosques.
Privately funded mosques, however, may choose their own
religious leaders. In 1991 a number of these privately funded
mosques increasingly serve as centers for the promotion of an
Islamic fundamentalist state.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom to travel within Algeria and abroad and to emigrate is
provided for by law and generally is respected in practice.
Gendarmerie checkpoints in the countryside routinely inspect
vehicle registrations and occasionally search Algerian-owned or
-operated vehicles for evidence of black-marketing. During the
state of siege, police blockades became extremely intrusive,
and cars and vehicles were regularly searched. There are some
administrative restrictions related to mandatory military
service and the obligation to repay state education
scholarships. These controls are not applied arbitrarily or
for political purposes.
The Constitution provides for the right of political asylum an
estimated 165,000 refugees from the Western Sahara live in
camps in southwestern Algeria. They are supported by both the
Government and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
With the approval in 1989 of a revised Constitution which
converted Algeria from a one-party Socialist state to a
multiparty system, the legal framework was in place to allow
citizens to change their government. However, implementation
was delayed until the end of 1991 by slow progress on the issue
of electoral law reform. National Assembly elections were
originally scheduled for June, but prior to these elections the
National Assembly approved a gerrymandered electoral law which
was construed by some as intended by the FLN-dominated Assembly
to insure a FLN victory in the national legislative elections.
The major Algerian opposition party, the FIS, protested the
Assembly's actions and indicated that it would boycott the
elections if the new law were not revised. The FIS' threats of
boycott were ignored by the Government, and the FIS
subsequently launched a general strike to protest the
Government's position. Perhaps 20 percent of the population
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I ALGERIA
participated, many apparently acting under coercion from
aggressive FIS partisans who pressured shopkeepers into closing
their shops. The ensuing violence and the state of siege
delayed the elections until December 26, when the first round
was held. The results of the first round amounted to a strong
popular condemnation of the Government and a major victory for
the FIS. The overwhelming nature of the FIS' first round
victory indicated that the FIS would almost certainly gain an
National Assembly majority. President Bendjedid abruptly
resigned on January 11, 1992, and the Higher Security Council
took over the Government and interrupted the electoral
process. A Council of State was subsequently created to
exercise executive power until December 1993, when Bendjedid 's
term would have expired. This series of events suspended that
part of the Constitution that would have allowed Algerian
citizens to change their national government in 1991.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
A number of legally established human rights organizations are
active in Algeria. They include such organizations as the
Committee Against Torture, the Algerian League of Human Rights,
which is affiliated with the Maghreb Human Rights Association,
and the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights.
Algerian human rights activists receive wide publicity in the
press and regularly give press conferences to support their
initiatives. Some activists have said, however, that they are
quietly ignored by the FLN-controlled French-language daily El
Moudjahid.
The Government appointed a Minister Delegate for Human Rights,
Ali Haroun, in June. Since the state of siege was declared,
members of the Government have discussed the Algerian human
rights situation with a wide range of visitors, including a
delegation from Amnesty International, and foreign
parliamentarians .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language or Social Status
The current constitution specifically prohibits discrimination
based on birth, race, sex, opinion, or any other personal or
social conditions or circumstance. It omits, however, the
specific guarantees for women's political, economic, social,
and cultural rights that had been included in the 1976
constitution. It does not appear that women and minority
groups are treated unfairly in their access to housing,
education, and health care. The Government's difficulties in
meeting these social needs are linked to the country's rapid
population growth and significant drop in oil revenues. Ethnic
minorities, except black Algerians, seem to fare no better or
worse than the Arab majority. Black Algerians, however, face
continued social discrimination at all levels of society and
are traditionally pushed into the most menial and lowest paying
jobs .
Berber ethnic consciousness remains strong and is fueled by the
Berbers' desire to preserve their distinctive cultural identity
and language in the face of the Government's emphasis on the
development of Algeria's Arab identity. Berber spokesmen
assert that the Government seeks to repress the distinct Berber
culture, including the teaching and propagation of the
Tamazight (Berber) language. Tamazight has never been taught
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ALGERIA
in primary and secondary schools but is taught at Tizi Ouzou
University.
The fate of the nomadic Tuareg of Algeria's southern desert
continues to be a subject of Algerian governmental and
international interest. The continuing drought in the Central
Sahara has disrupted traditional Tuareg patterns of life and
led to insecurity in the desert areas of southern Algeria along
its borders with Mali and Niger. In September 1990, an
agreement was negotiated between the Governments of Algeria,
Mali, Niger, and Libya, and Tuareg representatives. This
agreement, which sought to address Tuareg grievances,
apparently has not successfully resolved them, and violence
continues in the south. In Algeria, the Tuareg are encouraged
to settle and are generally treated fairly by government
authorities.
Women's rights are restricted by law, and they encounter
discrimination in the workplace, home, and in society,
dominated as it is by Algeria's traditionalist, patriarchal
culture. Women's rights to work, live independently, and
generally function outside the traditional Muslim social norm,
although previously supported by government rhetoric, have come
under heated attack from both Islamist political leaders and
conservative elements of society. Under Algeria's 1984 family
code, inspired by Islamic law, women are perpetual minors who,
regardless of their age or civil status, remain under the legal
guardianship of a husband or father. The code also permits
polygamy — which nevertheless remains rare due to the housing
crisis — and makes it more difficult for a woman than for a man
to obtain a divorce. The same law awards only 4 months of
alimony to the woman regardless of the husband's means and the
circumstances of the divorce. Because Islamic law and the
family code forbid Algerian Muslim women from marrying
non-Muslims, Algerian women engaged to non-Muslim men are
sometimes subjected to harassment, including confiscation of
their passports by authorities upon entering or leaving the
country. Increasingly in 1991, some Algerian women found
themselves pressured to wear Islamic dress (usually the
hidjab-headcovering with ankle-length overdress) by husbands,
fathers, and brothers jealous of the family's reputation. In
municipalities run by Islamist political parties, there were
continued efforts to ban women's sports, women's swimming,
coeducation, and women in the workplace. In early 1991, FIS
organizers orchestrated nationwide campaigns against
coeducation. These campaigns, while discontinued during the
state of siege, were revived after its end in October.
With the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria, secularist
women regarded themselves as increasingly under attack from
proponents of Shari'a (Islamic law). For example, some
Algerians blame male unemployment on female participation in
the workplace. Prior to the state of siege. Western-dressed
women were occasionally spat upon on the streets by Islamists.
This behavior apparently did not continue after the state of
siege was declared, nor did it revive after the state of siege
ended. In October, at a major Algiers mosque, FIS leaders
suggested during a sermon that the Algerian unemployment
problem would be "solved" if all women stopped working. Other
FIS leaders have stated that women should not be allowed to
work outside the home. It is estimated that 500,000 Algerian
women work, mostly in urban areas, out of a total work force of
4,700,000. Many are trained and employed in the professions,
and some women serve in the armed forces. According to the
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ALGERIA
most recent government statistics, girls represent 41 percent
of all children enrolled in primary and secondary school.
Although violence against women is known to occur, little is
know about its extent. Abuse within the family is seldom
mentioned publicly because of the value attached to family
honor in this traditional society. Wives who are the victims
of wife beating may file criminal charges or sue for divorce,
but the filing of such cases is rare.
Women's issues seemed to have only a limited resonance with
Algerian women in 1991. The Government has attempted to
reassure feminist women that their rights will be defended, but
many Algerian women still saw fundamentalist strength and the
1984 family code as the greatest threats to women's rights.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Under legislation passed in 1990, Algerian workers now have the
right to form and be represented by trade unions of their
choice. Under the new legislation, government approval for the
creation of a labor union is not necessary. There are,
however, limits on union activities. Unions are not allowed to
be associated with political parties, although in practice
some, including the FLN-backed general Union of Algerian
Workers (UGTA) are. Unions are forbidden to receive funds from
abroad, and a union's operations may be suspended by the
Government if it violates the law. Unions are also subject to
dissolution by judicial means if the courts rule they have
engaged in illegal activities.
Under the 1990 law on industrial relations, strikes are
permitted only after mandatory conciliation, mediation, or
arbitration efforts fail. This law states that arbitration
decisions on worker-management disputes are binding on both
parties. However, another section of the same law states that
if differences persist after conciliation and mediation efforts
have been attempted (arbitration is not specifically mentioned
in this context), workers may strike after giving 8 days'
notice of their intention to do so. The strike must be
approved by a majority vote of workers in a secret ballot.
The result of the new law was a renaissance of labor activity
as well as numerous strikes in all sectors. Although many of
these strikes were not legally authorized under the terms set
by the law, the Government has not prosecuted the persons
involved. In 1991, both the UGTA and the Islamist Workers
Union (SIT) called general strikes. The UGTA organized a
48-hour strike in March to protest the escalating cost of
living for workers. Though the UGTA claimed that 92 percent of
the country's workers participated, in fact the participation
rate was much lower and was limited to those working for the
Government and state-owned companies. Workers belonging to the
SIT boycotted the strike. The SIT carried out a politically
motivated general strike in late May. The strike, boycotted by
UGTA members, led to civilian unrest in several cities that
prompted the Government to impose a state of siege. At the
Government's direction, many state-owned companies fired
workers who participated in this strike on the grounds that it
was politically instead of economically motivated. However,
most of the affected workers were eventually reinstated. In
addition to these general strikes, airline pilots, air traffic
controllers, and customs officials, among others, held strikes
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in 1991 to protest the unsatisfactory level of wage and fringe
benefits. These were generally resolved by wage or other
concessions .
Unions may form and join federations or confederations and
affiliate with international bodies, and in 1991 Algerian
unions sought contacts beyond the quasi-official Arab and
African trade union organizations in which they still
participate.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The 1990 legislation provides for collective bargaining for all
unions, and this right has been freely practiced. It also
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against union
members and organizers and provides effective mechanisms for
resolving trade union member complaints of antiunion practices
by employers. It further permits all unions, whether
longstanding or newly created, to recruit members at the
workplace; this right appears to have been consistently
upheld.
There are no special economic zones in Algeria.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is incompatible with the
Constitution's sections on individual rights, and the penal
code was amended in 1990 to ban it explicitly. This ban is
effectively enforced by labor inspections and penal sanctions.
The Government asserts that prisoners are paid for any work
they perform and that forced labor does not exist in Algerian
prisons; trade union officials also deny that forced labor
exists .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum employment age is 16 years. Work inspectors, who
report to the Ministry of Labor, are responsible for enforcing
the minimum employment age by periodic or unannounced
inspection visits to the workplace. The minimum age is
enforced in the state sector, the country's largest employment
sector. It is not effectively enforced in the agricultural
sector or in the small private sector, but violations are not
widespread. With continuing economic hardship, however, there
has been an increase in the number of children occupied in
informal employment, such as street vending.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The 1990 Law on Work Relations defines the overall framework
for acceptable conditions of work, but leaves specific policies
with regard to hours, salaries, and other work conditions to
the discretion of employers in consultation with employees.
Minimum wages are fixed by government decree after negotiations
between the Government and the UGTA. Although Ministry of
Labor work inspectors are responsible for ensuring compliance
with the minimum wage regulations, enforcement has been
spotty. The minimum wage is not adequate to provide a worker
and his family a decent standard of living.
Algeria has a 44-hour workweek and we 11 -developed occupation
and health regulations, but enforcement by government work
inspectors is generally lax.
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BAHRAIN
The Al Khalifa extended family has ruled Bahrain since the late
18th century and dominates its society and government. The
Constitution confirms the Amir as hereditary ruler. The
current Amir, Shaikh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa, governs Bahrain
with the assistance of his brother, the Prime Minister; his
son, the Crown Prince; and an appointed Cabinet of Ministers.
The Government has suspended some provisions of Bahrain's 1973
Constitution, including those articles relating to the National
Assembly, which the Government disbanded in 1975. There are
few judicial checks on the Amir and his Government.
Bahrain is a relatively heterogeneous society in which social
ties and interpersonal associations are formed in a complex web
of family, tribal, economic, and religious affiliations.
Bahrain is divided between the Shi ' a and Sunni sects of Islam,
with the Shi 'a comprising over two-thirds of the indigenous
population. There are important sectarian divisions among the
Shi 'a. Despite their minority status, the Sunnis predominate
because the ruling family, supported by the military, security
forces, and powerful merchant families, is Sunni.
The Ministry of Interior is responsible for public security.
Under its auspices, the police force and the Security Service
are responsible for maintaining internal order and preventing
sectarian violence and terrorist actions. The state security
apparatus in Bahrain is extensive and highly effective. The
past year witnessed a decrease in credible reports of human
rights violations. In part, the decrease may be due to the
perception of a lessened security threat, both domestic and
international. There were no confirmed reports of torture by
security forces in 1991.
Bahrain has a mixed economy, with government ownership of many
basic industries, including the oil industry. Possessing
limited oil reserves, Bahrain has diversified its economic
base, attracting companies doing business in financial
services, petrochemicals, and light manufacturing. It has used
its oil revenues to build an advanced infrastructure in
transportation and telecommunications and has become a leading
regional financial center. The economy suffered from the
decline in oil prices beginning in 1986; Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait further depressed business confidence. In the post-Gulf
War period, business confidence and investment have recovered
significantly.
Civil liberties remain closely circumscribed. Principal human
rights problems continue to include the denial of citizens'
right to change their government, the occasional practice of
arbitrary and incommunicado detention, and the absence of
impartial inspection of detention and prison facilities, as
well as restrictions on the right to a fair public trial,
freedom of speech and press, freedom of assembly and
association, women's rights, and worker rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known political or other extrajudicial killings.
1345
BAHRAIN
b. Disappearance
There were no known disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is prohibited by law. There were no credible reports
of torture in 1991. There were few reliable reports about what
happens during detention in security prisons, since visits by
nonofficial persons are generally prohibited. However,
Bahrain's small size, and the complex web of family, tribal,
economic and religious affiliations which criss-cross society,
would make it extremely difficult for the Government to conceal
such practices were they frequent or systematic.
The Government continues to deny categorically that torture
takes place, but to date it has not implemented the procedural
safeguards consistent with international norms that would help
deter such practices. Allegations of torture, regardless of
their validity, are lent credence by government policies
allowing the practice of incommunicado detention and detention ^
without trial. There were no known instances of authorities
being punished for committing human rights abuses in previous
years .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Political activity is strictly controlled by the security
forces, and persons may be detained and arrested for attempting
to exercise the rights of free speech, association, or other
rights, often on suspicion of antiregime activity. The
Government's assessment that domestic and international threats
to its stability and security have diminished has resulted in
some loosening of control on some activities which previously
might have been considered "subversive." Activities that could
lead, under provisions of the security law, to detention,
cjuestioning, warnings, or arrest include membership in illegal
organizations or those deemed subversive; painting antiregime
slogans on walls; joining antigovernment demonstrations;
possessing or circulating antiregime writings; preaching
sermons with an extreme Islamic fundamentalist or a "radical"
political tone; or harboring or associating with persons
committing such acts.
According to the State Security Act of 1974, persons accused of
subversive or antiregime acts may be detained without trial for
a period not to exceed 3 years. Detained persons have the
right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal after a period
of 3 months, and, if the appeal is denied, thereafter every 6
months from the date of the original detention. Bahraini
authorities are known to detain suspects without charge and
hold them in incommunicado detention, often for periods of up
to 3 months. Abdullah Fakhro was held without charge for 6
months in 1991 for publicly praising Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
and calling on Saddam Hussein to invade Bahrain. The
Government denies that it is currently holding any prisoners
without charge and claims that none of the prisoners awaiting
trial have been charged under the 1974 State Security Act.
The Ministry of Interior, which oversees the Security Service
and police, also controls the office of the public prosecutor,
whose judges initially determine if sufficient evidence exists
to continue to hold a prisoner in "investigatory detention."
The Ministry is also responsible for all aspects of prison
1346
BAHRAIN
administration, giving prisoners and their attorneys no
recourse to any authority outside of the Ministry of Interior
in the early stages of detention.
In the past there have been confirmed reports that, without
benefit of trial, young Bahraini men suspected of
ant i government activity have been forced to reside outside of
Bahrain.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Procedures in Bahrain's Security Court do not meet
international standards for fair trials. A person arrested may
be tried in either an ordinary criminal court or, if required
by the prosecution, the Security Court. Ordinary civil or
criminal court trials provide procedural guarantees, including
open trial, the right to counsel (with legal aid available when
necessary), and the right to appeal. Security cases are tried
directly by the Supreme Court of Appeal, sitting as the
Security Court. Such proceedings are held in secret, and there
is no right to judicial review of the legality of arrests. The
Security Court is exempted from adhering to the procedural
guarantees of the penal code. There are unconfirmed reports
that convictions in the Security Court can be based on
confessions alone, obtained while in official custody and
possibly elicited under duress. Bahraini attorneys are
appointed by the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs to act
as counsel . Some defense attorneys assert that they are denied
access to "secret information" upon which accusations against
their clients are based. Sentences imposed by the Security
Court may, at the discretion of the court or the desire of the
defendant's family, be referred to the Amir for clemency.
The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) maintains a separate court
system for military personnel accused of offenses under the
military code. These courts do not review cases involving
civilian criminal or security offenses.
It is impossible to determine the number of political prisoners
in Bahrain because the Government does not release data on
cases involving security offenses, such cases are not tried in
open court, and prisoners convicted of security offenses are
not always allowed visits. Government officials have stated
that there are currently only 300 people in Bahraini jails,
including those who claim to be political prisoners. Credible
sources indicate that, while the overall number of prisoners
has probably decreased in the past year, between 100 and 150
persons who claim to be political prisoners remain in Bahraini
jails. On March 17, in commemoration of the first day of
Ramadan, the Government released, as is customary, a group of
some 40 prisoners. Of those released, 18 may have
characterized themselves as political prisoners.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Interior Ministry is empowered to authorize entry into
private premises without judicial authorization, although such
authorization by the Ministry is said to be infrequent.
Telephone calls and correspondence are subject to monitoring.
Police informer networks are extensive and effective.
1347
BAHRAIN
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
While the Constitution provides for the right "to express and
propagate opinions," in practice, Bahrainis cannot freely
challenge the legitimacy of the regime in speech or writing.
Political meetings are not permitted. Gatherings which might
take on a political tone are monitored.
In the wake of the Gulf War, some governmental restrictions on
freedom of speech and assembly have been informally relaxed.
The Information Ministry exercises wide power over the local
media, and the press generally follows official policy
closely. Self-censorship of stories on sensitive topics is
routine. In the past, minor deviations have brought closure
of the offending newspapers. The Government also does not
condone unfavorable coverage of its domestic affairs by the
international media and has on occasion revoked the press
credentials of offending journalists. Since the Ministry also
sponsors the journalists' residence permits, such actions can
easily lead to deportation.
The State owns and operates all radio and television
stations. Iranian radio and television broadcasts (in Arabic
and Farsi) are accessible. Many senior government officials,
ruling family members, some businessmen, and the major hotels
use satellite dishes to view international broadcasts. The
use of satellite dishes by private citizens to pull in
television signals from outside Bahrain has greatly
multiplied. Cable News Network is now broadcast 24 hours a
day on a local channel without censorship, and BBC World News
Service is carried on a local channel approximately 18 hours a
day, also uncensored. U.S. Armed Forces Radio is also
available. All newspapers are nominally privately owned and
exercise self-censorship in reporting on antiregime activities
and in criticizing the Government.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although the Constitution affirms the right of free assembly,
public political demonstrations or meetings are prohibited.
Political organizations are also prohibited, but the large
number of social and sports clubs have traditionally served as
forums for discreet political discussion, although even these
are closely monitored by the Government. The Government has
recently introduced a requirement that all social and sports
clubs include clauses in their founding documents barring any
form of political activity. The Bahrain Bar Society (BBS)
refused to include such a clause in its constitution but,
after extended negotiations with the Ministry of Labor, was
issued an organization permit without the clause. Without
permits, organizations are technically illegal. Permits for
religious rites, including for Shi ' a ceremonies, are routinely
granted.
c. Freedom of Religion
The population is overwhelmingly Muslim, and Islam is the
state religion. Christians and other non-Muslims, including
Jews, Hindus, and Baha'is have long enjoyed considerable
freedom to practice their religion and build places of
worship. Adherents of other faiths also maintain places of
worship; some small groups worship in their homes. Religious
tracts of all Islamic sects, cassettes of sermons delivered by
1348
BAHRAIN
famous Muslim preachers from other countries, and publications
of other religions are readily available in Bahrain.
Proselytizing by non-Muslims is not encouraged and
anti-Islamic writings are prohibited, but conversions from
Islam to other religions are tolerated. Both Sunni and Shi ' a
sects are subject to government control and monitoring, but
there is no interference with routine worship, preaching, or
religious activities. Public religious events, most notably
commemorative marches by the Shi 'a, are permitted but are
closely watched by the police. Prior to the Iraqi invasion
and occupation of Kuwait, there were no restrictions on the
number of Bahrainis permitted to make pilgrimages to Shi ' a
shrines and holy sites in Iraq. Such pilgrimages are not
currently feasible owing to conditions inside Iraq. Religious
study in, and pilgrimages to, Iran were strongly discouraged
in the past, although restrictions on all travel to Iran have
been relaxed in recent months.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Bahrainis are free to move within the country and change their
place of residence or work. Passports, however, can be denied
on political grounds. At least 3 to 5 percent of the
indigenous Bahraini population, mostly Persian-origin Shi 'a,
do not have passports and cannot readily obtain them.
Bahrainis living abroad who are suspected of political or
criminal offenses m.ay face imprisonment upon return to
Bahrain. There have been recent credible reports that
opponents of the regime and their families have been refused
permission to return to Bahrain after traveling abroad.
Refugees are not repatriated to countries from which they have
fled. Generally, Bahrain does not resettle refugees, although
it did accept more than 7,500 Kuwaitis during the Gulf War,
almost all of whom have now returned to Kuwait. There are
some Iranian emigres who have fled Iran since 1979 and have
permission to remain in Bahrain, but they have not been
granted citizenship. A second group in a similar situation is
the 3,000 to 5,000 Persian-origin, Shi 'a Bahrainis who enjoy
less than full citizenship under the Bahraini Citizenship Act
of 1963. The law does not address the citizenship of those
who were not registered with Bahraini authorities as citizens
prior to 1959, creating a legal lacuna for these persons and
their descendants.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of
Citizens to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right or ability to change peacefully
their government or their political system. Since the 1975
abolition of the National Assembly, there have been no formal
democratic institutions, and neither political parties nor
opposition organizations are permitted. Bahrain is a
hereditary monarchy ruled by the Al Khalifa family, headed by
the Amir. All government positions are appointive. About
one-third of the cabinet ministers are Shi 'a, although they do
not hold key portfolios. The average Bahraini can attempt to
influence government decisions through submission of written
petitions and informal contact with senior officials,
including appeals to the Amir and other officials at their
public audiences, called majlises.
Four clandestine political groups seek change in Bahrain.
The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, the group
1349
BAHRAIN
responsible for a 1981 coup attempt, is almost exclusively
militant Shi ' a in its makeup eind calls for violent revolution
and a strict theocratic state . The Bahraini Isleimic Call
Party advocates a relatively moderate form of populist Islam
and demands reforms in the social and economic structure of
Bahrain and the establishment of an Islamic republic. Both
have ties to Iran and attract some support from younger
disaffected Shi 'a. Both organizations have become less active
over the past 2 years. Two underground, secular leftist
groups exist, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
and the National Front for the Liberation of Bahrain. Both
have ties to radical Arab regimes and Arab nationalist
organizations. Their influence has also declined in recent
years.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Given the restrictions on freedom of association and
expression in Bahrain, any independent, domestically based
investigation and public criticism of the Government's human
rights policies would face major obstacles. The Government
has consistently characterized charges of torture and denial
of access by families and lawyers to detainees as "baseless."
The Government indicated during 1991 that it intends to invite
Amnesty International and the International Committee of the
Red Cross to visit Bahrain but by year's end had not yet done
so.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Although there are notable exceptions, Sunni Muslims enjoy a
more favored status in Bahrain than the Shi 'a, who form
approximately two-thirds of the population. Sunnis generally
receive preference for employment in sensitive positions,
including in the Bahraini Defense Force and managerial ranks
in the public sector. Shi 'a tend to be employed in lower
paid, lesser skilled jobs. Social and municipal services in
most Shi 'a neighborhoods, particularly in rural villages, are
inferior to those found in Sunni urban communities. In an
effort to remedy social discrimination, improve living
conditions for the Shi a and encourage integration, the
Government has built numerous subsidized housing complexes
open to all Bahrainis on the basis of financial need.
Islamic law (Shari'a) governs the legal rights of Bahraini
women. Specific rights vary according to Shi ' a or Sunni
interpretations of Islamic law, as determined by the person's
faith or the court in which various contracts have been made,
for example in the case of marriage. A common complaint by
women's groups concerns inec[uality of wages and opportunity in
the workplace. While both Shi ' a and Sunni women have the
right to initiate a divorce, the court may refuse such a
rec[uest. Women of either sect may own and inherit property
and may represent their own interest in all public and legal
matters. In the absence of a direct male heir, Shi ' a women
may inherit all property; in contrast, Sunni women — in the
absence of a direct male heir — inherit only a portion of all
property, with the balance being divided among uncles and
(male) cousins of the deceased.
According to Islamic tradition, a woman generally ceases to
have responsibility for her children after they reach the age
1350
BAHRAIN
of 7 in deference to the father; in the case of proven
incompetence on the husband's part, this is not applied. A
non-Bahraini woman automatically loses custody of her children
if she is married to, and divorces, their Bahraini father.
Women may obtain passports without the permission of a male
head of the household and may exit the country without his
permission. Bahraini women are free to wear the clothing of
their choice (a large percentage wear Western dress outside
the home), to work outside the home, and to drive a car
without an escort. With the development of the Bahraini
economy, women have increasingly taken jobs previously
reserved for men. Women now constitute about 20 percent of
the Bahraini work force. The Government has encouraged the
hiring of women, enacted special laws to promote female entry
into the work force, and is itself a leading employer of
women. Generally, women work outside the home during the
years between secondary school or university and marriage.
Women make up the majority of students at Bahrain's
universities. Women's organizations exist which have as a
goal the betterment of the status of women under both civil
and Islamic law.
Violence against women is known to occur, but knowledge of
such incidents is usually kept within the family in this
traditional society, and it is difficult to judge its extent.
In general, there is virtually no public attention to or
discussion of violence against women and no government
policies that address it. There are very few known instances
of Bahraini women seeking redress for violence in court.
More evidence exists regarding violence against expatriate
women working in Bahrain as domestics. Cases of domestics
beaten badly enough to require hospitalization continue to be
reported to the police and, in the past, have been covered in
the local newspapers. Most victims are too intimidated to sue
their employers. Those who do, however, appear to receive a
sympathetic hearing from the courts.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Although the Constitution recognizes the right of workers to
organize, there are no trade unions, primarily because the
Government actively discourages them. Strikes are not
permitted. In response to labor unrest in the mid-1950 's and
in 1965 and 1974, the Government encouraged — and now closely
controls — the formation of elected workers' committees in
major companies. Since 1982, when the Government granted
permission to form the first joint labor-management
consultative committee (JCC), 13 JCC ' s have been established
in the major industries. The JCC's represent close to 70
percent of the island's indigenous industrial labor force.
Nonindustrial expatriate workers, who comprise about 60
percent of the overall work force, are denied even these
limited rights. The Bahrain Labor Committee, established in
1983 by law, is a nongovernmental organization which oversees
and coordinates the work of the JCC's. The Committee also
hears complaints from workers, Bahraini and expatriate alike,
and assists them in bringing their complaints to the attention
of the Ministry of Labor or the courts.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There are no collective bargaining units or contracts. As
1351
BAHRAIN
noted above, in 13 key industries employing significant
nuinbers of Bahrainis the Government has sanctioned the
formation of JCC's comprised of employee representatives and
representatives from management. While these JCC's are
empowered to resolve labor disputes, organize workers'
services, and discuss wages, working conditions, and raising
productivity, the workers have no independent, recognized
vehicle for addressing these or other labor-related issues.
Minimum wages in Bahrain are established by Council of
Ministers' decree. Increases in wages above the minimum are
negotiated between management and labor, with government
salaries for comparable work serving as an informal
guideline. There are two export processing zones, but labor
law and practice are the same in these zones as in the rest of
the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is legally prohibited, and the
Labor Ministry is charged with enforcing the law. The press
has reported instances in which private sector employers have
occasionally compelled expatriate workers from developing
nations to perform work not specified in their contracts.
Once a complaint has been lodged by a worker with a grievance,
the Labor Ministry opens an investigation and often takes
appropriate remedial action. Many abuses, however, probably
go unreported (see Section 6.e.).
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Juveniles between
the age of 14 and 16 receive special protection under the
labor laws. They may not be employed in hazardous conditions
or at night and may not work over 6 hours per day or on a
piecework basis. Child labor laws are effectively enforced by
Ministry of Labor inspectors, although child labor outside the
industrial sector is less well monitored.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wage scales, set by government decree, exist for both
private and public sector employees and generally afford a
decent standard of living for workers and their families. For
expatriate workers, employers consider benefits such as annual
repatriation, housing, and education bonuses as part of the
salary.
In practice, however, expatriate workers are disadvantaged by
the requirement that all foreigners must be sponsored by
Bahrainis or Bahrain-based institutions and companies in order
to work. Under this system, sponsors may cancel the residence
permit of any person under their sponsorship and thereby
blacklist them so that they cannot obtain entry or residence
visas from another sponsor. Such power contains the potential
for exploitation, since foreign workers are often unwilling to
report abuses of their rights for fear of forced repatriation.
Instances of expatriate workers being denied their guaranteed
holidays, days off, and vacations without compensation have
been reported by the English- language daily newspaper, which
serves as an unofficial ombudsman for the expatriate
community.
Bahrain's Labor Law, enforced by the Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs, mandates acceptable conditions of work for all
adult workers, including adequate standards regarding hours of
1352
BAHRAIN
work (maximuiti 48 hours per week) and occupational safety and
health.
Bahrain's labor law does not recognize the concept of equal
pay for equal work. Asian workers are paid lower wages than
their Bahraini counterparts (excluding housing and educational
allowances) . Westerners and Bahraini workers are paid
comparable wages; women are generally paid less than men.
Women are entitled to 60 days of paid maternity leave and
nursing periods during the day.
1353
BANGLADESH
On August 6, Bangladesh's National Assembly voted unanimously
to amend the country's Constitution to reintroduce a
parliamentary form of government. This decision was endorsed
by the general electorate in a referendum on September 15. As
a result, Bangladesh is now a parliamentary democracy led by
Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. Her ruling Bangladesh Nationalist
Party (BNP) enjoys a parliamentary majority. The parliamentary
opposition is led by Sheikh Hasina Wajed, who heads the Aweimi
League, and includes other parties such as former president
Hossain Mohammed Ershad's Jatiyo Party.
Country-wide parliamentary elections were held on February 27
under then acting president. Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed,
who assumed power following the resignation of former president
Ershad in late 1990. The elections, held under the scrutiny of
both international and domestic observer groups, were widely
regarded as free and fair and unprecedented in the history of
Bangladesh.
Bangladesh, under its recently amended Constitution, has a
unicameral Parliament of 330 members, 300 of whom are popularly
elected. The remaining 30 members occupy seats reserved for
women, who are chosen by the elected members. The Prime
Minister appoints the Cabinet, 80 percent of whom must be
Members of Parliament. The President, who is elected by the
Parliament, serves as the titular Head of State. The amended
Constitution ensures strict party discipline, containing harsh
penalties for floor-crossing.
The police and paramilitary forces, which are controlled by the
Home Affairs Ministry, bear primary responsibility for
maintaining internal security. Paramilitary forces include the
Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), which guards the borders; the
Bangladesh Ansars, a home guard which assists the police in
maintaining law and order; and the Village Defense Parties
(VDP), a uniformed but normally unarmed local militia. The
police and security forces were responsible for human rights
abuses in 1991. The army and the BDR play an internal security
role in the Chittagong Hill tracts (CHT) , where attacks by
tribal insurgents against security forces, Bengali settlers,
and other tribals continued in 1991.
Bangladesh remains one of the world's poorest and most densely
populated countries. The new Government has been receptive to
economic policy reform, but implementation has been uneven.
These reforms face resistance from many who fear losing de
facto monopolies or guaranteed jobs, or want protection from
foreign competition.
The human rights situation improved in 1991. The February
elections and their aftermath represented a significant
improvement both in the ability of citizens to change their
government through democratic processes and in freedom of the
press. In its first months in power, the BNP Government made
further improvements in freedom of the press by its revocation
of sections of the Special Powers Act dealing with press
freedom. However, there remain serious problems of arbitrary
detentions under the Special Powers Act (SPA), prisoner abuse,
and deaths in police custody as well as restrictions on women's
and worker's rights and some remaining restrictions on freedom
of speech and press.
1354
BANGLADESH
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Violent confrontations between rival student groups,
representing different political parties, plagued vmiversity
and lower level educational institutions throughout 1991. The
participants in these clashes were often armed, and their
confrontations resulted in injury and sometimes death. The
police and security forces have been reluctant to intervene in
these clashes. The police have also been slow to apprehend
those students accused of killings, including one case pending
from the 1991 democratic movement.
Sporadic violence during the February elections and the
September by-elections resulted in several deaths and
injuries. There were credible reports of deaths of persons in
police custody during 1991 (see Section i.e.).
b. Disappearance
There were no confirmed reports of disappearance resulting from
official actions in 1991. As in the past, however, armed
tribal insurgents in the CHT kidnaped an undetermined number of
persons in raids on Bengali and tribal villages.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although the Constitution forbids torture and cruel, inhuman,
or degrading punishment or treatment, police treatment of
accused criminals and other detainees, including those held on
political charges, is usually rough and can include torture and
other abusive treatment during interrogations. Reports of
prisoner abuse at Dhaka central jail in April 1991, in the wake
of prolonged inmate unrest, were among the most serious
allegations of human rights violations made since the fall of
the Ershad regime. Two purported eyewitnesses told a local
human rights group that 7 prisoners were killed and as many as
2,000 others were burned with scalding water and teargassed in
a crackdown at the jail between April 8-10. The informants
also alleged that over 120 prisoners had limbs methodically
broken before being transferred to other prisons. Furthermore,
it was alleged that no food was provided to the prisoners in
the jail during this period.
The incidents at Dhaka central jail drew relatively little
press attention. The Government publicly denied the
allegations of prisoner abuse. Reacting to a series of letters
from human rights groups and some individuals, the Government
issued an official press release on April 22 describing the
charges as "baseless." It maintained that only two prisoners
were killed during an escape attempt on April 9. The alleged
incidents occurred immediately prior to the transfer of former
President Ershad to Dhaka's central jail. The prison had
experienced prolonged recurrent unrest since late 1990 as
prisoners reacted to the atmosphere of "liberation" outside the
prison walls .
Three classes of prison facilities exist. Class "C"
cells — which generally hold common criminals, suspected
terrorists, and low-level political workers — are the worst.
1355
BANGLADESH
They often have dirt floors, no furnishings, and poor quality
food, and the use of hauidcuffs and fetters is common.
Prisoners in these cells reportedly suffer the most abuse, such
as beatings and being forced to kneel for long periods.
Conditions in "B" and "A" cells are markedly better, with the
latter reserved for "prominent" persons. Former President
Ershad, who was transferred from a house designated as a
subjail in a residential area to Dhaka's central jail in April,
is being detained in an "A" type cell.
Mistreatment of ordinary citizens frequently goes unpunished,
but police and jail officials involved in mistreating prisoners
are sometimes disciplined in cases where the victim or his
family and friends can attract publicity or persuade human
rights groups to investigate the allegations. An inquiry by a
five-member Citizens' Inquiry Commission headed by a former
District Bar Association president has found that three police
officials were responsible for shooting at students protesting
against the Ershad regime. As a result of this incident, two
students were killed. In a follow-up to the Inquiry Commission
report, a case has been filed in the Mymensingh Sadar court,
and a one-man committee of inquiry has been formed. Despite
increased public awareness, however, abuses continue. Reports
persisted of abusive treatment of citizens by a variety of
lower level government officials, party bosses, and labor
leaders. This treatment included the use of violence and the
threat of violence.
The Government has not interfered with human rights groups'
inquiries into cases of prisoner abuse but seldom undertakes
its own investigation and seldom punishes those responsible for
such abuses. Apparently in response to reports of prisoner
abuse, the Home Affairs Minister now rec[uires a magistrate's
investigation of any deaths in police custody.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under the Special Powers Act of 1974 (SPA), the Government may
detain a person without charge for an initial period of 30 days
to prevent the commission of "any prejudicial act" as loosely
defined in the legislation. The Government is obligated to
charge the detainee formally by the end of this period or
release him if it fails to file a charge. The person can
legally be held until completion of an investigation if the
Government brings a charge. In practice, though not in law,
the detainee has 15 days to respond to the specific charge in
writing to the Home Affairs Ministry, which can grant early
release. Detentions under the SPA are not subject to judicial
review imtil after 6 months, at which time a committee of three
jurists examines the case to ascertain whether there is
sufficient reason to continue the detention. Although the
detainee is theoretically entitled to see a lawyer at the time
of detention, in practice a lawyer is generally not allowed to
see the detainee until a specific charge has been filed.
Although the BNP Government has pledged to repeal the SPA, no
action had been taken by year's end. While a number of SPA
detainees were released after the February elections, the
Government also used the SPA against figures in the former
Ershad regime. The Government uses the SPA in ordinary
criminal cases as well as in political cases. During a
parliamentary session in April, the number of SPA detainees was
put at 1,375, a decrease from the 3,301 registered as of
October 1990. On January 20, a three-man government advisory
board headed by a Supreme Court justice was reconstituted to
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review all SPA detainees' cases. By February, it had reviewed
166 cases and released 141 detainees. The board discontinued
its activities subsequently but has issued no report on its
actions, nor has it put forward any recommendations.
The right of a detainee to a judicial determination of the
legality of his detention exists in local law. Bangladeshi
legal and human rights organizations, however, continue to
report cases of suspects who were arrested on minor charges but
who remained in jail for long periods without trial.
There were no reports of persons being exiled in 1991.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Supreme Court is generally considered to act independently
in most cases. Civilian courts hear civil and criminal cases
in public trials, and the right of counsel is respected.
Criminal courts are considered to be rife with corruption.
Though generally considered fair, civil courts are overburdened
and effectively available only to those who can afford
representation. The time-consuming and expensive process of
pursuing cases discourages many from seeking redress though the
courts. There are few legal aid programs to assist litigants
and no public defenders. In January the Government amended the
Code of Criminal Procedure to help speed up the trial process
and alleviate the associated hardships for prisoners awaiting
trial. The new ordinance requires magistrates to conclude
trials within 120 days from the date on which they first
receive the case and gives midlevel judges no more than 240
days to try a case. However, a shortage of judges and courts
and a backlog of over 500,000 criminal and civil cases make
longer delays a common occurrence. Prominent lawyers believe
there is little chance these backlogs will be cleared.
Former President Ershad was convicted and sentenced to 10
years' imprisonment in June for illegal possession of weapons.
Other cases against him, and against members of his regime, for
corruption are currently being tried. Ershad has been
represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. His trial
is open to the press and public and appears to conform to
standard Bangladesh legal practice. Some of Ershad' s prison
privileges have been revoked because of his purported attempts
to pass messages and funds to his supporters.
The Government claims to hold no political prisoners. Some of
those being held under the SPA may be considered political
prisoners. Three members of the Chittagong Hill Tracts
People's Council currently detained under the SPA fall in this
category. The number of political prisoners has been
significantly reduced since the fall of the Ershad government,
during which it was estimated to be in the hundreds.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Bangladesh law ordinarily requires a judicial warrant before
authorities enter a home, and courts require evidence
supporting a reasonable suspicion before issuing a warrant.
However, the SPA permits authorities to search premises without
a warrant under certain circumstances, and authorities have in
the past entered the homes of opposition leaders and human
rights activists and detained persons and searched their
premises without warrants. The Government's civilian and
military intelligence services are widely believed to monitor
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the opposition by such means as selective wiretaps and
interception of mail.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
A Bangladeshi tribal insurgent group called the Shanti Bahini
(Peace Force) has been engaged in a low-level conflict with
Bangladesh security forces in the; Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)
since 1973. The insurgency is sustained by the tribal people's
fears that their traditional way of life and special status in
the hill areas are being undermined by Bengali settlers from
the overpopulated plains. Religious differences between the
predominantly non-Muslim tribals and the Muslim settlers is a
contributing factor to the conflict.
The Government is attempting to address tribal grievances by
establishing and supporting elected district councils and by
discouraging further settlement. The issues of greatest
concern to the tribals — control over land and law and
order — have yet to be completely devolved upon the councils,
however. The Government since 1985 has tried to discourage
Bengali settlement in the hill tracts, and there has been no
further large-scale systematic settlement. Individual Bengalis
continue to settle in the CHT, however. Although there are no
precise figures available, the number of Bengalis residing in
the hill tracts continues to grow. In 1947, when British
colonialism ended, only 3 percent of the CHT ' s inhabitants were
Bengali. At present, Bengalis make up 45 percent of the CHT's
population.
Both the Shanti Bahini and the Government accuse each other of
human rights violations. Access to the hill tracts is limited
by government travel restrictions, difficult terrain, and the
unsafe travel conditions caused by the ongoing insurgency,
making it difficult to verify allegations of atrocities. In
the past, Shanti Bahini attacks on Bengali settlers have led to
reprisal attacks by Bengalis on tribal settlements. In 1991
the security forces remained under strict government orders to
prevent such reprisals. Human rights groups continue to report
reprisal killings and torture in the CHT, including some that
allegedly occurred during 1991. While some of these reports
seem credible, it is not possible to confirm them.
The number of complaints of human rights violations by the
Bangladesh military in the Hill Tracts have declined
considerably since 1987, when reprisal attacks were at their
height. Human rights groups continue to monitor the Chittagong
Hill Tracts situation closely and to encourage the Government
to safeguard the rights of tribal people. There was a lull in
Shanti Bahini activity following the change of government in
December 1990. This lull ended abruptly in June 1991, when the
Shanti Bahini mounted a number of attacks against Bengali
settlers and security forces. These attacks were viewed by
many observers as an attempt to disrupt the Government's local
autonomy program. Despite a respite in Shanti Bahini attacks
later in 1991, dozens of Shanti Bahini fighters, security
personnel, and both tribal and Bengali civilians were killed in
1991.
There are varying estimates as to the numbers of Bangladeshi
tribal refugees residing in India. The Government of India and
other observers claim that as late as 1989 there were 70,000.
The Bangladesh Government has disputed this figure, claiming
that there were never more than 40,000 such refugees. All
1358
BANGLADESH
observers agree that the number has steadily declined over the
past 2 years. The actual number returning to Bangladesh is
difficult to verify, however, with estimates varying between
3,000 and 15,000. There are also competing claims regarding
the treatment of the returned refugees . The Government has
announced an ambitious rehabilitation program which includes
subsidies, housing, and job training. Some tribals charge,
however, that the army is concentrating returnees in camps with
little opportiinity to work, thus perpetuating dependence on the
national government.
In 1990 and 1991, a group of European, Canadian, and Australian
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) under the name
"Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission" sent a mission to
Bangladesh and India to investigate allegations of human rights
violations in the CHT. The Commission's report, issued in May
1991, was the first attempt at a concise report on the human
rights situation in the CHT. The report was critical of some
aspects of the Bangladesh Government's past and present
policies. The Government has disputed some of the Commission's
claims, and it has become the subject of some controversy. The
report has also been criticized as one-sided and as overstating
government misdeeds.
Chief among the Commission's conclusions is that the Bangladesh
Government has militarized all facets of life in the CHT and is
destroying its tribal society and culture, as well as its
indigenous economy, by concentrating the population, tribal and
settler, into cluster villages as part of the government
counter insurgency strategy. The Commission also concludes that
government development and agricultural programs are causing
grave ecological damage to the area, destroying the habitat of
the tribal peoples. While the Commission notes that all
parties to the conflict suffer violence and human rights abuse,
it is most critical of the effects of continued settlement and
government policies on the indigenous tribal peoples of the
Tracts .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and expression
and freedom of the press, subject to "reasonable restrictions"
in the interest of national security, international relations,
public order, decency, and morality. In practice, previous
governments have used a variety of means to attempt to control
the press. These have included formal and informal censorship,
"guidance" from the press information department, temporary
closures of newspapers, control of newsprint, and arrest or
intimidation of journalists.
Most private publications are heavily dependent upon
advertisements from the Government or government-owned
corporations. These advertisements reportedly account for as
much as 75 percent of advertising revenues. All newspapers are
theoretically eligible to receive public sector advertising if
they meet minimum circulation requirements. Publishers
complain, however, that the placing and withholding of
advertising, as well as payment for it, can be used as a means
of influencing the press.
Under the new Government, speech and the press are much freer.
The Prime Minister is directly criticized by the opposition
press, as are government policies. There is no overt
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BANGLADESH
censorship — no newspapers have been seized or shut down since
the new Government took power. The practice of providing
"guidance" in the form of calls to editors from government
officials reportedly has not been wholly eliminated but is said
to be used much less often than in the past.
The Government still wields immense power through the placing
or withholding of ads in publications. During 1991, the
Government denied advertisements to Doinik Janata, the Jatiya
Party's newspaper. The Government contended that it was simply
balancing favorable treatment received by the paper under the
previous government. During November, however, a limited
number of government ads began to appear in the Doinik Janata,
indicating a degree of change in this policy. The Freedom
Party's newspaper Meillat, which has an editorial column
devoted almost solely to criticism of the Government, continues
to receive advertisements, as do other parties' newspapers.
According to some journalists, self-censorship is now practiced
not out of fear of the Government, but out of fear for it.
Papers are hesitant to jeopardize the fragile democracy by
being too critical in their reporting. The example of Meillat
notwithstanding, papers generally are still reluctant to
criticize the Government too frequently.
In a move welcomed by journalists, the Government repealed in
February the portion of the SPA that allowed the closure of
newspapers by government decree. This statute was used by the
Ershad regime during the protest movement of 1990. Now the
Government must go through legal channels to close a newspaper,
which it did not do in 1991.
The atmosphere in the media is generally positive, with new
publications appearing almost daily. There are now
approximately 100 daily publications and 350 weeklies and
periodicals. The Government owns two daily newspapers,
including one English- language daily, and one Rajshahi daily.
The Government also owns BSS, the national news service. The
other wire service, the United News of Bangladesh, is privately
owned.
There have been no substantial changes in the broadcast media.
Radio and television are still the exclusive province of the
Government. As with the print media, the Jatiya Party is not
given equal treatment by the broadcast media. For example,
their candidates were not allowed access to television during
the parliamentary campaigns, though other parties did not face
this restriction.
Although 56 foreign publications (18 dailies and 38
periodicals) are generally available in Bangladesh, the
Government has sometimes used the Customs Act of 1969 to
prevent the importation of foreign publications for various
reasons. The government ban on the book "The Satanic Verses"
remains in effect. No foreign journalists were arrested,
barred from entry, or expelled in 1991. Academic liberties are
not challenged. Teachers and students enjoy free expression.
Drama groups are required to obtain official approval to
perform. Films are censored for pornography, and South African
and Israeli films are still banned.
In May the new Government passed the Penal Code (Amendment)
Bill, 1991 over the heavy opposition of all the opposition
parties. This bill not only increased criminal penalties for a
number of offenses, but it contains a clause specifying that
anyone who "by words either spoken or written, or .. .publishes
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BANGLADESH
or circulates any statement, rumor, or report, which is, or
which is likely to be, prejudicial to the interest of the
security of Bangladesh or public order..." shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years, or
with fine, or with both." There were no convictions under this
section of the Penal Code in 1991, however.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Permits are not required for public meetings. Sit-ins,
marches, and rallies are common forms of political expression
in Bangladesh. Occasionally they lead to violence, with both
the demonstrators and the police accusing each other of
provocation.
The Constitution assures every citizen the right to form
associations, subject to "reasonable restrictions" in the
interest of morality or public order. In practice, individuals
are free to join private organizations and associations. There
are no restrictions on affiliations with international
organizations .
c. Freedom of Religion
Bangladesh, 87 percent of whose people are Muslims, has
recognized Islam as its state religion since the passage in
June 1988 of the Eighth Constitutional Amendment. This
amendment also states that all other religions may be freely
practiced. Although conversion is possible, there is strong
social resistance to conversion from Islam. Most proselytizing
by Bangladeshi citizens is directed toward such minority groups
as Hindus and tribal people. Proselytizing by Bangladeshi
citizens is permitted by the Constitution. Members of
religious minorities have reported being questioned by security
authorities about proselytizing. In one case, two "Messianic
Muslims" were imprisoned in 1990 in Bogra under Section 295(a)
of the Bangladesh Penal Code under charges of "outraging the
religious feelings of Bangladeshi citizens." While the two
were released on bail in February, their case is still pending
at the High Court level . The present Government has not
continued the policy of interfering with this group.
Government policy continues to permit various religions to
establish places of worship, train clergy, travel for religious
purposes, and maintain links with coreligionists abroad.
Missionaries, including foreign clergy who serve expatriate
congregations, are permitted, but they may not proselytize
Muslims. Some missionaries perceive the various obstacles they
face, including lengthy delays in obtaining or renewing
security clearances and residence and reentry visas, as
intended to curb Christian influence by reducing the number of
missionaries and limiting their humanitarian activities.
Despite official assurances of freedom of religion and equality
of treatment, the establishment of Islam as the state religion
continues to cause concern among Hindu, Christian, and Buddhist
minorities. Some minority group members still complain that
this constitutional change has emboldened some Muslims who are
hostile to the minorities, as well as criminal elements who may
prey on them.
In January, following the outbreak of hostilities in the
Persian Gulf, there were reports of violence directed against
Christians. There were sporadic incidents of communal strife,
including attacks on churches and Christian institutions. Some
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BANGLADESH
Christian nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) were harassed
by antiwar demonstrators. The Government acted quickly to
restore order.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Coxintry, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation.
Bangladeshi citizens are free to move about within the country,
except in designated areas of the CHT. Travel by foreigners is
also restricted in the CHT and some other border areas.
Bangladeshis are generally free to visit and emigrate abroad,
subject to foreign exchange controls, but civil servants
wishing to travel abroad must obtain permission from the
President's office. In some instances, persons considered to
be security risks are barred from traveling abroad.
Following the fall of the Ershad regime, the former President,
his family, and senior members of the regime were barred from
leaving the country. This restriction remained in effect in
1991. The passports of those subject to these restrictions
were confiscated by the Government, even though the Supreme
Court in July 1990 had declared illegal the seizure in 1986 of
a former Member of Parliament's passport. The right of
repatriation is observed.
More than 250,000 non-Bengali Muslims, known as Biharis or
"stranded Pakistanis," remain in Bangladesh pending
resettlement in Pakistan. After independence in 1971, these
persons opted for Pakistani citizenship, and Pakistan agreed to
accept them, provided financing for resettlements costs was
made available from outside sources. A Saudi Arabia-based
social organization has been trying for several years to raise
money for this purpose and claims that sufficient funds could
be found if permission were granted for the Biharis to
resettle. The Biharis, most of whom still reside in 66 camps
throughout Bangladesh, may seek employment and conduct other
activities, but they face disadvantages as noncitizens.
Biharis may apply for Bangladeshi citizenship at any time, and
those who do are granted full rights of citizenship.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens of Bangladesh exercised this right in the
parliamentary elections on February 27 and the September 15
referendiam on the Constitution. Under the Ershad regime,
violence at the polls and questions about the impartiality of
voting officials led various opposition parties to boycott
elections. The February parliamentary elections, by contrast,
were relatively free of these impediments.
The Government, under the leadership of the acting president,
took extraordinary measures to provide security and ensure the
integrity of the voting process. Candidates from dozens of
political parties competed in 300 constituencies on election
day. Both international and domestic observer groups praised
the holding of the elections, calling it the freest and fairest
in Bangladesh's history. Minor irregularities which did occur
appeared due to the short preparation time provided to the
election commission.
The BNP emerged from the election with a plurality of seats in
the Parliament, and was invited to form a government.
Following lengthy debate, a decision was reached to return to a
parliamentary form of government. The constitutional amendment
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BANGLADESH
bill was passed unanimously, and the general electorate
overwhelmingly supported this change in a September 15
referendum.
On September 11, by-elections were held in 11 constituencies to
fill seats vacated by candidates who had won multiple seats in
the February elections and one seat vacated by the death of the
incumbent. These elections also appeared free and fair,
although the incidence of violence increased.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are a number of local human rights organizations which
investigate allegations of abuse and seek prosecution of human
rights violators. Human rights groups are also active in
promoting awareness of human rights and law among the country's
largely uneducated rural majority. Although the Government
generally does not hamper these groups' activities, it
occasionally reminds them to avoid "sensitive" political issues
such as the CHT issue.
Following an August 1991 meeting of the independent Bangladesh
Human Rights Commission, two members of a local human rights
group were detained by security forces under the SPA. They
were questioned about their links with foreign embassies in
Bangladesh and about their efforts to distribute copies of the
CHT Commission report entitled "Life is Not Ours." According
to their statements, 1,000 copies of the report were
confiscated by the security forces. A local human rights
lawyer has challenged this seizure in a writ submitted to the
Supreme Court .
The Government remains sensitive to international opinion
regarding human rights issues. Although there were no visits
to Bangladesh in 1991 by representatives of Amnesty
International (AI) or similar groups, the Government responded
to inquiries by AI regarding the incidents in Dhaka's central
jail in April. When security conditions permit, the Government
has allowed occasional escorted visits to the CHT by members of
the diplomatic corps. Similarly, members of the CHT Commission
were given permission to visit the region.
International human rights organizations represented in
Bangladesh include the International League for Human Rights,
The Law Association for Asia and the Western Pacific, and The
International Commission of Jurists.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status.
By custom and local Islamic tradition, women occupy a
subordinate place in society. A family's ability to seclude
its women is a symbol of rising social status. These
underlying attitudes and social barriers circumscribing the
participation of women in activities beyond the home are
strongly entrenched and show few signs of weakening. For the
approximately 86 percent of Bangladeshi women who live in rural
areas, early marriage, high childbearing rates, and long hours
of household and farm labor leave little opportunity for
nonfamily interests or outside employment. Even in urban areas
and among the affluent, the traditional social system makes
women economically dependent upon their husbands and other male
relatives. Except in the export -oriented garment industry.
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BANGLADESH
women are virtually absent from the cash-earning work force.
There are daily press reports of domestic violence against^
women: murder, rape and other physical abuse, breach of /
matrimonial contract, denial of inheritance rights, and
desertion. There have also been reports of Bangladeshi women
being lured into travel to foreign countries, where they have
been sold into prostitution. The suicide rate among women is
reportedly higher than among men.
Laws to protect women include the Anti-Dowry Prohibition Act of
1980, the Cruelty to Women Act of 1983, the Child Marriage
Restraint Act of 1984, and the Illegal Trafficking in Women Act
of 1988. Enforcement of these laws continues to be lax,
however. It is a capital offense to traffic in women, to kill
a woman in the course of rape, or to murder a woman for dowry.
Even so, dowry killings, in which the husband or his family
attack and sometimes murder the bride for nonpayment of a
supposedly promised dowry, are said to occur frequently,
especially in rural areas.
The National Advisory Committee Against Repression of Women has
established local branches in rural areas to address the
problem of abused women. Nevertheless, there is still little
recourse for victims of crimes committed within the family or
home and, although newspapers occasionally print reports in
which a husband accused of dowry killing is tried and punished,
the vast majority of these cases are believed to go unreported
and unpunished.
Members of minority religious groups are disadvantaged in
practice, though not in the law, and their access to government
jobs, including in the military, and political office is
limited. Despite the fact that minorities account for 13
percent of the population, only 12 members of the current
Parliament, including 1 woman, are from minority groups. In
the years immediately following Bangladesh's independence,
members of some minorities, principally Hindus, lost or had
serious difficulty retaining their properties as a result of
the prejudicial administration of vested property laws. These
laws permitted the Government to use or even sell property
belonging to persons who left what is now Bangladesh between
1965 and 1971. Although President Ershad reaffirmed a 1984
executive order requiring the return of such property to the
original owners, in practice this order has not been widely
followed, and some human rights activists contend that property
is still occasionally seized under these laws.
Violation of tribal people's property rights in the CHT has
been an issue in the past, but there have been no reports of
such violations in the past 4 years. In addition to suspending
the transfer of land after 1985, the Government has taken other
steps to grant authority over land allocations and regulation
to the tribal-dominated local government councils. Although
the Government announced in July that all remaining local
government responsibilities were transferred to these councils,
the decision has not yet been implemented. Even with such
improvements, many tribal people remain concerned about their
ability to retain their distinct culture in the face of
incessant pressure from the dominant Bengali culture.
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Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for the right of association as well
as the right to form labor unions, subject to government
approval. Of Bangladesh's approximately 40 million workers,
only some 3 million are in the industrial sector. Agricultural
workers remain outside organized labor. As a result only 3.4
percent of the labor force is unionized. Labor unions are most
powerful in the jute, tea, and transportation sectors. The
law, however, prohibits civil servants and workers employed in
the Chittagong Export Processing Zone (EPZ) from forming trade
unions. These workers have formed "staff associations",
however, which perform many of the functions of unions. For
example, civil servant staff associations organized a strike in
August which resulted in large wage increases. The Government
has the legal right to suspend unions but took no such action
in 1991.
Unions are free, within the restrictions noted above, to draw
up their own constitutions and rules, elect officers, develop
programs, and conduct business without government *
interference. However, the large number of rival unions tends
to fracture labor solidarity and inhibit effective union
activity.
In addition to criticizing the prohibition of trade union
activity by public servants and workers in export processing
zones, the International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of
Experts expressed its continuing concern about restrictions on
the range of persons that can hold office in trade unions, the
extent of supervision in the internal affairs of trade unions,
the "30 percent" requirement for initial or continued
registration of trade unions, and other issues.
Although there are no restrictions on forming confederations or
affiliating with international organizations (all three
worldwide trade union federations have local affiliates), union
members need government clearance to travel to international
labor meetings. No such clearances were withheld in 1991.
The right to strike is not specifically recognized in the law
but is an accepted and common form of protest. Numerous
strikes were held in 1991. The Essential Services Ordinance of
1958 permits the Government to bar strikes for 3 months in any
sector deemed "essential," and the Government has occasionally
applied this authority in sectors not normally deemed essential.
The overwhelming majority of labor unions and federations are
associated with, and dominated by political parties. As a
result, union activities are often carried out in support of
political agendas, rather than the needs of the members. The
largest single labor organization is traditionally that of the
ruling party. With the resignation of H.M. Ershad as President
in late 1990 and the subsequent election of the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) Government, many workers abandoned the
pro-Ershad federation to join that of the BNP.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to collective bargaining is limited by law, in that
public sector employees cannot form unions or bargain
collectively. Except in the EPZ, unions in the private sector
can generally bargain collectively without government
1365
BANGLADESH
interference. Union activity in the EPZ has been suspended
since 1985, although there have been several reports of ad hoc
strikes in the EPZ which have not resulted in government
sanctions against the workers involved.
The Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969, amended in November
1989 on the basis of proposals made by a tripartite
consultative committee, places additional curbs on workers. It
allows employers to transfer union officials, with the
exception of the union president and executive treasurer,
without their consent. Ordinary workers have full
participatory rights in union business in theory, but some
union officials and employers often violate them in practice.
Union leaders allegedly make decisions without consulting
members, and allegations regarding improper union elections
have been lodged.
Employers are frequently accused of ignoring laws prohibiting
antiunion discrimination, harassment of union leaders, and the
firing of union activists. Although laws against such
practices exist, the difficulties of prosecuting a court case
against an employer discourage union attempts to have them
enforced. Allegations of employer abuses have been especially
prevalent in the garment industry, where most workers are
female. There have also been allegations of illegal activities
by unionists, including lock-ins of company management and
wildcat strikes.
The ILO's Committee of Experts continued to express concern
about the Government's practice of setting wage rates and
conditions through wage commissions, denial of the right of
workers to engage in collective bargaining, and other issues.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor. This
prohibition is generally respected, although there have been
unverified reports of bonded labor on some tea and rubber
plantations. This prohibition is not effectively enforced by
labor inspection. The Government actively seeks to prevent the
trafficking of bonded laborers into other South Asian countries.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Sanctioned by tradition and encouraged by dire economic
necessity, child labor is a serious problem. Employment of
children under the age of 14 has been banned for decades under
numerous labor statutes, but enforcement remains lax. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics has estimated the number of child
laborers at approximately 3 million, although informed
observers assert the number is higher. There is a mandatory
primary education law which specifies that each child must
attend school through fifth grade.
Legal minimum ages for various types of employment are seldom
enforced, and children are regularly engaged in all available
jobs. Children pedal rickshaws, serve as domestic servants,
work in great numbers in agriculture, and are found in textile
mills and garment factories. Bangladesh has ratified the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Government has
taken a number of steps designed to reduce child labor,
including the passage of a mandatory primary education bill in
January 1990. Government efforts to control child labor have
yet to have a serious impact, however, in large part because
child labor still constitutes a major income source for many
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families. The Government has so far proven incapable of
providing the expanded educational and social programs required
to solve the problem.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Many Bangladeshis live at below subsistence levels.
Bangladeshi workers able to procure industrial jobs can provide
their fcimilies with a rudimentary standard of living considered
higher than average.
Although Bangladesh labor law contains detailed provisions
regarding minimum wage rates, hours of work, and occupational
safety and health, these are rarely enforced. The Factories
Act of 1965 and the Shops and Establishments Act of 1965 limit
normal working hours to a maximum of 8 hours per day and 48
hours per week. With overtime, the workweek may not legally
exceed 60 hours.
There is no nationwide minimum wage as such. A minimum wage
commission sets minimum wages within each industry and
specialty, but private sector industrial units rarely follow
this wage structure. Under Bangladesh law, an employer who
does not pay the required minimum wage is subject to fines and
imprisonment of up to 1 year, but few employers are prosecuted
for violating this law. The law also stipulates that overtime
work is to be compensated by double the hourly rate, but with
little practical effect.
The Labor Ministry's Industrial Inspectorate is charged with
insuring the enforcement of Bangladesh labor laws relating to
the working environment and prosecuting those in violation.
However, safety equipment and precautions are largely unknown,
and the small number of safety inspectors are frequently
untrained, underpaid, and unable to conduct an adequate
enforcement program. This has resulted in an extremely low
prosecution rate. A 1989 ILO survey concluded that
Bangladeshiemployers generally pay little attention to safety,
health, cleanliness, and the working environment.
1367
BHUTAN*
The Wangchuck dynasty of hereditary monarchs has ruled Bhutan
since 1907. Isolated in the Himalayas between India and Tibet,
the small Kingdom has been able to escape domination by any
external power since the 10th century. King Jigme Dorji
Wangchuck (1952-72) took steps to move the Kingdom from
centuries of medieval seclusion toward a more representative
political system, a more productive economy, and ties with
other countries. Although he retained strong executive powers,
the King created several important institutions, including the
National Assembly (1953), the Royal Advisory Council (1965),
and the Council of Ministers (1968), to provide broader
participation in the Government. Serfdom was abolished, land
reform introduced, laws codified, and the judiciary separated
from the executive. There is no written constitution or bill
of rights. The present monarch, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, who
has held power since 1974, has continued Bhutan's social and
political evolution, although progress has been seriously
handicapped by the Kingdom's limited administrative capacity
and resources and, more recently, by ethnic tensions in the
south. Buddhists constitute approximately half of the
population, roughly divided between the ruling Drukpas and the
Sarchokpas; at least a third of the population, mostly from the
southern districts, is of Nepali Hindu ethnic origin.
Internal security is maintained by the Royal Bhutan Police. It
is assisted in this function by the Royal Bhutan Army, which
consists of 8,000 lightly armed men.
Calculating national income statistics for Bhutan is doubly
difficult. Government officials now acknowledge that the
official population figure of 1.4 million is greatly
exaggerated; the actual number is between 600,000 and 700,000.
This change alone would double the official per capita income
figure, raising Bhutan from its status as the poorest country
in South Asia to a position on a relative par with India. Even
this figure is deceptive, however, since the largely rural
population grows much of its own food and the ratio of man to
land is the lowest in South Asia. Bhutan is dependent on
foreign aid to cover much of its development costs; India is
the principal donor. The large majority of the population is
illiterate and rural, living on subsistence agriculture and
pastoral pursuits in a largely barter economy. Bhutan
continues to restrict access by the outside world in the hope
of minimizing the spread of foreign influences. The number of
tourists is limited strictly to 3,000 a year.
The human rights situation in Bhutan in 1991 showed further
deterioration due to government implementation of a nationality
law, which resulted in the expulsion of several thousand ethnic
Nepalese, as well as a code of "Bhutanization. " A resistance
movement gained strength among ethnic Nepalese in the south who
view these policies as an effort by the Government to suppress
their ethnic and cultural identity and to drive many of them
out of the country. Major human rights problems in 1991
♦Bhutan and the Uni;;ed States have not exchanged diplomatic
representatives, and U.S. officials travel there infrequently.
Since few scholars have published studies on the contemporary
Bhutanese polity or society, information on Bhutanese practices
which bear on human rights is neither readily available nor
complete .
1368
BHUTAN
included denial of the right of citizens to change their
government; limitations on the right to a fair public trial;
restrictions on freedoms of speech and press, peaceful
association and assembly, and worker rights. There were also
credible reports of arbitrary arrests, beatings, torture, rape,
robberies, and other forms of intimidation by police and army
officials of ethnic Nepalese suspected of supporting the
resistance movement. It appeared that dissidents also were
guilty of serious human rights abuses, including beating,
kidnaping, and killing government officials and suspected
informers, as well as using intimidation and extortion against
those who do not support their cause. Thousands of ethnic
Nepalese have fled the turmoil in southern Bhutan to Nepal and
India since the middle of 1990.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The People's Forum for Human Rights (PFHR), an organization of
ethnic-Nepali Bhutanese which operates primarily in Nepal,
claimed to have documented cases in which six ethnic Nepalese
women died following a gang rape by members of the army. In
addition, it accused government forces of both the execution of
targeted dissidents and the indiscriminate killing of innocent
ethnic Nepalese in retaliation for antigovernment actions by
dissidents. The Government denied such accusations and pointed
to an order by the King for police and army forces not to use
lethal force when dealing with dissidents or demonstrators as
evidence of its desire to avoid bloodshed. The Government
accused dissidents of carrying on a reign of terror in the
south, including arson, bombings, and assassinations which
resulted in the deaths of civilians, government officials, and
members of the police and army. There was no independent
confirmation of any of these claims.
b. Disappearance
The PFHR as well as Nepali and Indian human rights groups
interviewed hundreds of ethnic Nepalese both in southern Bhutan
and in Nepal and India. They reported widespread instances
since September 1990 of police and army forces rounding up men
suspected of supporting the resistance movement. The PFHR
claimed that hundreds of these men were never seen again after
being taken away; it presumed they were either being held by
the Government without charge or had been killed. These claims
could not be confirmed; however, the consistency of stories
among so many people, most of whom have fled Bhutan, lent
credence to their charges. The Government denied such
disappearances took place; it accused the PFHR and other
organizations such as the Bhutan People's Party and the
Students' Union of Bhutan of carrying out antinational
propaganda campaigns.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Ethnic Nepali refugees in India and Nepal recounted to human
rights groups hundreds of cases in which police and army forces
allegedly had beaten, raped, and robbed suspected supporters of
the resistance and their families. These stories could not be
confirmed but appeared credible based on the number of similar
1369
BHUTAN
accounts. The PFHR also claimed that government authorities
regularly tortured detainees and prisoners; the Government
denied these allegations.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There were no reports of arbitrary arrest and detention in
1991. As far as is known, exile is not used as a form of
punishment .
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Criminal cases and a variety of civil matters are adjudicated
under an 18th century legal code, revised in 1957, which
applies to all Bhutanese regardless of ethnic origin. Judges
appointed by and accountable to the King are responsible for
all aspects of a case, including investigation, filing of
charges, prosecution, and judgment of the defendant. The
judicial system consists of local, district, and national
courts. Appeals to higher courts are permitted, and final
appeals may be made to the King. The legal system does not
provide for jury trials or the right to a court-appointed
defense attorney. Prosecuting and defense attorneys are
generally not available because the number of lawyers in the
country is insufficient to serve in these capacities.
Questions of family law, such as marriage, divorce, and
adoption, are resolved separately according to the traditional
Buddhist law for the majority of Bhutanese and according to
Hindu law in areas where persons of Nepali origin predominate.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There are no written guarantees of privacy, but cultural
tradition is highly respectful of personal privacy. At the
same time, the Government places great emphasis on promoting
national integration. For example, under a 1989 decree, the
wearing of Drukpa national dress was made compulsory for all
citizens. Anyone found violating the decree may be fined about
$10 or sentenced to jail for a week. From all reports, there
is a degree of tolerance for noncompliance in urban areas, but
in other parts, particularly in the south, officials appear to
enforce the decree more rigorously.
According to human rights groups, police regularly conducted
house-to-house searches for suspected dissidents without
offering explanations or justifications.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
With an adult literacy rate of around 12 percent, Bhutan's
population is relatively unaffected by the print media. The
Government's weekly newspaper Kuensel is the country's only
regular publication. Indian and other foreign newspapers and
publications are distributed without apparent government
control. Bhutan has no television. In 1989 the Government
ordered the dismantling of all television antennas to prevent
the people from watching programs originating outside Bhutan.
The government radio station broadcasts for 3 hours daily in
the four major national languages. Criticism of the King is
permitted in the National Assembly but not in the public
media. The use of the Nepalese language in schools was banned
1370
BHUTAN
at the end of 1990. As a result of ethnic unrest in the area,
most public schools in the south were closed throughout 1991.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
No written guarantees of these freedoms exist. Bhutanese may
engage in peaceful assembly and association for purposes
approved by the Government. However, political parties are
discouraged, and there are no private voluntary social,
communal, or economic associations and no professional or trade
organizations. The Bhutan People's Party (BPP), organized by
Nepali-origin Bhutanese, has been labeled "terrorist and
antinational" by the Government.
c. Freedom of Religion
Buddhism is the state religion of Bhutan. The Government
subsidizes monasteries and shrines and provides aid to about
half of the Kingdom's 12,000 monks. The monastic establishment
enjoys statutory representation in the National Assembly and
Royal Advisory Council and is an influential voice on public
policy. Citizens of other faiths, largely Hindus, enjoy
freedom of worship but may not proselytize (under Bhutanese
law, conversions are illegal). The King has declared major
Hindu festivals to be national holidays, and the royal family
participates in them. Foreign missionaries are not permitted
to proselytize in the Kingdom, nor were there any resident in
Bhutan in 1991.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There is freedom of movement within Bhutan for all Bhutanese
citizens and no bar on emigration or foreign travel. For many
years, Bhutanese traveled little inside or outside the Kingdom,
but the recent construction of roads and the establishment of
air links with New Delhi, Calcutta, Dhaka, and Kathmandu have
encouraged travel. Bhutan's southern border with India is
open, and there is free movement across this border of people
residing in the immediate areas. Indians from other regions
who enter Bhutan by airplane or stay in hotels must have visas
and fall under the overall limitation of 3,000 tourists per
year .
Since 1986, Bhutan has been conducting a drive to identify
illegal immigrants by implementing a nationality law which
requires people to document that they or their families have
been residing in Bhutan since 1958 or before. Those who
qualify are granted citizenship; the others must register as
aliens and are subject to expulsion. In this process, about
10,000 foreigners have been expelled from the Kingdom, mostly
ethnic Nepalese. Many more have left because of the
Government's Bhutanization policies. They complain the law
makes unfair demands for 30-year-old documentation on largely
illiterate people in a country that has only recently adopted
basic administrative procedures. Human rights groups claim
many ethnic Nepalese known to have been in Bhutan for
generations face expulsion because they are unable to document
their claims to residence.
Bhutan traditionally has welcomed refugees and exiles from
other countries in the region. However, doubts about the
loyalty to Bhutan of Tibetan refugees prompted the Government
to rec[uire that they accept Bhutanese citizenship or face
expulsion. Many sought refuge in India. Tibetans who accepted
1371
BHUTAN
Bhutanese citizenship have been assured by the Government that
they will be free to return to their homeland. The Government,
however, no longer accepts new refugees from Tibet.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The citizens of Bhutan do not have the right to change their
government. Bhutan is a traditional monarchy, with sovereign
power vested in the King. It is a highly elitist system, with
decisionmaking centered in the palace and involving only a
small number of officials in the civil and religious
establishment. Although the present King and his father have
made attempts to integrate women and southerners (ethnic
Nepalese) into the body politic, the system is still dominated
by the male members of an aristocracy of Tibetan Buddhist
ancestry. Political parties do not exist, and their formation
is discouraged. The Bhutan People's Party (BPP), founded in
1989, was banned by the Government in 1990 and operates
primarily out of Nepal and India, supported by ethnic Nepalese
who have fled there. The BPP claims support in the
predominantly Nepali southern regions of Bhutan, but there are
no reliable reports on the party's actual membership.
The 150-member National Assembly is composed of 105 members
elected by limited franchise (heads of family in Hindu areas,
village headmen in Buddhist regions), 12 elected by the
monastic establishment, and 33 high-level officials of the
government administration appointed by the King. Its principal
functions are to enact laws, approve senior appointments in the
Government, and advise the King on matters of national
importance. It also provides a forum for presenting grievances
and rectifying cases of maladministration. Voting is by secret
ballot, with a simple majority needed to pass a measure.
The King cannot formally veto legislation passed by the
Assembly, but he can refer bills back to it for further
consideration. The Assembly occasionally has rejected the
King's recommendations or delayed their implementation, but the
King has always had enough influence to persuade the Assembly
to approve any legislation he considers essential or to
withdraw any proposed legislation he opposes. Government
officials may be questioned by the body, and ministers can be
forced to resign by a two-thirds vote of no confidence.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No nongovernmental human rights groups are known to exist in
Bhutan, and the Government would be likely to discourage their
formation. The PFHR, representing ethnic Nepalese dissident
opposition (see Section I.e.), claims to be based in Bhutan but
operates primarily from Nepal. Several international human
rights organizations, including Amnesty International, have
sought entry into Bhutan to investigate human rights
conditions. The Government has not permitted such visits; it
has, however, allowed foreign journalists to travel throughout
the country.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Although the Government over the past 10 years has adopted a
number of liberal measures that have benefited Bhutan's ethnic
1372
BHUTAN
Nepalese minority, more recently it has implemented a
nationality law and Bhutanization program which have had an
adverse and discriminatory impact on ethnic Nepalese. At the
root of this problem is the divisive issue of how to
accommodate the growing segment, estimated to be at least a
third of the population, of Nepali Hindu origin. The country's
Buddhist majority has long been concerned about being
outnumbered by immigrants from Nepal, as occurred in
neighboring Sikkim. In the past, the Government responded to
this concern by tightly limiting immigration and restricting
residence and employment of the Nepali population to the
southern part of the country. In an attempt to assimilate the
existing ethnic Nepalese, the Government liberalized certain
policies toward the Nepali minority by encouraging
intermarriage, educating some students in regions other than
their own, and giving priority to economic development of the
south. In the last decade, the King has allocated 2,500 acres
of land to 1,000 landless households in southern Bhutan, and
about 200 farmers and orange growers have been given special
loans, according to Bhutanese government sources. By law,
southerners may own land and establish business in the north,
and northerners have the same right in the south. Nonetheless
it is reportedly still difficult for non-Buddhist Bhutanese
(except government officials) to buy property in Buddhist
areas .
More young Bhutanese of Nepali origin are entering public
economic and administrative bodies, and laws concerning land
tenure and taxation in the south are being liberalized.
Although the language of instruction is English, there is a
requirement that Dzongkha, the language of the western
highlands, be taught in all schools, and this requirement is
said to disadvantage students from other areas. In addition,
instruction in Nepali has been terminated throughout the
country. Groups of ethnic Nepalese from Bhutan who are now
taking refuge in Nepal and India protest against "cultural
discrimination" and call for democratic reforms in Bhutan. The
size of these groups and the amount of support they attract in
southern Bhutan are not known.
Families with ties to the palace and senior levels of the
Government are strongly favored in their access to state
scholarships for foreign education. Nevertheless, the King is
making a serious effort to send other qualified candidates for
education overseas as well, drawing particularly from Bhutan's
prestigious civil bureaucracy.
Bhutan has not developed either a rigid caste system or customs
which sequester or disenfranchise women. Family land is
divided equally between sons and daughters. Bhutanese
traditionally place girls in a lower status than boys, however,
and girls receive poorer nutrition and less medical attention
than boys. Boys outnumber girls by about two to one in primary
school and seven to one at secondary level. The Government is
conscious of the disparity and has taken steps to encourage
equal treatment for girls and increased enrollment of girls at
school. The disparity between the higher mortality rates of
female versus male infants has resulted in an overall ratio of
97.2 females per 100 males, one of the lowest in the world.
The sexes mix relatively freely, marriages can be arranged by
partners themselves as well as by their parents, and divorce is
common. A man is allowed by law to have three wives, but
polyandry is no longer sanctioned. Legislation has been
enacted in recent years making marriage registration compulsory
1373
BHUTAN
and favoring women in matters of alimony. About 10 percent of
the persons employed by the various government ministries and
departments are women.
No reliable information is available on the extent to which
violence against women may be a problem in Bhutan.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Trade unionism is not permitted and Bhutan has no labor
unions. There are no export processing zones.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no collective bargaining or legislation addressing
labor-related issues pertaining to the small industrial work
force, which makes up less than 1 percent of the population.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
As far as is known, there is no law prohibiting forced or
compulsory labor, but it is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
There are no laws governing the employment of children.
Children are not employed in the industrial sector, but many
assist their families in the traditional economy.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
As noted above, there is no legislation addressing labor
issues. There is no legislated minimum wage, standard
workweek, or health and safety standards. Labor markets are
highly segmented by region, and monitoring wage developments is
inhibited by the preponderance of subsistence agriculture and
the practice of barter. The largest salaried labor market is
the government service, which has an administered wage
structure last revised in 1988. The shortage of labor in
Bhutan is such that the larger industrial firms, all of which
were established relatively recently, are organized along
modern lines and incorporate a considerable amount of
labor-saving technology. No industrial plant employs more than
60 to 70 workers. Apart from a few of these larger plants, the
entire industrial sector consists of home-based handicrafts and
some 60 privately owned small- or medium-scale factories
producing consumer goods.
1374
EGYPT
Egypt is a republic in which the President and his party, the
National Democratic Party (NDP), are the dominant political
forces. The NDP, in power since 1978, commands large
majorities in the two parliamentary bodies, the People's
Assembly and the Shura (Consultative) Council; three of the
eight legal opposition parties have some representation in the
Parliament. The Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, is
appointed by and responsible to che President. Mohammed Hosni
Mubarak was elected President by the People's Assembly in 1981
and reelected to a second 6-year term in July 1987. In
accordance with the Constitution, his reelection was affirmed
by a popular referendum.
The Ministry of Interior's General Directorate for State
Security Investigations (GDSSI) is the main domestic security
agency, although there are several other police forces. It
enforces the state of emergency and conducts most
investigations of domestic opponents of the Government. It has
been implicated in many reports of torture and abuse of
prisoners and detainees.
Egypt has a mixed economy dominated by an inefficient public
sector. The Government signed agreements with the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank in May to support
domestic economic reform calling for the reorganization or
privatization of state-owned companies, reduction of the budget
deficit, and letting the market determine currency and interest
rates. Rising prices and unemployment buffeted the economy in
1991, as incomes from tourism and worker remittances declined
during and following the Persian Gulf War.
Many basic human rights continued to be abused or significantly
restricted. The main problem areas included torture of some
detainees and the authorities' failure to punish the
perpetrators, the widespread practice of arbitrary detention
without due process under the state of emergency which has been
in effect since 1981. Given the dominance of the ruling
National Democratic Party over the People's Assembly, the Shura
Council, local governments, the mass media, labor, the large
public sector, and the licensing of new political parties,
newspapers, and private organizations, as a practical matter
the people do not have a meaningful ability to change the
government. Christians experienced discrimination by the
Government and Islamic militants, women continue to face
discrimination based on cultural traditions and some aspects of
the law, and there are important restrictions on worker rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of government- instigated killings for
political reasons in 1991; nor were there confirmed reports of
deaths of persons in official custody.
There continued to be instances in which the security forces
used lethal force against Islamic extremists, who were
sometimes armed. An estimated 8 extremists were killed in
clashes with police in 1991, down from an estimated 52 in
1990. Human rights observers maintain that security forces
have become accustomed to using lethal force quickly in these
1375
EGYPT
confrontations and usually do not give the warning prescribed
by law. In February police fired plastic bullets at anti-Gulf
War demonstrators at Cairo University, killing one student and
injuring others. There are unconfirmed press reports that
police may also have used lethal force to quell an anti-Coptic
riot in a Cairo suburb in September.
People's Assembly Speaker Rifaat al-Mahgoub was killed while he
was riding in a motorcade in downtown Cairo in October 1990.
Twenty-four members of the Islamic Jihad, a violent, extremist
group, are on trial, some in absentia, for the killing. In
August a witness testified that the defendants killed
al-Mahgoub by mistake, believing he was the Interior Minister.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of new disappearances in 1991, but a
report from the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR)
was published in July documenting the cases of three persons
who disappeared in recent years allegedly while in police
custody.
The disappearance of Zakariya Al-Sayed Bakr in January 1988 was
still unresolved. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Bakr
reportedly ignored government warnings to curb his activities
with the legally registered Progressive Unionist Party.
Mustafa Mohamed Abdel Hamid Othman, 23, a medical student at
Zagazig University, was arrested December 17, 1989, along with
an unknown number of suspected Islamic extremists, the day
after an attempted assassination of former Interior Minister
Zaki Badr . In July the EOHR reported that Othman was taken to
State Security
headquarters in Cairo where he was tortured. The Government
has said Othman was released from custody on December 28, 1989.
The EOHR also reported during the year on Nasra Fathi Ibrahim,
18, who disappeared on March 13, 1990, as she left her Cairo
home. In September 1990, a State Security official reportedly
informed a family lawyer that Nasra "voluntarily disappeared
due to disagreements with her family," an allegation the family
has denied.
Except in the case of Othman, the Government has failed to
answer inquiries on their fate.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although torture is illegal under Egyptian law, there is
convincing evidence that it is practiced by police and security
officers. Those guilty of torture are seldom punished. In
August the EOHR issued a report on conditions at the Tora
Prison complex south of Cairo. Among the abuses cited at Tora
were: whipping and solitary confinement; the unauthorized
removal of prisoners to another location for torture; and
inadequate food, water, and medical treatment. The report
alleges that contrary to prison regulations. State Security
officials routinely transfer prisoners from Tora to State
Security headquarters in Cairo where they are interrogated,
tortured, and returned to Tora. In another report issued in
January 1992, the EOHR documented five cases in which rape and
sexual abuse were used in 1991 as torture methods against both
men and women by Egyptian police and security officers.
1376
EGYPT
Dr. Mohamed Mandour, a doctor at Cairo's Palestine Red Crescent
Hospital and a member of the board of directors of the EOHR,
was arrested without charge on February 6; he was released on
March 2 and subsequently reported that he was beaten and
subjected to electrical shocks by security officers while in
custody. In late 1990, three Muslim converts to Christianity
were tortured by police (see Section 2.c.). The EOHR reported
that al-Shadly Ebeid al-Saghir, a lawyer, was tortured while in
detention twice in 1991; he reportedly was hung by his arms for
long periods, subjected to electric shock, and beaten. The
EOHR also reported that Mohamed Higazy, an Arabic language
teacher, was arrested on August 18 by State Security officers
who accused him of membership in an organization called Islamic
Groups and of aiding other members of the group to travel to
Afghanistan; Higazy reportedly was tortured for 3 weeks at
State Security headquarters in Dokki and 3 more weeks at State
Security headquarters in Lazoughly.
In July a judge ordered an investigation into allegations that
at least seven defendants in the al-Mahgoub assassination case
had been tortured. According to a credible source, the
prosecuting attorneys observed "marks and injuries" on the
bodies of the defendants when they were questioned in late 1990
but made no attempt to discover the cause of the injuries.
According to the same source, in the al-Mahgoub case, security
officers mistreated the spouses of some defendants in the
defendants' presence to obtain confessions.
Officers convicted of torture may receive up to 10 years in
prison, and murder charges may be brought against those
responsible for a victim's death. Such penalties are rarely,
if ever, imposed. In March a Cairo criminal court sentenced a
policeman to 1 year at hard labor, and a State Security officer
to 6 months at hard labor, for torturing a detainee to death in
1989.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arbitrary detention of government critics has been widely
practiced under the state of emergency which has been in effect
continuously since the October 1981 assassination of President
Anwar Sadat. In May the People's Assembly voted to extend the
state of emergency and the President's emergency powers until
June 30, 1994.
Under the Emergency Law, the Interior Minister may detain a
person without indictment for 90 days. With a court order,
detention may be extended for 6 months. In some cases, the
Government has used this power to rearrest a person who has
served time or been released by court order. In most cases,
however, detainees are released after interrogation. An
estimated 2,000 persons were detained for various periods under
the Emergency Law in 1991. In July the Interior Minister said
publicly that 700 "criminals" and 612 "political prisoners"
were being held under the Emergency Law. It cannot be
determined how many of these were detained for committing
violence or other crimes and how many were held simply for
trying to exercise freedom of speech, association, or other
human rights.
Under ordinary criminal procedure, arrested persons are charged
with violations of specific laws, have the right to a judicial
determination of the legality of arrest, and should be formally
charged within 48 hours of arrest or be released. Arrests
under this procedure occur openly and with warrants issued by a
1377
EGYPT
district prosecutor or a judge. There is a system of bail.
However, the regular penal code also gives the State wide
detention powers. State prosecutors may obtain court orders to
detain a person for 6 months, with 45-day extensions to
complete an investigation. Prosecutors are not required to
file an indictment, and the detainee is often released without
explanation and without acknowledgment that "charges" have been
dropped.
Exile is prohibited and not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There are three levels of ordinary criminal courts: Primary
Courts, Appeals Courts, and the Court of Cassation (the final
stage of criminal appeal). There is also a Supreme
Constitutional Court, but its jurisdiction is limited to legal
interpretations. It does not hear criminal appeals. There is
no jury system. Criminal cases are heard by panels of judges.
These trials are public.
In addition, there are two special courts for criminal cases:
the Court of Ethics and State Security Courts. Both have upper
and lower division tribunals. The Court of Ethics hears cases
falling under Law 95 of 1980, which may be brought on such
charges as "endangering the public safety," illegally
establishing a political party, inciting youth "to depart from
religious values and loyalty to the fatherland," and denying
the three "heavenly religions." In recent years, the Ethics
Court has been relatively inactive.
The State Security Courts have jurisdiction over more serious
offenses, such as armed insurrection. Three judges preside
over upper and lower division tribunals, but two military
officers may be added by presidential decree to the upper
division tribunal. Defendants before a State Security Court
may be indicted under the Penal Code or the Emergency Law.
When the indictment is under the Penal Code, the appeal goes
from the lower division to the upper division to the Court of
Cassation. When an indictment is handed down under the
Emergency Law, the court is designated an Emergency State
Security Court. The only appeal from the upper division of an
Emergency State Security Court is to the President, who may
amend, commute, or cancel a sentence, or order a retrial. His
powers imply that he may cancel an acquittal and order a
defendant retried for the same offense.
There are several recent precedents in which the Prime
Minister, acting on powers delegated from the President,
refused to ratify acquittals from Emergency State Security
Courts and ordered the defendants retried. One case involved
156 persons acquitted of charges related to Egypt's 1977 bread
riots. In October 1990, the Prime Minister refused to sign the
acquittal and ordered the defendants retried. When the case
went back to court in January 1991, the prosecution was granted
its request to delay the case indefinitely.
However, a person may be tried in both the Ethics Court and a
State Security Court on similar indictments: the latter court
metes out imprisonment as a penalty, whereas guilt before the
Ethics Court denies the person the right to engage in certain
occupations or activities. If the courts reach different
verdicts, the defendant may appeal to the President for a
pardon.
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The President appoints all judges based on nominations from the
Higher Judicial Council, a constitutional body designed to
ensure the independence of the judiciary. The Council is
composed of senior judges, lawyers, and law professors, and is
chaired by the President of the Court of Cassation. It
regulates judicial promotions, salaries, transfers, and
disciplinary actions. Judges may be appointed as prosecutors
and vice versa.
The judiciary maintains considerable independence from the
executive branch. State Security Court judges have ordered
inquests into torture allegations and have acquitted defendants
in cases in which torture was used to extract confessions. In
1990 the Supreme Constitutional Court overturned the electoral
law (for discriminating against independent candidates) and
ordered the People's Assembly, elected under the old law,
dissolved.
There are also limitations on judicial independence and due
process: the Ethics Court allows nonjurists to try cases; the
President may appoint military judges to the State Security
Courts; there is no judicial appeal from an Emergency State
Security Court; there is the possibility of double jeopardy if
the President orders a defendant retried; and the Emergency Law
authorizes a detainee's rearrest, without formal charge, even
if he has been freed by court order.
There are no reliable statistics on the number of political
prisoners, but, as noted in Section l.d., the Interior Minister
acknowledged in July that 612 were being held under the
Emergency Law on charges involving political activities.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Despite constitutional provisions, there is substantial
abridgement, under the Emergency Law, of the right to privacy.
Under the Constitution, homes, correspondence, telephone calls,
and "other means of communication shall have their own sanctity
and their secrecy shall be guaranteed." Under the penal code,
police must obtain a warrant, either from a judge or the public
prosecutor, before undertaking searches and wiretaps. Courts
have dismissed cases in which warrants were issued without
sufficient cause. Police officials who conduct searches
without proper warrants are subject to criminal penalties,
although this is seldom enforced.
However, the Emergency Law empowers the State to search persons
or places without regard to constitutional and legal
restrictions. Intelligence agencies frequently place political
activists and suspected subversives under surveillance, and
there are credible reports that they routinely screen
correspondence, especially international mail. Opposition
newspapers occasionally report that police illegally search and
confiscate materials from their reporters.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Egyptians openly express their views without fear of
retribution on a wide variety of political and social issues,
sometimes airing vigorous criticism of the Government. The
Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press.
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and the Government has to a large extent refrained from
curtailing political expression. However, there are
restrictions .
The Prime Minister and the Cabinet are often targets for
criticism, but the Press Law stipulates fines or imprisonment
for criticism of the President or a foreign head of state. In
recent years, however, opposition journalists have criticized
the President without harassment, although he may not be
satirized in cartoons.
The major national dailies are government owned. Their editors
in chief are appointed by the presidency and can be dismissed
by the NDP-dominated Shura Council. They follow closely the
Government's line and downplay or avoid Egyptian human rights
issues, sectarian strife, or other controversial themes.
Privately owned newspapers are free to publish material
supporting the political inclinations of their sponsoring
organizations .
Opposition newspapers are all associated with political
parties. With the exception of "Al-Wafd," most are weeklies
with small circulations. However, they frequently publish
tough criticisms of government policies, which in turn inspire
rejoinders in the "establishment" press. They also give
greater prominence to human rights abuses in Egypt than
state-run newspapers, although Islamic newspapers tend to be
interested in such abuses only when suffered by
fundament a 1 i s t s .
The Government influences the press in several ways. The
Prosecutor General from time to time imposes bans on certain
topics; in the past, such topics have included cases involving
charges of corruption, the Egypt Revolution case, and political
assassinations. These bans, however, are infreqxient and used
only during criminal investigations.
Press content is also affected by the Shura Council, which
supervises the press to some extent through the Higher Press
Council, a 45-member body chaired by the Speaker of the Shura
Council and composed of senior press figures. One of the
Higher Press Council's functions is to approve applications for
new publications. The Government firmly controls the right to
publish and in 1991 approved the applications for 48
newspapers, magazines, and periodicals. The Council's
approval, however, is only required for publications appearing
regularly.
In December 1990, the Government banned NOON, an in-house
newsletter of the feminist Arab Women's Solidarity Association
(AWSA) , for allegedly printing articles on political issues, a
prohibited activity. The Government earlier had banned NOON as
a magazine, forcing AWSA to change its format to a newsletter.
Radio and television are state owned, as is the Arabic-language
news service, and hence follow government directives closely.
The Cable News Network (CNN) began local broadcasting in
November, and the state monopoly on broadcasting is gradually
being weakened, particularly in urban areas, by the
availability of satellite dishes, which bring international
news and entertainment to a growing number of Egyptians.
Books and works of art may be confiscated or banned by decree
of various ministries without a court order. The Ministry of
Interior regularly confiscates works by fundamentalist authors;
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the Ministry of Defense may ban works about sensitive security
issues and prosecute their authors; and plays and films must
pass Ministry of Culture censorship tests both as scripts and
as prepared for final production. The Ministry of Culture also
censors foreign films but is more lenient when these are in
video form. Television productions are censored by the
Ministry of Information.
Al-Azhar University censors the publication of the Koran and
Islamic scriptural texts in Egypt. In recent years, the
University also has begun to pass judgment on the suitability
of nonreligious books and artistic productions. Although these
pronouncements do not have the force of law, authorities move
quickly to confiscate works Al-Azhar finds offensive.
In December, acting on a recommendation of Al-Azhar University,
the Cairo Supreme State Security (Emergency) Court sentenced
author Alaa Hamed and publisher Mohammed Madbouli to 8 years'
imprisonment for the publication of Hamed 's novel "A Distance
in a Man's Mind" in March 1988. The two were tried and
convicted of violating Article 98 of the Penal Code by
"degrading or disdaining one of the holy religions .. .with the
intention of harming national unity and social peace..." The
defendants were released on bail pending the verdict's review
by Prime Minister Atef Sedky, as provided under the Emergency
Law.
On two occasions in 1991, after the outbreak of the Gulf War
and at the opening of the Arab-Israel peace talks in Madrid,
the Government arrested journalists, political figures,
students, and others who attempted to publicize their
opposition in an organized manner to government policy
concerning these events. Most were released. At year's end,
however, scores of mostly fundamentalist students were still
reported in detention for their public opposition to the
Arab/Israeli peace talks.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
There are substantial restrictions on this freedom. Under the
Emergency Law, the Minister of the Interior's approval is
required for public meetings, rallies, and protest marches.
Permits are generally granted for indoor rallies, but street
demonstrations are banned, except on university campuses. The
Ministry of Social Affairs has legal authority to license and
dissolve nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Licenses may
be revoked if an NGO engages in political or religious
activities that are prohibited. The law also authorizes the
Ministry to "merge two or more associations to achieve a
similar function," a provision the State can use to merge an
undesirable organization out of existence.
In June, for example, the Ministry dissolved the 500-member
AWSA, founded in 1985 by noted feminist author, Nawal Saadawi,
on the grounds that it allegedly misused funds and engaged in
unauthorized political activities. Among the alleged illegal
activities were AWSA's expression of solidarity with the women
-of Iraq during the Persian Gulf crisis and a seminar on
Egyptian divorce law. After ordering AWSA dissolved, the
Ministry of Social Affairs ordered its assets liquidated and
the proceeds transferred to the state-approved women's group.
Women in Islam. AWSA is seeking a court reversal of the
dissolution decree.
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Since 1985, the Government has refused to license the EOHR and
the Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR) on the grounds
that they are political organizations. Both organizations
continue to operate openly from the same Cairo office. EOHR
lawyers visit prisons and collect information from government
offices, but only as individuals, not as EOHR representatives.
Both organizations are challenging their legal status in the
courts, claiming that the 1964 law governing associations is
unconstitutional .
c. Freedom of Religion
Although the Constitution guarantees "the freedom of belief"
and the practice of religious rites, there are some important
restrictions. Most Egyptians are Muslim and the Constitution
establishes Islam as the state religion. Approximately 10 per
cent of the population, 5 million people, belong to the Coptic
Orthodox Church. There are also smaller Protestant and
Christian evangelical denominations. The small Jewish
community practices its religion without harassment. Members
of recognized religions maintain links with coreligionists
abroad, and the foreign clergy generally pursue their
ministries without harassment. All recognized faiths may, in
principle, establish places of worship, run schools, and train
enough clergy to serve believers.
Islam accepts Christian and other converts, but Muslims face
legal problems and social pressure if they convert to another
religious faith. There is no clear legal prohibition against
conversion or proselytizing, but Article 98f of the Penal Code
prohibits any person from "degrading or disdaining one of the
holy religions or any of its religious sects" with "the
intention of harming national unity and social peace." This
has been interpreted specifically to discourage Muslim
conversions. Conviction is punishable by imprisonment.
Egyptian courts have upheld the principle that Muslims may not
change their identity papers to reflect conversion to a new
religion .
In September and October 1990, security forces arrested three
Muslim converts to Christianity for allegedly "insulting a
heavenly religion" and "forging" identification papers to
reflect their new faith. The three were tortured by state
security officers, purportedly to obtain information on other
converts and to force them to recant their own conversions.
The case attracted international attention. The three were
released on July 13 without explanation. Arrests of Muslim
converts to Christianity have occurred episodically in recent
years.
According to a still current 1856 Ottoman decree, non-Muslims
must obtain a presidential decree to build or repair a place of
worship. Copts maintain they are frequently unable to obtain
such authorization and, as a result, some communities use
private buildings and apartments for religious services. In
1991 the police closed several such unlicensed "churches." In
June the press began to focus on this issue as the Copts and
Muslim moderates advanced arguments for legislative reform.
Islamic fundamentalists have defended the building restrictions,
In the 10 years from January 1981 to December 1990, Copts
obtained only 36 church permits — 10 to build new churches and
26 for other purposes, such as to repair an existing church.
Forty-four permits were granted to other Christian sects. In
the first 6 months of 1991, the presidency issued six permits.
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of which the Copts received two, one for repairs, and one to
build an office.
Even with a permit, Copts often encounter difficulties starting
construction. A church may not be built near a mosque, but a
mosc[ue may be built near a church; reportedly when
fundamentalists hear a new church will be built, they convert
property near the site into a mosque, which means the Christian
parishioners must find a new location. Unauthorized mosques,
built without government permission, are common in Egypt.
The penal code prohibits a place of worship to be used for
antigovernment speeches. The Ministry of Religious Affairs
appoints Muslim preachers and monitors sermons at mosques, but
in practice the Ministry cannot control all sermons, especially
at "unauthorized" mosques.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Egyptians are free to travel within Egypt except in certain
military districts, and there are other restricted areas to
which foreigners may not travel. There are exceptions to
freedom of foreign travel and emigration. These affect men who
have not completed compulsory military service (although the
stipulation is often circumvented) and women who must have
permission from either their fathers, if unmarried and under 21
years of age, or their husbands, if married, to obtain a
passport .
There is also an unconfirmed report of a Christian convert from
Islam who was denied permission to travel abroad by the
Interior Ministry under article no. 7153 of the Emergency
Supreme State Security law of March 17, 1989, because, as a
convert, he is "without civil rights." Citizens who leave the
country have the right to return, and millions of Egyptians
work abroad and move in and out of the country freely.
The deportation of Egyptian citizens and aliens granted
political asylum is prohibited and not practiced. Egypt is
host to thousands of African and Arab refugees, but only a few,
screened on an individual basis, are granted the right to
resettle permanently. Many Ethiopians and other Africans, who
seek documentation as refugees by the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees, are instead detained by the police, and then
transported to areas near the Libyan or Sudanese borders where
they are released. Some return to their own countries; others
find their way back to Egyptian cities.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) dominates the
People's Assembly, the Shura Council, local governments, the
mass media, labor, the large public sector, and the licensing
of new political parties, newspapers, and private organizations
to such an extent that, as a practical matter, the people do
not have a meaningful ability to change the government.
In the 1990 People's Assembly election, NDP candidates won 383
seats of 444 elected, independents (most of whom had been NDP
Assembly members but were denied party support) 55, and a
leftist party 6. Seven opposition parties boycotted the
election. The Constitution reserves 10 Assembly seats for
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presidential appointees, which generally assures some
representation for Copts and women.
Women were granted suffrage in 1956. Ten women hold Assembly
seats: seven elected and three appointed. This is a decrease
from the 39 women in the 1984 Assembly when the now repealed
electoral law reserved 30 seats for women. Six Copts sit in
the Assembly: five appointed and one elected. This is a
decrease from the 11 Copts in the previous Assembly.
The Assembly vigorously debates government proposals,
especially on economic issues, and members exercise their
authority to call on Cabinet ministers to explain policy and
government-proposed legislation. However, much governance in
Egypt is by ministerial decree without significant legislative
oversight. Presidential appointments do not require
legislative approval; the executive initiates most legislation;
the Assembly may not modify the budget "except with the
approval of the government"; there is no recent record of
Assembly defeat of a major executive proposal; there is little
oversight of the Interior Ministry's use of Emergency Law
powers; and the military budget is prepared by the executive
and not debated publicly.
Moreover, Assembly votes and committee membership (except for
the chairman and vice-chairman) are not matters of public
record. Consequently, constituents have no independent method
of checking a member's voting record.
The Government's licensing power over newspapers, private
organizations, political parties, and even the recognition of a
single trade union federation discourages political pluralism.
New parties must be approved by a government committee. The
eight opposition parties, the newest approved in April 1990, do
not threaten NDP dominance. The NDP's ability to dispense
material and career rewards has in part prevented opposition
parties from playing a larger political role.
To form a party without a license is a felony which may be
tried before the Court of Ethics or a State Security Court.
The Constitution also prohibits parties based on religion.
Nevertheless, Muslim Brotherhood partisans are publicly known
and openly speak their views. Some serve in the Assembly,
elected as members of other recognized parties or as
independents not affiliated with any party.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
As noted in Section 2.c., the Government refuses to grant
licenses to local human rights organizations on the grounds
that they are political organizations. The EOHR and the AOHR
nevertheless operate openly without benefit of licenses. In
its 1990 annual report, EOHR said it "has not received any kind
of cooperation from the authorities, but rather (its) lawyers
were occasionally exposed to provocations and threats, with
some of them being called in for questioning by the State
Security Intelligence Service."
In the past, the Government has received several visits from
international human rights groups, while refusing to receive
others. There were no known requests for visits in 1991.
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Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Egyptian law provides for equality of the sexes, but aspects of
the law and many traditional practices are discriminatory
against women. Under Egyptian law, a married woman must have
her husband's permission to obtain a passport, and he may stop
her from traveling. A child must have the father's permission
to obtain a passport, and even if the parents are divorced and
the mother has custody, the child's mother need not be informed
if the child travels outside of Egypt. Only males can transmit
Egyptian citizenship. In rare cases, this means children of
Egyptian mothers and stateless fathers are themselves stateless.
Religious laws affecting marriage and personal status generally
correspond to the religion of the person involved, which for
most Egyptians is Islam. However, the revised Family Status
Law of 1985 amplified the legal basis for equality of the sexes
beyond rights contained in Islamic law. It largely ensures a
woman's right to divorce and preserves the wife's child custody
and property rights. A second marriage by the husband
(multiple marriage for men is acceptable practice in Islam) is
grounds for the first wife to seek a divorce. A wife has the
option of retaining the family residence or receiving financial
compensation. These aspects of the family status law only
apply to Muslims. Under Islamic law, female heirs are entitled
to half the amount of a male heir's inheritance. However, only
male heirs have a duty to provide for all members of the family
who need assistance.
Egyptian women have employment opportunities in government,
medicine, law, academia, the arts, and, to a lesser degree, in
business. Eleven percent of the diplomatic service, about 100
officers, are women, and 3 are ambassadors. Women have entered
politics and serve in the People's Assembly. The single female
cabinet member has served since 1978.
However, social pressure against career ism is still strong, and
some Egyptian feminists say that fundamentalism has introduced
a new conservative trend which limits further career gains.
Women's rights advocates also believe that traditional
attitudes and practices regarding female circumcision. Islamic
practices on divorce and plural marriages, and the male
responsibility to punish a female relative's presumed violation
of sexual conduct, are highly discriminatory against women.
Although violence against women is known to occur, little is
known about its extent. There are no reliable statistics on
the subject. Abuse within the family is seldom discussed
publicly owing to the value attached to personal privacy in
this traditional society.
Reliable statistics are not available on female circumcision.
Surveys indicate that, while its use is lower in urban areas,
the less extreme form of excision/circumcision is widely used
in rural Egypt. In some parts of upper Egypt the more drastic
infibulation is still practiced. While it is not against
Egyptian law, the law prohibits doctors from performing it in
government hospitals.
Egypt's approximately 5 million Coptic Christians are the
object of a disturbing pattern of discrimination on the part of
the Government and Islamic extremists. Security forces arrest
extremists who perpetrate violence against Copts, but the
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EGYPT
Government does little to correct nonviolent acts of
discrimination, including its own.
Copts work in all career fields, occupying many leadership
positions in the business and professional communities. Copts
also continue to enjoy access to public employment, although
there appears to be discrimination against their advancement in.
the governmental and public sectors. There are no Coptic
governors or active duty generals, and few Copts in the senior
diplomatic service. There are six in the Assembly. The sole
Copt member of the Cabinet resigned in December to become
Secretary General of the United Nations.
Some Copts allege that they are discriminated against in
admission to some fields of medical study; Islamic activists
have objected to the prevalence of Copts in the medical
profession, arguing that Muslim women should not be treated by
Coptic doctors or go to Coptic pharmacists. Anti-Coptic acts,
such as the burning of Coptic churches and Coptic-owned stores,
are reported regularly in the press.
Other governmental discriminatory practices are: suspected
statistical underrepresentation of the size of the Coptic
minority; governmental red tape on issuing permits to build or
repair churches; the detention and mistreatment of some Muslim
converts to Christianity; the prohibition against Muslims
changing their identity papers to reflect their conversion to
Christianity (upheld in a 1980 court decision); the use of the
Koran as an Arabic teaching aid; and underrepresentation in
government .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Egyptian workers are free to join trade unions, but are not
required to do so. A union local, or worker's committee, may
be formed if 50 employees express their desire to organize.
Most union members, about 25 percent of the labor force, work
in state-owned enterprises. Law 35 of 1976 states that a union
may not be formed by "persons employed in high administrative
positions in government, local administration, public
companies, and public authorities." Private companies
generally have nonunion workers.
There are 23 trade unions, all required to belong to the
Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), the sole legal labor
federation. The International Labor Organization's Committee
of Experts (COE) has long noted that the law requiring all
national trade unions to join a single federation infringes
upon workers' freedom of association. The Government has shown
no sign that it intends to accept the establishment of more
than one federation. The leadership of the Federation asserts
that it actively promotes workers' interests and that there is
no need for another federation. The ETUF is dominated by the
NDP and works in close concert with the Government.
Strikes are illegal, and strikers may receive up to 2 years in
jail. Those who incite others to strike may receive more
severe penalties. A 1977 law stipulates hard labor for
strikers in key industries who pose a "threat to the national
economy." In the past, police have used lethal force to break
up strikes at state-run companies, after which the Government
has forcibly relocated strikers to new jobs in different parts
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EGYPT
of the country. Strikes occurring in 1991 were brief,
isolated, and quickly broken up by the police.
The COE also criticized provisions of the law which provide for
imposition of compulsory arbitration at the request of one
party only and the power granted the Public Prosecutor to
remove from office the executive committee of a trade union
that provokes a strike, even in nonessential services.
The ETUF is a member of some international trade union
organizations and maintains relations with others.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is permitted in the private sector,
including in the export processing zones, but is rarely
exercised, in part because the larger private businesses offer
high wages and are not unionized.
Collective bargaining does not exist in the public sector.
Unions may negotiate work contracts with state-run businesses,
but they must be approved by the Ministry of Labor. The
Government sets wages, benefits, and many prices by
administrative decree. Labor and management are obliged to
conform to national development priorities.
The law prohibits employer discrimination against union
members, and a mechanism exists to resolve labor -management
complaints .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced labor, and it is not
practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 12. Education is compulsory
until age 15. The minimum age to join a labor union is also
15. The labor law of 1981 says children 12 to 15 may work 6
hours a day, but not after 7 p.m. and not in dangerous work or
heavy labor. Child workers must obtain medical certificates
and work permits before they are employed. A 1989 study
estimated that two-thirds of child labor, perhaps 720,000
children, work on farms. However, children also work as
apprentices in repair and craft shops and as workers in heavier
industries such as brickmaking and textiles. How closely the
Ministry of Labor tries to enforce child labor laws, especially
in small, mainly family-owned shops, is impossible to verify,
but it appears that no effective attempt is made to enforce
them.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
For government and public sector employees, the minimum wage
for the legal 6-day, 48-hour week is determined by a
combination of law and presidential decree. The minimum wage
is also legally binding on the private sector, and larger
private companies generally observe the requirement and pay the
bonus as well. It is doubtful that smaller private businesses
comply with the minimum wage or maintain regular social bonus
payments .
The base pay is supplemented by a complex system of fringe
benefits and bonuses that may double or triple a worker's
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EGYPT
take-home pay. It is doubtful the average family could survive
on a worker's base pay at the minimum wage rate.
Low pay scales in the public sector are partially offset by
relatively generous fringe benefits. These include guaranteed
life-time employment, subsidized housing, free medical care,
sick leave, and paid annual leave. Low pay, however, drives
many Egyptians to hold two jobs, while others seek employment
abroad, knowing they have reemployment rights when they return
to their jobs in state enterprises.
The Ministry of Lbor sets worker health and safety standards
which also apply to private companies in the export zones, but
enforcement and inspection are uneven.
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INDIA
India, the world's largest democracy, is a secular republic
with a multiparty political structure based on Indian political
traditions and aspects of the British parliamentary system.
Free elections are held regularly at national and state
levels. National elections in May and June were forced by the
resignation in March of Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar, who had
come to power in November 1990 at the head of a splinter group
from the Janata Dal, supported from the outside by the Congress
(I) Party. Following polling in all states except Punjab and
Jammu and Kashmir, the Congress (I) formed a minority
Government headed by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. On the
state level. President's Rule (direct rule from New Delhi)
remained in force throughout the year in the states of Punjab
and Jammu and Kashmir. It was lifted in Assam on June 30,
following the installation of a democratically elected state
government .
The 25 states have the primary role in maintaining law and
order, but both in law and practice the central Government is
responsible for protecting the fundamental rights guaranteed
under the Constitution. The internal security apparatus
combines national and state-controlled paramilitary and police
forces. The Union Ministry for Home Affairs controls the
nationwide Indian police force, the paramilitary forces, and
the intelligence bureaus. Over the four decades since India's
independence, control of law and order operations has become
increasingly centralized under the Home Ministry. This
tendency stems in part from the rapid growth of the
intelligence bureaus, which function with little reference to
the state governments, and in part from the increased use of
paramilitary forces against armed insurrectionists in disturbed
areas. These forces are deployed in Kashmir, Punjab, and the
northeastern states. Both the paramilitary and the police
forces have been responsible for significant human rights
abuses. Ultimately, abuses by the paramilitary and police are
questions of the effectiveness of civilian oversight and the
extent of the Government's willingness and ability to prosecute
offenders vigorously.
India has a mixed economy, with agriculture, most nonfinancial
services, consumer goods manufacturing, and some heavy industry
in the private sector. India's economic policies pursued over
the past four decades — rapid industrialization, massive state
intervention, subsidies to middle class consumption, tax
exemptions for large landholders, barriers to foreign and
domestic competition — skewed the distribution of income and
wealth. In July the Congress (I) Government began structural
reforms. Trade and foreign investment restrictions were
relaxed, foreign exchange controls were being phased out, and
the government deficit was being brought under control.
India's economic problems were compounded by rapid population
growth (863 million, growing by over 2 percent per year).
About 40 percent of the urban and 51 percent of the rural
population live below the poverty level as defined by the World
Bank.
India is a functioning democracy with strong and legally
sanctioned safeguards for individuals and an independent
judiciary. A vigorous free press and active civil liberties
organizations report extensively on human rights abuses
throughout the country. Nonetheless, significant areas of
abuse remain, many of them generated by severe social tensions
related to violent ethnic, caste, communal, and secessionist
politics and the authorities' reactions thereto. The catalog
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INDIA
of the main problem areas in 1991 varied little from what it
has been in past years, and included: security force excesses
against civilians, particularly in Kashmir in response to
attacks by militants; political murder, kidnaping, and
extortion by militants in Punjab, as well as extrajudicial
actions (beatings, extortion, and "fake encounter" killings) by
the police; incommunicado detention for prolonged periods
without charge under national security legislation; political
killing on an increasingly wide scale; torture, rape, and
deaths of suspects in police custody; inadequate prosecution of
police and security forces implicated in abuse of detainees;
widespread intercaste and communal violence; uneven
implementation of laws affecting women's rights; infrequent
prosecution of "dowry deaths" (wife murder); and widespread
exploitation of indentured, bonded, and child labor.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The Government continued to follow strict law and order
policies to control growing political and terrorist violence,
particularly militant separatist activity in the states of
Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, and Assam, as well as violence
resulting from widespread tensions over religion, politics, and
caste. Nevertheless, there was no reduction in the scale of
political killing. Some killings result from ethnic and
communal strife, some from separatist militant activity. Some
can be attributed to excesses by individual security force
members in encounters with terrorists, while in some cases
government security forces have killed civilians in apparent
retaliation for terrorist attacks; some can be attributed to
extrajudicial actions taken by security and police forces
against prisoners in detention. Little is done to punish those
responsible for extrajudicial killing.
In Jammu and Kashmir state, militant groups seeking Kashmiri
independence continued to carry out politically motivated
killings, targeting government and police officials (and their
families), alleged police informers, members of the press, and
members of rival factions. Among the victims were K.M. Shaban,
editor of Al-Safa, an Urdu-language newspaper; Ghulam Mustafa
Malik, a former state legislator; Hissamuddin Bandey, a former
state minister, and Sheikh Sadiq, cousin of the former chief
minister, Farooq Abdullah. Under the Jammu and Kashmir
Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir)
Special Powers Act, both passed in July 1990, security force
personnel have sweeping powers, including authority to shoot to
kill suspected lawbreakers or disturbers of the peace and to
destroy structures suspected of harboring militants or arms.
In Punjab, militant Sikh organizations targeted civil servants,
political candidates, journalists, presumed government
informers, and police officials (and their families), and
undertook random killings against public figures. The nine
principal militant groups claimed their terrorist activities
were part of the struggle for an independent Sikh state
"Khalistan." Twenty-three candidates for state and national
office in Punjab were killed by militants during the spring
election campaign. Among other militant killings, on January
28 militants stopped traffic on the road leading to Bhikowal,
identified 13 Hindus, and shot them. On March 22, militants
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stopped a bus carrying factory workers in Ropar district and
shot 30 passengers, killing 27. On June 15, gunmen entered two
trains near Ludhiana and fired indiscriminately, killing 75.
Four moving trains were fired at by militants in early
September, killing six. In September and October, militants
targeted relatives of police officials, killing 86 in less then
a month.
Human rights organizations have documented hundreds of cases of
"encounter killings," in Punjab in the past 7 years. In the
typical scenario, police take into custody suspected militants
or militant supporters without filing an arrest report. If the
detainee dies during interrogation or is executed, officials
deny that he was ever in custody and claim he died during an
armed encounter with police or security forces. The Armed
Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act of 1983 and
the Punjab Disturbed Areas Act of 1983 grants army,
paramilitary, and police members wide discretion in the use of
lethal force, thus permitting easy justification by authorities
for encounter killings.
In Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), a highly publicized encounter killing
of Sikhs took place on July 12 when police stopped a bus near
Pilibhit, carrying 27 Sikhs on a pilgrimage to holy places.
According to investigations carried out by human rights
organizations and political parties, police ordered 11 men into
police vehicles. The next day 10 of the men were split into 3
groups and executed. Police claimed the Sikhs were militants
killed in armed encounters. On August 21, a judicial panel,
headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Misra, ordered the U.P.
state government to pay compensation to the families of the
victims. A further judicial inquiry into the matter was still
under way as of year ' s end .
In Andhra Pradesh, credible reports indicate that a large
number of Naxalites (tribal militants using violence to bring
about radical land reform and other populist policies) were
also killed in fake encounter killings in 1991.
In Assam, the law and order situation had deteriorated to a
point where President's Rule was imposed on November 28, 1990.
The terrorist organization. United Liberation Front of Assam
(ULFA) , had been responsible for killing an increasing number
of politicians, police officials, businessmen, and innocent
civilians over a 2-year period. With the imposition of
President's Rule, the army commenced operations to restore law
and order under the code name Operation Bajrang. The operation
was suspended in April and terminated in mid-June, at the time
of elections. On September 15, the army once again moved
against ULFA, under the code name Operation Rhino, following a
summer of ULFA kidnapings, killings, and extortion carried out
despite the state government's offer of a general amnesty and
release of over 400 of the ULFA prisoners detained during
Operation Bajrang. Under the Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed
Forces Special Powers Act for Assam, the army and security
forces were given wide discretion for the use of lethal force.
Opposition parties claimed that the army killed at least seven
innocent civilians during its actions against ULFA. The army
denied these charges .
Violence surrounding the nationwide May/June election campaign
resulted in at least 150 deaths. Thirty-four candidates were
assassinated (23 in Punjab alone). Former Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi was assassinated while campaigning in Tamil Nadu on May
21. The assassin, who also died from the explosives wrapped
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around her waist, and her accomplices were believed to be
members of supporters of the Sri Lankan Tamil separatist
movement, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) . The
remaining deaths were primarily the result of clashes between
supporters of rival political parties.
In West Bengal, the Border Security Force (BSF) reportedly
fired indiscriminately on March 17 on villagers who had locked
up BSF members in protest against inaction regarding the theft
of cattle. Eleven people were killed. One local politician
was killed in June when, in a settling of scores following
elections, approximately 100 supporters of the Communist Party
of India (Marxist), wielding swords and axes, attacked local
Congress (I) politicians and supporters in Kendua village. West
Bengal .
According to the Home Ministry, 158 people were killed in the
first 6 months of 1991 in riots sparked by either tension
between different religious groups or disputes between rival
villages or castes. At least 51 passengers were massacred by
militants who boarded a train in Ludhiana district on December
26 and fired indiscriminately.
b. Disappearance
Reports of disappearance are extremely difficult to verify,
particularly in Punjab, Kashmir, and Assam.
Militants in Kashmir increasingly used kidnaping both of
prominent Indians and foreigners to attract international
attention to their cause and to force the Government to release
militants in detention. They have also kidnaped security force
personnel. Most of those kidnaped were eventually released,
but several subsequently were killed and some are still being
held. Kidnapings were also common in Assam and Andhra Pradesh.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and cruel treatment or punishment are prohibited by
law, and confessions or information extracted by force may not
be admitted in court. Significantly, however, under Section 15
of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act
(TADA) , a confession made to a police officer is admissible as
evidence, provided the police have "reason to believe that it
is being made voluntarily." Press accounts and reports by
human rights groups indicate that police brutality under this
law both to extract confessions and for extortion is common.
In theory, citizens may lodge a complaint for assault, wrongful
confinement, and death in custody, but in many jurisdictions,
including Delhi, prosecution of policemen requires the
permission of the police hierarchy. In the case of a death in
police custody, magistrates are empowered by sections of the
criminal procedure code to hold inquiries; however, such
inquiries may be conducted by an executive, not a judicial,
magistrate, and the results of these inquiries are generally
not made available. Human rights groups say most abuses in
prisons and jails are directed at the poor and uneducated
castes, who are unlikely to understand their right of redress.
Members of the police have been disciplined for abuse of
detainees, though civil liberties groups say punishment is
usually light (suspension or transfer) and occurs only in a
small percentage of actual cases of abuse. Among these few
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cases, eight Delhi policemen were arrested and charged and
three others suspended for involvement in five deaths in
custody between January and August. As of year's end, the
cases had not come to trial. Three other members of the Delhi
police were suspended in August in relation to the beating of a
woman in detention. A policeman in Narasinghpur , Madhya
Pradesh, was suspended on September 21, pending trial for
alleged involvement in the rape of a tribal woman in July.
Members of the Bombay police were suspended for their
involvement in the sexual abuse of a woman in February.
Numerous Indian human rights groups have detailed cases of
torture during interrogation by security forces in Kashmir and
Punjab, including beatings, burning with cigarettes, suspension
by the feet, and electric shocks. Under the special powers
given to the security forces (see Section l.d.), they are not
liable for prosecution for their actions in civil courts,
leaving victims no legal forum for the redress of grievances
other than courts-martial. Army and security force authorities
reportedly have, in some cases, court-martialed or disciplined
members found guilty of torture, but the results of these
actions generally have not been made public and cannot be
confirmed .
Press and human rights groups regularly report on torture in
Punjab as well. Such abuse most often takes place in police
stations during interrogations, though there have been numerous
reports of police going into villages and beating groups of
male residents and raping women.
Political parties and student and civil liberties groups
accused the army, paramilitary, and police forces in Assam,
which had arrested several thousand suspected ULFA militants
and sympathizers during Operation Bajrang, of torturing many of
these detainees. There were also accusations of numerous rapes
during the operation. The army denied specific charges but
maintained that when personnel had been found guilty of
wrongdoing, they had been punished. It did not disclose
individual cases or the punishment administered.
Scheduled castes and tribes (Harijans, or untouchables) remain
particularly vulnerable to police violence. There were
consistent reports that police, usually drawn from the upper
castes, had deliberately targeted members of these castes for
beatings and rape.
Press reports about prison conditions also include charges of
sexual abuse of prisoners, the use of prisoners by prison
officials for domestic labor, the sale on the black market of
food and milk meant for prisoners, and the sale of women
prisoners to brothels. Women constitute 2 to 6 percent of the
total prison population, according to the 1987 Justice Krishna
Iyer report, which also noted that cells are seldom
segregated. It was only after a female inmate had been raped
in custody that she could be transferred to a cell staffed by
women, the report continued.
At least 20,000 children and youngsters under 18 years old are
reported to be in jail, comprising nearly one-eighth of the
prison population. Although Parliament passed the Children's
Law in 1960 to safeguard young prisoners against abuse and
exploitation, most states have not followed with their own laws
to implement it; consequently, nearly 40 percent of the 380
districts in India are without a children's law. The Supreme
Court has criticized the states for not providing separate
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facilities for children in jails and for not constructing
reformatory inst itut ions .
It is estimated that at least 10,000 people with mental
disorders who have committed no crimes are held in prisons
throughout India. In West Bengal, a state minister reported
there were 1,000 such persons being held in Calcutta jails
alone.
Three classes of Indian prison facilities exist. Class "C"
cells are the worst. They often have dirt floors, no
furnishings, poor quality food, are overcrowded, and the use of
handcuffs and fetters is common. Prisoners in these cells
reportedly suffer the most abuse, such as beatings and being
forced to kneel for long periods. Prisoners are designated
class "C," not based on the nature or severity of the crimes
involved, but on their standing in society — those who cannot
prove they are either college graduates or income taxpayers
when they come before the magistrate are designated class "C."
Class "B" cells are for college graduates and taxpayers.
Crowding is less of a problem in "B" cells, and the food and
treatment of prisoners are reportedly better than in class
"C." Class "A" cells are for "prominent persons," as
determined by the Government. Prisoners in these cells are
accorded private rooms, visits,. and adequate food, which may be
supplemented by their families. Very few prisons actually
maintain class "A" cells; class "A" prisoners are usually held
in government guest houses .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Despite legal safeguards, there continued to be credible
reports of widespread arbitrary arrest and detention. The
Constitution requires that an arrested person be informed of
the grounds for arrest, given the right to be represented by
counsel, and produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of
arrest. At this initial appearance, the accused must either be
remanded for further investigation or released. These
provisions have been upheld by the Supreme Court and are
generally respected in states and areas not experiencing an
internal security problem or insurgency. However, they do not
apply to persons arrested under national security laws and,
while the right to judicial determination of the legality of
the detention may be sought from the higher courts to redress
unlawful detention, these rights are often unavailable to
families of poor or uneducated victims. These rights are also
ignored occasionally in states and areas that are not
disturbed; see Section 2. a. for a discussion of the case of an
editor of a Hindi daily who was arrested on charges of sedition
and who reportedly was not produced before a magistrate
following his arrest.
The Constitution permits the enactment of preventive detention
laws in the event of threats to public welfare and national
security. Such laws provide for limits on the length of
detention (up to 2 years) and for judicial review of such
detention. Several laws of this type remain in effect.
The National Security Act (NSA) permits detention of persons
considered security risks; police anywhere in India (except
Kashmir) may charge suspects under NSA provisions. At year's
end, 21 of 25 state governments had invoked the NSA. The Jammu
and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, provides corresponding
procedures for that state. To be released from detention under
this law, a court must determine that all grounds for detention
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are invalid. NSA detainees are permitted visits by family
members and lawyers. Under NSA's strict provisions for special
and preventive detention, a person may be detained for up to 1
year without charge or trial (2 years in Punjab) on loosely
defined security grounds but must be brought before a Defense
Ministry advisory board within 7 days of arrest. At this time
the detainee may be released on the basis of "insufficient
grounds." According to government statistics, 1,101 people
were detained under the provisions of the NSA in 1991; 501 were
subsequently released, leaving 600 in custody. Human rights
groups claim, however, that no accurate record is kept of the
many people held without charges on nonsecurity grounds, so
they have no way of making accurate estimates of the number of
persons in detention.
The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act
(TADA), though enacted to fight terrorism in Punjab, is
applicable in all states. At years end, 16 of 25 state
governments had invoked the TADA. On August 12, Parliament
voted to extend the Act for an additional 2 years. The law was
promulgated to punish those found guilty of terrorist and
disruptive acts with no less than 5 years imprisonment and up
to the death penalty for certain terrorist crimes. Disruptive
activities include speech or actions that disrupt or challenge
the sovereignty or territorial integrity of India. In
designated areas, pursuant to the TADA, incommunicado detention
is permitted. The Act permits maximum detention of 2 years,
but it provides the right of review and access to legal counsel.
It is difficult to determine how many people are held
throughout India at any one time under the TADA. Civil
liberties organizations often use a figure of 35,000, including
approximately 10,000 in both Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir,
5,000 in Tamil Nadu, 3,000 in Gujarat, and 1,000 in Assam. The
Government said such figures are greatly exaggerated. The Home
Ministry claimed that, since its inception in 1985, only 37,533
people had been arrested under the TADA; of these, 26,533 had
been released on bail and 318 had been convicted. According to
the Government's figures, 10,687 were still being detained
under the Act .
There were widespread accusations that the Act was being
misused in states not experiencing civil unrest as a convenient
way to hold people without trial. In Gujarat, since the Act
was invoked in 1987, over 10,000 people had been arrested under
its provisions, primarily as a result of communal
disturbances. Civil liberties groups claimed many of these had
been innocent bystanders; they also accused the police of
having used the law disproportionately against Muslims. In
Madhya Pradesh, police arrested over 100 members of tribal
communities under the TADA for communal disturbances.
Several court decisions overturning detention of persons under
the TADA in the state of Maharashtra reflected the view that
the police there were using the TADA to detain people they
could not otherwise legally detain.
Exile is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
India's legal procedures generally assure a fair trial, but the
process can be drawn out and inaccessible to the poor.
Defendants have the right to choose counsel from an Indian bar
that is fully independent of the Government. The Indian bar
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has a record of vigorously protesting infringements of human
rights. Effective appeal channels exist at all levels of the
judicial system.
The Indian Criminal Procedure Code provides for an open trial
in most cases but under certain circumstances it allows
significant exceptions, including in proceedings involving
official secrets, trials in which statements prejudicial to the
safety of the State might be made, or under provisions of
national security legislation such as the TADA. Sentences
must, however, be announced in public.
The judiciary is independent of the executive branch. Judges
are selected by the Law Ministry following consultations with
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Islamic religious law
governs some noncriminal matters concerning Muslims, including
divorce. The Government's declared policy is not to interfere
in the personal laws of the minority communities, with the
effect that discriminatory personal laws, often against women,
are upheld.
The Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act of Parliament
(TAAA) permits the establishment of special courts sitting in
camera and allows the identity of witnesses testifying before a
special court to be kept secret. Under an unusual provision of
the TAAA, a defendant charged with "waging war" carries the
burden of proving his or her innocence. Civil rights groups
charge that these special rules are contrary to the presumption
of innocence customary in Indian law.
In Kashmir and Punjab, where armed militants demand
independence for their states, the legal system barely
functioned. There were no convictions of alleged terrorists in
these states, even though some militants had been in detention
for years. Intimidation by militants also prevented the
judicial system from functioning normally. Judges were
reportedly reluctant to sit, and witnesses often did not appear
for trials involving suspected terrorists.
According to November press reports, 17 of 22 detainees in West
Bengal who had been held without trial for up to 10 years on
charges of terrorist activities have been released. Four
others are expected to be released shortly. One other has been
tried and convicted of a terrorist crime and is serving a long
jail sentence.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under Indian law, warrants are normally required for searches
and seizures. In a criminal investigation, police may conduct
searches without a warrant if obtaining one would cause undue
delay, but they must justify such searches in writing to a
member of the senior executive police administration. Under
the Disturbed Areas Legislation in Assam, Punjab, and Jammu and
Kashmir, the authorities continue to have special powers to
search and arrest without a warrant and to shoot to kill
suspected lawbreakers or disturbers of the peace.
Surveillance of communications, including tapping of telephones
and intercepting personal mail, is authorized under the Indian
Telegraph Act "on the occurrence of any public emergency or in
the interest of the public safety or tranquility." Various
members of the Parliament exchanged allegations that their
opponents, when in power, had used telephone tapping for
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political purposes. In Tamil Nadu, the press and the
opposition Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (DMK) party accused the
state's Chief Minister Jayalalitha of ordering the bugging of
opposition politicians' telephones. The Postal (Amendment)
Bill empowers the Government to censor mail in certain
circumstances, such as in a public emergency. These powers
have been used by every state government against specific
persons.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The human rights situation in Jammu and Kashmir, India's only
Muslim-majority state, further deteriorated in 1991. The
Muslim population in Kashmir valley was increasingly alienated
from India and largely sympathized with the demands of armed
militants for Kashmiri self-determination. Approximately
400,000 Indian army and paramilitary forces remained in the
valley to maintain law and order and check the militant
separatist movement. The Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act
and the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act
strengthened the hand of the security forces in using force
against suspected terrorists; some human rights observers
criticized the Act for giving too much latitude to these
forces. A compilation of statistics drawn from press accounts
indicates killings in Kashmir during 1991 totaled approximately
2,360, including 900 civilians, 1,305 alleged militants, and
155 security force members.
Militants maintained a reign of terror in the valley throughout
the year, targeting security force personnel, supposed police
informers, and others perceived as opposing their cause.
Invariably, innocent civilians were caught up in the violence.
Militants routinely planted bombs in and around military and
paramilitary installations, as well as at bridges and
communications targets. Militant groups kidnaped government
officials, foreigners, and family members of prominent
politicians and businessmen, killing some of them. They also
carried out extortion and protection rackets. (See also
Sections l.a, l.b., and 2. a.)
Security forces used excessive force against mass gatherings or
in retaliation against attacks on them by armed militants. On
January 19, at least 12 civilians were killed and at least as
many were injured when security forces fired on passers-by in
the crowded Magharmal Bagh Area of Srinagar following a grenade
attack on their vehicle. On May 8, security forces fired on a
funeral procession in Srinagar, killing 16 mourners.
Twenty-five civilians were killed by security forces at Chota
Bazaar in Srinagar on June 11, reportedly in retaliation for an
earlier ambush by militants in which a security force member
was killed. (See also sections I.e. and l.d.)
Government officials admitted that excesses by security forces
took place. They claimed that guilty parties were disciplined,
though the cases involved and the punishment administered were
not made public. As of mid-October, a court-martial was still
under way in the case of two members of the elite "Black Cat"
National Security Guards accused of raping a Canadian tourist
in Kashmir in 1990.
According to initial press reports, between 23 and 40 women
were raped when an army unit conducted a cordon and search
operation in the village of Kunan Poshpora in Kupwara District,
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Kashmir, on the night of February 23/24. The district
magistrate for Kupwara reported that 23 women had been raped.
According to the Home Ministry, an investigation by the
Divisional Commissioner of Kashmir, along with an army officer,
a Border Security Force officer, the Deputy Commissioner, and
the Superintendent of Police had concluded that the charges
against the army were unfounded. A team from the Press Council
of India (see Section 2.a.), headed by a respected journalist,
visited Kupwara and — citing a lack of credible evidence —
concluded the incident was an "invention." However, human
rights activists and most independent observers who visited the
site and interviewed the alleged victims concluded that
multiple rapes had taken place.
Most central security forces in Kashmir are non-Muslims; the
state police in Kashmir — mostly Muslim — were relegated to the
sidelines because of suspicion of its loyalties.
According to the Home Ministry, over 72,000 families, primarily
Hindu, had fled the violence in the valley since the beginning
of 1990. Two-thirds of them had moved to the Jammu region,
with another quarter going to Delhi .
In Punjab, the intractable problems of ethnic strife, violent
activity by militants demanding a separate Sikh state,
lawlessness, and actions by the police and security forces
pushed the number of deaths to 5,890 for the year, according to
press reports. These numbers included 3,340 civilians, 2,150
alleged militants, 375 security force members, and 25 persons
the Government claims crossed into India from Pakistan to
perpetrate terrorist acts in Punjab.
Twelve persons were killed and many injured on June 2 when
police opened fire on workers protesting the sale of the
state-owned Uttar Pradesh Dal la Cement Factory to a private
entrepreneur. Human rights and trade union activists charged
that the firing was a direct result of collusion between the
state government and management. The state government ordered
an inquiry into the incident.
In Bihar, at least 14 Harijans (untouchables) were killed on
June 23, allegedly by persons hired by upper-caste landlords in
retaliation for the killing of three upper-caste persons
charged with carrying out a massacre of 22 Harijan political
supporters in 1989.
In Karnataka, 17 people were killed when police fired on
protesters on December 14. The crowd was protesting a central
government decision on water rights to the Cauvery River.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Free speech and expression are protected by the Constitution,
and newspapers vigorously reflect a variety of public, social,
and economic beliefs. Several major national publications
regularly publish investigative reports and allegations of
government wrongdoing, and the press as a whole champions human
rights causes and criticizes perceived government lapses.
Civil liberties groups argue this is not the case in disturbed
areas, such as Punjab and Kashmir. They claim press reports
generally are based on official government statements, and do
not focus adequately on abuses by government forces in these
areas. One common accusation is that the Government, through
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its control of the allocation of newsprint, as well as the
placement of government and public sector advertisements,
exerts unfair influence over the press.
Even in areas not considered disturbed, legal protections
against arbitrary detention can be ignored. Rajendra Baid,
editor of a Siliguri Hindi daily, reportedly was detained in
Sikkim in November on charges of sedition for having allowed
his press to print pamphlets allegedly defaming Sikkim 's Chief
Minister. Baid said that he had not appeared before any
magistrate following his arrest and that he had been hit and
kicked by Sikkim police after his detention.
The Press Council of India is an independent board of
journalists, with the director (in 1991 a retired Supreme Court
justice) appointed by the Government. Designed to be a
self-regulating mechanism for the press, it investigates
complaints of irresponsible journalism and sets a code of
conduct for publishers. This code recommends against
publishing articles which might incite caste or communal
violence. Council findings carry no legal weight, though it
publicly criticizes newspapers or journalists it believes to
have broken the code of conduct. Many journalists complain
that the Council's actions promote self-censorship, resulting
in a chilling effect on investigative reporting. Under the
Official Secrets Act (OSA) , the Government may restrict
publication of sensitive security stories, but this is
sometimes interpreted quite broadly to suppress criticism of
government policies.
National television and radio, which are government monopolies,
are frequently accused of manipulating the news to the benefit
of the Government. The Broadcasting Corporation of India,
proposed by an act of Parliament in 1990, was intended to grant
greater autonomy to the electronic media. Actual creation of
the Corporation was put off by both Chandra Shekhar ' s
government in late 1990 and Narasimha Rao's Government in
1991. As of year's end, there was no sign that the bill would
be imp 1 ement ed .
In Punjab as well as Kashmir, journalists and editors were
harassed and intimidated by terrorists, local leaders, and
special interest groups. Militant organizations forced
newspapers to print their propaganda, under threat of death.
In Punjab, Amar Nath Verma, a journalist and editor of a weekly
magazine, Quomi Bulhara, was killed by militants on February
8. In Kashmir, K.M. Shaban, editor of the Urdu daily Al-Safa
was shot down in his office on April 23 by terrorists.
On April 4, Governor Saxena of Jammu and Kashmir invoked the
1971 Newspapers Incitements to Offenses Act. Under the Act, a
district magistrate may restrict media from carrying material
resulting in "incitement to murder and other offenses."
Piinishment permitted under the Act includes forfeiture of
newspapers as well as printing and other media equipment. The
Governor said the decision to invoke the Act was made to
counter newspapers printing stories dictated by militants.
Films are reviewed by the Censorship Board before being
licensed for distribution. The Board deletes material deemed
offensive to either public morals or religious or communal
sentiment. Private sector video newsmagazine producers are
also recjuired to clear their products with government censors.
This has resulted in numerous delays in the release and editing
of a number of stories on controversial issues.
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b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution protects the right of peaceful assembly and
the right to form associations. These rights are generally
respected. Government authorities sometimes require permits
and notification prior to holding parades and demonstrations.
At times of civil tension, local governments may ban public
assemblies and impose a curfew. Ordinarily, local governments
respect the right to protest peacefully, including such
traditional Indian forms of protest as "gherao," in which an
official or his office is surrounded by protesters who allow no
movement, and sitdowns blocking public thoroughfares.
Srinagar, in Kashmir, was under a continuous night curfew
throughout the year. In addition, government authorities
routinely imposed day curfews on communities experiencing
violent disturbances. In Punjab and Assam night and day
curfews were also sporadically imposed in response to militant
activities. Violent communal clashes throughout the country
provoked an imposition of curfew for 3 days or more in 18
cities in 6 different states during the first half of the year.
In December Indian authorities detained 14 Tibetan activists
without charges for approximately 1 week during the visit of
Chinese Premier Li Peng, to preclude thier organizing
anti-Chinese demonstrations. The Supreme Court ordered the
detainees released and established a judicial investigation of
allegations of molestation of female Tibetan detainees by Delhi
police.
c. Freedom of Religion
India is a secular state in which all faiths enjoy freedom of
worship. Government policy does not favor any religious
group. Nevertheless, tensions over religious differences
continue to be a social problem and pose challenges to the
secular nature of the Indian polity.
There is no national law to bar proselytizing by Indian
Christians, but the Government limits the number of foreign
missionaries, and laws in some states discourage them from
openly proselytizing. State officials in Arunachal Pradesh
continued to bar foreign Christian missionaries from the state
owing to a sharp increase in conversions among tribals there,
which has caused some social and religious tensions.
Indian religious organizations may maintain communications with
coreligionists abroad. Financial contributions from abroad are
subject to scrutiny and licensing by the Ministry of Home
Affairs .
Despite acts in various states to remove obstructions to the
exercise of religious freedom, Harijans ("scheduled castes" or
"untouchables") are still prevented from entering Hindu temples
in some areas.
The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Ordinance
makes it an offense to use any religious site for political
purposes or to use temples for harboring persons accused or
convicted of any crime. While specifically designed to deal
with Sikh places of worship in the Punjab, the Ordinance
technically applies to all religious sites. However, the
Government has been careful to avoid placing restrictions on
Sikh religious practices or on the management of Sikh places of
worship.
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INDIA
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Indian citizens enjoy full freedom of movement within the
country, except in certain border areas where, for security
reasons, special permits are required. Foreigners (including
diplomats) must obtain special permission to visit Assam as
well as other sensitive border areas in the northeast. Foreign
travel and emigration are without political restrictions.
Millions of people of Indian origin live abroad.
India admitted millions of refugees and displaced persons at
the time of partition in 1947 and granted them citizenship,
integrating them fully into Indian society. Subsequent
migration to India has largely been the result of upheavals in
nearby countries, and some of the refugees in these migrations
have not been granted citizenship or been fully integrated. In
some cases, both the refugees and their hosts consider their
stay temporary, although it may be for an indefinite period.
India does not, however, offer permanent resettlement.
Refugees it recognizes are placed in camps. Afghans,
Bangladeshis, Nepali-origin Bhutanese, and Burmese generally
are not deported; neither are they recognized as refugees.
These and other nationalities either receive a renewable
residence permit or are ignored. A dwindling flow of Afghans
continued to enter India.
Tamils fleeing armed conflict in Sri Lanka moved into the
Indian state of Tamil Nadu in large numbers in 1990. Over
120,000 Tamil refugees were in over 300 camps, with
approximately 80,000 more living independently in the state.
The state government, using central government resources,
provided shelter and subsidized food to those in the camps.
The Indian government did not accept assistance from the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the Sri
Lankan refugees; nor did it permit UNHCR access to the camps.
India continues to provide humanitarian assistance and
protection to the large communities of Tibetan refugees in
Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, and elsewhere in India, who number
over 100,000. At least 500 new refugees entered in 1991.
Ethnic Nepalese from southern Bhutan moved to parts of Assam
and West Bengal in late 1990 and 1991, in response to a
Bhutanese government implementation of a strict nationality
policy. The number of these people fluctuated in response to
political tensions in Bhutan; it was estimated that over 15,000
ethnic Nepalese were in these regions in mid-October. The
Indian Government did not recognize these people as refugees
and did not provide them with aid.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
India has a democratic, parliamentary system of government with
members elected under full adult suffrage; the voting age is
18. Multiparty elections are held regularly at state and
national levels. A Parliament sits for not more than 5 years
unless dissolved earlier for new elections, except under
constitutionally defined emergency situations. State
governments (headed by an appointed governor) are also elected
at regular intervals except in states under President's Rule.
Although the central Government spoke earlier of its desire to
replace President's Rule with elected state governments, law
and order problems in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir remain
1401
INDIA
obstacles to the holding of state assembly elections. Polling
in Punjab for the state assembly and the lower house of the
national Parliament, scheduled for June 22, was postponed by
the election commissioner on June 20, ostensibly because of the
deteriorating law and order situation. It was generally
believed, however, that the move was designed to allow the
Congress (I), which was boycotting the elections in Punjab, to
participate in future polling. The Congress (I) Government
subsec[uently canceled the elections but continue to affirm its
commitment to a special round of voting before February 15,
1992.
On the advice of the Prime Minister, the President may declare
President's Rule or a state of emergency in any state in the
event of war, external oppression, internal disruption, or
collapse of the constitutional machinery. Under President's
Rule, the central Government, through Parliament, the
President, and the appointed governor, directly administers the
state, bypassing the elected state government. President's
rule is for 6 months and must give way to new elections, but
may be extended by Parliament in increments of 6 months.
President's Rule in Punjab was first instituted on May 11, 1987
and has been extended every 6 months since then. On September
18, Parliament extended President's Rule in the Punjab for an
additional 6 months, effective November 11. The Government
promised to create a situation conducive to fair assembly
elections by February 15, 1992. Jammu and Kashmir state was
under President's Rule throughout the year. It was extended on
August 26 for another 6 months, effective September 3.
President's Rule in Assam, imposed November 28, 1990, was
lifted on June 30.
National elections were held in May and June. The campaign and
polling were marred by widespread violence and corruption, and
at least 150 people (including 34 candidates) died in
election-related violence. The press reported that throughout
the country politicians had hired armed gangs to disrupt
polling, to intimidate voters, and to steal or stuff ballot
boxes. Such violence and corruption was particularly prevalent
in the states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh.
According to the Home Ministry, polling was temporarily
adjourned or repolling was ordered in 2,594 polling stations
(out of 600,000 in the country) because of vote rigging and
ballot box stuffing. In addition, five elections for
parliamentary constituencies were nullified for the same
reasons .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Independent Indian human rights organizations are active and
vocal. They include the Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights,
the People's Union for Civil Liberties, the South Asia Human
Rights Documentation Center, Citizens for Democracy, and the
Indian People's Human Rights Commission, all of which send out
teams to study specific allegations of human rights abuses and
publish reports on their findings, which are often highly
critical of government authorities. All of India, including
Kashmir and Punjab, is open to investigation by Indian civil
liberties groups. However, individual human rights monitors
and people who file human rights complaints have been harassed
and in some cases physically assaulted by police.
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INDIA
The central Government, while tolerant of dissent within India,
is sensitive to international allegations of human rights
violations. Asia Watch sent a team of investigators to Punjab
and Kashmir in 1990. Though it did not request permission for
the visit, it did inform the Government of its plans and
requested appointments with officials. Amnesty International
repeated its requests for authorization for an investigative
team to visit several areas in India. As of year's end, no
authorization had been granted, although the Government claimed
to have the req[uests under consideration.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The traditional caste system as well as differences of race,
religion, and language severely divide Indian society in spite
of laws designed to prevent discrimination. Sporadic violence
occurred throughout the year based on these differences.
Despite several provisions in the Constitution promising
equality before the law and prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of sex, legally sanctioned sex discrimination is
manifested in the family, marriage, and inheritance laws of
several of India's religious communities. In recent years,
changes have been made in personal, criminal, and labor laws
governing women, including the Dowry Prohibition Act, the Equal
Remuneration Act, the Prevention of Immoral Traffic Act, and
the Sati (Widow Burning) (Prevention) Act, and the media have
reported more extensively on the treatment of women.
Nonetheless, as evidenced by increasing numbers of court cases
brought by women's rights groups, deeply rooted traditions,
often tied to religious or social practice, continue to
contribute to uneven enforcement of these laws, particularly in
the countryside.
Existing laws relating to asset and land ownership give women
little control over land use, retention, or sale. None of the
personal laws, except Hindu family law, makes distinctions
between ancestral and self-acquired property in the matter of
inheritance. The Hindu Succession Act provides equal
inheritance rights for Hindu women, although in practice
married daughters are seldom given a share in parental
property. Islamic personal law, while recognizing the right to
inheritance of both sons and daughters, specifies that a
daughter's share should be only one-half of a son's (a son has
responsibility for caring for the parents in their old age) .
Under the tribal land system, notably in Bihar, tribal women do
not have the right to own land; the practice of putting women
to death there as "witches" is closely linked to the denial of
property rights. Female bondage, forced prostitution, and
child marriage remain common in parts of Indian society. Child
prostitution is rampant in the larger urban areas, particularly
in Bombay and Delhi. In Bombay alone, there are approximately
100,000 prostitutes, many of them minors held in bondage at
brothels .
Sex determination tests (amniocentesis) are widely used,
resulting in a disproportionate number of abortions of female
fetuses. Coupled with a marked disparity between mortality
rates of male versus female infants in the 0-5 age group, this
has resulted in the unusually low ratio in the Indian
population of 933 females per 1,000 males (the ratio varies
considerably among states). Parents often give priority in
both health care and nutrition to male infants over females.
Female infanticide is also believed to contribute to the
1403
INDIA
disparity between rates of male and female mortality. Women's
rights groups point out that the burden of providing an
adec[uate dowry for girls is one factor in making births of
females less desirable to the parents.
On September 12, the Government introduced the Prenatal
Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse)
Bill 1991 to combat the use of sex determination tests leading
to the abortion of female fetuses.
According to an Indian government study, published several
years ago but supported by current press reporting, violence
against women — including molestation, rape (including while in
police custody), kidnaping, and wife murder ("dowry
deaths") — has shown an upward trend over the past decade.
Whether this is due to more reporting, a higher incidence, or a
combination of both is unknown. The claim that "dowry deaths"
(usually by burning) of young married women result from their
inability to meet property demands by their husband's families
has been challenged by women's rights groups who contend that
insufficient dowry is often used as an excuse for societally
condoned violence against married women.
Dowry crimes are a complex issue involving attitudes of parents
toward daughters, the social and economic status of women, laws
that do not adequately stipulate investigation and enforcement
procedures, and the failure of police to enforce existing
laws. There are no accurate statistics on the number of dowry
deaths per year, as much domestic violence is unreported or is
not registered by the police. Women's groups contend that, at
best, there has been no decrease in the numbers in recent
years, despite the strengthening of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
By law, every unnatural death of a woman in the first 7 years
of marriage must be investigated by the police and a
magistrate. According to the Home Ministry, there were 4,836
reported cases of dowry death in 1990. The Ministry did not
have statistics on how many of the reported cases were
registered for prosecution or ended in convictions. A member
of the Indian police on the Union Public Service Commission
stated in 1990 that about 95 percent of registered cases of
dowry death end in acquittal as corrupt police and medical
officers tamper with crucial evidence. Likewise, the Home
Ministry noted 9,518 reported cases of rape but offered no
information regarding prosecution or convictions.
About 150 women's organizations in India are active in working
for social justice and economic advancement of women and in
linking women's problems to larger social concerns.
The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act of 1989 added to other protective legislation
by specifying a new range of offenses and providing stiffen
sanctions with special courts. It has not, however, checked
atrocities committed against these groups. The Government
announced that there had been a total of 16,810 cases of
atrocities (including murder, rape, burning, and beating)
against scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in 1990. In the
first 3 months of 1991, the rate of atrocities had increased,
with 5,456 cases reported. There were no convictions under the
1989 Act, although the Government's minorities commission noted
that many cases were pending.
1404
INDIA
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for the right of association as
defined by the International Labor Organization (ILO). Workers
are guaranteed the right to form and join unions of their own
choosing without prior authorization, including in the seven
export processing zones (EPZ's); several trade union
confederations exist. Most trade unions have some tie to a
political party, national or local, but they make a point of
stressing their formal independence from political parties and,
on occasion, differ from their respective political allies on
labor-related issues.
Trade unions have the legally protected right to strike, but
public sector unions (i.e., in government -owned industries)
have to give at least 14 days' notice prior to striking. Some
states have laws requiring workers in certain nonpublic sector
industries to give prior strike notice. The Essential Services
Maintenance Act allows central government authorities to ban
strikes and requires conciliation or arbitration in specified
essential industries. Legal mechanisms exist for challenging
the assertion that a given dispute falls within the scope of
this act. At least two of the EPZ's limit the right to
strike. Approximately 730 strikes occurred in India in 1990
(the latest year for which figures are available).
By and large, human rights abuses against unions or unionized
workers have not been a problem in India. On September 28,
however, leading Madhya Pradesh trade union leader Shankar Guha
Niyogi was shot and killed by unidentified assailants.
Suspects included local industrialists opposed to his
organizing activities and rival trade unionists. State
authorities turned investigative responsibility over to the
(federal) Central Bureau of Investigation.
Unions are free to join and participate in international trade
union organizations and maintain a broad range of such
affiliations .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize (including protection against antiunion
discrimination) and to bargain collectively has existed in
Indian law for decades. Trade unions carry out these
activities independently and without government or, in general,
employer attempts to interfere. Police and judicial
authorities are generally quick to protect peaceful union
activities. However, the ILO Committee on Freedom of
Association considered three cases alleging antiunion
discrimination by private and state-owned companies in
retaliation for a union's protected activity and called on the
Government employer to assure that ongoing disciplinary
proceedings against workers do not violate ILO principles
barring prejudice in employment because of union membership or
activities .
In addition to the availability of normal civil and criminal
courts, a system of specialized labor courts exists to hear and
adjudicate labor-related complaints.
Collective bargaining is the normal means of setting wages and
settling disputes, and trade unions are usually vigorous in
defending worker interests in this process. Where collective
1405
INDIA
bargaining fails to establish locally ecjuitable wage levels,
the Government may set up tripartite boards, including trade
union representation, to determine them.
The Trade Union Act prohibits discrimination against union
members and organizers, and employers may be penalized if they
discriminate. Physical access to the EPZ ' s ordinarily is
limited to those who work in them, and union organizers are not
exempt from these limitations. While workers in EPZ ' s have the
legal right to organize and bargain collectively, trade union
activity is rare. Women workers, who are more difficult to
organize, constitute the bulk of the work force in the EPZ ' s .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by the Constitution. A Supreme
Court decision, however, has defined "forced labor" as work at
less than the minimum wage (minimum wages are usually set by
the states, not the central Government). Under this
definition, "forced labor" is widespread throughout India,
particularly in rural areas. "Bonded labor," the result of a
private contractual relationship whereby a worker incurs or
inherits debts to a contractor and then must work off the debt
(plus extensive interest), is illegal and specifically
prohibited under national legislation passed in 1976. While
violations are punishable by imprisonment for up to 3 years,
individual state labor departments are responsible for law
enforcement and prosecutions are rare. As a result, despite
active central government opposition, the practice of bonded
labor continues and occurs among significant numbers of
agricultural and construction workers.
The Government estimated that, based on reports from the
states, as of March 31 there were 255,608 bonded workers in the
country, of whom 222,935 had been "rehabilitated" by government
authorities. The Gandhi Peace Foundation, however, estimates
the number at 10 times the government figure. Private social
organizations, such as trade unions, the Council for
Advancement of Peoples' Action and Rural Technology, and Action
for Welfare and Awakening Rural Environments, attempt to
identify cases of bondage and pursue them with relevant
officials. However, even with better coordination and
increased resources to overcome the complicated jurisdictional
division between central and state governments, the eradication
of bonded labor is proceeding slowly.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
One-quarter of the world's child labor force is said to be in
India, where poverty and the lack of compulsory education make
it an especially serious problem. According to a Labor
Ministry survey, one out of four Indian children between the
ages of 5 and 15 is working. Government statistics put the
total at 17.5 million in 1985. Other figures put it as high as
44 million.
In 1986 legislation passed both houses of Parliament to ban the
employment of children under age 14 in hazardous occupations
(such as glass making, fireworks, match factories, and carpet
weaving) and regulate their employment in others. A child
labor division set up in 1987 in the Labor Ministry is carrying
out child welfare projects, including health and nutritional
programs, designed to rehabilitate child workers.
1406
INDIA
Nevertheless, progress has been slow. Some employers of child
labor have openly defied the Labor Ministry and resisted its
attempts at enforcement. As in the case of bonded labor, the
central Government often blames divided jurisdiction with state
governments for its inability to curb the practice. It has
urged private organizations, including the unions, to do more.
Most child labor abuses, however, occur in sectors outside the
traditional reach of labor organizations. The central
Government's fiscal 1990 budget allotted only $2.2 million for
all child welfare programs.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
While the basic minimum wage varies according to the state and
sector of industry, most "organized" workers receive much more
than the minimum wage, especially when legislatively mandated
bonuses and other benefits are included. In the "unorganized
sector," each state sets separate minimum wages for
agricultural workers, which are not well enforced. The minimum
wage for the unorganized section in New Delhi is considered
adequate only for the most minimal standard of living.
According to a government-sponsored report by the National
Commission on Self-Employed Women, most rural women work as
(unorganized) agricultural laborers, vulnerable to
exploitation. Overall, 94 percent of Indian women work in the
unorganized sector, which is not adequately regulated by labor
laws. Contractors customarily pay women wage rates lower than
those fixed by the several states. This is so even though
one-third of all Indian households are supported solely by
women, while in another third women are responsible for half
the family's income.
The Factories Act established an 8-hour workday and a 48-hour
workweek and provides for one 24-hour rest period which may be
worked if overtime is paid. These standards are generally
enforced and accepted (indeed, improved upon by various
enlightened employers and aggressive unions) in the modern
industrial sectors but tend not to be observed in the more
extensive older, smaller, and less robust industries. State
governments are responsible for the enforcement of the
Factories Act. However, the large number of industries covered
by a small cadre of factory inspectors, with their limited
training and susceptibility to bribery, makes for lax
enforcement .
Although occupational safety and health measures vary widely,
in general neither state nor central government resources for
inspection and enforcement of standards are adequate. Safety
conditions tend to be better in the EPZ ' s .
1407
IRAN*
Iran is an Islamic Republic under the leadership of Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei. The formal system of government, based on a
Constitution approved in 1980 by popular referendum and revised
in July 1989, features a parliament and a president elected
from among multiple candidates by universal suffrage. However,
all candidates must meet highly restrictive religious and
political criteria imposed by the Council of Guardians, and as
a result the choice offered to voters is narrow. The
Government, dominated by a political elite composed of Shi ' a
Muslim clerics and of laymen allied with these clerics,
attempts to impose its views on political and socioreligious
orthodoxy. However, there remain significant factional
differences on important economic and political issues.
The Government's hold on power continues to be reinforced
through arrests, summary trials and executions, ' and other forms
of intimidation implemented by an extensive internal security
system. Political arrests are made by the Revolutionary Guards
and by security forces operating under the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security.
Iran has a mixed economy. Although Islam guarantees the right
to private ownership, the Government has nationalized the banks
and several basic industries, including the petroleum and
utilities sector. Oil exports are a primary source of foreign
exchange. The disruptions of the revolution, the destruction
from the Iran-Iraq war, devastating earthc[uakes in 1990, and
government mismanagement have caused serious economic
deterioration. Inflation is estimated at 50 to 80 percent,
about 40 percent of the work force is unemployed, and
corruption and black market activities are rife. Many
industries are operating at less than half of capacity. While
an economic 5-Year Plan was approved in 1990, implementation of
reconstruction programs has been slow.
There was no evidence of significant improvement in the
Government's human rights practices; it continues to be a major
abuser of human rights. It was, however, difficult to know
precisely the details and numbers of such abuses in 1991
because of the great lengths to which the Government goes to
keep such information secret. Domestic elements that might
monitor and report on the Government's practices are ruthlessly
suppressed. The Government finally allowed a December visit by
the U.N. Special Representative for Iran, and signed an
agreement to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to visit prisoners. This report makes every effort to
describe the situation in Iran accurately within the confines
of the Government ' s efforts to obfuscate its record on human
rights .
Abuses included summary executions; widespread torture;
repression of the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and
association; arbitrary detentions; lack of fair trials;
continuing repression of the Baha'i religious community; denial
of citizens' right to change their government; and severe
restrictions on women's and worker rights. In his November
1990 report, the Special Representative concluded that "the
enormous quantity and variety of allegations and complaints
♦Because of the absence of a United States Mission in Iran,
this report draws heavily on unofficial sources.
1408
IRAN
received from very diverse sources .. .provide a credible factual
basis for the belief that human rights violations occur
frequently in the country and that governinent action to prevent
and remedy such violations has not been sufficient to put an
end to them . "
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There is no reliable estimate of the number of people killed
for political reasons in 1991. Given the lack of basic
procedural safeguards in political trials, most of the
executions ordered each year in such cases amount to summary
executions .
There continued to be credible reports that political prisoners
are among those executed for criminal offenses, and the
Government has repeatedly indicated in public statements that
it equates active opposition to Iran's Islamic revolution with
terrorism. In addition, the Government continues to carry out
political executions of its opponents residing abroad. As of
year's end, the French Government's investigation into the
August assassination of former Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar
and his assistant had resulted in a warrant for the arrest of
an Iranian governinent official.
b. Disappearance
The number of disappearances in 1991 is unknown. The situation
is complicated by the lack of government information on many
political prisoners. Many families of executed political
prisoners reportedly have not been informed officially of their
relatives' deaths. The Government responded to many of the
Special Representative's requests for information on specific
prisoners by denying that it had any judicial record of them.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Accounts of torture in Iran's prisons continued to be received
in 1991. Persistent reports tell that detainees are tortured
in detention, and that arbitrary brutality in the treatment of
convicted prisoners is common. There are also credible
reports, as noted by the Special Representative, that prisoners
are frequently held in solitary confinement or denied adequate
rations or medical care as a way of forcing them to confess.
Guards have threatened and intimidated family members of
detainees, and relatives or other prisoners have occasionally
been forced to watch torture. It is not known if such
practices occurred in 1991.
Prisoner protests against poor prison conditions have
reportedly been met with beatings, denial of medical care, and,
in some cases, execution. The Special Representative reported
that a "Prisoner's Organization" exists to redress
mistreatment. However, no information is available on its
activities .
1409
IRAN
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arbitrary arrest and detention is a major abuse, but it is not
known how many cases there may have been in 1991. It is known
that some persons have been arrested on trumped-up criminal
charges when their actual "offenses" were political. The lack
of fair trials and other procedural safeguards encourages such
practices .
No judicial determination of the legality of detention exists
in Iranian law. There is reportedly no legal time limit on
incommunicado detention. Suspects are held for questioning at
local Revolutionary Guard offices or in jails.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There are essentially two different court systems. The civil
courts deal with criminal offenses, and the revolutionary
courts, established in 1979, try "political" offenses as well
as cases involving narcotics trafficking and "crimes against
God."
By international standards, no trial by a revolutionary court
can be called fair or public in the usual sense. If the trial
is staged publicly, it is generally because the prisoner has
already been forced to confess to a crime. Persons tried by
the revolutionary courts enjoy virtually no procedural or
substantive safeguards. The Special Representative reported
that trials lasting 5 minutes and less are common. He also
noted in his February 1991 report many examples of the lack of
basic procedural guarantees, mentioning particularly the
problem of limited access to a lawyer. The right to a defense
counsel is theoretically provided for in the Iranian
Constitution, but many defendants do not have access to a
lawyer, are unable to call witnesses on their behalf, and are
unable to appeal. One observer with 30 years of judicial
experience told the Special Representative that lawyers are
generally not permitted to appear before the revolutionary
courts and are harassed and intimidated if they insist. Some
persons have been imprisoned beyond the limit of their
sentence, and even executed after the formal expiration of
their prison term.
There was no evidence in 1991 of judicial reform that would
bring Iranian courts into compliance with international
standards. Adoption of a draft law to guarantee legal counsel
for defendants was blocked by a lack of approval by the Council
of Guardians. Critics of the law also saw it as flawed because
it did not guarantee that counsel be provided by a qualified
attorney-at-law .
The judicial system is weakened by the fact that revolutionary
courts can consider cases formally under the jurisdiction of
the civil and criminal courts. Assignment of cases to regular
rather than revolutionary courts is haphazard and apparently
occurs mainly when arrests are made by regular police.
Revolutionary courts may also overturn the decisions of the
civilian courts. The review authority of the Supreme Court is
also limited.
For common criminal offenses, many elements of the
prerevolutionary judicial system survive, and the accused often
have the right to a public trial with benefit of lawyers of
their own choosing, assuming they can afford the fee. Even
this judiciary is not fully independent, however. Many of the
1410
IRAN
former judges were retired after the revolution, and new judges
were selected. Political and Islamic acceptability is a
requirement for any government position, including the
judiciary. Favorable verdicts reportedly can often be
"purchased" from the judges serving on civil and criminal
courts and, to a lesser degree, from judges of the
revolutionary courts. The expert cited above told the Special
Representative that even in ordinary penal cases lawyers must
be extremely careful, and mentioned the example of a colleague
who was indicted after requesting an additional hearing in a
case. In general, the expert said, the practice of interfering
with lawyers was becoming worse.
No reliable estimate is available on the number of political
prisoners. The Minister of Intelligence and Security reported
to the press in August that there were 500 prisoners from
"minigroups, " a term generally used to describe political
opposition groups, as opposed to 1,000 in 1988.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government rejects the Western distinction between a public
sphere which the State may control and a sphere of private life
(religion, culture, thought, and private behavior) which the
State may not properly control. Authorities enter homes,
wiretap telephones, and open mail, but these activities are
less common now than they were before 1982.
Special Revolutionary Guard units and security forces check on
social activities. Women whose clothing does not completely
cover the hair and all of the body except hands and face, or
who wear makeup, are subject to arrest. In the past, men have
also been recjuired to dress "modestly," eschewing, for example,
short-sleeved shirts. Enforcement of standards of Islamic
morality has appeared to vary with the political climate and
the jurisdiction. There have been periodic crackdowns by the
Head Office for Combating Unlawful Acts on dress code and moral
violations. However, there were increasing reports in 1991 of
instances in which women both individually and collectively
challenged the authority of the Special Revolutionary Guards to
impose "proper" dress.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
According to the Constitution, "publications and the press may
express ideas freely, except when they are contrary to Islamic
principles or are detrimental to public rights." In practice,
most publications are controlled by the Government; independent
publishers run the risk not only of press shutdowns and
confiscation of publications and equipment but of arrest and
summary punishment if they are overly critical of the
Government .
All books must be submitted to the Ministry of Islamic Guidance
for review before they may be published. Publishers, authors,
and printers also engage in substantial self-censorship before
submitting books to the Ministry in an effort to avoid the
considerable penalties, including economic losses, incurred
when books are rejected. Iranian authorities have interpreted
broadly their right to censorship on religious grounds,
including official acceptance of the 1991 renewal of the
religious decree condemning British author Salman Rushdie to
1411
IRAN
death for his book "Satanic Verses."
Newspapers, which are usually associated with various
government factions, reflect a variety of viewpoints.
Generally, newspapers can and do criticize government policies
and officials both in their reporting and editorials.
Newspapers are forbidden, however, to criticize the concept of
the Islamic republic or to promote ethnic minority rights.
Nevertheless, some independent publishers out of favor with the
Government continue to survive, and some books and pamphlets
critical of the Government are published without reprisal.
Foreign books, newspapers, and magazines may be imported only
after they have been reviewed by the Ministry of Islamic
Guidance .
All broadcasting facilities are government owned, and the
content of their broadcasting reflects the political and
socioreligious ideology of the Government.
Restrictions on academic freedom continue to be less severe.
However, course content is still monitored, and there is little
genuine critical discussion of issues. Informers are said to
be common on campus and in the classroom. To achieve tenure,
professors reportedly must cooperate with government
authorities over a period of years. All textbooks proposed for
use at the universities are reviewed by government authorities
to determine their acceptability.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution permits unarmed assemblies and marches
"provided they do not violate the principles of Islam." In
practice, the only ones permitted are those sponsored by the
Government, such as Friday prayers and parades and
demonstrations on official occasions. Throughout 1991 there
were reports of unofficial and spontaneous demonstrations
against the Government, many of them centering on the
deteriorating economy. These demonstrations were suppressed by
government forces .
Article 26 of the Constitution allows the formation of
political parties, groups, and professional associations, as
well as Islamic and some minority religious associations,
provided they do not violate the principles of "freedom,
sovereignty, [and] national unity" or question Islam or the
Islamic Republic. In practice, most independent organizations
have either been banned, co-opted by the Government, or are
moribund.
The Freedom Movement, founded in 1961, continues to be harassed
by Iranian authorities and was declared illegal in 1991.
According to reliable reports, the Movement's telephones are
tapped, its mail opened, and its members subjected to
intimidation. While the Movement participated in the first
parliamentary election after the revolution, it was prevented
from doing so in all subsequent elections. Nine members of the
Movement associated with the Association for the Defense of the
Freedom and Sovereignty of the Iranian Nation who were arrested
in May 1990 for their political opposition were finally
convicted in secret trials in September 1991 and sentenced to
terms of up to 3 years. Others arrested at the same time were
released after "confessing" the "wrongness of their stand
towards the Islamic Republic," according to government
sources. The Government claimed that the nine who were
convicted were "charged with participating in gatherings and
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IRAN
collaborating to take actions against the internal and external
security of the country, " and not for having signed an open
letter of protest to President Rafsanjani.
c. Freedom of Religion
Religion is almost inseparable from government in Iran. The
President and many other top officials are mullahs (Islamic
clergymen), as are the Speaker of the Parliament and nearly
half the parliamentary deputies.
Approximately 90 percent of Iranians are Shi ' a Muslims. Aside
from slightly over 1 percent who are non-Muslims (Baha'is,
Christians, Zoroastrians, and Jews), the rest are Sunni
Muslims. The Sunnis are mostly Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans,
Baluch, and other ethnic minorities whose political influence
is very limited. The Constitution declares that "the official
religion of Iran is Islam and the sect followed is Ja'fari
Shi 'ism," but it also states that "other Islcimic denominations
shall enjoy complete respect."
The small Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian (the pre-Islamic
religion of Iran) populations are concentrated mainly in urban
areas. Their religions are recognized by the Constitution, and
they elect representatives to seats reserved for them in the
Parliament. They are permitted to practice their religions, to
instruct their children, and — although with a great deal of
disruptive interference — to maintain schools.
In his February 1991 report, the Special Representative said
that religious minorities are freely able to practice their
faith, noting for example that the Armenian Christians operate
7 active churches in Tehran and 12 in Isfahan, and are able to
bury their dead in their own cemeteries. He also noted that
the Armenians, who number about 200,000, are permitted to
publish a weekly newspaper and to operate a number of cultural
associations .
Reports from other sources, however, suggest that while there
is little overt discrimination against Christians,
administrative and other official harassment is commonplace.
In the case of the Chaldean Catholics (numbering about 14,000),
the Government has reportedly refused to renew the church's
registration and has, as a result, denied requests to print
Bibles, construct chapels, or engage in registered charitable
activities. The Presbyterian church has allegedly suffered
similar interference from the authorities; while the Interior
Ministry was said to have allowed elections for church
officials, it disrupted the meeting at which they took place
and obstructed the balloting. In addition, it was confirmed
that a Christian pastor. Reverend Hossein Soodmand, was
executed in December 1990 in Mashad, apparently on charges of
apostasy, based on his earlier conversion from Islam to
Christianity and proselytizing activity. There were again
reports in 1991 that another Christian convert from Islam,
Mehdi Debadj , has been held in prison since his arrest in 1983
for apostasy.
The Government in 1991 continued to discriminate against the
Baha ' i community, Iran's largest non-Muslim minority (300,000
to 350,000 members). The Baha'i religion is considered a
"misguided sect" by the authorities and is not officially
recognized.
1413
As it has over the past few years, the Government continued to
mitigate its repression of individual Baha'is. No Baha'is were
executed in 1991. A small number of Baha'is were permitted to
leave the country. The Government continued to return some of
the property of individual Baha'is that it had previously
confiscated, although the amount represents a small fraction of
the total seized. Most Baha'is are now able to obtain food
ration booklets. Baha'is are now generally able to bury their
dead in Baha'i cemeteries, although this remains a problem in a
number of areas. Baha'i children are now permitted to attend
grade school and high school. In legal matters, the Government
has stated that it will protect the "social and legal rights"
of Baha'is as "normal citizens." However, the actual treatment
of Baha'is varies depending on the jurisdiction. In his
February 1991 report, the Special Representative noted that
"the situation of the Baha'is is moving towards quite broad de
facto tolerance."
However, widespread discrimination against the community
persists. Baha'is continued to face arbitrary arrest and
detention. A total of 31 Baha'is were detained for various
lengths of time in the first 6 months of 1991, although the
number of detainees at any one time was around 10. All
property of the community, such as places of worship, remains
confiscated. Baha'i marriages are still not recognized.
Baha'is generally cannot attend college (the Special
Representative noted that only four have been admitted to
universities) or be employed on college faculties. Baha'is are
forbidden to participate in social welfare organizations, and
they may not teach their faith. Some Baha'is continue to be
denied public sector (and often private sector) employment on
account of their religion; in a number of cases ration cards
have been denied on the same grounds. Thousands of Baha'is
dismissed from government jobs in the early 1980 's receive no
unemployment benefits and have been required to repay the
Government for salaries or pensions received from the first day
of employment. Those unable to do so face severe prison
sentences. While some Baha'i's have been issued passports, the
Special Representative reported that the vast majority of such
applications are denied. The Government continues to attack
the Baha'i community as a front for political and espionage
activities and prohibits the community from electing leaders or
conducting religious activities.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Iranians may travel to any part of Iran, although there have
been restrictions on travel to Kurdish areas at times of heavy
fighting. Persons may change their place of residence without
obtaining permission. Over 1 million refugees, the majority of
them Kurdish and Shi ' ite refugees from Iraq, entered Iran in
1991.
Males of draft age are not issued exit visas except for
approved courses of study, and Iranians who are suspect
politically, such as some retired military officers and
high-level public officials under the former regime, are not
able to leave the country. Persons who have not repaid loans
obtained under the old government also are denied exit visas.
Reportedly some Iranians, particularly those whose skills are
in short supply and who were educated at government expense,
must post bonds to obtain exit visas. In his February 1991
report, the Special Representative recounted several instances
in which passports were denied, sometimes for apparent
1414
IRAN
political reasons, and on other occasions with no reason
given. As noted in Section 2.c., most Baha'is are denied
passports.
Iranian Jews are permitted to obtain passports and to travel,
even to Israel, but they are normally denied the multiple-exit
visas given to most Iranians and must make a new application
(with another fee) for each planned trip. Permission is not
normally granted for all members of a Jewish family to travel
outside Iran at the same time.
Iranians are generally able to return to Iran after long
periods abroad without reprisal. Since the end of the
Iran-Iraq war, the Government has encouraged the many thousands
of skilled Iranians living abroad to return to help rebuild the
country. Of those who have gone back in recent years, a number
have been able to pursue, through the Iranian judicial system,
the return of their properties. However, many exiles complain
that formal legal guarantees of their safety have not yet been
provided, and, as a result, many remain reluctant to return.
There are some categories of persons who may be in danger if
they return to Iran. Some of those with close ties to the
former regime, draft evaders, and those who departed the
country illegally face possible arrest upon their return.
Members or sympathizers with the People's Mojahedin
Organization of Iran or the Communist Tudeh Party, both
opposition groups banned by the Government, are subject to
imprisonment and torture or even execution should they return.
Nevertheless, immediate relatives of persons wanted by the
Government are often able to live in Iran, travel outside, and
return without undue difficulty.
Iranian passports have always been stamped "not valid for
emigration," but the Government does not make a clear
distinction between legal residence in another country and
emigration. According to the regulations, Iranians with a
legal residence outside Iran may be issued passports and
advance exit visas by the Iranian embassy, consulate, or
interests section in their country of residence. Iranians who
have acquired U.S. citizenship are still considered to be
Iranian by the Government unless they have formally renounced
their Iranian citizenship in accordance with Iranian law.
There have been many instances in which Iranian authorities
have confiscated the U.S. passports of dual nationals. There
are no known instances of the denial of Iranian citizenship to
Iranians who left Iran, or to those who have remained there.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Iran is ruled by a group of religious leaders (mullahs) and
their lay associates who share a belief in the legitimacy of a
theocratic state based on Ayatollah Khomeini's interpretation
of Shi ' a Islam. Citizens are not free to question or to change
this form of government .
The revolutionary Government has held elections at fairly
regular intervals for president. Parliament deputies, members
of the Assembly of Experts (responsible for choosing the
Revolutionary Leader's successor), and members of local
government councils. Elections for the Assembly of Experts and
parliamentary byelections were last contested in 1990. Voting
is by universal suffrage of everyone age 15 and older and is by
secret ballot. All candidates must be approved by the Council
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IRAN
of Guardians, however, and only those meeting the Council's
vaguely described political and religious criteria may run. In
practice, only supporters of the theocratic state are
accepted. Following the Ministry of Interior's announcement in
December 1988 that political parties would be allowed to form,
provided they met the Government's religious and political
criteria, a few have been licensed.
The independence of the Parliament is provided for in the
Constitution and exists to a large degree in practice. While
Parliament deputies are typically allied with various powerful
political and religious officials, they may speak and vote
independently and may shift from one faction to another.
Vigorous parliamentary debates — normally covered extensively in
the press — cover a wide variety of issues. Harsh criticism of
government officials is often heard in these debates, and, in
some cases, laws proposed by the executive branch have been
voted down.
The Constitution provides for a Council of Guardians composed
of 12 members: 6 clerics unilaterally appointed by the Leader,
and 6 lay members well grounded in Islamic law who are
nominated by the head of the Judicial Council, subject to the
Parliament's approval. The Council of Guardians must certify
all bills passed by the Parliament as being in accordance with
Islamic law and the Constitution. If bills fail to be
certified, they are sent back to the Parliament for revision.
They cannot become law until passed by the Parliament and
certified by the Council.
The Council has rejected various important bills and portions
of bills passed by the Parliament, including legislation on
land reform, foreign trade, private enterprise, the dress code,
and reform of the civil code.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Iranian organizations that attempt to speak out on human
rights, such as the Freedom Movement and the Association for
the Protection of Liberties and Human Rights, face severe
harassment by the Government (see Section 2.b.). In the past,
the Government generally has been uncooperative with foreign
human rights groups, whether government-sponsored or
independent, regarding their activities as interference in the
country's internal affairs. Foreign diplomats stationed in
Tehran who attempt to develop information about human rights
abuses face strong interference from Iranian authorities.
In 1990 the Government, for the first time, permitted the U.N.
Special Representative to visit the country and interview both
opponents and supporters of the Government, including
high-ranking government officials such as the head of the
judiciary. Nevertheless, his access to victims of abuse was
limited, many potential witnesses were prevented or intimidated
from testifying, and some of those who testified suffered
reprisals. Government- imposed controls during the Special
Representative's visits prevented him from being able to
investigate fully all reports of human rights abuses.
In his February 1991 report, the Special Representative said
that the Government had responded favorably in principle to
several of his suggestions. These included regular visits by
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to prisons
1416
IRAN
throughout the country to examine conditions and to look into
the situation of political prisoners; the possibility of the
U.N. Center for Human Rights in Geneva providing technical
assistance to Iran; development of a program to identify
inconsistencies between Islamic law and international law to
help bring the Iranian system more in line with accepted
international standards of hvrnian rights; and consideration of
humanitarian requests submitted by the Special Representative.
At the United Nations, however, Iran continued its efforts to
end, or at least restrict, the Special Representative's
mandate. The Government finally agreed late in 1991 to allow
the Special Representative to visit in December.
In November the Government signed an agreement with the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) providing for
regular ICRC visits to Iranian detention facilities to register
prisoners and monitor their treatment. (Prior to this, the
ICRC already was visiting Iraqi prisoners-of-war held by
Iran.) This agreement provided for all the normal ICRC
conditions such as privacy of interviews and repeat visits. As
of the end of the year, visits had not yet begun.
Iran held an international seminar on international and Islamic
law regarding human rights in September, at which the main
theme was that Iran should be judged by "Islamic" rather than
Western human rights principles.
The Government indicated its willingness in principle to
receive an official visit from Middle East Watch, a New
York-based human rights monitoring group, to investigate
conditions inside Iran, but the visit did not take place in
1991. In May, however, the Government did allow a separate,
unscheduled mission to Iran by Middle East Watch, as well as
one by Amnesty International, to interview Kurdish and Shi ' ite
refugees from Iraq.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Women traditionally have faced discrimination in Iranian
society, and this discrimination has increased since the
revolution. Ultraconservative dress, entirely hiding the hair
and all of the body except the face and hands, is a requirement
for all women, regardless of their religion, national origin,
or citizenship. In the past, women have been harassed,
detained, or physically attacked if they appeared in public in
clothing that official or self-appointed guardians of public
morality deemed insufficiently modest. Enforcement of these
rules has varied considerably since Ayatollah Khomeini's death
in 1989, and, as noted in Section l.f., there was evidence in
1991 of growing resistance by women to the authority of the
Special Revolutionary Guards to impose a dress code.
Although violence against women is known to occur in Iran,
little is known about its extent. Abuse within the family is
considered a private matter in this conservative society and is
seldom discussed publicly. There are no official statistics on
the subject. There are persistent and credible reports of the
torture and execution of women detainees, some of whom were
allegedly raped before execution; it is not known if any such
incidents occurred in 1991.
Under legislation passed in 1983, women have the right to
divorce their husbands, and regulations promulgated in 1984
substantially broadened to 12 the number of grounds for which a
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IRAN
woman may seek divorce. A husband may obtain a divorce without
having to state a reason or go to court.
The Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Baha'i minorities
suffer varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination
in a number of areas, particularly with respect to employment,
education, and public accommodations. Muslims who have
converted to Christianity are similarly discriminated against,
and under Shari'a (Islamic) law the ultimate penalty for
apostasy is execution. One requirement of university admission
is passing a test on Islamic theology, which has the effect of
excluding most religious minorities from higher education.
Applicants for public sector employment are similarly screened
for adherence to standards of Islamic orthodoxy, with much the
same effect. There have also been reports that religious
minorities have suffered discrimination in the legal system,
such as receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits,
and of receiving heavier punishments than those imposed on
Muslims. Although Sunnis have encountered religious
discrimination on the local level, the Government has tried to
reduce Shi ' a-Sunni antagonism.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
There are no real labor unions. A national organization known
as the "House of Labor," founded in 1982 as the labor branch of
the now defunct Islamic Republican Party, is the only
authorized national labor organization. It works closely with
the Islamic societies and Islamic labor councils set up in most
Iranian factories. The House of Labor is headed by Hossein
Kamali, the Minister of Labor; as such, it is largely a conduit
of government influence and control, not a trade union founded
by workers to represent their interests. The officially
sanctioned Islamic labor councils also are instruments of
government control and not bodies created and controlled by
workers to advance their own interests, although they have
frequently been able to block layoffs or the firing of workers.
There is also a system of "guild unions," which operates on a
regional basis. These guild unions issue vocational licenses,
fund financial cooperatives to assist members, and help workers
to find jobs. The guild unions operate with the cooperation of
the Government .
No information is available on the right of workers in Iran to
strike. It is unlikely that the Government would tolerate any
strike deemed to be at odds with its economic and labor
policies. There were reports, however, in 1991 of sporadic,
politically motivated strikes of short duration, sparked
chiefly by economic conditions in the country.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
In practice, the right of workers to organize independently and
bargain collectively is extremely limited. No information is
available on the mechanism used to set wages.
It is not known whether labor legislation and practice in the
export processing zones differ in any significant respect from
the law and practice in the rest of the country.
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IRAN
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Section 273 of the Iranian Penal Code provides that any person
who does not have definite means of subsistence and who,
through laziness or negligence, does not look for work may be
obliged by the Government to take suitable employment. This
provision has been frequently criticized by the Committee of
Experts (COE) of the International Labor Organization (ILO) as
contravening ILO Convention 29 on forced labor. In its 1990
report, the COE noted an indication by the Government in its
latest report to the Committee that Section 273 had been
abolished and replaced, for a trial period, by a new provision
approved by the Parliament. The Government, according to the
COE, stated that the new provision was not incompatible with
Convention 29 and promised to provide a copy after the
provision was translated. The COE noted that the Government
had indicated in its 1977 report that similar regulations
concerning unemployed persons and vagrants had been repealed
but had not yet complied with the Committee's request for a
copy of the repealing legislation.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Iranian labor law, which exempts agriculture, domestic service,
family businesses, and, to some extent, other small businesses,
forbids employment of minors under 12 years and places special
restrictions on the employment of minors under 18. In
addition, women and minors may not be used for hard labor or,
in general, for night work. The extent to which these
regulations are enforced is not known.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The labor law establishes a 6-day workweek of 48 hours maximum
(except for overtime at premium rates), with 1 day of rest
(normally Friday) per week as well as at least 12 days per year
of leave with pay and a number of paid public holidays. There
are also legal provisions with respect to minimum wages and
health and safety in workplaces. Further information on these
laws and the amount and adequacy of the minimum wage is not
available.
Given the large segments of the economy exempted from the labor
law, the State's still unresolved administrative
disorganization resulting from the revolution, the effects of
the war with Iraq, and the general lack of effective labor
unions, it is unclear to what extent the provisions of Iran's
labor law affect most of the labor force.
The ILO has long been concerned with official discrimination in
employment against members of the Baha ' i religion. In its 1991
report, the ILO's COE recounted the 1990 ILO debates about
discrimination in employment against Baha 'is, and asked the
Government to provide additional clarification of the current
situation and of the Government's claims that it is taking
steps to bring about compliance with ILO Convention 111 barring
discrimination in employment, which has been the primary focus
of complaints against Iran at the ILO for its treatment of
Baha' is (see also Section 5).
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IRAQ
Political power in Iraq is concentrated in a repressive
one-party apparatus under the domination of Saddam Hussein.
The provisional Constitution of 1968 stipulates that the Arab
Ba'ath Socialist Party (ABSP) governs Iraq, with executive and
legislative authority exercised by the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC) . Saddam Hussein wields decisive power as
President of the Republic, Chairman of the RCC, and Secretary
General of the Regional Command of the ABSP.
The Government's security apparatus, including militias
attached to the President, the ABSP, and the Interior Ministry,
have been responsible for widespread and systematic rights
abuses; they continue to play a central role in maintaining the
intimidation and fear on which government power rests.
The Government exerts decisive control over Iraq's oil-based
economy and owns all the major industries. Owing to severe
economic dislocation in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War,
unemployment and inflation rose dramatically. Iraq's economic
problems were compounded by the Government's failure to comply
with U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 which resulted in the
continuation of U.N. -mandated economic sanctions against Iraq.
Sanctions prohibited all exports (including petroleum) and
imports other than food, medicine, and essential humanitarian
supplies .
The magnitude of Iraqi human rights violations in 1991 was
shocking, even by the previous standards of the Saddam Hussein
regime. Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait early in 1991 carried
out mass arrests and abductions, rape, torture, and execution
of hundreds of Kuwaiti citizens. They were also responsible
for wanton destruction of Kuwait's urban infrastructure,
systematic looting, the intentional discharge of a massive
volume of crude oil into the Gulf, and demolition of more than
700 oil wells, as well as missile attacks against population
centers in Israel and Saudi Arabia.
In brutally repressing a major domestic popular uprising in
March and April, Iraqi forces resorted to sustained
indiscriminate bombardment of population centers, resulting in
casualties estimated in the tens of thousands. Many more
perished in mass executions and from hardships encountered
during a mass migration of over 1 million people.
Human rights in virtually all categories continue to be
systematically violated by the Iraqi regime. Political killing
and torture continue, denial of due process, arbitrary
detentions, and disappearances remain widespread, freedoms of
speech and press and of assembly and association are
nonexistent, and Iraqis do not have the right to change their
government. The reader is referred to the report on Kuwait for
details of human rights abuses committed by Iraqi forces in
that country in the first 2 months of 1991.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The Iraqi regime has a well-established record of executing
perceived opponents both inside and outside the country.
During 1991 summary execution was a primary tactic of Iraqi
1420
IRAQ
military and security services in suppressing the popular
uprising and, subsequently, in punishing citizens thought to
have taken part in it. Prisoners in southern detention camps
during the rebellion subsequently reported that a number of
prisoners were executed by machinegun fire each day.
Widespread public execution of civilians, including women and
children, after Iraqi forces regained control was reported in a
number of southern cities. Such incidents appear to have been
at least as widespread during fighting in the north.
Executions are reported to have continued since suppression of
the uprising. There were credible reports that a number of
Iraqis were arrested and executed upon returning to their homes
in northern and southern Iraq following an amnesty offer
extended to Kurds in April and broadened to include all
citizens in early May.
In early October, a Western journalist in Sulaymaniyah
witnessed the suinmary execution of at least 60 unarmed Iraqi
soldiers by unidentified Kurdish elements during violent
clashes in the area between Kurdish guerrilla fighters and the
Iraqi military. The Kurdish leadership immediately denounced
the killings and ordered an investigation. A Kurdish guerrilla
commander was tentatively identified as the main perpetrator,
but final results of the investigation had not been announced
as of the end of the year .
In past years, Iraqi opposition figures abroad have also been
targets of government assassination attempts.
b. Disappearance
As in previous years, there were credible reports from numerous
sources, including the U.N. Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances, that large numbers of persons
"disappeared" while in the custody of Iraqi authorities.
The total number of suspected government opponents who were
arrested and who disappeared during and immediately after the
March/April uprising is estimated in the thousands. Opposition
sources report that several hundred Shi ' a scholars and students
of religion were arrested at that time and remain unaccounted
for. In the north, many Kurds arrested as suspected dissidents
or detained for use as "human shield" hostages during the
uprising also disappeared. In addition, the Government has
failed either to return or account for more than 2,000 Kuwaiti
citizens transported to Iraq by occupation forces.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
Despite a constitutional prohibition against torture, reports
of torture against suspected opponents of the regime,
particularly alleged supporters of the popular uprising, were
extremely numerous in 1991. Insurgents in the south reported
liberating a number of long-term prisoners, as well as some
Kuwaiti detainees, who showed the effects of extreme physical
torture and privation. There were reports of systematic
torture of prisoners in northern detention centers as well.
Techniques of physical torture — including burning, electric
shocks, beatings (to body, feet, and sensitive areas), breaking
of limbs, and denial of food and water — are said to be
routinely practiced by the Iraqi security services. The highly
centralized authority structure of the Iraqi regime indicates
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IRAQ
that torture, along with other egregious rights abuses, is an
essential component of a policy for domestic control formulated
at the highest levels of the regime.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Mass arrests were a common Iraqi tactic in repressing the
popular uprising in March and April. In southern Iraq,
house-to-house searches in Najaf, Karbala, Nasiriyah, and other
cities led to the arrest of thousands suspected of taking part
in opposition activities. The fate of most, including hundreds
of Shi ' a clerics, remains unknown. The 95-year-old Grand
Ayatollah Abdul Qasim Khoei, a venerated Shi ' a figure, is under
house arrest in Najaf. Khoei was arrested in late March and
taken to Baghdad, where he was compelled to make proregime
statements. He is occasionally subjected to the humiliation of
governinent-supervised visits by foreign visitors, during which
he is obliged to express support for the regime. When Khoei
became seriously ill late in the year, the Government delayed
nearly 2 weeks before bowing to international pressure and
allowing an international medical team to treat him. The
whereabouts of Khoei family members and supporters originally
taken into custody with him are unknown.
In the north, Iraqi authorities carried out similar mass
arrests of civilians during fighting with opposition elements.
Some detainees were reportedly used as "human shield" hostages
to deter attacks on government positions. A credible source
reported that more than 5,000 males, ranging in age from 15 to
60, were arrested in Kirkuk during March and were used as
hostages in various areas of the north. Most were believed to
have been released the following month, although some are
thought to have been executed shortly after their arrest. Many
similar incidents were reported during fighting in the south,
with women and children placed atop tanks which subsequently
bombarded residential areas. The fate of many detainees
remains unknown.
Although there were no known instances of Iraqi citizens being
exiled abroad, the refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow tens
of thousands of Kurds and Turcomans to return to their homes in
Kirkuk amounts to a policy of internal exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Iraq maintains a dual judicial system: a system of
"Revolutionary" and "special" courts for security offenses, and
a regular court system for all other charges. Civil, criminal,
and religious courts which hear ordinary cases embody many
internationally accepted legal norms. They provide for
investigation by police and then by an inquiry judge who may
refer a case to the courts or dismiss it. Trials are open to
public view, and defendants are entitled to counsel — at
government expense if the defendant is indigent. Charges and
evidence are available for review by the lawyer. Judges try
criminal cases; there are no juries. Convictions may be
appealed to the Court of Appeal and then to the Court of
Cassation, the Supreme Court. There are no Shari'a (Islamic)
courts as such in Iraq; however, family courts administer
Shari'a law according to Iraqi custom.
Security cases are handled by the Revolutionary Courts, which
usually conduct closed trials. Security cases include alleged
espionage and treason as well as other political offenses
(including peaceful dissent), smuggling, currency exchange
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violations, and drug trafficking. The right of defense in such
courts is severely restricted. The "special courts"
constituted by the RCC for specific incidents are also closed.
These special tribunals are exempt from constitutional
safeguards of defendants' rights. Defendants are held
incommunicado, and confessions extracted by torture are
admissible and often serve as the basis for conviction. In
theory, appeals may be taken only to the Chairman of the RCC,
but there are reports of executions shortly after trial.
Political "dissent" encompasses an extremely wide range of
activities in Iraq, and thousands have been imprisoned without
charge or trial, or after trials which do not meet
international standards of fairness. Since public
acknowledgement of arrest or imprisonment is rare, it is
difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners in Iraq.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Iraqi Government's disregard for the right to privacy was
typified by RCC decree 341 in late 1990, which declared that
housing a foreigner for the purpose of concealing him or her
from the authorities was a "crime of espionage" punishable by
death. Constitutional guarantees of the inviolability of the
home were totally disregarded by Iraqi military and security
services in crushing the uprising. Iraq's traditionally broad
definition of "security offenses" was, in effect, extended to
exempt Iraqi authorities in virtually all circumstances from
the legal requirement to obtain a search warrant before
entering a suspect's home.
The security services have been known to take reprisals against
family members of dissidents operating inside or outside the
country. Many Iraqi expatriates have been intimidated or
dissuaded from opposition political activity by threats
against family members who remain in Iraq.
Despite constitutional safeguards for the confidentiality of
mail and telegraphic and telephone correspondence, official
telephone monitoring and censorship of private mail have long
been common practice.
Pervasive networks of informers maintained by the security
services and ABSP serve to deter dissident activity and
instill fear of the regime. The government-controlled public
education system particularly encourages children to inform on
their parents for suspected antiregime activities.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The popular uprising against the Government during March and
April demonstrated both the desire of the Iraqi people to
change their government and the lengths to which the regime
would go to retain power. Republican Guard and regular army
units wrought terrible destruction on population centers in
the north and south with sustained, indiscriminate bombardment
of residential areas by tanks, heavy artillery, and helicopter
gunships .
Civilian casualties were estimated in tens of thousands, with
many attributed to attacks against masses of fleeing refugees
in both the north and the south. International human rights
authorities are investigating reports that hundreds of Kurds
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IRAQ
were rounded up, executed, and buried in mass graves during
the uprising. International human rights groups are also
investigating reports that the Iraqi Government executed
between 100,000 and 300,000 Kurds in a 1988 military campaign
know as Operation Anfal. Victims were reportedly buried in
mass graves in remote areas.
In the south, many sites of unique religious and historical
importance were heavily damaged by Iraqi attacks. In
particular, historic Shi ' a holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala
were heavily damaged by artillery, the ancient Shi ' a cemetery
in Najaf was virtually destroyed, and Shi 'a mosques and
libraries were systematically looted. Thousands of
irreplaceable manuscripts and historical religious texts are
unaccounted for .
The Government's response to periodic renewals of opposition
activity during the year was similarly brutal and
disproportionate. Minor clashes between Kurdish guerrilla
fighters and Iraqi military units in northern Iraq in July and
September led to renewed artillery bombardment of Kirkuk,
Sulaymaniyah, and numerous other towns in the region.
Independent observers reported that Iraqi ground units and
helicopter gunships launched periodic attacks during the
second half of the year against dissident positions in the
southern marshes region, including the city of Nasiriyah.
These military operations are known to have caused thousands
of civilian casualties, although no precise estimate is
available. In addition, after suppressing these uprisings,
the Government took advantage of localized food shortages,
particularly in the south, and diverted food stocks away from
disadvantaged civilians as a tactic to increase its control.
Iraqi government interference with food and fuel shipments
into the north during the latter months of 1991 caused great
hardship.
U.N. authorities and other international observers estimate
that up to half a million Shi ' a remain confined by military
blockade within the area of the southern marshes. Many are
believed to be military deserters or persons who took part in
the uprising.
The Iraqi authorities failed to comply with U.N. Security
Council Resolution 688. Adopted in April, the Resolution
required Iraq to cease repression of civilians and facilitate
international relief efforts in all parts of the country. A
Memorandum of Understanding between the Iraqi Government and
the United Nations on humanitarian relief operations in the
country similarly provided for the establishment of aid
centers throughout the country. Nevertheless, Iraqi
authorities continued to deny relief workers of the U.N. and
international aid organizations the required access to
threatened populations in the southern marshes region and the
northern city of Kirkuk.
In response to shortages of food and medical care in some
areas, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolutions 706 and
712, authorizing a limited sale of Iraqi petroleum to finance
the import of food, medicine, and essential relief supplies
under strict international supervision to ensure equitable
distribution to disadvantaged and vulnerable civilian
populations and guard against diversion to the military. At
the end of the year, Iraqi authorities had not yet accepted
Resolutions 706 and 712, a decision which ensured continued
deterioration of living conditions.
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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedoms of speech and press do not exist in Iraq, and
political dissent in any form is not tolerated. The
Government and the ABSP own all print and broadcast media and
operate them as propaganda outlets for the regime. Opposition
views are not reported, and the Government periodically
attempts to jam news broadcasts from outside Iraq (e.g., the
Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corportation, and
radio stations maintained by Iraqi opposition groups in
neighboring countries) . Some foreign journalists were allowed
to operate in Iraq f jr brief periods during the year, but
government censors strictly limited travel and contact with
the Iraqi people. During the second half of the year, senior
officials repeatedly promised that new laws increasing press
freedom would be forthcoming, but no action was taken.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Iraqi citizens may not assemble or organize for any political
purpose other than to support the regime.
c. Freedom of Religion
While the ABSP has traditionally sought to submerge religious
differences through the promotion of secular nationalism,
affiliation with a religious community remains important for
most Iraqis. The Government closely regulates Islamic affairs
under a 1981 law giving the Ministry of Endowments and
Religious Affairs authority over places of worship,
appointment of clergy, publication of religious literature,
and participation in religious councils and meetings. Sunni
religious leaders function under particularly close official
supervision and are considered salaried government employees.
There are no penalties under Iraqi law for conversion from one
religion to another, although there is a social stigma for
Muslims who convert.
International Shi 'a organizations view the Iraqi regime's
physical assault on ancient Shi ' a holy sites, despoliation of
religious libraries and archives, and detention of religious
leaders as a serious threat to religious freedom and to the
cultural institutions of Shi ' a Islam.
The Government has been less intrusive into the religious
affairs of Iraq's Christians, who number more than 300,000.
Their freedom of worship in churches of established
denominations is legally protected, but they may not
proselytize or hold meetings outside church premises.
The Jewish community has decreased from 150,000 following
World War II to an estimated 150, all in Baghdad, in early
1991. There is no recent evidence of overt persecution of
Jews, but the regime restricts travel (particularly to Israel)
and contacts with Jewish groups abroad. One synagogue in
Baghdad still functions.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Within the country, sensitive border areas and numerous
designated security zones are off-limits to all travelers.
There are police checkpoints on highways and outside major
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towns. Only inspection teams of the International Atomic
Energy Agency and the U.N. Special Commission (charged with
shutting down Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs and
dismantling current stocks of such weapons) are authorized to
travel to any site in Iraq without impediment, as stipulated by
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 699 and 707.
The Government has strictly controlled foreign travel by Iraqi
citizens since the early 1980 's. Overall travel controls were
eased in mid-May, and thousands began leaving Iraq. The
unavailability of commercial air transport due to U.N. economic
sanctions obliged all Iraqi travelers to go overland to Jordan,
where there were more than 100,000 at year's end. There were
numerous reports of Iraqi security personnel in Amman harassing
Iraqi citizens seeking international refugee status or visas
for onward travel.
There is no legal ban on emigration or special restrictions for
members of minority groups, although emigrants often must leave
behind substantial property because of the difficulty of
exporting assets. Currency exchange violations are considered
security offenses, and penalties can be severe. The
traditional requirement that a married woman have the
concurrence of her husband to travel abroad remained in effect.
The largest population movement during the year was the exodus
of more than a million refugees from northern and southern Iraq
due to suppression of the popular rebellion in March and
April. International intervention in the north facilitated the
return during the second half of the year of the vast majority
of those who had fled to Turkey and Iran.
However, the Government barred thousands of Kurds and Turcomans
displaced by the fighting early in the year from returning to
their homes in Kirkuk. Moreover, there are persistent reports
that the Government is attempting to alter the ethnic character
of the city's population by offering incentives to Arab
families from central Iraq to move to the Kirkuk area and
occupy land confiscated from Turcomans and Kurds.
That policy perpetuates the discrimination of past years, in
which mass forced relocations and government demolition of
villages denied hundreds of thousands of Kurdish, Assyrian, and
Turcoman residents of northern Iraq the right to choose their
places of residence. In the aftermath of the uprising many
began to reestablish residence on the sites of villages razed
by the Government over the past decade. Such resettlement
efforts have occurred without government approval, particularly
in the northern and northeastern areas of the country.
In addition, thousands of Iraqis who fled at the time of the
uprising — including about 4,000 Assyrians in Turkey and a much
larger number of Kurdish and Shi 'a refugees in Iran — had not
returned to Iraq as of year's end, owing to fear of government
reprisal .
In late 1990, the Government decided to end financial support
to Iraqi students overseas, resulting in a sharp decline in the
number of young Iraqis leaving for foreign study and financial
hardship for Iraqi students already studying abroad. A 1987
RCC decree, requiring Iraqi students abroad who refused to
return to Iraq to reimburse the Government for all education
received in Iraq or abroad at government expense, remained in
effect. The decree is applicable retroactively to students who
1426
IRAQ
have refused to return since May 16, 1983, when the Government
began requiring employees leaving government jobs before 20
years of service to reimburse the State for the cost of their
education. Amounts due can be recovered by confiscation, and
nonpayment may result in imprisonment. Each student must
provide a guarantor before traveling abroad. The guarantor and
the student's parents may be held liable if the student fails
to return.
Non-Iraqi spouses of Iraqi citizens who have resided in Iraq
for 5 years must take Iraqi nationality or leave Iraq. Many
people have thus been obliged to accept Iraqi citizenship and
become subject to official travel restrictions. In March 1984,
an order by the RCC reduced the residency period before
naturalization to 1 year for the spouses of Iraqi citizens
employed in government offices. The Iraqi spouse faces
penalties for noncompliance, including loss of job, a
substantial financial penalty, and repayment of the costs of
education. Iraq does not recognize the concept of dual
nationality, and many Iraqi "dual nationals," especially the
children of an Iraqi father and a mother of non-Iraqi birth,
have been denied permission to leave Iraq to visit the country
of their other nationality.
Persons of Iraqi nationality with legal residence or
nationality in another country have generally been permitted to
enter and depart freely, although on a number of past occasions
persons who emigrated after 1980 were denied permission to
depart after entering Iraq for temporary visits. Some,
including U.S. citizens, were forcibly conscripted into the
Iraqi armed forces.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Iraqi citizens do not have the right to change their government
peacefully. Full political participation is confined to
members of the ABSP, estimated to nvimber 1 1/2 million, or
about 8 percent of the population. The ABSP governs the
country under the provisional Constitution of 1968, with
legislative and executive authority vested in the RCC. The
National Assembly and the legislative assembly of the Kurdish
Autonomous Region are totally subordinate to the executive.
General elections were last held for the 250-seat National
Assembly in April 1989.
Saddam Hussein wields decisive power over all instruments of
government as President of the Republic, Chairman of the RCC,
and Secretary General of the Regional (i.e., Iraq-wide) Command
of the ABSP. He was unanimously reelected to the latter two
positions during the 10th Congress of the ABSP in September. A
personal relationship with Saddam Hussein is much more
important for political advancement than is ABSP membership or
ideological affiliation, as reflected in the fact that Iraq's
most powerful officials are all members of the President's
family or long-time family allies from his home town of Tikrit.
Along with the ABSP, two small progovernment Kurdish parties
constitute the Patriotic and Progressive National Front (PNF),
essentially a vehicle of support for the Government. The
Communist Party was removed from the PNF and declared illegal
in 1979. ABSP membership is not required for appointment to
senior military or government positions or election to the
National Assembly but is essential to attain political
1427
IRAQ
influence. Members of the military or security services may
engage in political activities only through the ABSP.
Opposition political organizations are illegal and severely
repressed.
In early September the RCC adopted a law nominally authorizing
the creation of political parties other than the ABSP.
Official media trumpeted the measure as a step toward greater
freedom and democracy; in fact, it reinforced the preeminent
position of the ABSP by prohibiting parties based on any
organizing principle other than complete support for Saddam
Hussein and the present Government. New parties can be based
only in Baghdad and are barred from having any ethnic or
religious character, effectively barring natural opposition
constituencies such as the Shi ' a of southern Iraq or the
Assyrian, Turcoman, and Kurdish communities in the north from
forming legal political organizations.
In April the Government entered negotiations with the Kurdish
leadership aimed at political autonomy for the predominantly
Kurdish region of northern Iraq. The talks continued through
the year, but results were inconclusive. Kurdish and other
opposition sources have stated that negotiations became
deadlocked over Kurdish insistence on internal democratic
reforms which the Government rejected.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The one authorized human rights group in Iraq operates under
official control and routinely corroborates official denials of
any violations .
U.N. authorities and human rights organizations sharply
denounced the Government's flagrant record of human rights
abuses in 1991. The U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) in
March called upon Iraq to cease its violations and abide by its
obligations under international covenants on human rights. In
May the UNHRC formally appointed a Special Rapporteur to make a
thorough study of Iraqi violations and report to the 1992 UNHRC
session. Iraqi authorities promised to assist the Special
Rapporteur's investigation but declined to give assurance of
unimpeded access for on-site research in areas of Iraq where
repression was taking place.
An Iraqi report to the UNHRC Human Rights Committee in July
denied any violations in Iraq but failed to address specific
questions on torture, summary and arbitrary executions,
disappearances, minority rights, and past use of chemical
weapons. Later in the month Amnesty International (AI) issued
a formal call for establishment of a permanent human rights
monitoring presence in Iraq. The Government did not respond to
this initiative. The Government also invited AI on April 30 to
visit northern Iraq to assess the situation but subsequently
failed to pursue the visit once AI requested broad access to
government officials and records and to all regions of Iraq, as
well as the ability to interview and medically examine
detainees .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The striking cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity of
Iraqi society is not reflected in the country's political and
1428
IRAQ
economic structure. Sunni Arabs, who constitute only about 12
percent of the country's population (excluding migrant Arab
workers), have effectively controlled Iraq since independence
in 1932. Shi 'a Arabs, who make up nearly 60 percent of the
population and live mainly in the south, have long been
economically, politically, and socially disadvantaged, and the
benefits of a decade of intensive government investment in the
south were obliterated by brutal Iraqi military campaigns
during the uprising.
Iraq's 17-percent Kurdish population has traditionally suffered
extreme political and economic discrimination, despite the
presence of a small number as figureheads in the Iraqi
Government. Kurds serve in the Iraqi military, including the
officer corps, but are excluded from senior command positions.
The small but significant Iraqi Christian community has
traditionally suffered little overt discrimination due to
religious affiliation. Some churches were targeted by Iraqi
forces during the uprising, however, and a number of Christians
who fled to Turkey in the aftermath of the fighting cited both
oppression by Iraqi authorities and discrimination by the
north's Kurdish majority as factors in their decision to remain
in Turkish refugee camps rather than return to an uncertain
future in Iraq.
The use of minority languages is unrestricted. Kurdish is an
official language used by the media and schools in
predominantly Kurdish areas, although the official curriculum
disregards Kurdish history and culture. Turcomans publish in
their dialect of Turkish, and Assyrian Christians often use
Aramaic as well as Arabic. Citizens considered to be of
Iranian origin carry special identification. They are often
precluded from desirable employment.
The ABSP is formally committed to equality for women, who
comprise about 20 percent of the Iraqi work force. Laws have
been enacted to protect women from exploitation in the
workplace and sexual harassment; grant subsidized maternity
leave; permit women to join the regular army. Popular Army, and
police forces; require education for female children; and
equalize women's rights in divorce, land ownership, taxation,
suffrage, and election to the National Assembly. Nevertheless,
married women may still travel abroad only with the permission
of their husbands.
Violence against women, such as wife beating and rape, is known
to occur, but little is known about its extent. Such abuse is
customarily addressed within the tightly knit Iraqi family
structure. There is no public discussion of the subject, and
there are no official statistics. Excessive violence against
women would be grounds for divorce and criminal charges, but
suits brought on these charges in Iraq are believed to be rare.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Trade unions independent of government control do not exist in
Iraq. The trade union organization law of June 2, 1987,
prescribed a single trade union structure for organized labor.
Workers in private and mixed enterprises and in
cooperatives — but not public employees or workers in state
enterprises — have the right to join a local union committee.
The committees form trade unions which in turn are part of
1429
IRAQ
provincial trade union federations. At the top is a single
umbrella organization, the Iraqi General Federation of Trade
Unions, which is organically linked to the Ba ' ath Party and
required to promote party principles and policies among union
members. The General Federation is affiliated with the
International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the
Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions.
Although workers legally have the right to strike after
providing notice to the Labor Ministry, no labor strike has
been reported over the past two decades.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to bargain collectively is not recognized. Salaries
for public sector workers (i.e., the bulk of the employed) are
set by the Government. Wages in the much smaller private
sector are set by employers or negotiated individually with
workers .
The Labor Code does not protect workers from antiunion
discrimination, a failure that has been repeatedly criticized
by the Committee of Experts of the International Labor
Organization (ILO).
There are no export processing zones in Iraq.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Although compulsory labor is prohibited by law, the Popular
Army (ABSP militia) used press-gang methods to draft recruits
during and shortly after the war with Iran and again during
Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.
ILO committees have noted that Iraq's Penal Code allows
punishment of civil servants with imprisonment, including
compulsory prison labor, for breaches of labor discipline,
including resignation from the job.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Employment of children under age 14 is legally forbidden except
in small-scale family enterprises, but children are frequently
encouraged to work as necessary to support the family. The law
stipulates that employees between the ages of 14 and 18 work
fewer hours per week than adults.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The workweek in urban areas is 6 days, 7 to 8 hours per day,
for workers in the private and mixed sectors. These provisions
do not apply to agricultural workers, whose workweek
and workday vary according to individual employer -employee
agreements. Hours for government employees are set by the head
of each ministry.
Occupational safety programs are in effect in state-run
enterprises, and inspectors are supposed to make periodic
inspections of private establishments. Enforcement varies
widely.
1430
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES*
Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a multiparty political
system and free elections. There is no constitution, but a
series of basic laws defines the responsibilities of government
institutions. The legislature (the Knesset) can limit the
government and force its dissolution. Israel has an
independent judiciary. Public debate on issues of concern to
Israelis is open and lively. A vigorous free press scrutinizes
all aspects of Israeli life and politics.
Since Israel's fovinding in 1948, it has been in a formal state
of war with most of its Arab neighbors, except Egypt, with
which it concluded a peace treaty in 1979. As a result of the
1967 war, Israel has occupied the areas of the West Bank, the
Gaza Strip, the eastern sector of Jerusalem, and the Golan
Heights. Israel has experienced numerous terrorist incidents,
within and outside its borders. In this atmosphere of
hostility and threat, Israel has relied heavily on its military
and related services for security and has retained many of the
security-related emergency regulations from the pre independence
British Mandate period.
Internal security is the responsibility of the General Security
Service (GSS, also known as Shin Bet), which is under the
authority of the Prime Minister's office. The police are under
the authority of a separate minister. The Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) — which include a significant portion of the
Israeli adult population in either active duty or reserve
status — also play a role in maintaining internal security. The
IDF is under the authority of a civilian Minister of Defense.
The Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee reviews the
activities of the IDF and the Shin Bet.
Israel has a predominantly market economy with substant 
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